JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People Index – January 2025
A third of respondents think the hostage release deal and the ceasefire constitute a victory for Hamas and a defeat for Israel.
- A rise in the percentage of respondents who say they believe Israel lost the war.
- A third of the respondent panel believes that the new Trump administration deserves more credit for the deal than the Biden administration, and another third believes the opposite to be true.
- A significant drop in the percentage of politically conservative Jews who are confident that Trump will “do the right thing” regarding relations with Israel.
- Most survey respondents are not confident that Trump will do a good job in the spheres of democracy, the economy, immigration, foreign relations, and security/defense.
- A decline was detected in the sense of personal security among Jews of all religious streams due to the war in Israel.
- A majority of the respondent panel (54%) feels that the United States does not support Israel enough.
- A majority of the respondent panel agrees that “Israel is the safest place for Jews to live”; a smaller majority agrees with the assertion that “the US is the safest place for Jews to live” (based on two separate survey questions).
- Half of the respondent panel says it’s easier for them to forge friendships with Jews (than with non-Jews).
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A general comment about the survey period: Data was collected between January 16 and 19, a few days prior to Donald Trump’s inauguration as the 47th President of the United States, and after an agreement was signed for the release of 33 hostages and a temporary ceasefire in Gaza. The past month was marked by a joint offensive by the IDF, the US, and the UK against Yemen, the continuation of Houthi drone and missile fire on central Israel, and two terror attacks in Tel Aviv.
A general comment about the respondent panel: After a full year of activity and following a detailed analysis of the data on respondent panel participants – their demographic composition and views – we will begin, starting this month, to include aggregate figures that reflect the position of the panel as an entirety. This signals the maturation of the Voice of the Jewish People surveys and the stabilization of the respondent panel, in such a way that we can now represent them as a fixed group, where the trends observed among them have, in our view, a significance that reaches beyond their breakdown into sub-groups by religious stream (Reform, Conservative, ultra-Orthodox, etc.), or political orientation (liberal, conservative, centrist and the like).
The group of American Jews whose views are expressed in JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People surveys consists predominantly of those with a relatively strong connection to Jewish identity, and/or Jewish institutions, and/or Israel. Our interest in this group is precisely due to that characterization. On average, this group is more active in the Jewish community, more connected to Jewish institutions of various kinds, contributes more to Jewish causes, identifies with Jewish struggles, and in many cases functions as the backbone of the larger American Jewish community – the largest outside of Israel. (JPPI tracks the views of Jewish Israelis via its monthly Israeli Society Index.) Therefore, there is a special significance to regularly and systematically monitoring the views, sentiments, and activities of this connected group, frequently and in an orderly way. This report includes a methodological appendix that details the composition of the Voice of the Jewish People panel, and the differences between JPPI’s survey and other surveys of American Jewry.
The Hostage Release Deal and the Ceasefire
As we began gathering data for this month’s survey, an agreement was reached on a hostage deal and a temporary ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. The deal was jointly brokered by the US, Qatar, and Egypt after long months of negotiation. Several of the questions posed this month examined respondent views regarding the agreement, which sparked controversy in Israel and around the world.
A third (33%) of respondents believe the agreement is a win for Hamas and a defeat for Israel, 31% maintain that it is a victory for both Israel and Hamas, 9% think it constitutes a defeat for both Israel and Hamas, and 7% think it is a win for Israel and a defeat for Hamas. Half of the liberal respondents believe the agreement is a victory for both Israel and Hamas, while most of their conservative counterparts regard it as a victory for Hamas and a defeat for Israel. Accordingly, in a breakdown by voting pattern, most Trump voters (61%) consider the agreement a victory for Hamas and a defeat for Israel, compared to 42% of Harris voters who believe it is a victory for both Israel and Hamas.
Many Israeli and American Jews credit the deal to the new president. A third of the American respondents feel that the nascent Trump administration deserves more credit for achieving the deal than the outgoing Biden administration, while a third give most of the credit to the Biden administration. A fifth (18%) of the respondent panel believes that neither the outgoing administration nor the incoming one deserves much credit for the deal, while an eighth (12%) gives equal credit to the two administrations. The majority of the “strong liberal” cohort (54%) thinks the Biden administration deserves more credit for the deal, while most in the “strong conservative” group (64%) believe that the Trump administration deserves more credit. Among those who self-identify as politically “centrist,” 39% believe that the incoming administration deserves more credit for the deal, compared to 18% who credit the outgoing administration.
