The horrific Hamas massacre on October 7 and the war it sparked, made the past year pivotal in regard to the geopolitical situation of Israel and the Jewish people. The war is not yet over, but its troubling ramifications can be seen across all aspects of Israel’s national resilience: security, the economy, social cohesion, international standing, and the strength of the strategic triangular relationship: Jerusalem-Washington-American Jewry.

The Hamas onslaught happened at a time of domestic upheaval in Israel, which began with the presentation of a government plan to reform the judicial system (January 2023). The plan triggered ongoing protests that highlighted Israel’s social and political rifts, led to warnings by reserve soldiers, including hundreds of pilots, that they would stop volunteering for reserve duty should the reform be implemented. It also elicited admonitions from the heads of the security system that Israel had grown weak in the eyes of its enemies, who might now be tempted to attack. The past year has illustrated the danger of a multi-front war; at the same time there has been a deterioration in the image of the IDF and the intelligence corps among both allies and adversaries. In Gaza a war is being waged whose goals have yet to be achieved.

Israel has severely diminished the strength of Hamas, killing many of its leaders, but has still not wrested its control over Gaza or ensured that it will be unable to reestablish itself and once again threaten Israel’s southern communities. The terrible fate of the 101 hostages, living and dead, still in Hamas’s hands (as of this writing) also testifies to the failure to achieve the objective of bringing them home.

In Israel’s north a conflict with Hezbollah is underway, in which towns on the confrontation line have been abandoned and 80,000 residents have become refugees within their own country. Iran’s retaliation for the killing of Mohammad Reza Zahedi, the Quds Force commander in Lebanon and Syria, changed the face of the Israel-Iran conflict. Although the mid-April Iranian attack was largely thwarted, the mere fact that Iran launched, from its own territory, hundreds of missiles and UAVs bearing 60 tons of explosives radically changed the “rules of the game,” posing another serious security challenge for Israel. Israel’s restrained response to the offensive was interpreted by many as a sign of weakness and as a change in the balance of deterrence vis-à-vis Iran, to Israel’s disadvantage. The Houthis of Yemen, aided by Iranian arms, threaten all Israeli vessels in the Red Sea, fire missiles at Israel, and disrupt operations at the Port of Eilat, while Shiite militias in Iraq, proxies of Teheran, also join in the missile attacks.

Israel’s harsh response – its strike on the port of Hodeida in western Yemen on July 20, 2024 – marked an expansion of the regional campaign.

The security situation in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) is shaky;

the scope of terror attacks has greatly increased, and recently there has been an alarming use of car bombs. Security officials are expressing concern about a potential slide into a new intifada. The IDF and the Shin Bet are being forced to allocate large forces and to take vigorous action in order to curb the efforts of Hamas and Iran (which assist with funding and arms smuggling) to spark a full-fledged conflagration on this front as well.

Growing violence by Jewish elements is heightening tensions. This trend, which was identified even before the war’s outbreak, caused IDF Spokesman Daniel Hagari to caution (August 7, 2023) that “these things are driving a civilian (Palestinian) population that isn’t linked to terrorism – to engage in terrorism.”

These warnings were not heeded and, a year later, Shin Bet director Ronen Bar saw fit to send a letter to the prime minister and his Cabinet ministers warning that Jewish terrorism is growing and that it is changing in form “from focused covert activity to broad, open activity. From using a lighter to using weapons of war, (sometimes using weapons that were distributed by the state lawfully). From evading the security forces to attacking the security forces. From cutting themselves off from the establishment to receiving legitimacy from certain officials in the establishment.” Contributing to the unrest were actions such as National Security Minister Ben-Gvir ascending the Temple Mount while hundreds of Jews were praying there in violation of the status quo (August 13, 2024).

In the months that have passed since October 7 international support for Israel has eroded, the country’s status in the international arena has plummeted, and Israel has drawn harsh criticism from its best friends, first and foremost the U.S., which has delayed some arms shipments as a means of exerting pressure.

Despite this blow to Israeli foreign relations, only three countries – Bolivia, Belize, and Colombia – have officially severed diplomatic relations with Israel (25 countries did so in the wake of the Yom Kippur War).

The peace agreements with Arab countries remain in place but are showing cracks. Antisemitism is worsening and instances of violence and hostility directed at Diaspora Jews are commonplace. In the realm of international law, Israeli leaders are under threat of arrest for “war crimes and crimes against humanity.” The protracted war is harming Israel’s economy: increased defense spending (governor of the Bank of Israel, Prof. Amir Yaron, has estimated that the costs of the war will reach 250 billion shekels by 2025), extended reserve duty that hurts businesses, tourism in a state of collapse, airlines halting flights to Israel, and a diminished international credit rating along with forecasts of a worsening budget deficit and inflationary pressure.

The country’s internal unity has been compromised, anti-government demonstrations are being held even as the war rages, and the fate of the hostages and the price of the deal to obtain their release from Hamas are fraying Israeli society. In light of the IDF’s growing need for manpower, ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) non-conscription into the IDF is spurring public outrage and threatening the government’s stability. The Emergency War Cabinet dissolved with the withdrawal of the National Unity Party (July 9, 2024), and the leaders of Otzma Yehudit and the Religious Zionist Party are threatening the survival of the Netanyahu government over the possibility that a deal to return the hostages would end the war without its goals having been achieved. Also notable is the troubled relationship between the prime minister and the minister of defense, who publicly called out Netanyahu (May 16, 2024) for his refusal to discuss the creation of a Palestinian alternative to Hamas rule.

In the wake of the shocking murder of six hostages by Hamas (September 1, 2024), the defense minister has also called for a reversal of the Netanyahu-initiated cabinet decision to keep the IDF in the Philadelphi Corridor, so as to facilitate a deal to free the hostages.

The country’s internal split found harsh expression in a New York Times guest essay (June 26, 2024) signed by major Israeli public figures (Ehud Barak, David Grossman, and others) calling for U.S. Congressional leaders to rescind Netanyahu’s invitation to address the Congress, arguing that Netanyahu does not represent Israel’s citizenry.

