Tensions between the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) and non-Haredi sectors in Israel have existed for several decades. October 7 and the subsequent war have brought them to a new low. A large majority of Israeli Jews are no longer willing to put up with the Haredi community’s limited partnership in shouldering the burden of ‘Israeliness’. Yet despite the gravity of recent events, most members of the Haredi public have not changed their views on an appropriate degree of partnership in the Israeli national enterprise. At the same time, data on Haredi integration in the labor market also shows a slight retreat, though it is too early to forecast the durability of this trend. It is clear that, in light of growing tensions and the Supreme Court ruling on Haredi conscription and state support for those engaged in Torah study, the sides must make a special effort to find solutions that will meaningfully and constructively alter relations between them and advance Haredi integration into the various circles of Israeli life.

The Haredi Community: Basic Data
At the end of 2023 Israel’s Haredi community numbered 1,335,000, 13.6% of the total population. The Haredi community is the fastest-growing group in the West, with a 4% annual growth rate (versus a 1.4% growth rate for the general Jewish population). Although the Haredi fertility rate has moderated slightly in recent years, it is still very high. Due to the high Haredi fertility rate of 6.4 children per woman, this population is also very young. Half of the Haredi sector is under the age of 16. If this growth rate continues, the ultra-Orthodox will account for 16% of Israel’s population in 2030; in 2065 32% of all Israelis and 40% of Israeli Jews will be Haredi. It should be noted that, over the course of the year, somewhat different figures were published on the size of the Haredi community, which attest to a more moderate growth rate. But even this data portend a dramatic increase in the number of Haredim versus other groups, and do not significantly reduce the magnitude of the challenge. The size of the Haredi community is strongly reflected in Israel’s education system. Even today, 26% of students in the Hebrew education streams, and 20% of all Israeli students, are ultra-Orthodox.

These basic data points pose a current and continuing challenge for Israeli society. If the Haredi community’s growth trends persist, and Haredi integration into the circles of Israeliness – the IDF, economic productivity, and the labor market – remain unchanged, the state’s ability to maintain prosperity will be tested. Israel’s main challenges are: the security challenge, the socioeconomic challenge, and the social challenge. Because this challenges are intertwined, state intervention tools are necessary if we are to address Haredi integration in a comprehensive and systemic way. The challenges and policy tools that could be employed to improve the situation are presented below.

The Security Challenge
Haredi participation in bearing Israel’s heavy security burden has been a contentious issue within Israeli society for five decades. In 1998, the High Court of Justice ruled that the Haredi draft exemption could no longer be granted at the discretion of the defense minister; if the state wishes to exempt ultra-Orthodox from IDF service, it must do so equitably and through legislation. The ruling was the opening gambit in a two-decade failed effort to draft Haredim. Over the course of those years, a “conscription law” was legislated three times in the Knesset only to be repeatedly nullified by the High Court, most recently in 2017, which ruled against the law as an affront to equality.

Over the years, in response to legislation and public demand for Haredi conscription, the IDF made efforts to increase the number of Haredim in its ranks. The goal was to meet the conscription targets set by the laws and to ameliorate the burden-sharing situation, thereby preserving the “people’s army” model. These efforts failed. Today, after more than two decades of IDF investment of energies and resources, only slightly over 10% of the draft-eligible Haredim in each conscription cycle actually serve in the army. Of those who serve in “Haredi frameworks,” many are former Haredim or non-Haredi.

Until October 7, public debate on Haredi military service revolved around the issue of equality in national burden-sharing, that is, the need to distribute the security burden more equitably among all segments of Israeli society. The way the war started, and its subsequent prosecution, have forcing Israel and the IDF to significantly change their approach toward force buildup. Before October 7, the defense concept (conceptzia in Hebrew parlance) almost entirely relied on advance warning from Israel’s intelligence apparatus, with a limited defensive force on the borders to thwart point-specific attacks. October 7 proved that Israel can no longer rely solely on these measures. To address the country’s current and anticipated security challenges, the IDF will have to maintain a much larger “order of battle”.

Today, there are about 14,000 young Haredim per conscription cycle, constituting 10% of each cycle. The number of those aged 18-26 who are exempt from IDF service has surged to a high of 66,000. These numbers will rise quickly, and the percentage of the ultra-Orthodox among all enlistment candidates is expected to become increasingly significant. In order to fill the army’s ranks, which are expected to grow, Haredi conscription is required, not just for the sake of greater equality, but because security needs demand it.

