The past year in Israel has been overcast by the shadow of the country’s domestic crisis, which began when the government presented its plans to make changes to the judicial system in January 2023. This led to protests that are ongoing and have heightened political and social divides in Israel. The warning by army reservists from special forces units and all the more so by hundreds of air force pilots that they would no longer volunteer to serve if the government went ahead with implementation of the reform package poses a threat to the IDF’s operational readiness. The dire dispute has had a negative effect on Israel’s international standing, its relations with the United States, its ties with Diaspora Jewry, the Israeli economy, and its deterrence. (For more on the sociopolitical crisis in Israel see page 83).

The internal crisis is roiling at a time when processes are taking place in external arenas that challenge Israel’s security and the resilience of the Jewish people. Responding to these threats requires solidarity and the focused use of resources, but these are being eroded by the internal crisis. At the same time, Israel has been negatively impacted by the global economic slow-down and by doubts over the stability of its judicial system and society, which could push away investors, and which have already led to dire warnings by senior economic figures around the world, including financial rating companies.

Alongside an internal crisis that could lead to long-term strategic damage, this year Israel has been handed an opportunity for a historic turnaround in its regional status in the potential signing of a peace agreement with Saudi Arabia. The agreement, which the United States is working to advance, will showcase Israel’s acceptance in a region that had denied its very existence and will create legitimacy for other Arab and Muslim countries to normalize relations with the Jewish state. The political, economic, and security opportunities that would result from a deal are significant. America standing firmly behind Saudi Arabia (Riyadh is demanding a defense agreement with the United States as part of the deal) will contribute to Iran’s isolation and help reverse the phenomenon in which Washington sees the Middle East as less important to its interests.

It would also help fill the strategic vacuum that has enabled elements unsympathetic to Israel to gain a foothold in the region. The cooperation required between Washington and Jerusalem (including preparations to circumvent Iranian attempts to sabotage the agreement) will mark a positive turnaround in relations between the countries, which have experienced some grating tensions in recent months. (Tehran recently expressed its concern about an Israeli-Saudi agreement, with Iran’s Foreign Ministry saying that the agreement would “harm peace and stability in the region.”) It is noteworthy that in view of the Saudi demands, security sources in Israel have expressed concern that Israel’s qualitative military edge vis-à-vis the Arab states could be weakened, and that the civil nuclear project the Saudis are demanding as part of the deal could be converted into a military program in the future and may lead other countries in the region to seek nuclear power.

In the international arena we are seeing an escalation of the great power rivalry, the war in Ukraine continues unabated, and the possibility of a global economic crisis continues to cast its shadow. The deeper the conflict between the powers becomes, the more complex it is for Israel to maneuver in its relations with them. To these challenges, we must add questions about the strength of the strategic triangle: Jerusalem-Washington-American Jewry, and about American policy in areas that impact Israel’s resilience. The government’s conduct and the constitutional crisis that has ensued are eroding Israeli international standing. Different countries are adopting various measures to express their discomfort with events in Israel and have taken a position on the country’s internal disputes. The fact that U.S. President Joe Biden has yet to extend the traditional invitation for a White House visit to an elected Israeli prime minister is one glaring example.

In the regional arena, we can see a trend in which veteran rivals are adopting pragmatic approaches, and at the same time Iran is continuing to advance its nuclear weapons project and its efforts to improve its geopolitical standing. Israel meanwhile is forced to continue allocating resources for dealing with Palestinian terrorism, as we saw with the launch of Operation Shield and Arrow against Islamic Jihad (May 2023) and Operation Bayit Vagan against the terrorist infrastructure in Jenin (July 2023).

Despite these clouds, we should emphasize that Israel is still perceived as a regional power with a strong economy (Intel is expected to invest $25 billion in setting up a new facility in Kiryat Gat), and its neighbors seek to collaborate with it. The perception is that the declining regional involvement of the U.S. emphasizes Israel’s importance as a country that can be relied on and which has the potential to offer new opportunities, inter alia because Washington increasingly sees Israel as an ally capable of protecting American interests in the region. The Abraham Accords, even though they have cooled somewhat, remain stable, and this shows that the Arab states have an interest in maintaining their ties with Israel.

The Abraham Accords countries are purchasing around a quarter of Israeli defense exports, which have increased by some 50% in the past three years and totaled $12.5 billion in 2022. Israel’s gas fields continue to have a positive economic impact and enable it to fulfil a key role in the Middle East Gas Forum, contribute to deepening strategic ties with Greece and Cyprus, and has an anchoring effect on its peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan. Israel has also seen new horizons for gas exports to Europe in view of its understanding that it cannot rely on gas imports from Russia. (In June 2023, Israel officially announced the discovery of a new offshore gas field, Katlan.)