Within this dark picture there are, however, some points of light: the harsh blows the IDF has dealt to Hamas; targeted assassinations of leading terrorists that display exceptional daring, capabilities, and intelligence. Particularly notable was the “pager attack,” which was unprecedented in scope and innovation – a series of explosions of thousands of pagers and hundreds of walkie-talkies carried by Hezbollah members in Lebanon and Syria (September 17-18, 2024), followed by the aerial assassination in Beirut of the commanders of the elite Radwan Force, among them the head of the organization’s operations division, Ibrahim Aqil, (joining an extensive list of eliminated operatives, which includes, among others, the commander of Hamas’s military wing , Mohammed Deiff, the head of its political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, Hezbollah’s “chief of staff”, Fuad Shukr; and others). Other points of light include the steadfast mobilization of Israel’s reserve forces for the war as well as the spontaneous coordination of Israeli civil society to aid those harmed by the Hamas offensive, necessitated by the poor performance of state institutions. In addition, the fact that there has not been a slide into the all-out regional war intended by Hamas (this could potentially change), that the U.S. has been standing by Israel as well as the mobilization of international forces under U.S. leadership to address the Houthi threat, and that those forces acted – with assistance from Arab states – to thwart the Iranian attack on Israel have all been a bright spot. Jewish-Arab relations within Israel have not deteriorated into violent confrontation; peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan and the Abraham Accords have remained in place despite a cooling of relations and harsh criticism of Israel.

The War against Hamas

Hamas’s October 7 onslaught was the worst catastrophe experienced by the Jewish people since the Holocaust. In a single day 1,200 Israelis, women and children among them, were slaughtered; 252 hostages were taken, alive or dead. The Israeli public suffered a terrible shock; the haven that was supposed to provide security to the Jewish people failed at its ontological mission. The atrocious massacre, which also featured the rape and burning of victims and other acts of bestial cruelty, brought the era of the pogroms and the Holocaust into today’s reality. On October 27 the IDF’s ground invasion of the Gaza Strip began, and the war objectives were defined: the elimination of Hamas as a military force and civil government, and the return of the hostages. As Israel launched its military campaign, Hezbollah began firing rockets and anti-tank missiles at Israel’s northern communities and at IDF bases. This northern front has not, thus far, devolved into an all-out war, but it has caused tens of thousands of Israeli citizens to evacuate their homes and created a deep sense of frustration in the absence of a response that would halt Hezbollah’s aggression. Israeli leaders have explained that the war effort should be focused on Hamas, and that Israel should not be drawn into a multifront war. Accordingly, Israel has put up with Houthi (an Iran proxy) attacks, in the form of missiles, drones, and strikes on Israeli-owned vessels in the Red Sea. American and British warships and fighter planes have intervened to counter these attacks. Pro-Iranian militias in Iraq also sporadicaloi launch missiles and armed drones at Israel.

A ceasefire was declared six weeks into the war (November 21, 2023) that lasted for a week and enabled a deal for the release of 105 hostages, most of them women and children. The issue of the hostages remains an open wound, as their families and many citizens increasingly wonder what the government’s priorities are. The claim that there is no contradiction between the war aims and that military pressure will lead to the freeing of the hostages has lost its persuasiveness over time. National Security Council head Tzachi Hanegbi revealed the contradiction between the war aims early on (October 14, 2023): “Israel will not hold negotiations with an enemy that we have vowed to wipe from the face of the earth.”

At the time of this writing, the war aims have yet to be attained. Hamas fighters hide in a tunnel network of massive dimensions. Hamas’s leader, Yahya Sinwar, apparently surrounds himself with a human shield of hostages. 101 remain in his hands, alive or dead. The humanitarian situation in Gaza has deteriorated, the scope of the killing and destruction is enormous, and Israel is subject to accusations that many of those killed are children and uninvolved civilians. The UN agencies warn of famine and medication shortages.

In early September 2024 a polio inoculation campaign was launched after a first case was diagnosed and the virus was detected in Gazan sewage samples.

Some claim that Israel is deliberately starving the Gazan populace and perpetrating war crimes. The “window of legitimacy” for continued fighting is closing as time passes. Israel is obliged to respond to international pressure, but Hamas terrorists hijack the food trucks that Israel allows into Gaza.

Israel’s non-success in fully achieving the declared war aims, and the lack of a clear statement about the day after the war, have caused the United States to pressure Israel to limit the scope of the fighting (in Rafah, for instance), and to agree to terms of a deal that would enable the return of the hostages.

Six months into the war Netanyahu promised that we’re “a step away from victory” (April 7, 2024); such proclamations were not perceived as credible by many Israelis. The sense that the war is not progressing finds expression in wrangling and mutual recriminations between the political and the military echelons. IDF Spokesman Daniel Hagari asserted (June 18, 2024) that the talk of annihilating Hamas “simply throws sand in the eyes of the public,” as Hamas is an idea “rooted in the hearts of the people.” According to him, the way to weaken Hamas is to establish a new governing authority in Gaza, and that is the political echelon’s job.

Despite the fact that Israel is at war, the prime minister has relatively low approval ratings, and protest demonstrations routinely call for his resignation and early elections. (A Pew Research Center survey found that 58% of Israelis express negative attitudes toward Netanyahu, the highest negative rating since 2013 when Pew began conducting surveys in Israel.) Internal criticism of Netanyahu is fueled by the lawsuits against him and by the letter of warning sent to him by the state commission of inquiry on the submarine and naval vessels deal (June 24, 2024) stating that he had “endangered the state’s security and harmed Israel’s foreign relations and economic interests.”

By September 2024 though, Netanyahu had clawed back to the top of the polls with Likud coming out as the top party if elections were held, ahead of Benny Gantz and Yair Lapid.

