



המכון למדיניות העם היהודי (מיסודה של הסוכנות היהודית לא"י) בע"מ
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Foreword

Stuart Eizenstat and Dennis Ross

It is hard to believe that the JPPI is publishing its 10th annual assessment of the situation and dynamics of the Jewish people. This flagship project began as an effort to create a baseline for establishing the status and well-being of different Jewish communities around the world. Its aim, however, was to use that baseline not just for comparative purposes but to be able to make recommendations for actions that could arrest decline in some communities and promote thriving in others. Each assessment offered judgments about how Israel was doing geopolitically, and where it faced challenges as well as opportunities. The relationship between Israel and the Diaspora, what was happening demographically in both, and the general direction of Jewish identity, all figured prominently in the earlier assessments.

A few years ago the Institute developed an interesting methodology for measuring how Israel and the Jewish world were doing. It sought to measure whether the trends were positive or negative in five dimensions: geopolitics, demography, identity, communal bonds, and resources. Not surprisingly, this year's assessment offers a mixed picture. Some of these are tending toward the slightly negative and some toward the slightly positive. Israeli demographics appear favorable because of higher birthrates and increased potential of Aliyah from Europe—which reflects negative pressures there. Jewish identity, especially in the United States, is tending somewhat negatively because of a weakening sense of “belonging and commitment to the Jewish people” among the younger demographic. Communal bonds are strengthening given stronger commitments to enhanced dialogues.

Geopolitically, the assessment also tends toward a more negative conclusion. We take the analysis that produces this conclusion seriously but also feel that it should be evaluated carefully. Israel faces increasing unknowns in the region. Egypt's future will take a long time to sort out. Whether the election of President Sisi will put Egypt on a more stable footing remains to be seen.

Syria will be a magnet for jihadis worldwide as long as Bashar al Assad is there—and his recent election and the all-out Iranian backing for him makes it likely that he can rule over western Syria for some time to come. The ongoing war in Syria, with its terrible humanitarian consequences, will create new pressures on Jordan and Jordan's stability remains critical to Israel's well-being. It also points to another reality in the region. Hezbollah is reluctant to challenge Israel when it is consumed in Syria—and this proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia—will not end anytime soon.

Recent polling of 18-24 year olds throughout the region, the segment that drove the Arab Awakening three years ago, shows a very different mindset today. There is much

less interest, than a few years ago in promoting regime change and much more interest in employment and their economic betterment.

With so much of the region internally consumed, there are two broad implications to keep in mind. First, Israel is not the preoccupation of most regional actors today. Most Arab leaders have their needs and priorities and the Palestinians are currently not a priority of any in the region. True, the conflict with the Palestinians puts Israel on the defensive internationally, and, as the assessment points out, has an impact on the views of younger Jews toward Israel. But solving this conflict is not a game-changer in the region—and upheaval will be the norm for the foreseeable future.

Second, it is a fact that there is tension today between the American and Israeli positions on Iran and the peace issue and it must be managed. But it is also true that the prospects for a more comprehensive deal with the Iranians are not high—at least in the near term. Will the Obama administration and Israel diverge so clearly if there is no deal? And, just because the current positions may be different on an acceptable deal, is it a given that if an agreement actually materializes, the differences cannot be managed? We are not so sure. Similarly, on the question of Israeli-Palestinian peace, the administration may well see the settlement issue as compounding the effort Secretary Kerry made, but it is neither indifferent to Abu Mazen's having not responded to the principles that were offered to him nor to the reconciliation deal he did with Hamas. At this point, we don't know whether Palestinian elections will actually take place—and if they do, what the American reaction to them is likely to be. If Hamas does not alter any of its positions on recognition and violence, the American posture will be unlikely to differ from Israel's.

When taken with the prospects of continuing upheaval in the region and Israel being one country whose stability can be counted on, the potential for ongoing cooperation between the US and Israel remains strong.

In the past year JPPI has played a significant role in strengthening the Diaspora-Israel dialogue. Minister of Justice Livni launched a legislative effort to strengthen Israel as both a Jewish and democratic state. She asked Dr. Ruth Gavison, a well-respected Israeli professor, to provide expert advice on this ambitious effort, and she, in turn, empowered JPPI to enlist the views of the Jewish Diaspora.

JPPI conducted a remarkable and unprecedented outreach effort in dozens of communities in the United States and Canada, but also in Europe and Latin America. Some 40 different seminars were held, along with questionnaires and analysis of other research. Diaspora Jews do not see a contradiction between Israel as a Jewish state and Israel as a democratic state. They see the two as complementary. As Israel ponders changes to its Basic Laws, it should consider carefully the views of the Diaspora to

assure it does not compromise standards of equality and tolerance, which our study found crucial for Diaspora Jews. World Jewry fully appreciates the difficulties Israel faces in a hostile region with major security threats, but a majority of Diaspora Jews does not see this as a justification for Israel lowering its own principles of democracy and adherence to human rights.

In addition, the Diaspora feels increasingly comfortable with voicing objections to non-security issues relating to the Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, for example, with the monopoly of the Orthodox rabbinate in Israel over issues of marriage, divorce and conversion. Many non-Orthodox Jews feel disenfranchised religiously in the Jewish State they so strongly support. This criticism is often rooted in democratic, pluralistic values, which are essential for Jews in the Diaspora, living as minorities in their country.

At bottom, Diaspora Jews are positive and optimistic about Israel, and see greater attachment of young Jews to Judaism as based, in part, on visits to Israel, such as through the Taglit-Birthright program.

Beginning this year, JPPI's annual assessments will focus deeply on one of the five dimensions described earlier. In 2014 we pay special attention to Jewish identity in the United States, by far the home of the largest Jewish Diaspora community. This largely results from the publication of the Pew Research Center's survey of U.S. Jews, "A Portrait of Jewish Americans," the most important study of American Jewry in a decade, and the first by a major, respected, non-Jewish group. It has engendered great concern and controversy within the Jewish community. Some see it as showing a community in decline while others see reason for optimism in its findings.

According to Pew, there are about 6.7 million American Jews—consisting of 5.3 million adults (both "Jews by religion" and those who consider themselves "Jews not by religion") and 1.3 million children in households with a Jewish adult who are being raised Jewish or partly Jewish. This is far higher than previous demographic studies have indicated.

But the Pew findings should be a wake-up call: the division of the American Jewish enterprise that is disengaging is growing at the expense of the engaged core. While it is a positive development that there over a million more American Jews than previous surveys indicated a decade ago, the birthrates of the Jewish population are at best at simple replacement levels, compared to the more rapidly growing general population.

Further, the growth of a large population that considers themselves "Jews not by religion," with a thin sense of belonging to the Jewish people and little attachment to the State of Israel represents a long-term challenge to the continued influence of American Jewry. While this group is 22% of adult Jews, compared to 78% who consider themselves "Jews by religion," it represents almost a third of the younger group of Jews born after 1980.

The Pew survey should add urgency to the imperative to strengthen the core of engaged Jews, while reaching out to the periphery. For the core, that means emphasizing Jewish education, particularly full-time Jewish Day School education, but also improving after school, synagogue based programs. A major barrier to day schools is the very high cost.

The segment of the Jewish community most deeply engaged in Jewish life must make it a priority to reach out to the part that is drifting away, or the entire Jewish enterprise in the U.S. will be progressively weakened over the course of the 21st century.

At the same time, we must adjust to reality of out-marriage by reaching out to intermarried couples to make them part of the Jewish community. The Jewish communities and State of Israel should allocate a small amount of resources for pilot and experimental programs aimed at rebuilding the Jewish identity of this group.

The 2014 JPPI Annual Assessment also highlights a growing problem: the rise of anti-Semitism in parts of Europe, 70 years after the end of World War II and the Shoah. In the May 24 European Union parliamentary elections, far-right populist and xenophobic political parties made considerable gains. Indeed, the National Front in France won more seats in the European parliament than any other party, surging from 6.3% in 2009 to 24.85% in 2014. Now headed by Marine Le Pen, who has avoided direct anti-Semitic statements, many in the party, including her father Jean-Marie La Pen, the National Front's founder, hold anti-Semitic views.

There is an acute discomfort among the 500,000 Jews in France, the largest in Western Europe. The French Jewish leadership sees unprecedented levels of anti-Semitism, with a combination of the far right, far left, and alienated young Muslim immigrants. They indicate that it is dangerous to wear a kippah on the Paris Metro.

Some 50 to 75% of French Jews envision possible emigration. In the coming years many would move to Israel if their diplomas and professional competencies were recognized in Israel as they are already in the EU, Canada, and Australia.

As always, we are confident that this assessment will spark a wide range of thought. It is our hope that it will also inspire action. We welcome your responses.

Dennis Ross and Stuart Eizenstat

Suggested Policy Directions, 2013-2014

The War against De-legitimization

It is recommended that the Government adopt and implement a comprehensive strategy for the war against the international phenomenon of de-legitimization of Israel, in the spirit of the plan that was developed under the leadership of the Ministry of Strategic Affairs and of the recommendations made by the Jewish People Policy Institute. The Government should allocate funding at the level required to strengthen the tools and frameworks necessary for the plan's implementation, and in order to enhance inter-ministry cooperation, with an emphasis on the Foreign Ministry while involving Diaspora organizations in its execution.

Explanation:

The threat of de-legitimization is of strategic significance for Israel – one that is no less serious than the physical threats the country faces – and human and budgetary resources should be invested accordingly in response to it. Given the severity of the threat, and in comparison to the readiness in the face of other threats, it is important to strengthen the effort and to allocate the funding necessary to do so.

About a year ago, during the presentation of JPPI's Annual Assessment, the Government resolved to assign primary responsibility for handling the phenomenon to the Minister for Strategic Affairs, and his ministry established a dedicated staff and developed a strategic action plan consistent with the conclusions of JPPI's de-legitimization project.

According to these conclusions and plans, the effort at this stage should concentrate – with Foreign Ministry involvement – on certain Western European countries that constitute a dangerous international incubator for the phenomenon and whose governments even provide, directly or indirectly, millions of dollars in funding de-legitimization organizations. This funding helps to bring the phenomenon to other countries, including the United States; at the same time, ties should be expanded with non-Western international actors who are not tainted by classic anti-Semitism (China, India, and Japan); a focused campaign should be waged using sophisticated tools (not necessarily those of the government), including media and legal means, in order to expose the de-legitimizers' true intentions and to place the main perpetrators on the defensive; Israel's "other face" should be presented to international public opinion; and significant international networks should be developed for the war against de-legitimization that include non-Jewish and liberal players while also running a campaign in the cyber arena.

In light of the above, the budget necessary for these activities should be increased substantially.

Israel-Diaspora Relations

Examining the Parameters for Advancing Israel-Diaspora Dialogue

JPPI recommends deepening and institutionalizing a permanent Jewish people dialogue mechanism for coordination on Israeli decisions that affect the Diaspora and on decisions taken in the Jewish world that affect Israel. In this regard, and pursuant to the broad consultative project that the Institute held this year on the Jewish world's views about Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, during the coming year, the Institute will hold another round of seminars in communities around the world as well as an annual conference of leaders from Jewish organizations, communities, and academia.

The discussions will focus on the main issues and challenges by relating to the five dimensions critical to the Jewish people's thriving: geopolitics, identity and identification, inter-community bonds, resources, and demography. Particular attention will be given to ensure pluralistic settings, the involvement of the younger generation and new initiators in the field, and appropriate gender representation.

