המכון לתכנון מדיניות עם יהודי

(מיסודה של הסוכנות היהודית לא"י) בע"מ

The Jewish People Policy Planning Institue

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2008

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Facing Tomorrow   פונים אל המחר

ועידת נשיא ישראל 2008

Background
Policy Documents

Provisional Edition

tomorrow המחר

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Background
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Provisional Edition

Editors: Rami Tal • Barry Geltman

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Introduction

The JPPPI is honored to have been selected this year by President Shimon Peres to lead the preparations and generate the content for his first presidential conference, *Facing Tomorrow*.

This decision could not have been made without the success and the energy that emerged at The Conference on the Future of the Jewish People held last July in Jerusalem with the participation of leaders, thinkers and prominent professionals. This year's Facing Tomorrow conference gives us the opportunity to push forward the work and momentum of last summer based on three integrated elements:

1. 60 years of Israeli independence as a Jewish and democratic state and as the core state of the Jewish People;

2. Efforts made by Israel to examine itself and its relations with the Diaspora and repair what needs repairing;

3. The election of Shimon Peres as President of Israel in light of his lifelong contribution as a partner in laying the foundation of the Jewish state and because he is a leading political figure with a vision that still inspires us, Diaspora Jews and Israeli Jews alike.

The policy background documents prepared and collected in this book are aimed to provide the participants in the advance day of working groups, as well as the invitees to the main conference, with the primary tools for making the deliberations of both gatherings as efficient, productive and inspired as possible.

The concept of this book is based on a process of strategic thinking and work generated by the Jewish People Policy Planning Institute during its five years of existence and is based on the evaluation of the situation and dynamics affecting the Jewish People like--

• Major shifts such as: Iran and the rise of radical Islam; the vulnerability of the civilian population in Israel; and the fact that Israel has become the largest Jewish community in the world.

- Main dynamics such as: The emerging superpowers like China and India and how the Jewish civilization will fit in the transforming international environment; how Jewish relations and affiliation with the West impact its relations with the Islamic world; the cultural trends and demographic changes affecting us; and how we embrace the extended circle of the Jewish People and turn it into an asset as the Diaspora is shrinking in numbers.

- Challenges and concerns such as: The cost of Jewish life and affiliation; creating new means of belonging and community life when religion is no longer the main factor in Jewish belonging; and enhancing the status of women.

In meeting these challenges it is critical to understand the opportunities available to us. We need to take advantage of our assets based on the substantial soft and hard power acquired over the last century by the Jewish People. The building of a Jewish and democratic Israel and a strong and influential community in the Diaspora—mainly in the West; the outstanding human resources; the solid Jewish education; the creation of high levels of wealth, and the tradition of philanthropy.

Having said that, we need to digest and deal with our liabilities too: The limited capacities for collective decision-making and action; the current deficits in leadership and weakness in developing the next generation of leaders. These are the tough questions in the chain of continuity from generation to generation.

This book is divided into two parts. Part one contains the papers prepared for the advance day of working groups and deals with geopolitics: mega-trends impacting world Jewry and Israel, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the Islamist challenge, the Jewish civilization and rise and decline theory, and the urgent issue of global leadership in the 21st century.

The first part of this book also includes papers relating to Jewish identity, Jerusalem as the civilizational capital of the Jewish People, demography, and Tikkun Olam.

Part two provides overviews of topics which are meant to add a deeper value to the agenda of the main conference, Facing Tomorrow, and which impact the Jewish future. It includes papers on the frontiers of scientific and medical research, technology and economic trends.

The challenge for the JPPPI has been immense, but as the raison d'etre of the institute is to make a contribution to the thriving future of the Jewish People, we couldn't miss this opportunity to be at the heart of this conference. The future of the Jewish People, the future of a democratic and Jewish Israel, the future of the world and the interaction and interdependence of the three is what this conference is all about.

This effort would not have been possible without the inspiration of President Peres and Ambassador Dennis Ross, the JPPPI's Chairman. It would also not have been possible without the professional guidance and quality assurance of the institute's Founding President, Professor Yehezkel Dror; the intensive investment in conceptualizing the conference and its content made by Ambassador Avi Gil, a Senior Fellow of JPPPI; and the experience and determined commitment of Israel Maimon, Chairman of the conference steering committee.

May this work be blessed with a fortune of ideas that will lead us forward and allow us to add our contribution to a better tomorrow.

Avinoam Bar-Yosef
Director General
Jewish People Policy Planning Institute

Conference on the Future of the Jewish People

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SECTION I:

Closing Plenary

Closing speech by Dennis Ross, Chairman, Board of Directors and Professional Guiding Council, JPPPI

I am not going to re-summarize what you have already heard summarized; that would make no sense. What I am going to try to do is offer a perspective and maybe give you a sense of impressions that I draw from the last several days. Out of that I will try and conclude with an issue that relates to leadership. Maybe the place to start with leadership is to start with the notion that if we are going to renew leadership we have to have inclusion and diversity. My comments are going to reflect not only what I heard each working group talk about but also the exchange that I heard between the leaders of the working groups and all of you who are assembled here.

The first point is diversity. It came through loudly and clearly and for a good reason. We have to have a leadership - if it's going to renew itself, if it is going to take on the challenges of the 21st century - that is inclusive, that is diverse. I have a recommendation for the JPPPI with which to start: you had a Master's Class here, you actually have them here now - why don't you

include them in the planning every time you have an event? If you do that then you will be bringing in a younger group of people that are also diverse, and who will increase your sense of perspective. I understand the concerns with quotas, but I think the notion of goals and purposefulness and having a sense of urgency about the issue of inclusiveness, and showing that you care about it is something that you have to demonstrate. The way you have to demonstrate it is by acting in a way that will bring people in. Include the Master's Class and others who are younger in the planning of every event that you undertake. That is my first observation.

My second one is that we spent three days here - think about who is here: we have an unusual collection of people. I said it at the outset of the conference. We have Jewish leaders who are here from their professional organizations, we have lay-leaders, we have Jewish thinkers, we have thinkers who are Jewish, we have academics. We have people who never come together in this type of a forum, much less to focus on intensive discussions for three days in working groups. The fact that all of you made the decision to come here says something about your own view of the state of the Jewish people, and the need to come here and have this kind of an intensive agenda. Abe Foxman said it best. Abe said he was here for the three days and no one came here with an institutional affiliation. Participants didn't wear their institutional affiliation as an emblem. They didn't wear it as a brand. They weren't thinking parochially. They weren't thinking territorially. They came here as a collective. It is highly unusual. It's a statement in and of itself, and it is something that suggests that there is awareness and readiness to make some hard choices about (a) leadership; (b) what any action plan will be about, and (c) reflecting a kind of commitment. I leave here with a sense that there is already a rather significant accomplishment.

Third observation: there was a theme that was repeated over and over in the working groups in different forms and in different guises, and that was the need for a new kind of connection between Israel and the Diaspora. Every working group in one form or the other talked about a new connection, increasing understanding and having Israelis have a better appreciation of the needs of the Diaspora. This is not something that is new in terms of recommendations, but it is striking to me how clearly it emerged in all the

discussions. One of the manifestations of what happened here is we had Israeli ministers take part in the working groups. They were active participants in this, and they heard very clearly what were the views and the perspectives of those from the Diaspora. In our geopolitics working group we actually had the Minister of Defense for what were a pretty intensive set of interesting exchanges. We had the Director General of the Foreign Ministry here for what were a crystallizing set of discussions on some geopolitical challenges. In each case, we came away with different appreciations. We heard from the Israeli government in a way that may not be unique for all of us, but they heard a kind of different, interesting set of perspectives from the Diaspora in a way that they bring back to their tasks at hand. So it strikes me that one of the more interesting accomplishments already of this convocation is the increasing awareness that this Israeli government has about how to think about the Diaspora because they heard it very clearly in these discussions. It is also interesting that for the three days of this conference there were stories every day in the Israeli press about views from the Diaspora. One of the comments that came up in the exchange today was that there is an increasing need to educate Israelis on the views of the Diaspora, because there isn't a great awareness of that. This conference has contributed to an advance in this regard. It's embodied in some of the recommendations that existed before and are being made again.

A fourth observation is something that again was reflective of a set of themes that were embodied in different groups. I would paraphrase it as a need for a better narrative. There is a need for an alterative narrative. The better narrative is important in terms of increasing the sense of solidarity and feeling better about the Diaspora and ourselves, and feeling less defensive. There is one aspect to this, which is the better narrative. There is the other aspect of this, which is an alternative narrative as it relates to radical Islamists. Let's divide this into a positive and negative set of stories. The positive set of stories can be useful in terms of building up identity and a sense of purposefulness, building on the very notion of what Jewish values are and making them part of the story. We heard a lot about the need for outreach to other faiths. We heard a lot about the need for outreach to other communities. One of the ways to think about outreach and one of the ways to tell the story better

not only in the Diaspora but here in Israel as well is to think about joint Israeli-Diaspora projects - doing good works. If Tikkun Olam is one way to create a

sense that it means something to be Jewish, that there is a value to being Jewish, that you have a purpose and you contribute to good things - if you have some joint Israeli-Diaspora projects which are geared to dealing with poverty in Africa as an example, you are presenting a positive story and contrast it to the radical Islamists. What's their story? Their story is one of destruction. You contrast the positive with the negative. It will make those in the Diaspora -and I think those here as well - feel better about what they're doing. The irony is that a lot of this is done anyway. Well, why not call attention to it? Framing is an important part of what I call Statecraft. Framing means how you describe what you do, what your purposes are and what issues and challenges you are going to address. This is the positive side of the narrative.

There is the negative side or the competitive side or the alternative side. We are in a world where we are dealing with threats from radical Islamists whose purpose is not only anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish, but also generally anti-Modern, anti-anything that reflects modern values, anti-anything that reflects pluralism and diversity. One of the ways to recognize that we are in a competition we have to win is to also be aware of one simple fact: at the end of the day, we are not going to discredit the radical Islamists.

Not us here. Not us in the West. But there are Moslems who are in fact threatened much more directly by them than we are. Their salvation depends on it. Part of our challenge is to identify those in the Moslem world who have the same set of fears. We talked in the geopolitical working group about the convergence of interests or the convergence of threats and fears that Iran creates. One challenge is to figure out who are our natural partners and how to connect to them. Now, you won't connect to them simply because you say `we have a common fear, therefore we have an obvious relationship.' It doesn't work that way. You have to work at it. You have to think about how to connect and how to frame issues. You may have to accept that even if you create certain kinds of dialogues, whether it's in the Jewish world or those in the moderate pragmatic Moslem world, you are not going to agree on all issues. There are moderate Moslems in central Asia, in places like Indonesia, but also in the Arab world. If you are going to create a common approach

with them, not only do you have to work at it, they will, in many cases, raise the Palestinian issue. You can't deny that and you can't avoid that. It's not a case where you have this common concern and say 'gee, we are both threatened, therefore they'll simply dispense with that issue.' They won't dispense with that issue, because it matters to them. That doesn't mean you suddenly have to concede, but it does mean that you have to have a policy on the Palestinian issue.

One of the themes from our working group was it isn't enough to use the U.S. relationship not to do anything. That doesn't mean you're at a point where you can suddenly go and solve the problem. It comes back to framing. If Israel got out of Lebanon and got out of Gaza, and the net effect was that it got lots of rockets, Israel can still say: 'we are going to have an initiative and we'll work with the United States to have an initiative, but the initiative is going to be premised on the following: Israel is prepared to take far-reaching steps when it comes to territorial withdrawal'. One of the recommendations was to have a Jewish majority in Israel, which means that you have to be prepared to define your borders. If you are prepared to move in those directions it can be part of framing the Palestinian issue. When you frame that issue and demonstrate that you are prepared to reach out, you don't have to give up the idea that the other side has responsibilities.

What is the consequence of having gotten out of Lebanon and having gotten out of Gaza? The consequence is that there has been nobody there to assume responsibility. On the other hand, we have seen who has assumed control. You want to compete? You want to have an initiative? You want to reach to moderate Moslems? You have to be prepared to have an approach on this issue and you can frame it in a way that makes it clear that Israel is prepared for very far reaching steps. Israel is prepared for far-reaching withdrawal, but if Israel is going to do it, what's the consequence? The consequence has to be known in advance. Someone has to assume responsibility in advance, not through words and not through slogans. If Israel gets out of most of the West Bank today, what's the effect? Every community in Israel is going to be hit by rockets tomorrow unless someone is there to assume responsibility. It doesn't mean you have to dispense with your security or your needs or your definition, but being on the defensive where the answer

is do nothing, or using the friendship with the United States to do nothing, is not going to help you build connections to those very moderate Moslems with whom you want to work to discredit radical Islamists. We face broad threats under an Iranian umbrella with the radical Islamists and we have natural partners. Think about how you connect with them. Think about how you frame discussions with them. Listen to them so that what you are saying publicly helps them and doesn't hurt them. This can be part of an approach to build an alternative narrative. There is the better narrative that can be used to build a sense of Jewish identity and Jewish values and the purposefulness of being Jewish and there is the competitive narrative that should be a part of what you do as you compete and take on the radical Islamists.

About this question of competing with the radical Islamists there is another negative side to this. There is the whole question of security - the threat of Iran. One of the issues we raised was of being able to mobilize the world. The world looks like it's mobilized: the Security Council has spoken twice with Chapter Seven resolutions imposing sanctions and there is a consensus internationally expressed by the Security Council that Iran should stop its nuclear program. But it hasn't happened. The sanctions that have been employed are very limited. The question is not 'are sanctions the way to go?' but rather how to implement sanctions that are meaningful. This forum is not necessarily the place for acting on that, but rather on how to mobilize the world to a sense of urgency for dealing with this threat, which is real. Preparedness is also a part of it. Deterrence and building up the deterrence capability is also a part of it. Demonstrating that the Israeli public and state are prepared for any contingency is a part of it. That's part of deterrence. That's part of dealing with what is a larger threat.

Let me come back to the issue of leadership. Leadership is not only a list of attributes. It's not only about how to recruit. In the end it comes down to "who" - who is going to act? There is one word that I heard repeatedly from the groups and it was: implementation. We have all these good words. We have all these recommendations. What's going to happen to them? Are they just going to disappear into the air? Or is someone going to act on them? We heard a call for a task force from among the working groups to follow up on the recommendations. I heard a call for putting together

an ongoing group to assume responsibility for implementation. I heard calls from the group to work with the Israeli government, the Jewish Agency and the different Federations to make sure that all these recommendations are pursued. Jehuda Reinharz talked yesterday about Chaim Weizmann, and what was Chaim Weizmann's approach? He not only knew how to appeal to a particular audience, which was an important attribute. He was a nudge, to use the technical term for it. He was incessant. He was relentless. Part of what is going to be required here is that same sense of relentlessness.

I was asked to outline the priorities. I'm not going to do that. You don't outline priorities based on just having heard over forty recommendations, because you have to think through which of those are the most important. You don't make that decision impulsively. Implementation isn't done impulsively either. I am going to suggest two things. The first is a need for an action plan put together by the JPPPI. The action plan has to distinguish between recommendations that are concrete and for which someone can be responsible for implementing, and recommendations that represent a direction, but could be developed into concrete recommendations. There is no such thing as an action plan if there isn't somebody responsible for evaluating how it's being carried out and if there isn't any accountability built into the process. That requires a mechanism. My suggestion is for a Secretariat be created from this group that would assume executive responsibility to work on developing the action plan, how that plan is being developed, evaluate whether some of the proposals are likely to be feasible or not and decide the right focal points for whom to be liaison with.

As long as we have the President-elect here, I am going to volunteer something for him: President-elect Peres, someone who I have had the pleasure and the honor to work with for more than twenty years, I am going to suggest that this Secretariat will work with your office and that your office will assume an umbrella responsibility for the Israeli government. I know there is a tendency to say 'do it through the Prime Minister's office,' or 'do it through the Foreign Ministry.' There is one virtue with the President's Office. The president actually has national responsibility. One thing I know about Shimon Peres: he is relentless. He can be a nudge. He doesn't give up. He has something else: Shimon Peres has always been a visionary. From the very

beginning of his career he has been a visionary and no action plan is going to work unless there are those with a vision guiding it and those who have operational responsibility for carrying it out. There has to be also a feedback cycle for making evaluations along the way, building in some milestones and evaluating the process of doing it. And at some point, we should reconstitute this group. In the meantime, since this is not a group that can be reconstituted easily, one of the things we have to do is have some kind of executive mechanism for this group that has ongoing responsibility. Those who came here have an instinct to the collective. We have a responsibility to think about how we take advantage of that instinct and take the spirit of Chaim Weizmann, and make it something that we internalize. We don't just intellectualize, but we internalize, and we act on it.

SECTION II:

Summaries of Working Group Discussions

Geopolitics Working Group - Closing Remarks

by Glen Lewy, Chairman of the ADL

The Geopolitics working group began its deliberation by considering broad political trends such as globalization and working from there towards more specific issues and regions such as the Middle East, Israel, Palestine and several issues relating to the US. The objective was to identify the issues most pressing to the survival and thriving of Israel and the global Jewish community and suggest policy directions.

Iran

The policies of the current Iranian regime are the existential threat to Israel and a dominant threat to the West. Iran's potential nuclearization reflects not only a possible nuclear attack on Israel, but also, very very probably and more broadly, the end of the current nuclear non-proliferation regime. Moreover, Iran foments radical Islam well beyond its borders and is a state sponsor of terrorism. The Jewish people must, as the highest priority, develop an appropriate response to the Iranian nuclear threat to Israel and to global stability as a whole. While there is no ambiguity about the need to do so in Israel, it is necessary to mobilize Jewish opinion around the world as well. The American Jewish community cannot be intimidated either by a post Iraq syndrome in the United States, or by the false and pernicious allegations of Professors Walt and Mearsheimer, or former President Carter. American public opinion and enlightened public opinion around the world needs to be galvanized against the profound threat posed by Iran's nuclear program to global stability and security. It must be made clear: Iran is not just a Jewish or an Israeli issue. Iran has to be addressed with utmost importance.

That entails understanding what the Western community might be willing to trade with the Russians and the Chinese in return for their support on the Iran issue. For instance, currently, the US negotiates with China, bilaterally and multilaterally on both currency issues and on Iran, without linking the two issues. Perhaps they need to be linked.

The urgency of the Iran issue requires bringing as many arguments and allies to bear as possible. It's important to recognize that India and China both have a stake in the matter. It is critical to make sure that pragmatic, moderate, Arab and Muslim states (Saudi Arabia, Turkey, or others) understand their own stakes in dealing with a nuclearized Iran. It is essential to build the broadest and widest coalition possible, absolutely committed to the proposition that the nuclearization of Iran would be a danger to the world and must be opposed. It must be understood that energy, both the demand for it and its relative high prices, embolden the regime in Iran to take actions they might not otherwise take. Jews and Israelis need to simply recognize that we all have a very important stake in this issue, and that while there is a need to

universalize it as much as possible, Jews and Israelis shouldn't be embarrassed about that stake.

Radical Islam and Terrorism

Radical Islamic terrorism is related to Iranian policy, but is not exclusively a product of it and even without Iran would be a major threat requiring a range of responses. Again, there is a need to mobilize the world, and to make sure that the world understands that this is not simply an Israeli problem, nor simply a Jewish one, but a problem that much of the world shares and in which it has a stake. One of the things that are important to remember and understand is that the radical Islamic narrative has appeal. It is not simply a function of nihilism, frustration, or poverty but also an expression of a worldview. Therefore, there is a need to respond to radical Islam with an alternative and better narrative, a more compelling and meaningful world view that will command adherents and undercut popular support for radicalism.

Non-state Actors

The issue of non-state actors is one of the most significant geopolitical changes of the last ten years, played out perhaps most dramatically in the Hezbollah war. The law of nations is unclear as to how a host state can be held responsible for violent and aggressive actors from within that state. During the recent war the questions raised were: What price should Lebanon bear? How accountable should Lebanon be for the warlike actions of Hezbollah? Should Israel, as the victim of these actions, respond? Part of the problem is that international law is confused on the question. Therefore, initiatives to address the issue are appropriate. This relates as well to UN Resolution 1701 and to the fact that the UN force and the Lebanese army, either because of unwillingness or inability, are not enforcing UN Resolution 1701 as it needs to be enforced. This in turn ties in to the question of non-state actors and who provides military enforcement within rogue states, or states that are not able to enforce law and order within their own borders.

The De-Legitimization of Israel

The issue of the de-legitimization of Israel has at least two components: the first is the argument that Israel doesn't deserve a place among the nations because it is colonialist, violates human rights, and engaged in unacceptable behavior that could be described as Apartheid and even Nazism; the second is the allegations of Jewish duplicity and dual loyalty, and especially that Jewish support for Israel is illegitimate, and that when Jews speak up on behalf of Israel they are behaving in ways that are antagonistic to the interests of their home countries. When the two components are tied together the argument is that the Jewish state is illegitimate and the Jewish people are illegitimate for trying to support the Jewish state.

This is an area in which Diaspora Jewry can and does play a major role: Dennis Ross and Abe Foxman are coming out with books in response to these allegations; there are ad campaigns that the ADL and others are running; the Washington Institute and others are going on to college campuses; and Hillel is playing a major role on college campuses. Most responses deal with the de-legitimization of Israel, and obviously Israel needs to be defended, but the broader issue is this perversion of the definition of human rights. What needs to be done is to remind the international community of the definition of human rights and why Israel is not a state engaged in violation of human rights, but a state that's better than any of its neighbors in supporting human rights.

The world doesn't stop just with America and Europe. India and China are emerging international powers that do not share many of the West's traditions and histories, nor do they have substantial Jewish populations within their boundaries; for better or worse, the do not share the Jewish people's two-millennia of engagement with Christianity. This is a wide-ranging issue that must be addressed; more immediately, ensuring the legitimization of Israel and of Jewish communities in these new contexts must be a priority.

The Israeli – Palestinian Conflict

The Iranian threat paradoxically presents opportunities with respect to the Conflict. There is a change in the Arab world. One can debate the seriousness of the recent Saudi initiative, but the difference between the Khartoum declaration forty years ago of the 'three no's: no negotiation, no recognition, no peace', and the Saudi initiative today, which, at least under some interpretations, reflects a strategic objective of a number of Arab states to reach some accommodation with Israel, so as to permit Israel to be a useful force in dealing with Iran, cannot be denied and presents opportunities. Egypt and Jordan --Israel has peace with both-- have their own issues and objectives as well. This may be a moment in time in which the crucial issue is not just the traditional question of: how is the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict linked to what's going on in the Middle East? Rather, it's about how to use what's going on in the Middle East as an opportunity to solve the Palestinian issue in a way that that didn't exist before. It's important to note also that no potential Israeli-Palestinian settlement can ignore the economic future both in the West Bank and in Gaza.

The Role of the US in the Region

A number of things are going to change in the US in the near future: Bush will leave office and whatever the post-Iraq syndrome will be, it will undoubtedly be real, most likely reducing America's inclination to engage in this part of the world. The kind of unconditional support that Israel has had in the past may not quite be the same in the next few years. The questions then become: (1) What actions should the Israeli government and the Jewish community take to continue keeping support for Israel on the highest level possible? and (2) What actions should the Israelis take, recognizing that it will be more difficult in the future to get support for positions that are resistant to initiatives? Israelis should develop their own redlines, define their strategic imperatives, and then go to the U.S. to ask for its help to move forward, emphasizing what Israel cannot live with and what it can.

Leadership Working Group - Closing Remarks

by Jehuda Reinharz, President of Brandeis University

The Leadership working group discussed the weaknesses and problems of Jewish communities both in Israel and the Diaspora, including the lack of succession plans, and of potential leaders from among young people, women and disadvantaged social economic backgrounds. The group discussed the desired qualities of leaders - a very long list – and the need for Jewish leaders who are imbued with Jewish values and a common vision for the Jewish People, in Israel and the Diaspora.

Principles

The group proposes a standard for Jewish leadership that aims high and departs from current realities. While recognizing the largely excellent leadership, both professional and lay, currently in place, the challenges of the times require reform. The Jewish People require a next generation of outstanding leaders fitting the novel requirements of the 21st century. Many present leaders meet some of the requirements, but all need retooling.

The quality of leadership is critical for the future of the Jewish People. This makes the development of leaders all the more essential, in particular for coping with all the challenges facing the Jewish People and crafting and implementing new grand-policies.

Requirements

Given realities, even general attributions needed to be emphasized and specified: Its All about the Who. Therefore, the group would like to emphasize the following crucial requirements:

- Strong commitment to the long-term future of the Jewish People and the State of Israel.

- Deep imbuement in Jewish cultural values, tradition and history.

- Knowing Hebrew and knowing Jewish and Hebrew texts.

- Visions for the future of the Jewish People.

- Knowledge of the Jewish People as a whole and a sense of Jewish solidarity.

- Cooperative attitudes and strong willingness to work with other Jewish People leaders and communities.

- Outreach capacities beyond the Jewish People.

- Ability to mobilize others.

- Institution-building capacities.

- Understanding of historic processes shaping the future.

- Strategic mind set, tactical skills and operational effectiveness.

- Constant self-reflection and self-improvement.

- Personal ethics fitting Jewish and universal values.

- "Open Mind" and innovativeness.

Jewish People Leadership as a whole should be younger, include more women and be more reflective of all strata of the Jewish People.

Recommendations for Israeli and Diaspora Jewish Leaders

- Give top priority to developing quality leadership in Jewish issues and thinking about leadership as a profession and a vocation.

- Set up a global center for Jewish leadership development, operating in part as networked centers co-operating with other institutions.

- Provide leaders with opportunities for mutual learning and shared reflection.

- Make special efforts to draw suitable candidates from all walks of life, especially young people and women, into leadership positions.

- Senior Jewish People leaders should undertake the mentoring of their junior partners and successors.

- Establish a global forum of Jewish leadership that will address issues facing the Jewish People in the near, middle and far terms.

- Create greater effectiveness through evaluation & accountability of leadership.

- Encourage overall Jewish leadership not necessarily tied to specific organizations and adapt a Jewish People perspective.

- Use new technologies to enhance and promote intra-Jewish dialogue, information, communication, and networking.

- Encourage overall Jewish leadership not necessarily tied to specific organizations and adapt a Jewish people perspective.

- Provide resources for grass roots young leadership initiatives, especially university students and young adults.

- Urge Jewish leaders to encourage outreach and alliances with non-Jewish communities.

- Encourage constant dialogue between Israeli and Jewish leaders abroad and encourage both to assume shared responsibility for the entire Jewish People.

- Establish a task force to design an implementation plan of these recommendations for concrete action.

Jewish Identity, Identification and Demography Working Group Closing Remarks

by Aharon Yadlin, Former Minister of Education of the State of Israel

The Identity group's discussion was filled by a sense of extreme urgency regarding the issues and challenges facing Jewish peoplehood and existence. While there is concern about the constant diminution of the share of Jews out of the total population of their countries of residence, in Israel and worldwide, there is a clear understanding that understanding the depth of underlying cultural and identificational changes is critical to evaluating the quantitative aspects of world Jewry. The debates surrounding these trends are deeply related to the diversity of Jewish perceptions, ideologies and world-views that do not share an obvious common denominator. This renders a unitary picture of these developments and of Jewish identity itself difficult if not impossible. The boundaries of Jewish peoplehood are becoming blurred and porous, and its contents more diverse and less consensual. The processes are heterogeneous, multidimensional and perhaps contradict themselves.

The group's participants represented a range of different religious commitments, but there was consensus that Jewish religion is an integral part of the history of Jewish civilization, culture and ethics. Several members – from different perspectives – offered moving articulations of their understanding of the profound and inescapable roles of God, theology, transcendence, spirituality, Prophetic ethics, as well as traditional *Halakhah*, in the most fundamental layers of Jewish identity. At the same time, it was underscored that the recognition of diversity is fundamental to any meaningful discussion of Jewish peoplehood in this time. By the same token, Jewish communities have long ceased to be homogeneous and undifferentiated bodies. Policy planning must, therefore, take into account diversity and articulate different options responding to the different needs and self-definition of Jewish communities, and their different normative approaches.

Priorities for Urgent Intervention

The working group recognized a number of priority suggestions for urgent intervention:

• The State of Israel should recognize the maintenance and thriving of Diaspora Jewry in its various forms as an abiding strategic imperative.

• New frameworks of dialogue should be encouraged and developed given the many different modes of Jewish identification that exist and compete in the contemporary Jewish scene.

• Rabbinic authorities – and the political structures with whom they interact – should be strongly encouraged to strengthen and make more accessible the *giyur* (conversion) system and procedures. Means of conversion should be developed which will facilitate the inclusion within the Jewish fold of as many members of Jewish families as wish to do so while respecting the integrity of the tradition and the tenets of Judaism.

• The Jewish People should have a clear growth-oriented population policy.

• Demographic factors should be taken into account in determining the agreed boundaries of the State of Israel, so as to ensure and preserve a clear and viable Jewish majority.

• In Israel, a policy of intense development and settlement of the southern regions should be implemented that would allow for significant Jewish population growth and a better population distribution over the national territory.

• The State of Israel should enhance the role of social services and of financial and value-oriented incentives aimed at facilitating family, marriage and childbearing of wanted children, particularly at medium parities such as the 3rd or 4th child, on a non-discriminatory basis for all its citizens.

• Regarding Jewish births in other countries, it is recommended to establish a child care service that would approach intermarried couples early on in

the parenting process, to offer them a basket of services, including early child care, family membership in Jewish community bodies and other points of access into Jewish life.

- The Jewish community worldwide should undertake to understand those communal spaces, institutions and activities in which groups such as intermarried couples and their children can participate in communal life while respecting the integrity of the range of religious and other commitments of other elements of the community.

- Some participants in the discussion raised the possibility of reinstating the notion of an intermediate Jewish status, akin to the ger toshav of Rabbinic literature. Other participants viewed that suggestion as a potential obstacle to the current process of *giyur* in Israel.

- As a goal of fundamental importance, Hebrew should be strengthened and expanded as a language of communication and learning unifying the Jewish people. Special emphasis should be laid on Hebrew in early childhood and an international network of ulpanim be established.

- Massive investment should be undertaken to improve knowledge and transmission of Jewish identity through expanding existing and new networks of Jewish schools, and the best forms of informal education such as Birthright, camps, youth movements, adolescent education and adult education.

- A range of affordable high quality Jewish educational options at a range of ages is an absolute prerequisite for the Jewish People's future survival, thriving and creativity. Such educational options should not be limited to schools but also include summer camps, youth movements, informal education, lifelong learning and other programs.

- In order to reduce the often-prohibitive costs of Jewish education, the State of Israel and Jewish donors worldwide should consider the provision of a guaranteed loan program for Jewish education.

- A majority of the participants thought that Jewish communities outside Israel should rethink their longstanding opposition to the use of public funds to finance Jewish education.

- One or more worldwide core curricula of Jewish identity should be developed, for Israel and elsewhere, that will educate to a deep relation to the Jewish people in all its communities and to Jewish history in all its periods and its rich textual heritage.

- Alongside traditional forms of *aliyah*, there should be recognition and support for new types of *aliyah*, including multi-local residencies. This entails the development of policy frameworks that will establish the legal, professional, economic and civic status of such olim in their respective situations.

- Communities of absorption, in Israel and elsewhere, should recognize the human capital and potential contributions of immigrants and work to incorporate them into the community as an asset, not as a burden, while respecting their identities.

- Regarding the community of Israelis living abroad, an entirely new attitude should be adopted striving to maintain their strong and viable ties with Israel. Some of the participants suggested that the possibility of allowing them continued political rights in Israel should be examined by the Government of Israel.

- As regards internal migration within the US and other major countries, communities should develop means of facilitating multiple communal memberships. The leadership of US Jewry should pay careful attention to the effects of such migrations on Jewish voting patterns and political traction in the society at large.

- A corps of Israeli *shelichim*, young and of the highest quality, should be created that will help to strengthen the relationship between Israel and world Jewry.

- New ways should be found to encourage Jewish creativity and communicate Jewish values to the outside world.

- Major nonprofit Jewish media networks should be established, including internet, print publishing, satellite channels and all media.

- By all means efforts should be made to encourage the search for meaning, spontaneity and spirituality that powerfully moves Jews, and especially young people, in Israel and throughout the world. This requires openness to innovative approaches to new forms of Jewish community life.

- A highly visible public, Jewish representative body should be created for deliberation and decision-making.

- All future Jewish People policy planning should take in due account the diversity of situations that prevails in different countries worldwide.

Vibrant Communities for the Next Generation - Closing Remarks

By Stephen Hoffman, President of the Jewish Federation of Cleveland

There is a continuing debate over the nature of community and policy. There is a case for and a need for a strong core and center, a real community comprised of interdependent parts, including common practices, common memory, and interests which extend beyond itself, to address the many goals that Jewish communities set for themselves. However, such a concept has evolved to understand that a strong core is not the antithesis of diversity and communal structures must be open to partnerships and new ideas that need to be tested over time.

Principles

In order to reach the next generation, the Jewish people need to understand that traditional forms of learning and social interaction are being challenged, and communities must be open to encouraging and facilitating new forms. History suggests that, in the long run, there continues to be value to known forms of community, i.e., kehilah, synagogues, minyanim, central organizations, etc., but they need to be reinterpreted and modified in a process in which younger generations are involved and with which they can

identify. There is a need to encourage creativity and diversity, rather than resist and treat it with disdain.

Learning is the heart of the Jewish tradition, and creative, open programs of Jewish learning, especially those initiated at the grass roots level, need to be encouraged and developed.

Judaism is not only a way of thinking but also a way of organizing one's life. There is value in teaching the next generation that to live a Jewish life entails acting not only for one's self but to improve the world, including the Jewish world and all of humanity. For a common destiny, Jews in the Diaspora and in Israel should work together on a profoundly Jewish charge to do justice and improve the world. Combined Jewish volunteering should be encouraged among Jews in Israel and around the world to engage in such programs designed with specific Jewish values and interests.

Opportunities for Action

- The Birthright experience has given Jewish communities wonderful opportunities to (1) continue expanding the Birthright concept itself, (2) exploit the follow-up opportunities such as Masa, the Israel Experience, and work on campuses worldwide; and (3) exploit opportunities for programming at key intervention points such as universal Jewish preschool, camping, and other significant milestones. Programs such as "Baby Birthright", which provide communal support for a Jewish pre-school experience, are to be encouraged. Such programs provide a Jewish experience to the children themselves but hold promise to engage the parents as well in Jewish activities.

- Jewish communities should work with the President of Israel to develop the President's House as platform for Jewish meetings, creativity and exchange. It should be a center where the arts, Jewish learning, and other forms of Jewish creativity will be celebrated and shared among communities. It should also be a center where creative people, especially those in Jewish philanthropy, Jewish education, Jewish communal service, etc., will be recognized. (Perhaps a "Jewish Creativity and/or Service Award.")

- Experts in the fields of communications technology should be brought together to explore ways of "getting the message out" and helping to build community.

- Encourage the development of mechanisms to engender examination and sharing of best practices among communities.

Expression of Group Views

- There was overwhelming sentiment that a state monopoly of religion in Israel, the Jewish homeland, is emerging as a major impediment to Jewish unity and continuity; a major impediment to the alignment of Jews in Israel and the Diaspora moving forward; a challenge to *aliyah*; and even as a major impediment to the Jewish identification of a very significant number of Israelis.

- There is an emerging consensus that the government of Israel has a responsibility to engage in Jewish identification and education activity in the Diaspora. Project Birthright and Masa, which have proven to be successful, should be expanded and followed up upon.

- There is a thirst in the Diaspora to be heard, and the government of Israel must establish and foster forums for dialogue with the Diaspora. Likewise, there is a need to inform and engage Israeli society at various levels, particularly through education and the media, about the Diaspora in the 21st century.

- There is concern at the rise of Diaspora Jewish anti-Zionist activism. The Israeli government needs to urgently invest resources in enhancing its *Hasbarah* effort, in order to effectively disseminate the Israeli narrative, provide "ammunition" to Israel's defenders, and bolster identification with Israel among Jewish communities.

The group calls upon the JPPPI to include an assessment of these issues in its Annual Assessments.

SECTION III:

Policy Directions

Geopolitics

Iran

- Prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

- Back up political and economic sanctions against Iran with a credible military option to increase chances of success.

- Deter Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons by taking advantage of its vulnerabilities such as a difficult economic situation, high dependence on the price of oil, divisions among its leadership, and overall sensitivity to international isolation.

- Engage Europe more deeply in the process of deterring Iran, as Europe holds much of Iran's economic lifeline.

- Put greater efforts into mobilizing China and Russia to deter Iran.

- Make clear throughout the international community that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons poses a problem for the entire world and so all must operate firmly to counter the threat; however, do not cower from acknowledging the particular threat that Iran poses to Israel and do not build on global mobilization for deterrence as a single option.

- Do not assume regime change in Iran will happen prior to Iran's acquiring nuclear weapon capacity.

Radical Islam

- Launch a comprehensive campaign against radical Islam's efforts to de-legitimize Israel's right to exist and its efforts to transform the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into a religious and existential one.

- Build upon the increasing sensitivity of world opinion to human rights to validate the right of the Jewish people to its homeland and engage diverse allies in this effort.

- Acknowledge Turkey's role as a bulwark against radical Islam and aid Turkey's acceptance into the EU as a means to preserve its moderate Islamic nature and support it as a model for the broader Islamic world.

- Highlight the danger of nuclear Pakistan falling into the hands of a radical Islamic regime.

Islamic terrorism

- Improve the defensive capacities of Jewish communities, especially smaller and more vulnerable ones.

- Acknowledge that Islamic terrorism is directed at the West as a whole, and avoid "jumping ahead" and creating the misleading impression that Israel and the Jewish people are the target of global terrorism.

- Modify international laws of war to address the new types of warfare and responses that are needed to combat terrorism.

- Prevent acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups as they would not be deterred from using them.

The Middle East and the Israel-Arab Conflict

- Leverage the Arab peace initiative to advance the Israeli interest for improved relations with the Arab world and to support and provide legitimacy for an Israeli-Palestinian process.

- Enter into dialogue with Syria to explore the seriousness of its intentions.

- Put greater pressure on Egypt to prevent entry of weapons into Gaza.

- Provide a plan for economic development of the West Bank that would lead to the creation of jobs and increased living standards in order to present to the Palestinians an economic horizon (in addition to a political one).

- Involve Jordan in the crafting of future arrangements (such as a confederation), given its ability to support those Palestinians who want an agreement with Israel.

The United States

- Clarify to the US Israel's positions regarding an agreement with the Palestinians, emphasizing non-negotiable items and positions

- Coordinate with the US an effective peace process with a reliable Palestinian partner, realizing that such a process could help consolidate a moderate regional group against the threat of radical Islam and deepen the trust between the leaders of the US and Israel.

- Deepen the strategic dialogue between the US and Israel, emphasizing the situation after Iraq and Israel's interest in the continuing engagement and leadership of the US in the region, and noting that starting a process with the Palestinians might serve that purpose.

Rising Powers

Develop and deepen Jewish people relations with India and China, noting that both rising powers do not have historical and religious relations to Judaism and the Jewish People

Jewish People Leadership

Jewish People Leadership, as a whole, should be younger, include more women and be more reflective of all strata of the Jewish People.

The Global Center for Jewish Leadership

Set up a Global Center for Jewish Leadership Development based in Israel, operating as the core part of a network of Leadership institutions and programs and serving as a leading framework for dialogues on Jewish affairs, as follows:

- Create curricula designed to develop Jewish People Leadership for both political and spiritual leaders. The curricula will enhance the development of the following crucial requirements in virtues and skills for Jewish Leaders:

- Strong commitment to the long-term future of the Jewish People and the State of Israel.

  - Visions for the future of the Jewish People.

  - Understanding of historic processes shaping the future of the Jewish People.

  - Strategic mindset, tactical skills and operational effectiveness.

  - Deep imbuement in Jewish cultural values, tradition and history. Knowing Hebrew and knowledge of Jewish and Hebrew texts.

  - Personal virtues: Constant self-reflection and self-improvement; Personal ethics fitting Jewish and universal values; "Open Mind" and innovativeness.

  - Knowledge of the Jewish People as a whole and a sense of Jewish solidarity. Cooperative attitudes and strong willingness to work with other Jewish People leaders and communities.

- Outreach capacities beyond the Jewish People. Ability to mobilize others.

- Institution-building capacities.

• Design core curricula of Jewish texts and practices – essential Jewish knowledge for Jewish leaders.

• Craft special mentoring program for the students and graduates of the center – so that they can work directly under the tutelage of senior Jewish People leaders. Build career-development programs that focus on leadership as a profession and a vocation.

Other Specific directions

• Encourage and facilitate a culture and use of new technologies to promote intra-Jewish dialogue, information, communications and networking.

• Provide Jewish Leaders with opportunities for mutual learning and shared reflection:

- Mechanisms of reflection and structured contemplation of crucial Jewish Affairs dilemmas.

- Enhance a culture of open dialogue – learn to create unity while promoting pluralism, strive for consensus building while allowing and respecting other voices.

- Encourage processes that will produce relevant ideas and knowledge that serve as a basis for reflection and dialogue (along the model of the Policy Papers of the JPPPI).

Identity, Identification and Demography

Transmission and Education

- Encourage and develop new frameworks of dialogue given the many different modes of Jewish identification that exist and compete in the contemporary Jewish scene.

- Massively invest to improve knowledge and transmission of Jewish identity through expanding existing and creating new networks of Jewish schools, and the best forms of informal education such as Birthright, camps, youth movements, adolescent education and adult education:

  - In order to reduce the prohibitive costs of Jewish education, the State of Israel and Jewish donors worldwide should consider the initiation of a guaranteed loan program for Jewish education.

  - Rethink longstanding opposition to the use of funds to finance Jewish education in the Diaspora.

- Find new ways to encourage Jewish creativity and communication of Jewish values to the outside world.

- Encourage by all means the search for meaning, spontaneity and spirituality that powerfully moves Jews, and especially young people, in Israel and throughout the world. This requires openness to innovative approaches to new forms of Jewish community life.

Jewish Population Growth

- Strengthen and make more accessible the *giyur* system and procedures. Rabbinic authorities – and the political structures with whom they interact – should be strongly encouraged to strengthen and make more accessible the *giyur* system and procedures. Means of conversion should be developed that will facilitate the inclusion within the Jewish fold of as

many members of Jewish families as wish to do so while respecting the integrity of the tradition and the tenets of Judaism.

- Facilitate the Jewish family, marriage and childbearing:

  o The State of Israel should enhance the role of social services and of financial and value-oriented incentives aimed at facilitating wanted children, particularly at medium parities such as the 3rd or 4th child, on a non-discriminatory basis for all its citizens.

  o Regarding Jewish births in other countries, it is recommended to establish a child care service that would approach intermarried couples early on in the parenting process, to offer them a basket of services, including early child care, family membership in Jewish community bodies and other points of access into Jewish life.

Jewish Population Distribution

- Encourage *aliyah* with attention to new forms of multi-local residence and an entirely new and inclusive attitude toward Israelis living abroad. This entails the development of policy frameworks that will establish the legal, professional, economic and civic status of such olim in their respective situations.

- Regarding the community of Israelis living abroad adopt an entirely new attitude striving to maintain their strong and viable ties with Israel, incorporate them into local communities; the possibility of allowing them continued political rights in Israel should be examined by the Government of Israel.

- Ensure that the borders of the State of Israel guarantee a clear Jewish majority.

- Intensively develop and settle Israel's southern and northern regions to allow for significant Jewish population growth and a better population distribution over the national territory.

Vibrant Communities for the Next Generation

There are three levels of intervention: strengthen local communities, strengthen inter-community relations, and strengthen the Israel-Diaspora relations. The projects are prioritized according to feasibility, urgency and structural impact criteria. The items at the top of the lists appear to be the most feasible.

Strengthening the Local Communities

- Encourage new forms of participation, creative and unconventional ways of reaching out to unaffiliated and non-participating Jews such as social justice, advocacy, learning, parent and family education.

- Expand Birthright and follow up: Masa, the Israel Experience, work on worldwide campuses.

- Universal Jewish preschool, camping, "Baby Birthright" program.

- Establish seed money foundation to assess and support grass-roots initiatives led by younger people.

- Employ communications technologies to build community.

- Reach out to Israelis and Russians in Diaspora communities.

Strengthening the Global Jewish Community

- Establish an efficient inter-community networking system.

- Engender examination and sharing of best practices among communities:

  ○ Systematic reporting of innovative initiatives.

  ○ Academic and policy oriented research about "best practices" such as writing of casestudies and analyses.

  ○ Consultancy services for Jewish community development - international professional consultants will act as "best practices" collectors and disseminators.

- Convene a forum for bringing together top professionals from different countries on an annual or semi-annual basis to discuss the situations in their respective communities.

- Internships in communities abroad should be encouraged or required for those entering Jewish communal service at the middle-level and leadership level.

- "Jewish Creativity and/or Service Award".

- Launch International "Tikkun Olam" initiatives– making a uniquely Jewish contribution to the welfare and enlightenment of world society such as Peace Corps, Darfur activism and Backpackers for Peace in Nepal. Encourage Diaspora-Israel combined Jewish volunteering programs designed with specific Jewish values and interests.

Revising and Strengthening Israel-Diaspora Relations

- Enhance Israel-Diaspora mutual knowledge, understanding and dialogue.

- Give Jewish People representatives more of a voice in Israeli decisions.

- Make the President's House a platform for Jewish meetings, creativity and exchange and a focal point of new community initiatives especially highlighting young innovative activities with conferences, monthly Presidential podcasts and moderated global discussions.

- Create a mechanism to inform and engage Israeli society at various levels, particularly through education and the media, about the Diaspora in the 21st century.

- Israel must engage in Jewish identification and education activity in the Diaspora.

- Encourage pluralistic Judaism in Israel -- this is critical to Israel and to Israel-Diaspora future relations.

- *Hasbarah* (effectively disseminate the Israeli narrative, provide "ammunition" to Israel's defenders, answers to nagging questions)

Geopolitics

Mega-Trends in the Next Five Years Which Will Impact on World Jewry and Israel

By Stuart E. Eizenstat

At one level, the late 20th century and early 21st century is a truly Golden Age for world Jewry. Following the decimation of the Holocaust, and since the Civil Rights laws of the late 1960s, Jews in the United States, Israel and elsewhere have enjoyed unparalleled opportunities. In the United States, quotas in higher education, professional schools, financial institutions, law firms, and hospitals have long since been dropped. A remarkable 85 percent of American Jewish youngsters attend college--twice the national average. Jews have been completely integrated into American society. Similar success has been enjoyed by Jews in Europe. And Jews have taken full advantage of the elimination of barriers. Jews are barely one-fifth of one percent of the world's population, but represent 20 percent of all Nobel Prize winners. There is hardly a field of endeavor in science, the arts, medicine, law, literature, government, in which Jews are not disproportionately prominent.

Jews have accomplished something no other people in recorded history has achieved: the return after two millennia of exile from our land to a new sovereign Jewish State , the Third Jewish Commonwealth, one which has embodied the Prophetic vision of the ingathering of the dispersed from the four corners of the world. Israel has made Hebrew a living language; helped move the Jewish people from a state of powerlessness, at the whim and caprice of rulers from time immemorial, to a state of sovereignty and power. Israel has successfully absorbed waves of refugees, first from Arab lands from

which Jews were expelled in the 1950s, then the massive migration of over 750,000 from the former Soviet Union in the 1980s and 1990s, and now the Ethiopian Jews. No state which won its independence after World War II from a colonial ruler, as Israel did from the United Kingdom, has come further, faster, than Israel. It has fulfilled the Biblical injunction of making the desert bloom. It boasts one of the highest levels per capita of exports of any nation in the world; has a GDP per capita above the level of several Member States of the European Union; is a world leader in science, and high technology; has a world-class university system; and receives a substantial amount of foreign direct investment from leading multinational firms around the world. Israel has one of the five strongest militaries in the world. And, in 2006, with a steadily growing population, it became the largest Jewish community in the world, surpassing the United States.

And yet, in the first decade of the 21st century and over the next five years, world Jewry and Israel face an unparalleled set of challenges, from Global Mega-Trends. Surmounting these challenges will require the same vision, leadership, courage, and strength as the Jewish people have summoned to meet past challenges.

There are Five Mega-Trends with which World Jewry and the State of Israel must cope:

I. THE DRAMATIC SHIFT OF ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND MILITARY POWER FROM THE WEST TO THE EAST AND SOUTH, MOVING FROM A UNIPOLAR WORLD DOMINATED BY THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES TO A MULTIPOLAR WORLD;

II. THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION AND ITS EFFECT ON A POSSIBLE "WAR OF CIVILIZATIONS";

III. THE RISE OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM, THE RISE OF VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS, AND THE CHALLENGES THESE POSE TO MODERATE ARAB STATES, THE UNITED STATES, ISRAEL, AND WORLD JEWRY;

IV. THE RISE OF NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY RISKS: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION; GLOBAL WARMING; AND DEMOGRAPHY;

V. THE RISE OF A NEW FORM OF ANTI-SEMITISM AND ANTI-ISRAELI SENTIMENT.

For Israel, these Mega-Trends could form a "perfect storm" of economic, geo-strategic and environmental factors all potentially impacting the state. But all of these Mega-Trends, with proper foresight, leadership, and diplomacy, can be not only managed, but surmounted, with Israel emerging stronger for having faced them.

I. DRAMATIC SHIFT OF ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND MILITARY POWER FROM THE WEST TO THE EAST AND SOUTH, MOVING FROM A WORLD DOMINATED BY THE UNITED STATES, ISRAEL'S CHIEF ALLY, TO A MULTIPOLAR WORLD.

