Israel has an unusually high level of fertility, well above the replacement rate of 2.1. Although fertility is highest among the most religious, even among secular Israelis the average number of children per woman is high relative to other economically developed countries. Unlike other countries, where fertility rates have declined, aggregate fertility rates in Israel have remained stable over the past 40 years, despite marked declines in some population sectors. The reason for the stability of national fertility rates over the last several decades, despite changes within some subgroups, is due to the shifting composition of the population. Population projections suggest continued population growth well into the future, leading to increased population density.

Fertility in Israel

Israel has a relatively high fertility rate of 2.9 children per woman on average as of 2020.¹ In fact, Israel has the 63rd highest fertility rate in the world.² The countries with the highest fertility rates are overwhelmingly concentrated in Africa. Israel’s fertility rate is similar to that found in neighboring Egypt. However, when Israel is compared with Western and economically developed nations, its fertility rate stands out. For example. the average for OECD member states is only 1.61 children per woman.³ Even if we were to include OECD affiliate and partner nations, Israel has the highest fertility rate. This is not the result of increasing fertility in Israel, but rather of declining fertility elsewhere (Israel only surpassed Saudi Arabia in terms of birth rates in 2010, when it became the OECD country, broadly defined, with the highest fertility rate). In fact, despite minor fluctuations, Israel’s total fertility rate (TFR), a measure of the average number of children per woman, has stood at around three children per woman for the last 40 years.⁴ Prior to the last four decades of stable birth rates in Israel, there had been a TFR decline in the 1970s. Large waves of migration from North Africa, and to a lesser extent, Asia, pushed up average fertility rates in Israel in the 1960s However, immigrants from those regions, soon adjusted their fertility downward to match that of the local Israeli population, leading to a fall in overall Israeli fertility rates.⁵

Israel is unusual in the OECD context for its high fertility and because that fertility has remained so stable over the past four decades. In 1980, Israel’s TFR was 3.14, sixth highest out of 38 current OECD member states. Also in 1980, Israel’s TFR was lower than those of Mexico, Turkey, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Ireland. In the last four decades, as Israel’s fertility rate has remained essentially unchanged, the fertility rates of those five countries have all declined, most dramatically in Mexico, which has declined from 4.84 to 2.10 (children per woman). Thus, without any significant shift in Israel’s own fertility rate, its relative position compared to other current OECD member states has grown higher.⁶

Demographic Transitions

Demographic developments are very similar across the world, although they differ greatly in terms of timing. Historically speaking, the first major demographic change in the modern era was the decline in infant mortality. Jews tended to experience these transitions earlier than non-Jews in the same region. Central and Western European Jews were the first to experience rapid population growth due to decreasing mortality, followed by Jews in Eastern Europe, with Jews in Asia and Africa experiencing the same phenomenon much later.⁷

The second demographic transition is marked by declining fertility and is still underway in many countries. In Europe, where demographic transitions occurred earlier, fertility rates in most countries are now below replacement level (2.1 children per woman). The second demographic transition is characterized by other features such as postponement of parenthood, a decline in the importance of marriage and the increase in adoption of non-traditional living arrangements, with a rise in the number of children born outside of marriage. The underlying cause of these shifts is generally considered to be a transition toward postmodern norms that emphasize self-actualization and individuality.⁸ On all counts, Israel remains something of an outlier, at least in the context of Western and economically developed nations. Israel’s demographic patterns are in many ways similar to those of other countries in the region.⁹

Fertility Rates by Religion and Religiosity in Israel

Despite stability in the aggregate fertility level, in Israel there is evidence to suggest that different population sectors are exhibiting wildly divergent fertility patterns.¹⁰ There is some variation in fertility rates across a range of sociodemographic characteristics such as income and education.¹¹ However, religion seems to be one of the most important factors at play. Religious families have significantly higher fertility rates.

Non-Jewish Israelis have fertility patterns that differ significantly from those of the Israeli Jewish population. Since the 1960s, Arab Israelis have reduced their fertility markedly, from 4.7 to 2.1 among Christians, 7.3 to 2.3 for the Druze population, and from 9.2 to 3.3 among Muslims.¹² By contrast, over the past 40 years fertility rates among Jewish Israelis have remained relatively high and stable. Among Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) women, TFR has fluctuated between 6.0 and 7.3 over the past 40 years and is currently 6.45, for Dati (religious) women, it has remained within a narrower range, between 3.7 and 4.3, and is now 3.88. Traditional-religious women’s TFR has remained within the 2.5 to 3.3 range and now stands at 2.82, for traditional-not-so-religious women, fluctuations have occurred between 2.1 and 2.6, with a current value of 2.34, and for secular women, the TFR ranged from 1.8 to 2.3 over the last four decades and is now exactly two children per woman. There is only one OECD country, Mexico, where the fertility rate is higher than two children per woman, which represents the (low in the Israeli context) fertility rate of secular Israeli Jewish women.¹³