At the conclusion of the process, the Institute will submit a report to the government and to Jewish leadership around the world, including detailed recommendations on strengthening and updating the consultative mechanism, and on the main parameters that should be focused upon.

Explanation:

Development of a dialogue mechanism is necessary in order to:

1. Preserve the unity of the Jewish people in an age of "free choice" in which the possibility of building and adopting other identities is widely available.
2. Ensure participation of the next generation in Jewish life and in contributing to the community.
3. Strengthen and develop Israel's character as a Jewish and democratic state and as the core state of the Jewish people.
4. Advance Israel-Diaspora relations and those between communities around the world in a way that cultivates and preserves the value of shared responsibility as expressed in the saying: "All Jews are responsible for one another."
5. Ensure systematic consideration of the implications that decisions made in Israel have for the Jewish people.

6. Deepen the common dialogue on issues fundamental to the Jewish people.
7. Improve coordination on policy decisions with Jewish organizations that focus on the matter in question.
8. Maximize the mobilization of Diaspora Jewry in the struggle against the phenomenon of de-legitimizing Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people.
9. Deal with issues that "fall through the cracks" or that are addressed in a duplicative or uncoordinated manner.

The following conditions are necessary for establishing this forum:

1. Ensuring that the topics under discussion are critical to the Jewish people.
2. Developing a dialogue that will not deepen disagreements within the Jewish people or the divides within Israel.
3. Avoidance of causing damage externally, for example by intensifying anti-Jewish perceptions of a "Jewish conspiracy," dual loyalty, etc.

The Non-Orthodox Streams

JPPI recommends that the State of Israel enhance the status, the role, and the level of official participation of the non-Orthodox Jewish streams (including secular streams) in the religious life of the state, in order to strengthen and underscore their pluralistic character, including the egalitarian. At the same time, initiatives must take into account existing Israeli perspectives and institutions that provide religion with a public role, and to involve them in the proposals brought up for discussion.

Explanation:

The Orthodox rabbinate's monopoly on matters relating to ritual and personal status are an impediment to Diaspora communities' identification with the State of Israel, an impediment whose severity has been intensifying in recent years. In order to enhance the Diaspora's identification with Israel, this monopoly should be ended. At the same time, it should be recognized that religion is part of the Jewish national collective identity (as it is in other nation states), and many in Israel and overseas – not all of whom are necessarily religious – consider public and state religious expression as part of the State of Israel's Jewish character.

Demography

Increasing Aliyah from Europe

JPPI recommends that an administration be established within the Prime Minister's Office that will be responsible for advancing Aliyah from Western Europe in general and from France and Belgium in particular. The administration will focus the efforts of the various national and government bodies charged with Aliyah promotion, the Aliyah process, and immigrant absorption. It will deal with coordinating and managing all matters related to the Western European Aliyah continuum under a single integrated umbrella, with a single information system and a computerized information-management system, and by redefining the Aliyah and absorption continuum.

Intensive efforts are required in the two main areas that constitute key impediments to tens of thousands who have expressed great interest in making Aliyah to Israel and/or in migrating in general:

A committee should be established immediately and charged with the removal of impediments and with increasing the pace of Aliyah from France and Belgium. It will deal, among other things, with matters related to education, military service and ties to the IDF, academic and student affairs, employment, professional licensing and recognition of professional degrees, promoting the relocation of businesses, and investments. The committee's membership should include the directors general of the Ministry of Aliyah and Immigrant Absorption, the Ministry of Jerusalem and Diaspora Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economy, the Jewish Agency for Israel, and the World Zionist Organization, and should be chaired by the director general of the Prime Minister's Office.

Actions should be taken to promote Aliyah through cooperation with the Jewish Agency for Israel and the World Zionist Organization and to provide information in every possible way, including through active marketing to increase and renew programs to expose various target audiences to Israel, and through activities in smaller and more distant communities.

Explanation:

Although there has been a consistent increase in the number of olim arriving from France over the past 15 months, it still falls far short of the potential given the new reality in Europe. It is likely that focused efforts to provide solutions for the tens of thousands of Jews who have expressed interest in making Aliyah immediately will lead to the development of a dynamic of mass Aliyah of tens of thousands, or even more, from France.

Various indicators point to push factors leading to an increase in Jewish migration from France and Belgium to other countries. Along with the economic recession and the

growing strength of the extreme right in Europe, and pull factors related to Israel's stable economy, another element has recently been added: the fear for the safety of European Jews in light of the expected return home of hundreds of European jihadist fighters trained in Syria and Iraq.

For a variety of reasons, most of which can be mitigated, Israel is not necessarily the preferred destination for these migrants. Turning the wave of emigration from France and Belgium into Aliyah to Israel requires targeted and focused action in cooperation with the relevant communities.

The French Jewish community is the largest in Western Europe, and for a variety of reasons it is also the community ripest for emigration. Various surveys indicate that an overwhelming majority of Jews do not have faith in the French government's ability to defend their institutions and are considering emigration. Therefore, this community has been selected as the focus of a pilot initiative of cooperation between government ministries and the national organizations.

Selected Indicators of World Jewry 2013-2014

Country	Jewish Population Core Definition			GDP per capita, PPP US \$	Index Of Human Development – World Rank	Recent Out- marriage Rate (%)	Aliyah	Number of Jewish Legislature Members / Seats In Legislature
	1970 ^a	2013 ^b	Projected 2020 ^c					
World	12,633,000	14,626,200 ^w	13,827,000	-	-	-	2013 ^e 16,882 ^f	2011-2012 ^g -
Israel	2,582,000	6,102,900 ^g	6,543,000 ⁱ	34,770	16	5	-	108/120 ^t
North America	5,686,000	6,499,500 ^w	5,581,000	-	-	-	2,413	-
United States	5,400,000	5,425,000- 6,814,000 ^y	5,350,000 ⁿ	53,101	3	>50	2,185	33/535 ^s
Canada	286,000	380,000	381,000	43,472	11	15-24.9	228	8/413 ^t
Latin America	514,000	384,900	364,000	-	-	-	921	-
Argentina	282,000	181,500	162,000 ⁱ	18,749	45	25-34.9	255	11/329 ^u
Brazil	90,000	95,200	90,000 ⁱ	12,221	85	25-34.9	169	8/594
Mexico	35,000	40,000	42,000	15,563	61	1-4.9	-	-
Other countries	107,000	68,200	70,000 ⁱ	-	-	15-95	-	-
Europe non-FSU	1,331,000	1,134,400	1,070,000	-	-	-	4,288	-
France	530,000	478,000	482,000	35,784	20	25-34.9	2,903	13/925 ^u
United Kingdom	390,000	290,000	278,000 ⁱ	37,307	26	26 ^v	403	89/1438

Germany	30,000	118,000	108,000	40,007	5	45-54.9	79	2/691 ^u
Romania	-	9,400	-	13,396	56	-	41	3/588 ^u
Bulgaria	-	2,000	-	14,499	57	-	15	2/240 ^u
Hungary	70,000	48,000	34,000	20,065	37	60	148	7/386
Other EU ^j	171,000	160,300	134,000	-	-	33-75	-	-
Other non-EU ^k	140,000	28,700	34,000	-	-	50-80	-	-
FSU	2,151,000	289,900	173,000	-	-	-	7,266	-
Russia	808,000	190,000	130,000 ⁱ	17,884	55	80	4,026 ^p	4/616 ^u
Ukraine	777,000	65,000	25,000 ⁱ	7,423	78	80	1,917 ^p	7/450 ^u
Rest FSU Europe ^l	312,000	15,300	15,000 ⁱ	-	-	65-75	584	-
FSU Asia	254,000	19,600	3,000	-	-	50-75	739	-
Asia (rest)^m	104,000	19,800	21,000	-	-	-	281	-
Africa	195,000	74,700	60,000	-	-	-	1,562	-
Ethiopia	-	100	-	1,366	173	-	1,355	-
South Africa	118,000	70,000	57,000	11,259	121	15-24.9	161	-
Morocco	-	2,400	-	5,456	130	-	-	-
Other countries	-	2,200	-	-	-	-	-	-
Oceania	70,000	120,100	105,000 ⁱ	-	-	-	149	-
Australia		112,500	97,000 ⁱ	43,073	2	15-24.9	-	3/226
New Zealand	5,000	7,500	8,000 ⁱ	30,493	6	15-24.9	-	1/120 ^u

- a. Source: Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics, The A. Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
- b. Source (except where stated otherwise): DellaPergola, Sergio, (2013), "World Jewish Population, 2013," in Arnold Dashefsky and Ira M. Sheskin. (Editors), **The American Jewish Year Book**, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 279-358.
- c. Source: DellaPergola, Sergio, (2011), **Jewish Demographic Policies: Population Trends and Options in Israel and in the Diaspora**, The Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI), pp. 66-67.
- d. A measure of a country's development based on health, educational attainment, and real income. Source: Human Development Report 2013- The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World, **United Nations Development Programme** (UNDP).
- e. Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract Of Israel 2014/1. The data on continents are not sums of mentioned countries but of general Aliyah figures from the continent.
- f. Including country not specified.
- g. Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract Of Israel 2014/1. The population is defined on the basis of the permanent (de jure) population, and consists of permanent residents - Israeli citizens and permanent residents without Israeli citizenship (including those who had been out of the country less than one year at the time of the estimate). The data here are according to segmentation of the population by religion and refer only to the number of Jewish residents.
- h. Based on adjusted response from NJPS 2001.
- i. Revised population projections for 2020.
- j. Without Baltic States.
- k. Including Turkey.
- l. Without Baltic States.
- m. Without Israel, FSU and Turkey.
- n. Forecast based on the low estimate of the Jewish population of the United States, 5.42 million, according to Sergio DellaPergola (2013) **How Many Jews in the United States? The Demographic Perspective**. Contemporary Jewry 33, 15–42
- o. Source: Website for the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook for 2013. Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP), per capita (international coin).
- p. Source: Press release by Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 29/04/2013 - Immigration to Israel in 2013.
- q. Number of self-identified Jewish members of parliament according to the World Jewish Congress dated June 2011, except where stated otherwise.
- r. Source: http://www.knesset.gov.il/mk/heb/Individual_find.asp
- s. Source: The Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion & Public Life (2012) Faith on the Hill: The Religious Composition of the 113th Congress. <http://www.pewforum.org/Government/Faith-on-the-Hill--The-Religious-Composition-of-the-113th-Congress.aspx>
- t. Source: The Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs, Canada.
- u. Data for previous parliament.
- v. The range of data is based on conflicting numbers from three studies: 1. Pew Research Center, A Portrait of Jewish Americans, 2013; 2. Brandeis University,

- American Jewish Population Estimates: 2012; 3) World Jewish Population, 2013. See footnote b.
- w. Based on the median point in the range of assessments of the number of Jews in the United States.
 - x. DellaPergola, Sergio, (2013), "World Jewish Population, 2012," in Arnold Dashefsky and Ira M. Sheskin. (Editors), *The American Jewish Year Book*, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 213-283.
 - y. Institute for Jewish Policy Research, *Jews in the United Kingdom in 2013*

2013-2014 Integrated 'Net' Assessment

As previously, JPPI has focused on five key dimensions: **Geopolitics**, **Demography**, **Identity** formation and expression, **Bonds** within and between communities, and **Material Resources**.¹ Some of the reasoning behind this selection is as follows:

- **Geopolitics:** What is the 'net' power of the Jewish people in comparison to the threats it faces?
- **Demography:** Numbers matter for sustaining communities and culture, generating political power, fostering in-marriage, and maintaining excellence in education.
- **Identity Formation and Expression:** The degree of active pursuit by individuals of the various forms for affirming identification with the Jewish collectivity determines much of the trajectory of Jewish people interests in modern times.
- **Bonds Within and Between and Communities:** This dimension examines the nature of the fundamental bonds between Israel and other Jewish communities as well as the state of bonds within these communities themselves.
- **Material Resources:** This dimension examines wealth accumulation and its availability for Jewish causes, Jewish involvement in science and technology as key sources of future economic power, and economic growth in Israel.