There has been a gradual but clear shift of economic power from Israel's closest ally, the United States, and its Western allies, to Asia and Latin America, which have no historical ties to Israel, and to Russia and the Gulf States, which are either openly hostile or, at best, neutral. Today, the "BRIC" nations of Brazil, Russia, China, and India, and other emerging countries represent 45 percent of global GDP, 40 percent of world exports, and 65 percent of foreign exchange holdings -- figures which are similar to the combined economic position of the United States and E.U. countries. Between 2004 and 2030, more than 70 percent of the increase in global energy demand will come from the developing world.

In order to feed its frenetic growth, China, which has about 20 percent of the world's population, consumes half of the world's cement, half of the world's pork, one third of its steel, and over a quarter of its aluminum; shipments of iron ore to China have risen by an average of 27 percent per year for the past four years. China will be the largest consumer of oil well before mid-century. In 1990, China consumed 2.4 million barrels per day, now it consumes over 7 million barrels per day, and by 2030, the International Energy Agency forecasts it will increase to 16.5 million per day, of which some 13 million barrels per day will be imported from abroad -- more than the current total output from Saudi Arabia.

In real terms, over the past decade China has had sustained GDP growth of more than 9 percent per annum; the past five years has seen its GDP grow even more quickly -- nearly 10.5 percent. India is only slightly less impressive,

averaging nearly 8.5 percent per year since 2002. Already in 2005 the International Monetary Fund found that developing countries held nearly $3 trillion in foreign exchange assets, an amount mounting quickly. It is thought that Beijing adds $1 billion a day to its already hulking reserves. The United States, meanwhile, has grown at just over 3 percent annually in the past decade, while the E.U.-15 has expanded at a rate of 2.3 percent per annum. Notably, as China and India picked up the pace in the past five years, the traditional global economic powers have seen their average growth rates slow, down to 2.8 percent for the United States and just over 2 percent for the E.U.-15. 2008 promises a further slow down. At the current rate, the Chinese economy will equal the United States' within twenty years, and will be nearly six times as big by the middle of the century.

The current financial crisis in the U.S. punctuates the shift in economic power. In 2008, the U.S. is going through the most severe financial crisis since the Great Depression, with a massive de-leveraging triggered by the bursting of the bubble of home prices and the sub-prime mortgage market. While the U.S. will bounce back, it will not occur overnight.

The U.S. is the world's greatest debtor. From the household level to the federal government, we have been living beyond our means, consuming more than we invest and save. Current account deficits at historic levels in net importing states, like the United States and Europe, have directly transferred trillions of dollars into the state treasuries in Beijing, Delhi, the Gulf States, Iran, and elsewhere. At some point the bubble had to pop, and it has. Over the next five years, the national debt, now $9 trillion, will grow by another $2 trillion. Almost half of the U.S. government's debt owed to banks and individuals is held by foreign creditors -- China, Japan, and the OPEC nations, up from only 13 percent five years ago.

America's ability to play a greater role in the world may be restricted by our looming financial problems. Despite this, it is important to recognize that the U.S. will remain *primus inter pares*, even in the economic sphere, for at least another generation. With only about 4.5 percent of the world's population, the U.S. produced 30.1 percent of global GDP in 2006. This percentage is projected to decline to 27.5 percent by 2020 and is likely to continue to decline thereafter, but will remain a significant percentage of global GDP.

Thus for the foreseeable future, the U.S. remains the most important economy in the world and the U.S. Dollar the world's major reserve currency, the medium of exchange for transactions the world over, including transactions in oil and gas. But the continued decline of the Dollar and the rise of the Euro is already having an impact, raising inflation rates in the Gulf States, encouraging them to continue raising oil prices.

These economic changes are not temporary; there has been a fundamental, structural change in global flows, which will accelerate over the next five years.

There are several ancillary effects to this new economic reality. First, while the world economy is still powered by the U.S., as economic power is increasingly dispersed among other nations, to the extent American power is economically based, Washington's influence may be diluted. The weakening U.S. Dollar, which has seen record lows since the beginning of the year, undercuts not just the direct force of "Dollar Diplomacy" but also the underlying strength of the American economy as the global guarantor.

A further impact of declining American economic hegemony concerns the other side of the economic ledger -- what increasingly rich developing countries do with their wealth. The threats for Israel are multi-faceted. First, apart from China and India, there are another set of winners in the recent global economic shift. In large part due to the insatiable demand of China, India and other quickly-industrializing countries, the price for commodities has exploded. In the first quarter of 2008, oil prices reached record levels, exceeding the inflation-adjusted highs achieved in the 1970s. Since 2000, oil prices have quadrupled as growth in demand has regularly outstripped the ability of oil producers to increase output. One result has been massive financial transfers to oil rich states, including those in the Middle East, many of whom remain opposed to Israel.

The amount of wealth many of these states have managed to collect is staggering; China and the Gulf States have created "Sovereign Wealth Funds" (SWFs), but one measure of the amount of wealth that is being concentrated in these states. Such funds are pools of capital collected, owned, and employed by states in global financial markets. These national funds have become key repositories for the fiscal surpluses enjoyed by

commodity producers and net exporters. Morgan Stanley estimates that SWFs have some $2.5 trillion under management, and growing. By 2015, SWFs will have some $12 trillion in assets. Six of the top twenty SWFs (measured by assets) are in the Gulf -- collectively these Arab funds control more than $1.2 *trillion*, a stunning amount that is growing rapidly.

Unsurprisingly, SWF owners have been on a spending spree in the United States and Europe, with SWFs and wealthy Gulf citizens putting up billions of dollars to invest in everything from Wall Street (UBS, Citibank, Blackstone, the Carlyle Group) to Main Street (the Dubai SWF purchased high street retailer Barneys during 2007). The concern for Israel is that the greater the weight of these financial actors in the American and European markets, the more they will be able to gain the ear of policy makers. The growing financial might of these funds is another reason time is not on Israel's side when it comes to making peace with its neighbors and becoming integrated into the regional economy.

Of course, money flowing into the Gulf and East Asia is not just spent on investments in OECD states; rather, unfortunately, it is also aiding in the substantial build up of regional militaries. These countries, and China in particular are spending a portion of their earnings to build militaries commensurate with their global economic standing. Reported Chinese military spending has increased by nearly 20 percent per annum over the past several years (with actual spending perhaps many times greater still), and Beijing's work on ballistic missiles, anti-satellite technology and the "Ring of Pearls" strategy for befriending nations in the region and throughout the world, challenges a clear area of American advantage -- our military dominance. The U.S. remains the strongest military in the world, with brisk increases in defense spending of our own. But the cost of fighting two wars is diverting resources from building a 21st century armed force. The $20 billion U.S. arms package for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, and the billions more from European countries, although less than the $30 billion package for Israel, and the substantial increase in Iran's military expenses, means that Israel's regional military dominance is likewise challenged.

Iran is an especially troubling beneficiary of this increased oil wealth. It is very likely pursuing nuclear weapons, which may in turn lead other regional

actors -- Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, among others -- to seek such weapons as well, adding to regional instability and further challenging Israel's strategic advantages. And it is not just formal militaries that are benefiting from this attention. Iran is using its healthy income from its oil and gas exports to reportedly have a nine figure line item in its budget to support terrorism; annual payments to Hezbollah from Tehran, for example, are thought to be as much as $200 million.

There are other ways in which oil dependence weakens America's national security, and thus has an impact on Israel. The U.S. consumes 20 million barrels of oil a day, 7.2 billion barrels annually. 60 percent of our oil is imported, compared to only 23 percent in the 1970s; by 2025, the U.S. will be importing nearly 70 percent at current growth rates. OPEC countries produce around 42 percent of world oil, and of these supplies, 68 percent come from Persian Gulf nations that have no diplomatic relations with Israel. As Senator Richard Lugar (R-ID) has put it, most of the world's oil is concentrated in places that are either hostile to American interests or vulnerable to political upheaval and terrorism. The negative implications for Israel are evident.

A 2006 Council on Foreign Relations Report concluded that the "lack of sustained attention to energy issues is undercutting U.S. foreign policy and national security." The CFR report found that the U.S. addiction to fossil fuels imperils the nation in several ways:

-- Expanded oil revenues give greater flexibility to oil exporting countries to adopt policies contrary to U.S. interest, from Iranian nuclear desires, to Russia's move toward more bellicose authoritarianism, to Venezuela's troublemaking in Latin America;

-- America's foreign policy flexibility could be reduced with China investing huge amounts in Africa to secure oil and other commodities, and with Russia able to exert pressure on neighboring countries and on Western Europe;

-- A move from the current system of open oil markets to special oil and gas deals to ensure supply, which include political arrangements to ensure secure supply. To satisfy its enormous needs for natural resources, China is using lavish aid and economic incentives to lock-in sales agreements from Angola and Sudan to Myanmar (Burma) and Australia. This has foreign policy

and national security implications, for example making China reluctant to support stiff sanctions against Sudan over Darfur or Myanmar over their human rights record, and often investing in natural resources development to secure resources solely for China's use, taking such resources off the world market. Beijing's unquenchable desire for oil may over time lead them to seek special arrangements with Arab oil producers, as well, with implications for both U.S. and Israeli security.

-- Dependence upon oil revenues could keep the "oil curse" alive and postpone needed internal reforms by oil producing nations, from Nigeria and Angola, to Chad, Equatorial Guinea and the Gulf States.

The shift in power is not only economic, but diplomatic as well. America's standing in the world has taken a beating, largely due to the Iraq war, but also because of perceived inaction on climate change, arms control, and poverty reduction. Some of this is unfair. The Bush Administration has an admirable record of increasing foreign assistance dramatically, creating innovative ways to reward good international actors through large grants, and has vastly increased assistance for fighting AIDS. But recent opinion polls have demonstrated growing hostility in Europe toward the U.S.; in one survey almost half of the European public perceives the overall influence of the U.S. in the world to be negative. In Britain, Germany and Spain, three historically friendly countries, the U.S. is seen, remarkably and disturbingly, as the "the greatest threat to global stability" ahead of China, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. When Israel's principal ally is held in such low esteem, there are implications for Israel.

Despite these sobering surveys, after a first term in which the Bush Administration took a number of unilateral actions to demonstrate America's hegemony in the world -- from the invasion of Iraq to the withdrawal from the small arms convention, the ABM treaty, and the Kyoto Global Warming Protocol, at the beginning of his second term the President was chastened -- again primarily by the Iraq war -- and, to his credit, pivoted. President Bush has made the alliance with the E.U. a central feature of his foreign policy, and building the very multinational coalitions he had criticized the Clinton Administration for seeking and which he shirked as a restriction on America's freedom of action, a central feature of his second term. Thus, in dealing

with Iran, North Korea, and even the Middle East peace process, the U.S. has worked closely with the E.U., the Six Party Talks, and the Quartet.

All in all, Israel is facing a significant set of risks in the near term. But in this great global shift of power, Israel is not without assets.

Israel makes up just 0.3 percent of global GDP and consequently there may be seemingly little that Israel can do to influence wider economic forces. That may be true, and Israel will certainly be buffeted by the global financial changes underway, perhaps most importantly by the slow, relative decline of U.S. power. In this, however, there are several variables that, depending upon how both the U.S. and Israel manage their economic, diplomatic and military relations, may soften the landing.

First, if the U.S. chooses to continue its current economic policies, expanding its current account deficit to yet new heights, maintaining its tight dependence on foreign oil, and refusing to encourage savings, the situation for both the U.S. and Israel could become quickly dire. Yet, if the U.S. makes some needed policy adjustments there is every reason to think that the U.S. will remain at least the first among equals. America remains the most creative, most innovative, most competitive, most industrious nation in the world. Israel should take some comfort that the U.S. will remain a key player in all major foreign policy issues, certainly including the Middle East. A new administration in January 2009 will likely tackle some of the difficult domestic economic conditions. This will indirectly strengthen Israel.

Changes in U.S. policy ought to also be external and structural; one of the more difficult challenges would be forcing Beijing to unshackle the Yuan, which would have a positive impact on the U.S. (and likely Israeli) current accounts. Further, the U.S. and other members of the G8 should contemplate inviting China, India and other emerging economic powers to full seats at the table in the Bretton Woods system, increasing their explicit share allotment at the IMF and World Bank, and thus their stakes in the process.

Regardless of U.S. policy choices, Israel need not be passive and it could improve its economic outcome by maintaining its strong relationship with the U.S. as the centerpiece of its foreign policy, but also broadening its base of economic support to include Brazil, Russia, India and China (the BRIC

countries), as well as other emerging countries, including Turkey and the Asian tiger countries.

There are promising signs on this front. Bilateral trade between Israel and Brazil increased from $449 millions in 2002 to $746 millions in 2006, and Jerusalem and Brasilia recently signed a bilateral agreement for industrial research and development in the private sector. Israel-India trade is also increasingly robust, and proposed joint Indian/Israeli investments in research and development should be seriously considered. The Israel-Turkey relationship is also promising, both for the economic boon it provides Jerusalem but also as a critical further foothold in the Muslim world; the relationship is multifaceted and extends from the more than 300,000 Israelis who vacation in Turkey every year, to Jerusalem's importation of water from Ankara, to high-level Israel-Turkey military cooperation.

Regarding Russia, Israel is already Russia's leading trading partner in the region, and given Israel's strong base of CIS olim, Israel has natural advantages as it seeks to further economic ties with Moscow. While Vladimir Putin, and now Dmitry Medvedev, have clearly sought to create a distinct Russian foreign policy, often at odds with the U.S. and more friendly to the Arab states, the Kremlin nonetheless wants Russia to be seen as a constructive player in the Middle East peace process through the Quartet. Moscow clearly values relations with the Jewish State, and with Russia's Jewish community. Even on Iran, although clearly opposing tough sanctions, Russia has proposed constructive ways to deal with Iran's nuclear program.

Meanwhile, trade with China represents perhaps the biggest prize, but brings with it a firewall of which Israel should be wary. Israel-China trade is accelerating remarkably, climbing 30 percent between 2005 and 2006 to $3.8 billion, and exceeding $5 billion in 2007. China is now Israel's second largest trading partner, after the U.S. However, in balancing its relationships, Israel must be very careful in its dealing with China, because of American concerns, expressed particularly by those in the Pentagon who see China as a potential military opponent, and consequently strongly oppose transfers of technology to China which could aid its military and missile capacity. Consequently, Israel must be wary of the particular ways in which it becomes close with Beijing. Israel's recent, alleged military cooperation with China

(via Israel Aircraft Industries and others), led to tensions in U.S.-Israel relations. It required an MOU between the U.S. and Israel to confirm that Israel would not supply military-related items to China, but the scars remain, and there have been clear impacts outside the defense cooperation relationship with greater scrutiny being paid by U.S. regulators on Israeli acquisition plans for U.S. assets in the high tech sector.

Israel's policy moves internally are arguably as important as her decisions to further relations externally. And, in this regard, the best scenario for Israel is to continue down the path it set in the 1980s -- towards further and faster economic liberalization and promotion of high technology -- and to limit any slide in the areas that have made the country so successful. Signs in this regard are also hopeful. Israel's "Silicon Wadi" remains the envy of much of the world, and IBM, Motorola, Microsoft, and dozens of other multinational high technology companies have benefited greatly from their positioning in Israel. The wider Israeli economy is attractive enough to have coaxed U.S. investment bellwether Berkshire Hathaway out of its American shell and choose Israel as the location for its first ever international investment (in 2006 paying $4 billion for 80 percent of Iscar Metalworking). Meanwhile, technology firm Cisco has made nine high-tech acquisitions in Israel and is aiming for more. Such investments are only a part of Israeli foreign direct investment, which reached $9.5 billion in 2007, a number that puts it in rare company -- FDI is more than 5 percent of the country's GDP. This is reflected in the size of Israel's economy, especially when compared with its oil rich neighbors: GDP per capita in Israel is $28,800; average GDP per capita in OPEC states is more than 25 percent less, only $21,250.

Other macroeconomic and microeconomic factors also suggest that Israel has the potential to thrive, even without the backstop of an all powerful U.S. Israel spends a greater share of its GDP on research and development than any OECD state (4.4 percent); almost one Israeli in 10 works in the high-tech sector; thousands of start-ups are created every year; and, outside U.S.-based firms, more companies from Israel are listed on the NASDAQ than from any other state. Israel has world-class basic research institutions, like the Weizmann Institute, with which I have been affiliated, Technion, and others, and the capacity to convert basic research breakthroughs into commercial

products, like the Weizmann-developed drug Copaxone, which has become one of the most important treatments for MS.

On the economic front, the risks for Israel come from its strengths. As Cisco CEO John Chambers noted, the reason his company has been disproportionately interested in Israel, rather than, for example, China was because though China boasted greater manpower, the attraction of Israel is that "innovation was Israel's strong point." Unfortunately, there are some signs that Israel's role as a fount of innovation has slowed; education has been subjected to budget cuts in recent years, and a recent poll of potential high-tech investors conducted by consultants Deloitte found that 30 percent intended to invest in Chinese companies while 25 percent said they planned on investing in India -- Israel was not on the list. Perhaps most alarming is the Israeli "brain drain"; in academia the number of Israelis working at U.S. universities equals one quarter of the total senior faculty in Israeli academia. In order to forestall the negative scenarios, Israeli investment in education and in keeping its clear comparative advantages must be paramount.

II. THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION AND ITS EFFECT ON A POSSIBLE "CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS"

Globalization is a related, but separate, Mega-Trend to the Shift of Global Economic Power. It refers to the breaking down of national boundaries, the growing interconnectedness of economies, and the increasing ubiquity and ease of global communications and transportation. The globalization of markets for trade and services, as well as for foreign direct investment, are growing unabated. Capital flows have obliterated national boundaries. Annually some $6.4 trillion, or 14.5 percent of global GDP and four times higher than capital flows only a decade earlier, are moved about globally. Billions of dollars cross national boundaries every minute of every day, with the simple push of a button.

Over the past seven years, world trade volumes have increased at a rate of 6.7 percent per annum, more than twice as fast as industrial production. In current dollar terms, world trade doubled during the 1990s and has doubled again since 2000. The portion of U.S. GDP devoted to international trade was 6 percent right after World War II, 11 percent in the 1970s, and is now

26 percent. In the developing world the figures are just as startling. In just five years, from 2002-2006, international trade as a percent of Indian GDP jumped from 36.1 percent to an astonishing 65.7 percent.

Despite the benefits of globalization, which include making more products affordable to moderate income families, some have rightly pointed to various troubling side effects of the phenomenon. Globalization is clearly a central factor in the loss of industrial jobs in many western democracies, Israel included, as work moves to low wage countries like China. It was partly due to this phenomenon that led MK Avishai Braverman to warn in January of this year that "Globalization, is a greater threat to Israel than even Iran." MK Braverman's concerns rest primarily on the unequal benefits globalization has provided different sectors of Israeli society – "We're building a country in Tel Aviv and overseas, not in outlying areas," he said. And indeed, it is the Information Age, which is part of the globalization phenomenon, that largely accounts for Braverman's concerns; it has sharply devalued the work of those who are not part of the information revolution, and those with fewer job skills. The result in Israel has been a yawning income inequality; the wage gap in Israel is more severe than in any E.U. state save Slovakia, and nearly 18 percent worse than in the average OECD state. To many, including MK Braverman, globalization is a prime culprit.

Unfortunately, there is another dark side to globalization. Cyberspace and the Internet, which undergird so much of the new 21st century global economy, is widely used by terrorists groups as a safe haven to "plot attacks, raise money, and recruit new members on the Internet." This calls for robust counter-terrorism efforts using the very weapons terrorists use. Israel must engage in such efforts and work to ensure that the U.S. is sharing information from its counter-terrorism efforts that would directly implicate Israel.

Globalization can no more be stopped that King Canute could order the waves in the ocean to cease. But the impacts of globalization must be recognized, so that societies like the U.S. and Israel can adapt to the rapid changes involved.

Yet, despite mounting inequality and threats from those leveraging globalization's tools to do Israel harm, the Jewish state becoming a net loser

in globalization is only one potential outcome. In fact, I believe strongly it is the least likely outcome. Another, more likely eventuality, would see Israel leveraging the economic, technical and entrepreneurial talents of its citizens and taking advantage of globalization. And, again, the state is well positioned to do so.

Israel boasts the highest number of engineers per capita (135 per 10,000 people, compared with 85 per 10,000 in the U.S.), the highest number of cell phones per capita; three-quarters of Israelis use the internet, 1.25 million households are online -- 95 percent of whom have broadband connections -- and Israel stands in second place in the world for the amount of time its citizens spend online. With a third of the population born outside the country, and more than half of the population making at least one international trip a year, Israel is more "plugged in," and globally aware, than nearly any other state. From a business perspective one of Israel's disadvantages can, in an era of globalization, be turned into a significant advantage. Israel is too small a market to sustain most large scale businesses; consequently Israeli entrepreneurs are forced to look abroad immediately, to be globalized from "Day 1." Few other states with similar traditions of entrepreneurship and innovation have been similarly pushed to take the wider world into account so early in a business's development.

Globalization necessitates global interdependence and cooperation. Countries that are mutually dependent for their economic health on each other, rarely go to war. This was the genius behind creating the European Union, binding the French and German economies together. The more Israel can leverage its global connectivity, in order to promote investment, exchange and interdependence, the more Israel can be embedded in the global economy and the greater advantage she will be able to take of globalization. The more Israel can encourage other states to become similarly bound up in its success and stability, the better the outcome for Israel in an era of globalization.

This suggests that Israel must make itself more central to the economies of as many countries as possible. This includes, eventually with the Arab states, when they make peace with Israel, as Israel has begun to do in a limited fashion with Egypt and Jordan.

Globalization may be the best antidote to the "clash of civilizations" Professor Sam Huntington forecast over a decade ago, between the Islamic world and the West (including Israel). In the language of Tom Friedman's "The World is Flat", Israel can push more than its normal weight.

Yet, despite the potential for Israel, there is a concerning scenario in which Israeli bureaucracy, alternatively described by some Israeli entrepreneurs and manufacturers as sclerotic or simply backwards, impedes the ability of the state to take advantage. To some, it is bureaucracy and an antiquated tax code that helps produce the inequality in Israeli incomes -- a 2006 study suggested that Israelis earning NIS 12-13 thousand paid the world's highest taxes. As Shragga Brosh, the president of the Manufacturers Association of Israel put it: "Israel has opened itself up to globalization and free trade but lags behind the world it is competing with in the areas of taxation and governance." In measuring the ease with which Israelis can start and operate businesses, the state is ranked in the middle of the pack -- right behind Moldova and ahead of Turkey -- but far below even states like Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Mongolia, let alone the Western states to which Israel rightfully compares itself. This is unsurprising to Amnon Rubinstein who dubbed the situation "red tape mania" in a January 2008 *Jerusalem Post* editorial; as a result of bureaucracy "dozens of developers are fleeing from Israel's bureaucrats and investing their capital and energies abroad with great success…causing damage greater than any Arab boycott."

Additionally, there is growing competition for the very technical and engineering talent in Israel that has been so prized by foreign investors and that has helped make so many Israeli firms "world beaters." Israel may have the highest number of engineers per capita of any state, but it still only has fewer than 100,000 engineers. China is thought to be producing as many as 600,000 new engineers every year, with India minting 350,000 annually. Clearly Israel needs to differentiate its engineering product, based on quality and ingenuity, to avoid being shut out by the growing weight of Chinese and Indian expertise. Israel's comparative advantage will maintain, and Israeli talent will remain sought after, so long as Israel continues to focus on ensuring that its engineers are also "world beaters."

Israel's success in globalization is clearly impacted by its ability to compete on all levels with Western and developing states, and with appropriate reforms -- that address both red tape and income inequality, let alone maintaining technical and educational advantages -- there seems little reason to think that the disturbing scenario Rubinstein, Braverman and others have forecast must necessarily come to pass.

However, in order for any of the true benefits of globalization to come about, peace with the Palestinians, and eventually with the wider Arab world, is an important pre-condition. Evidence for this comes from the positive economic fallout of the 1993 Oslo Accords, which directly "triggered a warmer global embrace" and resulted in even more multinational corporations being attracted to Israel.

The alternate scenarios in this regard are well known but worthy of repeating. In short, the status quo can be maintained, with a focus primarily on the short term security situation. Unfortunately, it appears that such a focus will produce poverty-ridden, violence prone entities next door to Israel -- a clear medium and long-term threat to the state. The other alternative is to provide some needed breathing space for Palestinians, at least moderate Palestinians. Israel must create an economic interdependence with the West Bank and Gaza, as it did successfully before the Second Intifada in late 2000, and help integrate the Territories with the wider, global economy, as had been done with the opening of the Gaza airport and construction of the seaport. Clearly there is a security imperative, but there is also a security imperative in having the Territories cut off from both the Israeli and wider global economy that is even more compelling. Israel would do well to follow Rabin's wise counsel of fighting terror as if there were no negotiations, but simultaneously to negotiate as if there were no terror. The continued expansion of settlements and the failure to reduce check-points undercuts the moderates and gives Hamas and the radicals the argument that only violence will succeed. When it takes several hours to get to jobs, schools, and hospitals, it can only build up anger and frustration. Obviously, this always must be balanced against the threat of terrorism. But this was the purpose of the security fence. Some of the improvements in facilitating passage of Palestinians through the checkpoints

could be made by simply using all of the lanes at some key checkpoints, which now have only one lane operating. Israel must not let this happen.

During the Clinton Administration, I was responsible for the economic dimension of the peace process. With the cooperation of both then Prime Minister Netanyahu and later Prime Minister Ehud Barak, up to the time of the Second Intifada in September, 2000, with U.S. encouragement, Israel was allowing some 100,000 Palestinian workers into Israel daily; some 20,000 VIP passes to Palestinian businessmen were granted, who had access to Israel by car; the airport was opened; the seaport was being constructed: the Gaza Industrial Estate, which I visited in July 2000, created pursuant to legislation passed by Congress as a Qualifying Industrial Zone (QIZ), had some 30 companies from Israel and all over the world employing 1,200 Gazans, with a second phase planned to take advantage of the duty free treatment of products back to the U.S. if they had a requisite percentage of Israeli content. The result was that from 1997-2000, there was over 5 percent GDP growth in the Territories, with unemployment down to 8 percent in the West Bank and 14 percent in Gaza. All of this was brought to a halt by Yassir Arafat's leadership of a Second Intifada, following his rejection of the Camp David Summit package in 2000. But it is the model to seek now.

If that scenario -- peace in the Territories and the region -- manages to come to pass, Israel will be far better positioned to address each of the challenges it faces and to more freely choose its most propitious course. In this regard, the regional instability may indirectly help Israel towards this end, or at least help compel the United States to become even more engaged in the process towards peace. Turmoil in the Arab world and the growing dependence of the U.S. on Middle Eastern oil, together with a need to rebuild America's esteem in the world, has already influenced the Bush Administration to take a more aggressive posture toward the need for settlement of the Israel-Palestinian dispute. This activity will continue regardless of who is elected the next President.

III. THE RISE OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM, TERRORISM, VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS, AND IRAN: THE CHALLENGES TO MODERATE ARAB STATES, THE UNITED STATES AND THE WEST, AND ISRAEL AND WORLD JEWRY

One of the unfortunate Mega-Trends of our era, which will only increase over the next five years, is the rise of a virulent form of Islamic extremism by non-state actors. This is fed variously by anti-Western religious doctrines, like Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia; by a sense of embarrassment at the fall of the great Islamic culture of the past; by the colonialism through which Arabs have lived; by economic hopelessness; by corrupt, autocratic regimes in the Arab world, which suppress democratic reformers; and by support from state actors, like Iran and Syria.

This phenomenon is not entirely new. But the new element is the fusing of a perversion of Islamic religious teaching with anti-Western attitudes. The PLO was a secular movement, while Hezbollah, Hamas, al-Qaeda, and Islamic Jihad combine radicalism with a religious fanaticism that is hard for Westerners to understand.

Extremists on Israel's borders in Gaza (Hamas), southern Lebanon (Hezbollah) and Egypt (Muslim Brotherhood) are an ever-present threat; unfortunately, even those extremists who ply their trade further afield, in Iraq (al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia) and North Africa (Al-Qaeda in North Africa), pose threats to regional stability and further dim prospects for peace.

Though there are debates regarding how big the extremist population is, there is little doubt that such groups are more capable than ever, both in recruiting and spreading their message and in effecting violence. The geographic dispersion of recent attacks -- New York and Washington D.C. (2001), London (2005), Madrid (2004), Bali (2002), Mombassa (2002), Nairobi (1998), Djerba (2002), and Dar es Salaam (1998) (amongst dozens of others) -- demonstrates that groups' operational capabilities extend far beyond the Levant or even the wider Middle East. The rise of such extremism, and the potential mainstreaming of their philosophy, portend difficulties in establishing more stable, moderate regimes in Israel's neighborhood, and beyond.

Adding fuel to the geographic diversity of extremism is the growth rate of the Muslim population, perhaps most marked in Europe where Muslims have three times the birthrate of non-Muslim Europeans. This, combined with the one million new Islamic immigrants arriving on the continent every year, means that by 2050 one in five Europeans is likely to be Muslim. This does

not mean that extremism will increase at the same rate; it does, however, mean that extremists will have a larger pool from which to draw recruits, and that Jews (presently less than 0.4 percent of the European population, and with Jewish birthrates falling in every Diaspora country) will be likely more marginalized in their efforts to fight it.

Similarly, as the poles of global power stretch to Asia and other regions without a long history of exposure to Judiasm, let alone attachment to the Jewish state, Israel may find itself even more marginalized. Yet, this is also an opportunity for Israel, as introducing new world powers, many of whom are neutral to the Jewish state, may help temper some of the more virulent anti-Semitism and anti-Israel sentiments fueled by demographics and petrodollars in the Muslim world.

Much as there are various ways that new global powers could interact with Israel and Judiasm, there are several divergent scenarios regarding how the larger challenge of Muslim extremism will play out. In the status quo scenario, Israel maintains its defensive posture and hopes that more moderate, pro-Western regimes in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon and elsewhere can survive and provide needed buffers to radical Islamization on her borders and in the few Arab states with which Israel enjoys peace. The threat of the status quo, however, is that it is not clear for how long these states can survive dynastically or politically, and more importantly, the status quo has seen the continuing build up of domestic tensions which are liable to explode -- at an unknown time and with unknown consequences -- if not managed.

Another option, and a scenario originally championed by the Bush Administration, is to move for immediate elections and democratization. This too, as we have seen in the Territories, can produce unfortunate results; polls suggest that the outcome of such a strategy would be a mass, overnight militant Islamization of the various electorates in Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and comparatively moderate governments in the Gulf. The result would be larger, more capable and more popularly legitimate Hamas-type governments surrounding the Jewish state. As Professor Huntington mentioned in his "Clash of Civilizations" fifteen years ago, at least in the short term, "(i)n the Arab world…Western democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces."

The third scenario is perhaps the best positioned, both for Israel and the region. This scenario calls for Israel to cooperate with its U.S. and European partners to begin preparing the region for true economic and political reforms, by slowly showing the region's constituencies that there is another way, and that the movement towards violent Islamization if not outright political jihadism is a return to the past rather than a way to the future.

This is not necessarily blue sky optimism; aided in part by globalization, Robin Wright of the *Washington Post* recently described new "public voices, daring publications and noisy protests across two dozen countries (in the Arab world) are giving shape to a vigorous, if disjointed, search for alternatives to the autocratic regimes and imperious monarchies that have proved they're out of sync with their people." There are growing cadres of moderate Islamic players in Morocco and throughout North Africa, an expanding group of "pajamahedeen," or pajama warriors, wielding computers instead of roadside bombs throughout the Middle East, and challenges to the status quo arising from surprising places – such as from the brother of Iran's supreme leader, and middle-aged, connected, politically-savvy, Egyptian "soccer moms."

Added to this are cultural and educational reforms emerging, some from unlikely sources. In Saudi Arabia, the newly-inaugurated King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST) has been set up outside the confines of the conservative education ministry, and has been modeled on U.S. institutions of higher education and chartered to educate both men and women. KAUST is just one of many new, decidedly modern institutions of higher education sprouting in the Arab world: Qatar's Education City has attracted half a dozen U.S. universities to set up branch campuses outside Doha, while Dubai's Knowledge Village has attempted to do the same.

Even if there are parts of the Islamic world turning their back on the hatred and destruction of militant Islam, in the short and medium term Israel must nonetheless figure out how to deal with militant Islam on its very doorstep. The dilemma of how to address Hamas is a difficult one, and as former Ambassador Martin Indyk concedes, the present situation "does not lend itself to a sensible policy," either for Jerusalem or Washington. In one, often-suggested scenario, a new American President could open discussions with Hamas directly. But this would reward violence. At the other end

of the spectrum the U.S. could continue to ignore Hamas. But this risks a continuation of their rocket attacks, and could lead to a major Israeli invasion and re-occupation of Gaza. A third, and more promising scenario, is to have indirect negotiations, through President Abbas and the Egyptians, with the aim of a long-term cease-fire.

Such movement must occur quickly. The current cycle of violence is creating a dangerous polarization. The brutal attack on eight young Yeshiva students at the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva, the almost daily rockets into Israel, some using longer range rockets reaching Ashkelon, obviously makes compromise by Israel more difficult. Yet, the despair on the Palestinian side is revealed in a recent poll by Khalil Shikaki, showing greater support for violence than at any time since he began polling 15 years ago in the Territories and growing support for Hamas in the West Bank, with Fatah losing ground. This will lead to continued conflict.

Yet, it is evident that even if able to devise the best path for negotiating with Hamas and other terrorist groups, the real interface that will prove still more challenging will remain Hamas's backers in Tehran. Clearly, Iran is the greatest medium-term threat to Israel. It is Iran that funds and supports the major terrorist groups that prey on Israel. It is Iran that attempts to scuttle any Palestinian movement toward peace with Israel. And, it is Iran that marries a radical ideology, a professed determination to eliminate Israel, with an increasing capacity to do so.

It was the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 that fused the Muslim religion with violent anti-Western attitudes and actions in a nation state. And Iran is a thread that connects the rise of Muslim extremism with one particularly disturbing aspect of the next Mega-Trend: the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

IV. THE RISE OF NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY RISKS: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION; GLOBAL WARMING; DEMOGRAPHY

Nuclear Proliferation

According to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency and the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, there are eight nations that publicly possess nuclear weapons: the U.S., Russia, the U.K., France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and one, Israel, which is "widely believed" to have such weapons. Despite this relatively small number, the challenge comes in the warning articulated by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.), Mohammed ElBaradei that as many as 30 additional states could have nuclear weapons "relatively quickly." And some of these potential nuclear powers are not traditional friends of Israel.

Iran appears clearly intent on developing a nuclear weapons capacity, not simply a civilian nuclear ability. It has repeatedly refused to fully cooperate with the I.A.E.A. in full scope inspections of all its facilities. It has deeply buried and dispersed its nuclear facilities. And in November, Tehran announced it had 3000 centrifuges working, inching the regime ever closer to mastering the nuclear fuel cycle and to making the enriched uranium needed for a bomb. The actual production of a bomb that could be fabricated and used on a delivery system against Israel or parts of Europe is anywhere from 3 to 10 years away.

This is a grave danger to the security of Israel and the West. Iran involves a dangerous brew: a radical ideology, a president pledged to wipe Israel from the face of the world, and who rejects the Holocaust as a historical fact, and a medium range missile capacity with Sheehab-3 missiles that can already reach Israel, and will soon be able to reach to eastern boundaries of the European Union. Iran's moves toward nuclear weapons will also spur other Arab states, who fear Iranian hegemony in the Middle East, like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, as well as Turkey and Algeria, all of whom have indicated an

interest in civilian nuclear power, to pursue their own programs. We could be perilously close to a Second Nuclear Age.

Israel, however, is not defenseless.

First, Israel has a capacity for massive retaliation that Iran must know could do grave damage to their country, plus an increasingly sophisticated anti-missile system, with U.S. partnership. Israel has the ability to maintain mutually assured destruction for any attempt at a nuclear attack against Israel. Israel's recent strike against Syria, evading their considerable air defenses, sent an important signal to Iran of Israeli military capability to interdict any budding nuclear weapons program. As former Mossad chief Efraim Halevy has stated, "Israel has a whole arsenal of capabilities to make sure the Iranians don't achieve their result." Israel would do well to maintain its course of hoping for the best and preparing for the worst. This involves increasing the sophistication and ability of its Arrow, Patriot, "David's Sling," and Iron Dome missile defense, as well as perfecting an adequate, robust second-strike capability. Israel is well on its way in both regards, with recent additional funding from the U.S. to work on missile defense, and the continued procurement of German Dolphin-class submarines providing a second-strike platform that would make any state think twice before launching against Israel.

Second, Israel is not alone in its deep concern about Iranian nuclear ambitions. The U.S. has made its views known, and backed them up with a beefed-up American naval presence in the Persian Gulf, serving as a warning against Iranian excesses. The E.U.3 (England, France, and Germany) have stood shoulder to shoulder with the Bush Administration on making it clear that it is unacceptable for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. French President Nicolas Sarkozy and his Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, have been especially clear on this point. Iran has thrice been subject to U.N. sanctions resolutions for refusing to abandon its uranium enrichment capacity. While these sanctions are mild, and are unlikely to deter Iran, they have garnered support from Russia and China, as well, both of whom have joined with the E.U., U.S., and others in stating that it is unacceptable for Iran to have nuclear weapons. The unilateral U.S. financial sanctions, creatively administered by the Treasury

Department, are working to discourage European and Japanese banks from financing important projects in Iran, and are having an adverse impact on Iran's economy.

Third, the moderate, predominantly Sunni Arab countries are as concerned as Israel about Iranian pretenses to hegemony in the region backed by nuclear weapons.

All of these forces are having a clear effect within Iran. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's party lost almost every seat in the 2007 local elections, and was dealt a set-back in the recent parliamentary elections -- as rigged as they were. It is thought that as much as 15 percent of the new parliament may be made up of reformist members. And there are clear cracks in Ahmadinejad's support among conservatives. Student demonstrations are breaking out on Iranian campuses and there is a growing, increasingly rancorous debate within Iran about the costs and benefits of pursuing their nuclear ambitions.

Iran's very radicalism is serving to isolate it. President Ahmadinejad's statements denying the Holocaust and his grossly perverted Holocaust denial conference engendered the enmity of leaders throughout the world. His Holocaust denial flies in the face of the U.N.'s own commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the liberation of the Nazi concentration camps, which included for the first time Holocaust survivors addressing the U.N. General Assembly.

With all of this mind, there are several scenarios on how to deal with Iran, both its nuclear arms pretensions and its support for terrorism.

One scenario is to simply accept the fact that Iran will have nuclear weapons and to make the best of it. But this is an unacceptable option. It would put these feared weapons into the hands of extremists. It would lead to a nuclear arms race in the most volatile region in the world. It would be a direct security threat to the U.S., Israel, and the West.

A second scenario involves military confrontation by the U.S. or a U.S.-led coaltion of states. But as the recent resignation of Admiral William Fallon, the recent commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East, indicated, there are grave Pentagon concerns about U.S. military action against Iran, especially

when the U.S. military is stretched like a rubber band with two "hot" wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan. The collateral damage from a military confrontation to U.S. interests in the region would be grave. These factors indicate that at least from the U.S. perspective, while a military response cannot be ruled out and should remain on the table, other options should be exhausted first.

There is a related scenario of Israel unilaterally attacking Iranian nuclear facilities in a redux of Israel's successful strike on Iraq's Osirik reactor in 1981. The problem is that similar success is unlikely in the current case. The distances to Iranian nuclear plants, and the number of "key" facilities that would need to be targeted, are both greater than was the situation in Iraq twenty-seven years ago. Given the conditions of the U.S. military, Israel would need to attack on its own, engendering technical difficulties -- for example, the necessity of refueling bombers over hostile territory -- and potentially horrific consequences. At the very least, such an attack would further elevate oil prices, increase regional tensions markedly, and perhaps even ignite full scale conflicts with any of Iran's proxies in the Territories, Lebanon, Syria or elsewhere, or even with Iran itself.

Moreover, even if Israeli jets made it to Iran there is no guarantee that a successful strike would dissuade Iran from developing nuclear weapons. According to some, a successful strike would simply lead Iran to redouble its subsequent development efforts, hide and secure their facilities even more comprehensively, or, in a truly nightmarish scenario decide that actually mastering the nuclear fuel cycle was uneconomical when it could just use its excess petrodollars to buy a ready made, even if crude, weapon from a cash poor, nuclear state like North Korea or Pakistan.

There is a third scenario: a package of robust economic incentives, backed up by sanctions, like those put together for North Korea, has a chance of success. If the West continues to support the reformists, it is not impossible under one scenario -- even if it remains difficult -- to imagine an alliance of convenience between the Iranian reformists and the anti-Ahmedinijad conservatives that could be brought together to make such a scenario a reality. And yet, over the next five years, the more probable scenario may be the continued supremacy of the mullahs, the Guardian Council, and the Revolutionary Guard.

A little-talked about fourth scenario also exists regarding Tehran: a Grand Bargain with Iran. This would combine elements of the economic incentives (and strengthened sanctions if these were rejected), but would also involve political and diplomatic steps. In short, it would provide, in a careful, step-by-step process, ultimate recognition of the Iranian revolution and the Iranian regime (as repugnant as they are), in return for abandonment of both their enriched uranium program, with strict I.A.E.A. supervision, and their support for terrorist groups.

At an appropriate point, and with appropriate conditions, it is desirable for the U.S., in league with the E.U. and perhaps the Russians and Chinese, to sit down directly with the Iranians, with all issues on the table. Iran must be made to see that their self interest would be better served by taking alternative paths. This would help embolden the more rational elements of the Iranian government.

If this bargain is rejected, then there would be more world support for a direct confrontation with Iran.

A comprehensive and far-sighted agreement could even respect Iran's right, as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to peaceful nuclear energy. However, instead of allowing Iran to develop indigenous capacity to master the nuclear fuel cycle, the world community could resurrect an idea first suggested by President Dwight D. Eisenhower fifty years ago and develop a "nuclear fuel bank." Such an entity would provide its members the necessary material for civilian atomic power, but would control the nuclear processing and thus obviate the risk of members weaponizing the byproducts. There is already wide support for this initiative. The Saudis, in line with a Russian proposal, recently suggested the formation of such a bank.

Dealing with nuclear proliferation involves more than a sole focus on Iran; to do so would be to lose sight of even bigger risks. And, no country has a greater stake in this effort than Israel.

For example, there is a great need to upgrade the security of existing nuclear stockpiles, to be certain that countries like Pakistan, Russia, and China are not subject to nuclear theft from terrorist groups who are actively trying to acquire nuclear material to make a crude nuclear bomb. Al-Qaeda, as

early as 1993, tried to buy highly-enriched uranium in Sudan, and Osama bin Laden has called getting the nuclear bomb a "religious duty". The Nunn-Lugar legislation in the U.S. has been making major strides towards securing nuclear materials in Russia and the former Soviet Union, and strengthening security of stockpiles. There is nuclear security cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan -- the state, after all, where al-Qaeda's leaders are likely located -- and with China, although none yet with India.

There is a need for effective global nuclear security standards and for a global effort to secure every nuclear weapon and supply of nuclear bomb material, to keep them out of the hands of rogue states or terrorist organizations.

Moreover, the U.S. is expending great effort to develop systems that can identify the source of unconventional weapons and their components. President Bush has properly stated that the U.S. will hold any nation that shares nuclear weapons with another state or terrorist group "fully accountable", meaning those who supply arms or components to terrorists are as accountable as those who order and carry out an attack.

There is one other difficult decision Israel may eventually have to face to avoid nuclear proliferation in the Middle East: whether to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and subject itself to international inspection. Given the history of U.N. bias against Israel, and the opportunities for other countries, like Iran, which are signatories, to cheat, this is a step that should only be taken with the greatest of caution, if it is taken at all.

Global Warming

Global warming is the greatest environmental threat to the world. As the chief U.S. negotiator for the Kyoto Protocol, I have followed this issue closely. The statistics are alarming. On a worldwide basis, the 12 warmest years of the last 125 have all occurred since 1990, and 20 of the 21 warmest since 1800 have also occurred since 1980. The last 50 years appear to have been the warmest half century in 600 years. Pre-industrial concentration of CO_2 in the atmosphere was about 280 parts per million (ppm); it is now 380 ppm. The last time CO_2 concentrations were greater than 300 ppm was some 25 million years ago. Recent projections by the Intergovernmental Panel on

Climate Change (I.P.C.C.) indicate that a doubling of pre-industrial CO_2 concentration, from about 280 ppm to about 500 ppm, will result in an increase in global average temperatures between 2.5 and 4.0 degrees Celsius. Previously, many analysts believed that stabilizing temperature increases at 3 degrees Celsius (with a corresponding concentration target of 550 ppm) was a reasonable target, but many now believe that sustainability requires that temperatures only increase by no more than 2 degrees Celsius (compared with pre-industrial average temperatures), corresponding to a stabilization target of 450 ppm.

There is a consensus among virtually all of the world's top scientists in this area, that the build-up of greenhouse gases, most particularly CO_2, are man-made and are causing temperature increases that will reach dangerous levels over the next 25 years if we do not reduce the levels of CO_2 in the atmosphere. Even with an increase in average temperatures of 2 degrees Celsius, we could see catastrophic melting of Greenland and Antarctic ice, with multi-meter rises in sea level; reduced agricultural productivity in many regions; increased devastation from droughts, heat waves, wildfires, powerful storms, and floods; accelerated loss of biodiversity from tropical rain forests and coral reefs, like those in Eilat; and, expanded geographic ranges of disease. Already Artic ice is melting at unprecedented levels. Left unabated, climate change can lead to profound changes in the world's ecology, including rising sea levels from melting glaciers, leading to flooding of islands and coastal areas around the globe, droughts and water shortages, destruction of sea life and coral reefs, and conflict between nations over water.

As a coastal state dominated by desert and one which rightly treasures water as much as any strategic asset, the threat of global warming to Israel is all too real. Over the past century the Levant has seen a thirty percent reduction in precipitation, and as a direct result of global warming, Israel stands to have forty percent less water at the end of the 21st Century than at the beginning.

But, here again, there is opportunity within the challenge, depending upon the various paths Israel chooses to follow. Israel has long recognized the problems of climate change and to its credit has signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (at Rio) and the Kyoto Protocol.

Further, a state that has so famously made the desert bloom, certainly has within its ability the potential to alleviate and perhaps even help avert a global catastrophe. In so doing Israel can build upon the technical comparative advantages it has developed, creating "green collar" jobs and promoting a wider green economic sector. In other words, the threat of environmental change could propagate substantial economic and technical gains for Israel. Israel is perfectly positioned for this scenario, already at the forefront of technology and policy as the international community belatedly begins to address this crisis.

The likelihood of this scenario increases when one realizes the strides Israel has already made in the alternative energies field. The Israel Project lists 270 Israeli firms actively engaged in alternative energy research and development and a similar number of individual scientists engaged in such endeavors. The country has 67.5 square meters of solar collectors per 100 people, the highest per-capita rate of solar collectors in the world. Israeli companies have been partnering with European and American companies to work on alternative energy for more than twenty years, and last year such partnerships moved to an even higher level, promising to buttress Israel's already well-deserved reputation as a far-sighted experimental laboratory for environmental technology.

To this end, the Israeli government has even announced a seemingly audacious plan to install the world's first network of electric cars within three years. The endeavor will be a joint venture with Project Better Place -- owned by Israeli-American entrepreneur Shai Agassi -- providing lithium-ion batteries and the infrastructure to refresh or replace them, while Renault and Nissan will build the cars.

Demographic Realities

There are 13 million Jews in the world, four million less than before the Holocaust. We were left with 11 million Jews after the Holocaust. It took only 13 years to add another million. But it has taken over 40 years to add the second million. The numbers are telling.

There is a slow, steady, seemingly inexorable decline in an already diminished population in all countries in the Diaspora. With the ironic exception of Germany, due to the large influx of Jewish immigrants from Russia and the former Soviet Union, Jews have the lowest birthrates of any group in the world, between 1.5 and 1.7 on average compared to 2.1 births per mother necessary just to stay even. The intermarriage rates and low levels of conversion by non-Jewish spouses to Judaism exacerbate the demographic problems. In the U.S. in 1970 there were 5,400,000 "core Jews" (those who identify themselves either as Jews or come from Jewish parents with no other religious identification). Today there are a little over 5.2 million, with projections that by 2020 that number will remain essentially unchanged, at a time when the population of the U.S. will be far larger. In the U.K., the figures are even more dramatic: 390,000 core Jews in 1970, 297,000 in 2006, and only 238,000 projected in 2020. For Europe as a whole, outside of the former Soviet Union, the Jewish population is projected to drop by 300,000, from 1.3 million to barely over a million. In Russia and the FSU, the figures are even more dramatic, from 2.1 million in 1970 to 366,00 today, and to 173,000 in 2020.

This drop in population will have the biggest political impact in Europe, where there are now 25 million Muslims, with some projecting this number could grow to up to 50 million in the next 25 years. The vast majority would be peaceful and non-violent. But it also portends a growing number of radical Islamists in Europe at the fringe. Even more profound, as general indigenous European birthrates plunge and the growing Muslim population becomes more engaged in national politics, it could portend an even less friendly attitude by European governments toward Israel.

But harsh demographic realities are not limited to the Jewish Diaspora. They will impact on Israel, as well. Only in Israel is the Jewish population growing, with in-migration, and birth rates that are double (2.7 percent) those in the Diaspora. Between 2005-6, Israel's Jewish population grew by 1.4 percent, while the rest of world Jewry declined by 0.3 percent. 2006 was a landmark year in modern Jewish history, one not seen since the destruction of the Second Temple in the first century of the Common Era: Israel became the largest Jewish community in the world, surpassing the U.S., with a plurality, now 40 percent, of the total Jewish population in the world.

Yet Israel also faces a demographic challenge, because while the Jewish population of Israel is increasing, the population of Arab Israelis and Palestinians in the Territories is increasing at a far greater rate. Between the Mediterranean and the Jordan Sea, there may be a majority of Palestinians by mid-century. Time is not on Israel's side.