Confidence in Trump
With Donald Trump’s inauguration approaching, we looked at the levels of confidence among American Jews in the incoming president across a variety of spheres. As expected, the level of confidence in Trump expressed by conservative Jews is significantly higher than among liberal Jews.
A similar trend is evident when the results are broken down by religiosity level – the further one moves along the religious spectrum from Reform to ultra-Orthodox, the higher the confidence in Trump’s future actions. Of the five areas on which we questioned respondents – democracy, the economy, immigration, foreign policy and security/defense – immigration and security garnered the highest levels of respondent confidence. The area that netted Trump the lowest level of confidence was his future handling of or, more precisely, his future impact on, democracy. Sixty-four percent of American respondents have no confidence in Trump in this sphere.
An overwhelming majority among the liberal cohorts (“strong liberal” + “leaning liberal”) does not believe Trump will do a good job with respect to democracy. Some 60% of those belonging to the centrist group concur. By contrast, most of those in the “leaning conservative” (56%) and “strong conservative” (81%) groups have confidence in Trump in the democracy sphere.
Most of the conservative respondent cohort trusts Trump with regard to the economy, while most liberals do not have confidence in him in this area. Among the centrist cohort, 46% have no confidence in Trump in the economic sphere, while 35% do have confidence in him. In a breakdown by religiosity level, we see a similar distribution – most ultra-Orthodox (77%) and Orthodox Jews (58%) have confidence in Trump in the economic sphere, while most Conservative (59%) and Reform Jews (74%) do not have confidence in the incoming president with regard to the economy.
On immigration, too, the new president enjoys a high degree of confidence among politically conservative Jews – 97% of “strong conservatives” and 85% of the “leaning conservative” group say they trust Trump in this sphere. By contrast, the majority of those in the “strong liberal” (97%) and “leaning liberal” cohorts say that they do not have confidence that Trump will do a good job on immigration.
Compared to the immigration and the economic spheres, Trump elicits lower confidence in foreign relations among “strong conservatives.” As with the other spheres, most liberal respondents (“strong liberal” + “leaning liberal”) attest to having no confidence in Trump when it comes to foreign relations. In the centrist cohort, the share of those who say they have no confidence in Trump with respect to foreign affairs (47%) is higher than the share who say they do (30%).
Half of the respondent panel (52%) does not trust Trump in the security and defense sphere. Most conservatives do trust him in this area, as do half of those in the centrist cohort (47%). Most liberal respondents also say they have no confidence that Trump will do a good job with respect to security and defense.
Further to last month’s Voice of the Jewish People survey, we looked again this month at how confident the respondent panel is that Trump will “do the right thing” in four areas – US-Israel relations, the fight against antisemitism, Iran, and the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Respondents expressed the highest degree of confidence in Trump around Iran. Trump’s future handling of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict elicited the least confidence.
A quarter (28%) of all respondents say they have a lot of confidence that Trump will do the right thing regarding US-Israel relations, a quarter say they have no confidence that Trump will do the right thing in this sphere, and 37% say that they have a little confidence that he will do the right thing in maintaining the relationship between the two countries. Compared to last month, there was a significant decline of 20% in the share of the conservative cohorts (strong conservative + leaning conservative) who say they are confident that Trump will do the right thing with regard to US-Israel relations.
A quarter (26%) of the respondent panel has a lot of confidence that Trump will “do the right thing” regarding the fight against antisemitism, a quarter (27%) say they have little confidence in Trump on this matter, and 40% say they have no confidence at all that he will do the right thing in fighting antisemitism. Most conservative respondents (“strong conservative” + “leaning conservative” ) have a lot of confidence in Trump in this regard, while most liberal respondents (“strong liberal” + “leaning liberal”) say they have no confidence at all. Compared with last month, there was a decline in the confidence level of those in the “leaning conservative” group on this issue – last month 69% of them said that they had a lot of confidence that Trump will act appropriately in this sphere; this month the corresponding figure was 52%.