¹JPPI's Annual Assessment for 2011-2012 provides a more detailed discussion of the methodology behind both the short-term net assessments and the longer-term trends and scenarios ("Integrated 'Net' Assessment," in Annual Assessment 2011-2012.)

Geopolitics

2014 – A Strategic Crossroads

Israel, in the second half of 2014, will likely face a series of strategic crossroads. The two issues presenting the greatest challenges are the ultimate disposition of Iran's nuclear program and new Israeli-Palestinian developments in the wake of the exhausted negotiation process led by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry. Both issues may place additional stress on the triangular relationship: Israel, the United States, and the American Jewish community. The interim agreement with Iran, and the permanent settlement talks with Teheran currently underway in Vienna have provoked harsh responses from Israel. At the same time, diplomatic negotiations with the Palestinians, which expired without result when their April 30, 2014 deadline passed, leave Israel with potentially problematic alternative scenarios. The coming months, therefore, may bring new tensions between Washington and Jerusalem that may trouble American Jewry and could strain the "triangle," a cornerstone of Israel's and the Jewish people's power. The main issues – efforts to halt Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapon, and the failed attempt to reach a breakthrough toward an Israeli-Palestinian agreement – arise within stormy global and regional contexts. Replete with uncertainties and dilemmas highly relevant to Israel's standing, both issues test Jerusalem's decision makers and the triangle's strength.

The "world order," which prevailed during the Cold War and was then supplanted by years of American dominance following the Soviet Union's collapse, has made way for "world dis-order" yet to coalesce into a stable and functioning system. Alongside the rise of China and the increasingly vexing geopolitical challenge Moscow still poses to Washington, the erosion of the international standing of the United States continues. Home to almost half the Jewish people who live there in unprecedented prosperity, U.S. friendship and support are critically important for Israel. Israel will be greatly affected not only by changes in the quality of its relationship with Washington, but also by a change in U.S. global standing. The perception taking root, that the United States – Israel's ally – is in the process of decline and of abandoning the Middle East, erodes Israel's deterrence capacity and the power associated with it.

The optimism many expressed at the beginning of the recent regional developments has given way to disappointment and concern. There is growing doubt that the movement that toppled autocratic rulers is also capable of bringing political cohesion and liberal reform to societies that lack a democratic culture and laden with poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, tribalism, social divides, radical Islam, the oppression of women, corrupt regimes, discrimination against minorities, poor education systems, backward economies, and a weakened middle class.

From Israel's perspective, anchors that had provided relative strategic stability over the years have weakened: Mubarak's overthrow and the undermining of Egypt's general governability and in Sinai in particular; the deep crisis in relations with Turkey, which seem unlikely to return to previous levels; Syria's de facto breakup; threats to the monarchy in Jordan; anticipated changes in Saudi leadership; and Iraq's difficulty in maintaining unity and quelling internal terror. Israel faces a regional situation in which it is increasingly difficult to deal with weakened governments that are no longer the real "address" for what takes place in their sovereign territory and in which problematic non-state actors are strengthening at their expense.

Some of the threats facing Israel are camouflaged by developments that would seem to indicate an improvement in its strategic stature: the Arab countries are preoccupied with internal and economic challenges that jeopardize their stability; a conventional war against Israel does not appear likely; the Syrian army has been seriously worn down and is busy fighting a civil war; the Iran-Damascus-Hezbollah axis is strained; political Islam has lost status and luster, and has been removed from power in Egypt; Hamas has lost its base in Syria, and after the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood government is regarded by Egypt's rulers as an enemy; Hezbollah's standing has been hit as a result of its active fighting in Syria in alliance with the hated Assad; and the Arab world as a whole is bedeviled by a violent internal Sunni-Shiite conflict. At the same time, the peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt remain in place; relations with Turkey are no longer at a low ebb; development of the natural gas fields, which will turn Israel into an energy exporter, continues successfully; and regional players are seeking a connection with Israel in the face of the threats of the Iranian axis.

Yet these facts, encouraging as they may be, cannot stifle deeper negative trends or change the reality that Israel is located in the heart of a violent and unstable region.

The negotiations with Iran expose the significant disagreement between the United States and Israel over their ultimate goal. While Israel is categorically opposed to any agreement that would leave Iran with an independent capacity to enrich uranium, most commentators believe that the United States and the West will come to terms with a permanent agreement that leaves Iran with a nuclear capability, including uranium enrichment on its soil. The main U.S. intention is to ensure that Iran will not have the break out capability to quickly to produce a nuclear bomb. This goal is not satisfactory to the Israeli government.

The failure to reach a permanent agreement within the set time frame (July 20, 2014) would not necessarily mean the end of efforts to reach a diplomatic settlement with Iran. Israel is likely to either find itself facing a reality in which the interim agreement is extended again and again, or, alternatively, may find itself with an unsatisfactory permanent agreement. Jerusalem would be left facing some difficult dilemmas: whether to attack Iran's nuclear facilities independently, contrary to Washington's position, or

risk a new regional reality in which a country ruled by zealous religious leaders who declare that Israel has no right to exist and must be wiped off the map has a doomsday weapon; or come to terms with a situation in which Iran dramatically increases its subversive capability and progresses toward regional hegemony while other Mid-East countries respond by joining the nuclear arms race. Alternatively, Israel must weigh whether an attack on Iran nuclear facilities will have lasting results, that in addition to damaging relations with the United States the security situation will deteriorate over the long term and open fronts that include Diaspora Jews who are also likely to be seen as legitimate targets for Iranian retaliation.

The Palestinian issue may also intensify disagreement with the United States. According to the Americans, both sides contributed to the failure of Secretary Kerry's efforts: Israel in not fulfilling its commitment to release the fourth group of prisoners (March 30, 2013) and in reissuing the construction tender for 708 housing units in the Gilo neighborhood of Jerusalem (April 1, 2014); and the Palestinians in their decision to submit membership requests to 15 international conventions (April 2, 2014), and in signing a Fatah-Hamas reconciliation agreement (April 23, 2014). Alongside American criticism of the parties, Martin Indyk, Kerry's representative during the negotiations, also praised their readiness to compromise on significant issues. At the same time, the Americans admit that Abu Mazen "shut down" at a certain point and provoked their anger when he did not respond to the bridging formulas intended to allow the completion of the paper of principles presented to him by Secretary Kerry (February 19, 2014) and by President Obama (March 17, 2014). The reconciliation agreement with Hamas was portrayed as an additional important indication that the Palestinian leader had lost interest in talks with Israel. This agreement prompted an Israeli decision to suspend the negotiations, which – according to senior Israeli officials – were close to reaching a formula (which included the release of Jonathan Pollard) that would have allowed negotiations to continue. In accordance with the reconciliation agreement, a technocratic government headed by Abu Mazen and with a mutually agreed upon membership has been formed. This government is supposed to pave the way for presidential and legislative elections and for updating PLO institutions. Abu Mazen has made it clear that the new government would recognize Israel and condemn terrorism, and even that he himself would be authorized to continue conducting peace talks with Israel. Still, Israel demands that Hamas accept the Quartet's conditions as a party to the agreement that provides the authority on which the government is being established. Reactions to the reconciliation agreement in the West were mild compared to Israel's harsh response. The European Union pointed out the opportunity implicit in the Palestinians' coming to talks with Israel as a unified body that enjoys public legitimacy. Similar views were heard in the American administration, although the official U.S. line remained critical of the reconciliation move and President Obama called it "unhelpful."

The broader the PLO-Hamas agreement's implementation, the wider the gulf between Israel and the Palestinians will become and the greater the danger of escalation between the sides will be. The United States' inclination now is to lower the profile of its involvement and to let the sides "stew in their own juice." At the same time, Ambassador Indyk has rejected the possibility that the United States will abandon attempts to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. One initiative the administration may take at the end of the "time-out" period is the publication of the American paper detailing principles for a permanent settlement. The intention would be to challenge the sides and invite them to renew negotiations on the basis of the paper.

If attempts to resuscitate the talks are unsuccessful, the Palestinians may carry out its threats to launch a diplomatic-legal campaign against Israel in the international arena, and to strive to supplant the "direct talks under American mediation" model with an alternative – "a quasi-imposed settlement under multinational sponsorship." To increase pressure on Israel, the Palestinians may even – in an extreme case – announce the dismantling of the Palestinian Authority with the aim of handing back responsibility for the West Bank to Israel and demanding a "one state for two peoples" solution (even though Abu Mazen himself recently stated that he will not dismantle the PA and that he prefers the two-state solution).

A diplomatic-legal confrontation resulting from the talks' failure could eventually lead to a deterioration of the security situation and perhaps even to a third intifada, not necessarily of the same character as the previous two. In light of the failure of the talks, Israel could also find itself facing an intensifying de-legitimization campaign of, sanctions and boycotts. Senior EU officials have also warned that the failure of the peace talks could have implications for the continuation of EU aid funds to the Palestinian Authority. In their words, the EU finds itself "funding the Israeli occupation" and is bearing costs that are supposed to be borne by the occupying state under international law.

Tensions between Washington and Jerusalem do not skip over U.S. Jewry. Critical comments about Israel (especially Kerry's use of the phrase "apartheid state" have drawn outraged condemnation from Jewish spokesman in the United States, but they also cause discomfort as American Jews increasingly find themselves between a rock and a hard place. U.S. Jewry is therefore likely to be challenged more stringently as gaps between the Israeli and American positions become wider. The more Israel presses to "mobilize" American Jews behind the effort, and the more Israel operates in the administration's political back yard, especially if it is perceived as favoring Republicans, the more difficult the situation may become. Such a reality could discomfit the American Jewish community and make intra-Jewish divisions highly conspicuous, especially given claims that Israel and the Jewish lobby have undue influence on American foreign policy in the Middle East that conflicts with the United States' own interests.

These two pressing issues – Iran and the peace process – so critical to both Israel and the strength of the Jerusalem-Washington-U.S. Jewry relationship triangle, are replete with uncertainty. But this extreme uncertainty, which unfortunately characterizes the entirety of Israel's strategic situation, does not relieve Jerusalem of the need to make weighty decisions.

Political Perspectives

The Triangular Relationship: Washington, Jerusalem, and the U.S. Jewish Community

Although it appeared that tensions between the United States and Israel were easing to some degree in the first half of 2013, 2014 has brought a crisis in the relationship. This may presage a new period of serious challenges that are likely to present the U.S. Jewish community with difficult dilemmas. This is so, even though continued security cooperation between the two countries has not, at this point, been damaged. In fact, according to government sources in Jerusalem and Washington, the alliance has deepened, reaching unprecedented levels.