The demographic realities in Israel are one of the major reasons former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon decided to withdraw from Gaza and that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert campaigned on withdrawing from large swaths of the West Bank. We have learned from the Gaza experience that a unilateral withdrawal, without an agreement with responsible Palestinians, can result in continued violence. The Gaza withdrawal by then Prime Minister Sharon was a courageous step, but it does not change the demographic reality that Israel cannot be a Jewish, democratic state by permanently occupying all of the West Bank Palestinian land, whatever the Jewish historical claim, with the rapid increase in Palestinian population. I continue to believe that the majority of Palestinians are prepared to live peacefully with Israel as a Jewish state. But, the weakness of the Abu Mazen government, despite the genuinely first-class Prime Minister, Salam Fayyad, and the inability to control violent groups in the West Bank, let alone Hamas in Gaza, means that progress in the peace process will be slow. But, the peace process must continue, not because it is a gift to the Palestinians, but because Israel needs to have permanent, secure, internationally recognized borders that will keep it as a Jewish, democratic state.

V. THE RISE OF A NEW FORM OF ANTI-SEMITISM AND ANTI-ISRAEL SENTIMENT

A key challenge facing American and European Jewry can be framed in a single question: Is there a new anti-Semitism, not the old Church-based, stereotyped anti-Semitism, but one based on an attack on Israel as a Jewish state and on its Jewish supporters in the Diaspora?

Jews in America face no serious threat of classic anti-Semitism, except at the extreme fringes of American society, although we are wise to keep up our guard. A new ADL study shows that anti-Semitic propensities in the U.S. since

1964 have declined from 29 percent to only 15 percent in 2007. Old anti-Semitic canards like having too much power, too much influence on Wall Street, a lot of irritating faults, being more willing to use shady practices, to being more dishonest than other business people, not caring about anyone but their own kind -- well under 20 percent believe these are true. But one area which is disturbingly high is that almost one in three Americans believes American Jews are more loyal to Israel than to America.

This presents an opening for a more nuanced challenge. It has been raised in two best-selling books. The first is by Professors Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer who virtually question the legitimacy of the Jewish State, assert that Israel was born out of "moral crimes" against the Palestinians, and who assert that an Israel lobby advances Israel's interests at the expense of America, and led the Bush Administration to invade Iraq. Their central thesis is that the Israel lobby is principally responsible for the substantial aid and for supporting Israel unconditionally, which they believe is not in the national interest of the U.S. But, they also assert that neo-conservative Jews in the Bush Administration led the U.S. into an ill-fated invasion of Iraq.

In a less extreme form, the second book by former President Carter, painfully for me, alleges that AIPAC's controls American foreign policy, and asserts that Israel's occupation against the Palestinians amounts to "apartheid".

At bottom, this criticism of Israeli policies and of groups like AIPAC that support them, is a criticism about too much influence and power. Does this constitute a "new anti-Semitism" in the form of attacks against Israel, the Jewish state?

In Europe, the external challenge is more severe. There remains a degree of underlying anti-Semitism, but the old, church-based anti-Semitism, with the old stereotypes, has also significantly diminished in Europe.

For an organization like al-Qaeda, there is no "new" anti-Semitism, but a virulent anti-Jewish attitude. Osama bin Laden's deputy has recently called for an attack against Jews everywhere, as well as against America.

There is a troubling combination of real threats from disaffected "skin-heads", the growth of far right parties in the eastern part of Germany, France, and

Switzerland, together with disaffected young Muslims, angry at their inability to be integrated into the fabric of European society, and radicalized by the Palestinian-Israel conflict -- from France to The Netherlands to the U.K.. While the great majority of Muslims in Europe are peace-loving and simply want a better standard of living, there is a dangerous fringe, particularly among the youth, who blame Jews for siding with Israel and for their own problems at assimilating into Europe , and attack Jews and Jewish institutions. The February 2006 brutal murder of young Ilan Halimi in Paris was a punctuation mark.

To this motley group one must add substantial elements of the European academic community who have taken a virulently anti-Israeli position. General public opinion in Europe is much less positive toward Jews in general and Israel in particular, than in the U.S. In recent surveys of 11 European countries between a low of 39 percent in France and high of 60 percent in Spain, Europeans feel Jews in their countries are more loyal to Israel than to their country. One more general negative Jewish stereotype -- Jews have too much power in the business world and in international financial markets -- over one-third agree (twice the U.S. levels), and over 40 percent feel that Jews talk too much about the Holocaust. About a quarter say that their opinion of Jews is influenced by the actions taken by Israel, with a majority of that group feeling their attitude toward Jews is worse as a result. A survey by the European Union's Eurostat showed that European public opinion saw Israel and the U.S. as the two greatest threats to world peace, ahead of Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Iraq.

In its 2007 Hate Crimes Survey the U.S.-based NGO, Human Rights First documented a growing anti-Semitism across Europe. In France, for example, there has been a 6 percent rise in attacks against Jews, and a notable rise in attacks against individual Jews and Jewish communal property. The police chief in Berlin reported a doubling of neo-Nazi attacks over the course of 2006. The survey found that in Eastern Europe and Russia, "extreme nationalist political groups have adopted the language of 19th century anti-Semitism." They also concluded that with the notable exception of a few countries, such as France, there is a general indifference by many European governments, "broad segments of public opinion", and the press to anti-Semitic violence. Few countries even keep a data base of anti-Semitic incidents.

The 2001 U.N. International Conference Against Racism and Xenophobia in Durban, South Africa, was hijacked by a rancorous attack against Israel, equating Zionism with racism, and against Jewish representatives who tried to defend Israel.

The problem seems most acute in the U.K. The U.K. University and College Union, representing 120,000 instructors in British colleges, voted in late May 2007 to reconsider future exchanges with Israeli academic institutions. Unison, one of England's largest unions, representing more than one million British public service workers, has likewise considered punitive action against Israel.

Since the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000, there has been a "steady rise in anti-Semitic incidents in the U.K.", leading to a parliamentary inquiry to examine anti-Semitism in Britain. The results of the inquiry were reported in a graphic op-ed article in the September 4, 2007, *Washington Post* by Denis MacShane, entitled "The New Anti-Semitism." He chaired the blue ribbon committee of British parliamentarians and former Cabinet ministers established to examine the problem of anti-Semitism in Britain. His report is chilling. It found a "pattern of fear" among British Jews, with synagogues attacked, Jewish schoolboys jostled on public transportation, Rabbis punched and knifed, private security ordered at Jewish weddings and community events, with militant anti-Jewish students on British campuses fueled by Islamist or far-left hate seekers preventing Jewish students from expressing their views.

How do we react to these external challenges to the Diaspora?

1. In the U.S. we are not dealing with classical anti-Semitism: stereotypes, blood libels, and the like. What exists is an attack on Israeli policies and on groups like AIPAC that support them. For sure, virulent attacks on the Jewish State can amount to modern day anti-Semitism. But we should be careful not to throw around the accusation of anti-Semitism too lightly, or we debase it when it is genuinely deserved.

   Natan Sharansky has given a good test of distinguishing criticism of Israeli policies from anti-Semitism, in what he calls the three-Ds:

(a) Is the Jewish State being Demonized by having its actions blown out of all proportions, for example, by making blatantly false comparisons of Israelis to Nazis and Palestinian refugee camps to Auschwitz.

(b) Is there a Double Standard, in which Jews of the Jewish state are treated differently from other countries, for example, being singled out by the U.N. Human Rights Commission for human rights abuses while Iran, China, Syria, Zimbabwe are left untouched.

(c) Delegitimization. Is the attack an effort to deny the legitimacy of the Jewish state?

I do not see Jimmy Carter remotely meeting any of these standards, but on the third point, Walt and Mearsheimer come very close in their original paper in stating that Israel was born out of "moral crimes" against the Palestinians.

2. But this is not the end of the story. One can be dead wrong without being anti-Semitic. It is our responsibility to point out the mistakes, which are replete in the Walt/Mearsheimer and Carter books on even the most basic points. When President Carter calls Israel's security fence an "imprisonment wall" aimed at taking away Palestinian Territory and "imposing a system of…apartheid", we must loudly proclaim the truth. When I was Under Secretary of State, I made half a dozen trips between 1997-2000 to promote the economic dimension of the peace process. There were 100,000 Palestinian workers going in and out of Israel every day, and 20,000 VIP business people able to travel by car, with no wall. The wall was erected only after the Second Intifada, when terrorist attacks were regularly mounted against innocent civilians. It is critical to clarify serious historical misstatements, like President Carter's assertion that the international community allowed Jews to "take" Palestinian land when the country was founded; or that the first militants in the region were "Jewish militants" in 1939 -- ignoring the Arab violence against Jews in 1920-21, the 1929 massacre of Hebron's ancient Jewish community, and the "Great Arab Revolt" of 1936-39 in which 415 Jews were killed, let alone the continued Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah violence of today. Likewise

incorrect statements that the "PLO never advocated the annihilation of Israel", that the 1993 Oslo Agreement specified that Israel must return to pre-1967 lines, that Palestinians "accepted the 2003 Roadmap in its entirety" while Israel imposed qualifications and obstructed it must be corrected.

We need to arm students on our campuses and adults throughout the country with the facts to counter these false allegations, so they do not seep into the general public thinking. One of the most disappointing aspects has been that the only significant criticism of these books has come from within the Jewish world, not from respected academics and experts who know better.

3. We should make clear that the charge of excessive Jewish power over America's policies in the Middle East is untrue and a dangerous canard. I can tell you having been on the receiving end as a former senior U.S. government official how I see it. There is a "Jewish lobby" for causes important to our community, from the cause of Jews in the former Soviet Union, to Darfur, to support for a secure Israel. But that lobby is itself diffuse, from conservative to liberal groups with different ideas of what is best for Israel and U.S.-Israel relations. Even Walt and Mearsheimer define the Israel lobby as a "loose coalition of individuals and organizations" working "to shape U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction." There is little that unites these disparate groups on U.S. policy toward Israel, except for the basic security of a Jewish state. Indeed, former Prime Minister Rabin, at times, had a tense relationship with AIPAC, the central focus of the Israel lobby for President Carter and Walt/Mearsheimer, because he believed they were undercutting his peace proposals.

Walt/Mearsheimer evidence a naïve view of the interplay of domestic and international forces that go into making Middle East policy by the U.S. government. The influence of American Jews is always counterbalanced with other lobbies -- the Arab lobby backed by oil power; business groups; academics stressing the national security interest of the U.S. in closer relations to the Arab world. Decisions on Israel and the Middle East are not dominated by Jews, who make up 2 percent of the U.S. population, but are made by the clash of conflicting domestic interests and international

considerations, not the least of which is the increasing power of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states in a world with $100 per barrel oil. From the Eisenhower Administration forward, every American administration has taken actions which have at times been at odds with Israeli policy.

Moreover, for the majority of U.S. Jews, Israel is hardly the focus of their attention. In fact, some surveys indicate that roughly one-quarter of American Jewry feels little attachment to Israel, less than 40 percent feel a "lot" of attachment to Israel, and only a third feel that being Jewish involves supporting Israel. A majority of Jews in some major cities have never been to Israel.

More fundamentally, U.S. support for Israel comes endures because the American people broadly support and sympathize with Israel, because it is a democratic state in a sea of dictatorships; because it is pro-American and embodies Western values -- which, indeed were at their outset Jewish values, and because for many it is the Holy Land they revere from a religious standpoint. Without this bedrock support, no amount of lobbying would be successful.

4. The response to the external challenges facing European Jewry are more difficult. Here there have been overt anti-Jewish actions against individual Jews and Jewish institutions, with threats of boycotts against Israel. There are a number of responses needed:

(a) The European Jewish community should enlist moderate Muslims (in the U.S. as well) and their religious leaders in the kind of interfaith dialogue that has occurred over decades with the Catholic community, and should be at the forefront of opposing discrimination against European Muslims and promoting their economic dignity and well-being.

(b) European Jews should encourage the leaders of key European countries to take action against radical elements of the Muslim community and far right and far left anti-Semitism.

Much progress has been made: Many European countries are beginning to understand that Muslim attacks against their Jewish communities are a surrogate, as in France, for broader assaults on their societies as a whole.

-- In France, anti-Semitic acts have now been included in criminal hate crimes laws;

-- In the U.K., then Prime Minister Blair responded to the MacShane report with a series of government responses, setting out tough, new guidelines for the police to investigate anti-Semitic attacks and for universities to stop anti-Jewish ideology from taking root on campuses. The British Foreign Office has been instructed to protest to Arab states that allow anti-Jewish broadcasts.

-- The World Jewish Congress organized a conference on anti-Semitism in Europe hosted by the President of the European Conference to bring together leaders in Europe to fight the new wave of European anti-Semitism.

-- The 47-nation Council of Europe has launched a lengthy inquiry into combating anti-Semitism in Europe.

-- The European Union has produced a directive outlawing Internet hate speech.

Conclusion

Israel is one of the only major countries in the world without recognized international boundaries.

Unfortunately, while making peace with the Palestinians is the major part of the problem of achieving recognized and security border, Israelis must make peace with themselves over the peace process. Today, 60 years after the founding of the State, there remains no consensus in Israel over what the borders of Israel should look like. A significant percentage opposes the Oslo peace process, and so deeply distrusts the Palestinians and/or are so attached to the Territories, that they prefer the uneasy status quo to an uncertain peace agreement. Moreover, there is a tiny Jewish fringe prepared to use violence against their own leaders who offer compromise to the Palestinians. There was a striking reminder of this when a moment of silence to remember the 12th anniversary of the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin at a soccer match last November was interrupted by

boos and catcalls and shouts of "Amir, Amir", in support of Yigal Amir, his assassin. More troubling, a recent Haaretz poll showed that 15 percent of the Israeli public favors Amir's immediate release from prison. There have been posters of President Shimon Peres wearing an Arab headdress, similar to posters of Rabin seen shortly before his assassination. This fringe must not be permitted to stop the peace process through violence.

For sure, there can be no withdrawal from most of the West Bank in the absence of a peace partner. The unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon and Gaza demonstrate the limitations of unilateral withdrawal without such a partner.

The contours of a final settlement are clear, and were presented by President Clinton, and accepted by then Prime Minister Barak, but tragically rejected by Yassir Arafat, at the 2000 Camp David Summit. This would assure a Jewish majority in a democratic Israel. But it is also clear that incremental, confidence building steps will be essential, rather than one, sweeping, comprehensive agreement.

Just as Israeli Jews must come to terms themselves over the contours of a final settlement, one that allows for a two-state solution, and a Jewish majority behind secure borders, Israel must also reach out to its Israeli Arab citizens to give them a greater stake in the future of a Jewish state.

All the Mega-Trends offer real challenges to Israel and to the Jewish people, but so too they challenge every country in the world. Israel is well-placed, with its strong economy, excellent military capacity, and the creativity of its people, to turn these challenges into opportunities.

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The Annapolis Process: Possible implications on the future of Israel and the Jewish people –Platform for discussion

By Avi Gil

Preface

The joint announcement read by U.S. President George W Bush at the conclusion of the Annapolis conference (November 27, 2007) marked a significant shift in the outline of the Israeli-Palestinian political process. Until Annapolis, this outline was defined in the Roadmap as a sequential process: progression from stage to stage required the implementation of specific benchmarks outline in the plan's three stages. According to this logic, the Roadmap asserted, the negotiations for a permanent status (stage 3) shall commence only after the implementation of the first two stages of the plan. And indeed, then-Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon strictly and repeatedly stressed that there would be no transition from one stage to the next without the full implementation of the previous stage.

In Annapolis Israel gave up this demand. The sequential logic of the Roadmap was replaced by the parties with a process conducted along two parallel tracks: the first deals with implementation of the requirements specified in stage 1 of the Roadmap, and the second entails the negotiations for a permanent agreement.

The abandonment of the sequential process serves as testimony to the failure to achieve the original outline of the Roadmap. The parties accepted that without serious negotiations over a final status agreement, the Palestinian

side lacks sufficient motivation to fulfill its obligations, chief amongst which is an end to terrorism. In addition, the supporters of the two track approach explain that the presentation of a clear "political horizon" would strengthen the moderate Palestinian camp; it would give credibility to the process and pave the way to an historical agreement accepted and supported by the majority of the Palestinian people.

The Annapolis process entails dilemmas that are not isolated from the wider geopolitical reality, as illustrated below. Changing the outline of the process created a reality in which the discussions concerning sensitive core issues – borders, Jerusalem, refugees – are no longer postponed to some vague, undefined point in the future. These discussions are supposed to occur now. The sense that Israel is inching toward historic decisions causes mixed feelings that could manifest in grave dissent both domestically and within the Diaspora. Several prominent Jewish figures, who are not Israeli, recently introduced an argument – indeed, a demand – that they have a "right" to be involved in decisions over the core issues listed above. Such a demand demonstrates that the Annapolis process is perceived by some as having the potential to significantly influence the future of Israel and of the Jewish People. Not surprisingly, the issue of the future status of Jerusalem is at the core of this potential turmoil, a result of its historical, religious, national and emotional weight.

The Main Elements of the Annapolis Process

An analysis of the Annapolis Declaration points to the two simultaneous tracks:

Track 1 – Negotiations for a Permanent Status Agreement

• The immediate launching of bilateral, ongoing and vigorous negotiations in order to conclude a peace treaty that would resolve all of the outstanding core issues.

• Making every effort to conclude the peace treaty before the end of 2008.

- Conducting bi-weekly meetings between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) for the purpose of advancing negotiations.

Track 2 – Implementation of the Roadmap

- The parties undertake to immediately implement their respective obligations under the performance-based Roadmap.

- The United States, will follow up on the implementation of the Roadmap.

- The United States will monitor and play the role of arbitrator in the fulfillment of the commitments of both sides.

The Annapolis Declaration also defines the condition for the implementation of the permanent agreement: "Implementation of the future peace treaty will be subject to the implementation of the Roadmap, as judged by the United States". The declaration, therefore, envisages the possibility of a situation in which a permanent agreement is achieved along one track, but on the other track the conditions defined by the Roadmap are not yet fulfilled. In such a case, the permanent status agreement will be suspended until the conditions making its implementation possible exist. The Annapolis outline includes, therefore, the concept of a "shelf agreement" without specifically saying so. Non-performance in regard to the obligations imposed upon the sides according to the Roadmap does not constitute a reason to stop the negotiations with respect to final status.

Indeed, Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and the Palestinian Authority representative Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala) are negotiating for a permanent agreement, although the take-over of the Gaza Strip by Hamas puts heavy constraints on the capability of the Palestinians to stand by their obligations and there is no apparent progress along the parallel track (implementation of the Roadmap obligations), whose main points are specified *as follows:*

Commitments of the Palestinian Side

- An unconditional ceasefire.

- Overt efforts to prevent individuals and organizations from planning attacks on Israelis anywhere.

- Continuous, efficient and focused activities to confront terrorist elements.

- Dismantling terrorist infrastructures and capabilities.

- The confiscation of illegal weapons.

- Putting and end to incitement against Israel.

- Unifying the Palestinian security organizations into three security services, with no connection whatsoever to terrorism and corruption and under a reinforced Minister of Interior.

Commitments of the Israeli Side

- The removal of settlements established since March 2001 (the unauthorized outposts).

- Freezing all settlement activities, including natural growth (according to the terminology of the Mitchell Commission).

- Opening the offices of the Trade Council and other Palestinian institutions, which were closed down in Jerusalem (subject to commitments that they would act in accordance with previous agreements between the parties).

- Activities to improve humanitarian conditions, lifting curfews and removing checkpoints.

Israel's approach toward the Annapolis process is linked to a complex reality: relevant trends in the geopolitical system in general and in the Middle East in particular, the international status of the United States, the 2008 U.S. presidential elections, the dynamics that characterize the Arab-Israeli conflict, the internal Palestinian situation and Israel's own political arena.

The Relevant Trends in the Geopolitical Arena

The international system relevant to the Middle East and to Israel's position is manifesting trends that "threaten" to change its unipolar characteristics. The American dominance which has characterized the international arena

since the downfall of the Soviet Union is eroding. The rising powers of China and India, a stronger, assertive Russia, the economic crisis in the United States and the latter's deep entanglement in Iraq – all signal the establishment of a different international system where Washington may show less interest in aggressive regional involvement and increased preference toward multilateral frameworks for executing its foreign policy. From the Israeli perspective, all of these may negatively impact the stability of the Middle East, the status of Israel, the decisiveness of the struggle against radical Islam and international terrorism and the effort to prevent Iran from achieving nuclear weapons (which could in turn support wider efforts to control regional nuclearization).

The trends characterizing the Middle East may foretell further violence and upset the region's stability. The social, economic, political and religious realities on which radicalism and Islamic terrorism prosper do not seem to be heading toward a change for the better in the foreseeable future. The economy of the region drags behind the world economy and depends almost exclusively on oil production. Unemployment rates are high and many of the increasingly-growing young generation find themselves unemployed and without hope, only to take their place in a frustrated public (while increasing the potential for being recruited by radical movements). The media and Internet revolution, which is well exploited by extremist elements, also contributes to the arousal of hostility towards the West against the background of gaps in standards of living and in social norms which are now being exposed in a very blatant and graphic manner.

The deterioration of the security situation in the region may destabilize the oil supply, boost its prices, block foreign investments and cause the depletion of funds outside the Middle East. The feelings of frustration and deprivation could be expressed against the West and Israel, but also against the authoritarian regimes in the region because they are weak, economically inefficient and unrepresentative (Egypt will soon face the test of a generational change in its leadership).

The International Position of the United States and the 2008 Presidential Elections

A significant "constitutive test" faces us in the near future in Iran and in Iraq, in terms of the focus of America's foreign policy and its position in the Middle East and worldwide. In light of the unstable hegemonic position of the United States in the external arena and the effects of the deep entanglement in Iraq on American public opinion, a large question mark now hangs above Washington's will and ability to successfully lead the diplomatic process to stop Iran from becoming armed with nuclear weapons and to initiate a military operation against it as a last resort.

At the same time – the nature and scope of the American withdrawal from Iraq will signify a trend of abandonment by the powerful country which historically produced a relative stable Middle East arena. Such a reality might encourage the blossoming of radical forces, cause the upset of moderate regimes and motivate other countries in the region to obtain nuclear weaponry.

The results of the 2008 U.S. presidential elections will, of course, affect the directions of American foreign policy. Altogether, we must assume, regardless of the identity of the next president, that the new administration will invest efforts in settling the Arab-Israeli conflict. These efforts will take place in the regional and international contexts described above, and will likely reflect the spirit of the Iraq Study Group's recommendations, which expressed positions held by many in the U.S. foreign policy community (the study group was led by former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III, and former representative Lee H. Hamilton and was appointed by Congress to offer policy guidelines on the war in Iraq. Its ten members were comprised of representatives of both parties):

• An increasing tendency to operate in multilateral frameworks (greater cooperation with the United Nations and other international organizations).

• Reducing limitations on contacts and cooperation with extremist regimes (Iran, Syria).

- Recognizing a direct linkage between the Arab-Israeli conflict and the key issues in the Middle East, which are of concern to the United States: Iraq, Iran, terrorism, Islamic radicalism and so on – while clearly and unambiguously stating: "The United States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle East unless it deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict . . .".

The Dynamics Characterizing the Arab-Israeli Conflict

The 1991 Madrid conference placed the Arab-Israeli conflict on the course of a process based on mutual acknowledgment. Despite the hard and bloody road, the conflict seems more and more to be taking place between national movements which do not reject a compromise out of hand. Yet, the blossoming of radical Islam is threatening to bring the conflict back to its existential characteristics while stressing the religious dimension. The prevalence of powerful weapons in the area and the possibility of weapons capable of mass destruction reaching the hands of Islamic radicals further exacerbate such dangers. The Arab process of accepting Israel's existence, which started in the early 70's, is now threatened by the empowered axis negating Israel's right to exist: Iran-Hizbollah-Hamas-Al Qaeda. From its own perspective, this extreme axis has had significant achievements: driving the Soviets out of Afghanistan, forcing Israel out of Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, the monumental terrorist attack on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, the American entanglement in Iraq, the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections, Iran's continuous efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and the "victory" of Hizbollah during the Second Lebanon War.

The "Three No's" of the Arab League in Khartoum (1967): No peace, No recognition and No negotiation with Israel were turned "upside down" into "Yes" in the Beirut Declaration (2002) – normal peace relations with Israel are now defined as the strategic goal of the Arab world which comes back and places this "peace initiative" at Israel's doorstep (Syria, which maintains close relations with Iran, declares its interest in launching peace negotiations with Israel as well). The moderate Arab countries are in fear of Iran and of the danger of the Islamic extremists. This reality introduces opportunities for cooperation between Israel and the moderate Arab axis, particularly

if progress toward an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement is seen, while depending at least partially on the Arab peace initiative.

The Intra-Palestinian Situation

The January 2006 victory of Hamas in the PA elections and its later overtaking of the Gaza Strip (June 2007) dealt a serious blow to the ongoing efforts to establish peace between Israel and the Palestinians. An Islamic movement wielding the weapon of terrorism and committed in its charter to annihilate Israel won the elections in a democratic procedure. The success of Hamas does not seem right now to be a fleeting episode in the life of Palestinian society, but rather is viewed as an authentic expression of fierce undercurrents which show an Islamic radicalization. with regional characteristics. An open question remains: Just how much would the power and status of Hamas erode if it were faced with the alternative of an efficient and uncorrupted Palestinian Authority government, a prosperous economy and an attractive and reliable political horizon?

The Palestinians are ideologically and geographically split. Most of the Israeli public finds it hard to regard them as a reliable partner capable of implementing and honoring signed agreements. Opposing Hamas, which refuses to recognize Israel's right to exist, is Fatah, and its leader, the elected Palestinian President Abbas who does recognizes Israel, is committed to the peace process and publicly rejects the use of terrorism. Alas, Abbas has not been able to impose his authority over Hamas; his movement is weak and divided. A scenario in which Fatah and Hamas put aside their differences and join forces again in a unity government is not out of the question, particularly in light of both internal and external initiatives striving for their reconciliation. Such a scenario would exacerbate the "absence of address" problem on the Palestinian side, assuming that Israel will enforce its warning and cut off contact with any Palestinian government that includes Hamas. The participation of Hamas in a unity government and possibly in PLO institutions – also increases doubt concerning the readiness of the Palestinian side to sign a permanent peace agreement with Israel.

The Annapolis Dilemmas

If the parties reach an agreement, one can assume that its basic elements would entail:

- The establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel.

- Borders will be based on the 1967 lines with border modifications that will include agreed-upon land swaps, leaving the large Jewish settlement blocs under Israeli sovereignty.

- Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem will come under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods under Israeli sovereignty. As for the Holy Basin, there will be an arrangement to grant each side control over their respective holy sites.

- The Palestinian refugees will be compensated and would be able to settle in the state of Palestine, in their current host countries, or in willing third countries.

- The most significant gaps requiring bridging (and at the moment of truth one could expect tradeoffs between the issues) focus on the following questions:

- What kind of arrangement will be devised for the Holy Basin – division of sovereignty, absence of sovereignty, a special regime, international presence, etc.?

- Would Israel be willing to absorb in its territory, over a number of years and as a "humanitarian measure," a limited quota of Palestinian refugees?

- Would the territorial exchanges be on a ratio of 1:1, and what would be the maximal percentage of West Bank territory Israel is permitted to annex?

The basic line of disagreement between the different opinion camps in Israel is drawn between those who are willing, more-or-less, to compromise for the sake of reaching an agreement and those who object to making concessions. But the anti-Annapolis camp is not just composed of those objecting to the price tag of an agreement. This camp also contains those who are

willing, in principle, to pay the painful price of an historical compromise, but object to doing so right now. According to them, the weakness of the Palestinian Authority, the strength of Hamas, the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip – all against the backdrop of the dangerous, unstable Middle Eastern arena – require caution, barricading, risk-avoidance and contentment with conflict "management," because there is no viable and feasible solution right now.

Opponents of Annapolis caution against replacing the sequential logic of the Roadmap process with the two parallel tracks and the formation of a "shelf agreement", i.e.– formulating a permanent agreement and then waiting until the conditions are ripe for its implementation (the Palestinian side fulfilling the requirements specified by the Roadmap). Such opponents point to two probable negative outcomes: international pressure would force Israel to begin implementing the agreement immediately after its formulation, even if the Palestinian side has yet to fulfill its Roadmap obligations. Furthermore – the compromises that Israel would make in order to achieve the "shelf agreement" could turn into a mere starting position once the process is renewed. From such a starting point, Israel would be pushed to make further concessions. A possible mechanism intended to "immunize" against such negative outcomes could be a formal or informal agreement that oversees and "synchronizes" progress in the final status negotiations with progress in the Roadmap implementation track (and in so doing, bring the sequential logic back into the process through "the back door").

Another school of thought claims that at this stage the Palestinian issue must be placed on the back burner and the focus should shift to promoting peace with Syria. According to this claim, the rulers of Damascus are reliable partners for a dialogue, capable of upholding obligations they would undertake. Great strategic importance is attached to an agreement with Syria: removing a significant military threat to Israel, creating a potential break between Damascus and Tehran, creating motivation to moderate Hamas and Hizbollah and minimizing the flow of weapons currently reaching these organizations – which would subsequently make the resumption of Israeli-Lebaneese peace processes possible. Proponents of Annapolis claim that time is not on Israel's side. Demographic realities and the inability to

realize the "Two States for Two Peoples" formula could increase among the Palestinians the attractiveness of the "One State for the Two Peoples" formula. The Palestinians who support this formula explain that soon the day will come when Israel will lose its Jewish majority and, consequently, its Jewish identity. The Palestinians will fulfill their dream thanks to a high birth rate and the demand – which would be perceived in the world as legitimate – "to respect the rules of democracy" by instituting a "one person – one vote" system.

Significant progress toward the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the primary strategic tool with the power to influence inclusive peacemaking with the Arab and the Muslim world, Israel's security and economy, its international status, the morale of its citizens, its ability to regionally cope with radical Islam and to lessen Muslim hostility towards Jews in general.

A "shelf agreement" would gain wide international support and legitimacy, including in the Arab world, and would anchor the probable advantages embodied in an agreement that is reached under the current conditions. There is no guarantee that such favorable terms could exist anytime in the near future. Additionally, the wide support for the agreement and the guarantees that Israel would receive regarding its fulfillment and validity would prevent the danger of its erosion (for example, by turning the agreement into a binding UN Security Council resolution). President Bush is perceived as a true friend of Israel and reaching an agreement during the remainder of his term would be preferable to an agreement reached during a less-friendly administration. As long as Bush is the U.S. President, it would be easier to hammer into the permanent agreement the positions he specified in his letter to Sharon (April 14, 2004):

• No return to the Armistice line of 1949.

• The border modifications should reflect the reality of existing Jewish population centers (settlement blocs).

• Palestinian refugees should find their solution in Palestine, rather than in Israel.

The actual advancement of the Annapolis process requires handling additional difficult issues:

Hamas

The continuing firing of Qassam rockets from the Gaza Strip toward Israel's territory threatens to derail the Annapolis process, particularly if it leads to resumed escalation where Palestinian violence provokes a wide-scale Israeli military operation. According to the declarations of its leaders, Hamas is willing to reach a long-term ceasefire agreement with Israel ("Hudna") that does not include recognition of Israel's legitimacy. Those siding with this option claim that the power of Hamas cannot be ignored and that it represents a significant portion of the Palestinian population. According to this approach, after a long period of quiet and exchanges of generations in the organization, their hearts would be ready to acknowledge Israel's legitimacy and open to a permanent peace agreement.

Those objecting to an agreement with Hamas claim it is an extreme religious movement, linked with regional radical Islamists, that would never acknowledge Israel's existence. Israel's willingness to be content with the "ceasefire" could encourage the regional radical axis and may motivate forces in Jordan and in Egypt to demote or redefine their peace agreements with Israel to the level of ceasefire. This would also create an international normative assessment of the Arab readiness for nothing more than Hudna as sufficient. Furthermore, Israel's acknowledgment of the status of Hamas by conducting contact with it would further weaken President Abbas and his constituents.

Coping with the Hamas dilemma also produces a middle way of 'informal understandings' through the facilitation of a third party, based on the need of Hamas for a period of calm. The "incorporation" of Hamas, even if it means an essentially informal and unstable ceasefire, could grant, according to this line of thinking, much-needed space in which the Annapolis process could be advanced.

Alongside these approaches another doctrine claims that absent a total war against Hamas – destroying its infrastructure, neutralizing its military and

political leadership, ending its control over the Gaza Strip and its ability to thwart the Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation process – it would be impossible to promote the Annapolis track.

Preparing for a Political Decision

If the parties reach a permanent status agreement, each side will need to approve it through some kind of internal ratifying procedure. On the Palestinian side, several alternative procedures have been mentioned: elections, a referendum and a decision by the PLO institutions. Naturally, the threat of a civil war would hover over this process, along with a violent attempt by Hamas and other radical factions to thwart internal Palestinian decision-making. It thus turns out that the actual reaching of an agreement does not ensure its approval, and this necessitates an institutional strategy aiming to increase the probability that at the moment of truth the decision would be carried out and achieve positive results to build a better reality of daily life in the West Bank in contrast to the one offered by Hamas in Gaza. Possible components of such a strategy include the normalization of life in the West Bank, removing checkpoints, meaningful improvement in the economic situation including the channeling of international economic support, recruitment of the support and legitimacy of Arab countries (based on the Arab Peace Initiative), strengthening the Palestinian Authority's institutions with emphasis on its security organizations, and so on.

On the Israeli side, the leaders of the process would have to take into account (and maybe even initiate) early elections as a way to bring the agreement to the public for approval. Here too, from the point of view of the supporters of the agreement, the document per se is not enough to ensure electoral support. The Israeli public was disappointed to discover that the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip did not lead to the desired result of inhibiting hostile acts, and is filled with doubts concerning the seriousness of the Palestinian side (and would therefore wish to see a real change in the manner by which the Palestinian Authority fights terrorism). A significant, visible warming of relations with the Arab world on the basis of the peace plan it offers might compensate for Palestinian weakness and grant the process further credibility. Furthermore – one must not assume an automatic correlation between public opinion

polls in Israel concerning a peace agreement (which usually show an Israeli majority that favors a peace agreement package with the Palestinians), and the results of general elections in Israel which are not a referendum focused on just a single specific issue. Other issues beside the agreement with the Palestinians would be on the agenda of the general elections, as well as the fact that partisan loyalty may create a situation in which a voter who supported the agreement in the public opinion poll votes for a party that opposes the agreement.

The Desirable Product of the Current Negotiations

Three common views exist regarding the format of the agreement to be drafted, which will then be brought to the publics:

- A short (about 1 page) declaration of principles, specifying the characteristics of the future agreement.

- A "framework agreement," which is an expanded declaration of principles (5-8 pages).

- A full and final permanent agreement, sometimes known as a "comprehensive agreement".

A declaration of principles could be achieved in a relatively short time and with minimal involvement of participants, but it may produce disagreements regarding interpretation of specific clauses down the road, a result of the formulation of principles in a minimalist, sometimes vague, manner. Though a full permanent status agreement would solve this problem, both the amount of time required for its completion and the number of people involved in its achievement are greater. The latter could create time frameworks which may deviate from the constraints of the political timetables of all sides and also increase the chances of leaks of sensitive parts of the agreement in a way that would undermine the entire effort. (A "framework agreement" is the middle way intended to compensate for the weaknesses of the other two alternatives).

Points of Significance for the Jewish People

The conventional wisdom assumes that achieving a truly stable peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians would increase security for Israelis, contribute to the country's economic growth, improve Israel's image and international position, reinforce the soft power of the Jewish people, minimize expressions of hostility and anti-Semitism toward Jews worldwide and would probably soften (but not necessarily eliminate) the motivation of Islamic terrorists to strike Israeli and Jewish targets. (In the short term, the pattern of influence could be the opposite: a reinvigoration of violence against Israel and against Jewish targets abroad, in attempt to thwart the agreement and its implementation).

The maturation of the talks might motivate the United States to pressure Israel to make further concessions in order to conclude an agreement. Tensions in Washington-Jerusalem relations against this background – or perhaps tensions with a new Israeli government that would renounce the Annapolis process – could place the Jewish community in an uneasy situation, especially against the background of claims like those of Walt-Mearsheimer, according to which American foreign policy in the Middle East is influenced by Israel and by the Jewish lobby in a manner inconsistent with and sometimes contradictory to American interests.

Israel's entry into final status negotiations places on the agenda sensitive issues close to the hearts of the Jewish People: assuring Israel's existence, the nature of the agreement concerning Jerusalem, the fate of holy places in Judea and Samaria, the evacuation of settlements, the preservation of a Jewish majority in Israel as well as the Jewish and democratic nature of Israel, the danger of fracturing internal solidarity in Israel and in the Diaspora, maybe even a civil war and bloodshed. One must assume that as the negotiations progress, the internal disputes could deteriorate and become significantly harsher both domestically in Israel and in the Diaspora. Not in vain did the Annapolis process begin to spark internal Jewish controversy – and not just about the promise or the danger vested in the process, but also concerning the actual question of if (and how) Diaspora Jewry should take part in historical decisions which have the power to influence the future of Jerusalem, Israel and the entire Jewish world.

The Islamist challenge

By Emmanuel Sivan

Introduction

The future of the world order hinges to a considerable extent upon what will happen to the Great Middle East (which stretches from Afghanistan to Morocco), given its geo-strategic position and energy resources. The most troublesome and destabilizing factor in that region is Islamism, a cogery of movements, both Sunni and Shiite, which challenge the present autocratic yet partly modernizing order. The challenge comes in the name of an alternative value system, i.e., the supposedly pristine Islam, which had been corrupted by modernity. Let me emphasize that this is a clash *within* Islam, not a Clash of Civilizations.

It is only in Iran that an Islamist movement controls a state, but elsewhere it enjoys many allies, conscious or objective within the regimes, especially among younger generations. Islamism has, as well, significant extensions among Muslim diasporas in Europe.

Though such Islamist movements fight first and foremost against "Vicious (i.e. heretic) Muslims", it has developed particular animosity, among non-Muslims, towards Jews and the Jewish state.

In the following pages we shall first draw the composite portrait of the Jews as set by the Islamists, and then delineate the specific movements within this cogery, which serve as social and political vectors for this newly-fangled

anti-Jewish hatred, their mode of action, their probable contribution to the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the danger they may present to Jewish communities in the diaspora. The sub-chapters of recommendations concentrate on major issues. We have left out secondary issues such as the manner in which Israel and Jewish organizations could treat anti-Semitic propaganda carried by Islamist opposition movements within Arab countries, which must be discussed on a country by country basis. Another issue, anti-Semitism among Muslim diasporas is briefly discussed in the recommendations and then explained in detail in the appendix.

Composite portrait:

Somewhat schematically, the salient composite portrait of the Jews in the Muslim world and the Muslim diaspora in Europe today may be summed up as follows:

1. Jews are a religion, not a people. As a religion, Judaism is a monotheistic one, preceding Islam, containing part of the *Divine message* which Allah would bring to perfection through Islam, but its kernel was falsified and corrupted after the time of the Prophet Moses (Musa, in Koranic language) by the Rabbis (especially of the Talmud) and converted into a petulant, pedantic, too rigorous and "angry" religion, unlike Islam which is the religion of the Golden Mean, of "live and let live".

2. That is why Judaism is hostile to Islam since its inception to this very day, as exemplified in the behavior of the Jewish tribes of Arabia who had concluded an alliance with Muhammad, and then turned against him.

3. As this behavioral pattern already indicates, the inherent characteristics of the Jews, both as individuals and as a community, are treachery, deviousness and hypocrisy. (Israel's preemptive attack in June 1967 is just a late manifestation of this psychological make-up).

4. The right status of the Jews, as a monotheistic yet partially corrupted religion should have been that of a "protected community" (Ahl al-Dhimma) under Islam. And that had indeed been their status until the rise of the illegitimate state of Israel, illegitimate because Jews do not constitute a people with the right to national self-determination. As a

state, based upon the spoliation of Muslims, the Jews acquired arrogance (ghatrasa), i.e. the capturing of a high and unmerited position by those who should have been the "lowest of the low" (asfal al-safilin).

5. Not only are modern Jews full of themselves (whether due to political power or to wealth), but they also tend to re-exhibit their age-old Biblical characteristic of unmitigated cruelty employing violence against civilians, women and children in their unquenchable quest for land and power, particularly when it is a matter of lording it over Muslims (see item 1).

6. In order to settle their historical account with Islam, the Jews have recently wrested from it the third holy city, al-Quds, a sacrilegious act which they carried out with the help of ethnic cleansing and mass settlement of Jews within its confines.

7. Due to their undeserved wealth, amassed by typically unethical means in the West, the Jews have conspired to achieve world hegemony as that authentic and priceless document, *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, had exposed. And indeed they control modern capitalism, especially in the U.S. and Western Europe. They receive collaboration from participants who are the patsies or playthings of this all-pervasive cabal.

8. One of the best means of bolstering this power is the harping over guilt feelings in the West over the Shoah, whose scope has been grossly exaggerated or (according to another version) never happened at all. This manipulation is exposed and proven by a few Jews who have integrity, such as Noam Chomsky or Norman Finkelstein, while the wholesale fabrication is amply documented by Roger Garaudy, David Irving and their ilk, whose voice the Jews do their best to stifle.

Strata

This eight-item portrait derives from three main sources:

Items 1 to 3 of the above portrait represent the contribution of the pre-modern Muslim encounter with the Jews, specifically during the formative period of the Prophet Muhammad; the later theological polemics through which Islam endeavored to bolster its claim to be the final and most accomplished

version of monotheism; and the lowly juridical and social status of the Jews throughout 13 centuries of unhampered Muslim rule – a status which stands in sharp contrast to the decline of Muslim fortunes and the "undue" amelioration, that of the Jews in the 20th century.

This is the bedrock of hostility, disdain and also envy, bordering on "cognitive dissonance," which the Islamic resurgence of the past half century had brought to the fore – together with other elements of Islamic heritage, such as Muslim law which it had selectively picked as "essence" or "fundament" of Islam which needs to be resurrected and refreshed, so as to save this religion from imminent collapse. In the early stages of the resurgence movement, anti-Judaic themes were secondary yet integral elements of the new creed. Since 1967 and afterwards, however, they have moved to play a primary role.

Items 4 to 6 of the composite portrait represent the contribution of the ever-worsening Arab-Israeli conflict. Indeed the Islamization of that conflict, viewed increasingly as an inevitable, deterministic clash of the two religions, with roots in Muhammad's era and a hoped for, almost Messianic, victory for Islam, is the common denominator of all three items. The cornerstone had been laid by "fatwas" (religious opinions in matters of law) of the al-Azhar University in 1968, prodded by the Nasserist regime. This theologization of the conflict was taken up by various Islamic resurgence groups, in opposition to the powers-that-be, and later brought to its pinnacle by the nascent Hamas during the First Intifada. The suicide terrorism of the Second Intifada instilled into this context the highly emotive notion of the "*Shahada*" (martyrdom for the Faith) which galvanized millions of Muslims with their visual representations lavishly commented upon by eloquent preachers. (However, not all Hamas concepts were fully integrated. Their concept of Palestine as Waqf, an endowed holy land which can never be expropriated from under Muslim rule, was never truly integrated into the Islamic Jew-hatred, for its theological basis was rather flimsy).

Items 7 and 8 of the composite portrait represent the contribution of non-Muslim Western anti-Semitism. This was not an automatic process, because certain elements of the latter, such as the Blood Libel, were never truly integrated into a coherent Muslim concept, despite numerous attempts being too Christian in origin. (It is only among Orthodox Christians in the

Middle East that the idea still has some sway). The Protocols, however, fitted too well with the conspiratorial atmosphere rife in the politics of Islamic lands, and also provided a ready answer to the "cognitive dissonance", or discrepancy between ideal and reality, created by Jewish success despite their small number, and Muslim defeats despite a huge numerical advantage and oil wealth.

Whatever strata they originate from, the eight items are integrated into a functional whole, a sort of grid upon which to interpret reality, with coherent conclusions as to modes of action.

Movements:

In the Sunni world, contrary to what may be expected, it is not al-Qaeda, the most extremist current, which is the major vector of the new anti-Semitism. This organization had indeed dubbed itself, at its inception (in 1998) the "United Front for Jihad Against the Crusaders and the Jews," but the Jews are not the centerpiece of its transnational, global-scale strategy; this strategy is directed against the pillars of Western civilization, controlled by the U.S., and aims to hit at weak points among its networks of local (mostly Muslim) clients. With Palestine-Israel being a relatively hard to hit target, al-Qaeda, especially in its much enfeebled incarnation after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, has patently chosen not to focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict, down-grading it to a subaltern rank. The Jews are certainly excoriated as the power-behind-the American-throne and/or a major supporting pillar, and some al-Qaeda planned operations are known to have been intended against Jewish institutions in New York and Los Angeles. All these operations were nipped in the bud, and as the fight against the U.S. came to be carried out (after 2003) mostly in Iraq, the anti-Jewish & anti-Zionist themes suffered a further slump. The rise in the fortunes of Hamas, a nationalist-Islamic force in Palestine, has made the Arab-Israeli conflict even less appealing for al-Qaeda, a truly anti-nationalist global movement. Nationalism is for al-Qaeda yet another nefarious modern form of idolatry.

So it comes as no surprise that it is the Muslim Brothers movement, spread in national branches all over the Arab world – with allies in non-Arab Muslim

countries such as Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia and Turkey – that has become the major vector of the new Muslim anti-Semitism. All the more so as Hamas, its local Palestine branch, came to the fore in the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1988 onwards, and that in a spectacular fashion, following the violence of its suicide terrorism since 1993. Branches of the Muslim Brothers in the European diaspora enthusiastically embraced the revived anti-Jewish lore both in identification with the Palestinian cause and as an expression of their alienation with European societies, where Jews have a prominent (and, for them, undeserved and enviable) status (see appendix). The Hamas-inspired ideology, which considers the Arab-Israeli conflict the extension and pinnacle of an age-old Jewish–Muslim clash of civilizations, and the promised deterministic victory over the Jewish state, seen as the just punishment for Jewish sins perpetrated against Islam in centuries past – was easily imbibed by alienated, unemployed or underemployed Muslim youth well beyond Palestine, galvanized by the martyrdom of the suicide bombers.

Hamas, the Muslim Brothers and various loosely-coupled *jama'at* (associations) are a substantial yet basically anti-establishment force, but their ideas (including anti-Semitism) seep into some circles of the establishment, including clerics, particularly among younger, dissatisfied age cohorts and quite a number of the semi-independent media (especially on the Internet).

Yet there are also establishment forces that share in the anti-Semitic frenzy, notably the Saudi Arabian foundations controlled by members of the ruling family (which numbers some two thousand princes). Indeed Saudi foundations come a close second to the Muslim Brothers as producers of and disseminators of anti-Semitic propaganda in Arabic and in European languages for use in the Sunni world. The princes involved in this endeavor, tolerated though not necessarily instigated by the regime, have multiple motives: sincere adherence to the Wahhabi doctrine which contains a strong anti-Jewish (as well as anti-Christian and anti-Shiite) core; a hypocritical engagement with zealotry in order to cover up their own decadent lifestyle; an attempt to appease regime critics especially from amongst the *Ulama* (men of religion), who chastise them for toadying up to the U.S. The regime is, in a way, caught in its own contradictions as it was created by a religious movement, the Wahhabiya, which endows it with legitimacy. But it must also

conduct a policy of close security and economic cooperation with a great Christian power, the U.S., in order to insure its very survival against strong neighbors (Iraq, Iran). The regime thus has to balance out internal legitimacy and external security and here the best way is to make a show, at a low cost, of adherence to past values. An anti-Semitic campaign comes in handy, all the more so as it is not conducted as an official initiative but in an official manner.

In the Shiite world, by contrast, it is a regime, that of the Iranian ayatollahs, which takes up cudgels for anti-Semitism, openly and officially. This policy, which impacts upon Shiite communities in the Gulf and in Lebanon, has deep roots in Shiite historical hostility towards the Jews, who had been deemed impure spiritually and physically, and hence to be avoided socially and guarded against. The close Israeli collaboration with the Shah's regime (particularly with its internal security service, the Savak) had for its part left an indelible imprint upon the revolutionary Islamists, and once ensconced in power, they turned their virulent attitude toward the Jewish state and the people it belongs to. Both attitudes have a standing of their own in a good part of public opinion and help solidify popular support for the regime, but regime anti-Semitism is not just a matter of posturing. It is inextricably intertwined with national security policy, which sees Iran as surrounded by powerful enemies (including Israel and its Jewish allies in high places in the West). A mixture of siege mentality and a paranoid political style makes the present elite live in a world of concepts where Jews and other arch-enemies conspire day and night against it. The nuclearization endeavor is perceived as a national response to that challenge. Anti-Semitism is here the propaganda medium of these external security concerns.

Recommendations:

1. The fight against anti-Semitism has little to do with the American-led War on Terror. Although Bin-Laden and Zawahiri sound from time to time declarations against "these unconditional supporters of Israel," the Jews are a low priority target on their list of enemies made mainly of bad Muslims and strong world powers. Furthermore, to incorporate the Clash of Civilizations rhetoric of the War on Terror is not only unfounded in reality but also bad public relations.

It might draw the Jews into fanning the flames of religious discord, an act which a small people has certainly no interest in.

2. A prime aim of Jewish action should rather be isolating Iran and Hamas in world opinion and especially in the community of liberal and pro-western nations. Iran (and its extension, Hezbolla) as well as Hamas are major producers and disseminators of Islamist anti-Semitism in the Shiite and Sunni worlds. They are also resolute political actors in the fight for the destruction of the Jewish state. They have not only the intention but try to acquire the means for doing so, which they expand in a most troubling manner. They should be presented to world opinion in this double role. It is important that the campaign against Iran and Hamas be conducted by a wide coalition of forces, and as much as possible headed by non-Jewish political actors. The world campaign for Soviet Jews could serve as a model.