A third of respondents (30%) have a lot of confidence that Trump will do the right thing in dealing with Iran, a third (29%) have little confidence, and a third (31%) have no confidence at all in him on the Iran issue. Most politically conservative respondents and a third of self-identifying centrists (34%) have a lot of confidence that Trump will do the right thing regarding Iran. By contrast, most “strong liberals” (66%) and 40% of those “leaning liberal” report having no confidence in Trump where Iran is concerned. On this issue as well, a decline was found this month in the level of confidence placed in Trump among the “leaning conservative” cohort – last month, 69% said they had a lot of confidence in Trump vis-à-vis Iran, while this month 56% responded this way.
Forty-five percent of the respondent panel has no confidence that the new president will do the right thing regarding the Israeli-Palestinian issue, a quarter (27%) say they have little confidence, and only 16% say they have a lot of confidence in Trump in this regard. A large majority of “strong liberals” (81%), half of those in the “leaning liberal” cohort, and a fifth of those self-identifying as centrist (22%) say they have no confidence that Trump will do the right thing regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. By contrast, most “strong conservatives” (56%), a quarter of those in the “leaning conservative” cohort (23%), and a fifth of self-identifying centrists (18%) report having a lot of confidence that Trump will act appropriately on this issue. In a breakdown by religiosity level – 45% of ultra-Orthodox respondents and a fifth of the Orthodox cohort say they have a lot of confidence that Trump will do the right thing in addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Support for Israel
A majority of the respondent panel (54%) believes that the United States does not support Israel enough, 30% believe the US supports Israel enough, while 11% think the US supports Israel too much. This finding shows no change compared to previous months. The disparity consistently found on this question between the strong liberal cohort and the other groups remains unchanged this month as well: among conservatives and centrists, the dominant response is that the US does not support Israel enough. By contrast, in the “strong liberal” group, 33% feel that the US supports Israel too much.
In a breakdown by denominational affiliation, most Conservative, Orthodox, and ultra-Orthodox respondents say the US does not support Israel enough. Thirty-nine percent of Reform, 30% of Conservative, and 23% of Orthodox respondents believe that the US supports Israel enough.
The vast majority of Trump voters (90%) and a third of Harris voters (32%) think the US does not support Israel enough. Forty-four percent of Harris voters feel that the US supports Israel enough, while 17% of them believe that the US supports Israel too much.
Israel at War
This month we again examined how American Jews view the question of Israeli victory. Like last month, there is no consensus among respondents on this issue. The further one moves along the ideological spectrum from liberal to conservative, the higher the percentage of respondents who believe that Israel won the war. Most conservatives, 21% of centrists, 14% of the “leaning liberal” cohort, and 13% of the “strong liberal” cohort feel this way. A significant number of respondents feel that Israel has neither won nor lost the war. A low percentage across cohorts think Israel has lost the war, while an eighth to a quarter across all groups believe it is too early to say who won.
This month, there was a significant drop in the percentage of respondents who believe that Israel has won the war. Last month, 37% said they thought Israel was victorious, while only 19% thought so this month. At the same time, there has been a rise in the share of panel participants who think that Israel has lost the war. Last month only 5% felt this way, while 14% gave that response this month.
This month saw another drop in the percentage of “leaning liberal” respondents who think Israel’s actions in Gaza are “too aggressive.” Beyond that, no significant changes were found compared to earlier months on the question of Israeli aggressiveness. The share of conservatives who feel that Israel is overly aggressive has remained very low since early 2024, while the percentage of liberals and self-identifying centrists who feel this way has been on the rise almost every month – until the past few months, when the intensity of the fighting eased.
As of January, 39% of survey panel respondents feel that Israel’s actions in response to the October 7 onslaught are “not aggressive enough,” a fifth (22%) believe that Israel’s actions are at the right level, 15% think that they are a little too aggressive, and a fifth (18%) feel that they are much too aggressive. The further one moves along the religious spectrum from liberal to conservative, the higher the share of those who think that Israel’s response to Hamas is not aggressive enough.