What explains this duality? Certainly, the continuation and deepening of the security relationship is rooted in American regional interests, against the backdrop of Middle East instability where Arab regimes, long considered by the U.S. as secure regional anchors, are under threat. Furthermore, President Obama is inclined to accept the position of his supporters in the Jewish community, and especially of those close to him in Chicago, that diplomatic disagreements with Israel must not be allowed to affect its security strength and power, which guarantee its survival in a hostile region. The political price is another component: There is an assessment among those around Obama that weakening the security relationship would be unacceptable to Congress and the American public.

On the other hand, the president and his inner circle believe that continued Israeli control over the West Bank and its implications for the Palestinian people constitute a colonialist policy that is unacceptable for a democratic state that considers itself part of the West. Some in the administration are beginning to consider Israel more a liability than an asset. These views lead to a less than friendly diplomatic approach toward Israel, which, in the relationship equation with the Palestinians, is perceived as the stronger, occupying party.

Concern and Disappointment in Israel

A few months after President Obama's March 2013 visit to Israel, his charm wore off with the Israeli people, and suspicion of his administration's Mid-East policy reawakened. A survey published by the Israel Democracy Institute in March 2014, found that 66 percent of Israeli Jews and 53 percent of Israeli Arabs do not believe that Secretary of State John Kerry adequately takes Israel's security needs into account. The change in Israeli public opinion derives from disappointment on seven levels:

- A. Problematic U.S. diplomatic conduct toward Syria, Egypt, and Russia, which along with other factors, signals perceptions of weakness and a desire to depart from the Middle East;
- B. The failure of the American effort to move the peace process forward and the feeling that the White House tends to direct most of its criticism at Israel, while minimizing criticism of the Palestinians and downplaying their responsibility for their own mistakes;
- C. U.S. engagement with the Fatah-Hamas technocratic unity government, and the administration's readiness to continue providing it with aid, even though Hamas has not moderated its positions and continues to maintain its own military force in Gaza;
- D. Speculation that the U.S administration is prepared to espouse a compromise approach to the Iranian nuclear threat – at Israel's expense;
- E. The evaporation of the positive atmosphere toward the Obama administration created by the President's visit to Israel, and the missed opportunity to improve the personal relationship between the President and Prime Minister Netanyahu;
- F. Reports in the American media critical of Israel not only for its part in the failure of the diplomatic process, but also for a series of apparent Israeli attempts to damage American interests and to engage in espionage on U.S. soil.
- G. Concern that if the tension intensifies the U.S. administration may withhold support for Israel on the international scene, which would contribute to its isolation and a deepening of de-legitimization efforts against it.

U.S. Suspicion of Israeli Conduct

At the same time as questions were being raised in Israel about President Obama, serious suspicions within the administration about the Israeli government has also contributed to the lack of confidence between the two governments, for the following reasons:

- A. There is anxiety regarding both the hardening of Israel's positions and the increasing right-wing turn in Israeli public opinion;
- B. The increase in comments by Israeli leaders who are members of the coalition about the intention to annex territories in Judea and Samaria (mainly in the settlement blocs) unilaterally;
- C. There is disapproval in the U.S. administration of Israeli interference in domestic U.S. politics;
- D. Continued building and issuance of construction tenders for new housing units in West Bank settlements and in East Jerusalem;
- E. Perceptions in President Obama's inner circle and in the Democratic Party, about Israeli interference in the 2012 election;
- F. Harsh comments by ministers and by coalition Knesset members about Secretary Kerry and members of the American peace team.

The American administration's frustration was expressed in reports – both in the United States and in Israel – that accompanied the failure of the talks with the Palestinians. The major blame was placed on Israel's refusal to freeze settlement construction and on the issuance of a slew of plans and new construction tenders during the negotiations. The feeling in Israel was that the administration was excessively forgiving of what was referred to as "Abu Mazen's running away from making decisions." The Americans replied by saying: "Abu Mazen did not run away from making decisions. He was 'locked in' because of the continuation of construction in the territories."

Direct talks with Iran have also contributed to recent tensions. The Israeli government's trust in the readiness of the United States to live up to its commitment to stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, which is considered an existential threat to Israel, has eroded. The main concern is that U.S. policy will enable Iran to establish itself as a nuclear threshold state, and is exacerbated by what Israel regards as signaled U.S. weakness vis-a-vis Syria, Egypt, and Russia.

President Obama's May 2014 West Point commencement address was also interpreted by some Israelis as a sign of American hesitance: "Since World War II, some of our most costly mistakes came not from our restraint but from our willingness to rush into military adventures without thinking through the consequences..."

The Israeli Paradox

From the outside, it is difficult to understand the apparent paradox that characterizes Israeli life. On one hand – the pervasive feeling that Iran's nuclear ambitions pose an existential threat, the demographic reality and the concern that it could become a bi-national state, instability in the Middle East, and the de-legitimization campaign waged against it around the world; and on the other hand – the Israeli public's optimism, its high birthrate, economic stability, high-rise construction in Tel Aviv and soaring property values. International surveys (such as the 2013 World Happiness Report published by UNSDSN, which relied on Gallup World Poll data and findings of the OECD and ranked Israel 11th out of 156 countries), show Israel high in quality of life indices. In this regard, two key parameters should be noted as far as Israel is concerned: Mutual responsibility-social cohesion; and the health indices.

The Jewish Community: "Between a Rock and a Hard Place."

A crisis in the relationship between Israel and the United States could put the Jewish community in a problematic position. American Jewry has felt comfortable when there has been a convergence of interests between their government and Israel's in combination with the moral and democratic values both countries hold. When one of the two pieces of the equation weakens, some U.S. Jews feel they are between a rock

and a hard place, pressed between their total loyalty to their country, the United States, and the expectation of support for their sister Jewish community in Israel.

Damage can today be detected on both levels. A situation in which Israel and the United States have different policy approaches toward Iran and in which the peace talks with the Arabs and particularly with the Palestinians has reached a dead end, increases these feelings, particularly if they are portrayed by the administration as contrary to American interests.

Further – and as reflected in a JPPI project conducted this year on Diaspora Jews' approach to the question of Israel's character as a Jewish and democratic state – the sense of alienation from Israel is deepening in parts of the Jewish community. Among the most frequently cited reasons are Israel's lack of openness to different streams of Judaism, and perceived discrimination against its Arab minority.

Critical articles and reports about Israel alleging harm to vital United States interests, such as charges of Israeli espionage, arouse concern in certain quarters within the community over the emergence of anti-Jewish sentiment among portions of the American general public.

Distancing is not yet a sweeping phenomenon, yet there are increasing signs of internal division in North American Jewry over Israel, particularly among younger Jews. In the past year, this phenomenon could be seen in Jewish campus activity and at community events, as well as in disagreements that arose over the participation of representatives of Jewish organizations critical of Israeli policies in New York's annual Celebrate Israel Parade.

Another issue that should be followed involves the relative erosion in the political representation of Jews in the United States. In the past six years, the number of Jews in the House of Representatives has dropped from 33 to 22, and in the Senate from 13 to 11. While the Jewish community still enjoys a comparative advantage in its political representation and while there may be some correlation between these numbers and a decline in the strength of the Democratic Party, for which a majority of Jews have traditionally voted, it is possible nevertheless that this phenomenon also reflects a weaker inclination among younger Jews to seek political or public service careers.

These phenomena require a response, both from the Israeli and American communities. The Israeli government and its friends in the United States must make a concerted effort to maintain the special relationship between the two countries. Israel must, for its part, develop a more hospitable policy toward the various Jewish streams and show greater understanding of the expectation among the younger generation that it be a paragon of morality and values by ensuring minority rights, in order to enable them to identify with Israel more strongly. And at the same time, the American Jewish community must encourage the development of talent and commitment

among the younger generation who will take responsibility for the future, not only within the Jewish leadership and the economy but also in politics, government, and academia.

We are moving the geopolitics gauge in a slightly negative direction this year in light of adverse changes in Israel's geopolitical situation, the main factors are: The collapse of the political process and the danger of political and security deterioration; the continuation of Iran's nuclear process, even today; the impacts of the Iranian issue and the reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas on Israel's isolation; tensions in Israel's relationship with the United States and its spillover into the triangular relationship between Washington, Jerusalem, and the U.S. Jewish community; erosion of U.S. stature in the region and in the international arena and the negative impact it has on Israel's international image and deterrence capabilities; the strengthening of delegitimization phenomenon against Israel; regional instability and the weakening of anchors that have provided stability in the past; and the strengthening of jihadist terror groups at the expense of centralized and stable government authorities, which could be an "address" from the point of view of Israel's foreign affairs.

We made only a limited change in the geopolitics gauge in light of other developments that could contribute to the Israeli strategic position: The Arab states are preoccupied with irritating domestic and economic problems, so a decision to go to war with Israel seems an unlikely scenario; the Syrian army has been worn down by the civil war there; Syria's disarmament of most of its chemical weapons, and the Tehran-Damascus-Hezbollah axis is threatened; political Islam has lost much of its stature and luster and was ousted from the Egyptian government; Hamas has lost its base in Syria, and following the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood government it became an enemy in the eyes of Egypt's leadership; Hezbollah's clout has declined in light of its military alliance with Assad's forces; Israel's peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan remain in force; Israel's relationship with Turkey is no longer at its lowest ebb; continued development of Israel's natural gas fields and opportunities they open with regional elements who also align with Israel on the Iran issue.

Demography

How Many Jews are in the United States?

In the past year, a number of important studies have been published (among them, the Pew report and an important demographic study of American Jews by researchers at Brandeis University) that show that the number of Jews in the United States is higher than that presented in many other studies from the past 10-20 years. At the same time, demographer Prof. Sergio DellaPergola continues to publish his studies in the American Jewish Yearbook in which he claims that the Jewish population in Israel is higher than that of the United States.

These significant differences between the various studies, which amount to about a million U.S. Jews, could be due to several reasons: 1. Definition: the studies do not agree with each other on the definition of "Who is a Jew" and whom to include in the count. Choosing a narrow definition leads to lower Jewish population numbers, while using a broad definition (and here too there is still disagreement about how wide to broaden it) leads to higher, more significant numbers. 2. Different methodologies: Some of the studies use different methodologies, some of which are more up to date and utilize technological tools unavailable in the past. Methodological differences may lead to significant changes in the count. 3. A real and fundamental change in the number of Jews in the United States: According to researchers who support this position, this change derives from the significant increase in the rate of intermarriage in recent decades, and in the self-identification of the children of intermarried couples.

Characteristics of the Haredi Population in the United States and the United Kingdom

The subject of Haredi integration and dealing with the Haredi challenge has been on Israeli society's agenda for a considerable time. In recent years, world Jewry has had to deal with questions and challenges that are in part similar to those in Israel and different (at least as of this writing) in other respects. The paper dealing with Haredi demography examines two recently published major studies, one in the United Kingdom and the other in the United States, and attempts to highlight the similarities and differences in their respective characteristics and the challenges. Among the main insights arising from the paper: the Jewish-Haredi stream in the Diaspora is different in many respects from the image of the main Jewish communities around the world, and also poses for them a challenge that demands a response. The Haredi community is characterized by a much higher birth rate than the non-Orthodox majority and is, therefore, much younger. 60% of Jewish children in New York live in Haredi households. Because of high birthrates and high rates of identity retention, the Haredi community is

growing as a proportion of the Jewish community as a whole. Other prominent characteristics of the Haredi community in the Diaspora – including its economic situation, education levels, and degree of dependence on the Jewish community – are very similar to the situation in Israel. In the United States, too, Haredi poverty rates are higher than in the Jewish community as a whole, the Haredim are more dependent on community and governmental assistance, and the proportion of Haredim with academic degrees is significantly lower than in the Jewish community overall. In the UK, despite the difficulty in obtaining precise data, we find higher poverty rates and lower levels of education in the Haredi community than in the wider Jewish community.