3. The second major aim of the campaign is to be directed towards world and especially U.S. public opinion and administration. It must expose the most negative role played by Saudi semi-official princely foundations as a most important disseminator of anti-Semitic propaganda in Sunnii countries as well as in Muslim diasporas. It is to be expected that an important obstacle for this campaign may emanate from the U.S. government's commitment to the present Saudi regime which leads American diplomacy to excuse the Saudi regime for many sins, including those with regard to human rights. Our campaign must stress that the new Muslim anti-Semitism contributes to the exacerbation of the Arab-Israeli conflict and therefore runs counter to a major U.S. foreign policy interest, namely the resolution of the conflict. Scaling down Saudi propaganda is, then, not just a matter of principle, but also a matter of realpolitik.

4. In order to work against the counter-productive logic of the Clash of Civilizations, Jewish organizations, in coordination with Israel, should foster relations with Muslim countries such as Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia and perhaps also Pakistan. (This task may present us, however, with grave dilemmas, particularly with regard to the issue of the Armenian genocide).

5. As for the strategy to be followed by the Diaspora communities vis-a-vis Muslim communities in their respective countries, each Jewish community should be left alone to decide it on its own, according to local conditions which may totally differ from one case to the other. We shall exemplify this in the following Appendix.

Appendix : Two Test Cases: Britain and France

These two diasporas look, at first glance, as quite similar. In both countries Muslim communities were established mostly from 1950's onwards, based on immigration from their respective former colonies, mostly harking from under-developed rural areas. The first generation was employed especially as manual laborers, unqualified and semi-qualified, in typical second-stage industries (such as mechanics, chemistry, mining, car production). The second generation of migrants in both countries had to face the challenge of third-stage industrialization which requires a labor force predicated on knowledge, and communication with intellectual qualifications to boot. Yet these offspring of immigrants lack such qualification due in large part to the underinvestment of France and the UK in education and housing in areas where migrants tend to settle, as well as anti-Muslim prejudice among employers. This crisis of the second generation has produced the rise, over the last three decades, of a militant Islam, in protest against injustice, discrimination and a seemingly hypocritical liberal civilization. The Jews, as paragon of a successful minority in that civilization, are a plausible object of envy and hostility, well before we take into consideration the impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict (especially from the first Lebanon war onwards). The two cases thus look the same, yet in reality are quite distinct from each other.

What has characterized the British case (at least from the eighties) is, firstly, a growing rate of people of Muslim extraction in representation in municipal, district and national government. The basic reason is that people originally from the Commonwealth (from where most Muslims come) are eligible for automatic citizenship, and British political parties and social organizations are hence interested in drawing them to their ranks.

Second, all surveys attest to the consistent decline in discrimination rates (in employment, housing, education) due to a systematic application and

monitoring of the 1980 legislation which followed the race riots in Brixton and elsewhere. Monitoring is done both by the central government and voluntary inter-ethnic bodies.

Third, British public opinion (including the lower socio-economic strata) has increasingly come to accept the legitimacy of ethno-cultural uniqueness. The spread of this consciousness which most opinion surveys attest to is greatly facilitated by grass-roots activity of inter-communal committees, where Muslim and non-Muslim activists work together.

Last but not least, as there is no separation of state and church in Britain, one can conduct legitimate public debate on the extent to which Islam may be endowed with a public expression. Islam being the religion of many Commonwealth immigrants (especially from the Indian subcontinent). The aim, accepted by almost all participants except for the extreme right is to find a "live and let live" solution.

This four-layered social situation explains why Muslim radicalism, whether violent or non-violent, has little drawing power for Muslim immigrants in Britain. They posses plenty of other avenues for expressing themselves, and their rising educational achievements provide them with social mobility. A descendant of illiterate Muslim parents can within a generation enter public colleges (though not yet Oxbridge). In the 2007 GCSE matriculation exams, the overall rate of success for all of Great Britain was 58%. For students of Pakistani origin it was likewise 58% and to those of Bangladeshi origin 56%.

Muslim British citizens can give vent to their ire against the Iraq war within the framework of a vast British political movement, whose members may not share their shock at the conquest of a Muslim land by non-believers, but may rather be motivated by an anti-U.S.-imperialist stance. Collaborating with extreme and even moderate leftists can inspire in these Muslims a sense of empowerment, even pride. It is thus that they acquire a sense of belonging, vehiculated above all at face-to-face encounters at the neighborhood level.

Anti-Semitism and Shoah denial are likely to isolate the Muslims, and Muslim associations would tend to avoid them, at least in British public space. (The only exception is the "Islamic Liberation Party"). Still, there are ominous signs within the Muslim space. A policy exchange survey of October 2007 found

that of 100 mosques monitored, anti-Semitic sermons are delivered in about one quarter and are as a rule backed by the availability of anti-Semitic literature (of Saudi origin for the most part). Such material is available even in London's Regent Park mosque.

The situation is much more hospitable for Muslim anti-Semitism in France.

France is a more centralized state, and the reigning idea is that all citizens are equal but as individuals. Positive discrimination (or affirmative action, as known in the U.S.) is, therefore, almost impossible (though President Sarkozy has taken a few hesitant steps in that direction). Yet it is only affirmative action that could extract the 5 million Muslim population from its really distressful situation. As in the UK, migrants came (above all from North Africa) as manual laborers, but in France their status is of temporary residents, not as citizens. Only since 1973 have they received the status of regular residents and could bring in their families. They were crowded in low-cost (HLM) housing blocks in the working class suburbs. Schooling in these neighborhoods is low-quality. French teachers employed there broadcast to their Maghribi (North-African) pupils low expectations. No wonder dropout rates were high and failing students were drifting into life of petty crime drugs. The state manifestly underinvested in immigrant areas (in health, schooling, housing, social services) and thus a culture of poverty was created among the second and third generation of Muslims. Such neglect was no doubt encouraged by the fact that the immigrant wielded little political power. Descendants of migrant residents who were born on French soil are entitled at age 18 to present a demand for citizenship (which is usually granted). Yet this procedure requires an initiative taken by the youngsters which is not taken at least in half the cases whether due to indifference, ignorance or (increasingly during the last decade) out of a sense of alienation towards France.

All this creates a powerful background for hostility towards the French state and culture, where the Jews happen to play a salient role. The brilliant success of Sepharadi Jews, coming from the same Maghribi countries as the Muslims, merely tends to heighten the envy and sense of injustice felt by many Muslims. The explanation provided by militant Muslims is that the Jews manipulate the French sense of guilt over Vichy and the Shoah in order to receive undeserved preferential treatment from a hypocritical state and

society. Such a response mode has the advantage of enabling Muslims to avoid confronting hard questions, such as why did so many penniless Jewish migrants from the Maghrib invest so much in their children's education while we Muslims did not? Is Jewish mobility really due to affirmative action by the state? Anti-Semitism as a solution for "cognitive dissonance" was well known in Christian Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries. It plays the same role among Muslims in France today.

With the Muslim resurgence in the last generation, immigrant hostility towards the Jews has taken a distinctly Islamic character, expressed above all in day-to-day banal prejudice, and leading at times to violent acts. It is mostly anti-Semitism against "virtual Jews", present on TV and other media, whereas most children and grandchildren of immigrants do not know Jews as individual persons. The Sepharadi Jews, the parents of whom had co-existed with Muslims in the HLM, have left these mixed neighborhoods thanks to education and high saving rates.

The Islamization of that sense of relative deprivation comes up quite due to a much deeper reason as well. If there is such a thing approaching a "Muslim essence" it consists of an ideal of justice upon earth, the infringement of which is dubbed *Zulm* and is the ultimate incarnation of evil. Such a concept has roots in Muhammad's early prophecy (in Mecca, before 622 A.D.), when he had served as a spokesman for the dispossessed lower classes. The vectors of the idea had later been a motley of protest movements (especially messianic,) the legitimate successor of which is the present Islamist resurgence. Psychiatrist Marc Sagemam, in his important book, Leaderless Jihad (2007) probed the inner motivation of some 500 Islamist terrorists and found that no infringement of their sense of honor (`Ird) lies at the bottom of their commitment to the "United Front to Combat Crusaders and Jews," but rather an all-pervasive Zulm. And it is Zulm which reigns over Islamism in France, much less so in Great Britain.

JEWISH CIVILIZATION AT THE CROSSROADS: RISE AND DECLINE IN HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE

By Dr. Shalom Salomon Wald, Senior Fellow, JPPPI, Paris, 27.3.2008.

A Thought Experiment

The thoughts and reflections presented in this paper are taken from a broader study written for the Jewish People Policy Planning Institute, to be published later in 2008.

The issue of the future of the Jewish people and of Judaism preoccupies many Jews, including leaders of Israel and the Jewish People. They face many critical questions, for example: Which historic factors explain the survival of the Jewish people for millennia, against the odds? Are these still at work today? What does the future hold? How can it be shaped and influenced?

The number of publications on Jewish themes is large and growing. However, the overwhelming majority of scholarly studies are on specific issues, periods, countries or events. They focus on "micro-history" and do not address the great "macro-historic" questions of rise and decline. If one wants to produce lessons from past history in order to influence the future one has to consider these macro-historic questions. This paper proposes a thought experiment, which is to "interrogate" a number of historians who, with few exceptions, were or are not Jewish and did not specialize in Jewish history, but have written about rise and decline of other civilizations and nations from a long-

term perspective. The main causes of rise and decline that they have identified will then tentatively be applied to the Jewish people. This could provide a basis for policy planning and suggestions for further study.

Twenty-two authors of the last 2400 years have been chosen for this exploration.[1] They include three of the greatest ancient historians, a Greek, a Chinese and an Arab, eleven classical historians (ten European, one American) who wrote in the 18th, 19th and 20th century, and eight contemporary Americans most of whom are not academic historians. This tentative reliance on non-Jewish history will be criticised, but this is not a new problem. David Gans, one of the first pre-modern Jewish historians and a student of two great spiritual leaders of his time, Rabbi Moses Isserles in Krakow and the Maharal (Rabbi Judah Loew) in Prague wrote in 1592: "I see in advance that many will speak out against me, condemn me and consider me sinful because I have taken material from non-Jewish writers…I contend that Scripture has allowed us to search in non-Jewish books for accounts of events which can be of some use for us". Critics may argue, as Heinrich Graetz, Simon Dubnow and other Jewish historians have done, that the longevity of the Jewish people under adverse conditions and its survival without territorial base has no parallel in known history. This is true, but it does not follow from this uniqueness that the specific ups and downs of Jewish history, the successes and failures of their leaders, the victories and defeats of their collective endeavours, are also in every respect unique and incomparable to other civilizations. With due caution, they can be compared. This might also allow for a number of tentative policy lessons. At the end of the sub-chapters such policy lessons are highlighted in *italics.*

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1. In chronological order, Thucydides (ca. 460-400 BCE), Sima Qian (ca. 145-90 BCE), Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), Edward Gibbon (1737-1794), Jacob Burckhardt (1818-1897), Max Weber ((1864-1920), Oswald Spengler (1880-1936), Johan Huizinga (1872-1945), Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975), Pitirim Sorokin (1889-1968), Fernand Braudel (1902-1985), Marshall G.H. Hodgson (1922-1968), Bernard Lewis, Jonathan I. Israel, Paul Kennedy, Jared Diamond, Bryan Ward-Perkins, Mancur Olson (1932-1998), Peter Turchin, Christopher Chase-Dunn/ Thomas D.Hall, Joseph A.Tainter, Arthur Herman.

Macro-Historic Observations on Rise-and-Decline Patterns

Historians of civilization have been looking for general patterns of rising, thriving and declining periods of civilizations, states or other social entities. Their research allowed them to draw general lessons of history. The early beginnings of a civilization are particularly difficult to understand. The best known, though vague theory of the rise of civilizations is Arnold Toynbee's "challenge-and-response" model. A new civilization can arise due to external or internal challenges, for example harsh natural living conditions, foreign aggression or social and religious discrimination. Some populations react creatively to such challenges, others do not and disappear over time.

Toynbee acknowledged that he took this idea originally from the Jewish Bible. In fact, his model well fits Jewish history if one adds that a successful response to a severe challenge always involves change and transformation. The secret of longevity is transformation, as other historians have shown. Jonathan I. Israel analysed how the Dutch survived in the 17th century against enormous external dangers by transforming their small strip of land into one of Europe's great powers. Bernard Lewis described how the Turks survived the catastrophic collapse of their Ottoman Empire in 1918 by transforming themselves into a new republican power.

Jewish history is structured by great ruptures that led to major transformations. Four major ones have been recorded by tradition and history: i.) Israel's dramatic birth as a nation coming out of Egypt, ii.) The Babylonian exile after the destruction of the First Temple in 586 BCE and the subsequent reforms, iii.) The formation of Judaism without a central sanctuary after the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE and the rise of Rabbinic Judaism, iv.) The deep transformations brought about by the Enlightenment, assimilation, the Shoah and the creation of the State of Israel. The second "response-cum-transformation" lasted more than two centuries, the third, four centuries. The Jewish people is in the midst of the fourth one that started almost two centuries ago. Its future is hard to predict.

It is easier to see the peak period or "Golden Age" of a civilization than its early rise, but explaining such peak periods is even more hazardous. "Golden

Ages" are periods of great cultural creativity – Athens under Pericles, Renaissance Florence, the Dutch Republic in the time of Rembrandt, the Jewish "Golden Age" in Moslem Spain – yet the deep reasons for such creativity are unknown. Contrary to popular belief, "Golden Ages" are not always periods of peace and general happiness. Often, they are periods of war, violence and sometimes military defeat. In contrast to Athens or Florence, long lasting civilizations, for example those of the Chinese or the Jews, do not have one great "Golden Age" but several ages during which culture was thriving, but also repeated periods of rise, stagnation and decline. For good reasons does rabbinic tradition compare the fate of the Jewish people to that of the moon: both keep going up and down.

The decline and fall of civilizations has fascinated historians and the general public more than their rise. Edward Gibbon's *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* has left a lasting impact on Western thought. Gibbon argued that no single reason could explain the fall of a civilization that was geographically so large, varied and complex. There were many reasons. Also, Rome was not destroyed by external enemies, it destroyed itself. Other historians tend to support such views, including Toynbee who said that "civilizations do not die by an assassin's hand, but by suicide". The conclusion that no mono-causal factor can explain the decline and fall of a wide-spread, multi-facetted civilization is applicable to the Jews. The Jewish people were saved more than once by global spread and fragmentation. Had 16th century Spain or 20th century Nazi Germany ruled the whole world there would probably be no Jewish people today. This means that a spiritually monolithic Judaism concentrated in one place might have a smaller chance of survival than a pluralistic, global Judaism, as long as at least two centres maintain critical size. However, in today's circumstances one may question this conclusion. It is not sure that the bulk of Diaspora Judaism could survive in a meaningful form and strength should Israel not survive.

Jewish history does not corroborate Gibbon's and Toynbee's assertion that civilizations disappear only for internal, not external reasons. The Jewish homeland was twice destroyed by external enemies although the Prophets and the Talmud put the blame for the catastrophes also on Jewish faults. Currently, Israel is threatened by very serious external factors, the Diaspora

by an internal one, assimilation. Assessing the balance between internal and external dangers will require continuous re-evaluation.

Drivers of Rise and Decline

Apart from macro-historic observations, the selected historians identify specific "drivers" of rise and decline that can lead to policy lessons. Nine drivers appear prominently in the work of many of our historians, both ancient and modern ones: religion, group cohesion, science, language, leaders, war, geopolitics, dissent, luck; one – economy – has been recognized as a major driver only since the 19th century and another – demography - has been added because it is significant for the future of the Jewish people, although our historians barely mention it. Together there are eleven drivers. This study treats dangers to the environment and natural disasters as "Global Futures and Threats" because they go beyond individual civilizations. A new historic view (21st century) asserts that such dangers have also been a driver of decline and collapse of particular civilizations. This particular view does not stand in contradiction to ours; rather, they can complement each other. The ranking of all these drivers does not indicate an order of priority.

1.) RELIGION: IDENTITY SAFEGUARDS AND THEIR DOWNSIDES

Religion is inseparable from ancient civilizations. Most historians see it as a driver of rise or of decline according to their own religious background. Few are as "value-free" as Max Weber had demanded of the social sciences. He showed that religion could do both: boost or even create a civilization (in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*) or paralyse it by preventing change as Confucianism and Hinduism are alleged to have done.

Religion has preserved the Jewish people's identity by a mix of norms and beliefs: by rituals that set boundary safeguards and instil a feeling of "otherness", by commemorating and re-enacting history through the celebrations of the Jewish year, by the message that Jews have been "chosen" for a mission in the world, by hope in a better future expressed in the Messianic idea, and also by the bond to the land of Israel. This bond lost much of its power when the Temple was destroyed, but it seems to regain it now.

When Jews began to abandon religion, the power of preservation of these five tools started to wane while at the same time the civilizations of the world increasingly incorporated Jewish contributions. Thus, for non-observant Jews, retaining Jewish pride and distinctiveness while embracing the modern or post-modern civilization of the West will remain a major challenge and cause many dilemmas.

Preserving the Jewish character of Israel and its Jewish population poses complex policy challenges. Living in Israel is not by itself a long-term guarantee of Jewish identity. In addition, a mix of ritual, historic memory and links with World Judaism might be required. Preserving Jewish identity in the Diaspora in the absence of religious practice might also require historic memory as well as links to Israel. The position of religious authorities towards conversion to Judaism will be an increasingly critical question.

2.) EXTRA-RATIONAL BONDS: "MAGIC CONSENSUS" OR "GROUP COHESION"

Civilizations depend on many unexplained and extra-rational factors. Oswald Spengler called the cohesion that had maintained the Jews in the past in the absence of a common land or language a "magic consensus". Freud spoke of a "spiritual essence" apparently common to Jews. The advances in the neuro-sciences are shedding new light on the biological and evolutionary basis of group cohesion, solidarity, "altruism" etc. Specific human groups can over time develop emotional and cognitive faculties that contribute to the group's survival chances in difficult environments. Other new discoveries show transmission of specific traits to offspring in not yet understood ways (epigenetics). These are outside the well-established means of inheritance, the DNA-sequence.

While it is still too early to assess the role of the mechanisms of evolutionary psychology and other neuro-sciences in the survival, rise or decline of the Jewish people, it is important to watch the fast progress in these sciences without prejudice.

3.) EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: DRIVERS OF THE FUTURE

Ibn Khaldun (14th century) was perhaps the first great historian to grasp the critical importance of education, scholarship and science in the fate of civilizations. He attributed the rapid decline of the Arab civilization of his time to the loss of Arab scholarship in all fields, particularly the sciences.

The level of education is a key indicator of a society's values and competitiveness. Jews were among the first to become a literate people. Although their reasons for this were religious, education gave them early occupational and economic advantages. In modern times, science and technology have become the cutting edge of knowledge. The countries in command of these instruments will determine a large part of our future. Jews had a pioneering role in the advancement of science and technology in the 20th century, widely beyond their small numbers. This enhanced their position in the world and helped Israel to survive against overwhelming odds.

Weaknesses in the domains of education, science and technology are now emerging that could affect the future position the Jewish people and Israel. Regrettably, Jewish, including Israeli policy agendas often neglect this issue.

4.) LANGUAGE: A FACTOR IN RISE AND DECLINE

"The high point of every culture is the miracle of language", said Jacob Burckhardt. Ancient Hebrew was one of several, very similar Canaanite languages. What distinguished ancient Israel most from its environment was not its language but the message that the language expressed. During the Babylonian exile, Jews began to speak Aramaic, and in the Eastern Mediterranean, Greek. Rabbinic tradition then understood the dangers inherent in the loss of Hebrew. In modern times, Hebrew became again indispensable for the national re-birth of the Jewish people in its ancient land. This historically unique language renaissance occurred together with an equally extraordinary language regression: while many Jews had easily spoken several languages two generations earlier, now many Jews speak only one language, particularly English.

Today, too many Jews across the world cannot easily communicate with each other in the same language

5.) CREATIVE LEADERSHIP AND ELITES

All classical and many modern historians assert that history is made by great, incompetent or evil leaders whose decisions can determine their people's rise or decline. Against this view stands a philosophy that sees history driven by deep, irresistible socio-economic forces if not "iron laws". Leaders are expressions of these forces, they do not create them. Karl Marx is the great protagonist of the "iron law" school. His influence is still visible in historians that look for "long duration" forces of history rooted in material factors (e.g. Fernand Braudel) or for universally valid laws of rise and decline.

Jewish history is not rooted in permanent natural-geographic or economic conditions. The critical condition for the long-term survival of Jewish civilization was and is creative spiritual and political leadership. Jews had good and bad leaders like every other people, but could afford the bad ones less because their external conditions were often so tenuous. There is no comprehensive history of the leaders who provided Jews across the ages with the political and material space for their spiritual achievements or physical survival. But when one compares great leaders from different epochs – say e.g. Nehemiah, Don Isaac Abarbanel, Jossel of Rosheim, Manasseh Ben Israel and some early Zionist leaders, a few common traits emerge. They all intervened strongly in history, had great courage and charisma, were financially incorruptible, sometimes ascetic and often ready to risk their life, health and money for their cause, all were learned, polyglot and knew Hebrew (except for Herzl), and all were attuned to the complex geo-political and religious situation of their times. Of course there is a great difference between the often desperate Diaspora conditions of the past and the often prosperous ones of today, and between the Diaspora and Israel, but it would be a mistake to believe that the Jewish people are today less in need of leaders with the calibre of those of the past.

The current Jewish and Israeli leadership situation is a source of grave concern. There is an urgent need to improve the political selection mechanism as well as the general quality of governance, policy making and policy implementation, particularly with regard to long-term policies.

6.) NUMBERS AND CRITICAL MASS

General historians have paid little or no attention to demography. Braudel is an exception. Is there a critical population number below which a civilization is doomed to decline? Everything depends on the ambitions and external conditions of a civilization. In Judaism, concern about the small number of Jews is old and begins already in the Bible. The Jews needed critical mass for different goals: defense, maintaining a majority in the homeland, cultural-religious creativity and wider political influence. Critical mass was essential for all four goals when Israel was sovereign and it is essential again today, not least for maintaining the Jewish nature of Israel and defense. In the Diaspora numbers were not required for defense, and Jewish religious and cultural creativity and even economic success were often ensured by numerically very small but well connected communities. However, in some places there could be a minimum level below which a community might not be viable.

Demographic challenges are now different from those before the Enlightenment. Demography is no longer limited to numbers of people but must include quality criteria such as identity and cultural-religious content. In Israel, the demographic challenge is to preserve the Jewish identity and majority, in the Diaspora, to preserve sustainable communities with spiritual significance.

7.) ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF LONG LASTING CIVILIZATIONS

The recognition that the economy is a dominant factor of history, a driver of rise and decline, belongs to modern times. Until the 19th century, mainstream historians paid almost no attention to it. The Industrial Revolution brought profound change not only to the economy, but to historiography which discovered the power of socio-economic drivers.

There were enormous differences between periods or countries where Jews were prosperous and other, frequent ones where they lived in great poverty. Periods of prosperity tended to sustain population expansion and cultural creativity and influence. Interesting patterns emerge when one compares some of these periods, for example that of the Jewish long-distance traders and urban pioneers north of the Alps between the 9th and 11th century CE, that of Jewish long-distance traders and craftsmen in the Mediterranean,

the Middle East and China between the 10th and 12th century, European Jewry in the time of Mercantilism (17th century), the economic rise of German Jewry in the 19th century and the extraordinary educational and economic success story of American Jews since 1945.

Some of the challenges were similar in all cases: Jews had no land or natural resources, experienced certain forms of discrimination, were dispersed and depended on the rulers of the day and place. Their responses were similar too: a high level of education ("human capital"), intense networking across the Jewish world ("social capital") and an exceptional gift for entrepreneurship, risk-taking and innovation. Jews created "knowledge-based economies", more by need than any other motive, long before this term existed. It was coined only in the late 20th century to describe the economy of the future. Today, the Jewish competitive advantage in human and social capital is probably shrinking because many others are trying to catch up.

In the past there was a "virtuous circle" whereby education and culture sustained Jewish prosperity and prosperity in turn supported education and culture. It is not sure that this "circle" will continue to turn without appropriate long-term policies. The past economic rise of German and American Jewry would have been impossible without the preceding, massive investments in education. If history can be taken as a guide, Israel's economic growth will not continue for very long without massive educational reforms now.

8.) WAR: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD

Virtually all historians regard war as a key driver of rise and decline, and many consider military virtues as essential to the long-term survival of civilizations. War has been seen as a part of the normal business of government. Among the classics, only Sima Qian, father of Chinese historiography, disagreed: peace is the business of government, not war.

War has repeatedly determined the rise and decline of the Jewish people. Victories over Philistines and Canaanites permitted ancient Israel to thrive, and defeat at the hand of Assyrians, Babylonians and Romans, though catastrophic for the defeated, triggered the radical transformations that created Judaism as we know it. Biblical messages incorporate conflicting realities: some wars were necessary and commendable, yet a deep

yearning for peace, expressed by the great Prophets, has become the hallmark of Judaism. One of the most underreported chapters of Jewish history is the voluntary participation of Diaspora Jews, sometimes in eminent positions, in the wars of the world. There are many examples where military virtue sustained Jewish presence and prestige: that of Judean mercenaries in Egypt, of Jewish military service in ancient Rome, first rewarded by Julius Caesar and continuing into the 5th century CE, that of Jewish soldiers in ancient Persia, in the Moslem Kingdom of Granada in the 11th century, and in imperial China in the 16th and 17th centuries. From the 11th or 12th century on, religious prejudice excluded Jews from all military service under Christian and Moslem rule. Following the French Revolution, Jews began to join European armies. Their multiple sacrifices in two World Wars – 300,000 Soviet Jewish soldiers lost their lives in battle or in Nazi captivity from 1941 to 1945 – did not seem to improve their standing anywhere in Europe, in contrast to more ancient times. Modern Israel owes its creation and survival to its readiness to fight wars of defense. This readiness had its roots in the early Zionist ideal of a "New Jew" but had also many links to old traditions and memories.

Ensuring Israel's future will call for great strategic, tactical and technological innovativeness and fast adaptation to new conditions, e.g. those of asymmetric high-intensity warfare. It is unlikely that Israel will be allowed to forget its martial qualities anytime soon. Struggling for peace while preparing for war was the fate of many nations. Israel and the Jewish people will have to live with this tension but also the complementarities between the two.

9.) GEOPOLITICS AND CIVILIZATIONAL AFFINITIES

Thucydides identified the will to power as the strongest motive of men and nations. Later historians described the strategies implemented by the latter in peace and in war to increase their power over that of others. Geopolitics is one of the oldest instruments of statecraft. Samuel Huntington has recently predicted that civilizational affinities will become the most important dimension of future geopolitical power alignments: nations with civilizational affinities will move closer and act together.

Israel, ancient and modern, is small, geographically exposed and surrounded by many larger powers, while Diaspora Judaism is so widely spread that any major event in the world will affect it somewhere. This should have

encouraged the Jews to keep their eyes open to the wide world and search for allies and affinities. Some affinities did play a role at critical junctures of Jewish history. Bernard Lewis suggests that religious affinity may have motivated the friendliness of Persia's King Cyrus towards the exiled Jews, and it certainly motivated England's Christian Zionists and contributed to the genesis of the Balfour Declaration. Today, affinity is again one of several reasons for the United States' support for Israel.

The Jewish people and Israel are today playing a global role while Jewish perspectives, at least those of much of the public, remain often short-term if not parochial. The current situation of the Jews and Israel makes the shaping of long-term geopolitical visions imperative.

10.) INTERNAL DISSENT

Many historians see internal dissent as the main cause of decline and fall of civilizations. Jewish history is different, as was already mentioned. It knew three types of dissent, but survived them all:

a.) Ideological conflict: Judaism is a religion of argumentation. The arguing parties, e.g. the Sadducees and Pharisees of the Second Temple period, did not exclude each other from the Jewish people, contrary to the treatment that Christians and Moslems would often inflict on their "heretics" or "schismatics". Rabbinic Judaism too faced severe challenges, e.g. from the Karaites (8th-11th centuries) who rejected the oral law, and from the Hassidic movement (18th – 19th century). These fights were intellectually violent but led to great upsurges in study, writing and scholarship. Often, they were creative, arguably because rabbinic power in the Diaspora was spiritual and could not use physical means to destroy its dissenters.

b.) Civil war: The late Second Temple period knew serious civil wars between royal pretenders that were conducted with horrible brutality. The last of these (63 BCE) brought in the Roman intervention which put an end not to Judaism but to the independence of the Jewish state. Civil war was also a component of the rebellion against Rome in 70 CE but this too did not put an end to Jewish civilization.

c.) Geographic partition: The partition of the united kingdom of Israel into a big northern and a small southern kingdoms did not terminate their relations.

These oscillated between cooperation and military clashes, but neither side ever forgot their common origin.

Judaism will remain a civilization of argumentation and spiritual conflict. Intellectual argumentation can be creative as long as it does not prevent joint action in times of crisis. Civil war is today not a real danger, but severe conflicts of opinion about the peace process in Israel and about the place of religion, and a new form of "geographic partition", with growing separation between Israel and large parts of the Diaspora could become critical policy issues..

11.) CHANCE EVENTS OR "LUCK"

Ancient civilizations were convinced that "fortune", luck or chance events intervened in the fate of nations and individuals. Historians who did not believe in "iron laws" of history made the same observation: the appearance of unexplained madness in or the sudden death of an important ruler, a mishap in war or an epidemic, could change the course of history. Machiavelli said that "Fortune seems to be the arbiter of half of our actions, but she leaves us the other half…Man should not neglect to prepare himself."

Rabbinic Judaism has no place for "fortune" besides the Almighty's unlimited power and it opposes reliance on magic and miracles to influence "fortune". However, a neutral historian could easily regard many events that influenced Jewish history for better or worse as chance events. A lucky event in 701 BCE was the unexpected end of the siege of Jerusalem by the Assyrian Sennacherib, perhaps due to an epidemic that struck his army. Another one was the sudden death of Stalin in 1953 a few weeks after he had fabricated the infamous Jewish "doctors' plot" and apparently was planning the deportation of Soviet Jewry to Siberia. There are also many unlucky chance events, for example some of the events that led to the destruction of the Temple in 70 CE.

A people in a tenuous situation – the Jews – must reduce their exposure to chance events and upgrade their capacity to cope with the unpredictable. This requires, in line with Machiavelli's advice, excellent science, long-term anticipation and strategic planning, and a very good decision-making capability for crisis situations.

Global Futures and Threats

The following global futures and threats are modern concerns. They challenge all of humanity. No single country can cope alone with all of them.

1.) DECLINE OF THE WEST OR THE "END OF CIVILIZATION"

Oxford's Bryan Ward-Perkins reviewed *The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilization* (2005) in the light of the latest archaeological discoveries. He found that the collapse of material civilization all across Europe after the 5th century CE was wide-ranging and catastrophic: "Romans before the fall were as certain as we are today that the world would continue for ever…We would be wise not to repeat their complacency".

Current prophecies of the decline and end of the West, of capitalism or of all civilization go back to 19th Century Europe and are regularly re-emerging in the West. Global decline and collapse could begin as a worldwide economic depression, a new world war or accelerating global warming followed by famines, wars and mass migrations. Jews will be drawn into any global crisis but have few, if any ways to significantly impact the mega-trends. Whether they will be more or less affected by these trends than others or more or less prepared for them, depends on many factors that are mostly unpredictable.

2.) NATURAL AND HEALTH DISASTERS

For the first time, natural and health disasters are recognized as potentially major causes of decline and fall. Jared Diamond's *Collapse* (2005) describes how ancient civilizations destroyed themselves by ravaging their natural environment. Man-made global warming and pandemics could become growing dangers to civilization. Earth-quakes and tsunamis are likely to cause increasing loss of life because population numbers are increasing.

No natural event seems to have greatly harmed the Jews in the past, but they may have to cope with such dangers in the future. Rising sea levels are now a certainty. Such rises are likely to affect in time the Eastern shores of the Mediterranean and will also threaten the wider regions of New York and Southern Florida where together approximately two million Jews are currently

living. Global warming will probably increase water shortages in Israel and the Middle East. Israel is in a geologically unstable region where major earth-quakes are more than likely while a large number of buildings are still not earth-quake safe.

The Jewish people and Israel need more long-term thinking and preparation for natural and health disasters. The dangers of global warming preoccupy the majority of humanity. Jews and Israel should respond to these global preoccupations beyond their own immediate interests, for example by greater and more visible participation in appropriate international policy and scientific-technological endeavours ("tikkun olam").

Outlook and Conclusions

The Jews formed a particular civilization more than three thousand years ago and have maintained it in changing forms ever since. A living civilization of this age and distinction might get weaker and smaller, by assimilation in the Diaspora and dilution of the Jewish character of Israel, but it will not die unless nearly all its members are physically eliminated or forced to abandon their traditions. Destroying the Jews was tried in the past and failed. It might be tried again and is likely to fail again as long as Jews are alert, defend themselves and have a global presence, and as long as the world is not dominated by a single political center hostile to Judaism.

Civilizations of such age and resilience tend to oscillate, go up and down, expand and contract in response to changing external and internal constraints. The current state of the Jewish people is a high point in their entire history although not all Jews are ready to see this. Never in two thousand years, and perhaps never in history have Jews at the same time been a leading military and economic power in the Middle East, a politically effective presence in the world's main super-power and a strong intellectual, cultural and scientific influence in many other parts of the world. If history follows a "normal" course, in the next phase the Jewish people will come down from this peak as it often has done after historic peaks, be it through accelerated assimilation, a catastrophic military or natural event striking Israel, a radical change in the internal or external situation of the current

main super-power, a major wave of global anti-Semitism, or several of these factors together. But history does not have to follow a "normal" course. The conditions for intervention to improve the present and protect the future are better than in earlier times because the Jewish people have many political, economic, military and intellectual resources. However, nothing is assured, and this is the reason why Jewish civilization is currently at the crossroads. Four priority areas to be addressed derive from our tentative application of rise-and-decline theories to the Jewish people. They select and summarize the most important of our eleven drivers. Improvements in all four will help ensure that Jewish civilization gets stronger or at least that Jews stay at the present peak and do not decline. All four depend on the will and wisdom of the Jews alone, not on external powers. The areas that require urgent attention and remedy are:

- The quality of political and spiritual leadership and of policy-making;

- The strength of Jewish identity and commitment to history and heritage;

- The Jewish participation and lead role in the world's ongoing knowledge revolution, particularly in science and technology;

- A long-term geopolitical vision of the Jewish people's place in the world.

The New Ruler

By Yehezkel Dror

Eine grosse Epoche hat das Jahrhundert geboren,

Aber der grosse Moment findet ein keines Geschlecht
Und noch kleinere Herscher

- Friedrich Schiller: *Der Zeitpunkt 1796,* bold addition by author

Our century has given birth to a great epoch,

But the great moment finds a stunned generation
And even more stunned rulers

- Friedrich Schiller: The Present Moment, bold addition by author

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Leitmotif

Humanity is entering a radically new epoch in which, for the first time in history, it has the power to destroy itself, by deliberate or unintended action. To prevent grievous harm resulting from this power and to use it for the better, radical improvements in critical future-shaping actors, processes and institutions are essential, especially in the moral and cognitive qualities of rulers.

1. Focus

This paper explores the core missions of 21st century political leadership worldwide, and preliminarily presents some of the qualities required for fulfilling them.[1] The emphasis is on qualities related to weaving the future and foundational tasks, which should characterize political leadership in the 21st century. Generic leadership attributes, necessary at all times, are left to the wide literature dealing with them.

To focus on what is most important, I have coined the term "New Ruler" to denote a "model" high quality top level political leader required in the 21st century. I am aware that the term "ruler" may be distasteful to many,but it is the correct one for institutionalized high-level political leadership, as discussed in this paper. It does not contain or indicate any meanings in contradiction to

democratic values and the principle of "sovereignty of the people". And calling a spade a spade is essential for penetrating the troublesome issues taken up in this paper.

Political leaders who lack essential qualities befitting their location in time-space have always been harmful. But the damage caused by inadequate political leaders is increasing exponentially, potentially endangering the very existence of humanity. Hence the need for New Rulers differing in important characteristics from all but the very few outstanding heads of governments of the 20th century and earlier.

The required qualities of the New Ruler are presented in this paper in the form of an optimal, and some might say ideal model. They should be realized by all high-level politicians and comparable leaders as much as achievable with serious efforts to do so. Politicians who do not meet significantly the main requirements should be gotten rid off. But rulers who impact significantly on the future of humanity or their country should satisfy the requirements nearly fully, assisted in doing so as far as necessary by counselors and other staffs. This applies in particular to presidents or prime ministers of major powers and

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1 The subject will be fully covered in a book on which the author is working.

heads of major global governance institutions should satisfy all requirements to a nearly full extent, as should top level politicians in countries facing situations requiring high-quality leadership.

More is required than the development of leadership who individually meet the new and demanding qualities discussed in this paper. Also necessary are changes in democratic or other procedures for selecting and re-evaluating political leaders, together with regime structures that enable them to perform their missions by providing adequate democratic power concentration safe-guarded by checks and balances.[2] Thus, providing voters with fuller information on candidates can help, including public hearings at which top candidates are subjected to vigorous questioning. Various incentives to politicians, especially younger ones, to acquire the learnable qualifications are also useful. But high quality political leaders cannot be assured by institutional arrangements alone. Also required are major efforts to motivate and develop them. This involves breaking some assumptions widespread in contemporary political cultures, such as the cynical view that nothing can be done about the poor quality of most politicians, and the taboo against putting the need for systematic action to improve high-level politicians on the public discourse agenda. Of interest and very worrying is the fact that main steam contemporary political philosophy and political science ignore this subject, despite the attention devoted to it in classical political science.

Instead, to deal effectively with radically new situations, all human institutions and this-worldly ideologies must be reconsidered and in part redesigned, and this includes political leadership.

It is the quantum leap in the human situation characterizing the 21st century and beyond that makes the nearly impossible fatefully necessary, including radical improvements in the qualifications of political leaders proportional to the radical shifts in the challenges they have to cope with. To these I now turn.

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2 For detailed treatment of these issues, see Yehezkel Dror, The Capacity to Govern: A Report to the Club of Rome (London: Frank Cass), 2002 (also available in German, Spanish, Portuguese and Polish. Japanese and Greek versions are in preparation).

2. Quantum Leap in the Human Situation

Some of the shifts in the human situation, which started in the 20th century but are sure to cascade to unprecedented and in large part inconceivable peaks in the 21st century and beyond, are well recognized: multi-dimensional globalization, escalating environmental impacts, new forms of murderous fundamentalism, demographic changes, cultural transformations, increasing material standards of living of large parts of humanity together with growing disparities, spread of market economics and more. The main two interacting drivers of such shifts are also well recognized, though not fully understood, namely rapid advances in science and technology and value shifts. However, the most fundamental quantum leap and its far-reaching implications, up to leading into a radically new human era, are not adequately recognized.

Thanks largely to science and technology, for the first time in human history human agency has the ability to radically change the future of humanity as a whole, for better or for worse. Examples for the worse include fatal ecological impacts of aggregate human action; doomsday effects of nuclear and biological devices and rendering homo sapiens obsolete thanks to the bio-technological creation of a different and more powerful neo-human being – which can be viewed as desirable or catastrophic, depending on one's values and beliefs.

The unprecedented future-impacting power given to humanity by science and technology can also, if used wisely for deliberate future-influencing, propel humanity onto a higher level of development in material terms, which can perhaps serve as a platform for a higher spiritual development. But my studies of human history lead me to assign a low probability of realization to such visions, making them less realistic than futuristic nightmares – unless a breakthrough occurs in human moral, cognitive and institutional capacities.

3. Critical Capacity Deficit

The critical question is whether innate or very slowly changing fundamental attributes of human beings and societies have the potential to provide the cognitive, ethical and institutional capacities needed for using the increasing power of humanity to influence and in part shape its future for the better.

ultimately, the answer to this question to this question, if at all accessible to human beings, depends on better understanding of the "wiring" of the brain and of critical issues in the philosophy of the mind. However, as a matter of fact, human cognitive, ethical and institutional capacities are improving slowly, while the increase in human power to impact on the future is much faster. This leads to a very dangerous capacity deficit. **To put it into a neo-Malthusian form: while human power to impact on its future increases geometrically and, even, exponentially, human capacities to use that power for the better improve arithmetically at best. The result is an increasing danger of catastrophic results, unless a radical upgrading of salient human moral, cognitive and institutional capacities can be brought about.**

4. Reviving Politics as the Dominant Future-Shaping Arena

Unless one clings to an optimistic teleological view of a good "end of history" sure to come about more or less on its own, which has no basis whatsoever in human history or in all that is known on human individual and collective behavior, the hard question is: what can we deliberately do to radically improve critical future-shaping choices?

This question is all the more crucial, as reliance on semi-automatic social processes and diffuse actors, e.g. free markets and civic society, is valid only within limited, however important, domains. They are very effective in the economy, in initiating environmental protection measures and in a few other fields. But they cannot cope adequately with the most critical issues, such as putting limits on the production and diffusion of dangerous scientific knowledge and the containment of "prophets" armed with mass-killing instruments. Neither can they implement on their own large-scale projects that may be important for the future of humanity, such as extensive and far-reaching space exploration. Nor can they on their own bring about the necessary radical redesign of governing institutions, such as decisive global governance.

Furthermore, in terms of legitimacy, political institutions--and they alone-- have the right to make critical future-shaping choices; and often they are the only ones that have the capacity to implement such choices against resistance.

It follows that, contrary to contemporary moods, politics has to be revitalized as the arena in which crucial future-shaping decisions are made and enforced. But this will only be useful if the quality of politics, in terms of values and cogitation, is improved step-by-step with the rapidly increasing human power to impact on the future. Ergo, the quality of politics has to be improved radically, up to a new "revolution in governance" befitting a radically new era in the history of humanity which constitutes a real rupture in the timeline of humanity.

5. A Minute Number of Top-level Politicians Exert Dominant Influence on the Future

Once we stop speaking about "politics" in the abstract and ask ourselves who decides what, a large part of the answer is that a minute number of top-level politicians dominate critical future-making choices (including non-choices). This view is unpleasant and for sure very unpopular in Western culture. Therefore, it needs both hedging and justification.

When no critical choices with meaningful alternatives are, or should be, on the agenda, then incremental processes which do not require pivotal decision makers are adequate. But this is not the case in the 21st century, when many choices with profound and even fatal impact on the future are on the agenda, whether recognized as such or not. And in these momentous decisions top-level politicians carry much and often decisive weight.

High-level politicians, including top-level ones, are constrained by political and social processes and other actors and operate within high-tension power fields which limit their options. But if they cooperate in small cohorts or when the choices are not exposed to public scrutiny, and if they are skillful in handling mass media, then their freedom of choice is considerable. And even when they are unable to make the choices they wish, they often have a veto-power over options they oppose, which is no less important a future-weaving[3] capacity than is positive decision making.

Let me clarify: I speak about deliberate choices, not about future-impacting processes, including major ones, which are more or less outside the control of politics – though this may, in part, have to change. Break-through thinkers, value and culture creators, scientists, entrepreneurs and other outstanding private individuals and groups, as well as shifting semi-spontaneous public moots, not to mention the importance of "Fortuna", exert deep influence on the future, often more so than that of any politician or political institution. But here comes the catch: as long as such future-influencers could not endanger the future of humanity, their freedom of action worked often, though not always, for the better; and, at worst, they could effect only limited damage. But this is no longer the case.

Thus, to return to already mentioned examples, a scientist developing biological technologies which can easily be used to kill a large part of humanity or might do so accidentally, or a very charismatic "prophet" calling for the extermination of all non-believers who might gain a hold over large masses -- these cannot and must not be tolerated any longer. And the decisions when and how to restrain them depend largely, though not exclusively, on a small number of top-level politicians.

However, most contemporary high-level politicians (and also historical ones), with all too few exceptions, are grossly inadequate for 21st century future-weaving tasks. Therefore, as there is no substitute for high-level politicians in their critical tasks, unless their qualities can be radically improved, the future looks very bleak indeed. In that case the relatively least pessimistic scenario is: after humanity pays a very high price for the failures of politicians -- learning will occur and steps to assure the high quality of politicians will be taken.

But, before depending as a last resort on such very costly and not reliable self-correction processes, let us try and develop a partly novel type of New Ruler equipped with the moral and cognitive qualities essential for engaging in optimal future-weaving.

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3   The idea that the main task of rulers is "future-weaving" originates with Plato in his dialogue The Statesman.

6. Hope-Providing Precedents

The proposition to work on the radical upgrading of high-level politicians is likely to be rejected out-of-hand as not only "elitist", which it is, but also as "utopian", in its popular meaning as something impossible in this world given the innate characteristics of human nature. However, let me prove this view to be false by mentioning a few hope-providing historic precedents from the not-too-far past which show that "mission impossible" is not really and absolutely impossible.

The well-studied example is that of the Founding Fathers of the United States. True, they were exceptional and could emerge only under the special conditions of the first period of the country.[4] But outstanding high-level politicians have occasionally emerged in other foundational periods, such as – to limit myself to the 20th century -- in Singapore and Israel.

 Therefore, efforts to develop a new type of politician are not in vain. And, even if improvements do not fully meet requirements, they may be adequate to reduce the dangers of collapse and increase the likelihood of thriving.

7. Foundational Tasks

Up to this point I have used the term "future-weaving" to designate the main mission of high-level politicians in the 21st century. Now is the time to sharpen the mission concept by introducing a more drastic but also more appropriate term, namely "founding". The 21st century poses dangers and opportunities which add up to a revolution in human affairs. This requires laying new foundations for the future approximating a revolution. In this foundational task, high-level politicians are and should be main actors for whom there exists no substitute. Accordingly, high-level politicians are required who possess core qualities enabling them to fulfill their mission as main actors in weaving the future -- up to founding a world different in critical respects from the past.

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4 Without endorsing in any way the judgments expressed in the quoted question, relevant is a quote from Joseph J. Ellis, American Creation (New York: Knopf), 2007, page ix, in which he describe a question he was asked at every stop while being on a trip to present his book: "Why must we choose between Al Gore and George W. Bush, whereas American voters two hundred years ago could choose between John Adams and Thomas Jefferson?"

Thus, to provide just a few examples, necessary are:

- decisive global governance;

- limitation of state sovereignty;

- reduction of inequalities in human levels of development[5] and standards of living;

- prevention of dangerous misuses of science and technology, of freedom of information etcetera;

- addition of individual responsibility and human duties to human rights;

- strict and fully enforced limitations on armament;

- containment and reversal of environmental damage;

- regulation of large-scale population movements,

- novel monitoring and guidance modalities to prevent serious market failures such as worldwide financial crises;

And much more.

8. A Note on Value Assumptions

Before proceeding further, the very concepts of "bad" or "good" futures, as used in this paper, require clarification. They are clearly value-sensitive. Thus, a sect believing that killing all of humanity will assure salvation will view as ideal a doomsday scenario regarded by all others as the ultimate catastrophe. Or creation of a new type of "humanity" with the help of genetic engineering may be regarded as the only way out from the *cul-de-sac*, or "cage", in which humanity is caught by its hard wiring, or as a sacrilegious cardinal sin. Less extreme examples abound, such as a world dominated by a single power or a small oligarchy of powers as opposed to a world of conflicting but free states – with preferences depending on one's views on what is necessary to prevent nuclear or bio-technical self-destruct.[6]

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5 In the sense of the UNDP Annual Human Development Reports.
6 Thus, depending on one's views, one can regard the "evil power" of the Star War movies as really the best option.

For the purposes of this paper, the range of main stream humanitarian values serves as the yardstick for good or bad futures. But the need for a new type of high-level politicians holds true for all values on the desired trajectory of humanity into the future. For sure, values will change, and in part radically so, as illustrated by the not so long away history of slavery – but this will make no difference to the need for New Rulers and little difference to most of the required qualities of such high-level politicians.

9. Recapitulation

All this leads to the mapping of the main missions of high-level 21st century political leadership and the core qualities required for adequately fulfilling them. But first let me recapitulate my reasoning in the form of ten theses:

1. The 21st century is sure to further explosively increase the power of humanity to impact on its future;

2. Human moral, cognitive and institutional capacities as they are now constituted are grossly inadequate for preventing dangerous and perhaps fatal misuses and abuses of that power and for the assurance of its uses for the better.

3. The result is a capacity deficit which is rapidly becoming very dangerous, with human power to impact on the future increasing geometrically while human moral, cognitive and institutional capacities to use that power for the better are increasing at best arithmetically, and even this is not obvious.

4. Therefore, upgrading the main factors determining the capacity to use the power to impact on the future for the better is an urgent necessity.

5. Among these factors, politics is of the utmost importance in making deliberate future-weaving choices, inter alia because of the legitimacy of its future-shaping activities and its command of decisive instruments, including force;

6. Within politics, high-level, and in particular top-level politicians are the single most important future-shaping actors, though operating under many constraints – which, however, they can in part overcome or modify;

7. The prevalent type of contemporary politician is, with all too few exceptions, grossly under-equipped for the critical tasks he or she must fulfill in the 21st century, including in particular, the ability to assure that the new era of humanity, which is coming whether we want it or not, is a better and not a catastrophic one.

8. Therefore, however taboo or difficult, strenuous efforts to radically improve high-level politicians, within the context of basic values such as democracy, are imperative.

9. This is a very difficult task. However historic examples, even if all too few, of top-level politicians possessing the required qualities in adequate measures demonstrate that the task is not impossible. And even partial success in the radical improvement of high-level politicians is of pivotal importance.

10. Trying to develop what I call New Rulers is, therefore, imperative

10. Political Leadership as a Calling

A first and fundamental requirement from New Rulers is motivation and self-understanding of political leaders.