The war has placed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict back on the international agenda. The framework for Gaza’s future presented by Netanyahu (February 23, 2024) has not garnered international support. Netanyahu has clarified that once Hamas has been eradicated, Israel will retain freedom of security action in Gaza in the medium term, create a security buffer within Gaza along the border, act to prevent smuggling at the Egyptian border, transfer civil administration to local entities unconnected to terrorism, and allow Gaza to be rebuilt only after it has been demilitarized. While the Israeli government refuses to present its vision for a resolution of the conflict, unilateral measures are being taken on the matter. Spain, Norway, and Ireland have announced their recognition of a Palestinian state (May 22, 2024), joining 144 other countries that have made such declarations in the past. The international moves toward unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state are being represented by Netanyahu as an unprecedented “prize for terrorism.” And it is indeed hard for many Israelis to swallow, substantively and emotionally, a commitment to the idea of a “Palestinian state” as a central element of a resolution of the crisis, given both the horrific events of October 7 and the lack of any expressions of empathy on the part of the Palestinian “peace camp” for the suffering caused by Hamas. Although Fatah issued a condemnation of Hamas (March 16, 2024) (“You have caused a reoccupation of Gaza, a nakba of the Palestinian people worse than Israel’s creation”), Fatah leaders such as Jibril Rajoub have blamed Israel for the Hamas attack, and 71% of Palestinians say the October 7 offensive was justified.

Israeli reservations notwithstanding, the U.S. is trying to hammer out a regional arrangement that would mark a path toward a permanent solution based on the two-state formula. Arab countries, from which the U.S. has requested forces for the administration of Gaza, are conditioning their cooperation on an Israeli commitment to the future establishment of a Palestinian state. Washington wants to see the resolution of the Gaza crisis incorporated into a regional agreement that would include Israeli-Saudi normalization, which in turn would make it possible to organize regarding the Iranian threat and would accord with American interests as reflected in competition with China and Russia. Washington also wants to implement the plan it announced at the G-20 summit in New Delhi (September 2023) to build a commercial corridor featuring railways and shipping routes that would connect India with the Middle East and Europe, which would also include Israel.

The Northern Front

Hezbollah joined in the hostilities from the outset, and there has been no cessation of the exchanges of fire that forced the evacuation of Israel’s northern border communities. Eighty thousand people, refugees in their own country, are expressing in frank language their disappointment over the IDF’s failure to deter Hezbollah and the lack of appropriate governmental assistance. Hezbollah’s missiles, drones, and anti-tank munitions are causing death and widespread destruction. The government’s assertion that Israel has no interest in being drawn into an additional front before the objectives of war with Hamas have been achieved provides no solace to the country’s northern residents. In the case of an all-out war, Israel would have to contend with a well-trained army possessing 140,000 missiles and rockets, some of them precision guided. In a military exercise conducted by the IDF a year ago, a scenario was enacted in which 1500 rockets and missiles were being fired at Israel each day. President Biden is attempting to prevent an all-out conflagration in the north, and has dispatched his adviser, Amos Hochstein, to try to reach a ceasefire deal. Hezbollah is stiffening Lebanon’s demands regarding the border (they claim there are 13 points of contention), but it appears that the end of the hostilities in the north will have to wait until the Gaza war ends, unless they devolve into an all-out war. The Lebanese public and government fear such a development and this factors into Hezbollah’s calculations. The Lebanese economy is in deep crisis, and Israel is warning that an all-out war would send Lebanon “back to the Stone Age.” It is unclear whether the sides would adhere to the conflict’s “rules of the game”: a gradual escalation. Furthermore, there are figures in the Israeli government and security establishment who argue that Israel should proactively start a war with Hezbollah.

A sharp escalation was sparked by the killing of 12 children and teens in the Druze town of Majdal Shams on the Golan Heights by a Hezbollah-launched rocket (July 27, 2024). This was the worst strike on civilians on the northern front since the start of the war. Three days later the IDF responded by assassinating Nasrallah’s right-hand man, Fuad (Mohsen) Shukr, in the heart of Beirut. A large-scale reprisal by Hezbollah, which planned to launch 6000 missiles and drones, dozens of them targeting Tel Aviv, was thwarted by a pre-emptive strike by a hundred Israeli fighter jets that destroyed thousands of Hezbollah rocket launchers (August 25, 2024). This successful operation relied on detailed and precise intelligence, causing some foreign commentators to conclude that Israel’s intelligence establishment has recovered from the terrible failure of October 7.

This review was concluded when there was still a question whether the conflict in the north would spiral into all-out war, given the sharp escalation following the “beeper attack” attributed to Israel and which caused the death of dozens of Hezbollah operatives and the wounding of approximately 3,500 more, and later the elimination from the air in Beirut the commanders of the elite Radwan Force. Hezbollah responded with a heavy rocket barrage into the Haifa area and the Jezreel Valley (September 21, 2024).

The Israel-Iran Conflict

The past year brought a major escalation in Israel’s ongoing conflict with Iran. The drastic change occurred on the night between April 13 and 14, 2024, when Iran, contrary to Israeli intelligence assessments, made good on its threat of a “harsh and painful” response to Israel’s assassination of Mohammad Reza Zahedi, the commander of the Quds Force in Lebanon and Syria. Iran launched 300 ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones at Israel. Nine missiles hit two Israeli Air Force bases, but most were intercepted or failed to reach their targets. Countries that helped foil the attack included the U.S., the UK, and Sunni Arab states in the region – evidence of a potential regional coalition against Iranian aggression. The joint effort also called into question the Israeli security doctrine stipulating that Israel must rely solely on itself for its own defense. Israel responded to the attack with a limited surgical strike on Isfahan (April 19, 2024) signaling its disinclination to be drawn into a full confrontation. The deterrence balance changed to Israel’s disadvantage, and it will now have to take a massive response to its operations against Iran into consideration.

The killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh during his stay at an official guesthouse in Teheran (July 31, 2024) resulted in threats from Iran vowing harsh retaliation – a threat that has not been carried out as of this writing. Commentators have concluded that additional U.S. military deployments in the region, along with stern warnings conveyed to Teheran, were a consideration in Teheran’s decision not to respond at this stage.

Iran is not limiting its aggression to the Middle East; the Mossad divulged (May 30, 2024) that Tehran is attempting to enlist European criminal organizations for strikes against Israeli and Jewish targets (in May grenades were thrown at the Israeli embassy in Brussels, and the embassy in Stockholm was targeted by gunfire).