As noted, in 2017, the High Court nullified the Haredi Exemption Law. In June 2024, after seven years in which the Knesset failed to pass an alternative conscription law, the court ruled that the army must draft them. The court further ruled that as long as the exemption is not codified in law, the state cannot continue funding Haredim who do not enlist. In light of this ruling, the political system is working on a new law to address the exemption issue and the scope of the service exemption to be granted to the Haredim. This is happening in the midst of a heated dispute between the coalition and the opposition over the issue, and a lack of consensus within the coalition, which places the current Knesset’s ability to pass such legislation in doubt. At the same time, the IDF has announced that it will be fulfilling its responsibility to draft Haredim and has begun laying the groundwork.

In response, the Haredi community, at least outwardly, has closed ranks and exhibits overwhelming opposition to the draft. This is evident both among the leadership, which opposes conscription even for Haredim not engaged in Torah study, and among the broader Haredi public. Surveys show that even in the middle of a war a large majority of Haredim oppose the draft, and an absolute majority are unwilling to enlist. The diverging views between the Haredim and the general public on this issue signals an escalation of tension around Haredi conscription, which could slide into actual conflict.

The Economic Challenge
The Haredim are the poorest social sector in Israel. 34% of Haredim (as of 2021) live below the poverty line, compared to 15% among non-Haredi Jews. Forty-seven percent of Haredi children live in poverty, compared to 13% among non-Haredi Jews. That said, the incidence of poverty among Haredim has declined somewhat since its 2015 high of 39%.

Factors behind the depth of Haredi poverty: low male participation in the labor market; the relatively low wages earned by women; and the high number of occupants per household. The central ethos of Torah study is the ideological tether that holds the ultra-Orthodox “society of learners” in place. That is why labor market participation for Haredi men is 53% (2022), versus 87% for non-Haredi Jewish men. Those Haredi men who do work earn very low wages. A Haredi man earns, on average, just 50% of what a non-Haredi Jewish man earns. The gap is due to both lower hourly wages and fewer work hours than non-Haredi men. The main reasons for the low hourly wage are the lack of skills suited to the labor market, and the high share of Haredi men who work within the community in the education field (29% ), where wages are relatively low.

The situation is better for Haredi women. The labor-market participation rate of ultra-Orthodox women is high (80%) and nearly identical to that of non-Haredi Jewish women (85%). However, their wages are relatively low, amounting on average to 67% of what non-Haredi Jewish women earn. Here too, the disparity stems from a higher prevalence of part-time work and, to some degree, lower hourly wages. Unfortunately, for most parameters related to labor and income, there has been no real improvement in recent years.
Low labor-market participation rates and low wages lead to a daunting discrepancy between Haredi and non-Haredi Jews in terms of the country’s economic burden. This is starkly reflected in tax payments, on one hand, and the receipt of transfer payments, benefits, and other state services, on the other. A comprehensive study examined total tax burden by population sector, alongside transfer payments, other benefits, and the value of the state services provided to citizens. It found a deep incongruity between what non-Haredi Jewish households contribute to the state coffers and what the Haredi households receive from the state. On average, Haredi households receive ILS 4,107 per month, compared to non-Haredi Jewish households which provide the state with ILS 6,115.

When all of the services received by Israeli citizens and the average value of their net transfer payments are taken into consideration, the gap proves even larger. Further, 80% of Haredi households show a positive balance of benefits versus tax payments to the state, versus the 70% of non-Haredi households for which the “balance” vis-à-vis the state is negative.

Haredi education channels men to many years of religious study that end, if at all, no earlier than their mid-20s. Even if they were taught “core subjects” in an educational framework of limited scope and quality during their primary school years, their ability and willingness to pursue non-religious studies once they leave the beit midrash (study hall) are limited. Thus, despite a certain improvement in the number of Haredi men with academic degrees. which allow them to earn more, most do not choose this path and remain limited in their earning capacity.

The situation is unsatisfactory for Haredi women as well. Most do enroll in high school frameworks that include secular subjects. But the share of Haredi women eligible for matriculation certificates is low – 25% versus 86% in the non-Haredi Jewish school system. The percentage of Haredi woman with academic degrees is higher than that of Haredi men. However, the degree studies are strongly oriented toward education, and the low number of those who pursue more remunerative academic degrees, lead most Haredi women to lower-than-average earning capacity.

The various kinds of state support and payments provided to the ultra-Orthodox, and the low earning capacity of Haredi men, create very limited incentives for Haredi men to join the work force. Calculations show that the monthly break-even point for an avrech (married Torah scholar) is, on average, a little over a thousand shekels. It is therefore understandable, given the accompanying loss of social status involved, that many Haredi men prefer to remain outside the labor market.

