American Jews on the War in Israel, the November Presidential Election, and the High Holidays

Main Findings

• There are significant gaps between Harris and Trump voters on key voting issues: Israel, antisemitism, and immigration
• A very low share of the American Jews surveyed feel that US-Israel relations will improve if Harris is elected
• Most Jewish Trump voters feel that Israel’s actions in Lebanon are not aggressive enough
• A rise in “strong liberal” Jews critical of Israeli aggressiveness in Gaza and US support for Israel
• Israel was a topic of conversation at Rosh Hashanah meals in most American Jewish homes
• The share of American Jews who fast on Yom Kippur is higher among those who visit Israel most frequently

A general comment about the time period: Data was gathered October 14-20, less than a month before the US presidential election. The survey was conducted during the week Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader and mastermind of the October 7 massacre, was eliminated. The past month also saw the assassination in Lebanon of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, the start of IDF ground operations in Lebanon, and a second Iranian attack on Israel.

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The US Presidential Race

As the US presidential race nears its end, polls continue to show an extremely close contest between Kamala Harris and Donald Trump. Our survey points to a slow but continuous rise over the past few months in the share of self-identified “liberal” or “centrist” respondents who say they will definitely vote for the Democratic candidate. A similar, though less pronounced trend toward voting for the Republican candidate was found among conservative panel participants. The finding for all respondents, after weighting the survey data according to the relative proportions of the religious denominations within the total Jewish population (Reform, Conservative, ultra-Orthodox, etc.) indicates that two-thirds of the Voice of the Jewish People respondent panel plan to vote for Harris (63%) and a quarter for Trump (24%). The rest of the respondents don’t know, will not be voting, or plan to vote for someone other than the two main candidates. These findings are quite similar to those of a survey by The Forward via CHIP50, which found in mid-October that 62% of all US Jews intend to vote for Harris, and 31% for Trump. A survey by an organization identified with the Democratic Party (JDC) found in September that 68% of Jews plan to vote for Harris, versus 25% for Trump.

Voting Considerations

This month, as the US elections approach, we examined whether JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People panel respondents regard three issues – Israel, antisemitism, and immigration – as key factors in their voting decision making. Our findings show a large disparity between Harris and Trump voters in the importance they attach to these three issues. Trump voters overwhelmingly perceive them as major considerations; a much lower share of Harris voters do so.

Respondents were asked to indicate the degree of importance they attach to each of the issues in their voting deliberations. Most respondents said that Israel is an important issue to some extent, or one of the main issues that will factor into their vote. When looking at the voting distribution, the vast majority of Trump voters see Israel as one of the main considerations in their vote, while a quarter of those definitely voting for Harris regard Israel as a marginal issue or not as a consideration in their vote. Among respondents who say they will likely vote for Harris the distribution looks different: all respondents in this group view the issue as one of the major considerations in their vote or as a somewhat important issue. Among “strong liberal” respondents, a third regard the Israel issue as marginal to their vote, or do not consider it to be an influencing factor.

The share of liberal respondents who said that antisemitism is one of the main factors in their vote is higher than the share of liberals who said that Israel is a major consideration. The opposite situation was found among conservatives – a larger share said that Israel is one of their most important voting considerations. However, as one moves along the ideological scale from liberal to conservative, the percentage of respondents who view antisemitism as a main consideration in their vote increases. Here too, a large disparity emerges when looking at the distribution by presidential candidate preference.

There is also a significant gap between liberals and conservatives regarding immigration as an issue in the upcoming elections. Half of the liberals on the respondent panel said that immigration is a marginal issue or not a consideration at all. By contrast, most conservatives said that immigration is one of the main factors influencing their vote. A similar gap is found between definite Harris voters and definite Trump voters. In a September Pew Research Center survey, 39% of Harris-supporting Americans rated immigration as a very important factor in their voting decisions while 82% of Trump supporters rated it as very important (the question wording differs between the JPPI and Pew surveys, but we can see that the cumulative share of those who attach importance to immigration as a factor in their vote is quite similar).

Support for Israel

American military aid to Israel continued over the past month, both in terms of weapons supply and the deployment of forces in the region. A step up in American aid to Israel was seen in the deployment of THAAD batteries, an advanced anti-missile defense system. Attitude toward Israel and the handling of antisemitism continue to engage the presidential candidates and their campaign staffs.

This month’s Voice of the Jewish People survey found, once again, a gap between respondents who self-identify as liberal and those as centrist or conservative in how they perceive the degree of US support for Israel. The dominant view among conservatives and centrists is that the US does not support Israel enough. By contrast, for “strong liberals” there has been a slow but steady rise in the share that thinks the United States supports Israel excessively. This month, the percentage of the latter reached its highest level since we began looking at this parameter – a third of “strong liberal” respondents think US support for Israel is excessive. Notably, the responses of the entire panel, when weighted by religiosity level, reveal a small majority (56%) who say that the US does not support Israel enough. Among those who will definitely be voting for Harris, a small majority (51%) think that the US supports Israel at an appropriate level, but more than a quarter (28%) say that US support for Israel is inadequate. Among Jews who will likely (but not definitely) vote for Harris, a clear majority (60%) feel that the US does not support Israel enough. When examining the data on the importance of support for Israel as a factor in voting decisions, along with the degree of that support, we can speculate that those who say they will “likely” but not “definitely” vote for Harris are wavering because, among other things, they ascribe great weight to Israel as a consideration in their voting, and feel that the Biden-Harris administration’s support for Israel is not strong enough.

