Project Head: Shmuel Rosner
Participants: Ghila Amati | Nadia Beider | Ariel Bendor | Eliran Carsenti | Shimrit Cohen-Barbi | Janan Danial | Dana Fahn-Luzon | Shlomo Fischer | Shuki Friedman | Avi Gil | Yehonatan Givati | Noa Israeli | Eli Kannai | Dov Maimon | Robert Neufeld | Tamir Pardo | Rivka Ravitz | Daniela Regev | Yael Ribner | Lipaz Rotkovsy | John Ruskay | Jonathan Saidel | Roy Schondorf | Amit Shoval | Noah Slepkov | Yedidia Stern | Shalom Salomon Wald | Haim Zicherman | Eldar Zilber
The strength of the connection between Israel and Diaspora Jews can be gauged in two ways: one, through surveys examining the attitudes of Jews in Israel and the Diaspora; and the other, by analyzing their behaviors. At the end of this short chapter, we will present an example of such a behavioral analysis, which reflects the strength of the relationship, from on a comprehensive work of the Jewish People Policy Institute that is currently underway and will be presented in stages in the coming months.
In 2022, a number of surveys were conducted in Jewish communities in the United States, which examined, among other things, the strength of the connection between Diaspora Jews and Israel. The results of the surveys indicated, in general, a strong connection.
A survey conducted of the Jewish community in Long Beach, California found that Israel plays an important role in the Jewish identity of many Jews there.1 Most of the Jews in the Long Beach area are emotionally connected to Israel (18% are very connected, and 42% to some extent), half of them have been to Israel at least once, and almost two-thirds follow the news about Israel (23% follow very closely, and 39% to some extent). These data are similar to the data found among all American Jews in a survey conducted in 2020.2
A survey of Jews in northern New Jersey found that the feeling of connection to Israel and support for it is very strong.3 A large majority of the respondents (87%) answered that they are connected to Israel (to a great extent or some extent), have traveled to Israel (87%), and feel (to a great extent or some extent) that they have something in common with the Jews in Israel (85%). The majority of respondents also agreed strongly with the claim that Israel is essential to the future of the Jewish people (79%), feel proud of Israel (72%), and believe that concern for Israel is an essential part of being Jewish (59%). However, the majority of respondents (58%) stated that they feel uncomfortable with some of the Israeli government’s policies. The survey also shows that ties with Israel are relatively weaker among members of the Reform community and younger respondents (Charts 1 and 2).
The surveys mentioned above were conducted before the change of government in Israel at the end of 2022, which may have had an impact on the strength of the connection. So far, only two polls have been conducted after the change of government. As these surveys were conducted in non-representative communities, it is difficult to draw general conclusions based upon them.
The Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies at Brandeis University conducted a survey in Portland, Oregon, between October 2022 and January 2023.4 It was published in June 2023, and its results indicate that only a minority of Portland Jews are emotionally attached to Israel (18% are very attached and, 28% somewhat). These are relatively low rates – perhaps due to the change of government in Israel, and perhaps because the Jewish community in Portland is relatively liberal. Seventy-seven percent of adult Jews in Portland identify politically as very liberal or liberal, compared to 50% among all American Jews.5 In the past, many studies have shown that Jews with a liberal position tend to be less connected to Israel.6
Another survey published in March 2023 by Nishma Research examined the attitudes of Modern Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox American Jews.7 According to this survey, 88% of Orthodox Jews feel an emotional connection to Israel (65% to a great extent, and 23% to some extent), 54% of all Orthodox Jews visit Israel often (65% to a great extent, and 23% to some extent), and 78 % keep updated on the news in Israel (52% to a great extent, and 26% to some extent). The survey provides another interesting statistic about the connection of the Orthodox Jewish community in the United States to Israel: 7% of the respondents said that there is a high chance that they will immigrate to Israel in the next five years, and 14% said that it is certain that they will do so.
When respondents were asked about their attitudes toward the new government in Israel, 42% of all Orthodox Jews answered that they were satisfied with the government; 18% said they were concerned about its policy. Attitudes toward the government are related to affiliation group: among the ultra-Orthodox, the rate of dissatisfaction is about 50%, and among the Modern Orthodox, the rate ranges from 42% in the conservative wing to 11% in the liberal wing. The rate of concerned about the new government among the Orthodox according to affiliation group is shown in Figure 3.