Given the declining fertility of the Arab sector, combined with relatively unchanging fertility among Jews, one might have expected overall fertility rates to decline. However, changes in the population structure, that is in the proportion of each sector in the population, prevent this decline. Arab Muslims historically have had very high fertility rates. As a result, the Arab Muslim population in Israel is very young, with two-thirds of Israeli Muslims under the age of 18.¹⁴Although current fertility levels among this group are much lower than in the past, they are still above average and will push aggregate fertility rates up, especially as they constitute an increasing percentage of the cohorts that are already in, or entering, their childbearing years. A similar pattern can be discerned in the Haredi population. They, too, represent an ever-larger proportion of each cohort and have a much higher TFR than non-Haredi women. Therefore, even though their fertility rates are essentially unchanged, their greater weight in the population leads over time to an increase in the total TFR of the entire population, offsetting the decline in fertility among Israeli Arabs.

Fertility and Population Density

The combination of an ever-increasing population, dwindling finite resources, and increasing population density have led to calls for a reduction in fertility. However, in some countries, below replacement level fertility rates bring other concerns, particularly in relation to a lack of manpower in the labor force, the burden of an aging population, and broader concern over economic decline. While governments have succeeded in reducing fertility using draconian measures, notably in China, gentler methods of encouraging shifts in fertility, for example attempts to raise fertility by providing generous benefits and cheap childcare, have been less successful.

One of the main impacts of fertility is on population size and density. Israel is a small country with a total land area of 21,671 square kilometers,¹⁵ ranking 153rd out of 234 countries and territories in terms of size.¹⁶ However, in terms of population density it is ranked 34th, with 418 people per square kilometer.¹⁷Israel is currently a little more densely populated that Belgium, but less so than the Netherlands, which is the most densely populated European country. Concerns about overpopulation are more acute given that a significant portion of the territory of Israel is classified as desert, so that the population is not spread evenly, but concentrated in the central coastal plain and Jerusalem.¹⁸ Moreover, Israel’s population has grown by between 1.6% and 2.4% per year and is projected to continue growing on this scale in the coming years with a concomitant rise in population density.

Population Projections

The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) calculates population projections, from which it is possible to estimate future population density rates. As it is almost impossible to accurately project precise population size decades into the future, the ICBS issues population projections based on three different models (high, medium, and low estimates for fertility and life expectancy). Only one estimate for migration is used as it is very difficult to predict. For instance, the major recent wave of immigration has been caused by the war in Ukraine, something that it would have been impossible for demographers working on population projections several decade ago to foresee.

The projections are calculated by splitting Israeli society into three distinct groups, each with its own fertility and mortality patterns: Jews and others excluding Haredim, Haredim, and Arabs. Although there are distinctions within these groups, such as the aforementioned differences between Christians, Muslims, and Druze within the Arab population, in order to calculate projections for small population groups, it is generally necessary to aggregate some groups together. Projection calculations are run separately for each of the three groups and then integrated to create an estimate of the future total population of Israel.

The graph above shows projected population density based on projections made by the ICBS. It indicates that even according to the most conservative estimate of population growth in Israel over the next four decades, the population density will rise dramatically to 531 people per square kilometer in 2035, rising further to 721 in 2065. The population density in 2065 according to this estimate will be higher than the current population density of Taiwan, but lower than that currently found in the Palestinian Territories. The scenario that predicts the greatest population growth indicates that population density will reach around 1,150 people per square kilometer in 2065, a level similar to current population density levels in Bangladesh. Of course, population density in many other countries is also projected to rise; even so, Israel is expected to rise to somewhere between the 10th and the 16th most densely populated country by 2050 (depending on which model is used)¹⁹ second only to Malta in Europe in terms of population density.

Fertility and Higher Education

In Israel, the highest fertility rates are found among Haredi women, although future trends are hard to predict. In many countries, when women’s education levels risen, fertility has declined. It is not yet clear whether the pursuit of further education by Haredi women in Israel will have a similar effect. According to data from recent rounds of the Social Survey,²⁰ there does not appear to be a correlation between educational attainment and family size among Haredi women (at least up to seven children, as the ICBS does not release detailed data when a respondent has more than seven children).

Of course, it is possible that the increase in educational attainment among Haredi women, which is a relatively recent phenomenon, has not yet impacted fertility patterns, although it may do so in the future. Most Haredi women who pursue higher educational attainment are still young, so their current fertility level is still relatively low. If they decide to limit their family size and have fewer children than is presently the norm in Haredi society, it would represent a significant shift, indicating that education levels among Haredi women follow the patterns found in other societies. On the other hand, it may be that the main effect of education in reducing fertility is to be found in elementary and secondary education, therefore the pursuit of higher education among Haredi women would not have such an effect.