The classical idea of the high-level politician, even if often not fulfilled in reality, was one of calling, mission and vocation. But this has changed over the 19th and 20th centuries, with political leadership increasingly seen as a "career", especially in Western society which is increasingly dominated by individualistic, anti-elitist and market norms. Concomitantly, ethical demands from politicians have been relaxed and the idea that their private lives should be beyond reproach has been completely abandoned.

This does not imply that the behavior of rulers in the past was any better. In fact it often was much worse. This was recognized, for instance in the theory of the "two bodies" of kings. But moral demands were put forth, both

in Western traditions starting in the Bible, and in Chinese rulership literature such as Confucius. In modern society normative demands from high-level politicians are not taken seriously, and the democratic power to punish corrupt behavior of rulers, which did not exist in the past, is not exercised unless there are glaring criminal acts.

This contradicts fundamental requirements the New Ruler must meet. Regarding political leadership as a calling and mission and as providing main meaning and purpose to one's life is a key-requirement by itself. It is also an essential pre-condition for satisfying other required core qualities. And it is needed for gaining the deep trust of populations necessary for fulfilling foundational tasks which necessarily involve much painful constructive destruction. This is all the more so the case as the effects of mass media "spins" are not only corruptive for their user but also counter-effective as citizens become immunized to their mesmerizing effects.

Related is disinterestedness, in the sense of giving absolute priority to the mission over personal pleasures and acquisitions. This is another example of *desiderata* emphasized in classical thinking on rulership, however much ignored in practice, which is hardly mentioned in the modern discourse on politicians – but which is critical for the New Ruler.

But it would be unrealistic to ignore an internal contradiction: human beings are keen on power and persons going into politics probably seek power more than others. This *per se is* not too much of a problem so long as power is regarded mainly as an essential instrument, which as a side product also provides personal gratification but does not become a main goal in itself. However, only a thin line divides between those two subjective feelings about power, all the more so because a lot of power is objectively necessary for engaging in foundational endeavors. This is one of many pitfalls awaiting even the best humanly possible politician, avoidance or at least containment of which requires a personal philosophy and psyche of self-awareness, self-critique and self-discipline.

Leaving the complexities of this requirement for another occasion, requiring emphasis here it that full-hearted self-dedication to high-quality political leadership, up to regarding it with some sense of "sacredness", is the ideal

to be aimed at by New Rulers. Even partial success in doing so is a massive improvement over the vast majority of contemporary politicians.

11. Value Basis: From Raison d'Etat to Raison d'Humanité

Crucial is the fundamental value base in which all choices and actions of the New Ruler are grounded. While this is a matter for subject choice, however conditioned by culture and environment, required is self-consciousness about the values which the New Ruler strives to realize, an effort to take an "outside" look at one's values, a recognition of the legitimacy of other values within some red lines, and a good dose of moral reasoning so as to improve one's values.

To concentrate on the single most different value frame of most contemporary politicians and the New Ruler, essential for the New Ruler is quite some acceptance of raison d'humanité instead of raison d'etat.

Opinions can and do differ on some of the specifics of raison d'humanité, but its overall principle is clear: what is good for humanity as a whole instead of only what is good for one's country.

Sometimes these two really overlap, or at least appear to do so, but this is often a fallacy that helps to avoid internal value conflicts. Often they contradict each other or compete for the same resources. And, when this is the case, the New Ruler should give a lot of weight to raison d'humanité, whether or not he publicly admits doing so when this would be counter-productive.

This requirement is not simple in terms of democratic values. Democracy stipulates that the elected politician should look after the desires and interests of his constituency which elected him, i.e. his country. He may do so with a shorter or longer time horizon, but in principle his duty is directly to the public of his own country. But the good of humanity as a whole often requires giving priority to raison d'humanité even if this involves high costs locally. Saying that "in the long run" raison d'humanité equals raison d'etat and similar reliance on "real and enlightened" versus "imagined" interest is

sometimes true, but often is a delusion. Disproportional sacrifices by a part of humanity are frequently necessary for the future of humanity as a whole. All this is well illustrated by the debates on limiting carbon dioxide emissions, however hidden behind empty words and ambiguous formulations.

No formula for avoiding difficult and possibly tragic moral choices can be provided or is at least theoretically possible. Pareto's optimum and similar magic lanterns are both fallacious and non-implementable. Each New Ruler has to make and improve his own value priority judgments, but raison d'humanité should always be accepted as an important criterion and given increased weight, with public opinion being educated to its moral and practical justification.

12. Educating the Public

This leads directly to a main mission of the New Ruler, harshly neglected by nearly all contemporary high-level politicians who engage in self-marketing instead of enlightening the public. Acceptance of the task of educating the public to better understand the complexities of the new world in the making, with all its implications and its often painful adjustment requirements characterizes the New Ruler, as does the acquisition of the skills and the building of the instruments to do so without sliding into propaganda.

13. Thinking-and Acting-in-History

In essence, weaving the future involves interventions with history, with foundational activities and grand-policies being radical ones. This requires, first of all, understanding historic processes and their drivers, with emphasis on the current and expectable ones. Thus, at least some science and technology literacy is a must. Additionally it requires the design of realistic nightmares for, say, the next thirty years, to be avoided; and of realistic visions to be implemented as much as possible.

Another essential component is inventions of new policy options and openness to new ideas and facilitation of their production. The identification of the critical masses of intervention needed for achieving desired effects is another component leading to orchestrated action. All this unavoidably takes place within deep uncertainty, making "fuzzy gambling[7] sophistication" and rapid learning essential.

The overall frame for deciding on interventions with historic processes is theories of rise-and-decline to be applied to specific situations. However speculative or on the level of guesstimating, the New Ruler should think in terms of rise-and-decline within time horizons from five to, say, fifty years, assisted by high-quality advisors in doing so.

The qualities required for effective intervention with historic processes so as to influence for the better trajectories into the future illustrate, in addition to essential value bases, the demanding cognitive qualities essential for New Rulers. He needs a strategic and grand-strategic mind, expressed in conscious deliberations and in knowledge-based intuitive processes. A lot of knowledge and experience are needed to develop these qualities, this being a life-long endeavor.

14. On Differences between Western and Asian Ways of Thinking

However, differences between Western and Asian ways of thinking[8] are very relevant to thinking-and-acting-in-history, as well as to other aspects of high-quality rulership. Thus, Asian thinking tends more towards "flowing with history" till opportunities to change its directions arise, while Westerners are more active and have difficulties with waiting. Asians are much more aware of overall fields and wide contexts, while Westerners tend to focus on a few points. And more.

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7 "Fuzzy" because often no probabilities can be allocated and the qualitative features of alternative outcomes are unknown and unknowable. For detailed discussion, see The Capacity to Govern, op. cit., chapter 15.

8 See, for instance, Richard E. Nisbett, The Geography of Thought: How Asians and *Westerners Think Differently…and Why* (New York: Free Press), 2003.

New Rulers should partake of both Western and Asian frames and modes of thinking, especially in respect to policies understood as interventions with historic processes. But further exploration of this need must wait for more studies on Asian high-quality politicians in action and their basis in Asian ways of perceiving reality and acting on it.

15. Creative-Destruction

Quite different is the creative-destruction requirement, which brings into the foreground power-related qualifications.

Adjusting, up to refounding reality to a new era unavoidably involves a lot of creative destruction, such as institutional restructuring, radical policy innovations and also the re-valuation of some deeply held beliefs and values. All these are not only very difficult because of their dependence on the invention of new alternatives and the development of new values that better fit emerging realities, but also very painful.

Overcoming fixated thinking, vested interests, entitlements, obsolete legal norms and other tyrannies of the status quo therefore requires a lot of political power, as well as a readiness to take personal risks. However, without the strength of will to engage in creative-destruction on well-considered lines and the ability to mobilize the support and resources needed for it, the idea of a New Ruler is void.

16. Partaking in Global Governance

Partaking in building decisive global governance is another key attribute of the New Ruler. The concrete content of this part of the mission depends on each particular situation, but under all circumstances New Rulers must try to join one another in building up global governance and developing global grand-policies aimed at implementing raison d'humanité after operationalizing its concrete meanings within specific contexts.

17. Accumulating Power and Using it for the Better

Power is essential for the New Ruler for fulfilling his mission. Indeed, he needs more power than politicians who do not engage in high-power requiring activities such as creative-destruction, institution redesign and foundational grand-policies. Therefore he needs power accumulation and maintenance skills, which are beyond the scope of this paper, however important.

But one feature characterizes the New Ruler, in addition to the already mentioned requirement not to make power into a goal by itself and not to misuse it for personal gains. The New Ruler uses power as essential for fulfilling his mission, minimizing distorting political constraints. He first asks himself what he would do if not constrained by the hard facts of politics, and then tries to approximate the correct action while using all his skills to make them possible -- instead of starting to think "politically" and only then to consider issues on their merit.

Similarly, the New Ruler is not swayed by shifting public moods and not controlled by public opinion polls, acting within his legitimate mandate according to his best conscience, while explaining himself in enlightening ways to the public and justifying his choices on their merits. Also, he does not rush into easy agreed compromises, which often combine the worst features of harder to implement options.

Using his power to fulfill his mission and decide issues on their merits obliges the New Ruler from time to time to use stratagems which are immoral in themselves, such as not always telling the whole truth and sometimes to lie, to present feelings which he does not really have, and more

But, while differentiating between his brain and his mouth and wearing multiple masks, the New Ruler does so to a minimum essential degree, dislikes doing so, and – most important of all – is not himself mislead by them. He maintains membranes between his inner space and his external behavior, letting his mind shape his behavior but not letting behavior distort his mind. Thus, while he may have to lie to others, he makes a maximum effort not to lie to himself.

18. Consulting Speakers of Truth to Power

Even the best of New Rulers is not and cannot be self-contained. He or she knows only a small part of what is relevant to the issues he is facing and he is error-prone as are all human beings. Self-skepticism combined with decisiveness is essential, but not enough. Therefore, the New Ruler depends on a large range of colleagues, assistants and staff, must be fully aware of the importance of their partnership and be willing to work to improve it.

Most critical of all is seeking a diverse set of advisors and counselors who speak the truth to power. The New Ruler encourages frank criticism of his own ideas and designs multiple advisory systems so as to be exposed to a variety of perspectives, values, views, evaluations, and options.

19. Preparing the Next Generation of High-Quality Politicians

The last task of the New Rulers to be mentioned here is the preparation of the next generation of high-quality politicians. Taking interns and understudies, setting up leadership development institutes, investing in coaching promising young politicians – these illustrate relatively easy steps. More painful is grooming of your recommended successors, because they may also be your competitors and remind you of the finitude of your term in office. But, still, a New Ruler is measured by his impact on the future, including assurance of future and even better rulers to carry on his tasks as they see fit to do.

20. Personal Philosophy .

To become more of a New Ruler a fitting personal philosophy is required, quite independent of one's transcendental beliefs. To give but one example, particularly required is a good dose of stoic enthusiasm. This sounds like a self-contradiction, but is not. Enthusiasm is needed to persist in very difficult and demaning foundational endeavor. A good dose of stoicism is essential in order not to despair and to avoid burn-out. Keeping these two in balance,

on line with Aristotle's Golden Mean principle is not easy, but nothing about being a New Ruler is easy. However is not impossible given strenuous self-crafting effort.

21. Self-Evaluation Leading to Constant Self-Improvement

This leads to the last quality required of New Rulers taken up in this paper, namely self-evaluation leading to constant self-improvement. Constant self-evaluation, with contemplative time to be periodically reserved for doing so as a requirement of the examined life has a long tradition. But it is clear that very few high-level politicians do so, certainly not searchingly, frankly and self-critically. This was bad in the past, but becomes intolerable given their increasing future-impacting importance. Therefore, self-evaluation is a main requirement from the New Rulers.

A proposed mental tool for doing so is a "privileged historian", that is an imagined "privileged historian" who knows all the facts, including subjective feelings and mental processes of the ruler. An additional assumption is that the historian shares the ruler's values other than clearly obnoxious ones. However he gives much weight in evaluating the ruler *to raison d'humanité* as presently conceivable.

The way a New Ruler uses this (or other) virtual judges is by thought experiments imagining how such a historian would evaluate him. Unavoidably, such self-evaluations suffer from many biases, but making a sincere effort at systematic self-evaluation is much better than constant self-indulgence, self-justification and all too much self-congratulation with blaming of others for all failures which are too glaring to be ignored – as is the habit of the vast majority of present and past high-level politicians, with all too few exceptions.

However, self-evaluation is here not a goal by itself, however laudable morally. It should serve as a basis for constant self-improvement up to some measure of self-crafting and even self-recreating. There are many ways to do

so, such as selective reading, psycho-therapy, personal coaching, discourses with trusted counselors, participation in study retreats and more.

Young aspirants to becoming New Rulers should choose appropriate study courses, such as history, social science, public policy and public law (as long as they do not absorb too much the mind of a lawyer, which is not good for the critical future-weaving mission of a New Ruler). But these are subjects for another occasion.

21. Mirror Mirror on the Wall

To sum up this preliminary discourse on the New Ruler who is essential for the thriving of humanity in the 21st century and beyond, and to add some more specifications, let me conclude with a kind of virtual "mirror". In it required qualities of the New Ruler are engraved so his reflection contrasts his actual self with what is needed – thus guiding existing and nascent politicians in self-evaluation as necessary for the climb to remake themselves more fully into New Rulers.

PERSONAL MIRROR FOR POLITICIANS WHO ASPIRE TO BECOME MORE LIKE NEW RULERS

1. As a foundation for all you think and do, regard being a New Ruler as a calling and mission which imposes on you many responsibilities with privileges being but an instrument to help you fulfill your tasks.

2. As a 21st century high-level politician, or one aspiring to become one, your main mission is or will be to take care of the long-term future of humanity and your country. This involves devoting much attention, contemplative as well as in action, to weaving the future up to founding parts of a new world.

3. This does not mean that taking care of the here and now is not part of your duty, but you should not let "now-time" and "here I am" dominate your mind and monopolize your attention. Rather, taking care of the future should receive high priority in both your mind and actions.

4. To do so effectively you must develop the character, values, cognitive abilities, knowledge and behavioral skills essential for fulfilling your main mission as well as secondary ones.

5. As a politician, your duty is in part to those who elected and selected you. But you share responsibility for the future of humanity as a whole. Therefore, considerations of raison *d'humanité* should be given much weight in all your major decisions.

6. Weaving the future involves unprecedented moral issues, such as the meaning of "justice" on a global scale, justified uses of force, limiting the freedom of science and information, and handling the potentials of bio-technology. Pondering such issues is therefore a pressing "practical" condition for responsibly making up your mind on appropriate action. To do so you should engage a lot in deep thinking which provides deep grounding for practice and pragmatics.

7. Indeed, more is needed. To make up your mind in a responsible way, you need to engage in a lot of contemplation. Don't let the pressures of daily events, your liking for company and the temptations of being "practical" hinder you from engaging in solitude in a lot of action-directed contemplation.

8. Thinking-in-history is at the core of your future-shaping endeavor. You must understand global processes so as to be able to optimize interventions with them, which will often take the form of grand-policies. This requires a thorough awareness of the complexity of historic processes, which are non-linear and dense not only with uncertainty but also with inconceivability. No less important are the identification and invention of policy options which, if realized with an adequate critical mass, can change historic trajectories in desired directions. Developing your capacities to think, feel and decide in such terms, as well as in frames of rise-and-decline, is imperative.

9. Beware of being captivated by simplistic slogans, such as "sustainability", or being enslaved by simple "solutions" such as leaving all difficult issues to the magic of the market. And avoid the mental cages of "political correctness", even if you cannot say so in public.

10. Educating the public is a main mission of yours, as a value in itself and as a pre-condition for realizing new policies and mobilizing the support you need for doing so. Using well new modes of interaction and communication, such as social networking sites like Facebook, blogs, YouTube and so on, can be very useful – and makes you less dependant on monetary resources and mass media popularity. But be careful not to slide from education of the public into the pit of propaganda and mass media spin.

11. The warning above is but an introduction to your difficult and painful task of engaging a lot in creative-destruction, both in respect to your pet ideas and the external stubborn facts of fixed opinions, vested interests and other tyrannies of the status quo.

12. Partaking in building decisive global governance, as essential for the future of humanity, is part of your mission. Cooperating with other New Rulers is a main way to do so.

13. You depend on others to help you think and decide and to implement your choices. Be careful to avoid "yes-men or women" and cronies. Instead, build acvisory and advisory and consultative staffs composed of persons willing to speak the truth to power. But do not rely on any single group of advisors. The more important an issue is, the more you should expose yourself to a multiplicity of perspectives, views, evaluations and options. But always be skeptical, both about yourself and others.

14. For all you do, however valid in itself, you need a lot of power. Unavoidably you will have to use stratagems which may in be immoral. Do so sparingly and take extra care not to let them poison your own mind.

15. Avoid "politics as the art of the possible", being driven by public opinion polls and seeking easy compromises instead of fighting for the best option on its substantive merits. Explaining yourself, enlightening the public and building appropriate coalitions of the willing should be your main tools for achieving needed consensus, not mass-media spins.

16. Also needed is nurturing of a fitting personal philosophy including a lot of stoic enthusiasm, so you can persist in trying to do the very difficult.

17. No human being can become a perfect New Ruler. But you can strive to make yourself into something closer to one. This requires constant self-awareness, self-evaluation and strenuous self-remaking assisted by counselors of high stature whom you trust.

21. Action and Group Discussion Recommendations

The group will decide on its own priorities. My own recommendation is to concentrate on the need for significantly improving politicians in concrete and specific terms. Practical suggestions by the group on ways to facilitate the development of politicians meeting these requirements may be a very useful product of group deliberations.

Jewish Identity

JERUSALEM AS THE CIVILIZATIONAL CAPITAL OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE

By Yehezkel Dror

Based on Michael J. Weil together with Ahava Zarembski, Jerusalem: A Strategic Plan for the Strengthening of Jerusalem as the Civilizational Capital of the Jewish People (Jerusalem: JPPPI), 2007.

I. Introduction

There are many faces to Jerusalem, many reasons to strengthen Jerusalem and many ways to do that. This paper proposes a major Jewish People Project for making Jerusalem the Civilizational Capital of the Jewish People.

There are other urgent needs and real possibilities, such as strengthening the Jewish demographic basis of and the economic situation of Jerusalem. And, on a different level, gaining *de jure* recognition for Jerusalem as the Capital of the State of Israel. However these depend on political developments, including decisions on the future of Jerusalem, which are hard to foresee. A main advantage of focusing on the civilizational significance of Jerusalem, without neglecting the other issues, is that much can be achieved in relative isolation from the political issues which may take considerable time to develop and work out. At the same time, upgrading Jerusalem as the Civilizational Capital of the Jewish People, while also strengthening its global cultural significance, can have significant positive side effects on its economy, demography and political status.

The standing of Jerusalem as a multi-dimensional center of the Jewish People is closely related to other main Jewish People issues, which are the subject of other JPPPI work, such as identity and identification. Upgrading the standing of Jerusalem as the Civilizational Capital of the Jewish People will have many

important positive results, in addition to generally strengthening Jerusalem, such as providing an important identification symbol for the Jewish People and a source of pride in being Jewish, with special importance for the younger generation. Emphasizing aspects of Tikkun Olam – mending the world – will further increase the importance of the proposed project. Therefore, JPPPI decided to put the development of Jerusalem into the Civilizational Capital of the Jewish People on the agenda of the President's Conference and to prepare this paper, based on earlier JPPPI work and quoting extensively from it, as input and a basis for group deliberations and the crafting of concrete action recommendations.

However, to provide a full picture of JPPPI work relating to Jerusalem, a major JPPPI recommendation made in a number of papers and presented orally to main Israeli and Diaspora decision-making forums should be mentioned: as part of a necessary new grand-policy to strength Israel-Diaspora relations, JPPPI has recommended that main Jewish Diaspora leaders and organizations should be consulted on Israeli decisions having significant impact on the future of Judaism and the Jewish People, including Israeli decisions on the future of Jerusalem.

II. Core Proposal

The core proposal is to build up Jerusalem as the Civilizational Capital of the Jewish People by advancing a number of mutually reinforcing multi-dimensional and pluralistic modules involving a variety of activities central to various aspects of the Jewish People as a civilization.

At the same time, and in a synergetic relationship with the activity proposed above, it is proposed to strengthen the global cultural and religious standing of Jerusalem as the Holy City of Christianity and as a Holy Place for Islam and to make it a center of global activities focusing on the bettering of humankind.

III. Realistic Vision

The core of the proposed project can best be presented concisely in the form of a realistic vision for Jerusalem, for around the year 2030:

CULTURALLY, RELIGIOUSLY, SPIRITUALLY AND EDUCATIONALLY:

1. Jerusalem using its past to lead into the future
The realistic vision aims to allow Jerusalem to evolve, shaping its present by building on the past. This includes utilizing archeological remains, artifacts, and Jewish themes. Jewish history comes to life in Jerusalem as new dynamic museums recreate the past and other sites like the Western Wall tunnels, David's City and the Davidson Museum bring the past of Jerusalem's centrality to life with new meanings for the present and future.

2. Jerusalem as the center of Jewish creativity and a cultural core
Jerusalem is recognized as a main center for Jewish cultural creativity. A number of major international festivals take place in the city spanning music, theatre, poetry, cinema and art – mostly with a Jewish theme.

Jerusalem becomes a central place for publications on Jewish subjects.

Mishkenot Sha'ananim is expanded as are similar facilities established as more international figures spend time in Jerusalem in order to learn and to exchange ideas with fellow artists and thinkers.

A number of institutes for advanced cultural activities are established, where a variety of creative persons in cultural and spiritual fields will spend a number of years.

3. Jewish religious thought, scholarship, ideas and leadership emanating from Jerusalem

Jerusalem becomes a center for Jewish thinking and a leader in the discourse between pluralistic views of Judaism.

Advancements in Jewish thought accross a spectrum of religious scholarship and learning are made together with updated religious responsa *(she'elot u'teshuvot)* that meet the needs of modern society.

A forum of leading rabbis is located in Jerusalem who relate to world events and today's reality by making statements on religious, cultural and spiritual issues, Jewish as well as global. Chief Rabbis in Israel and other rabbinical leaders act as spiritual figureheads respected and listened to by all denominations.

4. Jerusalem as an epicenter of knowledge and education כי מציון תצא תורה

There is in Jerusalem a center of pluralistic Jewish day schools, initiating and guiding a global network of such schools, with a residence program too. It attracts students from all over the world. It includes an exchange project in which major Jewish high schools in the Diaspora send their students to Jerusalem for a semester of study.

An international endowment for religion and spirituality provides grants and scholarships for religious and spiritual study in Jerusalem as well as religious leadership development.

The Hebrew University and other places of higher education are the foremost in Jewish scholarship, study and research, leading and attracting some of the best scholars.

A University of the Jewish People focusing on Jewish subjects is established in Jerusalem with branches in other centers and utilizes remote learning extensively.

Some of the most important *yeshivot* are in Jerusalem as well as religious colleges for women. Jerusalem boasts of a spectrum of religious studies and learning institutions.

A majority of Jewish leaders, scholars of Judaism and rabbis around the world spend time studying, teaching and doing research in Jerusalem.

5. Increased Jewish knowledge strengthens awareness and understanding of Jerusalem

Jews become increasingly knowledgeable about their history, heritage,

literature and culture. This leads to greater understanding and interest in Jerusalem with more visitors, participation in websites, attending conferences, learning and writing about Jerusalem and it becomes central to their civilizational outlook. Jews everywhere become more aware of the reality of Jerusalem and its positive attributes.

6. Jerusalem serves as a main repository of Jewish publications and artifacts

This is supported by the creation of an extensive, renowned, and structurally beautiful national library containing the finest collection of Judaica and manuscripts, as well as collections in all major fields. It also puts to use the most up–to-date technology for Judaica-based research. Main publishers on Jewish civilization are located in Jerusalem, or have branches there.

7. Synergy between different dimensions of culture, spirituality and religion

A strong cooperation exists between organizations, groups and institutions engaging in art, religion, thought and research, without any "censorship" or impairment of pluralism. This includes scholars/artists exchange, an online network of resource exchange and interchange, and cooperative efforts.

8. Jerusalem as a place for young people

With a relatively large young population, young people are taking a lead. Many of the city's leaders are young and the young feature prominently in senior positions in business, commerce, educational institutions and public organizations.

The city abounds with activities for the young—festivals, cultural activities and entertainment.

Jerusalem is renowned for its Center for Developing Young Leadership.

DEMOGRAPHICALLY, GEOGRAPHICALLY, LEARNING AND PILGRIMAGE TOURISM:

9. Jerusalem is the geographical center of the Jewish People; the city is visited by the majority of Jews

Jerusalem retains its demographic majority of Jews.

Tourism to Jerusalem is expanded considerably. A modern day form of *aliyah la'regel* takes place and the majority of Jews in the Diaspora visit Jerusalem frequently. Many of these visits occur around the Jewish calendar, especially *aliyah la'regel* on Sukkoth and Pesach, but also around Jerusalem Day, Chanukah and the Israeli Day of Independence.

Heritage tours by Jews are centered on Jerusalem.

Jerusalem is the "part-time habitat" for many Jews from the Diaspora as they purchase recreational and part-living apartments in the city.

Jerusalem becomes a desired location for young Jews from the Diaspora to celebrate their Bat/Bar-mitzvah, marriage and other life cycle ceremonies.

10. A glorious cityscape expressing Jewish history, culture and values

Jerusalem is a destination and a city that inspires.

A number of major buildings are erected in Jerusalem designed by the best architects in the world that house important Jewish and Israeli institutions. These buildings include the Library of the Jewish People, new museums and the headquarters of main Jewish organizations and centers of learning.

Synagogues in various communities throughout the city are rebuilt or renovated. Architecture makes use of the greatest artists to continue with the historical feel of Jerusalem while bringing innovation and renovation.

11. Jerusalem develops as the center of Jewish cyberspace and the use of advanced technologies

Most of the major Jewish portals are based in Jerusalem. The computer and software sector are the main drivers of Jerusalem's commercial base. A number of major global IT corporations have research and development centers in Jerusalem.

Alternative and creative experiences of "being" in Jerusalem are available using "virtual" technologies. A system of virtual experience is created through which people can visit/tour Jerusalem, its key sites and newly developed showplace areas, and make a virtual pilgrimage to holy sites, experience theatrical performances, etc.

Institutions of higher learning and education use distance learning based in Jerusalem.

12. The predominance of Jerusalem and its widely accepted role as the institutional center of the Jewish People

Jerusalem is the main center of the organized Jewish world. All the major Jewish organizations are headquartered in Jerusalem and/or have a strong local presence.

Major conventions and conferences regarding Jewish issues take place in Jerusalem.

A Jewish People Leadership Academy operates in Jerusalem, at which most Jewish People leaders spend time discussing main shared issues and engaging in a variety of leadership development activities, with special attention to the next generation of leaders.

13. Using the Calendar

Events in Jerusalem follow the Jewish calendar. The highlights are the three "foot" holidays when festivals and activities abound and tourists pack the City.

Other days are also important, each for its own specific reasons, such as the fast of the 9th of Av and Jerusalem Day.

UNIVERSALLY AND GLOBALLY:

14. Jerusalem as the center of the three main monotheistic religions developing and transmitting spiritual and moral messages

The main monotheistic religions feature Jerusalem as a main center accentuating the need for ethic and moral development. Christianity, Judaism and Islam alike do so, each one on its own together with cooperation in joint ventures and scholarship, and jointly disseminate universal spiritual and ethical messages relevant to evolving global issues and events.

Jerusalem is seen as an example of how to treat holy places and sites. Significant investments are made to preserve and enhance them and to encourage pilgrimage.

15. Jerusalem as a multi-cultural city

Jews, Christians and Moslems live side by side. Much cooperation takes place and joint activities and institutions are formed. Christian and Islamic cultural centers thrive and shared ones discuss the main problems of humanity.

Jerusalem is recognized and admired as a model for multiculturalism.

16. Universal messages emanating from Jerusalem

Jerusalem is known as one of the cornerstones of human values. It is recognized as a place of justice, peace, tolerance and coexistence. Frequent statements by religious leaders, politicians and intellectuals are announced in Jerusalem and transmit universal messages.

17. Jerusalem as a global, international, cultural and world city

Jerusalem is recognized by the main powers as the Capital of the State of Israel. Most nations, led by the USA, set up embassies in Jerusalem, contributing to its cosmopolitan character and adding new suburbs with impressive diplomatic buildings and edifices.

A major international organization under the auspices of the UN sets up its headquarters in Jerusalem, to be followed by international NGOs.

Jerusalem becomes a favored location for international conferences and negotiations. It is one of the first, indeed obligatory, stops on world tours of international leaders.

Jerusalem becomes recognized as a world city "a place where things happen". It is frequently visited by major international figures and celebrities as well as intellectual creators and leaders.

Important international cultural festivals take place attracting the top performers in the world. Jerusalem becomes a major center of culture and performing arts on the world map.

III. Significance

The significance of the activities and objectives presented above, even if achieved only in part within the proposed time horizon, is obvious. They will strengthen Jerusalem and, not less so, strengthen the Jewish People by providing a radiating civilizational capital the development of which is a major Jewish People project. Contributions to humanity as a whole constitute an additional benefit while interacting positively with Jewish People aspects. In addition, the proposed activities will make an important contribution to the Jewish nature of the State of Israel, while also facilitating international recognition of Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel.

IV. Organization

The Jerusalem Project should be treated and presented as a major Jewish People project. It should be based on a partnership between the Government of Israel, the Jerusalem Municipality, the Jewish Agency and major bodies in the Jewish world. This partnership will act as a lead agency but the actual implementation will be carried out largely by existing bodies, so as to avoid too heavy bureaucratic machinery.

An international advisory committee should be set up to guide the activities.

An initial total budget of $50 million is suggested for the first five years.

V. Proposed Projects

The following tentative list of proposed projects serves to illustrate concrete ways to realize the larger Project:

CULTURALLY, RELIGIOUSLY, SPIRITUALLY AND EDUCATIONALLY:

1. Cultural Development and the Calendar

- A Jewish People museum.

- Festival of Jewish culture.

- Festivals of Jewish music, literature, poetry and art.

- Center for Jewish folklore.

- Annual Jewish youth art competition on Jerusalem.

- Adoption of cultural institutions in Jerusalem by their counterparts in the Diaspora and vice versa.

- Organized celebrations of Jerusalem Day in the Diaspora.

- Turning Jerusalem Day into a festival for all Jews and Israelis.

- Jerusalem Day as a day of tolerance and Tikkun Olam.

- Special events for *Tisha B´av, Jerusalem Day, Pesach , Shavuot and Sukkoth.*

2. Strengthening Jerusalem as the Religious Center of the Jewish People

- Secular yeshivot.

- Creating a panel of religious spokespeople that will address significant issues affecting Judaism and Jewry and speak out on universal matters.

- Central Halachic research center that will attempt to break new ground.

- International Beth Din.

- A global institute on applying Jewish thought to human problems.

3. Enhancing the status of Jerusalem as the center for the three monotheistic religions

- Inter-faith dialogue center of the three monotheistic religions.

- Conventions on religion and secular moral values.

- Museum of monotheistic religions and religious tolerance.

- Freedom of religion and tolerance watch, by a panel of religious leaders from the three religions.

- Multi-religious campus to train religious leaders (rabbis, priests and imams)

including in-training in conjunction with centers in Rome and Cairo and with special focus on questions of tradition and modernity, gender and so on.

- International commission on ethics.

4. Expanding the educational sector – כי מציון תצא תורה

- International Jewish day School.

- Semester in Jerusalem for Jewish Day Schools from the Diaspora.

- Creating a University of the Jewish People (or expanding The Hebrew University in this direction).

- Organized sabbaticals in Jerusalem.

- Twinning of schools in Jerusalem with schools in the Diaspora.

- Center for Advanced Jewish Studies.

CYBERSPACE, LEARNING AND PILGRIMAGE TOURISM:

5. Using cyberspace and modern technologies

- Establish a number of major Jewish portals.

- Center for remote learning in and about Jerusalem and Jewish subjects.

- Virtual pilgrimages and visits to Jerusalem for all the three monotheistic religions.

- R&D centers in Jerusalem in IT, communications and the Internet.

- Center for software development on Jewish related subjects.

6. Cultural Tourism Development

- Expanded and organized Bar/Bat-mitzvah programs.

- Organized *aliyah* la'regel on *Sukkoth* and *Pesach* with tours and seminars.

- Jerusalem as the focus of the 60th anniversary celebrations of the State of Israel in 2008.

- Kol Nidre appeal in all synagogues in the Diaspora to make a commitment to visit Jerusalem in the next three years.

- Center for volunteerism.

- Campaign to buy a second home in Jerusalem (combined with improving the supply of affordable housing).

7. **Strengthening the institutional dimension**

- Each major Jewish organization to have a physical presence in Jerusalem.

- Annual convention of all Jewish organizations in Jerusalem with substantive content.

- A "Jerusalem Charter" for Jewish institutions whereby they will commit to holding conventions in Jerusalem, keep an office in Jerusalem and run training and educational programs in Jerusalem.

- International advisory committee to the Jerusalem City Council.

- International Youth Congress in Jerusalem.

- Global Jewish Leadership Academy.

- Establish a Jewish People campus where many Diaspora institutions will be housed as well as community centers.

UNIVERSALLY AND GLOBALLY:

8. **Jerusalem as an international city**

- Encouraging the establishment of a major UN related agency in Jerusalem.

- An international prestigious *Jerusalem Prize for Tolerance.*

- Center for Tikkun Olam, including study, scholarship, practice and internships.

9. Universal Messages אור לגויים

- Center for outstanding students from around the world to study global human problems.

- Institute for Advanced Global Studies.

- Museum of global problems and urban issues of division and diversity.

- Creating a campus in the city for international institutions.

10. Activities Abroad

- Jerusalem curriculum for all Jewish day schools around the world.

- Exhibitions on Jerusalem in local Jerusalem committees (as was done successfully in the 1996 Jerusalem 3000 celebrations).

- Twinning of Jerusalem neighborhoods with Diaspora communities (as an extension of Partnership 2000).

VI. Action and Discussion Agenda Recommendations

It is recommended that group discussion focuses on the desirability and feasibility of setting up a Jewish People Project to develop Jerusalem into the Civilizational Capital of the Jewish People. If the project is supported by the group, concrete proposals on moving ahead are required.

Jewish Identity and Identification of America's Young Jews

By Chaim I. Waxman

At the turn of the 21st century, Robert Putnam wrote a book, *Bowling Alone*, in which he argues, with considerable supportive data, that Americans are increasingly detached from social groups such as community, and are less likely to be involved in civic activities. They are less likely to join Parent Teacher Associations, unions, political parties, and a host of other social groups, and this, he argues, has serious implications for the future of American society.

An article in the *American Sociological Review* by McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Brashears, entitled Social Isolation in America: Changes in Core Discussion Networks Over Two Decades, found Americans saying that Americans have fewer close friends today than they had a decade ago, and the number who say they've no one to discuss important matters with has doubled to 1 in 4. The weakening bonds of friendship result in:

• Fewer people turning to for help in crises such as Hurricane Katrina;

• Fewer watchdogs to deter neighborhood crime;

• Fewer visitors for hospital patients;

• Fewer participants in community groups.

America's Jews are not different. Their engagement in civic activities also weakened. Their rate of volunteering for communal causes has also declined, and they are much less likely to join Jewish organizations. Thus, the

2000/2001 National Jewish Population Survey found that there was a decline of close to 20 percent in affiliation with major American Jewish membership organizations between 1990-2000. Another indicator of the weakening bonds of community is in rates of philanthropic giving to Jewish causes. Charity and philanthropy have historically been among the primary manifestations of belonging to the community, and their rates have been declining during the past decade or two.

Some of the reasons for the decline in communal participation relate to the increasing perception that the communal leadership is elitist, parochial, self-serving, and resistant to innovation and to the active involvement of those who are not members of the "good old boys club," the circle of wealthy, old men who are at the helms of most major Jewish organizations. At least since the 1960s, younger people in the West have been raised to "question authority" and distrust "the Establishment," and they now they do so, sometimes adamantly. With respect to philanthropy, some who mistrusted the traditional communal philanthropic structure have opted for direct giving and philanthropic innovation, rather than giving to existing or communal institutions, and in many cases, this has made Jewish philanthropy more efficient. But it also has probably contributed to the decline in the rate of givers, even when the overall sums contributed do not decline, due to increased sums donated by direct givers. The new patterns also raise the question as to what role major contributors will play in setting communal priorities, the answer to which may hold even further and important consequences for communal well-being.

Another source of disillusion with Jewish organizational life and, in effect, the organized Jewish community, by some, especially younger American Jews, is the sense that there is too much overlap, duplication, and non-cooperation among some of the constituent organizations and institutions of the community. There is a sense among some that the older established organizations are incapable of making the changes necessary to accomplish what some non-establishment organizations have been able to achieve. It should be noted that, more than a half-century ago, the American sociologist, Robert MacIver, was commissioned by the National Community Relations Advisory Council, to study the American Jewish organizational structure, and

one of his most basic recommendations was to seek greater cooperation and coordination among the various organizations and agencies. As it happened, he was widely attacked by organizational leaders, especially the American Jewish Congress and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, and the report was never published.   Given the passage of time and the declines in membership among some of the very organizations that attacked the report, it clearly is time to revisit it and evaluate its relevance to the contemporary organizational structure of not only the American Jewish community but Jewish communities in other parts of the world as well. There appear to be grounds for assuming that some of the basic organizational problems still exist.

The increasing significance of cyberspace has probably played a role in contributing to the decline in communal participation, for several reasons. Cyberspace affords the opportunity for one to feel part of a community without actually being affiliated with it. One can participate virtually in a wide variety of community functions without ever coming into face to face contact with any members of the community (as members) or with any of the organizations of the community. The virtual community offers the opportunity to partake in some of the community's offering without the cost of having to tolerate undesirable aspects of communal life, and it appears as a "win-win" alternative. On the other hand, it is quite possible that it is in the nature of cyberspace to undermine group identity, to contribute to "post-ethnicity."

Above and beyond all of these reasons for the decline in communal participation, it appears that there have been basic changes in the nature of group identity among American youth in general and young American Jews in particular. Though we have no "hard" data by which we could measure the phenomenon, it appears that increasing numbers of American youth view themselves pluralistically, in hybrid and fluid terms, without firm, fixed identities. To draw an analogy from the computer operating system, they regularly open different "windows" and are quite adept at being part of several different windows and simultaneously participating with a variety of others. Perhaps an even more vivid analogy is that of the increasing pattern among youth of digital multi-tasting to be on the telephone with several different people, as well as being on the computer, mp3 player, and several

other gadgets simultaneously. To the extent that Jewishness is part of their identity and identification, it is but one of the many different selves.

In addition, assuming that the Jewish self is present, there are different dimensions to it, that is, one may identify Jewishly in terms of religion, local community, and/or peoplehood. Evidence indicates that the degree of peoplehood identification is low among contemporary American Jewish youth. They may feel comfortable in their Jewishness to the degree that they do not reject it and may even take pride in their Jewish heritage – insofar as they are familiar with it, but that does not necessarily lead them to identify with Jews abroad. Part of this is presumably related to the broader shifts in identity and the emergence of "post-ethnicity" among American youth, which emerged as a result of the declining significance of "ascribed status" and the increasing significance of "achieved status," as well as other cultural changes.

Identity, or at least the subjective understanding of it, is very different from what it was only decades ago, in part because of dramatic changes in the nature of status in contemporary Western society. Status refers to a position in a group or in society. Sociologists distinguish between two very different kinds of status. Some statuses derive from membership in involuntary groups, such as age. One is the age they are whether they like it or not. One has no control over how old they are and so, age is an ascribed status. Others, however, derive from membership in voluntary groups. Occupation, for example, is an achieved status, at least in Western society. Parenthood is an achieved status, but kinship is an ascribed status. Increasingly, there are statuses that are ascribed in one type of society and achieved in another. For example, in a traditional society, religion is an ascribed status -- if one's parents were of that religion, so are they, whether they like it or not. In a modern society, it can be "the religion of your choice." The individual can play a role in determining his or her religious status, so it is an achieved status. Likewise, ethnicity which, in a traditional society is ascribed is increasingly becoming a matter of personal choice and, thus, achieved in modern society. American youth are decreasingly likely to identify ethnically and increasingly likely to identify as something within the popular culture that is ethnically neutral. It is this change which may underlie a phenomenon which was unthinkable until very recently, namely, a presidential primary campaign in the Democrat party between a female and a black male. Be that as it may, just as young

Americans decreasingly make their political choices on the basis of ethnicity, so do they decreasingly make other choices on that basis.

Thus, younger American Jews are less likely than their elders to strongly agree that "Jews in the United States and Jews around the world share a common destiny." They are also less likely to strongly agree that, "When people are in distress American Jews have a greater responsibility to rescue Jews than non-Jews," and they are less likely to strongly agree that, "I have a special responsibility to take care of Jews in need around the world." They also manifest declining rates of ethno-religious homogamy, specifically, Jewish in-group marriages; declining rates of Jewish neighborhood concentration – increasingly Jews reside in ethnically and religiously heterogeneous neighborhoods and express less value in living among Jews; declining significance of Jewish friendships – increasing number of Jews state that their best friends are not Jewish; declining rates of philanthropic giving to Jewish causes; and declining degrees of emotional attachment for Israel. Project Birthright and other programs which bring young Jews to Israel have helped somewhat to stem the tide of disaffection, but the decline in degree of emotional attachment continues to be prevalent.

In sum, contemporary American Jews relate to Jews and Judaism in very different ways than have historically been the case. As indicated, religion is now an achieved status, and increasing numbers of Americans, including Jews, switch religious affiliation during the course of their lives. A 2001 study found the rate of religious switching among Americans to be around sixteen percent. Although the rate of switching among America's Jews is not quite that high, the rate for them has also increased and this means that the traditional loyalties, based on family, hold less than they did in the past.

In addition, young American Jews are increasingly less likely to distinguish between the Jewish and American components of their identity. For these Jews, the two are seen as inseparable parts of the American Jewish identity package in which the boundaries between the Jewish religious beliefs and values and the American national beliefs and values have disappeared. The two belief systems, the religious and the national, synthesized into an inseparable whole, with American Jews assuming that many liberal American values are actually Jewish values and, indeed, the most essential ones.

The declining group ties of contemporary American Jews manifests itself in the religious as well as the broader Jewish communal sphere. Like many of their non-Jewish countrymen, young American Jews increasingly shun organized public religion and are now turned inward. Their religious and/or spiritual quest and activity take place in the private sphere, as they search for that which is meaningful to them. An idea or activity is significant to the degree that it has meaning to the individual, and not simply because it has been part of the tradition. This challenges traditionalists to interpret the tradition in ways that can have meaning for modern individualists.

It should be emphasized that the patterns indicated above refer to the broad spectrum of America's Jews and are especially pronounced among the young, unaffiliated, non-traditional, and intermarried. Among the young on the other side of the spectrum, the affiliated, more traditional American Jews, there are no signs of weakening identity or group identification. Indeed, there are manifestations of intensification. Among them, there are increasing levels of Jewish education, from primary school through university -- the Jewish school-age population segment includes a growing share of the Orthodox and of children who are receiving full-time Jewish education, and courses and programs of Jewish studies on college and university campuses continue to grow. So too does the publication of Jewish books by both Jewish and general publishers. Likewise, levels of Jewish ritual observance among the more traditional segments of the American Jewish population have risen. Moreover, within the larger American culture, religion and religious traditionalism are viewed positively to an extent that would have been inconceivable several decades previously. Being Jewish is not only no longer a stigma in American society and culture; in many respects it is a prized status. It is "in" to be Jewish in America, and a record number of senators, congresspersons, and university presidents are self-identified Jews. Thus it is somewhat ironic that, while it is socially more acceptable and even desirable to identify Jewishly, the identity and identification are less firm and encompassing, and much more American. In contrast to the past, where persecution and stigmatization led some Jews to reject their Jewish identity and identification, contemporary young American Jews are not rejecting it; rather, it is much more circumscribed and much less controlling.

Jewish Identity of the Israeli Young Generation

By Shlomit Levy
The A. Harman Institute of
Contemporary Jewry
The Hebrew University of
Jerusalem

By Hagit Hacohen Wolf
The Melton Centre for Jewish
Education
The Hebrew University of
Jerusalem
Mitveh Applied Evaluation

Part I

Until 2000 – Shlomit Levy

This overview addresses the orientation of the younger Israeli generation (aged 20-24) towards the vast issue of Jewish identity. The discussion is based on a comprehensive study of the Jewishness of Israelis undertaken in 1999-2000. Detailed analysis of successive age groups illustrates the nature of ongoing and prospective trends.

Jewish identity, like any ethnic group identity is complex and determined by a variety of components. These relate to three main types: *religious-cultural* (including ethics), national-historical, and biological (not examined in this context). All of these share a sense of continuity – the link between past, present and future, namely the attributes that the group continues to manifest despite the continual generational replacement of its members. However Jewish identity differs from most group identities because of the close tie between its identity components, especially the almost inseparable link between religion and nation in Judaism. Hence, even the Jewishness of secular Jews cannot be completely separated from the religious component of Jewish identity. We will first comment on the religious identity of young Israelis to ascertain to what extent the principle of continuity indeed

continues to exist, and then move to discuss their Jewish identification and its components.

RELIGIOUS IDENTITY

Israeli Jews were asked to self-define their religious identity through the following question: "To what extent do you observe the religious tradition?" The possible answers were: 1. strictly observant; 2. observe to a great extent; 3. observe somewhat; 4. totally non-observant. The younger Israeli generation aged 20-24 is largely similar to the older age groups in their religious identity. However they tend to be somewhat less observant. The percent strictly observant remains unchanged, and there is a moderate rise of the "somewhat observant" and of the "totally non-observant".

The very same question on religious observances (including the same answer categories) was asked regarding past experience in the parents' home. Findings indicate that the big drop in levels of religious observance occurred between the "grandparents" and "parents" generations and even a generation earlier, as pointed out by those who are now aged 65+. Subsequent generations experienced very low rates of change.

What about the future? Respondents were also asked to relate to the desired tradition observance of the next generation: "To what extent do you want your children to observe the religious tradition?" (The possible answers were identical to those of self observance). The findings reveal striking generational similarity concerning the desired religious orientation for their descendants. Though the young Israeli generation aged 20-24 wishes somewhat less than the elder generations that the next generation be observant, they too, like all the others wish their children to be more attached to tradition compared to themselves. Each generation wishes that the "totally non-observant" will decrease among their children. Only 17% of the young generation wish their children to be "totally non-observant" compared to 26% of their own age group who claim to be "totally non-observant". This trend is pronounced most sharply among the current parents generation (aged 40-49) of whom only 7%-11% wish their children not to be observant at all, as compared to 19% of them who are "totally non-observant".

These findings reflect continuity in generational perceptions about the need for attachment to religious tradition in shaping the next generation's Jewish identity.

JEWISH IDENTITY

The majority of the younger Israeli generation considers it important to feel part of the Jewish people. Over a half believe it is "very important". An even higher proportion (two thirds) are "strongly" identified with the Jewish people and only a minority of 8% "do not feel part" of world Jewry. Jewish identity of the younger generation falls only slightly behind Jewish identity of the older generations.

Regarding Israeli identity, young Israeli Jews are very similar to older age groups, though a few more of them identify more as Israelis than as part of world Jewry. In contrast, somewhat more of the young would choose to be reborn as Jews rather than as Israelis if they could. This coincides with the lower influence that the young attribute to living in Eretz Israel on their personal Jewish identification, compared to older generations.

The strong feeling of belonging to world Jewry does not necessarily mean that there are no differences between Jews in Israel and Jews in other parts of the world. About 70% of Israeli Jews irrespective of age sense a difference between Jews in Israel and in the Diaspora. However more than two thirds of all age groups believe that Israeli and Diaspora Jews share a common fate.

Our findings support Kurt Lewin's important idea of the centrality of *interdependence* for group identification as contrasted with similarity or difference among group members. While interdependence (the feeling of "common fate") is strongly correlated with personal Jewish identification ("feel part of world Jewry"), there is hardly any relationship between Jewish identification and the perception that Jews in Israel constitute a different people from Diaspora Jews.

COMPONENTS OF JEWISH IDENTITY

A group's identity is determined by a variety of historical, cultural, religious and other components. Identity was assessed based on the influence of seventeen different components (cultural, historical, etc.) on their feeling of "Being part of world Jewry". Among the young generation, the influence of each of the identity components is somewhat less than among the parents (aged 40-49) and grandparents (aged 65+). The most notable differences concern the Zionist experience in Israel: "The fact that you live in Eretz Israel"; "Establishment of the State of Israel"; and "The wars of Israel"; all of which are *existential*. Despite these differences, the young generation and the older ones share very similar ranking of identity components by their influence on Jewish identification.

The identity components that exert the strongest influence ("influence a lot") on Jewish identity of the Israelis are those just mentioned in the Zionist existential sphere (of these, for the younger generation "Living in Eretz Israel" comes right next.) The Holocaust ranks equally high as the Zionist experience among the younger but not among the older generations for whom it is also central but only slightly behind the Zionist experience. A similar pattern to that of the younger generation was observed in earlier studies of Israeli youth. Jewish identity components associated with *culture* and *ethics* come next, and those relating to religion and religious tradition are perceived to be the least influential and are ranked lowest by the younger as well as by older generations.

This ranking is based on the respondents' subjective sense regarding the influences on their Jewish identity. An objective analysis correlates the influence of each identity component with the respondents' Jewish identification ("Feeling of belonging to the Jewish people"). Here components associated with *religious tradition* and *Jewish heritage* outweigh the influence of *Zionist experience* in shaping Israeli Jewish identity, irrespective of age. Hence, the subjective ranking differs from the objective one in that it puts greater emphasis on the influence of contemporary Israeli history compared to that of Jewish heritage.