Migration and Aliyah from France

Various indicators point to push factors that are leading to an increase in Jewish migration from the countries of Western Europe. According to findings of the European Union, there are potentially hundreds of thousands of Jews who feel insecure, fear for their children's future in their countries of birth, and who are considering emigrating. Despite the strong desire among broad segments of the Jewish community to emigrate to Israel, Israel is not the preferred destination of these migrants. There are various reasons – most of which can be changed – for this disconnect between desire and intention.

The Jewish community of France – because of its size, which according to various estimates numbers some half-million, with an additional half-million eligible for Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return, and because of its deep connection to Zionism and to Israel – is an obvious target for a concerted aliyah-promotion effort. It is likely that the jump in the number of olim in recent months is indicative of an approaching Aliyah wave. In the first half of 2014, 3,280 Jews have made Aliyah, compared to 1,907 in all of 2013 (an increase of 70%, expected to rise to 200% by year's end). 1,500 immigrants have come from France, compared to 500 during the same period in 2013, and approximately 250 in 2012. Most immigrants come to Israel in the summer months, so the final number of French olim for 2014 will, it seems, be several times greater than in previous years.

The unique push factors include: 1) the economic crisis and the growing interest in migration among French young people in general; 2) failures of governance and the strengthening of populist parties that are identified with the reactionary far right; 3) Anti-Semitism and the insecurity it engenders among Jews; 4) the threat of local Muslim terrorism and the likelihood that many hundreds of French jihadists presently fighting in Syria will return to France.

Possible Targets for Intervention: There are two target populations, each requiring different intervention strategies.

- The number of French Jews most strongly connected to the community and to Israel is estimated at around 200,000. Possible objective: To turn the yearning to make Aliyah into an operative plan through: 1) providing support throughout the migration process and making the process easier, including by furnishing reliable and up-to-date information, active employment assistance, expediting recognition of academic degrees, arranging appropriate IDF service, counseling and assistance in the areas of housing and finding suitable education solutions for children.
- Members of the wider community, which numbers some 300,000, as well as the third circle of those eligible under the Law of Return whose number is estimated at a further 700,000. Possible objective: to cause the young among them who are thinking about emigrating to consider Israel as an attractive migration destination through: 1) making Israel and Israeli culture available to French Jews while they are still in France; 2) a range of educational trips and transformational experiences such as professional pilot trips and trial trips in Israel; 3) a profession-specific Aliyah program.

Beyond the State of Israel's moral obligation to help communities in crisis, researchers are unanimous about the economic benefit of Aliyah from the West and about the olim's massive contribution to Israeli society. This represents a double window of opportunity – for the potential olim and for the State of Israel. Directing the wave of emigration from European countries into Aliyah to Israel demands deliberate and focused action by the State of Israel and by Jewish institutions in cooperation with the communities in question. It requires establishing a directorate within the Prime Minister's Office to deal with bureaucratic barriers and with the various interested parties whose goals do not necessarily conform with those of the Jewish people and with the founding values of the State of Israel.

We are moving the demography gauge slightly in a positive direction. The increase of children of intermarried families who identify as Jews adds to the population numbers of the Jewish people. In addition, the high Haredi birth rate also contributes to the population of the Jewish people. A further positive factor is the potential of Aliyah from France and elsewhere in Europe.

Identity and Identification

Challenges to Jewish Belonging and Commitment to the Jewish People among Diaspora Jewry

One of the most important activities of the American Jewish community in the past decades has been to advance Jewish and Israeli interests and the standing of the Jewish community and Israel. This activity has involved, among other things, lobbying, staging public displays of support, and mobilizing financial support for Jewish community causes (such as freeing Soviet Jewry) and for Israel. Since the mid -19th century, organizations within the Jewish community have attempted to influence political and social outcomes – to enhance Jewish identity, Jewish continuity, and Jewish education; defense against anti-Semitism and political and financial support for Israel; aid for distressed Jewish communities around the world; and issues relating to anti-Semitism, minority rights, and freedom of religion.

This activity constitutes "Jewish civil religion." The Jewish civil religion entails transnational Jewish solidarity and the sense of Jewish belonging, and promoting Jewish political, economic, and social flourishing and rests upon a feeling of Jewish **sacred** ethnicity. This is in line with Biblical and Jewish tradition in which the Jews as an ethno-national entity achieve sacredness through their covenant with God. The "sacredness" of Jewish sacred ethnicity expresses itself in a variety of ways: in the sense of Jewish "chosenness" or specialness, that Jews have special obligations to be moral or fight for justice, and in the normative obligations it imposes – especially regarding Jewish identity and continuity – one ought to identify as a Jew! This sense of sacredness is not doctrinal, but rather, is experienced. It does not necessarily entail formal religious belief. Indeed there are Jews who feel that Jews are somehow special but do not believe in God.²

The recently released Pew report, *A Portrait of Jewish Americans* (released October 1, 2013) and other studies raise major questions as to whether the pattern characteristic of the American Jewish community discussed above, of continued involvement in the Jewish civil religion and dedication to Jewish "sacred ethnicity," can continue, at least in its current form. In part, the effectiveness of such publically engaged Jewish organizations such as ADL, AIPAC, JFNA, and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations rests upon the fact that Jews and the Jewish community are (or have the image that they are) willing to be mobilized for various political and public causes. The Pew report and other research raise questions as to why Jews are willing to be mobilized for such causes and whether such willingness will persist.

² The above section is also to be found in Shlomo Fischer, "Implications of the Pew Report for the Public and Political Involvement of the Jewish Community", in The Jewish People Policy Institute, *The Conference on the Future of the Jewish People -2014: Background Policy Documents*. (Jerusalem, 2014)

The picture that emerges from the Pew report is that a large majority (about 80%) of American Jewish adults report high levels of a sense of Jewish belonging and solidarity.³ However, an emerging group, which is much more highly represented in the younger age cohorts, differs in very significant ways. This second group exhibits a pattern of ethnic identity that is closer to that of "ordinary" or descriptive ethnicity rather than the sacred ethnicity, which was hitherto characteristic of American Jews. "Ordinary" or descriptive ethnic identity holds that a certain ethnic background (say, Irish, Polish or Italian) is simply a fact about the person who bears it, for the most part, it is not very important to its bearers nor it does not incur any special sense of belonging or obligation. It is like having brown eyes or hair.

The group that, according to the study, participates in Jewish civil religion and exhibits a high degree of "sacred" ethnic Jewish solidarity is designated "Jews by religion." These Jews have relatively high rates of in-marriage (64% have a Jewish spouse). 93% are raising their children as Jewish, and 82% say that all, most, or some of their close friends are Jewish. Furthermore, being Jewish is important to them: 90% said that it is very or somewhat important to them (56% said very important). Even more significant, 85% said that they have a strong sense of belonging to the Jewish people, and 71% indicated that they have a special responsibility to care for Jews in need. Regarding Israel, 76% have an emotional attachment to Israel, and 91% say that caring about Israel is an essential or important part of being Jewish. These feelings and attitudes are also backed up by behavior and action. 61% are members of synagogues or other Jewish organizations, and 67% have made a donation to a Jewish organization in the past year.

At the same time, "Jews by religion are, in fact, not very religious, in the sense of a belief system and a set of practices that relate to things Divine (God, afterlife, Divine worship and religious ritual). In response to the question, "How important is religion in your life?" only 31% (which includes the Orthodox who are 10% of the Jewish population) answered "very important." In contrast, among the general American population, 56% answered that it was very important, and among the population that defined itself as Christian, 69% said it was very important. We find similar numbers in regard to belief in God. Only 39% of Jews by religion (including Orthodox) indicated that they are absolutely certain regarding their belief in God (general population 69%, Christian population 78%). Attendance at religious services shows the same pattern: Among Jews by religion, only 29% report monthly attendance (general American public 50%, Christians 62%).

Because of the low level of Jewish practice and belief among Jews by Religion, we would say that in the majority of cases when Jews say that their religion is Jewish, what they really mean is that their ethnicity is sacred. That is, the Jewish religion is an explicit,

³ Among the younger age cohorts of this group as well, some of these components, such as in-marriage and level of organizational affiliation is weakening. See below.

adequate symbol for the sacredness of Jewish ethnicity and for the religious, sacred aspect of Jewish civil religion. Thus, for most American Jews, Jewish civil religion goes together with synagogue membership or denominational affiliation.

"Jews Not By Religion" and their Importance

However alongside this conventional Jewish population, the Pew Portrait also reported on a substantial population that has departed from these norms of Jewish solidarity and commitment. One of the central messages of the Pew report is that about 20% of adult Jewish Americans are "Jews of no religion." In contrast to "Jews by religion," "Jews of no religion," overall, lack Jewish connection: They are much more likely to have a non-Jewish spouse (79%); and they are much less likely to raise their children Jewish (67% will not raise their children Jewish vs. 7% of Jews by religion).

Similar results were found in responses to the sentiment that "being part of the Jewish community is essential to being Jewish." Only one in ten of Jews of no religion agreed with that concept. Jews of no religion are less attached to Israel (only 12% are very attached); they belong to Jewish organizations of any kind to a much lesser extent; and they give much less, if at all, to Jewish causes. They are also less likely to have mainly Jewish friends.

What separates "Jews of no religion" from "Jews by religion" is not religion as it is commonly understood. What separates them is their different relationship to Jewish ethnicity. Jews by religion, as we have seen, share a sense of sacred ethnicity; Jews of no religion have a sense of ordinary or descriptive ethnicity; only 12% said that it was "very important" to them. Most Jews of no religion (67%), as we have seen, do not prioritize passing on their Jewishness to their children, nor do they have a strong sense of belonging to the Jewish people. If Jews of no religion are still very much a minority, apparently their importance will grow. While they constitute only 22% of the overall population of Jewish adults, among the Millennials, they constitute 33%. In general, as one descends among age cohorts the percentage of Jews of no religion grows.

"Jews Not By Religion" and Inter-marriage

There is a strong overlap between the population Pew identified as "Jews of no religion" and Jews who are either intermarried themselves or are the children of intermarriage. 36% of Jews of no religion have non-Jewish mothers and 79% have a spouse who is not Jewish. The higher proportion of Jews of no religion in the younger age cohorts stems from the higher rate of intermarriage among recently married Jews.

The Pew study further demonstrates the overlap between Jews of non-religion and intermarried Jews in regard to enrolling children in Jewish educational programs, the sense of belonging to the Jewish people, and responsibility to care for Jews in need.⁴

The Pew data (among other studies) seem to raise significant challenges regarding the socio-cultural infrastructure of the public involvement of the Jewish community. The majority of American Jews, especially the older ones, continue the pattern of "sacred" normative ethnicity and Jewish civil religion. What seems to raise challenges is the growing number of "Jews of no religion." As we have seen, they do not share in the Jewish civil religion and are not committed to sacred ethnicity. Can they form a base for public and political engagement on the part of the Jewish community?