Sense of Security
Most panel participants continue to report that the war in Israel compromises their sense of security to some degree. Forty percent say they feel less secure due to the war, and another 36% say that they are more worried about their personal security as Jews as a result of the war. A fifth report that Israel’s war does not affect their sense of personal security. The data indicates that the personal security level of those in the liberal cohorts is slightly lower than for respondents in the conservative groups. All groups show the persistence of a similar share, amounting to a fifth of their members, who say the war does not affect their sense of security.
There was a rise this month in the share of connected American Jews, from all religious streams, who say they feel less secure because of the war in Israel. Ultra-Orthodox respondents showed the most significant increase; last month, the share of this cohort who felt this way was 28%, while this month it was 41%. However, this finding should be treated with caution, as the percentage of ultra-Orthodox survey participants is not large. Compared to the same point in time last year, the sense of security among Reform and ultra-Orthodox respondents has weakened, while the sense of security among Conservative and Orthodox respondents has improved slightly.
This month, we also queried respondents about their views regarding Israel and the US as a “safe place for Jews to live.” Most respondents (63%) feel that Israel is “the safest place for Jews to live” (totally agree + somewhat agree with the statement). It is interesting to compare this finding with those of an identical question posed to Israeli Jews last month (in an Israel Democracy Institute survey). According to those findings, 73% of Israeli Jews think that Israel is the place where Jews can most safely live.
Among American Jews who answered this question, the percentage of respondents who think Israel is the safest place for Jews to live rises the further one moves along the ideological spectrum from liberal to conservative. While most “strong liberals” (51%) do not agree with the statement “Israel is the safest place for Jews to live,” most “strong conservatives” (77%) believe that the statement is correct. A breakdown by voting pattern shows that most Trump voters (77%) and most Harris voters (52%) agree that Israel is the safest place for Jews.
A similar question presented respondents with the statement: “The US is the safest place for Jews to live.” Nearly half the respondents (46%) somewhat agree with this statement. A third (31%) somewhat disagree with the statement, while less than 10% totally agree or disagree with it. Compared with the previous question, we can see that a higher percentage of survey panel respondents feel that Israel (63%) is safer for Jews than the US (54%). It should be noted that the questions were posed separately, and both could be responded to with affirmative agreement or disagreement to varying degrees. A fifth of respondents, in fact, said that both Israel and the US are the safest places for Jews to live.
Closeness to Israel and to Judaism
We have assessed the connection of US Jews to Israel several times since the October 7 attacks. Over the past year, there has been a consistent respondent majority who assert that the events of the past year have caused them to feel closer to Israel. At the same time, there has also been a consistent percentage (10-16%) who say that these events make them feel more distant from Israel and a similarly consistent share of a quarter who report no difference in their feelings one way or the other.
This month there was a slight drop in the percentage of respondents across all ideological cohorts who say that events in Israel make them feel closer to Israel. This month recorded the lowest percentage of “strong liberal,” “centrist,” and “strong conservative” respondents who reported that what is happening in Israel makes them feel closer to Israel. As of this moment, a quarter (28%) of “strong liberals,” half of the “leaning liberal” cohort, and most conservatives and centrists say that what is currently going on in Israel makes them feel closer to the country.
Friend Groups
We included a question this month about respondents’ social lives. Half (52%) reported that it’s easier for them to forge friendships with Jews, while another 46% said that whether someone is Jewish or not has no bearing on their ability to build a friendship with them. The further one moves along the religious spectrum from Reform to ultra-Orthodox, the higher the share responding that it’s easier to forge friendships with Jews than with non-Jews. It is also worth noting the correlation between the rise in respondent share more comfortable making friends with Jews, and the number of Israel visits. While a third (31%) of respondents who have never visited Israel say that it’s easier for them to build relationships with Jews, two-thirds (64%) of those who have lived in Israel for a period of time say this.
In a question about friendship with Israelis, most respondent panel participants (66%) report that whether someone is Israeli or not has no effect on their ability to forge a friendship with them. A fifth (22%) say that it’s easier for them to build friendships with Israelis. A quarter of all respondents say that it’s easier for them to forge friendships with both Jews and Israelis.