Further confirmation, along the same line, comes from studying the overall structure of the interrelations between Jewish identification items and the components of Jewish identity. Despite differences between younger Israelis and the older generations in the contribution of different identity components to their Jewish identity, they share a similar perceptual structure of Jewish identification and identity components. This perceptual structure clearly shows that the Jewish identification of the young Israelis, much like that of the older generations, is affected primarily by religious-traditional components while the historical components (excluding "ancient history") are the most distant from Israeli Jewish identification. It should be noted that in this analysis all historical components but one, "Jewish history of 3000 years", relate to modern times – the Zionist experience in Israel on the one hand, and the Holocaust on the other hand. "Ancient history" is relatively remote from the modern historical components for both the younger and the older generations. But while for the older generations Ancient history is closer to other historical components than to cultural components such as the Hebrew language, etc., for the young generation it is closer to cultural components than to modern history components.

This indicates that the continuum of thousands of years of Jewish history may affect slightly more Jewish identification than do specific events that by themselves do not symbolize historical heritage of a group. This perception is more pronounced for the young Israeli generation than for the older ones. Our analysis shows that Jewish identification of Israeli Jews, regardless of age, cannot be disconnected from Jewish heritage, even if the latter may be subjectively perceived to be less influential.

JEWISH IDENTITY VALUES

To what extent does the Israeli young generation consider the variety of collective Jewish identification aspects important features in their lives? And in what ways are they different or similar to the older generation in that respect? As in the case of the possible influence of identity components on personal identification, the young generation , when compared to the older ones, attributes less importance as a guiding principle to Jewish and related pro-collective values (such as "Help the needy", "Contribute to society").

These differences mainly appear between the younger generation (20-24) and the oldest one (65+). Furthermore the differences are mainly in the extreme positive answer "very important". The most notable differences concern the values "To live in Eretz Israel" and "To be a good citizen". While 76% of the parents and grandparents generations consider these values as "very important" guiding principles in life, only 48% of the young generation consider "Living in Eretz Israel", and 51% consider "To be a good citizen" very important values. It is important to bear in mind that the vast majority of all age groups (83%-97%) consider both values to be at least "important".

There emerge in general considerable differences in generational value preferences. For the young generation to "Feel part of world Jewry" and "Mark Jewish holidays in some way" (not necessarily according to the religious law) rank highest. These are followed very closely by collective values such as: "Help the needy", "Contribute to society", "Be a good citizen", and "To live in Eretz Israel". Values associated with religious observance according to the Jewish tradition and Bible or Talmud study rank the lowest. For the eldest generation (aged 65+) to " Live in Eretz Israel" and to "Be a good citizen" rank equally highest, preceding the feeling of belonging to world Jewry and marking Jewish holidays in some way. Next, similar to the young generation's ranking, come the collective values, while values associated with religious observance according to the Jewish tradition, and Bible or Talmud study are ranked the lowest – with similar frequencies.

Hence, surprisingly, the younger generation places values relating to attachment to the Jewish people and to Jewish heritage on a somewhat higher level than values associated with Eretz Israel and the State of Israel (such as "Being a good citizen"). In contrast, the older generation, which was more involved in the establishment of the Jewish State, prefers values related to the national component of Jewish identity.

Despite the generational differences in the importance attributed to different Jewish values, and few differences in the value preferences of the young and older generation, the young generation and the generations of the parents and grandparents share a similar conceptual structure of Jewish identity values. Hence, for the young generation as well as for the older generations, "Feel part of the Jewish people" and "Live in Eretz Israel" turn

out to be objectively central to the Jewish identity value system. Moreover, marking holidays and Shabbat "in some way" constitute in each generation a second circle close to the just mentioned two more central variables. Thus, the feeling of belongingness, namely Jewish identification, is firstly related to Jewish heritage through marking holidays, albeit not necessarily according to Jewish law. As discussed above, this same phenomenon is observed in the context of the structure of the interrelations between identity components and Jewish identification.

SUMMARY OF PAST TRENDS

All in all, the religious observance of the young Israeli generation is not very different from that of the older generations. The big drop of religious observance occurred between the "grandparents" and "parents" generations and even a generation earlier. Generational differences narrowed over time, rather than widening. Furthermore, the younger generation is akin the older generations in wishing that fewer of their respective children will be totally non-observant. These findings rather indicate the wish of the young Israeli generation for a continuity of religious identity.

Young Israelis have a strong Jewish identification that falls only slightly behind the Jewish identification of the older generations. They also believe that Israeli Jews and Diaspora Jews share a common fate, though much like the older generations, they perceive a difference between Israeli Jews and Jews in the Diaspora.

However, the younger generation attributes less influence on their Jewish identification to each of the identity components (regardless of their kind – cultural, historical, etc.) than do older generations. The most striking difference concerns the Zionist experience, especially living in Eretz Israel. This lesser attachment to Israel among the younger generation concurs with the finding that, were it possible, a few more of younger than older Israelis would wish to be reborn as Jews rather than as Israelis. Despite these differences the young and the older generations share very similar rankings of Jewish identity components. The younger generation, like the older ones, attributes the strongest influence on their Jewish identification to contemporary Zionist experience in Israel - the establishment of the State of Israel; living in Eretz

Israel etc. Objectively however (by correlating the influence of each identity component with the respondents' Jewish identification), Jewish heritage and history since olden days are found to be more strongly related to Jewish identification, irrespective of age.

The weaker attachment of the younger generation to Eretz Israel comes to a stronger expression when the value system is at issue. "Living in Israel" and being a "Beeing a good citizen" is far less important to the young generation than to the old generation. The young generation also attributes less importance than do older generations to collective-oriented values such as contributing to society, or helping the needy. These differences led to a few generational differences regarding Jewish and pro-collective value preferences.

Hence, surprisingly, the young generation prefers most values relating to attachment to the Jewish people and the Jewish heritage rather than values associated with Eretz Israel and the State of Israel (being a good citizen).

For the older generation, which was more involved in the establishment of the Jewish state in Israel, values relating to the Zionist experience in Israel precede the value of feeling part of world Jewry. As for the remaining values, there emerge no generational differences.

Despite the abovementioned differences the young and the older generations share a similar conceptual structure and a strong sense of continuity of Jewish identity values along with generational differences in emphasizing various aspects of Jewish identity.

Part II

New Indications – Hagit Hacohen Wolf

The previous findings were based on a national survey conducted in 1999-2000, and they are rather reassuring for those concerned with the Jewishness of Israeli Jews. However, in recent years we have been finding that a significant share (about 20%-25%) of the participants refused to

identify themselves with one of the typical Jewish identification categories. It appears that questions of cultural belonging in Israeli society are no longer perceived as simple ones. Many of the respondents choose to reply "other" and to specify a unique answer or to add categories to the possibilities suggested. Among the variety of definitions given by the participants in the various studies we may find the following definitions: "free / secular Jew", "Jewish", "Jewish without additions", "Israeli", "religious in my religion", "formerly religious", "conscious-traditional", "traditional in my way", "secular-traditional", "secular plus", "secular believer", "secular atheist", "a bit traditional", "free believer", "spiritual-secular", "free", "unique", "with an affinity to heritage rather than to religion", "multi-religious", "wondering and questioning secular", "secularreligious", "enigmatic", "spiritual-traditional", "it's really complicated…", "God seeking", "dedicated to doing good", "Zionist believer", "traditional-spiritual", "non-defined."

NEED FOR NEW PARAMETERS

Seemingly, there is a contradiction between the two types of phenomena which arise from the findings: on one hand, clear consistency of many years of findings concerning the attribution of the respondents (according to their self report) into sociological categories which are standard in Israeli social discourse and are expressed through dimensions such as observing ceremonies of receiving the Sabbath (lighting candles and blessing on the eve of the Sabbath), eating kosher food and separating dairy from meat dishes, lighting Hanukkah candles, ritual circumcision, mourning rituals, believing in the values of respecting the parents, helping the needy, contributing money to charity and more. These fairly consistent findings may indicate continuity and stability in the perceptions of Jews in Israel of their identity and of their Jewish identification.

On the other hand, we cannot ignore the phenomenon of the unwillingness of some of the respondents to "assign" themselves to the common definitions. These may pinpoint developments in thought, in frames of mind and in the feelings that currently characterize Jews in Israel regarding their Jewish identity.

The seemingly contradictory evidence requires an expansion of the types of parameters and indexes used in Israel. For instance, it is suggested to use a variety of parameters which serve researchers of collective identity worldwide, while adapting these to Jewish identity. For example, "Self Categorization", "Entitativity of the Jewish people" (sense of the Jewish people as a group), and other unique indexes such as perceptions of authority. This goes hand in hand with the essentialness of the continued usage of regular indexes in the study, whose purpose is to reflect trends and changes.

DIVERSITY IN ISRAELI SOCIETY

The first years of existence of the state were characterized by significant efforts to establish the physical construction and existential needs of the state and the society.

Even today, Israelis cope with many challenges; security, social and economic challenges. Yet Israeli society has gone through many changes during the past six decades: from a society with a collectivist nature which sanctified the needs of the public and placed them in clear, supreme priority over the needs of the individual, to an individualistic and materialistic society which places emphasis on the needs of the individual (from a cooperative to a privatized society).

Simultaneously, along with the efforts made to fulfill the basic existential needs of the state and the society, a dynamic Israeli culture developed during the state's years in literature, poetry, plastic art, theater, cinema, music, folk dancing, etc.). This culture reflects the uniqueness of the early years of Israel as a society which absorbed immigrants from many countries and cultures. The founders' dream of a "melting pot" which would unify immigrants from various Diaspora communities with the veterans of the Yishuv and create a uniform Western Israeli culture has been transformed over the years by a multi-cultural trend which seeks to allow the maximal expression possible to the variety of cultures comprising the Israeli society.

Alongside the trend of multi-culturalism, attempts have been made to agree upon a common core of values for all citizens of Israel (such as democratic principles, individual freedom, human rights). Despite these attempts, various

sectors in Jewish-Israeli society (such as Haredim, immigrants from the Former Soviet Union countries and more) are drifting away from the former national ethos, according to which the state is the primary source of identification.

Two paradoxes underlie the basis of the Jewish state. The first derives from the ongoing dialectics between the desire to be "Like all of the Nations" ("in favor of being normal"), and the desire to preserve the unique Jewish identity as a "Chosen People" (Deuteronomy 7: 6).

The second has to do with the fact that Jewish identity has become the basis of rifts and schisms in Jewish-Israeli society. These rifts are expressed through discourses in the media, in politics and in the academic world and are also reflected in the Guttmann report, which pinpointed the ongoing deterioration of the quality of the relations between the different groups in Jewish-Israeli society and the continuous erosion of the feeling of inter-Israeli unity.

The report also pointed to the growth of a perception that Israelis and the Jewish people in the Diaspora are two separate entities (i.e. a decline in Jewish unity). The rift between different Jewish sectors in the Israeli society derives from a number of main sources. The classical secular Zionism was largely established in rebellion against tradition and with a cosmopolitan orientation. As a result, a vast public no longer regards itself as a partner and a "proprietor" in all that concerns the continued Jewish creation and has become distant from the classical sources of Israeli heritage and from an active Jewish lifestyle. A rift exists today between the sons and the grandsons of this public, and this rift appears to be, in part, the product of an educational system that is deficient in its Jewish quality.

ATTEMPTS TO REFORM

The latter was a main conclusion of the 1991 Shenhar Committee report, submitted to the Minister of Education and Culture. The decline in Jewish quality, the report asserted, is the result of social and political changes as well as changes of values which are reflected in the school and emphasized in the humanistic professions, which determine the order of values, of which Judaism studies is but a part. The committee particularly noted the decline of ideologies; the rise of the consumer society and the global village, setting

different values and world perspectives against each other; the information explosion threatening a generation's ability to bequeath authorized knowledge to its young; increasingly narrow professional expertise which makes it difficult to educate a multi-dimensional person; the prestige and the attractiveness of the sciences and technology; the increasing politicization of religion and its institutionalization, and the increasing polarity between the religious and secular publics; the decline in the strength and authority of voluntary movements; and the increasing social gap and the inter-sectarian confrontations, among others.

The founders of the state aspired to create a "New Jew," but this myth never managed to become rooted into Israeli society which was, from the very beginning, a diverse society with many cultures and sub-cultures (rather than a multi-cultured society), identities and sub-identities.

The sources for the multitude of identities and the phenomena of identity-exploration and ambiguity of identity (expressed among other things by responding to questions of self-definition) are found not only in the social-economic-cultural processes through which Israeli-Jewish society has undergone. They also largely derive from fashions concerning Jewish identity and identification that have recently developed in Israel and have been greatly influenced by wider and more general procedures in the Western world of the early 21st century.

Post-modern approaches, originating in academia, place the "natural" and obvious element of belonging – a basis which was once perceived as unquestionable - on trial. In other words, the primordial discourse is replaced by a constructivist discourse and identifications which were once conceptualized as compelling are now perceived as a matter of choice. In this framework a transition occurred, in the academic discourse and in the media, from an essential perception of identity as internal, holistic and stable to a constructivist approach which asserts that the identity of human beings is a "narrative", the story that they themselves tell within the cultural-historical contexts in which they live.

INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES

Along with the changing understanding of identity, the West, under the influence and leadership of the United States, has been undergoing an individualization process, at the expense of the collectivist orientation. This fostered the concept of the private - individualist religion, which has developed among Jews in the United States during recent decades, and is also seeping into Israeli society in the form of idiosyncratic and unique patterns of faith and practice which are more diversified in their nature and less uniform and accepted (as expressed by the self-definition of the study participants previously specified). The legitimacy for exploring the identity and the unique personal expressions of the identity are therefore vested in the various expressions of "spiritual quest", "personal journeys" which individuals report, emphasizing their uniqueness of identity more than their belonging to a community, which in the past provided the basis of their Jewish identity. Altogether, it is unclear if the rate of those reporting "an exploration of identity" has changed in recent decades and the question to be asked is to what extent we can influence the exploration process emanating from an inner mental need, which is not influenced by any one or other social trend.

On the other hand, a decline has occurred in the intensity of the concepts which until recently were perceived as the "glue" unifying and consolidating Jews from various Diaspora communities with different ways of life. The memory of the Holocaust has dimmed. We have today a new and different generation for whom the Holocaust is an important and a significant historical memory, but its safe and comfortable life experience, which takes the existence of the State of Israel as a given, provides for a critical and distant approach. Some reservations have even been recently voiced with respect to the role of the Hebrew language in creating a common denominator between various factions in the Israeli society.

The constant conflict between state and religion in Israel, between the secular and the religious, flattens the Jewish discourse to polar positions and does not allow for the pluralism within which the typical Diaspora Jew lives. In addition, the political condition and the ongoing conflict are often perceived as a collision between Jewish values and the values of democracy

and equality, with respect to the ongoing control of the Jewish majority over the Arab minority in Israel and its social and moral implications.

Increasing social gaps between rich and poor in Israel, despite the dramatic rise in the standard of living of everyone; the surging feeling that the social, economic and security burdens are not equally divided between the various parts of society; all of these contribute to the feeling that the general social strength of the society in Israel is not as strong as it used to be. Israel is no longer perceived by this generation as an impressive achievement of the Jewish people, and as an exemplary society, as its prophets and founders hoped it would be.

The survey findings indicating great similarity in the patterns of traditional observance of Jewish customs by the majority of the Jews in Israel may be inclusive today, because the motivations and meanings involved in the performance of the rituals may be different today.

Nevertheless, it is important to indicate that different reasons have always been given for the observance of customs, and therefore it seems that the very fact that such a high percentage of Israeli Jews observe the customs is significant.

Despite this fairly gloomy picture, there are several signs suggesting that among certain circles in Israeli society there is an interest in changing the situation and retrieving the feeling of "ownership" of Jewish culture and tradition. During the last decade many initiatives have been started and developed in various places and among various sectors, which have in common the desire to create a Jewish revival in Israel. Among these phenomena are the growth and the multitude of places of pluralistic Batei Midrash for Torah study and of communities of adults all over the country who study Jewish heritage in a pluralistic spirit; the establishment of educational networks stressing various shades of education for Jewish identity; addressing young families caught in between the official national education and the religious-state education (such as the Morasha, TALI, and Meytarim networks, among others); the influx of organizations dealing with the development of study programs of Jewish, Zionist and Israeli civilian identity and support for their educational and organizational internalization into the national state

education system; the establishment of frameworks dealing with Jewish and Israeli identity addressing young adults (such as the pre-military preparatory programs addressing the graduates of the education system, Hillel houses in universities and various academic centers); the publication in recent years of scores of books, dealing with issues of identity in general and with issues of Jewish and Israeli identity in particular; and so on.

QUESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Yet these steps, which are usually initiated and financed by voluntary bodies, are still the exception to the rule and have not yet led to a real breakthrough in Israeli society.

We may compare our situation to that of a couple driving their car, unable to find the right way to reach their destination. Despite the wife's persistent pleas to ask a passer-by, the husband prefers to find his own way. In order to bring his wife and himself to peace, he says: "We're not lost; we just don't know where we are".

Do we really not know where we are going? Are we indeed heading in different directions or maybe we cannot break away from the "basic model" of the Jewish identity in Israel? Do stability and continuity exist (as some of the indexes indicate) with only the "mantle" changing? Is the claim that the "core of the Jewish identity in Israel" remains unchanged true? What are the factors influencing it? Family factors? Religious factors? Israeli factors? What is the essence of each one of these factors?

Whatever the answers, these issues are and will continue to be critical. Any effort at policy planning must address them.

JEWISH PEOPLE LEADERSHIP FOR THE 21ST CENTURY[2]

By Yehezkel Dror

I. Introduction

The 21st century is sure to pose unprecedented external and internal challenges for the Jewish People making outstanding leadership essential. However, the qualities required of that leadership differ in important respects from those of 20th century Jewish People leadership and from the 21st century leadership of other states and entities. This paper focuses on those specific requirements, leaving detailed discussion about needed attributes shared by leaders in general to the extensive literature dealing with this subject and, in part, to the companion paper on *The New Ruler*, which deals with the requirements of political high-level leadership for the 21st century – most of which apply to Jewish People leaders too, with suitable adjustments and subject to the requirements presented in the present paper.[3]

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1. Leadership as discussed in this paper refers to institutional, public and "political" leadership, what can appropriately be called Jewish polity leadership, not spiritual and intellectual leadership however important – perhaps more so in the longer run than polity leadership.

2. This paper adopts a different perspective than that of the document on "High-Level Jewish People Leaders for the 21st Century" prepared for the JPPPI 2007 Conference on the Future of the Jewish People. These two papers supplement each another. JPPPI plans to integrate and expand them in book form.

3. Therefore both papers should be read in conjunction as background for discussions in the group dealing with Jewish People leadership.

This also applies to the paper's treatment of the leadership of the State of Israel. As leaders of a Western developed state, Israeli leadership must meet the criteria that applies to all leaders of such states. The serious challenges faced by Israel make outstanding political leadership all the more essential. However, Israel is unique in being a Jewish state and in its striving to be the core state of the Jewish People. Therefore, Israeli Jewish leaders have to satisfy additional requirements pertaining to these unique features, which in part overlap with the required qualities of all Jewish People leadership, as discussed in this paper, but must also include some additional features which can only be specified in part in this paper.[4]

In line with the action-orientation of the paper, its core conclusions with respect to qualities required of Jewish People leaders are presented throughout the paper, as derived from the various issues under exploration. Also, to facilitate group and panel discussions at the President's Conference, the paper concludes with two concrete action proposals and some suggestions for the discussion agenda.

Required Jewish People leadership qualities depend on the challenges with which they must deal, which must therefore be explored first, however briefly.

II. Historic Situation

To understand the challenges likely to face the Jewish People in the 21st century, which in turn shape required Jewish People leadership qualities, the situation of the Jewish People must be put into historic perspective.

The Jewish People is still moving through four radical transformations which started in the 19th century and reached a crescendo in the 20th century. The first one was the European Enlightenment together with the Jewish Haskalah movement, which disestablished religion as the main characteristic and bond of the Jewish People, raising the critical question, namely what is the nature and identity of a non-religious Jew? It is a question that continues to challenge the Jewish People to the core. The second was the Shoah,

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4. For detailed treatment see Yehezkel Dror, *Epistle to an Israeli Jewish-Zionist Leader, in Hebrew (Jerusalem: Carmel Publisher and Israel Zionist Council), 2005,* revised and expanded edition to be published in 2008.

which killed about a third of the Jewish People including large parts of its most creative constituents, profoundly impacting its demography, sense of existence, psychology, theology and geopolitics in ways which are still far from having worked themselves out. The third was the establishment of the State of Israel, which has been nothing less than a radical and deep rupture in the history of the Jewish People. And the fourth is the emergence of thriving Jewish communities within liberal societies, including the largest one in the USA.

Full discussion of the meanings and implications of these transformations and the challenges they pose is beyond the scope of this paper. But, just to indicate their importance to our subject, it must be realized that sixty years is much too short a time for the implications and consequences of the existence of a Jewish State for the future of the Jewish People to become clear. Furthermore, the meanings of being a "Jewish state" are as yet very unclear, with some of the main questions surrounding those meanings just beginning to emerge. Similarly, the future of relations between Israel and the Diaspora, on institutional, social and individual levels, is just starting to reveal its problematics.

All this takes place within the deep transformations of humanity as a whole which are sure to characterize the 21st century and beyond, and which impact significantly and perhaps critically on the Jewish People, which in turn influences at least some of them and may have some critical impacts on human futures as a whole. These global transformations are dense with deep uncertainties, some of them of profound importance for the Jewish People. Just to give one example, the future of religions in the 21st century is far from known, although there is no doubt that it is crucial to the identity, cohesion and global standing of Judaism and the Jewish People.

Accordingly Jewish People leaders are located for at least all of the 21st century in a period of deep transformations of the Jewish People. All of their tasks are shaped by this situation, which in some important respects is not new in the history of the Jewish People, but unprecedented in both the quantity and quality of the immense discontinuities. Therefore, 21st century Jewish People leadership must meet three critical clusters of requirements:

Requirement One: Good "thinking-in-history," with understanding and sensing the historic situation and the dynamics within which they operate, and of the problematic of crafting policies and institutions which amount to efforts to interfere with historic processes so as to set the Jewish People on a trajectory towards thriving.

Requirement Two: Accepting as their main mission the fulfillment of major roles in creating a thriving future of the Jewish People, which involve degrees of societal architecture and institution building, and indeed "founding" of new realities while continuing the core of the chain of generations, far beyond what more stable situations dictate.

Requirement Three: Ability, both emotionally and cognitively, to cope well with overwhelming uncertainty.

III. Between Thriving and Decline

The main task facing the leadership can be concisely put in the form of two rudimentary realistic visions for the future of the Jewish People towards the end of the 21st century, one of thriving and the second of decline.[5]

Main features of the thriving realistic vision for the end of the 21st century, according to main stream Jewish-Zionist values, as will be explained later, include:

• Increasing number of Jews worldwide, in part thanks to an improved capacity to keep the descendants of out-marriages within the Jewish community;

• Strong cohesion of the Jewish People as a whole; a large Jewish majority in Israel, together with a thriving Arab minority that identifies strongly with the state and accepts its predominantly Jewish nature while maintaining their own cultural identity;

• Deep Jewish nature of Israel in pluralistic ways;

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5. To be compared with the JPPPI paper on alternative futures for the Jewish People in 2030 prepared by Avi Gil and Einat Wilf, full version to be published in 2008..

- Intense Jewish identity and identification, in part thanks to Jewish education reaching most of the younger generations with the help of advanced and innovative learning technologies;

- Synergetic relations between Israel and the Diaspora; Jews in the Diaspora participate fully and equally in the life of their respective countries, while regarding Israel as their civilizational home and Jerusalem as their civilizational capital;

- Wide acceptance of Israel as the core state of the Jewish People, together with Israel receiving substantial support from the Diaspora while contributing much to the Diaspora, and Israeli Jewish leaders serving also as Jewish People leaders;

- The Jewish People as a whole is increasingly a knowledge society;

- Overall good economic situation of the vast majority of Jews and Jewish communities and of Israel;

- Jewish creativity is flourishing, its fruits being of significance for human civilization as a whole;

- A relatively stable peace between Israel and its neighbors together with a weakening of fanatic anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish groups and an overall reduction in anti-semitism and anti-Israelism;

- Significant Jewish People *Tikkun Olam* – Mend the World activities, unique in nature and based on Jewish values and traditions.

In sharp contrast, the realistic decline vision includes:

- Declining number of Jews worldwide in the Diaspora, with a growing percentage of out-marriages the descendants of which fully exit Judaism;

- Fragmentation of the Jewish People; a declining Jewish majority in Israel, with the Arab minority becoming about a third of the population while being hostile to the very existence of Israel as a Jewish state;

- Dilution and dissipation of the Jewish nature of Israel, with an increasing part of the Jewish population preferring being a "normal" and post-modern society rather than a Jewish one;

- Weakening Jewish identity and identification and declining significance of Jewish education;

- Growing distances between Israel and the Diaspora, including in the political, economic, religious, cultural, social and additional dimensions;

- Increasing anti-semitism, accusations of "dual loyalty" and militant anti-Israelism;

- The Jewish People looses its knowledge edge and Jewish creativity decreases;

- A growing number of Jews become poor;

- Repetitive surges of violence between Israel on one hand and some of its neighbors in concert with fanatic non-state actors, on the other one;

- The Jewish People is less and less globally significant.

To be added are possible collapse and catastrophe contingencies, such as a nuclear conflict in the Middle East. And, more likely, a variety of surprise developments at present not only unforeseeable but in part inconceivable.

Nevertheless, these do not change the overall conclusion of the two alternative visions: the future of the Jewish People is quite open, with real possibilities of both thriving and decline. Catastrophe contingencies must not be excluded from consideration and disaster preparations should be made however low their probabilities seem to be.[6]

Awareness of the wide range of realistic alternative futures of the Jewish People adds another necessary attribute for high-quality leadership:

Requirement Four: Thinking and action within the frame of "rise and decline" and perspective of alternative futures, so as to reduce the probability of negative ones and increasing the probability of positive ones.

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6 The alternative visions and the possibilities of catastrophe are presented within a this-worldly perspective. Let me add, without going into relevant Jewish beliefs and traditions, that Jewish sages were not sure that "the merits of the fathers" assures the future, and Jewish theological discourse on the *Shoah* also rejects simplistic trust in a preordained thriving of the Jewish People before the Day of Judgment.

7 This involves knowledge of main theories of rise and decline and their application to the Jewish People as a basis for grand-policy crafting. See the JPPPI study by Shalom (Salomon) Wald of the subject, full version to be published in 2008.

IV. On the Concept "Thriving"

The alternative futures presented above, and indeed much of Jewish People leadership behavior depend on the values which serve as basis for regarding various situations as either "thriving" or "declining," or, as is often the case, having a mix of qualities of both. While there is much consensus among Jewish thinkers and decision-makers on some of the conditions of thriving and decline, there are also many differences such as those between orthodox and secular Jews.

Such pluralism within agreed core values has characterized the Jewish People through all its history and is part of the explanation both for its survival and occasional thriving during the exilic periods and for its extraordinary creativity. Therefore, fully legitimating pluralism, as long as it does not lead to hostility and too much fragmentation, is a positive feature which not only has to be accepted as a fact but should be facilitated. It also has two important implications for the qualities required of high-quality leadership:

Requirement Five: Vigorous contemplation and soul-searching in order to function from a position of clarity, and to constantly refine one's ideas on what constitutes "thriving" of the Jewish People as a whole and one's community in particular – within an understanding of the personal and collective meanings of being Jewish and based on adequate knowledge of Jewish traditions as well as overall human values.

Requirement Six: Whatever one's values are, accepting pluralism within a broad range of values and so serving as a leader of the Jewish People and its communities as a whole.

V. Our Future Depends Largely on Us, or At Least We should Act on that Assumption

However, to justify the *leitmotif* of this paper, two key questions must be examined. The first one is: to what extent does the future of the Jewish People depend on the Jewish People themselves?

This is a difficult question to which no definite answer can be provided. But two responses indicate the recommended conclusion. First, my own studies

of related historic processes lead to the guesstimate that the Jewish People has the potential to shape its future to the extent of, say – to quantify as a metaphor the unquantifiable- seventy-five percent – if it succeeds in realizing its full future-weaving[8] potential. Or, as a minimum, there is a good chance that high quality Jewish People actions will significantly influence its future for the better, even if it is not clear what the magnitude and significance of the overall impact will be.

The second response is more philosophical, regarding it our duty to make a robust effort to influence our future for the better even if we do not know and cannot know how far the future depends on our efforts.

To put both formulations together, the recommended working assumption is that our future depends significantly on us; and, even if we cannot be sure about the validity of that assumption, both morally and pragmatically we should act on this basis.

Taking into account that spontaneous historic processes cannot be relied upon to assure a thriving future, the following requirement is of critical importance:

Requirement Seven: The Jewish People should take energetic and carefully crafted pro-active and reactive measures to maximally shape its future for the better, with much of the responsibility for doing so belonging to leaders, policy planners and policy intellectuals supported by salient research.

VI. Critical Importance of Jewish People Leaders

The second question that must be examined, though already touched upon, is do Jewish People policy leaders really fulfill an important role within the set of Jewish People actors and processes weaving the future?

The answer ultimately depends on different philosophies of history. But my conclusion from relevant studies of historic processes and from theories based on them agrees with the conclusion drawn by Dr. Shalom (Salomon)

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8 I borrow this term from Plato's Dialogue *The Statesman.*

Wald in his already mentioned JPPPI study of rise and decline theories: "Rise and thriving depend on creative leaders and elites. All great transformations that ensured Jewish survival…were guided by outstanding leaders".

A number of additional factors make leadership of special importance to the Jewish People, the most significant of which is the absence of a state structure encompassing the entirety of the Jewish People, with about half living in voluntarily organized or virtual communities that interact within a loose network. This situation makes outstanding leadership an essential integrating factor, to compensate for the absence of the formal structures found within states.

This does not imply that polity leaders are the most important actors in shaping Jewish People futures. Spiritual leaders, as mentioned, may in the long run be much more important, as often illustrated in the history of the Jewish People. And other actors as well as diffuse societal processes are also very influential, as are external influences. And, yet, Jewish People leaders are an important and often critical variable in shaping the future, for better or worse.

Our discourse above leads to three additional cardinal requirements in respect to Jewish People leaders:

Requirement Eight: Regarding the weaving of the future of the Jewish People, globally and locally, as their most important mission, while also manging to take care of the here and now.

Requirement Nine: Making a maximum effort to acquire the moral and cognitive capacities to engage in effective positive impacting on the future, such as engaging in moral reasoning on Jewish values and the ethics of leadership; and developing a strategic and grand-policy mindset.

Requirement Ten: Outreach capacities beyond the Jewish People, so as to gain cooperation and support.

Let me illustrate in a nutshell the meanings of having a "strategic mind" by mentioning five core dimensions:[9]

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9 For detailed discussion, see Yehezkel Dror, "Training for Policy Makers", in: Michael Moran, Marin Rein, Robert E. Goodin, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2006, pp. 80-105.

- Thinking-and-acting-in-time, that is understanding relevant deep historic processes and their drivers and acting in terms of "intervening with history";

- Taking a comprehensive view of issues within their contexts, instead of "tunnel vision";

- Seeking new options and encouraging creative policy ideas;

- Being uncertainty-sophisticated;

- Working closely with a wide variety of professionals in policy planning.[10]

The necessity for a grand-strategic mindset goes one step further, involving long-term broad perspectives and focusing on a limited number of large-scale interventions with historic processes by "grand-policies" that is, policy principles guiding and integrating clusters of strategies and actions.

Having a strategic and grand-policy mind involves both a lot of knowledge and also, often more importantly, multi-dimensional but integrted patterns of thinking. This is a prime subject for deliberate efforts to upgrading leadership capacities, both on one's own and within structured learning situations, illustrating leadership development possibilities as recommended later.

VII. Global Jewish Peoplehood

Both in terms of values and of utilitarian considerations, it is essential for the Jewish People to operate increasingly as a cohesive entity while being in many respects very pluralistic with a lot of productive competition and conflict too.This is necessary to meet the challenges of globalization in terms of geo-strategy, culture, economics and more, which require some global Jewish People grand-policies, such as increasing its overall human capital and knowledge funds. It is also necessary in order to achieve a critical mass of "hard", political and "soft" power; and for mutual assistance as may be needed. Thus, to give just a few examples from many: the fight against anti-semitism has to be global, the security of Israel depends in part on the

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10 This is but one illustration of the dependence of even the best leaders on professional staffs and organizations. But consideration of aspects of this requirement unique to Jewish People leadership in the Diaspora, related to the absence of authoritative structures, have to be left for another opportunity.

support of all the Jewish People, and the renewal of Jewish values so as to assure continuity while fitting a changing world requires pluralistic spiritual creativity accepted by a vast majority of the Jewish People.

Given the fact that the Jewish People in the Diaspora does not have authoritative institutions and that centripetal forces are strong, leaders have a main task of providing cohesion and, indeed, are critical for doing so. However, this depends on leaders meeting three requirements, which at present are not adequately satisfied:

Requirement Eleven: Having a global perspective and understanding of the Jewish People and its dynamics worldwide.

Requirement Twelve: Regarding as a main task the strengthening of overall Jewish People cohesion, while accepting pluralism.

Requirement Thirteen: Deep understanding of the long-term problematic of relations between Israel and the Diaspora and strenuous efforts to strengthen these relations while providing them with a new basis (as illustrated later).

Requirement Fourteen: Possessing the ability and will to cooperate with other Jewish People leaders so as to achieve synergetic effects in the absence of shared authoritative formal structures, despite differences, disagreements and competition.

Requirement Fifteen: Familiarity with advanced information, networking and communication technologies and efforts to put them to optimal use for integrating Jewish communities and individuals.

VIII. Educational Tasks

Given the very nature of Judaism and the Jewish Civilization together with the absence of authoritative frameworks for the Jewish People as a whole, deepening of pluralistic Jewishness, Jewish identity and Jewish identification in Israel and the Diaspora depends a lot on education – in the broadest sense of that term – as both a value and a main policy instrument. This requires from leaders not only multiple communication skills, but more importantly an educational personality and exemplary personal life style. And, most important

of all, a rich contents of Jewish and human values and cultural assets as well as personal styles of living that facilitate wide acceptance as an educational personality most current Jewish People leaders, including Israeli ones, are regrettably lacking in these respects. The following requirements are therefore all the more important:

Requirement Sixteen: Accepting and serving in the role of educator as a main part of the leadership mission.

Requirement Seventeen: Constant efforts to broaden and deepen one's educational contents, such as by maintaing close contacts with value, spiritual, cultural and intellectual leaders and creators and learning from them on an ongoing and permanent basis.

IX. Creative Destruction is a Must

The high rate of change characterizing the Jewish People and the environments impacting on it make many of the best practices that have worked in the past useless and even harmful in the future. This also applies to many Jewish People institutions, which require redesign. Therefore, creative destruction is imperative, including both the invention and the application of new policies and institutions and the abandonment of obsolete ones – which is often a very painful and costly process.

Indeed more is needed, namely changes in dearly held beliefs enmeshed in one's psyche as well as interests, habits and organizations. This is often the most difficult and most painful of all, and is also very risky unless much care is taken to preserve the continuity of critical values while resolutely giving up what has become counter-productive.

As this is a crucial but very painful necessity, fulfillment of which imposes heavily on leaders, let me provide three illustrations to clarify what is involved:

1. The denial of the legitimacy of the Diaspora in most of Zionist ideology, which is explicitly or tacitly still widely accepted in Israel, must give way to a full recognition of the permanence of the Diaspora and the importance of perpetuating and furthering its thriving, hand-in-hand with the thriving of Israel as the Jewish core state of the Jewish People.

2. Concominantly, relations between Israel and the Diaspora should be based on a partnership between equals. This involves, for instance, consultative participation of Diaspora leadership in Israeli decisions of far reaching importance for Judaism and the Jewish People as a whole, such as the future of Jerusalem.

3. The period of mass *Aliyah* to Israel is probably over, necessitating innovation, development and facilitation of new forms of quasi-*Aliyah*, such as living part time in Israel while maintaining multiple residences.

The difficulties of such changes and their institutional implications are obvious, as is the crucial role of leaders in bringing them about. Therefore:

Requirement Eighteen: Innovativeness together with a readiness to abandon outdated notions and the constant willingness and capacity to learn.

X. Power Accumulation

Power is essential for fulfilling leadership tasks, all the more so when these involve painful activities such as creative-destruction. However, power accumulation is more difficult for Jewish People leaders in the Diaspora, which lacks authoritative institutions which serve as a relatively stable basis for "ruling". Instead, Diaspora Leaders must gain power-providing support on a purely voluntary basis, which depends heavily on their personality, behavior and images.

This is a subject which needs more study to serve as a reliable basis for formulating salient requirements. As such knowledge is presently not available, only a more general requirement as well as a study requirement can be validly formulated:

Requirement Nineteen: Power accumulation and support mobilization abilities fitting Diaspora conditions of absence of authoritative Jewish institutions, adequate for constructive-destruction and a willingness to use that power to bring about needed policy and institutional changes, even at personal risk.

Requirement Twenty: Studies on ways to facilitate necessary power accumulation by Jewish People leaders in the Diaspora, adjusted to the particular characteristics of different communities, are urgently needed.[11]

XI. Israeli Jewish People Leaders

The role of Israeli Jewish leaders as Jewish People leaders[12] is grossly neglected. Israeli parties nominate part of the leadership of main Jewish People organizations. But, with a few exceptions, the better Israeli leaders are not eager to take up such positions. Also, the very fact that political parties make appointments to such positions and that many of those appointed continue to be active in Israeli party politics is problematic.

Furthermore, while quite a number of Israeli Jewish political leaders regard themselves as being automatically entitled to be viewed also as Jewish People leaders, the vast majority of them are quite ignorant of Diaspora situations. And, unless religious, do very little to strengthen the Jewish nature of Israel.

This leaves a dangerous vacuum in Jewish People leadership as a whole and threatens in the long run the Jewish nature of Israel. Therefore this is another prime illustration of the need for radical constructive-destruction. Accordingly:

Requirement Twenty-One: Upgrading of the quality of Israelis appointed to leadership positions in Jewish People organizations, including changing the appointment process and, once appointed, detaching them from Israeli political party activities.

Requirement Twenty-Two: Acceptance by main Jewish Israeli leaders of active Jewish People leadership roles after they qualify themselves by studying the situations, dynamics and problems of the Jewish People.

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11 This is only one illustration out of the many Jewish Diaspora leadership subjects on which action-oriented research is urgently needed.

12 I avoid in this paper discussion of the serious leadership crisis in Israel, though it has grave implications for the Jewish People as a whole in addition to the dangers it poses to the long term future of Israel as a Jewish State. Therefore I think that this issue should be put on the agenda of the Jewish People and its leadership. The group may decide to devote attention to this problem.

Requirement Twenty-Three: Intense efforts by Jewish Israeli leaders, supported and also "pushed" by Diaspora leaders, to deepen the Jewish nature of Israel, in a pluralistic sense, as an important part of their core mission.

XII. Diaspora Leadership Selection

Diaspora leadership selection also raises difficult issues, which largely depend on the particularities of each community. Leaving the need to reduce the average age of the leadership for the next section, I would like to emphasize three main points, as detailed in the following requirements:

Requirement Twenty-Four: While democratic elections or quasi-democratic selection of leaders are not feasible in many communities, still an effort should be made to introduce them as far as possible.

Requirement Twenty-Five: In any case Jewish People leadership should be more broadly representative, with monetary contributions given less weight in selection while moral and cognitive qualities are given more weight.

Requirement Twenty-Six: The number of women in Jewish People leadership should be increased.

Requirement Twenty-Seven: Procedures should be established to rapidly remove leaders who fail in their tasks or when their behavior raises moral concerns.

XIII. Preparing the Next Generation of Jewish People Leaders

The fundamental problematics of the Jewish People can be put into a nutshell as one of continuity of the chain of generations together with adjustments to changing realities so as to facilitate thriving. This has two additional overlapping implications for Jewish People leadership. The first one is the need for rapid development and activation of young Jewish People leaders who will be accepted as leaders by the next generation. The second is to assure the high quality of the young leaders, including the meeting of requirements suggested in this paper and additional ones.

Some action along useful lines is taken by a number of Jewish organizations and foundations, but –however beneficial and important – it does not meet quantitative and qualitative requirements. At a minimum,main organizations should insure that not less than a third of the members of all their governing forums are below the age of 35. And strenuous efforts to mobilize outstanding youngsters and especially students for leadership development, with systematic studies, internships and more, are essential. Also, various grass root initiatives by the younger generation to advance themselves into leadership roles while equipping themselves to do so should be richly supported, without in any way interfering with their autonomy.

There is an additional important aspect to building up the next generation of Jewish People leadership. Many more women should be included in it, both as a matter of equity and in order to fully utilize the limited supply of good leadership candidates.

Unless such --and additional-- steps are taken decisively, the dangers of breaks in continuity in Jewish People leadership are aggravated with grave implications for the continuity of the chain of generations as a whole. This point needs emphasis, because JPPPI Recommendation 35-35, made quite some time ago, that the number of younger members in governing bodies of main Jewish organizations should be increased significantly has been widely ignored; and even requests for data on the age composition of those bodies have not been answered satisfactorily.

Therefore,

Requirement Twenty-Eight: Decisive efforts to develop young Jewish People leaders, with more women and better social representation.

Requirement Twenty-Nine: Personal efforts by Jewish People leaders to coach high-quality successors and to prepare young leaders, such as by understudies and internships.

XIV. Top Priority Action Recommendations

The twenty-nine requirements that should be met to a significant degree (together with additional ones, including those applying to leadership

in general) by Jewish People leaders, as introduced in this paper, may seem overwhelming, if not utopian. But this is not the case. They constitute a cluster with mutually supportive components and do not add up to more than should be demanded and can be realistically achieved, in measures adjusted to the level of leadership. However, this cannot and should not be left to individual self-crafting desires and abilities only, but should be assured by serious Jewish People efforts. Much more is needed in the way of Jewish People institutions devoted to facilitating leadership self-improvement and providing systematic leadership cultivation and development.

This leads to realization recommendations. The Presidential Conference aims at practical recommendations which are well thought-out and very significant while also being feasible. The number of recommendations coming out of the Conference on each subject should be limited to two or three which each discussion group judges to be the most important ones – so as to permit focused implementation efforts.

Accordingly, I conclude this paper with two recommendations suggested for discussion, elaboration and adoption by the group that will discuss Jewish People leadership for the 21st century:

Recommendation One: Set up a Global Jewish People Leadership Development Center in Jerusalem, to engage in a range of support, training and discourse activities with the help of multiple methods and a worldwide network of affiliated institutions.

Recommendation Two: Act vigorously to develop young Jewish People leaders, by increasing the number of members younger than 35 in governing bodies of Jewish organization – with special attention to women and to broader representation of various social strata.

However, it is up to the group to decide which recommendations to support.

XV. Proposed Group Discussion Agenda

Accordingly, the following two items are suggested for discussion in the group, subject to the decision of the participants.

1. The situation of present Jewish People leadership, in the Diaspora and Israel, and its main improvement requirements.

2. A small number of top priority concrete projects for improving Jewish People leadership along with practical ways to implement them.

As indicated, the group may also decide to devote some time to discussing the Israeli leadership crisis and searching for ways in which the Jewish People as a whole can help to overcome it.

TIKKUN OLAM : BASIC QUESTIONS AND POLICY DIRECTIONS

By Yehudah Mirsky

Recent years have seen a surge of projects in social justice, humanitarianism, ecology and similar endeavors, aiming both to bolster Jewish identity and enhance Jews' standing with other communities, and expressed in terms of *Tikkun Olam*. This traditional term, literally meaning "repair and restoration of the world," has come to signify a Jewish commitment to ethically charged social activism, and well beyond the parameters of Jewish communities as such.

Thinking about *Tikkun Olam* and its place in Jewish life entails coming to grips with a number of basic, practical questions. For instance:

• Do we have reasonably clear visions of what *Tikkun Olam* means in today's world?

• What should we concretely do in order to work for the realization of those visions?

• Should the Jewish People proceed in *Tikkun Olam* through exclusively or distinctively Jewish ventures? What are the advantages and disadvantages of doing so, both substantively and in terms of perceptions?

• What ought to be the shape of institutional cooperation between Israel and the Diaspora on *Tikkun Olam* projects?

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- What should be the appropriate venues for recruitment, organization and financing Jewish efforts for "*Tikkun Olam*"?

These are the sorts of questions that will frame our discussion at the Conference. But before proceeding to these concrete issues, some more basic introduction is necessary, and that is what this paper seeks to provide. It seeks briefly to suggest some lines of conceptual order and clarity that can help us make sense of the welter of activities that are and may be pursued under the rubric of *Tikkun Olam*; to lay out the pros and cons of different forms of activity in their various rubrics; to raise some – hopefully constructive – questions and criticisms regarding these activities as a whole and their place in organized Jewish life; and, in closing, to suggest some tentative policy directions for Jewish activists, professionals and concerned citizens that may help focus the work of *Tikkun Olam* and better realize the potential good it may work for the Jewish people at large and the family of humanity as a whole.

Historical Background

While our focus is on contemporary issues, some historical background is indispensable to our approaching the subject.

*The term T*ikkun Olam, which literally means "repairing the world," first appears in the Mishna, the canonical Jewish legal digest compiled at the turn of the 3rd century CE, where it is given as the rationale for a number of specific legal provisions and edicts enacted within Jewish society and its then-existing frameworks towards ends of social justice.[1] The term entered contemporary usage as the rubric for spiritually charged social justice efforts in recent decades, most notably via th*e jour*nal Tikkun, founded in 1986. While that journal espouses an unmistakable and assertive Left orientation, the term has gained increasingly wide currency and appeal indicating a consciously-assumed Jewish responsibility to work for the general welfare of humanity.

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1 The term appears in Mishna Tractate Gittin chapter 4, and acquired a more broadly redemptive sense in the Kabbalistic literature of the Middle Ages, signifying chiefly the spiritual transformation of the world, in which ethical action plays a major role. A very helpful collection of historical and conceptual essays is David Shatz, Chaim I. Waxman and Nathan J. Diament, eds., Tikkun Olam: Social Responsibility in Jewish Thought and Law (Northvale & London: Jason Aronson, 1997).

Jewish tradition and Jewish history offer rich troves of thought and experience regarding social responsibility, ethics and justice, ranging from the exhortations of the Prophets to the detailed legal analyses of the Talmud, which in turn served as the basis for a rich jurisprudence of justice and ethics over the centuries. At the same time, it must be recognized – for the sake both of historical accuracy as well as conceptual clarity in our own time – that in many respects the corpus of Jewish tradition is of limited usefulness in addressing many contemporary questions of social justice – and certainly on a global scale – if for no other reason than that the historical moment in which we find ourselves is without precedent in human history.

The radical newness of modernity (and beyond) poses challenges, and opportunities, which are well beyond the scope of the traditional sources, if they are to be read seriously and not anecdotally or superficially. Central features of today's world, such as the extraordinary power and reach of modern states, economies and transnational entities; an increasingly networked global community, facilitated in many ways by the Internet; and, at a deeper level, the conviction, central to all modern politics and certainly to much humanitarianism, that societies are man-made entities which can be remade by the proper application of knowledge and skill – all these pose major, though not insurmountable, challenges to the inheritors and interpreters of Jewish texts and traditions.

Indeed Jewish law and philosophy have over the centuries regularly proved themselves to be deeply responsive to changing circumstances and new ideas – but here as elsewhere it is easy to read the tradition sloppily or worse; it is more demanding to read and interpret it meaningfully and with care. This is no merely academic point but has powerful implications for thinking about *Tikkun Olam* as a vehicle of Jewish identity, and in terms of its relationship to Jewish cultural literacy as a whole.

How Jewish Is Tikkun Olam?

A critical question underlying this entire discussion is whether we are talking about a distinctively Jewish set of practices, for example, a distinctively Jewish way of doing humanitarian work in developing countries, or whether we are talking about a set of activities which are not distinctively "Jewish," as such (as are, say, observing Shabbat or building a Jewish Community Center). Do the specific activities of *Tikkun Olam* differ in some ways from ethically-driven social action undertaken by non-Jews and if so how?

There is no doubting that much of the contemporary appeal of *Tikkun Olam* activities – especially for many young people and for adults who generally find themselves uncomfortable with other forms of Jewish identity – is precisely that they can seem no different from the works of other people of conscience the world over, or put a little differently, that they seem to draw on and reflect a more broadly human, and perhaps universal, moral sense. Yet, if indeed many activities currently pursued under the rubric of *Tikkun Olam* are not being done in any distinctively Jewish fashion, we may ask what value if any they add to ethically-charged action undertaken by people of goodwill in other frameworks, and what claim these activities can make on Jewish communal energies and resources.

Put a little differently, the impulse to think in terms of *Tikkun Olam* does have the potential to bring great benefit to Jews and to the world. But we would do well to try and formulate distinctively Jewish forms of this work, not as a substitute for universalist moral concern but rather as the best way to bring Judaism's own resources to bear on that concern, and in so doing offer one way of invigorating Jewish identity in a globalizing age.

Why should *Tikkun Olam* Matter -- What Ends does it Serve?

There are several reasons to consider *Tikkun Olam* as a significant project and as one – though not necessarily exclusive – organizing principle for contemporary Jewish life, one which operates at multiple levels as a driving force empowering and enlightening Jewish peoplehood. *Tikkun Olam* offers the possibility of reinforcing Jewish identity and solidarity, contributing morally

to the good of humanity (Raison d'Humanite) as well as better integrating the Jewish People into the emerging networks of global civil society.

Of course the creation of just societies and the advancement of such goals as environmental protection, public health, economic well-being, and so on are incumbent on all people. Thus speaking of a specifically Jewish effort of *Tikkun Olam* beyond social responsibility and other efforts in which Jewish communities and the State of Israel participate as a matter of course entails articulating distinctively Jewish values and objectives. How could *Tikkun Olam* work differ in substance from the broad gamut of humanitarian, environmental or social justice work? Does a Jewish focus illuminate problems and potential solutions to issues of broad human concern which might otherwise go unnoticed? And what distinctive benefits might this focus bring to Jewish life?