In short, it seems that the current trends are damaging to Jewish communal life as we know it today. From the data it seems that three options are available to the organized Jewish community and its leadership:

1. To find a way to reverse the trends.
2. To find a way of living communal life of a new type, not yet discovered.
3. To have many Jews in the U.S. – possibly even more than today – but a shrinking "Jewish community."

This has implications for Jewish institutions, it makes the need to improve and consolidate institutions even more urgent. It also has implications for Israel, which will likely have less support in the political-communal sense, even if Jews are still "attached" to it on a personal level.

In the light of these findings, we recommend to strengthen the Jewish attachments of Jews by religion and also to try and reach out to Jews of no religion. The Jewish involvement of non-Orthodox Jews-by-religion cannot be taken for granted either. Among Reform Jews, for example, 50% of those who are married are married to non-Jews. We find a similar phenomenon among younger Jews by religion. Thus, Jewish connections must be planted and nurtured throughout childhood, the teen years, and well into young adulthood so that this largest segment of the American Jewish community feels Jewishness to be a central component of their lives. High-quality Jewish education (not only in day school settings) that lasts through the teen years, summer camps, college classes in Jewish studies, and Israel trips dramatically increase the likelihood that Jews will marry Jews and create unambiguously Jewish homes.

More challenging even than that are the Jews of no religion and no denomination. We must realize that moving from a descriptive ethnicity to sacred, normative ethnicity would seem to involve some kind of conversion experience. It is a change in

⁴ See "Implications of Pew on the Public Political Involvement of the Jewish Community."

the very essence of one's Jewishness. Such an intervention would be unlike almost anything major Jewish organizations habitually do.

In response to these challenges we should conduct further, mainly qualitative, research to further untangle the relationship between intermarriage and Jews of no religion. Secondly, we should allocate a small amount of resources to pilot programs that encourage the type of identity reconstruction that occurs in conversion experiences. One promising direction is "re-biographing," that is, participants revise and retell to themselves their own biographies. In this retelling, their Jewishness and Jewish identity is ascribed a new and more important significance than it hitherto had. Recent research has shown that this process is a major component in the success of Birthright-Israel.

Jewish Identity in Israel

Jewish identity is very important in Israel, but its context and manifestations are very different from that of the Diaspora. One aspect of Jewish identity that does not at all exist in the Diaspora is the Jewish identity of the state. This was of course reflected in the Proclamation of Independence (the Declaration of the Establishment of the State), which states that [we] "hereby declare the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz-Israel, to be known as the State of Israel." The language, official state holidays and symbols all reflect the Jewish identity of the state as does the Law of Return (1950), which codifies Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people worldwide. In two Basic Laws (which have constitutional status), Israel is defined as a Jewish and democratic state.

In Israel, Jewish identity, even for individuals, is primarily national-political. As indicated, Jewish identity is extremely important to Israeli Jews, but its significance is radically different from that of Jewish identity to Diaspora Jews, especially in America. First and foremost, for Israelis, Jewishness ensures full membership in the Israeli political and social collectivity.

The religious dimension of Jewish identity and religious life in Israel is organized largely according to a European nation-state model. This model has two aspects to it: First, religious identity is a function of collective national identity. It is much less given over to individual choice and autonomy as in the United States. Secondly, religious life and activity is organized around a state religious organization ("church") that provides religious services for the collectivity. Jewish Israelis are automatically registered within the population registry in the Ministry of the Interior as of the Jewish religion since their religious identity is a component of their national identity. Secondly, Israel maintains a state religious organization, the Chief Rabbinate, whose task it is to maintain the religious identity of the national collectivity and to provide religious services for the

entire population – such as marriage and burial. Thus in Israel, too, religion is a public utility supported by taxes like the postal service. Insofar as it serves the entire Jewish population it has been organized according to the widest common denominator, that is, in Orthodox fashion, so that even the most devout can benefit from the service that it provides. In addition, as in Europe, religious institutions are conceived of as something that ought to be historical, traditional, and “authentic.”

This past year was witness to several developments that touched upon all of the above aspects. Leading members of the coalition and the Minister of Justice Tzipi Livni introduced legislative initiatives designed to strengthen the Jewish identity of the state. At the same time, there were a number of developments that challenged the received relationship of religion and state in Israel. Thus, Minister of Religious Affairs Naftali Bennett has effected the construction of a prayer area adjacent to the southern part of the Western Wall in which egalitarian and non-Orthodox services do take place. In a similar fashion, starting on Jan. 1, 2014, four Reform rabbis, who are rabbis of regional councils, began receiving salaries from the state, just like their Orthodox counterparts. A further development has been the highlighting of the *Hitchadshut Yehudit* movement (through the maiden parliamentary speech of MK Ruth Calderon in which she taught a passage of Talmud) in which Jewish identity is not only a function of collective national identity but is also a matter of personal choice, appropriation, and ownership as it is in American Jewish identity.

* * * * *

Jewish Genealogy and the Advent of Home Genetic Testing

The last few years have witnessed a dramatic increase in the amount of interest in genealogical mapping. Dozens of new businesses now exist that enable consumers to trace their family history online by searching electronic documents. With over a billion people included in tens of millions of family trees, these companies harness the power of virtual social networks and crowd sourcing to connect individuals with close and distant relatives to collaborate on building interconnected family trees with embedded historical data.

Concurrently, advances in genetic research and computing technology have enabled direct-to-consumer (DTC) genealogical mapping through DNA analysis at affordable prices. These two methods of ancestry tracing have become interwoven. Consumers are able to find distant relatives through DNA matching, expanding their family tree and ancestral knowledge in ways unimaginable only 25 years ago. As a result of these products, individuals and families are learning more about their ancestors and origins.

Of the many discoveries made by individuals taking advantage of these advances in genealogical mapping is the possible existence of Jewish ancestry.

The DNA test results have led many consumers into exploring their newly discovered Jewish roots. In 2005 the New York Times observed that due to DNA tests, “embraces of Judaism are growing more common in parts of the (American) Southwest” by Hispanics who believe they are descendants of Marranos.

Such developments offer exciting opportunities for connecting, engaging, and strengthening the bonds of the Jewish People.

Furthermore, Jewish genealogy, especially Ashkenazi genealogy, has been and continues to be the focus of many scientific studies aimed at determining the genealogical origins of the Jewish People. Although few individuals understand the biology, algorithmic calculations, and probabilistic nature at the foundation of these scientific studies, they gain widespread publicity and raise controversial questions with geo-political implications.

The chapter on these developments in the 2014 Annual Assessment reviews the advances and applications of genealogy research and genetic sciences; briefly discusses how these advances are affecting various non-Jewish population groups; explains the results generated by home DNA tests with an example test conducted on a JPPI fellow; and then considers the implications that these advances have on the Jewish people, both on the individual and collective level.

Some of the questions raised in the chapter are:

- Can these new tools affect connectedness of the Jewish People?
- How do these developments influence the way Jewish identity is conceived?

The chapter includes the following conclusions

- 1) Identifying genetic commonalities among the Jewish people and studying Jewish genealogy is not synonymous with racial studies on Jews.
- 2) For those who identify themselves as part of the Jewish community because of their ancestry alone, strengthening their sense of Jewish heritage or deepening their knowledge of their ancestor’s beliefs and customs has the potential to reinforce their Jewish identity and lead to other forms of Jewish engagement. It also includes the following recommendations:

- 3) Efforts should be made to prevent DNA tests from becoming a device of alienation away from the Jewish people.
- 4) Jewish community organizations should be aware of the types of results generated from DNA tests and the potential effect they have on one’s identity.

Israeli scientists should be at the forefront of this growing field not only to demonstrate the historical connection of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel, but also to help refute studies that manipulate data in order to undermine that connection.

We are moving the identity gauge in a slightly negative direction. Together with the growth of the number of people who identify as Jews in the United States, the recent Pew report has shown the existence of three substantive overlapping groups – who comprise over a million people – who have a weak sense of belonging and commitment to the Jewish people: Jews of no religion; children of intermarried families; and Jews of no religious denomination.

Intercommunity Bonds

Community Bonds: The Need to Institutionalize Dialogue

Future events and developments in Israel and in the rest of the Jewish world are soon likely to influence the state of Jewish community bonds. At the same time, the current state of these bonds is good, and a number of events and pieces of evidence enable us to characterize the recent period as one in which a number of mostly positive developments have occurred. This year, we can add first-hand evidence to these developments. This came in the framework of JPPI's comprehensive study "Jewish and Democratic: Perspectives from World Jewry."⁵ This study concludes that "Jews around the world support Israel and see the connection with it as an important matter that should be maintained."

New studies published this year – among them the comprehensive survey of American Jewry conducted by the Pew Research Center,⁶ as well as studies dealing with other Jewish communities such as British Jewry, have shown the intensity of the Jewish connection to Israel.⁷ These studies strengthen the claim that there is no solid evidence at this stage of "distancing" from Israel by the Jewish world.⁸ Nevertheless, some findings are troubling. In the large American Jewish community, two competing trends are polarizing young Jews. On one hand, there is a dramatic rise in the number of young Orthodox Jews who today, according to a weighted analysis of Pew data,⁹ make up more than a quarter of all young Jews (although the Orthodox community comprises only about a tenth of all American Jews). These young Jews are much more closely connected to Israel than American Jews in general.¹⁰ On the other hand, there is a dramatic increase in the number of non-Orthodox young Jews who choose non-Jewish

⁵ See: Israel as A Jewish and Democratic State: Views from the Jewish World, JPPI, May 2014. Project Heads: Shmuel Rosner and Avi Gil. This study, which drew from dozens of seminars held in Jewish communities around the world and that was summarized at a Jewish leadership conference in New York in March 2014, was presented to Prof. Ruth Gavison as background material for her investigation into the question of the constitutional arrangement that is appropriate for Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. Prof. Gavison was appointed to undertake this task by Minister of Justice Tzipi Livni.

⁶ A Portrait of Jewish Americans – Findings from a Pew Research Center Study of U.S. Jews, 2013.

⁷ Jews in the United Kingdom in 2013, David Graham, Laura Staetsky, and Jonathan Boyd, February 2014.

⁸ For further reading on this subject: The Challenge of Peoplehood: Strengthening the Attachment of the Young American Jews to Israel in the Time of the Distancing Discourse, Shmuel Rosner and Inbal Hakman, JPPI, April 2012.

⁹ The weighting of the data was conducted by Prof. Steven Cohen. For further details: Orthodox Population Grows Faster than First figures in Pew #JewishAmerica Study, The Jewish Forward, November, 2013.