Iran is sticking to its strategic objective of bolstering its status in the Middle East; accordingly, it is acting to weaken Israel and to push the U.S. out of the region. The war in Gaza has revealed the damage caused by the “ring of fire” Iran has been working to create around Israel: aid to Hamas in the form of weapons and military training, strengthening Hezbollah, cultivating the Houthis in Yemen and the Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria. (Assad, whose country is still licking its wounds from its bloody civil war, is deterred at this point and careful not to join in the attacks on Israel, for fear of being ousted.) At the same time, despite the sanctions imposed on it and the targeted killing operations attributed to Israel, Iran has not halted its efforts to become a nuclear threshold state. Teheran is developing and operating advanced centrifuges and enriching uranium to 60% (a 90% enrichment level is required for a nuclear weapon). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) warned of Iran’s ongoing failure to cooperate with IAEA supervision of its nuclear facilities.

An updated IAEA report (August 29, 2024) indicates that Iran is enlarging its uranium stockpile and now possesses 164.7 kg of 60%-enriched uranium, an increase of 22.6 kg since the agency’s previous report three months earlier.

Experts estimate that if the necessary political decision is made, it would take Iran two weeks to enrich the uranium it has amassed to military grade. Opinions differ about the amount of time it would take for Iran to manufacture a detonating mechanism and adapt it to a ballistic missile warhead, but all agree that Iran has the ability to achieve these things. Kamal Kharrazi, a senior Khamenei adviser, used threatening language to address the possibility of Israel striking Iran’s nuclear facilities (May 9, 2024): “We have made no decision to build a nuclear bomb, but should Iran’s existence be threatened, there will be no choice but to change our military doctrine.” Contrary to Israel’s hopes, the United States is not leading an initiative aimed at winning the conflict with Iran, but rather at containing it.

Israel and the International Arena

The global arena is marked by stiff competition between the superpowers, which is undermining the world order and precluding cooperation between the powers against global threats: the proliferation of nuclear arms, climate change, the inherent dangers of artificial intelligence, and more. The big power rivalry also has implications for the war Israel is fighting and is itself affected by that war. U.S. support for Israel provides China and Russia with rhetorical ammunition; they can portray the U.S. as unsuited to lead the world order, due to its double standard. The war is helping President Putin distract the world from his war in Ukraine, disrupting U.S.-led efforts to stabilize the Middle East, returning the Americans to involvement in the region’s dilemmas, and undermining U.S. intentions to focus its strategic interests on Asia. Washington’s efforts to broker an agreement to end the war in Gaza also stem from its aspiration to reach a deal with Saudi Arabia – both to consolidate a regional alliance against Iran, and to halt the spread of Chinese influence in the region (as evidenced by China’s success in mediating between Riyadh and Teheran in March 2023).

The U.S. is also concerned that the war’s continuation could deepen Russia’s involvement in the anti-Israel axis and thus cause a global escalation of inter-power tensions.

Increased American involvement in the Middle East is promoting cooperation along the China-Russia-Iran axis, with North Korea an occasional participant. Since its failed rapprochement with Washington, Pyongyang has strengthened ties with Moscow and is supplying Moscow with weaponry for its war in Ukraine; during a visit by President Putin to North Korea, a strategic cooperation agreement was signed that included a “mutual defense” clause (June 20, 2024). Russia and China, determined to play a greater role in shaping the world order, are holding joint military exercises and helping Iran evade the sanctions imposed upon it. Russia is buying Iranian drones and even missiles for its war in Ukraine and is signing deals with Tehran for the purchase of state-of-the-art fighter jets (SU-35), attack helicopters, aerial defense systems, and more. At the same time, China, the main importer of Iranian oil, is steadily increasing its regional penetration, viewing the Middle East as a developing market for its products, a station on the road to European markets and, above all – a source of energy (a fifth of China’s oil and gas imports comes from Saudi Arabia). China is the Arab states’ major trade partner, and also the largest foreign investor in the Middle East.

China and Russia perceive liberal-democratic values not simply as an ideological threat, but also as a tool the West uses to undermine their regimes. However, one should not exaggerate the ideological homogeneity of the “American bloc.” Loyalty to Washington’s leadership is limited, and countries like Saudi Arabia and Turkey are able to maneuver between the great powers for maximum benefit. Israel’s current war has reemphasized its strong dependence on the U.S. and reveals its lack of such maneuvering room.

The big power competition animates positions taken toward the war. China refrained from condemning Hamas and is using the war to bash Israel, while Putin has even drawn an analogy (October 13, 2023) between a possible Israeli siege of Gaza and the Nazis’ siege of Leningrad. The coming months will tell whether the big power rivalry will thaw enough to allow cooperation between the superpowers on an arrangement that will end the war and even, perhaps, have an impact on the “day after.” While China has no interest in undermining the stability of the region that provides it with energy, Russia could benefit from a potential rise in oil and gas prices.

The cold shoulder Israel has been getting from Russia and China is not confined to them. The international support for Israel that characterized the days following the Hamas onslaught has dissipated over time and transformed into actual hostility. In the first few days after the slaughter, over 40 countries (including India, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and others) issued harsh denunciations of Hamas. Half of them, especially the Western countries, expressed explicit support for Israel’s right to defend itself. But the gruesome scenes of October 7 have been suppressed and the television screens abound with images of the suffering, the destruction, and the humanitarian disaster that beset the Gaza Strip in the wake of IDF operations there. Israel has been accused of deliberately starving the population, preventing humanitarian aid from reaching the people, and indiscriminate mass killing of innocent civilians.

Statements such as that of Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich (August 5, 2024) intensify the criticism. Smotrich said: “Nobody will let us cause 2 million civilians to die of hunger, even though it might be justified and moral, until our hostages are returned.”

In countries that had been friendly to Israel there has been a dramatic reversal of public opinion, and expressions of criticism and disgust at Israel’s conduct proliferate. The ostensible friendship between Netanyahu and Russia’s Putin, and Israel’s connections with China, have given way to sharp condemnation. The collapse of international public opinion is serious and highly visible on the campuses of leading American universities, where demonstrations take place and slogans can be heard effectively calling for Israel’s dismantlement: “From the River to the Sea, Palestine will be Free.”