1) FULFILLING OUR MORAL OBLIGATIONS AS JEWS AND AS HUMAN BEINGS

As members of the human race we bear inescapable moral obligations, and participate in the broader ethical life of humankind. How we go about living up to those obligations has of course varied greatly over time and place and among cultures, traditions and belief systems. And in this globalizing age, in which such marvels as modern medicine and the internet are more than challenged by catastrophic threats of nuclear weaponry, global terrorism and massive climate change, the urgency of a moral commitment to humanity at large is perhaps keener than ever before.

At the same time, and no matter one's specific political, religious or ideological position, there is no doubt that a strong sense of moral obligation and a commitment to realizing moral ideals in practice, are a central element of Jewish tradition and a central feature of Jewish civilization. Both interpersonal ethics and a commitment to fostering a just and moral social and political order on earth have been central to Jewish thought and

practice throughout history, however imperfectly those ideals have been realized in practice.[2]

This moral commitment must be brought to bear on specific problems and in very concrete, indeed prosaic, terms. While this point seems trivial it bears repeating. This is because one of the pitfalls of ideal-driven politics, a pitfall to which *Tikkun Olam* can be very susceptible, is that without the disciplining focus of the concrete effects that public policy and social activism have on people's lives, those policies and engagements can proceed in an abstracted, and at times romanticized fashion which serves both to undermine their effectiveness and even generate backlash against them.

At the same time, a careful attention to details and a pragmatic approach to problem-solving is itself a hallmark of the Jewish tradition in general and the Jewish legal, halakhic, tradition in particular and this mix of focused pragmatism and idealism may itself be a defining Jewish element of *Tikkun Olam*.

2) STRENGTHENING JEWISH IDENTITY

Undertaking ethically-charged action, and in broader, non-Jewish, and thus altruistic contexts, is a moving and stirring vehicle of identity. This is especially the case with younger people who are several generations removed from earlier, more primal connections to Jewish identity. They are often made uncomfortable by activities emphasizing specifically Jewish commitment and identity which can seem to them narrow and even potentially chauvinistic and/or grounded in an archaic religious language that does not speak to them or give expression to their passions and concerns.

Yet young people are far from the only ones whose Jewish identity stands to be enriched by the work of *Tikkun Olam*. It has been pointed out that in the course of modernity key dimensions of Jewishness – ethical universalism,

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2. The Jewish commitment to social responsibility is a major theme of Jewish thought in modern times and has been articulated by major thinkers who deeply differ with one another on numerous issues, such as Hermann Cohen, Martin Buber, Abraham Isaac Kook, Aharon David Gordon, Abraham Joshua Heschel and Emanuel Levinas, to name just a few. Their writings offer rich resources for reflection on the meaning of Jewish social responsibility.

group identity and a relationship to spirituality and the sacred – broke apart from one another, each becoming, as it were, the property of a specific party.[3] Thus actions by Jews, qua Jews, undertaking social activism with a universalist orientation can have a powerfully healing effect on the fractured Jewish identities of our times.

It is widely recognized that many young people and others inside and outside the Jewish community often perceive the Jewish People as narrowly self-centered and chauvinistic, a perception both deeply disturbing and destructive. *Tikkun Olam* work which makes credible and meaningful contributions to the well-being of humanity, done so out of humility, sincere conviction and in concert with other groups and peoples offers an especially powerful alternative to these disturbing perceptions. Needless to say, it can only offer that alternative if pursued for its own sake and with integrity, with real commitment over time and not as an exercise in image-building and public relations.

3) BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS IN GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

A salient feature of today's world is the steady growth and sophistication of global networks of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), which interact in increasingly complex and cross-cutting ways with one another and with international bodies, public and private. All these connections are of course deeply wired into the Internet. We see, in other words, alongside the increasing interconnectedness of governments, economies and markets, the steady emergence of a global civil society, an international society defined neither by governments nor economics as such, in which NGOs – and the values, interests and commitments they represent – play a very significant role.

And so, there simply is no denying that part of the *appeal of Tikkun Olam* work is that it seems to offer the possibility of enhancing the Jewish People's position within global civil society in a number of ways, and of fostering

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3. This analysis was put forth by Abraham Isaac Kook, see his canonical work Orot, pp. 70-72, (Shemonah Qevatzim III:1-2), English version in Bezalel Naor, ed. & tr., Orot (Northvale & London: Jason Aronson, 1993), pp. 176-178.

positive images of the Jewish People, as is indeed the case for any number of polities, institutions or individuals who engage in idealistically-charged and humanitarian work. S*imilarly, Tikkun Olam* may beckon as an avenue for the expression of Jewish ethics in the international geopolitical arena apart from the wrenching and at times seemingly intractable moral dilemmas in which the State of Israel finds itself. Yet it cannot be emphasized strongly enough that these collateral e*ffects of Tikkun Olam* work will be meaningless – and indeed counterproductive – if they are pursued as ends in themselves and are not anchored in a good faith moral commitment, pursued on its own terms and to substantive ends of social and global responsibility.[4]

And it is worth emphasizing again the need for humility in pursuing this work if it is to be sustainable and true to Jewish and other moral visions.

Questions and Critical Thoughts

Notwithstanding all the above, serious examination of the present-day *Tikkun Olam* enterprise as a whole must reckon with some very substantive questions and criticisms, especially given that we face in the coming years a shrinking pool of Jewish resources.

Three serious sets of questions must be addressed in the present-day context of *Tikkun Olam*:

1) Is this the sort of humanitarian and charitable "feel good" work that does little other than to assuage the consciences of those involved in it at best, and often ignores the complex dimensions of problems*?*

2) Can Tikkun Olam serve as a meaningful, long-term ground for Jewish identity in the absence of other commitments, or i*s talk of Tikkun Olam* as a vehicle for Jewish identity just a particularly edifying way of changing the subject?

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4. Indeed parading one's social awareness is not only self-defeating but even self-parodying. This is the argument of Sarah Moore's recent book Ribbon Culture: Charity, Compassion and Public Awareness (London: Palgrave/MacMillan, 2008) see the review at http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php?/site/reviewofbooks_article/4919/

3) What is the relationship *between Tikkun Olam* and political work and advocacy? Can there be a broadly shared c*oncept of Tikkun Olam* which might serve as a reference point for many different Jewish communities and groupings while still maintaining enough definition to be operationally meaningful and morally compelling, indeed normative?

The Problems with Humanitarianism

Critics of humanitarian assistance have pointed out several problems with the construct as a whole, which are of particular relevance here. Humanitarian assistance can often seem as an exercise in what Rudyard Kipling famously labeled "The White Man's Burden," a condescending attempt to ease perceived Western guilt with programs which are oblivious to worse or local conditions, politics and cultures.

On the colloquial level, we are all familiar with the problems of well-intentioned volunteers or entities wandering into places about which they know little, intending to do good and at times doing the reverse. Serious as this is, another powerful concern is that articulated by Michael Edwards of the Ford Foundation who, in criticizing what some have dubbed "philanthrocapitalism," has pointed to "(t)he diversion of energy and resources away from structural change, institution building and deep reform, in favor of social and environmental service-provision."[5]

Moreover, Jews in the Diaspora, and increasingly in Israel as well, by and large subscribe to free market capitalism. This may certainly be justifiable both on economic and on moral grounds, but for social justice commitments not to be hollow rhetoric, Jews as individuals and communities must be self-consciously aware of those commitments and their biases. This is not a reason to desist from humanitarianism, on the contrary, but an argument that it be done with great awareness and care.

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5. See his essay "Philanthrocapitalism: After the Goldrush," available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/globalisation/visions_reflections/philanthrocapitalism_after_the_goldrush

Jewish Identity: Changing the Subject?

It is unclear that *Tikkun Olam* can serve as a meaningful, long-term basis for Jewish identity in the absence of some other commitments, to Jewish peoplehood and civilization, to distinctively Jewish forms of spiritual life, the Jewish textual tradition, and so on. Simply encouraging young people who are otherwise indifferent to or estranged from Jewish life to engage in humanitarian work with no distinctive – let alone transformative – Jewish dimensions other than the label "*Tikkun Olam*" will strengthen neither Jewish identities nor Jewish life. Humanitarianism, social justice and ecological advocacy are not distinctively "Jewish" as such, and while this makes for very meaningful points of contact with people of goodwill outside the Jewish community it also suggests that in and of themselves they will not reinforce stable Jewish identities over time, no matter how they are labeled.

Political Dimensions

It goes without saying that there is seldom if ever one unequivocally "Jewish" position on most issues of social policy. This is due to the great diversity of contemporary Jewish life, the multiple and regularly conflicting perspectives to be found in the classic sources (themselves reflective of the complexities of Jewish historical experience) and the interests and values of contemporary Jewish communities.

At the same time, engaging in meaningful *Tikkun Olam* work regularly entails staking out distinctive – and regularly contentious – positions on a range of issues of political, economic and social policy.[6] Jews act as individuals and groups within the political processes of their countries, and above all in democracies, to shape public policies which reflect not only their interests as such but also their values. They also act in international arenas to further not only specific goals relating to Jews and Israel, but also objectives relating to

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6 A further complicating dimension is the growing recognition that issues of economic development are deeply intertwined with political development as well. The well-known but still thought-provoking finding of Amartya Sen, recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics, that famine is more a function of the lack of political openness and freedom than it is of economic and ecological variables as such, serves to remind us that development work, when done well, is deeply implicated in politics.

the international community as a whole, such as treaties and conventions, international efforts on issues such as refugees, climate change, rights of persons with disabilities and so on.

On a different note, Israel figures in this entire discussion in two ways. First, it is a Jewish state which on its own undertakes numerous *Tikkun Olam* projects, most notably through Mashav, the Center for International Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Second and more broadly, it is a society where by definition Jews assume responsibility for all of society and its welfare and which can point to many extraordinary achievements in that regard both by the State and civil society. Yet by the same token, one cannot talk about *Tikkun Olam* in an Israeli context without getting into such thorny questions as mounting income inequalities, discrimination against Arab citizens, the treatment of foreign workers, trafficking in women and the unresolved status of the Palestinians and of Judea and Samaria; these and other problems threaten to undercut the moral suasion of Israeli and Jewish social justice efforts as a whole.

All the above critical comments are not arguments for inaction but rather a spur to further and disciplined thinking on the concrete meanings of *Tikkun Olam.*

Tentative Policy Directions and Recommendations

This discussion does yield a number of conclusions and tentative policy recommendations:

Tikkun Olam ought to be recognized as a major, over-arching Jewish value

Jewish life proceeds through a basic conceptual vocabulary – including such terms as Torah, Jewish People, Mitzvah – and *Tikkun Olam* ought to be incorporated into that basic lexicon, with the full awareness that there is no obviously or unequivocally "Left" or "Right" way to live up to that ideal. Of course a major challenge here is developing a broadly shared concept of *Tikkun Olam* which might speak to a wide range of people and yet be substantive, concrete and compelling, even commanding.

At this point we might suggest a productive working defintion of *Tikkun Olam* as Jewish social responsibility arising out of a Jewish commitment to human flourishing and well-being, guided by over-arching moral imperatives, as articulated and interpreted through Jewish history and tradition. The normative – or if you will, mitzvah – character of *Tikkun Olam* is vital to its effectiveness as part of a robust commitment to Jewish and human flourishing.[7]

Tikkun Olam is, in this light, not a substitute for other, more particular or more strictly spiritual or metaphysical Jewish values – but takes its place alongside them.

Articulating a distinctively Judaic moral vision for the 21st century

A searching imperative of our time, incumbent on the world community, is the creation of some sort of global moral language which would in some measure emerge in part from – and reflect the differing teachings and historical experiences of – the great and varied religious traditions which have shaped our world.[8] Jews and Judaism must take part in this global conversation, because we do indeed have much to say. Judaism's vast library of texts and equally vast range of historical experience, heroic and tragic, mined with knowledge and care, is a large and precious resource for contemporary moral reflection and action.

To take several examples:

1) One can think of distinctive Jewish contributions to rights discourse, which would integrate thinking of rights with corresponding discussion of responsibilities, including responsibilities of rulers and regimes.

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7. One particularly eloquent articulation of this idea is put forth in Eugene Korn's essay, "the Mitzvah of Tikkun Olam," to be found at http://www.learningtogive.org/religiousinstructors/voices/mitzvah_tikkun_olam.asp

Another is the presentation by Jonathan Sacks, Chief Rabbi of the British Commonwealth available at

http://www.ou.org/public/Publib/tikkun.htm#_ftnref26

My thanks to Dov Maimon for directing me to these essays.

8. One particularly helpful introduction to thinking about these issues is the slim but powerful volume by Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994).

2) Jews have for centuries been a deeply globalized people who have nonetheless maintained a very distinctive identity, due not only to external circumstances but also their own inner resources. This combination can serve as a powerful source of reflection for others on navigating the ethical and societal challenges of globalization.

3) Jewish tradition may have distinctive contributions to make to contemporary thinking on economics and human development. Thus for instance, the approach to tzedakah,(the traditional Hebrew term for `charity,' whose literal meaning is `justice') as the cultivation of self-reliance and moral perfection, most famously enunciated by Maimonides but resonant elsewhere in the tradition, interestingly intersects with emerging ideas of development which see economic growth as simply one element in a larger picture in the development of human capabilities and flourishing.[9]

4) The practices of Sabbatical and Jubilee years offer a distinctive model linking ecological sustainability and social justice, one worth pondering.

5) The interaction throughout Jewish history of the prophetic and rabbinic/sage models of leadership offer instructive models of the relationship between moral and legal/political leadership. A distinctive feature of Jewish ethical thinking is the ceaseless effort to integrate the passionate moralism of the Biblical prophets with the detailed, case-by-case analysis of Talmudic law. This centuries-long interpretive drama bears potentially great significance for the creation of contemporary moral discourse across the globe.

6) The Jewish mobilizations in response to the genocides in the Balkans and Darfur bespeak an historical sensibility especially tuned to the possibility of

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9. I am referring to the celebrated passage in Maimonides' Code, the Mishne Torah, in Hilkhot Matnot `Aniyim (Laws of Gifts to the Poor) 8:10-14, and to the "capabilities approach" to development put forward in recent years by Nobelist Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, see, e.g. Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).

genocide – a sensibility that deserves to be explored and whose lessons can be shared with others.[10]

7) The Jewish commitment to lifelong learning and the unique forms of study to be found in the traditional *beit midrash* have much to offer educational reformers today.

Jews have over the centuries cultivated not only a passion for learning but a variety of educational forms and methods, which, both separately from and in tandem with new information technologies, can do much to raise global education and human development.

8) As was noted above, the interaction of principles and pragmatism is a hallmark of the Jewish legal, halakhic, tradition – and that approach offers rich resources for thinking through the relationship between ideals and reality on a range of issues. Jewish bioethicists working out of that tradition have already made distinctive contributions to that field, and provide a model for further endeavors.

9) The rich tradition of tzedakah is a model of communal social responsibility in the absence of a strong welfare state; it also connects to the burgeoning area of Micro Philanthropy, which pools large numbers of small donations resulting in more direct interaction between donors and recipients, or "givers" and "doers," higher resolution in the focus of giving and the creation of new networks of cooperation.[11] This could reinterpret

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10. The issues of human rights protection and democracy-promotion, though grounded in deep moral intuitions and in the long run vital both for Jewish survival and global well-being, are nonetheless complex and deserve careful study. Thus advocacy on behalf of international treaties and conventions and broadly-based UN and similar organizations for the promotion of human rights, may for a variety of reasons, some deeply structural, result in profoundly unintended consequences. I have discussed this at some length in "Human Rights, Democracy and the Inescapability of Politics, or, Human Dignity Thick and Thin," Israel Law Review, (2005:1-2) pp. 358-377. A PDF is available on request.

11. See Tom Munnecke and Heather Wood Ion, "Towards a Model of Micro Philanthropy," http://www.givingspace.org/papers/microphilanthropy.htm
It is of course related to the somewhat more-developed field of Microcredit, which fuels economic development by small loans to small business and lone entrepreneurs, often women, in developing countries

a time-honored commitment to charitable giving as a moral imperative, incumbent even on the poor themselves, for the more diffuse social and global landscape of today. [12]

10) The traditional idea and discipline of "keeping kosher" can be extended to a broader range of concerns, such as the treatment of workers in workplaces, or ecology.[13]

One may differ with some of these ideas, suggest others – and deep humility is always called for when talking about trying to shape the world. Yet this list should, if nothing else, stimulate thinking on a range of possibilities for thought and action.

Moving from Ideas into action

"Great is study, for it leads to practice" (Babylonian Talmud, Qidushin 40b)

Bringing these more philosophical ideas to life entails a number of concrete steps.

1) Efforts should be undertaken to develop a strong interdisciplinary *Tikkun Olam* study group, based in Jerusalem and in dialogue with peers elsewhere, which will bring together a range of scholars and practitioners for ongoing focused and disciplined work on *Tikkun Olam*'s philosophical and policy dimensions. The objective of this group will be to think hard in a

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12. Danny Siegel, founder of the Ziv Tzedakah Fund, is widely regarded as the pioneer of Jewish micro philanthropy, see his website: www.dannysiegel.com.

13. A sterling example is the "kosher" certification program of the Israeli religiously-based social justice NGO Be'maaglei Tzedek, which certifies that eating establishments and other workplaces adhere to legally-mandated standards as regards wages and work-conditions. See their website www.mtzedek.org.il

The notion of eco-kashrut, incorporating traditional kashrut with ecological and other concerns was first put forward in the 1970s by Rabbi Zalman Schachter-Shalomi and has been popularized by Rabbi Arthur Waskow. A particularly engaging website addressing this and related issues is www.jcarrot.org

disciplined fashion and in both theoretical and practical terms about how the Jewish People might realize the many potential dimensions of *Tikkun Olam* and how those commitments might in turn enrich Jewish life.[14]

2) *Tikkun Olam* must be made a serious vehicle of Jewish identity and continuity, especially in projects for young people. Thus the study of Jewish texts ought to be incorporated into *Tikkun Olam* projects,[15] and the development of appropriate materials should thus be a significant educational priority.[16] Thought should be given to incorporating forms of *Tikkun Olam* into the life cycle and other developmental stages of life, into the yearly cycle and into the ongoing life of communities – not as a substitute for other forms of Jewish life but as one particularly enriching and vital dimension.

3) A diversity of *Tikkun Olam* work is to be encouraged, in order to allow for the expression of a range of visions and energies. A wide array of people is already involved in a wide number of *Tikkun Olam* projects under both Jewish and non-Jewish auspicies, and it would be worthwhile for them to be in contact with one another for the sake of sharing ideas and information and building solidarity.

4) At the same time, thought should be given to developing several Jewish People-wide *Tikkun Olam* projects. One possibility is the creation of a Jewish Youth Corps which would bring together young people from

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14. Some projects in this direction have already begun such as the social justice beit midrash programs of Beit Morasha in Jerusalem and Yeshivat Chovevei Torah in New York, the humanitarian assistance and religion program of the Hartog School of Tel Aviv University, and the conference on Judaism and Ecology at Harvard Center for the Study of World Religions, which yielded the important volume, Hava Tirosh-Samuelson, ed., Judaism and Ecology: Created World and Revealed World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003). These are marvelous beginnings which deserve to be built upon and integrated into larger wholes.

15. One such example is Tevel B'Tzedek, which incorporates study of Jewish texts with on-site ecological and development work in Nepal; another is the work-study volunteer efforts done by groups of US Rabbinical students from different denominations.

16. One very interesting and creative example of such materials is the series of volumes, entitled The Jewish Political Tradition, jointly edited by Michael Walzer, Menachem Lorberbuam, Noam Zohar and others, published in English by Yale University Press and in Hebrew by Carmel Publishing, incorporating a wide and erudite range of primary texts with contemporary commentaries.

across the Jewish world, including the Diaspora and Israel and from across denominations (with special emphasis on projects relating to education, science and technology) for work in a range of countries or settings. Their programs would include a strong learning component as well.

Tikkun Olam is a project which has the potential to unleash special energies and passions – and that potential needs to be realized.

Conclusion: What does a Repaired World Look Like?

What ought to be the guiding vision of *Tikkun Olam*? What is a "repaired world," "an *olam metukan*"? Here as elsewhere Jewish tradition speaks in many voices, and utopianism is as deceptive and dangerous an illusion here as elsewhere. But I would nonetheless give the last word for now to one of the most authoritative voices in all of Jewish history. Moses Maimonides, at the close of his encyclopedic, fourteen-volume treatise of Jewish law, the Mishne Torah, shares his vision of the Messianic era which has fired human imaginations for centuries:[17]

Do not think that in the Messianic age the way of the world will pass away or that there will be some change in the order of creation; rather the way of the world will continue…and all will return to true morals, and neither steal nor ravage…The sages and prophets did not long for the Messianic era in order to be world-sovereigns, or to rule over the nations, or to be exalted by the nations, or to eat, drink and be merry but rather to be free to devote themselves to Torah and its wisdom, with none to oppress or disturb, and thus attain life eternal. And in that time there will be neither famine, nor war, neither jealousy nor competition…as is written (Isaiah 11:9), "and the world will be filled with the knowledge of God, as the waters blanket the sea."

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17. Maimonides, Mishne Torah, Hilkhot Melakhim (Laws of Kings) 12:1, 4-5.

Jewish Demography and Peoplehood: 2008

By Sergio DellaPergola

Demography is a fundamental existential process present in the daily experience of every society at the individual and collective levels. More than once throughout history, the existence of the Jews was radically modified by events that embedded elements of demographic change. This was the case with the repeated instances of massive coerced and voluntary migrations and relocation of Jews across seas and continents; the major increase in Jewish population size – mostly in Eastern Europe – from the late middle ages to the early decades of the 20th century; the massive destruction of Jewish communities through the Shoah; and the emergence of contemporary America and Israel as major Jewish population centers. In each instance, demographic change itself was not only the dependent variable but also played an important independent role in shaping those historic transformations.

The current Jewish scene is perhaps changing less dramatically than in those past occurrences. Nonetheless, the imperceptible daily impact of demographic change has deep consequences for the Jewish corporate and individual existence. Jews constitute the majority of the total population in the State of Israel, but this majority is being challenged by the more rapid growth of the non-Jewish population within the state and in its proximate surroundings. Jewish populations in the Diaspora are diminishing numerically, becoming older, and constitute a decreasing share of the surrounding

society. Population projections to the year 2020 and beyond provide disquieting scenarios of the deterioration in the Jewish demographic balance that is expected if current trends continue unchanged. In light of these developments in Israel and in the Diaspora, policy planning and operational suggestions are needed to provide insights to decision-makers concerned with the facts, outlook and emerging challenges for Jewish peoplehood.

1. General Patterns

At the beginning of 2008, world Jewish population was estimated at 13,225,000 – 70,000 more than the previous year – reflecting a growth of 80,000 in Israel and a decline of 10,000 in other countries. The overall growth in 2007 was 0.5%, resulting from a 1.5% increase in Israel and a -0.2% decrease in the Diaspora. These trends continued the well established patterns of past years of minimal growth in world Jewry mostly determined by Israel's natural increase.

The Jews' unique and peculiar experience in the 20th century was tragically marked by the Shoah and followed by rather stagnant demographic patterns in a context of rapid global population growth. Since 1970, world Jewry has grown by only 4%. As a consequence, at the beginning of the 21st century Jews represented about 2 per 1000 of the world's total population – a significant decline as against 3.5 per 1000 in 1970, 4.7 per 1000 in 1945, and 7.5 per 1000 in 1938.

TABLE 1. WORLD JEWISH POPULATIONA BY MAJOR REGIONS, 1948-2008

Region	Number (thousands)			Percent			Percent change		
	1948	1970	2008	1948	1970	2008	1948–1970	1970–2008	1948–2008
World total	11,500	12,662	13,225	100.0	100.0	100.0	+10	+4	+15
Israel	650	2,582	5,472	5.7	20.4	41.4	+297	+112	+742
Total Diaspora	10,850	10,080	7,753	94.3	79.6	58.6	-7	-23	-29
Europe, Westa	1,035	1,119	1,146	9.0	8.9	8.6	+8	+2	+11
Europe, East and Balkanb	765	216	21	6.7	1.7	0.2	-72	-90	-97
Former USSR in Europeb	1,950	1,906	313	17.0	13.9	2.4	-2	-83	-84
Former USSR in Asia	350	262	20	3.0	3.1	0.1	-25	-92	-94
Other Asia	275	100	20	2.4	0.8	0.1	-64	-80	-93
North Africac	595	83	4	5.2	0.6	0.0	-86	-94	-99
South Africa	105	124	73	0.9	1.0	0.6	+18	-42	-30
North America	5,215	5,686	5,649	45.3	45.0	42.7	+9	-1	+8
Latin America	520	514	392	4.5	4.1	2.9	-1	-24	-25
Oceania	40	70	115	0.3	0.5	0.9	+75	+64	+188

a Core definition, not including non-Jewish members of households.
b Countries in East Europe that joined the European Union were included in Western Europe in 2008.
c Including Ethiopia.
Source: DellaPergola (2008).

Estimates reported in Table 1 cover the 60-year period between 1948 and 2008, based on the concept of *core Jewish population*. This mostly includes self-reporting Jews as well as people without religion but with at least one Jewish parent. In the U.S. persons of Jewish origin who hold a non-monotheistic religion were also included. In countries such as the FSU, Jewish population estimates reflect declared ethnic affiliations. The concept of *enlarged Jewish population* also comprises non-Jews in Jewish households. Demographic change reflects not only the varying intervening changes within each community, but also the willingness of Jews to identify as such.

Israel's share of world Jewry increased from 5.7% in 1948, to 20.4% in 1970, and 41.4% in 2008. The Jewish population of Israel has more than doubled since 1970. This reflects large scale immigration during the 1990s. A comparatively young age composition and a persisting preference for nuclear families with 3-4 children explain an annual natural population increase of 80,000, to 5,472,000 Jews at the beginning of 2008. Adding another 308,000 non-Jewish members of Jewish households, Israel hosts an enlarged Jewish population of 5.8 million. Jews constitute 76% of Israel's total population of 7.2 million in 2008. Another 4% are non-Jewish members of Jewish households.

Jewish population estimates in the United States have been the subject of a high-profile debate. Our estimate of 5,275,000 represents the middle range between two large national surveys conducted in 2001, the National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS) and the American Jewish Identity Survey (AJIS). In spite of some limitations, these surveys still provide the most authoritative national sources. Both pointed to effective Jewish population reduction since the early 1990s; the causes for this negative trend are: later and less frequent marriages, low fertility, continuing increases in out-marriage rates, population aging, and declining numbers of immigrants from other countries.

Some population growth in Canada and Australia was offset by more significant losses in the FSU, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Latin America, and Africa. In Western Europe, the number of Jews in Germany has stabilized after nearly twenty years of steady increase, but France and the United Kingdom are recording declines.

Exposure of individual Jews to political and socioeconomic constraints and opportunities within national societies has crucial consequences for international migration. Based on the latest available data (2004), Israel kept its 23rd place out of 177 world countries according to the Human Development Index (HDI) developed by the UN, which can be viewed as an operational measure of life quality at the country level. Israel was 9th best in terms of health, 26th in income per capita as measured by real purchasing power (but only 62nd in income distribution equality), and 34th in educational enrollment. At the same time, inasmuch as 85% of Diaspora Jewry live in countries with an HDI higher than Israel's, the impetus for international migration, including *Aliyah*, is low.

The role of changing Jewish identification is of course very important in determining not only population estimates but the whole thrust of Jewish life. A weakening in ethnic and community oriented expressions of Jewish identification among younger Jewish adults competes with the resilience of religious components of Jewish identification. Perceptions of Judaism change, increasingly moving from one's own religion to a broader spectrum of secular, cultural, or undetermined modes of identification. These changes are connected with declining rates of communal affiliation in secular as well as religious Jewish organizations; declining rates of ethno-religious homogamy, specifically, Jewish in-group marriages; declining rates of Jewish neighborhood concentration; declining rates of predominantly Jewish social networks; declining percentages of Jews among the total population in their countries, cities, and neighborhoods.

On the other hand, the Jewish school-age population comprises a growing share of the Orthodox and of children who are receiving full-time Jewish education; Jewish studies courses and programs on college and university campuses continue to grow; as does the publication of Jewish books by both Jewish and general publishers; levels of Jewish ritual observance and Hebrew literacy have risen among the more traditional segments of the Jewish population in the U.S. and elsewhere; and the proportion of Jews who have visited Israel at least once increases over time.

2. Leading Drivers

Figure 1 outlines the main drivers of Jewish demographic change, the intervening operational variables, and the final results in terms of three dependent variables that constitute the main targets of policy planning: Jewish population size and composition, and the share of Jews out of total population.

The main drivers of Jewish demographic change operate at several levels: the broader societal (macro) level, the Jewish communal (intermediate) level, and the individual (micro) level. Jews, besides being studied here, provide a general case of the demography of a subpopulation whose existence and development over time is determined by demographic-biological factors, *and* by cultural-ideational factors.

FIGURE 1. FRAMEWORK OF JEWISH POPULATION TRENDS AND POLICY CONCERNS

Main drivers	Operational variables	Dependent variables
1. Global inequalities and geopolitical changes	**1. Main demographic aspects:** a. Group's boundary definition: Accessions/ Secessions	**1. Jewish population size** **2. Jewish population composition**
2. National societal contexts and interventions	b. International migration: Immigration/Emigration c. Family and Fertility d. Health and Survivorship e. Territorial boundary definitions	**3. Share of Jews out of total population**
3. Jewish institutional interventions	**2. Intensity and quality of Jewish identification**	
4. Personal characteristics: a. Gender b. Socioeconomic c. Identificational		

Jewish population trends primarily reflect:

1. Long established patterns and sudden changes in **global society**, including unequal opportunities and constraints across different countries and regions in the world, and major geopolitical events of international relevance;

2. **The national country context** of Jewish communities, including the main socio-cultural patterns of the relationship between the majority of society and the Jewish part of it, main gaps within society, and main policy interventions that may affect demographic trends at the national level;

3. The interventions of **Jewish organizations** internationally and locally;

4. The **personal characteristics** of individual Jews, in particular gender, socioeconomic status, and Jewish identification.

Five main operational variables determine the eventual Jewish population size and composition, and the share of Jews out of the total population in each country:

1. Definition of the Jewish group's boundary and the balance of accessions to and secessions from the group These issues are often, but not exclusively, dealt with under the heading of *conversions*. A growing gap emerges between the large number of non-Jewish individuals comprised under the enlarged Jewish population definition, and the actual numbers handled by recognized conversion authorities and formally admitted within the Jewish fold. A growing gap is also emerging between subjective feelings of belonging to Jewish peoplehood (no matter how specified), and formal Jewish definition categories as established by legal authorities or by researchers. Jewish organizations that operate within the broadly defined Jewish community adopt different criteria in accordance with their own mandate and targets.

2. International migration (the balance of immigration and emigration) International migration between Israel and the rest of world Jewry is recently playing a diminishing role in global Jewish population redistribution. Most Jews already left the countries where their conditions, economic and political, were less attractive, and the vast majority reside today in fairly developed and democratic societies where the pressures to leave are not overwhelming. In 2007, a total of 18,000 new immigrants arrived in Israel – a decrease of 5% versus 2006. Migration to Israel includes a growing share of non-Jews under the Law of Return. Most of these come from the FSU, but the whole Falashmura immigration from Ethiopia as well as other smaller groups such as the Bnei Menashe from India or the Bnei Avraham from Peru

consist of people who undergo conversion to Judaism in the course of their transfer to Israel. Emigration from Israel is quite stable, around 10-15,000 a year. Due to diminishing immigration, Israel's net international migration balance now consists of just a few thousands a year. Jewish migration from the FSU to Germany and to the U.S. has steadily declined, while attention to possible future moves has been growing among Jews in France and the UK. Current international migration includes a growing share of people who maintain family and economic links with their countries of origin and whose life effectively functions in a bi-local or multi-local context. This affects the patterns of absorption of Jewish migrants and should be drawing greater attention.

3. Family formation and fertility levels, affecting the birth rate The global Jewish collective is currently characterized by two extremely different behavioral models, one in Israel and the other throughout the Jewish Diaspora. In Israel well established patterns of family formation result in a stable Total Fertility Rate of 2.6-2.7 children per woman (regardless of marital status), and an ideal family size above 4 among married Jewish couples at reproduction ages (3.8 if excluding *Haredi* families). These values are uniquely high for a developed society, although they are still markedly lower than those among Israel's Arab citizens and the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians. In Israel too, like the prevailing trends in the West, there emerges a trend to later, somewhat less frequent, and somewhat less stable marriages. Out of Israel, Jews are affected by the continuing erosion in conventional family patterns expressed by far lower frequencies of marriage, higher rates of divorce, lower marital fertility (usually lower than 1.5 Jewish children per woman), and the continuing expanding rate of out-marriage. Out-marriages create a virtual opportunity of expanding the Jewish population pool, but in reality constitute a primary factor of erosion in the younger Jewish population component, and a likely chain of transmission of further assimilation in the future. Contrary to the situation in Israel, Jewish generations in the Diaspora not only do not reproduce but rather undergo a constant process of shrinking.

4. Health and survivorship In developed societies where most contemporary Jews live, health patterns generally follow a course of slow and gradual improvement. However epidemiological events mostly related to behavioral

patterns, as well as large-scale disruptions related to natural or technological causes need to be carefully monitored. Of growing general interest – and of interest for specific Jewish communities – is the emerging body of research relating health patterns to specific characteristics of the human genome.

5. Definition of the territory considered. In Israel, given the presence of a large Arab minority, demographic trends may quite crucially affect the extent and stability of a Jewish majority. The actual size of that majority plays a crucial role in determining the very essence of society, its adherence to rules of democracy, and its cultural identity. Jewish and Palestinian populations grow at quite different rates, and the Jewish population edge is being daily eroded by these differential trends. Alternative definitions of the boundaries of the State of Israel, with the eventual inclusion or exclusion of significant numbers of Palestinians through withdrawal from areas kept since the 1967 war, and swaps of sovereignty over relevant portions of the land, could result in radically different population compositions.

In addition, the **intensity and quality of Jewish identification** plays a significant role in Jewish demographic patterns – as the likelihood of occurrence of demographic events such as a birth, a conversion, or even geographical mobility strongly reflect Jewish beliefs, tastes, and opportunities.

3. Current Debates: Agreements and Disagreements

The whole approach to Jewish demographic and identificational trends obviously reflects the empirical evidence and the theories and models available at present, which can rely on quite a large number of different sources. However, the final judgment about the size and composition of a Jewish population rests on decisions made by researchers and data users about population definitions. It should be stressed again that the *core*, *enlarged*, or *Law of Return* Jewish population concepts result not only in different numbers but also in opposing diagnoses about the main thrust of population growth or diminution. In addition, it is interesting to

ascertain how policies may be affected by different definitions and new emerging evidence.

In the past, conventional wisdom was that ascertained facts affected interpretations, which in turn affected the process of policy decision making and implementation. In the more recent realities, a more complex and reciprocal interplay of facts, interpretations and policies has emerged. In Jewish population research, the reading of basic findings is increasingly affected by pre-existing interpretative assumptions, such that a positive or negative interpretation of the trends often precedes in-depth analyses. In fact, if one sweeping critique can be put forward of the more recent research efforts, it is the underutilization of the data, thus lending a very shallow factual basis to most of the debates around the findings. In turn, policies tend to directly affect both the interpretations and the very results – in particular the different choices made by various large scale Jewish organizations in determining their target constituencies (see Figure 2). The logic and mandate of organizations is very much oriented by the pressing requests of "here" and "now", whereas good research requires historical perspective and geographical comparisons. The latter should be based on stable definitions and research questions along with constant innovation. But organizational policies sometimes require a re-invention of the subject matter as a function of changing contingencies. The consequences for the seriousness of the debate about trends, their causes and consequences are detrimental.

**FIGURE 2. CONTEMPORARY JEWISH POPULATION:
FACTS, INTEPRETATIONS AND POLICIES**

Two different ongoing debates are worth mentioning in this respect. In the United States, the discussion about Jewish demography, rather than tackling substantive realities in the perspective of the last decades, has instead focused on numbers and on the quality of sources of data, none of which can be conclusively rated better than others. As against the estimates of 5.2-5.3 million core Jews mentioned above, an estimate of 6.2 million Jews was issued in the 2006 *American Jewish Year Book* based on a compilation of Jewish population surveys and other sources obtained in local Jewish communities. An even higher estimate, reaching up to 7.5 million Jews, was suggested by Len Saxe and his associates at the Steinhardt Center at Brandeis based on a meta-analysis of general national social surveys, each of which included small samples of Jews identified by religion, complemented by assumptions about the share of Jews who do not declare a religion. These compilations of disparate surveys – local or national – do rely on better response rates than large national Jewish population surveys. However, they are spread over many years, are collected with different and not always random methods by different investigators, rely on different definitions of who is a Jew, are not comparable in their topical contents – sometimes not even regarding the

same variable – and any one source is inadequate to portray the whole of American Jewry in isolation from other cognate sources. Jewish population estimates suggested by these research efforts, higher by one or even two million as against the *core Jewish population* used in the estimates presented above, evidently reflect a broader definition of the Jewish collective.

While the evidence of a deficit of Jewishly identified births versus Jewish deaths – inherent in an aging Jewish age composition – suggests that in the U.S. the *core* Jewish population is past its peak, there exist at least another 1.5 million people who do not see themselves as Jewish but are of Jewish parentage. In addition, about the same number of persons of non-Jewish origin live in mixed Jewish households, thus creating an enlarged Jewish population of about 8.3 million. The population theoretically eligible for Israel's Law of Return would be considerably above 10 million, also including non-Jewish grandchildren and non-Jewish spouses of Jews, children of Jews, and grandchildren of Jews. All in all, one detects a shrinking core and an expanding periphery. The identificational stratification of American Jewry is reported in Table 2.

TABLE 2. U.S. JEWISH POPULATION, BY DIFFERENT IDENTIFICATION CRITERIA

Jewish Identification	Millions
Law of Return eligibles	> 10.0
Total in Jewish households	> 8.0
Have Jewish parent/s	6.7
Core Jewish population	5.2-5.3
Declare to be Jewish	4.3-4.4
Jewish organization affiliated	3.0
Devote time to Jewish community	1.5
Denomination Orthodox	0.5-0.6

Clearly policies aimed at the more strongly identified Jewish core and at the broader virtual collective of Jews and their non-Jewish extended families cannot be the same. In the name of integrity and efficiency, separate policy objectives and appropriate tools and strategies need to be developed for these different and relevant constituents.

The demographic balance between Israel and the Palestinians has been the object of another lively debate. Not unlike the case with the U.S. Jewish population, the available Palestinian data base is far from perfect and must be regarded with critical eyes. The 2007 Palestinian census indicated a total population of 3.5 million, without East Jerusalem which is already included in the Israeli data. When we add the West Bank (but not Gaza) to Israel's population, 5.8 million Jews including their 300,000 non-Jewish household members represent 61% of a total of 9.5 million inhabitants, including foreign workers. Some observers have suggested that Palestinian population estimates in the West Bank and Gaza should be lowered by one million. If this were true, as suggested by Zimmerman, Seid, White, and Ettinger, Jews would represent 66% of a total population of 8.8 million in Israel plus the West Bank. In other words the impact of significant variations in Palestinian population estimates on the share of Jews out of total population is quite less than might be expected.

The fundamental issue in this debate is not the specific percentage point of the extant Jewish majority, or the specific date at which Jews will or will not lose their current majority over the entire territory between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, or even within the Green Line. Neither a difference of one or five percent, nor advancing or deferring the date of the demographic "tie" by one or by five years, is the main issue at stake. Rather, the main issue is what are the implications for the nature of Israel's civil society of this seemingly approaching shift, as well as its geo-strategic and international implications.

4. Suggested Policy Directions

With all the uncertainties and unknowns of the contemporary global scene, and their predictable or unpredictable consequences for Jews, clearly

World Jewry faces several serious demographic predicaments with profound long-term consequences. As demographic policies take effect only after a number of years, the momentum of current trends will generate more of the same for several more years. This is one reason why Jewish population issues should be constantly monitored both on the local and on the global scale, and policy programs developed for the shorter as well as the longer run.

It should be recognized that Jewish realities often depend on circumstances beyond our control. Nevertheless, a better outcome may with effort be secured by acknowledging the broader situation and focusing on specific ends. A realistic assessment of where and how Jewish individuals and their institutions can best shape their own demographic and identificational future should be combined with a willingness to make decisions and initiate processes apt to promote these goals.

Policies are needed to reverse trends perceived as dangerous and to stimulate countervailing trends. Policy interventions should aim directly at the different trends outlined here, through the intervening mechanisms that causally shape each main trend. Available data are adequate for identifying some of the urgently needed measures, but in some cases new policy oriented research is needed. We need to research and understand the demographic issues honestly, removed from old myths, new superstitions, and narrow interests. The mutual dependency and commonality of interests that tie together Israel and Diaspora should be kept in mind when considering policy planning.

Jewish population policy options should consider each of the main areas of concern outlined above. In the following we list specific aspects without assigning priorities:

1. Jewish identity. How do we more effectively handle hundreds of thousands of non-Jewish Israeli immigrants – mostly from the Former Soviet Union but also from Ethiopia and other countries – and the modes of their incorporation within the Jewish mainstream of Israeli society? Based on the assumption that a majority are willing to be part of a Jewish society, much larger scale *giyur* (conversion) should take place of those who seriously wish to join Judaism. This in turns relates to:

- The role of institutions such as Israel's Chief Rabbinate regarding procedures for admission and the follow up of neophytes after conversion. The alternative will be witnessing a growing pool of non-Jewish children, grandchildren and other household mates of Jews in Israel;

- A related major concern is how to bring children of out-married couples into the mainstream of Jewish society in the Diaspora;

- The effectiveness of different Jewish educational programs, full time and part time, formal and informal, in shaping and developing an attractive and durable Jewish identity among the younger generation;

- Creating an enhanced sense of internal coherence and a dialogue respectful of differences in the context of growing identification gaps within the Jewish collective along religious-non religious lines and Israel-Diaspora directions.

2. Migration. How do we rescue, provide assistance to, and resettle the persisting potential for Jewish international migration? This in turn calls for:

- Understanding and developing assistance to new types of *aliyah* including multi-local and time-sharing arrangements residences and other Jewish migrations. This calls for new ideas and procedures related to the whole complex of civil, economic, legal and political rights of those who are more highly mobile;

- Evaluating geographical mobility between and within major urban areas and changing patterns of affiliation, and planning the territorial location of Jewish community services, together with enhanced use of networking with the help of information technologies;

- Monitoring trends in economy and labor force and especially employment, welfare and equal access to opportunities, and a fair distribution of resources.

3. The family. How do we develop a more systematic approach to changes in Jewish family patterns? This involves:

- Understanding marriage and family related attitudes and behaviors among the growing pool of young unmarried adults in Israel and in the Diaspora;

- Facing up to high frequencies of out-marriage in the Diaspora, and envisaging mechanisms apt to facilitate the encounter of young Jewish adults;

- Evaluating the role of child and young adult formal and informal Jewish education in shaping Jewish identification;

- Acknowledging the existing prospects for facilitating Jewish birth rates in Israel – where the demand for children is still high – and in the Diaspora – where powerful constraints are created by the prevailing restrictive norms on family size and by comparatively weaker infrastructures and provisions for early childrearing.

- Some studies indicate that the role of social services and of financial and value oriented incentives for fertility can be significant – particularly at medium parities such as the 3rd or 4th child. Policy instruments can perhaps affect the statistical equivalent of one-half a child per family. Multiplied by millions of Jewish households in Israel and across the world, the demographic impact might eventually be significant.

4. Longevity. How do we ensure that the current fair level of personal health enjoyed by the Jewish population in Israel and throughout the world is maintained and improved where feasible?

5. Territory. What policy answers do we provide to the questions raised by the deep connection of Jewish demography with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict? This implies:

- Coming to terms with the implications of differential Jewish and Arab growth rates for population size and composition;

- Taking into account demographic factors in determining the agreed final boundaries of the State of Israel, so as to preserve a viable Jewish majority.

5. Concluding Remarks

Facing these trends and prospects, two distinct sets of issues should be at the center of the Jewish agenda in relation to Jewish population prospects.

In most Diaspora communities, the challenge is how to preserve the sense of a cohesive and meaningful Jewish community, while enjoying the full gamut of creative opportunities offered by open and non-hostile societies. From a demographic point of view, resilience of the Jewish way of life in the long term significantly rests on the primary biological foundations of family and children. A related challenge is how to reach those who do not bother nor want to belong, in order to revive in them a spark of historical memory and mutual responsibility, if not a sense of pride and mission.

One of the greatest challenges in Israel is how a clear Jewish population majority can be preserved. Differential growth, the changing population composition by ethno-religious groups – Jews and Palestinians, and territorial configurations need to be considered. Interconnections should be developed among security, the economy, the demography of international migration and family patterns, emerging identification patterns, and policy-making. These factors, each alone and in combination with others, will determine the future destiny of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, and of world Jewry as a set of viable communities and peoplehood.

Part 2

Science, Technology, Medicine & Global Economics

Tomorrow's Crises Today: Frontiers of scientific research and technology in the coming decade

By Hermona Soreq, PhD

The 21st century faces several major challenges. These include, but are not limited to, the Earth's dwindling resources and collapsing environment, insurmountable communication gaps and irrevocable irrational decisions leading to a disastrous outcome to a rapidly aging and increasingly urban global population. These challenges threaten to substantially damage the overall quality of life in Israel as well as in other parts of the world. Scientific research confronts these challenges by revolutionizing existing technologies and inventing totally new ones, essentially following the advice of the Stanford economist Paul Romer, who so rightly said: "a crisis is a terrible thing to waste". Below, we list 9 selected research topics addressing the above challenges, discuss very briefly what each of those topics aims to achieve and outline the infrastructure and running cost requirements needed to assist and support these efforts.

The fields and sub-fields are:

I. THE EARTH'S DWINDLING RESOURCES AND COLLAPSING ENVIRONMENT:

Igniting renewable energy;
Predicting climate changes;
Understanding earthquakes;

II. FIGHTING COMMUNICATION GAPS IN A GLOBAL VILLAGE:

Harnessing quantum mechanics

Size does matter; developing nanoscience and nanotechnology

Revolutionizing bioengineering tools for the benefit of mankind

III. RATIONALIZING A WORLD OF IRRATIONAL DECISIONS:

Expanding the implications of game theory

Advancing genomics in the post genome age

Brain research: the final frontier

I. The Earth's dwindling resources and collapsing environment:

IGNITING RENEWABLE ENERGY

It took the earth 300 million years to produce all the fossil energy on our planet; it took mankind 100 years to drain half of it, and at the current rate we will consume the other half during the next 50 years. Development of new energy sources that are secured for long term supply at affordable cost and do not depend on fossil fuels, is hence the most important challenge for Western civilization in the 21st century.

A "democratic" source that is available and particularly abundant in Israel (and its surroundings) is solar radiation, which can be converted into (other) useful types of energy. Impressively, in less than one hour, the planet Earth absorbs solar energy that is equivalent to a year-long consumption of the entire population on earth. This means that if effectively utilized, as little as 0.01% of this energy can satisfy the needs of humans worldwide. Improving photo-voltaic cells to become more cost-effective is *primarily a basic* materials science issue, but it is strongly coupled to issues of more efficient and novel engineering. Knowledge that has already been accumulated within the Hebrew University's Faculty of Science on nano-materials, can provide a unique opportunity for implementing novel applications in solar energy-related research.

Some of the specific goals and open questions for future research in photo-voltaic cells include semiconductor nano- and micro-crystalline materials. Photo-catalysis with materials that better overlap the solar spectrum based on doped titanium oxide will enable solar energy utilization for photo-catalytic water cleavage for hydrogen generation; synthesis of new metallic nano-particle materials using digital printing will facilitate light absorption and energy transfer; sealing of porous silicon films will constitute a novel photo-voltaic concept; new ways will be designed for preparing bio-fuels and hydrogen storage; nano-particles will be prepared for harvesting solar energy and composite nanotechnology-based solar cells and biofuels will be constructed. These are all risky goals, but even part of those will suffice to make a profound change.

PREDICTING CLIMATE CHANGES

The Earth is currently experiencing a worrisome rapid climatic change, predicted to accelerate in the course of the current century, as was recently reported by the Inter Governmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) in its influential 2007 report. Temperature is expected to rise in the coming decades, and precipitation patterns will change. While it is well known that anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases, especially CO_2, are the culprit of this problem, there are still many open questions that need to be solved in order to better predict, and to better prepare for the 21st climate-change. Some of these crucial questions are studied at the Hebrew University's Earth Sciences Institute.

One major question concerns the interaction between clouds and aerosols formed by dust and pollution. As the IPCC report emphasizes, these aerosols change the clouds reflectivity and thus have strong control on the radiation budget and the rate of global warming. Researchers dealing with this interaction observe it by remote sensing, radar, and in-cloud flight, or simulate it by advanced mathematical models. Importantly, this led to the realization that aerosols have strong influence on precipitation, and thus on water resources. Investigating the radiation properties of the widespread organic aerosols, which are currently still unknown, is hence of utmost importance. Predicting future climate is built on fundamental exploration of atmospheric and oceanic physics, from ocean currents, to waves, and jet streams.

Understanding past variations in climate is a key to understanding future climate-changes. Various methods developed and refined by Hebrew University researchers have substantially contributed to this understanding. The currently increasing ocean acidity, which results from the increasing atmospheric CO_2 loads, may damage the skeleton building in corals and oceanic plankton, with possible severe consequences for marine ecosystems. This new threat is being studied by Hebrew University's researchers at the Inter-University Marine Biology Institute in Eilat.