¹⁰ See: Eight facts about Orthodox Jews from the Pew Research survey, Pew, October 2013. "Orthodox Jews express much more emotional attachment to Israel than do other U.S. Jews. This is particularly true of Modern Orthodox Jews, 77% of whom say they feel "very attached" to the Jewish state. By contrast, among ultra-Orthodox Jews, 55% say they feel very attached to Israel. And among American Jews overall, 30% say they are very attached to Israel."

partners, or who are defined by the Pew researchers as "Jews not by religion."¹¹ The attachment to Israel of these young Jews' is much weaker than those of other Jews, and their growing percentage among all young Jews is also reflected in data relating to the connection to Israel (Steven Cohen's research also found a certain correlation in the Pew data between the political views of young Jews and their attachment to Israel – liberals are less connected to Israel).¹²

These data reflect a fundamental challenge for the future preservation of community bonds, just as they reflect a challenge for the preservation of Jewish identity in general. They have already prompted the Jewish establishment into action to neutralize crisis factors, and to reinforce the Israel-Diaspora partnership in building a common Jewish future. For official Israel's part (mainly through government ministries and the Jewish Agency for Israel), a special effort in this regard has been apparent in the past year, such as in the ongoing attempt to settle the status of the Western Wall plaza (neutralizing crisis factors), and in the comprehensive initiative of consultation, allocation of budgets, and joint activities to strengthen Jewish identity in the Diaspora (partnership in strengthening identity).

Points from the Report on Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State

In recent months, seminars were held in dozens of Diaspora communities at the initiative of the Jewish People Policy Institute in which the question of Israel-Diaspora relations was raised. The investigation, which was summarized in an extensive report, showed a strong desire among Jews to find and to exploit channels of partnership between Israel and Diaspora communities (it should be noted that most of the Jews who participated were of the "first circle" who are connected to the organized Jewish community).¹³ It was found that there is striking similarity between the views of Diaspora Jews on the issue of Israel's identity as a "Jewish and democratic state" and

¹¹ JPPI has published two short reports that analyze the possible significance of the growth of the "Jews not by religion" category, which appeared over the past year in two major studies:

- Shlomo Fischer dealt with the sociological significance of identifying as a Jew "not by religion". See: Who are the 'Jews by Religion' in the Pew Report?, Shlomo Fischer, November 2013.
- Shmuel Rosner dealt with the policy dilemmas that this category poses for the Jewish people's decision makers. See: 'Jews Not By Religion': How to Respond to American Jewry's New Challenge, Shmuel Rosner, December 2013.

¹² See: Young Jews' Israel Alienation, Shmuel Rosner, Jewish Journal, May 27, 2014

¹³ The full JPPI report on "Israel as A Jewish and Democratic State" includes an entire chapter on the methodology that guided its editors, along with a detailed analysis of its advantages and disadvantages in reflecting the view of the world's Jews. In short: it is clear that the way in which the seminars were held had a significant effect on the composition of the participants and, in any case, on the view expressed in the discussion. This process focuses on the organized Jewish community that is connected and interested, and other Jewish groups are not fully represented. Thus, as a process for ascertaining the view of all Jews, it is lacking. However, it does allow for an understanding of the depth of the views of those Jews who have the greatest prospect of being mobilized behind significant activity, and who have a high level of commitment to a significant Jewish future.

those found among the Israeli public.¹⁴ The idea that Israel should be a Jewish and democratic state creates a conceptual framework that includes the view of most Diaspora Jews.

Below are some of the conclusions presented in the special report:

- Most of the world's Jews have a desire to see an Israel that is both Jewish and democratic, and assume that this combination is certainly possible. Accordingly, the vagueness inherent in the current formulation of "Jewish and democratic" is seen by many as an advantage. For many Diaspora Jews, democratic values are considered to be "Jewish values." Thus, conduct that erodes the democratic characteristics of Israel is seen as harmful to Judaism and to Israel's definition as a Jewish state. If Israel is not a liberal democracy, its attraction to many Diaspora Jews will be eroded.
- Diaspora Jews are interested in a more significant religious component in Israel's identity than there are in their own countries, as part of preserving Israel's "Jewish" identity. Nevertheless, serious criticism was voiced about the practical implementation of the religion-state relationship in Israel, especially with regards to the Orthodox stream's monopoly, which excludes other streams of Judaism from the public expression of Jewish life in Israel.
- It was clear that many Diaspora Jews recognize the difficulties and constraints that Israel faces in light of regional hostility and security threats. Nevertheless, the majority does not consider this situation to be justification for lowering the high values standards that Israel is expected to maintain. Similarly, the regional situation does not immunize Israel from criticism.
- Diaspora Jews' expectations of Israel:
 - Israel should be pluralistic.
 - Israel must ensure equality for its non-Jewish citizens.
 - Israel should aspire to a situation in which it does not rule over the Palestinians.
 - Israel should put an end to the Orthodox monopoly over Jewish life and should give equal status to all Jewish streams.
 - Israel should avoid imposing religious norms on a civil society that is mostly secular.
 - Israel should strengthen its Jewish character by strengthening its citizens' familiarity with the traditions, values, and history of the Jewish people.

The right of Diaspora Jews' to express their opinions on matters that are decided in Israel was a main topic in the discussions.

¹⁴ JPPI's report "Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State: Views from World Jewry" was completed and presented in person to Prof. Gavison on May 21, 2014, in the presence of the Chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive Natan Sharansky. The full report appears on the JPPI website.

- Their growing self-confidence in expressing views critical of Israel was conspicuous, particularly on subjects related to the Jewish characteristics of Israel's identity.
- Many participants emphasized that Israel's policies and its image around the world have an effect on the security and wellbeing of Diaspora Jews.
- It was the clear desire of most participants to see Israel consult regularly with Diaspora Jews on various issues. It was emphasized that such consultation would intensify the solidarity between Israel and the Diaspora.

Meeting, Consultation, Influence

Among many participants, there was a prevailing sense that communities around the world have the right, and perhaps even the duty, to be actively involved in shaping Israel's character, particularly when it comes to shaping its character as a Jewish state. There is great interest among the world's Jews in permanent and significant dialogue between communities.

In the context of this dialogue, three principles should arise in many of the discussions as being key to the dialogue's success:

1. The dialogue should be two-way, rather than an initiative whose purpose is only to rally the world's Jews behind Israeli goals.
2. The dialogue should be held with Israelis who have the ability to influence decision-making on the issues being discussed.
3. The dialogue should be held with representative Diaspora Jews who have the ability to present Israeli decision makers with the range of views of Diaspora Jewish communities in all their ideological, political, religious, and organizational diversity.

Questions relating to the nature and structure of the dialogue between Israel and Diaspora have already been raised in previous JPPI publications, and the reason for returning to it this year resulted from a number of factors: the fact that the process is still not optimal; our sense, which rests on the study and on developments on the ground, that there is a greater readiness in Israel today to accept a consultation process as desirable; our impression, gleaned from the intensive seminar process we conducted this year, is that Diaspora Jews attach a high level of importance to the matter of dialogue. Our recommendation based on these considerations is to hold an additional discussion on questions affecting the channels of the dialogue between Israel and the world's other Jewish communities, as a prelude to organizing and institutionalizing it.

We are moving the intercommunity bonds gauge in a slightly positive direction as a result of the findings above.

Material Resources

In the past year several issues arose in Israel and the United States deeply connected to questions of what is required for thriving Jewish communities and how those requirements should be met.

Government of Israel-World Jewry Joint Initiative

On June 1, 2014, the Government of Israel approved the Government of Israel-World Jewry Joint Initiative, which aims to help ensure the continuity of the Jewish people by strengthening young Jews' Jewish identity and enhancing connections between world Jewry and the State of Israel. According to the decision, the total budget will be NIS 570 million during the initial stage of the initiative's implementation, of which the Government of Israel will allocate a third, and two thirds provided by world Jewry. In 2016, an expansion of the initiative will be brought to the government for approval.

The Joint Initiative will be based on a full and equal partnership between the Government of Israel and the Jewish people, who will act in concert via a joint steering committee to develop the program, achieve its goals, and fund its activities. The day-to-day operation of the initiative will be under the auspices of the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs. The Jewish Agency and its partners, the Jewish Federations of North America and Keren Hayesod-UIA, have made the strategic decision to spearhead the fundraising effort to ensure this initiative's success.

Drawing on a conceptual framework designed by JPPI in 2009, the government decision is based on a planning process that began in 2012. The process included the participation of thousands of individuals – including top government officials and both professionals and lay leaders from Jewish communities, organizations, and philanthropic foundations around the world – in conferences, seminars, in-depth interviews, and advanced technological platforms.

The comprehensive and multi-year initiative will involve joint programs between Israel and Jewish communities around the world that will have a significant, measurable impact on young Jews in Israel and throughout the Jewish world in such areas as formal and informal education, Jewish and Israel experiences, campus life, tikkun olam (social justice), and opportunities for life in Israel. While some existing programs will be scaled up, others will be developed to meet the initiative's aims. The goal is to offer a range of programs to enable Jews from all denominations, communities, and walks of life to find their place. The programs will include high-quality training for staff and professionals and an advanced online platform to multiply their impact.

This decision is of major strategic significance to Jewish communities around the world in that it signifies the State of Israel's sense of responsibility for ensuring that Jewish life,

Jewish identity, and connections to Israel endure well into the future. Additional resources are expected to be allocated to Jewish causes, and this coordinated large-scale effort is expected to encourage additional funders to align themselves with the agenda designed to ensure the long-term global thriving of the Jewish people. Despite the moderate and negative trends described in the next paragraphs of this section, this major historic decision may be a game-changer that foretells a likely improvement of the Jewish people's material long-term wellbeing.

Funding Jewish Life in the U.S.


The U.S. community remains important for Israel as well as for other global Jewish communities, particularly those under stress. Despite economic recovery, fiscal sustainability for Jewish activities in the U.S. remains an issue of matching resource sources and uses. Philanthropic patterns are shifting with generational change (reflecting a decrease in Jewish identification expression) as well as changes in the style of Jewish giving. Donors who previously were the principal support of the federation system are expressing greater interest in more focused, hands-on giving and demand greater transparency and evidence of measurable outcomes.

Assessing the balance of U.S. Jewry's ways and means is difficult because of the way Jewish life in the U.S. is organized. Religious and communal institutions are self-funded and the former do not disclose finances. Transactions in this 'market'¹ take place in thousands of institutions. There have been several attempts to calculate the 'Jewish GNP',¹ most recently in *The Forward*.¹ Based on U.S. tax filings, *The Forward* aggregated data for those non-profit organizations it could identify as Jewish.

The Forward estimated at least \$26 billion in total assets for these organizations with 2011 annual revenues of \$12-14 billion,¹ the largest share spent on Israel-related activities (38%, versus 20% each for the next two highest uses--education and health care & social services.) Contributions accounted for 36% of their income—triple the average rate of all U.S. charities.

The Forward's aggregation calls attention to major issues of both process and priority that often lack sufficient information. In 2013, JPPI took a different, in-depth approach to these issues.¹ Three U.S. federations were selected (two with annual disbursements in the \$20-30 million range and one in the \$50-70 million range) and analyzed their budgets for 2010 and 2011 (the same year as *The Forward's* snapshot) in detail.

Figure 1. Appropriations by three North American federations, by category, 2011



Source: JPPI based upon IRS form 940 filings for 2012

The primacy Israel giving was corroborated although JPPI’s analysis also brought out the distinction among federations. The two smaller federations focused 40-50% of their support in 2011 on activities classified by JPPI as having an Israel focus (Figure 1). The largest of the three, however, gave less than 30% to Israel while its proportional focus on education was nearly triple that of the other two. While the U.S. social safety net has grown, this remains the leading sector for federations after Israel-oriented activity. Spending on other activities was relatively small.¹

Between 2010 and 2011, the federation giving the highest share to Israel *increased* its commitment within a smaller overall budget. The fact that all three had smaller total allocations in 2011 than in 2010 provides some insight on priorities. While the total budget decline ranged 2 to 15%, in one the support to health and welfare declined more than 20% while in another it increased by 10%. Federations support specific efforts, not broad areas, so such assistance may prove “lumpy” when looked at over time, thus making determination of priority more difficult still.¹

Whether the balance between U.S. financial support for Israel and for Jewish education at home requires readjustment is a policy question, one difficult to address unless information is available. Federation data are not reported in a consistent framework. But this does not mean that the question will not become more prevalent within the Jewish community.