Prof. Chaim Waxman, in an article he published last year that reviewed the attitudes of U.S. Jews toward Israel from 1967 to the present day, stated that according to the data there is no weakening of the bond between the Jews of the United States and Israel, and that the bond has been strong and stable for many years.8 Although the self-definition of American Jews in religious terms has weakened over the years (today 32% of them do not identify with any religious movement, and 53% say that religion is not a significant element in their lives), they continue to identify as ethnic Jews. As such, their identification is with Jewish culture, a component of which is affinity with Israel. Waxman also explains why, contrary to the data he presents, there is a feeling among many that the connection between Israel and Diaspora Jews is in crisis.9
A survey conducted by the Ministry for Diaspora Affairs and Combatting Antisemitism in January 2023, following Israel’s change of government, examined the attitudes of Jews living in Israel toward Diaspora Jewry in several parameters.10 The survey findings paint a positive picture of the sense of brotherhood that Jews in Israel feel toward Diaspora Jews: 63% of respondents largely agreed with the statement “I feel that Diaspora Jews are my brothers,” and 69% said that “Diaspora Jews and Jews in Israel have a common destiny even though they live in different countries.” The survey also examined the sense of brotherhood through the reactions of Jews in Israel to antisemitism abroad: an absolute majority of respondents (81%) answered that they are bothered by antisemitic attacks against Diaspora Jews.
Similar to what surveys have shown for many years, this survey indicates a negative correlation between belonging to a particular religious group in Israel and the sense of closeness felt to the Jews of the Diaspora. Orthodox and religious Jews overwhelmingly tended to express greater solidarity with Diaspora Jewry than traditionalist or secular respondents. However, in the statements that concerned the consideration of Diaspora Jews in matters of religion and state, this correlation did not exist. In other words, ultra-Orthodox and religious respondents were not interested in considering the positions of Diaspora Jews on these issues.
Along with measuring the strength of connection between Israel and the Diaspora, we would also like to examine various studies on the practices of Jews. This year, JPPI has devoted time and resources to investigating empirical data that reflect patterns of behavior.
One of the criteria that makes it possible to examine the strength of connection is the extent of donations to Israel. The research literature indicates that, in general, the contributions of diasporas are a means of expressing support for the country of origin, as well as a vehicle for connecting with it.11 Thus, the donations of Diaspora Jewry are a vehicle for preserving and strengthening the connection between Diaspora Jewry and the State of Israel. Further, an examination of the number and size of donations may reveal whether there has been a change in attitude among Diaspora Jewry toward Israel (increasing or decreasing extent of donations).
The data we have examined with respect to donations are taken from a survey of income and expenses of nonprofit organizations and institutions in Israel carried out by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS).12 The survey encompasses all nonprofits in Israel and its data are obtained from an analysis of financial statements of a representative sample of active nonprofits in Israel.
Donations from abroad are a source of funding for nonprofits (along with current transfers from the government, the sale of services, interest income, and donations from Israeli households). The contributions from abroad, as they are presented in the report, include current transfers received from individuals, businesses, and nonprofits abroad. Although the CBS data does not include donations from Jews only, it can be assumed with considerable probability that in most cases contributions from Jewish sources constitute the bulk of all donations.13
Figure 5 shows that the volume of foreign donations to Israeli nonprofits has increased, in real terms, from approximately NIS 9 billion in 2009-2013 to NIS 12.8 billion in 2021, the last year for which there is CBS data. Hence, as to the behaviors of Diaspora Jewry, at least as indicated by the pattern of donations, the connection to Israel is strong. And yet this conclusion must be qualified: the donations shown here reflect the amount of money, but not the number of donors. It is possible that fewer donors are contributing more funds, a situation that would not necessarily reflect a general strengthening of connection, but rather a strengthening of the connection of a few large donors.