Survey Data and Its Implications
This report is an analysis of a survey administered to 734 American Jews registered for JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People respondent panel. The report includes an appendix describing panel member characteristics, and differences between it and American-Jewish groups surveyed by other organizations.
In general, it can be said that JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People surveys tend to reflect the views of “connected” American Jews, that is, Jews with a relatively strong attachment to the Jewish community and/or Israel, and/or to Jewish identity.
Appendix: Methodology
After a year of continuous activity and following a detailed analysis of the data on JPPI’s respondent panel, its composition and views, we will now, starting this month, publish a general statistic that reflects the position of what we will be referring to here as “connected American Jews.” This reflects a maturation of the Voice of the Jewish People panel and the stabilization of the survey respondent sample in a way that allows us to now represent it as a coherent group. The trends observed among this group, in our view, have a significance that reaches beyond breakdowns into sub-groups based on religious stream (Reform, Conservative, ultra-Orthodox, etc.), or political orientation (liberal, conservative, centrist).
The group of connected Jews we are tracking is – as the designation suggests – a group whose degree of connection to the Jewish people, the Jewish community, Jewish institutions, Jewish identity, and/or Israel is strong – certainly compared to American Jewry writ large. To illustrate the group’s characteristics, we present here a few comparisons between connected Jews and US Jewry more broadly. Our underlying assumption is that there is value and interest in its frequent and continuous monitoring, along with less-frequent tracking of American Jewry in general, given that a certain dominance can be ascribed to it in setting the American Jewish community’s “agenda,” to the extent that the community has an identifiable and distinct voice.
The “connected” group is not, of course, identical in composition to the American Jewish community as a whole, and its views are not representative of all US Jews. On certain issues, the differences between our respondent panel and the wider US Jewish community are substantial and significant. On many other subjects, the gaps are negligible. Either way, regular tracking of the connected Jewish community certainly doesn’t obviate the need for periodic consideration and assessment of the views of American Jewry as a whole, as conducted by a variety of organizations.
What does this mean in practical terms? It means that starting this month, a single weighted response will be presented for every question in the Voice of the Jewish People surveys – a response that expresses the aggregate view of our respondent panel. These general-result statistics will be presented after weighting by religious stream and political orientation, in order to maintain consistency from survey to survey. Alongside these statistics, we will also, as usual, present sub-breakdowns by religious stream, ideological camp, and other characteristics as needed (age, connection to Jewish institutions, voting patterns, Israel visits, and the like). Month-to-month trend shifts will also continue to be monitored. As part of the analysis, we will, of course note the specific origins of the shifts, if any (for example: strong liberal Jews changed their view, causing the total to change, while in other cases strong-conservative Jews changed their view, causing the total to change).
The framework of the connected community, as presented in the Voice of the Jewish People surveys this year, was established after an in-depth assessment of data from JPPI surveys and other surveys of American Jewry – the Pew Research Center’s comprehensive survey from the start of the decade figuring chiefly among them. The Voice of the Jewish People scientific adviser, Professor David Steinberg of Tel Aviv University, examined JPPI’s respondent panel, the major characteristics of panel participants over the course of a year’s activity, against the characteristics of respondents to other surveys of American Jews. This assessment enables us to set a framing standard that will be maintained via the sampling and weighting of data, such that the significance of responses given from month to month will remain the same – because the group surveyed will remain the same. In other words, the connected American Jews of January and the connected American Jews of December will have similar characteristics, making it possible to reach meaningful and insightful conclusions from changes and trends we will detect moving forward.
A central characteristic of JPPI’s respondent panel, which can be compared with the general American Jewish population, concerns the degree of representation of “religious streams.” In general, our panel of connected Jews has a higher representation of Jews affiliated with religious streams and a higher incidence of religious activity. The Panel’s share of Orthodox Jews is three times higher than in the general Jewish population, while the percentage of Conservatives is nearly double. The percentage reporting affiliation with “other” streams is much larger – nearly one out of every six respondents versus 1 out of every 25 in the general American Jewish population. A group that is significantly underrepresented vis-à-vis American Jewry as a whole comprises Jews who are unaffiliated with any recognized stream of Judaism. The table below shows the representation of religious groups on the JPPI’s panel in comparison with Pew data.