Once social welfare needs are met, the biggest tradeoff will be between what goes to Israel and what is necessary to address the deep questions of Jewish identity and continuity within the U.S. The need for education, outreach and new means for arresting the trends of dis-affiliation may cause increasing pressure for reassessment. Coming at a time when the bonds between the U.S. and Israel are increasingly subject to at least the potential for strain it behooves leaders within the U.S. to address questions of priorities before this trade-off becomes starker. And it behooves the government of Israel to consider what accepting financial support from the U.S. at historical level might actually cost in terms of forcing hard choices, equitable burden sharing, and the non-financial bonds that might, under present conditions, be of greater value to Israel going forward.

Uneven Growth in Israel's Economy

This year saw indications of a possible sputtering of Israel's engine for growth. The two major concerns are a slowdown of macroeconomic growth, accentuating fiscal imbalances, and the sharing of economic benefits across Israel's society.

Economic growth was 3.3% in 2013, down from the more typical 4-5% in previous years, slowing to 2.8% in the year's second half.¹ Projections by the IMF see 3-3.5% as the likely range for growth in coming years despite Israel's natural gas discoveries.

The slowdown may be explained by continued sluggishness in the economies Israel trades with and the strengthening shekel, which appreciated about 15% compared to the U.S. dollar. The shekel's rise may also be due to reduced energy imports. Precautionary measures, such as a sovereign wealth fund, should shield the currency when energy begins to be exported. The strong shekel also favors Israel's high technology producers over more traditional sectors.

The long-run concern is Israel's productivity gap. The 10% differential compared to the 1975 OECD average grew to about 40% by 2012.¹ This worsening suggests systemic causes. An important contributor to productivity is "human capital". In Israel, international tests of educational performance are relatively low even if restricted to the Jewish community. The majority of incoming children now track into the Arab-language or Haredi school systems. Disparities in education and employment opportunity, especially outside the high growth sectors, have further accentuated not only differences in income but also the consequences. Housing prices continue to rise dramatically (up 6% after inflation—and 80% since 2007) as have costs of food and other essentials. The result is pressure on household incomes and, increasingly, poverty.

Israel's poverty rate, 20.9% of households, is the highest in the OECD and income inequality measures are also in the high end. Poverty is shifting from a problem of workforce non-participation toward a phenomenon of working poor. During the past decade, poverty in one-worker households increased from 9.6% to 13.7%; 5% of two-

worker households also fell below the line. Poverty in Jewish households increased by 3%.

On the other hand, the most recent OECD survey measuring indicators of wellbeing shows Israel placed 13th among 34 countries in subjective overall life satisfaction, also placing high in categories such as health, income and wealth, and jobs and earnings. (However, Israel scored low in civic engagement and governance, environmental quality, personal security, work-life balance, and education and skills.)¹ Another 2013 study also showed high relative levels of life satisfaction for Israel (which placed 11th among 156 countries.)¹ Six variables explained three-quarters of the variation over time and among countries. Besides GDP per capita, these included the less directly economic factors of 'healthy life expectancy', 'having someone to count on,' 'perceived freedom to make life choices', 'freedom from corruption,' and 'generosity.' The health outcomes and social solidarity in Israel would explain, in part, the positive result.

But in four countries hardest hit by the euro crisis, the actual fall in GDP could not explain large drops in measured happiness. The indirect effect of economic pressure tended to limit opportunities and caused insufficiency of public services. For Israel a slowing of growth, higher costs of living, and a perception of unequally distributed opportunity might in the future become more than just an issue of economics alone.

A Meeting Point

The U.S. Jewish community and Israel are in transition with respect to material resources. U.S. Jewry faces questions about allocating Jewish wealth to Jewish priorities-including Israel. Israel has newfound wealth, but faces budgetary pressures, a continuing defense burden, and socio-economic growing pains. And Israel itself confronts questions about its role toward Jewish communities abroad. As both communities seek answers, any solutions arrived at independently may serve the interests of all less well than those that might arise from joint consideration from the perspective of the Jewish people as a whole.

Because of the significance of the Government of Israel-World Jewry initiative we are moving the resources gauge in a slightly negative direction. This is because of possible hidden problems in the Israeli economy and the question mark around the actual level of resources available to Jewish communities abroad.

JPPI Recommendations Adopted by the Israeli Cabinet:

What has been done and what remains to be done

In recent years, the Jewish People Policy Institute has submitted to the Israeli Cabinet a number of recommendations intended to ensure the Jewish people's future thriving. Three of these recommendations have been adopted as official Israeli government policy.

The first recommendation, under the title "The New Paradigm," dealt with the need for the State of Israel to take greater responsibility for ensuring the future of the Jewish people globally. The New Paradigm included a large number of secondary recommendations related to ways the State of Israel could operationalize this responsibility. The Cabinet adopted the New Paradigm as its official policy and as a result, expanded its commitment to programs such as Birthright and Masa. On June 1, 2014, the government resolved to significantly upgrade its commitment through "The Joint Initiative of the Government of Israel and the Jewish People in the Diaspora," which is intended to strengthen the connection between Israel and the Jewish people and to give substantial expression to the Israeli government's increased responsibility for ensuring the future and thriving of the Jewish people. Implementing this program will represent a central and significant component in the New Paradigm's actualization.

At the same time, many other recommendations remain that should be implemented, especially institutionalizing a permanent dialogue mechanism between the Israeli government and the Diaspora to enable Jews throughout the world to see themselves as partners in what happens in Israel, even if they do not live there.

The second recommendation dealt with the need to develop a comprehensive strategy to deal with the international campaign of Israel de-legitimization, to acquire the practical tools for doing so, and to prepare for a struggle against it – just as we prepare for other strategic threats. Secondary recommendations dealt with the need to coordinate, focus, and upgrade efforts in this area already existing in various government ministries. During last year's Annual Assessment presentation, the Cabinet passed a resolution adopting the recommendation and assigning responsibility for coordination to the Minister for Strategic Affairs. Over the course of the past year, the Ministry of Strategic Affairs has established a dedicated staff and has worked to increase the coordination of efforts against de-legitimization, including a significant conference that brought together those dealing with the subject in Israel and the Jewish world, and by establishing consultation and coordination mechanisms. A comprehensive plan is being prepared for the Israeli government, based on the conclusions of the conference and their translation into concrete work plans. The acceptance, budgeting and implementation of these plans will, in our view, represent a significant component in the fight against de-legitimization.

It is important that the strategy for the war against de-legitimization include: a focused battle employing sophisticated diplomatic, media, and legal tools in order to expose the major perpetrators of de-legitimization and put them on the defensive; the development of ties with non-Western international actors, such as China, Japan and India, that are not tainted by classic anti-Semitism; presenting Israel's "other face" to international public opinion; and substantially developing alliances in the war against de-legitimization, including with non-Jewish and civil society organizations in the West, among them trade unions, churches, NGOs, cultural bodies, etc., as well as a campaign in the cyber arena. It should be stressed that de-legitimization is a real and dangerous strategic threat to Israel and appropriate human and financial resources should be invested in combating it.

The third recommendation dealt with the opportunity to bring a large number of Jews from France and Belgium to Israel as olim, in light of the deterioration of the situation of Europe's Jewish communities in general and those in French-speaking countries in particular. In keeping with the recommendation, a plan was prepared to increase the likelihood that French Jews, many of whom are considering emigration, choose to move to Israel rather than the United States, Canada, or Australia. Since the plan was prepared, the situation of Jews in French-speaking countries, as well as in other European countries, has deteriorated and is likely to worsen further. The growth in the number of European jihadist fighters who have been trained in Syria and Iraq and who are returning to Europe substantially increases the physical danger Europe's Jews face. Election results in recent months also indicate that the challenges in Europe will likely expand beyond France and Belgium.

In the meantime, the steps taken by the government have been far from adequate. The allocated budget is substantially smaller than outlined and required. Barriers remain that must be removed in order to enable French Jews to find suitable employment in Israel; the coordinating mechanism in the Prime Minister's Office that will oversee the plan's implementation has not been established; the number of emissaries in France needed to handle the growing interest in Aliyah has not kept pace with the need; and a Cabinet resolution on the matter has not yet been taken.

Israel has reached out to Ukrainian Jews in jeopardy as a result of the still unfolding crisis there, and the government has clearly shown a readiness to invest in their immigration. However, the Israeli government's response in other countries has not yet reached a scale to adequately address the opportunity. Given the developments of the recent months in France, Belgium and Europe in general, the response required is even greater than that foreseen a year ago.

Therefore, along with the efforts being invested in bringing Ukrainian olim to Israel, a greater response is needed throughout Europe. The immediate need is in French-

speaking countries – French and Belgian Jews together number half a million – but in the near future, it will likely expand. Israel’s response should be precise and immediate.

Main Publications of the Jewish People Policy Institute

Jewish and Democratic: Perspectives from World Jewry, Project Directors: Shmuel Rosner and Avi Gil, 2014

Russian-Speaking Jews in North America, Jonathan Sarna; **On Israelis Abroad**, Yogev Karasenty, 2014

The Challenged Triangle: Washington, Jerusalem, and the American Jewish Community; Israel: Jewish and Democratic; Background Policy Documents prepared for JPPI's 2014 Conference on the Future of the Jewish People, (Glen Cove, NY, March 11-12, 2014)

Rise and Decline of Civilizations: Lessons for the Jewish People, Shalom Salomon Wald, Foreword by Shimon Peres, Academic Studies Press, Boston, 2014; Yediot Books (Hebrew translation), Tel Aviv, 2013.

Annual Assessment 2012-2013, Executive Report No. 9, with special in-depth chapters: Combating De-Legitimization; Israel and the Jewish People: Geopolitical Developments; The Triangular Relationship – Washington, Jerusalem and the Jewish People, new U.S. and Israeli Administrations, Challenges and Opportunities; The Rise of Asia: Policy Implications for Israel and the Jewish People; Fathers of the Faith? Three Decades of Patrilineal Descent in American Reform Judaism; Jewish Leadership in North America – Changes in Personnel and Structure; European Jewry – Signals and Noise: Is there a Point of Negative Inflection?; Latin American Jewish Life in the 21st Century: The Paradox of Shrinking Communities, and Expanded-Revitalized Jewish Life; Israel Faces the Ultra-Orthodox Challenge; Women of the Wall: Toward Compromise or Continued Conflict; Project head: Shlomo Fischer; JPPI Staff and Contributors, 2013.

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Annual Assessment 2011-12, Executive Report No 8, Introduces JPPI's Dashboard of Jewish People Indicators, and includes special in-depth chapters: Geopolitical Turmoil in the Middle East; Creating Jewish Meaning in the U.S. and Europe; and Israeli Democracy: Politics and Society; Project heads: Avi Gil and Shlomo Fischer; JPPI Staff and Contributors, 2012.

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Muslim Anti-Semitism: The Challenge and Possible Responses, Emmanuel Sivan, 2009.

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