The existing data indicate a strong connection between the Jews of Israel and the Jews of the Diaspora, although it is clear that the connection is weaker among the Reform Jews in the United States and the secular Jews in Israel. Based on the above data, it is difficult to identify a real change in these connections over the last year, although it is possible that the effect of the change in Israeli government, and the social tension that resulted from it, are not yet reflected in the few surveys that have been conducted in recent months.
In the table below from JPPI’s Voice of the People platform, one can see how strong the tendency is among American Jews to respond to events in Israel with anxiety. All the other options presented to the survey respondents were chosen at significantly lower rates than “anxiety.” Moreover, one can see that this is the response that represents the most widely felt emotion, regardless of denominational affiliation (or non-affiliation). The table also shows the second- and third-most-chosen emotional responses for each group.
The following graph indicates that “anxiety: was the dominant response even when U.S. Jews were categorized on an ideological/political scale. Both liberals and conservatives chose this option at higher rates than any other option presented. Additional options chosen at significant levels were “disgust,” selected by those who self-define as “very liberal” (19% of respondents chose “disgust”), and “astonishment,” selected by those who self-define as “centrist” (21% chose “astonishment”). In response to the question of how the events in Israel would affect the respondents’ attitudes toward Israel, the dominant answer among Orthodox and Conservative Jews was that there would be no change, while the dominant response among Reform and non-affiliated Jews was “it depends on the outcome” (a third of Conservative Jews and a quarter of Orthodox Jews also chose “it depends on the outcome”).
The data are based on the responses of 600 American Jews registered for the Voice of the People panel as of late July 2023. The data provide an indication of the feelings of American Jews, but the registrants do not constitute a representative sample of American Jewry as a whole.
1. https://www.brandeis.edu/cmjs/community-studies/long-beach-report.html
2. Pew Research Center, “Jewish Americans in 2020,” https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2021/05/11/jewish-americans-in-2020/. In the same survey it was found that the majority of Jews in the USA are emotionally connected to Israel (25% very connected and 32% to some extent), 45% have been to Israel at least once, and 57% follow news about Israel (14% follow very much, and 43% somewhat).
3. https://www.jewishdatabank.org/databank/search-results/study/1206.
4. https://www.brandeis.edu/cmjs/community-studies/portland-report.html.
5. Pew Research Center, “Jewish Americans in 2020,” https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2021/05/11/jewish-americans-in-2020/, page 161.
6. For example, the AJC 2021 Annual Survey of American Jews found that 86% of respondents who identified as Republicans believed that a connection to Israel was important to their Jewish identity, but only 52% of respondents who identified as Democrats believed so.
7. https://www.jewishdatabank.org/databank/search-results/study/1196
8. Waxman, Chaim I. “Who Says American Jews are Detaching from Israel, and Why?” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs 16.3 (2022): 350-364.
9. Waxman, pp. 353-357.
10. Report of the findings of the follow-up survey of the Index of Public Attitudes toward the Relationship between Israel and the Diaspora – 2023, Ministry for Diaspora Affairs and Combatting Antisemitism.
11. Hanna Shaul Bar Nissim, “New Diaspora Philanthropy? The philanthropy of the UJA-Federation of New York toward Israel,”Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 48, no. 4 (2019): 839-858. |
12. Boyle and Kitchin, “A Diaspora Strategy for Canada? Enriching Debate through Heightening Awareness of International Practice,” The Canadians Abroad Project Paper No. 11-1, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (2011). Retrieved from http://eprints.maynoothuniversity.ie/2928/1/MB_Canada_diaspora_Strategy_2011.pdf
13. Nonprofit Income and Expenditure Survey 2009-2021, Central Bureau of Statistics, Table C. https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/mediarelease/pages/2022
14. As mentioned, the CBS data includes current transfers received from individuals, businesses and nonprofits abroad. They do not include government transfers to nonprofits. The data includes donations from Christian associations, but a study conducted on donations from the US to Israeli associations found that donations from Christian associations accounted for 3% of all funds raised by Israeli associations through foreign donations. Jamie Levine Daniel, Galia Feit, and Osnat Hazan. “Who Gives, Who Gets, and How Do We Know? The promises and limitations of administrative data for cross-border philanthropy tracking,” VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organization 34: 91-99 (2023).