The Israeli government’s unwillingness to present a political vision for the day after the war, and its opposition to the Palestinian Authority’s inclusion in whatever entity replaces Hamas in the civilian administration of Gaza, have been interpreted by many as proof of Israel’s intention to reoccupy the Strip. The calls by some Cabinet ministers to resurrect the settlement enterprise in Gaza have contributed to growing suspicions of Israel’s war goals, as have media reports that the government underreacts and allows violent settlers to harm Palestinians in the West Bank. In the West there is a growing awareness of the price they are paying in terms of their relations with the Arab world. Concerns have arisen that Israel wants to draw them into an all-out regional war; the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Charles Brown, has even warned (June 24, 2024) that the U.S. would not be able to help Israel against Hezbollah as it did during April’s Iranian offensive.

An array of world leaders, some of whom visited Israel after the Hamas attack to express solidarity (Biden, Macron, Scholz, Meloni, and others), launched warships (the U.S., the UK) to deter Iran, Hezbollah, and others from attacking Israel, and whose forces were mobilized to defend freedom of navigation in the Red Sea from Houthi attacks from Yemen, have changed their tone and started voicing harsh criticism of Israeli conduct while demanding a ceasefire. Macron, for example: “Israel must stop killing babies and women in Gaza” (November 11, 2023); Trudeau: “The killing of women, of children, of babies, in Gaza […] must stop” (November 15, 2023). Josep Borrell, EU foreign affairs chief, has accused Israel of using “starvation as a weapon of war in Gaza” (March 18, 2024), while the Spanish foreign minister announced (May 17, 2024) that his country had refused to allow a ship bearing arms for Israel to dock at its ports (Spain has also joined in South Africa’s case against Israel in the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

The deterioration of Israel’s standing has also manifested in international organizations. UN Secretary-General António Guterres has claimed (October 24, 2023) that the Hamas onslaught “did not happen in a vacuum” but rather against the background of 56 years of Israeli occupation. South Africa has brought a genocide case against Israel in the ICJ (January 11, 2024). The International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor, making a chilling analogy, has demanded that arrest warrants for war crimes be issued against Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Gallant – as well as against the Hamas leaders Sinwar, Haniyeh and Mohammed Deif (the last two rendered moot as a result of their assassinations). This development represents a dangerous erosion of Israel’s international status with potentially far-reaching consequences for Israel in the foreign affairs sphere: Israel could become a pariah state; it could suffer diplomatic isolation due to its leaders’ inability to enter the territory of ICC member states; foreign leaders could be incentivized to avoid meeting with Israeli leaders; it could become increasingly difficult to enlist international support and assistance in the face of security threats, especially that of an Iranian nuclear weapon; there is danger of an arms embargo (in early September 2024 Britain announced that it was freezing arms shipments to Israel), and restrictions on Israeli defense exports; trade relations could suffer (Turkey, for instance, decided to terminate trade with Israel and Colombia has announced that it will suspend coal exports to Israel); Israeli science and academic activity could be increasingly subject to boycott; the imposition of sanctions on Israel could gain wider traction; the delegitimization of Israel around the world could be encouraged; and antisemitism could be exacerbated. UN Secretary-General Guterres’s announcement (June 7, 2024) that Israel would be added to the “black list” of countries that violate the rights of children in areas of conflict could contribute to this trend.

Against the background of this escalating criticism, there is growing recognition worldwide that a diplomatic agreement should be imposed on Israel. International pressure for the two-state solution forced the U.S. to use its veto power to block a UN Security Council resolution recognizing a Palestinian state (April 19, 2024). Twelve of the 15 Security Council member countries supported the proposal, two countries – the UK and Switzerland – abstained, and the U.S. was the sole dissenting voice.

The Middle East – Threats and Opportunities

Although the governments of the region’s Sunni states would like to see Hamas disappear, their responses to the October 7 massacre did not convey much empathy for Israeli suffering. The Arab leaders’ fear of negative public opinion in their countries, which expresses solidarity with the Palestinians, dictated their official reactions. An exception was the United Arab Emirates, which expressed disgust at the abduction of civilians. The Arab League, which convened in November 2023, called for an immediate ceasefire and for a weapons embargo on Israel. Protest measures have been taken by some countries: the recall of ambassadors, the cessation of flights, etc., but relations have not been severed with any of the countries that have peace treaties with Israel. The longer the war has lasted, the harsher the statements by Arab rulers have become. Thus, in the wake of the operation in Rafah in which tens of Palestinians were unintentionally killed, the Saudi foreign ministry accused Israel of “genocide” (May 29, 2024).

Israel’s failure to achieve its goals after 11 months (at this writing) of fighting, Hezbollah’s incessant barrages, and the fact that Iran has fired hundreds of rockets and drones at Israel without eliciting a comparable response – all of these things project weakness and impede Israeli deterrence. This element of Israel’s national resilience is also affected by how Israel’s relations with the U.S. are perceived in the region. At the start of the war Washington expressed unequivocal support for Israel. President Biden’s stern warning to Israel’s enemies – “Don’t!” – and the deployment of two aircraft carriers to the region were impressive acts, but were later followed by public rebukes of Israel and an incident in which a heavy weapons shipment was halted.

A positive development embodying hope for improved regional relations and for a true American-led coalition was the mobilization of regional actors to thwart the Iranian attack on Israel. However, the continued fighting in Gaza and the lack of Israeli commitment to a two-state solution as demanded by the Arab states are creating obstacles in the process of forming the mentioned regional coalition. Despite its strategic importance, one cannot conclude that the members of this group would rush to Israel’s aid if it becomes embroiled in an all-out war with Iran; those countries have no interest in exposing themselves to Iranian vengeance. Furthermore, on the eve of October 7 there were signs of a thaw in relations between the Arab states and Iran. The trend toward regional détente is consistent with the aspiration of young leaders such as Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) to promote prosperity and modernization in their countries. These leaders understand that violent conflicts undermine their modernization plans. American support for Israel during the Gaza war, the role of the U.S. in deflecting the Iranian missile attack, and U.S. leadership of the multinational effort against the Houthi disruption of global shipping and actions against Israel, are improving the image of the U.S. in the eyes of the region’s leaders, who had doubted American willingness to fight for its interests and friends in the Middle East. (The Houthis, however, display an unexpected ability to persevere with their disruption of Red Sea shipping lanes.) Alongside their security reliance on the U.S., the countries of the region, especially Saudi Arabia, still desire to maintain good relations with Russia and China (China purchases a quarter of all Saudi-produced oil); doubts still linger regarding the familiar question of American staying power and how the upcoming presidential elections will affect Washington’s commitment to the region.