The shift among panel participants
To illustrate how the views of panel participants are shifting, this month we looked at the responses of 130 participants who answered identical questions in both the May and October Voice of the Jewish People surveys. The table below shows that, apart from the overall change on the issue of US support for Israel, as reflected in the percentages displayed in the tables above, there have also been changes in the views of specific participants. For example, eight participants who said in May that the US doesn’t support Israel enough, now (October) say that the US does support Israel enough. At the same time, six participants who said in May that the US provides Israel with the right amount of support have shifted to the view that the US does not support Israel enough. However, most of these respondents remained consistent with their earlier positions.

Who is Pro-Israel?

As part of our series of questions on support for Israel, we again looked at respondent perceptions of the candidates’ views on Israel. As in previous months, we asked whether respondents consider the presidential candidates to be “pro-Israel.” The table below shows that a clear majority of liberal respondents continue to regard Harris as a pro-Israel candidate. Among centrist respondents there has been a modest upturn in the share who think Harris is pro-Israel, while an opposite trend can be seen among conservative-leaning respondents. For the entire panel, after weighting for religiosity, half (50%) say that Harris is pro-Israel and a third (37%) say she is not; the rest do not know.

This month’s survey found a rise in the percentage of “strong conservatives” who view Trump as pro-Israel, and an opposite trend among centrist voters. The share of all panel respondents (47%) who feel that Trump is pro-Israel is slightly lower (after weighting by religiosity level) than the share (50%) who say this of Harris.

The Future of US-Israel Relations

This month we looked at how the respondent panel thinks the election of each of the two major candidates would affect US-Israel relations. The data shows that a majority of conservatives think relations would improve if Trump were elected, while less than a fifth of liberals say the election of Harris would lead to improved relations between the countries. Among centrist respondents, a larger percentage think a Trump victory would lead to improved relations, compared with the percentage who feel that a Harris victory would produce such a change.

In terms of religious affiliation, we can see that a very small percentage of respondents from all streams think that if Harris is elected, US-Israel relations will improve. A quarter of Reform Jews, half of Conservative Jews, and most Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox Jews feel that if Harris is elected, US-Israel relations will become less close. Only a tenth of respondents who said that they will definitely be voting for Harris think that her election will lead to improved relations between the two countries, while a third of the respondents who said that they will likely vote for her think that if she is elected then US-Israel relations will be less good. These responses explain why, among Harris voters, Israel’s importance as a voting issue is substantially lower (if it were higher, they wouldn’t vote for Harris, given their prediction about the future of US-Israel relations). As expected, most Trump voters feel that if Harris is elected, US-Israel relations will become less good.

When we look at respondent views about what will happen to US-Israel relations if Trump is elected president, a fifth of Reform, nearly half of Conservative, and most Orthodox panel participants think that US-Israel relations will improve. In the case of a Trump victory, a small percentage of respondents say that the relationship will remain unchanged. In accordance with the findings on the importance that Trump voters attach to Israel as an issue in the upcoming elections, an overwhelming majority of respondents who say they plan to vote for him feel that his election will lead to improved relations between the countries.

Israel at War

This month the slow upward trend in the share of liberals who feel that Israeli operations in Gaza are too aggressive continued. Most “strong liberals” and half of those “leaning liberal” feel this way. By contrast, only a tenth of centrists and virtually no conservatives share this view.

In the past month IDF ground forces entered Lebanon, and the intensity of fighting escalated. Compared with our August data, there was an upsurge this month in the share of liberal respondents who believe that Israeli actions in Lebanon are “much too aggressive.” At the same time, there has been a downturn in the share of conservatives and centrists who feel that Israeli actions in Lebanon are not aggressive enough, and a rise in the share who think Israel is showing the right amount of aggression.

Similar trends can also be seen by voting distribution. A new finding that emerges from this distribution is a certain rise in the percentage of those definitely voting for Trump who feel that Israel is not being aggressive enough in Lebanon. In August, half of this respondent cohort felt this way, while now most of them do.

The Iranian Threat

At the beginning of October, Iran attacked Israel for a second time since mid-April. In the weeks that preceded the attack, Israel had been in a “waiting period” for the Iranian offensive. The onslaught included 201 ballistic missiles aimed mainly at strategic and military targets. The offensive was thwarted overall but did cause some damage to air force bases and to several civilian sites. US support and active participation in missile interception helped contain the damage. The attack was condemned by US President Joe Biden, who reiterated his support for Israel and announced that additional sanctions would be imposed on Iran.