As part of our data analysis on the entire respondent panel, and on the 2024 survey participants, we looked at many variables such as religious-stream affiliation (Reform, Conservative, Orthodox, ultra-Orthodox, other), political orientation, levels of Jewish identity and parental identity, visits to Israel, connection to Israel, and traditional practices. In some cases, the possible responses to questions are worded differently in different surveys, which may explain incongruities in the findings. Even so, there are major points that are easy to identify. Nearly all of JPPI’s panel participants are Jews “by religion” (96% versus 73% of the American Jewish community as a whole, per Pew data). A large majority of JPPI’s panel participants report that both of their parents are Jews (84% versus 69% per Pew data on all US Jews).
Assessment of panel data on religious practices also enables us to make certain comparisons with other surveys that examine American Jewry as a whole. For example, 83% of JPPI respondents reported having attended a Passover seder, compared to 62% in a Pew survey of American Jews (albeit from a different year). On Yom Kippur, 47% of JPPI’s respondent panel reported having fully fasted, and another 27% had engaged in a partial fast – for a total of 74%. In the Pew survey (2020), 46% reported having engaged in a partial or complete fast. Although these differences do not refer to the same year, there is clearly a disparity between surveys that does not reflect a sudden leap in the percentage of those observing the traditional Yom Kippur fast, but is rather a reflection of the fact that our panel comprises “connected” Jews whose level of traditional observance is higher. Similarly, with the approach of Hanukkah and Christmas, most Voice of the Jewish People survey respondents reported that they were planning to light Hanukkah candles on each of the holiday’s eight nights. The candle-lighting rate in JPPI’s survey is also higher than in other surveys of American Jewry as a whole, 90% of the JPPI respondent panel reported lighting candles every night (or most nights). A large majority of our respondent panel participants (90%) said that there would be no Christmas trees in their homes. This is a higher percentage than that obtained by the Pew Research Center in 2013, when 32% of US Jews said that they would have Christmas trees in their homes during that survey year’s holiday period (27% of Jews by religion).
The most striking component of how JPPI’s respondent panel reflects the identity of “connected” Jews has to do with connection to Israel. Over six out of every ten panel participants have visited Israel more than once; only one in five of them have never visited Israel. This is a markedly different finding than that obtained for the American Jewish community as a whole.
Similarly, and perhaps most strikingly, a higher percentage of JPPI panel participants report a stronger connection to Israel than do American Jews in general. In this case, the wording of the question is not identical to the Pew survey, but a reasonable comparison of categories points to the difference. Comparison to other surveys reveals similar findings. For example, a 2021 AJC survey included a question about the importance of connection to Israel for Jewish identity (“How important, if at all, is being connected with Israel to your Jewish identity?”). In the survey’s findings, which represent American Jewry in its entirety (though with some differences from the Pew survey), 29% said that connection with Israel was “very important,” and 31% said it was “somewhat important.” The JPPI panel reflects, in general, the views of Jews whose attachment to Israel is clearly stronger than the broader American Jewish population.
Regarding political orientation, the JPPI panel has a slightly, though not significantly, more conservative bent than American Jewry as a whole. The following table provides a comparison with the Pew survey used in all of the comparisons, but juxtapositions with other surveys have been made as well. For example, the 2014 AJC survey, which regularly skews more conservative, categorized American Jews as follows: 29% liberal, 19% leaning liberal, 32% “moderate” (as opposed to the JPPI designation “centrist”), 9% leaning conservative, and 11% conservative (1% did not respond). Overall, the AJC survey found 47% of US Jews to be liberal (a finding in line with JPPI surveys), 32% “moderate” (lower than in JPPI surveys), and 20% conservative, versus 28% for the JPPI panel.
In JPPI’s ongoing research, our goal is to continue monitoring respondent panel characteristics and, when needed, to update the group framework and, accordingly, the way trends we track are presented. Because the panel is still in an early stage of development, such assessments will be made every six months. The framework evaluations will also be carried out during periods of dramatic increase in the number of panel participants (after a participant-recruitment campaign).