The challenge of Haredi integration in the Israeli economy is significant. Despite ongoing efforts on the part of the state and nongovernmental organizations to improve the situation, the rate of change does keep pace with the Haredi sector’s demographic growth rate. Only meaningful change in curricula, and in the willingness to participate in the labor market, can extricate the ultra-Orthodox from poverty and enable Israel to remain a net-positive welfare state.

The Cohesion Challenge
The conscription and economic challenges, as well as the significant ideological differences between Haredi and most non-Haredi Israelis, are deepening the rift between the Haredim and the rest of Israeli society. This rift, which has eroded societal cohesion, is not new. But the war, and the unwillingness of the ultra-Orthodox to share in the weighty security burden, have intensified the crisis. For example, the Jewish People Policy Institute’s Israeli Society Index for February 2024 shows that 44% of Israelis have negative feelings toward the Haredim. Of all the various Jewish subgroups in Israel, the Haredi community evokes the greatest amount of negative sentiment. Accordingly, most Haredim (55%) believe that secular Israelis have a grudge against them.

The cohesion challenge is also evident in the major ideological differences between the ultra-Orthodox community and the majority of Israel’s Jews on a variety of issues. The most striking difference, as noted above, pertains to IDF conscription. Although an absolute majority of young Haredi men are unwilling to enlist, a large majority of Israelis believe that they should serve in the army. But the ideological differences also manifest in an array of other issues.

For example, only a small majority of Haredim (57%) believe that equality is a basic element of democracy, compared with the rest of Israel’s Jews, who overwhelmingly believe that it is (75%). Regarding the need for a balance between government authorities, the disparity is much larger; only 30% of Haredim believe that a balance of powers is a fundamental component of democracy, versus 67% of non-Haredi Jews. Another significant gap, and perhaps an understandable one given the Haredi community’s fundamentally alienated attitude toward the state, relates to Haredi trust in the state’s non-political institutions (the army, the police, the courts, etc.). Haredi trust in those institutions is generally the lowest of all Jewish subgroups. Over the years, the Haredi public has also voiced relatively extreme views regarding Israel’s Arab minority.
For the last three decades, Haredi integration in the various circles of Israeli life has been a social-economic-security challenge. Awareness of that challenge among decision-makers, and to a certain degree among the broader public, is high. Over the course of these decades, many attempts have been made to mitigate the situation, and to integrate the ultra-Orthodox into all of the relevant societal arenas. Unfortunately, those efforts have had little effect.

In light of the Haredi community’s rapid demographic growth, the need for change will only intensify. Meanwhile, given the fact that Haredi political power is growing as the community grows, and because the sector’s main goal is to safeguard the Haredi way of life, the ability to generate change is waning. In order to effect positive change, all Israelis must join forces, Haredi and non-Haredi, out of an understanding that in the central areas of our lives, the current situation poses a challenge to Israel’s continued prosperity.

Recommendations
The challenge of integrating the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) community into Israeli society has been on the public and state agenda for 25 years. Much has been done to integrate Haredim into military service, the workforce, and other circles of Israeli life. The success of these considerable efforts has so far been limited. The only notable success was in integrating women into the labor market. In order to effect a significant change in the trends described in this document, there must be a significant mobilization of Israeli society and the political will to bring about change. If this happens, change can be achieved along three main axes of action:

Education: Fundamental change must be introduced in the education of Haredi boys to enable them to acquire skills, throughout their years of schooling (as opposed to dropping “core secular subjects” in high school). This would allow them to obtain an education that will enable them to earn a decent living.

Military Service: The pattern of exemption from IDF service to which the ultra-Orthodox have been accustomed since the establishment of the state will not change even if the exemption is formally abolished. Only the creation of a network of significant incentives and sanctions, over a period of years, will be able to influence the willingness of Haredim to enlist in the army.

Employment: To significantly increase employment rates and wages for ultra-Orthodox men, it is necessary to drastically reduce the incentives for not working (government subsidies for the Haredi lifestyle) and create positive incentives for integrating into productive employment. These measures should be enacted for a long enough period of time to effectively influence current trends.

Endnotes
1 Source: Gilad Malach and Lee Cahaner, The Yearbook of Ultra-Orthodox Society in Israel, 2023, The Israel Democracy Institute, 2024.
2 Eitan Regev and Yehudit Miletzky, Report on the State of Haredi Society, 2023, The Haredi Institute for Public Affairs, 2024.
3 “What the Haredim Think: Are the Secular Angry that They Don’t Enlist, and What’s the Solution?”
Kikar HaShabat, 28.3.2024
(https://www.kikar.co.il/haredim-news/sb1)
4 Source: Israeli Democracy Index 2023, The Israel Democracy Institute.