Another important aspect is the understanding of how much of the anthropogenic CO_2 emissions would be naturally sequestered by the oceans and by the terrestrial biosphere. Currently, these sinks take up as much as half of the anthropogenic CO_2. However, the future of this uptake is unknown. New stable isotope tools serve to measure ocean photosynthesis (which relates to CO_2 uptake), while studies of how climate interacts with the terrestrial biosphere (plants and soils) explore the interlinked carbon, water, and phosphorous cycles by remote sensing, field studies, and stable isotope techniques.

Importantly, the climate change research at the Hebrew University involves tight collaborations in Israel and abroad, creating a global effort aimed at deciphering this complex *environmental change.*

Understanding Earthquakes

Half of the Earth's population is already living in and around urban centers. In less than 15 years, the UN estimates that half of the population of every country in the world will fall under the category of Urban Society, which is particularly vulnerable to earthquakes. The history of mankind was largely affected by the fear and memory of earthquakes as massive powers of unpredictable destruction. Understanding the dynamics of earthquakes is hence a fundamentally important issue with enormous practical implications. In large parts of the globe massive earthquakes entail a potentially devastating loss of life as well as large-scale financial repercussions.

Despite decades of research, many of the fundamental questions of the physics of earthquakes are far from being understood. The rupture processes driving earthquakes are extremely complex phenomena, which extend for many decade time scales. For example, immense tectonic forces load geological faults over centuries, with the release (via earthquakes) of this stored energy occurring within seconds. The entire process is concentrated on a thin interface, with grain-scale physics often thought to be responsible for determining the rupture strength. The grain scale thus affects, in a way that is incompletely understood, ruptures that may be hundreds of Km long.

IT IS, THEREFORE, PARAMOUNT TO PROVIDE AN ANSWER TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

Can we predict the onset of an earthquake? Currently there are no reliable indicators that an earthquake is about to occur. The best that can be offered are statistical probabilities, with sometimes tantalizing hints of possible precursor mechanisms. Significant research is still required to provide markers that can reliably signal the advent of an earthquake.

Can the magnitude of an earthquake be predicted? The current situation in the field of earthquake science is that the community is nearly equally divided between those who believe that a large earthquake "knows" that it will be large before its initiation and those who believe that a large earthquake is simply an event which is not somehow, "pinned" by an obstacle encountered while it is already propagating. This fundamental question requires much better understanding of the process than is currently available.

Assuming that a large earthquake is imminent, is it possible to predict which areas will be most affected? The damage imposed by earthquakes is far from uniform. At times, despite strict concurrence with modern building standards, massive and unexpected damage is sustained. More research is required to determine the key geographical factors that influence the amount of damage inflicted. Effective knowledge of these factors could enable society to both derive better building standards and to apply them more effectively for specially targeted areas.

Once an earthquake has initiated, is it possible to know its eventual size in order to shut down key systems (e.g. gas lines, traffic along bridges, nuclear plants etc)?

Secondary damage due to e.g. fires, explosions and water, are often the major causes of both loss of life and collateral damage in an earthquake. Any effective and reliable early warning signals could result in major reductions in these secondary effects – even in cases where an earthquake is already in motion. Several groups at the Faculty of Science are studying these issues.

II. Fighting communication gaps in a global village:

HARNESSING QUANTUM MECHANICS

Today's world depends on the rapid and efficient transfer of massive information loads and on the availability of friendly means for their storage and processing. Classical information is stored and transmitted by using basic building blocks called 'bits'. They are realized by physical systems such as transistors or light pulses in an optical fiber, that can be in one of two states, referred to as zero and one. Classical information theory deals with the ability to transmit, store and process such information, via the internet, hard disks and computers, respectively.

In the last 25 years, a new field has emerged from discussing the fundamental question: what will be the consequences if we preserve information with quantum mechanical systems? These systems, such as an electron, a photon or an ion, demonstrate a counter-intuitive property – they can exist simultaneously in both logical states, zero and one. These quantum mechanical realizations of bit information are called 'qubits'. Some of the current answers to this question are revolutionary: it is possible to form a communication channel that is ultimately secure against any possible eavesdropping; quantum information can be transmitted without actually sending the physical system (quantum teleportation); a machine that processes quantum information can complete in reasonable time some computational tasks that classical computers require many years to solve

(such as simulating molecular interactions, deciphering complex codes and pattern search in large data sets).

Different realizations of qubits have been demonstrated during the last 10 years. Today, some examples for the prominent realizations are photons, trapped ions, semiconductor quantum dots and superconducting Josephson junctions. Each realization has its own advantages and deficiencies. Photons are easy to generate and transmit over long distances, but their weak interaction complicates computation. It is easier to implement computing logic with other solid state elements, but the quantum properties of such elements are usually lost within relatively short times – a problem known as *decoherence*.

The most advanced application of quantum information that has been realized to date is quantum cryptography. Apart from two companies that already sell such products, extensive research is conducted in universities and research institutes. Quantum-secured channels are studied in optical fibers where already existing infrastructure can be used, and in free space for securing communication with and between satellites. Quantum teleportation was demonstrated for the first time in 1997. This effect will be a crucial component in future long-haul quantum communication channels.

Quantum computers are currently in their infancy. A single quantum logical gate, the building block of a computational process, has been demonstrated with photons, ions and Josephson junctions. Some very simple algorithms and protocols such as error correction were also realized. The main difficulty is to build a quantum system of many qubits that will keep its quantum properties (will not loose coherence) for a long enough time, sufficient for applying a number of quantum logical gates. The largest demonstrated systems are of 6 photons, 8 ions and 4 superconducting Josephson junction elements.

Israel is already a leading center for theoretical studies in quantum computation and quantum cryptography and with its close knit community and advanced infrastructure should be able to contribute significantly in the future development of quantum information systems. During the last two years, 3 new labs were established in Israel that address the central efforts in experimental quantum information. Two labs in the Hebrew university are

using photons and superconducting Josephson junctions and one lab at the Weizmann institute uses trapped ions. A more established lab at the Technion is utilizing quantum dots.

Over the next 5-10 years, we will likely see the coming of long-haul quantum communication by using quantum dots as quantum memories and teleportation for quantum repeaters. The number of qubits available for quantum computation will reach the dozens. A conceivable breakthrough will increase this number to the 100's and 1000's, large enough for a useful computation. Another exciting possibility is hybrid systems that combine various realizations and benefit from the strengths *of each one.*

SIZE DOES MATTER; DEVELOPING NANOSCIENCE AND NANOTECHNOLOGY

The earth's dwindling resources, combined with the increasing dependence on technological tools and accessories, facilitated the recent emergence of nanoscience and nanotechnology. Nanoscience has emerged in the recent two decades as a central interdisciplinary research field where novel properties of materials can be obtained. Indeed, the nanometer scale represents an intermediate regime between molecules and solid materials and the optical, electrical, chemical and mechanical properties are strongly modified by the size.

At the Hebrew University's Harvey Krueger Center for Nanoscience and Nanotechnology, 40 research groups use state-of-the-art instrumentation infrastructure for performing basic and applied research in this direction. Some of the exciting new features which were discovered in this Center include the unique chemical activity of minute gold clusters, offering new platforms for catalysis, efficient and tunable fluorescence from semiconductor nano-crystals that can be used in optical and electro-optical applications, as well as new platforms for sensing and nano-capsules for targeted drug delivery schemes.

Additional research involves the development of new nano- scale transistors, memory elements, sensors and bio-sensors, new materials for photo-voltaic and photo-catalysis applications, directed drug delivery schemes and

more. Outstanding and general open issues related to nano-materials are being addressed.

A first grand-challenge relates to novel methods for creating nano-materials. Here bottom-up approaches hold great promise and in particular, a new approach of creating complex hybrid nano-particles has been introduced where several components are grown onto one nano-particle creating a 'smart' system. A second challenge relates to exploring to what extent and how 'small is different' - what are the new chemical, mechanical, physical and quantum mechanical behaviors displayed by the nano-materials? How to integrate all this is another central question that will be addressed in the future. Again, bottom-up approaches are central to the idea of using nano-building blocks like LEGO to create complex functional architectures. This requires understanding of forces between nano-materials and how can we control and manipulate them. This all accumulates to a grand-challenge of moving from the realm of nano-science into nanotechnology – namely, using these principles and new properties for novel applications for the benefit of mankind.

Revolutionizing bioengineering tools for the benefit of mankind

Bioengineering is a discipline that addresses fundamental and applied problems in life sciences and medicine through a combination of knowledge from fields in basic sciences such as biology, molecular biology, genetics, physics, mathematics, chemistry, biochemistry, economics and humanities with knowledge from fields of engineering such as mechanical, computational and electrical. Bioengineering emerged at the end of the 20th century from advances in cell and molecular biology. There is a substantial similarity between the emergence of bioengineering at the end of the 20th century and the emergence of electrical engineering. Electrical engineering emerged as a discipline at the beginning of the 20th century from advances in fundamental physics. Both are disciplines that owe their formation and existence to advances in fundamental sciences. Both did not exist as disciplines in traditional engineering. The similarity between electrical engineering and bioengineering does not end with their emergence. Electrical engineering has dominated advances in the 20th

century engineering and completely changed the world's technology in one hundred years, in ways that were not expected at its emergence. Who could have predicted the electrical engineering would facilitated personal computers and the ubiquitous cellular phone one hundred years ago? We expect that bioengineering will be the engineering field that will dominate and affect every aspect of life in the 21st century, in a similar way to the 20th century dominance of electrical engineering.

Bioengineering will produce individualized medical technologies that will cover the range of scales from molecular to whole body. Emerging applications include home medical imaging in the mode of a blood pressure transducer, artificial organs to replace diseased ones and single-cell level molecular treatment of diseases – in which every cell in the body can be tested and modified. While these applications of bioengineering are actually around the corner, others will emerge. For instance, bioengineering will cause biological matter to become an environmental friendly source of energy. Through bioengineering, plants will directly convert solar power to electricity and the chemical processes in our body may power a personal computer. Bioengineering will find organic ways to use solar energy to purify water. Inspired by the experience garnered by life through hundreds of millions of years of evolution, bioengineering will find ways to develop new manufacturing processes that will produce products the way organisms are produced. Similar to electrical engineering, the technology of bioengineering will power further fundamental understanding in life sciences which will then further advances While all these advances and others are possible – one has to be cautious. If bioengineering will continue to produce, as it does now, expensive technologies that benefit only the highly industrialized countries and those who have, the gap between those that have and have not will continue to increase. We need to make an effort to ensure that bioengineering is accessible to all and made available and affordable to all, otherwise it will not improve humanity. A new unit for bioengineering has been established at the School of Engineering at HUJI to address these issues.

III. Rationalizing a world of irrational decisions:

EXPANDING THE IMPLICATIONS OF GAME THEORY

"Game Theory" or "Interactive Decision Theory" was born as a scientific discipline during the Second World War, with the publication of the monumental book *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* by the mathematician John von Neumann and the economist Oskar Morgenstern.

The early pioneers of Game Theory were mostly mathematicians. Since then the discipline has greatly expanded, and nowadays it plays a major role in many areas—mostly in economics, but also in psychology, evolutionary biology, computer and political science, statistics, engineering, law, philosophy, and even history and literature.

Game Theory studies decision making and behavior in situations where the actions of each participant, be it an individual, a corporation, a nation, a computer, a plant, or a gene—affect not just that participant himself, but the other participants as well. Each participant would like to obtain a certain preferred outcome; however, the nature of the interaction is such that the participant cannot achieve this goal in general, since progress depends on the actions of the other participants. Participants must therefore take into account what the others do, and also the fact that *they* want to obtain outcomes that *they* prefer—which may well be "bad" for the original participant. Moreover, the other participants take into account what *they* do, and so on … seemingly, an unsolvable vicious circle.

Game Theory succeeds in cutting this Gordian knot and getting useful and insightful solutions. Where is Game Theory going?

Game Theory is expected to continue to develop and expand in many directions, be they theoretical, applied, or both.

• Basic (theoretical) Game Theory

The research here combines conceptual advances—novel ideas and approaches—with formal developments that firmly establish and analyze them.

- Economics

This is currently the main discipline where Game Theory is used and applied; most economic models are game-theoretic in nature.

- Computer Science and Engineering

The interface between Game Theory and Computer Science is greatly expanding nowadays, in various directions: mechanism design and implementation, algorithmic, epistemologic, and even engineering. It is only the beginning, and it is expected that significant advances will occur here.

- Evolutionary Biology

Evolutionary biology uses game-theoretic models, and game theory uses and expands the evolutionary paradigms to other areas.

- Behavioral Sciences, Psychology and Neurobiology

Empirical, experimental and neurobiological studies help us understand actual behavior and decision-making, and may lead to new insights and advances.

- Other

Many other areas interact with game theory, and the next decade will probably bring new and surprising connections and developments.

ADVANCING GENOMICS IN THE POST GENOME AGE

The first draft of the human genome sequence (3,000,000,000 base pairs), has been completed and was published in February 2001, thus we are within the Post-Genome Project Era. The identification of all those genes that comprise the human genome, the determination of the function of each of these genes by itself and the networks it forms with other genes, the regulation of these functions and links by yet-to-be-identified modifier genes, the consequent diseases that occur as a result of mutations, and the development and refinement of therapeutic technologies will be the natural next phase of this information explosion. Linkage analyses will be applied to one-gene (monogenic) diseases and complex traits alike.

The genomics revolution has already led to strategic investments in biological research, which shifts from focusing on individual phenomena and pathways, to integrating entire genetic programs. The major challenge for the coming years is to develop methodologies associating between DNA sequence information and biological functions using genomic knowledge centers specialized in highly sophisticated methodologies- currently, for the benefit of Western societies; and in the future, it is hoped, for the benefit of mankind at large.

Genomics will provide methods to find the specific causes of disease, and will prescribe therapies that are specifically tailored to the individual. Moreover, RNA-targeted technologies will provide drugs that are targeted to genes rather than proteins, reducing the dose, improving specificity, limiting side effects and offering intriguing therapeutic advantages. This will change medicine by stimulating our own cells to fight diseases, regenerate or repair damaged tissues/organs and tailor pharmaceuticals which target the cause of disease, not just the symptoms.

Computational genomic tools have been and will be further developed for sequence comparisons and data storage, extraction and analysis. The use of publicly available (and rapidly changing) genomic information changes the way biological discovery is done, and can provide tremendous shortcuts in genomics, pharmacology, medicine and agriculture. The genome of several bacteria, yeast (S. cereviciae) and flatworms (C. elegans), the fruit fly D. melanogaster, the mouse and model plants (e.g. A. thaliana) have already been completed.

Jews living in the Diaspora were relatively isolated from the surrounding non-Jewish population and from other Jewish communities, which increased the incidence of genetic diseases. For example, Tay Sachs disease is a rare fatal genetic disorder which is prevalent among Ashkenazi Jews and is not found in Jews from other ethnic origins or among non-Jews. Furthermore, the genetic basis of common genetic diseases is often different between Jews and non-Jewish patients as well as between the different Jewish ethnic groups. For example, cystic fibrosis (CF) is one of the most prevalent diseases among Caucasians. However, 50% of the CF patients from Ashkenazi origin show a unique prevalent defect, so that analyses in non-Jewish populations

may be irrelevant to the Jewish patients. Hence, genetic research focused on Jewish populations is a must to identify the molecular basis of genetic diseases among Jews. Such research involves clinical diagnosis, DNA isolation from patients, and genetic analyses of the entire genome using sophisticated high-throughput analyses, aimed to identify disease-causing genes. Experiments using such technologies should best be performed in research service centers, ensuring efficient use of the infrastructure and highly trained staff.

Israel in general and the Faculty of Science and Medicine at the Hebrew University in particular, have a world-class academic community in biology and medicine and its theoretical computer science is better than many in the world. This is a winning combination when it comes to computational genomics. Israeli scientists are internationally acclaimed as leading the progress in algorithm development for genomics, DNA microarray analysis, structural genomics and proteomics, molecular evolution and more. Several universities offer original computational genomics courses that have been developed over the last several years. Formal bioinformatics degree programs have begun to emerge in the past years.

BRAIN RESEARCH: THE FINAL FRONTIER

The current rapid increases in life expectancy are accompanied by accelerated enlargement in the fraction of the population which is afflicted by neurodegeneration and dementia. This calls for preserving mental capabilities as a major demand. Deterioration in mental capabilities is largely caused by loss of nerve cells; therefore, uncovering the mechanisms underlying aging-associated cell loss in our brain will pave the way for the development of methods and strategies that will prevent such cell death. Premature death of specific subsets of brain cells is the hallmark of certain neurodegenerative diseases such as Alzheimer's and Parkinson's disease, ALS, and multiple sclerosis. Exploring the mode of operation of the brain is considered to be "the final frontier" in life sciences.

By no means does this imply that the secrets of life have been resolved. Rather, the basic foundations for principal understanding

of how living organisms function have been laid. Consequently, it is hoped that the complexity of nervous system interactions will become amenable for unfolding. Thus far, only a few guiding principles have been unraveled, but network interactions, where the neuronal code is embedded, are still an enigma and will be the challenge of the next decade. Nevertheless, those few principles uncovered during the last 50 years already foreshadow a significant improvement of life quality. Thus, brain research is currently on the verge of finding a cure for neurodegenerative diseases, encompassing breakthroughs of unparalleled proportions that might affect all aspects of our life.

Importantly, the next challenging task involves cracking of the neuronal code. This will require a multidisciplinary effort, to be carried out jointly by major laboratories around the world. Theory and innovative experimentation technologies will work hand in hand to explore the intricate structure of the neural network and decipher the neuronal code. If successful, it will enhance the understanding of fundamental issues such as planning and execution of motor commands. A deep understanding of these principles can be utilized to develop a brain-machine interface that will enable amputees to regain lost functions. Likewise, delineating the process of decision making and the neuronal manifestation of thoughts and intentions can revolutionize politics, economy and social structures. For example, predicting threats can replace cumbersome screening devices which are time consuming and financially unacceptable to nations and societies.

During recent decades we have gathered a wealth of information regarding the mechanisms of cell to cell communication through neuronal synapses. Recent evidence revealed the detailed molecular cascades that underlie synaptic transmission processes and suggests that dynamic changes in their strength accentuate multiple processes of learning and memory formation. The power to actively modulate synaptic transmission, facilitate learning and improve memory is hence just around the corner.

The expected benefits to emerge from these and other advances of brain research are tremendous. The underlying research should

evolve along two main pathways: network exploration, and cellular and molecular manipulations. The former is still in its infancy and its implementation is on the verge of pure fantasy, but the latter is based on solid, well established principles and out-visions more immediate and applied goals.

Apart from the above challenges, there is a major ethical problem to be considered here. The aforementioned benefits touch the very essence of our existence as individual human beings in democratic societies and should therefore be handled with care.

Several groups at the Faculty of Science address these basic issues.

Medicine Tomorrow: Trends in 21st Century Medicine
From the Original Hippocratic Oath to the Modern Medical Pledge

By Yaakov Naparstek, MD
Professor & Chairman of Medicine
Hadassah University Hospital

Our journey into 21st century medicine begins with a trip to the ancient past to the 5th century BCE to the eastern Greek island of Cos, the residence of Hippocrates a teacher, philosopher, and doctor. His *Corpus Hippocrates,* in which he defined medicine as an independent profession, made him the "father of medicine."

The Hippocratic Oath — the bylaws of the medical profession — continues to bind medical practitioners all over the world. Over the centuries, the original Hippocratic Oath has been modified and amended, yet it remains at the foundation of modern medical oaths. An integral element of the original Hippocratic Oath is a doctor's **commitment to the medical profession** (see box). In comparison to the Hippocratic Oath let's look at the oath medical students at the Hebrew University Medical school pledge at the beginning of their clinical practice and work with patients. The students' pledge begins with the words, "You are standing today on the threshold of a new chapter

THE ORIGINAL HIPPOCRATIC OATH

"I swear by Apollo Physician and Asclepius and Hygieia and Panaceia and all the gods and goddesses …"

So begins the original Hippocratic Oath. The Oath-taker then pledges "to hold him who has taught me as equal to my parents," to continue to "teach (them) this art without fee or covenant," to keep the sick from "harm and injustice," to forswear "deadly drugs," and to forgo the "use (of) the knife."

The principle of doctor-patient confidentiality is upheld with these words: "What I may see or hear in the course of the treatment or even outside of the treatment in regard to the life of men … I will keep to myself, holding such things shameful to be spoken about."

The oath concludes: "If I fulfill this oath and do not violate it, may it be granted to me to enjoy life and art, being honored with fame among all men for all time to come; if I transgress it and swear falsely, may the opposite all this be my lot."

in medical study, directed at, and focusing on, the patient. Remember, the patient is an entire world of his own. …"

The difference between the two oaths represents in fact the shifting stance of the medical profession over hundreds of years; and more specifically, over the last decades. This shift can be seen in five main areas:

- **Accessibility of medical data:** As medical information is easily accessible to the layman, the once omnipotent practitioner is now seen more as a consultant to the patient.

- **The profession of medicine itself:** Once viewed as a profession of absolute truths, medicine is now viewed as a profession based on probability of benefits and risks.

- **The definition of health:** "Health," once defined as the "absence of disease," is now defined as "body, spiritual and social welfare of the patient." This definition caused a shift from the narrow treatment of the "disease" to the broader treatment of "illness".

- **Personalized medicine:** Doctors now have the ability to plan "tailor made" treatments to the individual patient according to his/her specific genetic profile.

- **Patient autonomy:** Doctors, too, have changed their approach. Once paternalistic, today's practitioners recognize the central role of patients' autonomy in decisions regarding their treatment.

Accessibility of Medical Data: From the Omnipotent to the Advisor

Not so long ago, doctors of a previous generation were seen as omnipotent and invincible in their absolute knowledge of medicine. They demanded it of themselves. It was expected of them by their patients and students.

Today, there is no doubt that it is absolutely impossible to know everything about medicine. The information explosion in recent years and the deciphering of the genomic code and development of proteomics in the last decade has expanded the amount of information tremendously. Fortunately, computer science has developed in parallel, providing adequate storage and easy and convenient access.

Medical education has changed as well. It aims not to teach all available medical information, but rather trains the doctor how to acquire knowledge about a specific disease or condition through information resources and databanks, utilize analytical thought, and relay it to treat the patient. Today's doctors are therefore not omnipotent in their knowledge, but are trained to define and acquire knowledge relevant to their needs.

Access to medical knowledge is not restricted to medical professionals. It is easily available to patients. Today's patients are informed through the medical data resources about illnesses, progression, and the therapeutic options available, giving balance to the doctor-patient relationship. The omnipotent doctor and ignorant patient have been relegated to the past. Today's well-informed patient consults with a doctor-advisor who counsels based on knowledge, experience, and expertise on what he or she considers the best course of action.

The Profession of Medicine Itself: Absolute Truth to Probability and Risk

Medicine was always thought to benefit the patient — sometimes to cure, sometimes to improve, but certainly never to harm. Unfortunately, this idea includes a certain amount of naïveté. Since medical interference is not specific to the pathological process, it nearly always has some effect on other physiological processes.

Think of the surgical process: While excising a cancerous growth, healthy tissue must be cut. Or chemotherapy for cancer: Drugs that stop cancer cells from proliferating will also affect proliferation of the bone marrow, blood producing cells and cause anemia, leucopenia and thrombocytopenia .Or even a simple medical treatment: Using aspirin to prevent blood clotting may be accompanied by bleeding in the digestive system.

In fact, there are side effects to all medical treatments. Some more; some less. Unfortunately, the fact that medical treatment carries intrinsic risks of side effects is often wrongly viewed as medical malpractice by the public. The understanding that medical treatment is inherently associated with the risk of adverse side effects should be better absorbed in the public and this should be the responsibility of the medical profession.

For this reason, every medical treatment, and in particular new treatments, must be thoroughly tested in a large number of patients. Based on statistical evidence of the efficacy (or damage) caused by a treatment, this method, referred to as "evidence-based medicine," helps identify infrequent side effects. In some cases, even after a medicine has passed the complex clinical trial phases (see box) and is approved for use, it is discovered to manifest significant side effects that were previously undetected.

A well-known example is the blockbuster drug Vioxx® (rofecoxib). With worldwide sales of $2.5 billion in 2003, Vioxx was popular and effective medication for inflammation of the joints. It was appropriately checked and tested in a large number of patients and found safe for use. In 2004, after it had been on the market for five years in the United States, it was discovered that prolonged use (more than a year) increased the frequency

CLINICAL TESTING: COMPLEX PHASES BUT NO GUARANTEES

Before finding their way to the medicine cabinet shelf, new drugs must pass through a number of strict testing phases. Putting a drug through its paces can take many years. Phase I tests the safety of the treatment on a small group of people. Phase II evaluates efficiency and further evaluates safety, this time on a larger group. Phase III broadens the efficiency and safety testing under controlled conditions on a large number of cases. Phase IV includes studies of the drug or treatment after it is in the market.

Only after evaluating this information can the treatment be accepted or rejected, and then again, only after the benefits have been weighed against the side effects. Adding a warning from the U.S. Food & Drug Administration regarding side effects occurs in 7.5% of drugs authorized for use. After the addition of a warning, approximately one-third of these are removed from the shelf. Still, the clinical trial system remains the correct manner in which to validate and monitor n

and mortality rate from heart disease and strokes. Consequently, Vioxx was removed from use.

It is essential that all medicines and drugs prescribed to patients be evidence-based; yet, when it leads to loss of common sense, evidence-based medicine can cause more harm than good. Is it necessary to collect exact evidence in a bleeding patient when it is critical to stop the blood flow? Or, to collect evidence from a patient who has stopped breathing and needs resuscitation? Gordon C. S. Smith and Jill P. Pell, authors of "Parachute use to prevent death in major trauma related to gravitational challenge: systematic review of randomized control trials," an ironic article published in the prestigious British Medical Journal, point out that there has never been an organized clinical trial conducted to determine whether or not the use of a parachute prevents "gravitational damage" to someone jumping from an airplane. They speculate it would be difficult to find volunteers for such a trial.

An additional inherent problem in evidence-based medicine is the fact that evidence is collected from a vast number of patients and is based on

the average result, whereas the individual patient is not an average of the group. Therefore, when considering implementation of the conclusions with regard to the individual patient, a complete medical and social history of the individual patient must be determined along with his attitude toward the side effects involved. The individual cannot be perceived as the average of the whole group in which the treatment was tested.

The Definition of Health: From Disease to Patient Welfare

In the past, the World Health Organization's definition of "health" was quite simply "the absence of disease." When referring to disease, the term defined a specified condition — absolute and objective — independent of the patient. High blood pressure: 120/80. Diabetes: a sugar value over 100mg/% after fasting. Today, health is defined as the "body, spiritual, and social welfare of the patient."

An illness, as opposed to a disease, addresses the range of influences on a patient's life. The same disease affects patient A completely differently than patient B because of differences in age, gender, cultural background, or lifestyle. The effects of an illness go beyond the objective — pain or shortness of breath. Effects of an illness are likely to include absences from work, decreased earning ability, depression, and loneliness, all of which affect the patients' quality of life. Doctors now diligently consider the quality of a patient's life. The understanding that in most cases Medicine does not cure the disease but rather helps the patient to live longer and better with it led to the development of "supportive care" or "palliative care", a relatively new branch of medicine, that deals primarily with the effects of the illness on the life of the patient.

On example highlighting the difference between disease and illness is comparing extending life to that of quality of life, or significant life. The broad consensus upholds that life is of the highest value. It is the doctor's obligation to prolong the patient's life and fight death at whatever cost. While it is accepted today that one of the doctor's guiding principles is to prolong life, this does not mean at any price. In the event of a terminally ill patient, when

suffering and quality of life are impossibly difficult, then the fight to prolong life will not occur. In 2006, the Israeli Parliament approved the Law of the Terminally Ill Patient. In part, it "permits a doctor to refrain from administering cyclic medical treatment to a terminally ill patient." In appropriate situations, the authorized physician can refrain from administering treatment such as dialysis, radiation, or chemotherapy. This law applies to the terminally ill patient who has agreed to a DNR (Do Not Resuscitate) order. On a much larger scale, people who have prepared living wills specify the conditions under which they request a doctor to sustain, or not sustain, their lives.

The problem regarding the decision as to whether or not to prolong life leads down a slippery slope. Although the question whether or not to sustain life is justified, it can lead to decisions which are not justifiable, and consequently bring the whole process into question. One example of the slippery slope is the transition from passive to active death.

Most doctors accept that in certain cases life should not be sustained actively, an action defined as passive death. But is it permissible to take one additional step forward and actively help a patient die? Dr. Jack Kevorkian, the U.S. physician, developed an instrument to enable chronically or terminally patients to commit suicide. This action in itself brought about many conflicting opinions and caused controversy in the medical world. Dr. Kevorkian took it one step further. For those patients who were unable to operate the machine, he pressed the button for them. Most doctors do not believe that effecting death actively is an option. The American legal authorities saw effective death as a criminal offense. Dr. Kevorkian was arrested, tried convicted, and incarcerated.

What is significant life?   Here it is also possible to slide down the slippery slope to the extreme form of medicine practiced under the Nazi regime. Mentally retarded people were defined as negligible and inconsequential with no inherent value, thereby justifying effective death. Though there is scant possibility today of comparable behavior in the Western world, the prevailing thought among doctors is due to the danger of going down the slippery slope, discussion of significant life should not even be entertained. Some physicians and ethicists suggest therefore that it might be better to

stay within the definition that life itself is of the utmost importance and should be sustained in any situation.

Personalized Medicine: Tailored Medical Treatment

As a result of deciphering the human genome and the development of proteomic and genomic disciplines, there comes the understanding that two patients, although apparently suffering from the same illness, may nevertheless have different genetic profiles, even with the same genes typical of the illness. These differences can in part determine the progress of the disease and, more importantly, the planning of patient- specific treatments. For example, the antibody Herceptin® (trastuzumab), used in the treatment of breast cancer, binds only to breast cancer cells that have the mutated protein HER2 on their surface. This occurs only in women that have the relevant specific genetic mutation. It will not bind on breast cancer cells in women who do not carry the mutation. While two patients may apparently suffer from the same disease, breast cancer, they will be treated differently according to their genetic profile. It is already possible to determine the location of the mutation, making it much easier to determine an effective course of treatment uniquely designed for a specific patient.

The fact that genes related to the later development of disease are found in a healthy carrier many years before manifestation of the disease enables preventative steps to be taken depending on a person's genetic profile. For example, the BRCA gene encodes a protein which suppresses tumors. Therefore, when the gene is damaged, there is a significant increase in the frequency of malignant tumors in the ovaries and the breast. It is possible to identify the presence of the mutated BRCA gene in women with a family history of ovarian and breast cancer and to institute regular and frequent monitoring or even to suggest preventive surgery.

In the not too distant future it will be possible to determine a patient's full genetic profile through a simple blood test, which will guide physicians in prescribing preventative medicine as well as curative treatments.

Patient Autonomy: The Central Role in Treatment Decisions

Not so many years ago, medicine was characteristically paternalistic, autocratic, and all-knowing. As has been discussed, without access to databases of information, the patient was the passive recipient of the doctor's medical knowledge. Because the only "enemy" of medicine was the disease itself rather than its effects on patient's welfare, doctors considered it pointless to involve the patient in the decision-making process.

Today, it is acknowledged that medical treatments carry with them risks. Where risk is involved, the patient too considers side effects and dangers inherent in specific treatments. Well-informed patients are much more proactive with regard to how a treatment affects their lives. The understanding, too, that medicine does not always heal, and the patient suffering from a chronic illness will have many effects on his quality of his life, demand the patient's involvement and emphasizes the patient's autonomy in determining the form of his medical treatment.

The transition to personalized medicine based on genetic profiling incorporates an additional important factor in a patient's participation in his treatment. If the patient is willing, it is possible to explain an illness, the principles of the medical treatment to be prescribed, the expected outcome of the treatment, and the possible dangers and to obtain "informed consent." The medical student's pledge addresses this with the statement: "I promise to listen to the patient; to understand his expectations; to consider his wishes; to respect his point of view; and to remember that the patient is the master of his body and has the right to decide his fate."

In the final analysis, the patient decides what course of treatment to undergo. In most cases, the decision agrees with the solution presented by the medical team, but not always. Consider a Jehovah's Witness, who is not prepared to undergo blood transfusion, even when her life is in danger. The physician knows that the relatively routine procedure will save her life. When the patient refuses, the doctor may naturally become frustrated or angry. However, when we change our mode of thought and try to understand the patient's values (a blood transfusion is a terrible sin that will harm her in eternal

life), it becomes possible at some level to understand her point of view, even if it difficult to accept. The doctor remains obligated and dedicated to giving the best possible treatment, to saving lives, or to improving a medical condition, even if it is not the advised treatment.

Another example related to suicide. When a patient attempts suicide, it is obvious that he must be saved. Where is the patient's autonomy? One "trick" is to consider the patient as temporarily insane and therefore not responsible for his actions. This removes patient autonomy and reverts to paternalistic decision-making in the hope that the patient will recover from the "temporary insanity" and be grateful his life was saved.

Can patient autonomy be carried too far? Certainly. Recently, the director of an Israeli health fund stated that his health fund views the patient as a client. The patient-client can listen to the medical advice and choose the most suitable form of treatment. From this point on, the patient-client remains solely responsible for his decision. This perception is incorrect, and the method is irresponsible. The doctor **must** bear responsibility for the treatment he recommends to the patient. He must try and persuade the patient that the treatment is offered in the patient's best interest. In fact, the doctor must be a partner in the significance of the decision and take responsibility for it — complete responsibility as in paternalistic medicine — but with total patient involvement in the decision-making process.

Maimonides ("the Rambam"), the renowned 12th century Jewish doctor and philosopher, expressed a point of view that epitomizes the essence of 21st century medicine: "The doctor must not treat the disease, but must treat the patient suffering from the disease."

Israel 2028: Vision and Strategy for Economy and Society in a Global World

Basic Principles

By David Brodet

THE MATERIAL PRESENTED HERE PROVIDES A SUMMARY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE, INCLUSIVE STRATEGIC PLAN DEVELOPED BY THE "ISRAEL 2028" TASK FORCE, HEADED BY ELI HURVITZ AND DAVID BRODET, WITH THE SUPPORT AND COOPERATION OF THE US-ISRAEL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMISSION (USISTC).

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Introduction

"Israel 2028: Vision and Strategy for Society and Economy in a Global World" is a comprehensive plan for achieving the national objectives of rapid, balanced growth and reduction of social gaps, and positioning Israel among the world's 10 to 15 leading nations within the next two decades, in terms of economic growth and quality of life. The vision and strategy address a broad range of issues, including economy and society, government and public administration, globalization, and science and technology.

The plan also addresses policy issues as regards the labor market, national infrastructures, elementary and secondary education, higher education,

scientific research, traditional industries and integrating these industries into global processes. These issues and others are discussed and presented via a mirror of Israel's future, which reflects its position at the forefront of the world's nations in terms of society, economy, culture and education.

This plan for Israel's economy and society was born out of a sense of concern for Israel's future. Still in the process of nation-building, Israel has struggled throughout its history for its identity, its citizens' welfare and its place in the world, and has done so under difficult internal and external conditions. During its sixty-year history, Israel has experienced numerous economic and security crises: one of the worst such crises occurred during the mid-1980s, when the government was forced to take emergency measures to counter the threat posed to economic stability by high inflation. It was clear at the time that unless some bold measures were taken, Israeli economy and society would find itself in dire straits.

The foundations of the nation-building process, which will continue for years to come, were already laid prior to the state's establishment and during early statehood. We must now add an additional tier to reinforce the building. We believe that Israel cannot afford mediocrity in economy, science and technology, governance or security. It cannot afford wide social gaps and the rise of forces that threaten to disintegrate it from within. The formidable internal and external challenges facing Israel require the building of a top-quality education system, world-class science and technology infrastructure, a thriving economy, and a society based on justice, tolerance, conciliation and social solidarity.

This expansive strategic plan provides detailed recommendations on a series of central issues. Public consent will provide considerable support for the plan's fulfillment. In order to realize the vision and achieve the plan's important, ambitious goals, we will require a determined national leadership that is able to set clear, transparent economic, educational and social priorities for the long term and to implement the proposed strategy for Israel's future.

The plan was formulated over the course of nearly two years, based on research and the authors' considerable knowledge, and examines Israel's

basic issues through a multidisciplinary discourse. The various chapters are integrated into one document, whose unifying approach identifies mutual influences and interrelationships among the various realms and issues. The plan has benefited from the high academic level of its authors, who come from the world of science and research on one hand, and the practical world, with its broad knowledge, inclusive perspective and rich experience, on the other. All worked out of recognition of the program's importance and out of a sense of urgency.

Background

During its history, Israel's economy has made a long journey away from deep government involvement in economic activity, extensive use of administrative decisions in economic management and little reliance upon market forces. Over five decades, Israel has been transitioning almost constantly from a directed, protective economy to a competitive economy that relies largely upon market forces. This process has gained impetus since the mid-eighties.

The transition has been achieved through various measures that have been taken in different realms: removal of the protection of local production vis-à-vis imports; liberalization of financial, foreign currency and capital markets; privatization of state companies; and partially-successful attempts to increase competition in centralized economic sectors. Concurrently, budgetary discipline has been tightened and monetary policy tools have been improved. Israel's transformation into a modern, open economy has had its share of obstacles and challenges, but maintaining resolve along the way to the clear goal has facilitated great successes. We are still in the midst of this journey.

Israel is a small economy vulnerable to external forces that exercise significant influence over it. Its development has been decided to a large degree by external factors not controllable by economic policy: the security situation, world economic developments and business cycles and waves of immigration.

The security situation strongly impacts upon various economic realms; its deterioration significantly diminishes demand for consumption and investment, deters foreign investment and causes severe damage to the tourism industry. Thus the worsening of the security situation slows economic growth.

As an open economy with high import and export rates in relation to the GDP, Israel depends heavily upon international economic developments. As was demonstrated in the early 21st century, the economy is sensitive to changes in demands for high technology products, especially in the US (in 2006, the export-GDP ratio was 45% and the import-GDP ratio was 44%).

In the past, waves of immigration were an accelerating factor in development, growth and increased productivity. The wave of immigration from the former Soviet Union in the 1990s enriched Israel with a large addition of educated manpower, in whose training the Israeli economy did not invest. However, due to the relatively long process of immigrants' acclimation into the new employment conditions, the impact on productivity and output was felt only about a decade later.

The Israeli economy's sensitivity to factors outside of its government's control requires policy-makers to make the most of those economic and social factors that can be controlled through economic policy. The globalization of recent years has added a major dimension to the development of the Israeli economy, which has benefited greatly from the process; at the same time, globalization processes take their toll, primarily in the social realm, and changes are needed in economic and social policy for the coming years.

The successful transition from a centralized economy with a high degree of government involvement to a market economy integrated in the global economy required numerous economic reforms in various realms, which were implemented over a long time period. Cumulatively, these reforms provided the economy with many capabilities for dealing with global and security challenges.

Social and Economic Challenges

Today, we face a completely different situation than that of the past, but one that is no less disturbing. Israel's economy is no longer in immediate danger, but a number of warning signs caution of a real risk for the future of society and state. These risks stem from deep, worrisome social and economic processes in Israel, which cannot be remedied by quick, relatively simple solutions, but rather require a wide-ranging, visionary national strategy, perseverance and forbearance.

Following are headings of the major issues, policy topics and strategy components addressed by the plan:

Dual Economy: Two parallel economic systems have developed in Israel, one progressive and the other traditional. The progressive economy is knowledge-intensive, employs advanced technology and has sometimes been a leader in technological innovation. It responds relatively well to the challenges of globalization and enjoys high productivity, rapid growth and expanding exports. This economic sector constitutes only 6% of the economy's labor force and contributes 9% to the business sector's output. The traditional economy, comprising service and manufacturing sectors, suffers from low productivity and slow growth. Forced to compete in an international market saturated with cheap labor, it pays its employees low wages.

Large Income Gaps, a Polarized Society: Israel has some of the largest income gaps among developed countries. This polarized economy weakens social cohesion and impedes fulfillment of economic growth potential.

Slow Growth – Shortage of Resources vs. Multiplicity of Needs: In 1973, the Israeli economy transitioned from rapid growth to a continuous trend of slow growth. The GDP per capita has since risen by 1.5% annually on average (the improved growth rates since 2004 are still far from the growth rate required by the plan). The shortage in resources is intensified by slow growth, while competition over resources tightens among social and defense objectives.

The Challenges of Globalization: The progressive sector has been able to successfully handle the challenges of globalization. However, the bulk of the economy is unable to adequately address rapidly-changing

international conditions as regards imports and exports, capital markets and international labor markets. Globalization has created a dynamic world that is characterized by frequent technological advances and rapid transitions of comparative advantages and risks among nations, population groups and manufacturers. The rapidly-changing global reality, chiefly the economic growth of China, India and Eastern European nations, and their entry into the high-tech arena, pose significant competitive challenges for Israel.

Low Labor Force Participation Rate: Israel's participation rate in the labor force (55%) is among the lowest in the developed world. We will not be able to achieve our growth targets or the desired reduction in income gaps unless the labor force participation rate and the employment rate are significantly increased among the adult population.

Infrastructure Challenges

Public Education: The public education system, from elementary through high school, is experiencing formidable challenges and low achievements. The poor performance of Israel's pupils on international comparison tests is disconcerting, as are gaps in achievement nationally, the low eligibility rate for matriculation certificates among high school graduates, and the general knowledge and cultural literacy of Israeli youth.

Higher Education and Research: Standards are declining in higher education institutions in Israel; the scope of scientific research is diminishing; and there is a clear "brain drain" trend away from Israel.

Government and Public Service: Over the years, the quality of public service has deteriorated as regards its employees' professionalism, the scope of knowledge at its disposal, and its ability to plan and formulate long-term public policy in its various areas of responsibility.

Standard of Physical Infrastructures and Environmental Quality: The current level of investment in roads, ports and public transportation is inadequate for the needs of a progressive market economy that wishes to become integrated in globalization processes and to achieve a high

per capita GDP. Environmental protection and quality have also received insufficient attention and investment.

These challenges and the accompanying sense of urgency and concern served as the motivating force behind the formulation of the strategic plan for society and economy for 2028, which is presented here.

Principle Points of a National Strategy for Economic Growth and Reduction of Social Gaps

Following is the general outline of the national plan for Israel's economy and society. The plan's numerous components, discussion of the dilemmas, analysis of the approach, and the rationale for choosing the strategy and course of action, are all detailed in the complete document. The document presents a vision from which the strategic plan for 2028 is derived. The comprehensive plan is based upon a socio-economic perspective that adopts the advantages of the market economy, but like many other nations, rejects the neo-liberal economic approach as regards government's role in the economy. It aspires for a free, fair and balanced economy that has a humane face, and which relies upon Israel's cultural wealth and scientific/technological capabilities. At its core lie Israel's high-quality human capital and the nurturance of this asset.

The strategic plan is founded on the vision that was formulated by its initiators at the outset. Following is the essence of that vision:

The State of Israel will be among the world's ten to fifteen leading countries in terms of income per capita; it will strive for the good of all its citizens, their quality of life and the future of its young generation.

Israeli society will be open and enlightened; its economy will be free, balanced and fair and will rely on Israel's cultural and scientific/technological capabilities, the wealth of its human capital, on innovation and initiative.

The State will achieve all of this through collaboration of all of its sectors, while maintaining its values and strengthening Israel's image in the eyes of its citizens, its partners around the world and the Jewish people.

The objectives are numerous and the challenges are ambitious. This plan, which outlines Israel's social-economic development for the next twenty years, is derived from the vision that places Israel among the world's leading nations, not only in terms of GDP per capita (over $50,000 by 2028 vs. $23,000 in 2007), but also by qualitative measures in the realms of education, higher education, society, science and technology, government and environmental protection. The state will enable all its citizens to enjoy a high standard of living and a high quality of life. Its achievements will be based on innovation in the realms of economy and government as well as the creativity of its citizens. A considerable twenty-year time period has been chosen for this vision and strategy, due to the recognition that profound and essential changes require a sufficiently long maturation period. Israel's experience and that of other nations has shown twenty years to be sufficient for the required changes to be realized. By the end of this period, we may see the fruits of social and economic processes, primarily in the realms of education, higher education, basic research, infrastructures, and the labor market. Following is a summary of the proposed strategy to facilitate realization of the vision by utilizing Israel's comparative advantages and recruiting the strengths of its citizens:

A national strategy of innovation, based on progressive knowledge and the values of excellence and originality, in an open society that encourages high quality and treats all of its sectors fairly.

Following are the plan's primary objectives:

- Rapid, balanced economic growth (over 6% annual GDP growth on average; 4.7% annual GDP growth per capita by the end of the twenty-year period) and a reduction in economic duality.

- Reduction of social gaps.

- Recruitment and inclusion of all strata of Israeli society to address the challenges.

Achievement of the primary objectives will be based on policy guidelines, and will rely on a fair, balanced market economy and government involvement in the realms of national infrastructure (in its broad sense) and public service, as regards six main issues:

- Promoting and strengthening the education system from kindergarten through higher education;

- Increasing labor force participation among economically vulnerable populations, including Arab and ultra-Orthodox sectors;

- Reinforcing and improving state mechanisms and enhancing governance of the state and its institutions;

- Leveraging technology and introducing multidisciplinary innovation into traditional market sectors;

- Creating conditions for continued rapid growth in knowledge-intensive industries;

- Enhancing physical infrastructures.

The primary objectives are interrelated, and their achievement requires adopting the entirety of the strategy and policy guidelines. Rapid, sustainable growth cannot be achieved, nor can the dual economic structure be minimized or income gaps be narrowed, unless all parts of the population are involved in the economic effort and in sharing the fruits of economic progress.

Unless labor force participation is expanded, it will be impossible to introduce innovation into traditional industries; Israel will not be able to participate effectively and extensively in global competition, and in turn will be unable to achieve rapid growth, or a significant, sustainable rise in the incomes of society's lower classes.

The primary objectives of reducing economic duality and minimizing income gaps require employing a strategy that will significantly improve the quality and uniformity of public education, and strengthen and expand higher education and scientific research. Education's reach will not be significantly broadened without the participation of population groups that have traditionally refrained from general/secular education, including ultra-Orthodox men and Muslim women.

The ability of economic and social agents to function, as regards this plan as well, if adopted, depends to a large degree on the professionalism and

effectiveness of the government and public service. We propose a strategy to increase public service's effectiveness, strengthen its planning ability, enhance its professionalism and open it to dialogue and deliberation with centers of knowledge and civil society.

Israel's chances for social and economic prosperity also depend, in large measure, upon strengthening trends of peace and calm in the region, both in the immediate vicinity (Palestinian, Syrian and Lebanese) as well as in the circle of more distant threats from Iran and other centers of radical, hostile Islam. Of course, the circles of economy, technology, policy and security interface and feed off each other.

According to the plan's macro-economic assessment and evaluation, given the appropriate conduct, the Israeli market will be able to finance the needs required to fulfill its objectives, in terms of building infrastructures, providing social services, and investing in education and higher education.

"Israel 2028: Vision and Strategy for Economy and Society in a Global World" presents an extensive bill of policy measures in the areas of macro-economic, fiscal and monetary policy, alongside necessary policy measures regarding the labor market, the environment, globalization, governance and the public sector. Adopting the proposed strategy and fully implementing the detailed measures will enable fulfillment of its ambitious objectives.

Israel will advance to the forefront of the world's leading countries in terms of economy and quality of life. This is not an unattainable dream. In the framework of the right public strategy, Israel's dynamic, creative and entrepreneurial population can make the outlined vision a reality. Fulfilling this vision and achieving the objectives at the foundation of the outline of the plan we present involve the adoption of long-term thinking, adherence, and determination and require setting clear, transparent economic and social priorities. It will require determined national leadership as well as public identification and support. In the past, Israel made impressive, significant social, scientific/technological and economic achievements. This national plan envisions a competitive, balanced and fair economy, taking its inspiration from long Jewish traditions of national solidarity, respect for knowledge and education, and excellence in the material and spiritual our

estimation, the ambitious objectives outlined in this plan may be achieved, thereby leading Israel to the forefront of the world's most progressive nations, while nurturing its traditional values.

The Implications of Relinquishing a Strategy of Social and Economic Change

In the event that the strategy proposed in this plan is relinquished and existing trends continue, Israel, its well-being and its future will face real dangers. An increasingly established and entrenched dual economy, against the backdrop of rapid globalization processes, will broaden income gaps, shatter social solidarity, increase the sense of alienation, and impair the state's economic strength and its social and economic soundness.

The continued deterioration of the school and higher education systems and reduction in scientific research will remove Israel's sole comparative advantage in a competitive world. Such processes will preclude rescuing Israel's traditional economic sectors from their technological lag and lifting the uneducated, low-income population from their difficult situation.

Perpetuating traditional sectors' technological lag will prevent rapid growth and will impede appropriately responding to the social and security challenges facing Israel. The technological lag of many economic sectors will deepen the wage gap between low-skilled workers in traditional sectors, and employees in progressive sectors. Rapid technological changes and globalization processes are transforming a growing segment among service sectors, which were previously internationally non-tradable, into sectors whose output is traded on the world market. These processes endanger the future of employees in traditional service sectors that do not adopt new technologies nor adapt to a changing world.

A continued downward trend in public service's capability and functioning and in governability will prevent the achievement of prime national objectives, impair the business sector's performance and diminish its achievements. Israel's ongoing lag in physical infrastructures will impair its integration into global processes, impede foreign investment and hamper economic growth.

The poverty phenomenon divides Israeli society into two groups: one group experiences economic stress and depends upon support and assistance, and the other comprises highly-skilled employees whose work supports a growing sector that avoids work or is at the bottom of the employment ladder. This social polarization, which involves an increasing financial burden on a broad middle class, may encourage emigration of citizens who are significant contributors to economic strength and social soundness, in search of better opportunities abroad.

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