Saudi Arabia – The U.S. is working to advance Israeli-Saudi normalization as part of a broader strategic outlook meant to retain oil-rich Saudi Arabia within the American sphere of influence, to keep it from sliding into China’s embrace, and to establish a front vis-à-vis Iran. The Saudi foreign minister, Faisal bin Farhan, stated (April 29, 2024) that agreements with the U.S. are “very, very close,” but stressed that such agreements could include normalization with Israel only if there is “truly a pathway to a Palestinian state.” In light of the continuation of the war and the Israeli government’s refusal to commit to a two-state solution, Secretary of State Blinken said (May 21, 2024) that Israel may not be part of the emerging agreement with Saudi Arabia. Israeli security officials have expressed concern both that Saudi Arabia’s demands of the U.S. could result in a reduction of the qualitative advantage Israel currently enjoys with respect to the Arab states, and that a Saudi civilian nuclear project could potentially be repurposed for military objectives, or even incentivize other countries in the region to embark on nuclear projects. Despite the renewal of relations, Riyadh has no illusions about Iran, and is building a modern army (Saudi Arabia ranked fifth worldwide in military spending in 2023). The crown prince has affirmed (September 20, 2023) that, should Iran gain possession of a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia would have to do so as well “for security reasons, for balancing power.”

Egypt – The war in Gaza has heightened tensions between Israel and Egypt. At stake are vital security interests as well as economic interests (since 2020 Israel has been exporting natural gas to Egypt in growing quantities). Israel believes that Hamas has smuggled large amounts of weaponry into Gaza via the Egyptian border, which raises suspicions regarding Cairo’s intentions. The IDF takeover of the Philadelphi Corridor and the border crossing has been met with sharp Egyptian criticism.

Egypt views it as a violation of its peace treaty with Israel. An indication of this was the Egyptian chief of staff’s visit to the country’s border with the Gaza Strip (September 5, 2024).

Egypt condemns IDF operations in Gaza and fears a Palestinian migration into Sinai as well as the appearance of cooperating with Israel in another Palestinian “nakba.” Egypt, alongside Qatar, is assisting in the effort to reach a deal for the release of the Israeli hostages. However, in the wake of Israeli operations in Rafah, Egypt announced (May 12, 2024) that it would join in South Africa’s ICJ petition for an end to the “genocide and war crimes” in the Gaza Strip. (Ireland, Turkey, Chile, Mexico, and Spain have also joined in the petition.)

Jordan – Israel and Jordan have common security and economic interests (thwarting Iranian subversion, the supply of water and gas by Israel to Jordan). Despite this, the Jordanian responses to Israel’s military operations have been exceedingly strident. Jordan’s ambassador was recalled from Tel Aviv to Amman (November 1, 2023), and Queen Rania stated (March 12, 2024) that “Israel experienced one October 7th. Since then, the Palestinians have experienced 156 October 7ths.” The deep hostility notwithstanding, Jordan helped foil the Iranian missile attack on Israel (though warning that it would not allow Israel to retaliate via Jordanian air space). Jordan’s economic and security dependence on the United States is a positive counterbalance to its attitude toward Israel. King Abdullah fears that his subjects’ natural solidarity with the inhabitants of Gaza (more than half of Jordan’s population is of Palestinian descent) would boost the power of the Muslim Brotherhood in his country and undermine the kingdom’s stability. To ease public pressure, the Jordanian air force has received permission from Israel to make humanitarian aid drops over Gaza (Salma, the king’s pilot daughter, has taken part in this activity).

Turkey – Turkish foreign policy had changed in tone and become more conciliatory due to the country’s economic crisis; this shift included a thaw in relations with Israel. Ankara hoped to become a transfer point for Israeli gas exports to Europe. A meeting even took place on September 20, 2023 between Netanyahu and Erdoğan within the framework of the UN General Assembly in New York, but the Hamas attack returned the Turkish ruler to his old ways, more than happy to respond to public protests against Israeli actions in Gaza. In his crude speeches Erdoğan has sided with Hamas and called it a patriotic non-terrorist organization striving for national liberation while, according to him, “Netanyahu and his government are today’s Nazis.” Netanyahu did not let this latter remark pass, and responded that “Erdogan, who is carrying out a genocide of Kurds and holds a world record number of journalists opposed to his rule in jail, is the last to preach morality to us.” The Turkish president took his threats still farther: “Just like we entered Karabakh, just like we entered Libya, we might do the same to Israel” (July 28, 2024). Later, after an American-Turkish human rights activist was killed during a demonstration near Shechem (Nablus), Erdogan called for the Islamic nations to form an alliance against “the growing threat of expansionism” from Israel (September 7, 2024).

Past periods of difficult relations did not harm trade between the two countries (Israel imports $7 billion in goods from Turkey annually and exports approximately $2.5 billion to Turkey annually), but this time Erdoğan decided to sever economic ties entirely (May 2, 2024).

The Strategic Triangle: Jerusalem-Washington-American Jewry

Since October 7, both impressive expressions of the United States’ commitment to Israel and significant cracks in the special relationship between the two countries have been revealed. The war has not left American Jewry unaffected; American Jewry stands concerned in the face of rising trend of antisemitism and the anti-Israel protests on college campuses, which conflate anti-Zionism and antisemitism. All this poses a challenge for the resilience of the strategic Jerusalem-Washington-American Jewry triangular relationship. The political and social turmoil in Israel and the approaching U.S. elections in November add further complexity to an already-complicated reality.