However, there is a relationship between labor force participation and number of children among Haredi women. The more children a Haredi woman has, the less likely she is to work or to be part of the labor force (i.e., actively seeking work, although not currently employed). This may be a result of an economic cost benefit analysis (low wages and the costs of working outside the home), or simply that wealthier families can afford both having more children and for the mother to stay at home.

More Jewish Parents, More Jewish Friends

About a third of Jews in the United States report that all or most of their friends are Jewish. Having Jewish friends generally indicates a Jewish identity that has practical meaning, such as celebrating Jewish holidays or visiting Israel. American Orthodox Jews have a very high proportion of Jewish friends (88%, per 2021 Pew Research Center data). The share drops when segmented by denominational affiliation or by age cohort (younger Jews have a lower proportion of Jewish friends).

An analysis of data from JPPI’s Voice of the People platform shows a correlation between the identity of parents and the proportion of Jewish friends their children have. Half of those who grew up in families where both parents were Jewish have a majority of Jewish friends. By contrast, those who grew up with one Jewish parent (father or mother) usually have fewer Jewish friends. The circle of community in the Jewish framework is, of course, a complete circle. That is, those whose friends are mostly Jews have a greater chance of building a relationship with a Jewish partner, and the same is true in other areas of life.

Endnote

1. Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. Media Release. Births and Fertility in Israel, 2020. (21.02.2022). https://www.cbs.gov.il/en/mediarelease/Pages/2022/Births-and-Fertility-in-Israel-2020.aspx

2. World Bank. Fertility rate, total (births per woman) ttps://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?most_recent_value_desc=true

3. Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. Media Release. Births and Fertility in Israel, 2020. (21.02.2022). https://www.cbs.gov.il/en/mediarelease/Pages/2022/Births-and-Fertility-in-Israel-2020.aspx

4. Dov Friedlander and Calvin Goldscheider. 1978. “Immigration, Social Change and Cohort Fertility in Israel.” Population Studies 32(2): 299-317. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2173563.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Acc923873329cfa54cc6ab19d99041d01&ab_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1

5. Dov Friedlander and Calvin Goldscheider. 1978. “Immigration, Social Change and Cohort Fertility in Israel.” Population Studies 32(2): 299-317. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2173563.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Acc923873329cfa54cc6ab19d99041d01&ab_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1

6. OECD Data. Fertility Rates. https://data.oecd.org/pop/fertility-rates.htm

7. Sergio DellaPergola. 2001. “Some Fundamentals of Jewish Demographic History,” in Sergio Della Pergola and Judith Even (eds.) Papers in Jewish Demography 1997. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University. https://www.bjpa.org/content/upload/bjpa/dell/DellaPergola%20Some%20Fundamentals.pdf

8. Batool Zaidi and S. Philip Morgan. 2017. “The Second Demographic Transition Theory: A Review and Appraisal.” Annual Review of Sociology 43:473-492. https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev-soc-060116-053442.

9. Alex Weinreb, Dov Chernichovsky and Aviv Brill. Israel’s Exceptional Fertility. Jerusalem: Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel. https://www.taubcenter.org.il/en/research/israels-exceptional-fertility/

10. Evgenia Bystrov. 2012. “The Second Demographic Transition in Israel: One for all?” Demographic Research 27(10): 261-298. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26349924#metadata_info_tab_contents

11. Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. Media Release. Births and Fertility in Israel, 2020. (21.02.2022). https://www.cbs.gov.il/en/mediarelease/Pages/2022/Births-and-Fertility-in-Israel-2020.aspx

12. Alex Weinreb, Dov Chernichovsky and Aviv Brill. Israel’s Exceptional Fertility. Jerusalem: Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel. https://www.taubcenter.org.il/en/research/israels-exceptional-fertility/

13. OECD Data. Fertility Rates. https://data.oecd.org/pop/fertility-rates.htm

14. Nasreen Haddad Haj-Yahya, Muhammed Khalaily, Arik Rudnitzky, and Ben Fargeon. 2022. Statistical Report on Arab Society in Israel: 2021. Jerusalem” Israel Democracy Institute. https://en.idi.org.il/articles/38540

15. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Israel – Size and Dimension. https://embassies.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/Maps/Pages/Israel-Size-and-Dimension.aspx

16. Worldometer. Largest Countries in the World (by area) https://www.worldometers.info/geography/largest-countries-in-the-world/

17. World Population Review. Countries by Population Density. https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/countries-by-density

18. Alon Tal. 2016. The Land is Full: Addressing Overpopulation in Israel. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. https://books.google.co.il/books?hl=en&lr=&id=bea7DAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR21&ots=BiDH8WUV5k&sig=aKxG3e1R1H-wJl86eL_7AfgsHU4&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false

19. Population Density 2050, populationpyramid.net

20. Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. Social Survey. https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/Surveys/Pages/%D7%A1%D7%A7%D7%A8-