In the wake of recent developments, we took another look this month at respondent views of US policy toward Iran. The data indicates that a quarter of the strong liberal cohort, half of the leaning liberal cohort, and most centrist and conservative respondents believe that US policy toward Iran is too friendly. We can also see an upward trend compared with August among centrists and those who lean conservative. There was no rise across all survey cohorts in the share of those who feel that US policy toward Iran is too hostile.

A breakdown by intended presidential vote shows a rise in the percentage of respondents “definitely” voting for Harris who feel that US policy toward Iran is too friendly (but a decline among those who say that they will likely vote for Harris). An even more significant rise in this direction was found among respondents who said they would definitely be voting for Trump. Additionally, the share of the “definitely Trump” group who think US policy toward Iran is too hostile dropped to zero over the past two months.

The US Political Parties and Antisemitism

Again, this month we strove to determine which of the presidential candidates, in the view of the survey panel participants, would be better in the fight against antisemitism. Conservative-leaning respondents showed a rise in the share who believe Trump would be better than Harris at combating antisemitism, following a slow but steady downward trend in the past few months. A similar trend can be seen when the data is broken down by religious-stream affiliation: this month witnessed a rise in the share of Conservative and ultra-Orthodox respondents who think Trump would do better in the fight against antisemitism. Among all panel participants, after weighting by religiosity, half believe Harris would do better (50%), and a quarter that Trump would do better (26%). The rest think that both would be equally good or bad, or don’t know.

Further to the question about the candidates and the fight against antisemitism, we again tried to determine which of the political parties is regarded as potentially better in this arena. We have detected an upturn in the percentage of conservatives who feel that the Republican Party would do better; by contrast, no change is discernible among the liberal camp. While the percentage of those leaning liberal who feel that the Democratic Party is better suited to the struggle rose, strong liberals showed an opposite trend. When we look at the breakdown by religiosity level, we find that the members of most groups, except the Reform, believe that the Republican Party would be better at fighting antisemitism than the Democratic Party. Half of the Reform respondents believe that the Democratic Party would do better in this struggle, while a quarter believe the Republican Party is best suited to the task. A weighted picture for all panel participants shows near-parity between those who say the Democratic Party or the Republic Party would better fight antisemitism – 31% for the Democrats and 34% for the Republicans.

The High Holidays

In light of the High Holiday season, the Voice of the Jewish People survey posed a few questions about participation in holiday observances and prayers. Most respondents took part in at least one synagogue prayer service during the High Holidays. The further one moves along the ideological scale from liberal to conservative, the higher the share of respondents who participated in synagogue prayer services.

Additionally, the data indicates that most survey respondents – liberals, centrists, and conservatives – took part in a Rosh Hashanah holiday meal, most of them with family.

Based on the panel participant responses, Israel was a topic of conversation at Rosh Hashanah meals in most Jewish homes. The further one moves along the ideological scale from liberal to conservative (not including the strong conservatives), the percentage of those who talked about Israel increases. A similar trend can be seen in terms of the religiosity scale. 78% of all panel participants reported that Israel came up as a topic of conversation at the family meal they attended.

This month we also asked how respondents had marked Yom Kippur: most reported that they fasted fully or partly. As with the holiday-meal data, for this question, as well, the further one moves from liberal to conservative on the ideological scale, the higher the likelihood of fasting. We can also see that the percentage of those who fast is higher among those who have visited Israel. The more a Jew has visited Israel (or lived there for a period of time), the higher the percentage of those who fast.

Comparing our panel data with the findings of a Pew survey of American Jews (2020), we can see that a significantly larger percentage of JPPI panel participants fasted, fully or partially, this year, compared with the percentage of Pew survey respondents in June 2020 – 70% versus 46% (this figure does not include those who refrained from eating but not from drinking). The difference stems, in our view, mainly from the makeup of our panel, and less from the time gap (see the panel information at the end of the report).

Survey Data and its Implications

This report is an analysis of a survey administered to 512 American Jews registered for JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People respondent panel. The report does not provide a weighted representative sample of American Jewry as a whole, but the number of panel respondents who self-identify as belonging to various groups enables us to identify trends, views, and differences between Jews based on religious affiliation, emotional attachment to Israel, political orientation, attachment to Judaism, and more.

Roughly speaking, it can be said that this survey tends to reflect the attitudes of US Jews with some connection to the Jewish community, as indicated by a specific question in this regard (which includes data for anyone who stated a connection to some Jewish institution, such as a synagogue, community center, Jewish organization, etc.), as well as Jews with an attachment of some kind to Israel, as reflected in the data on visits to Israel, which are significantly more numerous than the average for all US Jews. Data on survey participants (see table below): About half self-identify as liberal; the percentage of intermarried respondents is significantly lower than the average for US Jews generally; the share of Conservative respondents is higher than their share in the American Jewish population as a whole. The percentage of respondents unaffiliated with any religious stream is lower than for American Jewry in general.