Maintaining the resilience of the “triangle,” a crucial force multiplier for Israel and the Jewish people, has been an ongoing challenge for successive Israeli governments that entails preserving both bipartisan American support for Israel and American Jewry’s attachment to Israel. Jerusalem-Washington relations are irreplaceable – crucial for Israel’s security, economy, and international standing. The war has highlighted Israel’s dependence on the U.S. and, by extension, the importance of American Jewry in cultivating and maintaining this vital relationship. The Jews of the United States have power and influence, are well organized, and occupy high-ranking positions in all areas of life – politics, the economy, culture, academia, and philanthropy. Maintaining the strength of this “triangular relationship” is no simple task in light of trends threatening to weaken its resilience: on one hand, internal American demographic shifts alongside deepening ideological polarization, which, despite Israel’s wishes, turn it into a partisan issue; and on the other hand, illiberal processes within Israeli society that widen the gaps in perceptions and values, both in relation to the American public (with an emphasis on the younger generation) and a significant portion of American Jewry (approximately 70% of whom support the Democratic Party). The war has accentuated American Jewry’s internal discord regarding Israel. For example, in a survey conducted by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (May 11, 2024), 30% of respondents agreed that Israel is carrying out a genocide in Gaza. 52% support President Biden’s decision to suspend arms shipments to Israel to deter Israel from launching a Rafah offensive. The Democratic Party-aligned Jewish lobby J Street has called upon the president (May 28, 2024) to expand restrictions on weapons shipments to Israel and expressed opposition to sanctioning the two international courts acting against Israel.

In the months that preceded the Hamas attack, major disagreements between Jerusalem and the Biden administration came to the fore (the judicial reform, handling of the Iranian threat, the Palestinian issue as a whole, aid to Ukraine). The Israeli government’s views on other topics – religion and state, the status of the liberal streams of Judaism, individual rights – intensified alienation and distancing from Israel among American Jews. The challenge the Israel-Hamas War has posed to the resilience of the strategic triangle had its roots in trends already underway.

In the days immediately after October 7, the U.S. stood by Israel unreservedly. President Biden expressed support and an exceptional degree of empathy. He sent two aircraft carriers to the region and warned Israel’s enemies not to join in the fighting (October 10, 2023). He ordered a veto on Security Council resolutions calling for a ceasefire, and flew to Israel for an emotional solidarity visit (October 18, 2023). Two days later, Biden asked Congress to approve a special assistance package to Israel in the amount of $14.3 billion (the package was approved on April 24, 2024). These sweeping expressions of support were accompanied by statements revealing the seeds of the disagreement that deepened later on. The U.S. warned Israel not to repeat the mistakes that the U.S. itself had made after 9/11: Israel was exhorted to avoid creating a humanitarian crisis, to honor the laws of war, to not act out of a desire for vengeance. In a Washington Post article (November 18, 2023), President Biden formulated the “day after” objective based on a policy line completely contrary to the views of the Israeli government. The president set forth guiding principles for achieving the objective: “Gaza must never again be used as a platform for terrorism. There must be no forcible displacement of Palestinians from Gaza, no reoccupation, no siege or blockade, and no reduction in territory… Gaza and the West Bank should be reunited under a single governance structure, ultimately under a revitalized Palestinian Authority, as we all work toward a two-state solution.”

And indeed, as time passed, the disagreements between the countries have become more public and more glaring. Israel has been depicted as fighting without having defined strategic goals for the “day after” from which tactical, on the ground measures could be derived. Even after long months of fighting in Gaza, Israel has not achieved the objectives it announced at the beginning of the war, and the IDF is not, in the view of the U.S., taking care to protect the lives of innocents. The U.S., which leads the negotiations to free the hostages, occasionally expresses dissatisfaction with Israeli positions. In light of Netanyahu’s insistence on permanent Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor, senior American officials are telling the media that the U.S. has the ability to effectively block the Gaza border with Egypt, with no need for an IDF presence there. When President Biden was asked whether Prime Minister Netanyahu is doing enough to achieve a deal to release the hostages, he answered, “No.”

The Biden administration is frustrated by Israel’s failure to accede to its requests, which gives the impression of Israeli ingratitude and disregard for American interests. And opinions are, in fact, being voiced in the U.S., especially in academic settings, that call for a reassessment of U.S. relations with Israel, and for Israel to be treated like any other country – purely on the basis of American interests. At the same time, lawmakers identified with the left-most wing of the Democratic Party are calling for a reassessment of aid to Israel, and for conditioning any aid on Israel’s behavior (the right-wing flank of the Republican Party also poses a challenge to Israel, due to its isolationist foreign-policy approach, which opposes foreign aid).

President Biden, before he withdrew from the presidential race, had drawn both domestic and foreign criticism for his unreserved support for Israel.

Muslim voters threatened to withdraw their support, which was critical for Biden in states where they have the power to tip the balance: Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Ohio.

A month into the war, 500 U.S. officials signed an unusually critical letter protesting Biden’s pro-Israel policy and demanded that he act to promote a ceasefire in Gaza (November 14, 2023). American criticism is growing in light of Israel’s refusal to cooperate with the U.S.-formulated plan aimed at creating a regional defense coalition against the Iranian threat, with normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia. The Israeli government has refused to meet Riyadh’s condition: willingness to pave a diplomatic path toward a two-state solution. Suspicions have even arisen in Washington that Israel is trying to draw the U.S. against its will into a regional war. Israeli government ministers add fuel to the fire with their pronouncements about furthering settlement activity and with settler actions against Palestinians. Against this backdrop, President Biden signed an executive order (February 1, 2024) allowing sanctions to be imposed on those found to be involved in acts of violence in the West Bank. In the letter, the president states that “the situation in the West Bank – in particular high levels of extremist settler violence, forced displacement of people and villages, and property destruction – has reached intolerable levels.” The order prohibits funding anyone subject to the sanctions; in response, Israeli financial institutions, backed by the Bank of Israel, hastened to restrict the settlers’ account activity, out of fear that they would be targeted by American sanctions. This measure could have exceedingly negative consequences for the settlement enterprise in Judea and Samaria. Following the American lead, other countries – the UK, France, Spain, New Zealand – have taken similar measures and a process is underway to embrace this approach within the European Union as a whole. Canada has also sanctioned Amana, the main settlement organization, and revoked the Jewish National Fund’s tax-exempt status due to the complaints of local Palestinians about its activity in the West Bank.

Despite the international criticism, Defense Minister Gallant announced (May 2, 2024) a decision, primarily declarative, that would expand the applicability of the law allowing a return to West Bank areas evacuated in addition to the disengagement from Gaza

President Biden did not mince words when, in an NBC interview (February 27, 2024), he cautioned that “Israel has had the overwhelming support of the cast majority on nations. If it keeps this up with this incredibly conservative government they have, and Ben-Gvir and others… they’re going to lose support from around the world.” The U.S. illustrated its discomfort with Israel’s handling of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza with its aid drop initiative (from March 2, 2024) and with the construction of a floating pier for aid vessels. In his State of the Union address (March 7, 2024), Biden warned Israel not to use humanitarian aid as a “bargaining chip.” He described with great empathy the situation of the Palestinians in Gaza and essentially affirmed the casualty figures about whose validity he had expressed doubts: “More than 30,000 Palestinians have been killed. Most of whom are not Hamas. Thousands and thousands are innocent women and children. Girls and boys also orphaned. Nearly 2 million more Palestinians under bombardment or displaced. Homes destroyed, neighborhoods in rubble, cities in ruin. Families without food, water, medicine. It’s heartbreaking.” Biden said (March 9, 2024) that Netanyahu is “hurting Israel more than helping Israel” (Netanyahu responded that the President was mistaken and that his [Netanyahu’s] policies are supported by most Israelis). The tense relations deteriorated farther when Netanyahu publicly complained (June 18, 2024) that the U.S. had been delaying weapons shipments to Israel in recent months.

Extreme statements by Israeli government ministers such as Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich have caused some Americans to question Israel’s loyalty to the basic values of liberal democracy on which the special relationship between the two countries rests. Minister Amichai Eliyahu stated (November 5, 2023) that dropping an atom bomb on Gaza would be “one means” of fighting Hamas, while Education Minister Yoav Kisch said (November 8, 2023) that he would not rule out a situation in which settlements returned to the Gaza Strip. Ministers Ben-Gvir and Smotrich talk of Palestinian emigration from Gaza, with the former asserting (February 4, 2024) that “if Trump were in charge, the United States would conduct itself altogether differently.” Diaspora Affairs Minister Amichai Chikli declared (April 24, 2024) that “if I were an American citizen with the right to vote, I’d vote for Trump and for the Republicans.” After President Biden announced (May 9,2024) that he would halt weapons shipments to Israel should Israel invade Rafah, Ben-Gvir tweeted “Hamas ️ Biden.”

Israel’s unwillingness to lay out its plans for the “day after” is driving the Biden administration toward an initiative of its own, as revealed in a CBS interview (May 12, 2024) with Secretary of State Blinken: “We’ve been working for many, many weeks on developing credible plans for security, for governance, for rebuilding. We haven’t seen that come from Israel.” U.S. pressure to reach a deal for a ceasefire and the release of hostages and to allow increased humanitarian aid is intensifying. The Senate’s Democratic majority leader, Charles Schumer, the highest ranking Jew in the American government called for elections in Israel and offered this critique of Netanyahu (March 14, 2024): “Prime Minister Netanyahu has lost his way by allowing his political survival to take precedence over the best interests of Israel. He has put himself in coalition with far-right extremists like Ministers Smotrich and Ben Gvir […] Support for Israel worldwide [has declined] to historic lows. Israel cannot survive if it becomes a pariah.” President Biden backed Schumer’s remarks. To Israel’s chagrin, the U.S. refrained from vetoing a Security Council resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire in commemoration of Ramadan, not conditional on the release of the hostages (March 25, 2024). In the wake of the tragic deaths of seven World Central Kitchen aid workers in Gaza (April 3, 2024), Biden said, “Israel has not done enough to protect aid workers trying to deliver desperately needed help to civilians.” In a tense conversation with Netanyahu, he threatened to halt defense and diplomatic aid; he also delayed the provision of heavy munitions. Later (June 4, 2024), he accused Netanyahu of continuing the war for the sake of his personal political interests.

The criticism has also been accompanied by harsh measures, such as the White House’s expression of support for the position earlier embraced by France and Germany – opposition to sanctions on the ICC for anti-Israel conduct.

In contrast to Israel’s traditional policy of cultivating bipartisan support, Israel is becoming a wedge issue in American politics.

Close Trump associate David Friedman, who served as ambassador to Israel under Trump, voiced a grave accusation (April 25, 2024): “Under Joe Biden’s watch, there has been a complete dereliction of duty when it comes to protecting, or even condemning, attacks against the Jewish people.”

This development is intensifying as the November 2024 elections approach. Donald Trump has said (March 19, 2024) that “the Democrat party [sic] hates Israel… Any Jewish person that votes for Democrats hates their religion.” The White House responded to these remarks by calling them “vile antisemitic rhetoric.”

Despite prior concerns, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to the United States went relatively well: Netanyahu was careful not to disclose his preferences regarding the November presidential election; his speech before a joint session of Congress on July 24, 2024 earned standing ovations; and his meeting with President Biden at the White House heralded the end of a period in which the Biden administration treated Netanyahu as an unwanted guest – this despite the fact that the disagreements between the two sides still stand.

The phenomenon of Israel as the subject of political dispute did not bypass the presidential debate (September 10, 2024). Harris expressed her commitment to Israel and its security, supported its right to defend itself, but emphasized, “how it does so matters. Because it is also true far too many innocent Palestinians have been killed. Children, mothers.” Harris clarified, “I will assure you always, I will always give Israel the ability to defend itself, in particular as it relates to Iran and any threat that Iran and its proxies pose to Israel. But we must have a two-state solution where we can rebuild Gaza, where the Palestinians have security, self-determination, and the dignity they so rightly deserve.” Trump repeated his claim that if he had been president, October 7 would not have happened. He accused Harris, saying, “If she’s president, I believe that Israel will not exist within two years from now… she hates Israel. At the same time, in her own way, she hates the Arab population because the whole place is going to get blown up, Arabs, Jewish people, Israel. Israel will be gone.” Regarding Iran, Trump accused the Biden administration of thawing the sanctions he had imposed on Tehran: “They had no money for terror. They were broke. Now they’re a rich nation. And now what they’re doing is spreading that money around.”

One of the main lessons of the past year is that decision-makers in Israel and the Diaspora must formulate a comprehensive strategy for restoring the resilience of the strategic triangle. The fissures that have emerged are especially dangerous because they have called into question the basic principles on which the relationship is founded: common values, coinciding strategic interests, bipartisan support, sympathy on the part of both the American elites and the public at large, and the natural solidarity between Israel and American Jewry.