Israel and the great power rivalry

The global arena is characterized by growing great power competition, which has strategic implications for Israel. The West, led by the United States, sees itself as standing up for a liberal-democratic world order. Autocratic rivals, led by China and Russia, claim that Western rhetoric is a guise for colonialism and offer the countries of the world liberation from what they claim to be the West’s cynical exploitation. China portrays itself as proof that refutes the West’s claim that economic prosperity requires a liberal regime, and has undertaken a series of global economic, security, and cultural initiatives. The war in Ukraine, tensions over Taiwan’s sovereignty, continued development of Iran’s nuclear program, and other areas of contention are bringing the great power rivalry back to Cold War levels and raise fears of deterioration into hot conflict.

Less than a year ago, President Biden called the threat of nuclear doomsday the most acute since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. “He [Putin] is not joking when he talks about potential use of tactical nuclear weapons or biological or chemical weapons.” After Russia placed nuclear warheads in Belarus, Biden repeated his warning (June 2023). Europe is currently digesting the fact that it must devote more resources to its security and free itself from its energy dependence on Russia. These tensions have led to further expansion of NATO. Finland and Sweden, which in the past had decided not to join NATO so as not to outrage Russia, are now joining the organization.

Growing global tensions are expressed in a wide range of areas, from Russia’s decision to suspend its participation in the New START treaty that caps the number of intercontinental-range nuclear weapons that Russia and the U.S. can deploy (February 2023), through worsening of the trade war between the powers to the U.S. decision to supply cluster bombs to Ukraine. This great power competition undermines the world’s ability to deal with challenges that require broad mobilization: climate change and droughts, nuclear proliferation, regulation of the safe use of Artificial Intelligence, and more.

Israel, which is highly dependent on the United States, has no real possibility of maneuvering between the powers in the way that countries such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and others do through influencing the policy of one great power by “threatening” to move closer to a rival power. The United States is putting pressure on Israel to moderate China’s involvement in building infrastructure in the country and to limit the transfer of Israeli technologies to Beijing. In fact, this year, as in previous years, Israel faces a strategic dilemma: What leeway does it have to maintain the support of the U.S. while not harming the benefit it derives from its relations with Washington’s rivals.

There is no end in sight to the war in Ukraine, a central arena in which these complexities play out. The Ukrainians complain that Israel has not agreed to supply it with air defense systems and has not allowed the U.S. to transfer its Israeli-made Iron Dome batteries to the country. Washington is pressuring Israel to supply armaments to Kyiv, but at the same time Moscow is warning Israel not to acquiesce to this demand. On top of this strategic dilemma, there are also moral deliberations: How much weight should Israel’s foreign policy give to moral considerations when there is a security or economic price to be paid.

The United States – The basic strategic documents published at the end of 2022 by the White House and the Pentagon put China at the focus of American foreign policy. Russia is given a lower threat ranking, while the Middle East no longer occupies the place of importance it held in the past. The U.S. wishes to draw down its level of involvement in the Middle East and to replace it with a reliance on countries in the region to maintain stability. While American spokespeople declare the U.S. commitment to the countries of the region, these countries are far from being convinced.

The U.S. maintains a large military force in the Middle East (35,000 troops) but is hesitant to deploy that force even when its soldiers are targeted by hostile actors. Russian and China, which demonstrate determination in their quest for greater involvement in shaping the world order, sense the strategic vacuum left by the United States. Russia is not loosening its grip on Syria, and China’s actions go far beyond the economic activity that characterized its modus operandi in the region in the past. In July 2022, CENTCOM Commander General Michael E. Kurilla defined the Middle East as “the region at the center of America’s strategic competition with Russia and China.” An open question is to what extent this diagnosis will lead to increased American involvement in the region, and whether Israel has the ability to influence the U.S. in this direction. Declining U.S. involvement in the Middle East does not serve Israel’s security interests and erodes its ability to project deterrence.

Russia – Despite the considerable resources required to manage the war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed by Western countries on Moscow, the Russian economy has not collapsed. Major countries, including China, India, Brazil, and others, continue to trade with Russia and do not comply with the sanctions regime against it. In the long run, Russia may sustain heavy damages as the result of the departure of some 1,000 international companies, loss of markets, brain drain, severe damage to the prestige of Russian weapons systems, and more. At the moment, however, Moscow appears to have sufficient resources to continue waging the war. In the Middle East arena, Putin is tightening his relations with Tehran, cooperating with it to evade the sanctions regimes against both countries, and purchasing its drones.

China – China’s leader, Xi Jinping, has secured a third term as president (March 2023) and continues to lead a vigorous foreign policy that challenges the United States and the world order shaped by the West. China’s military power is constantly growing, and it is developing the ability to wage war in space and in cyberspace. China is not deterred from operating global intelligence operations, as evidenced by the downing of a Chinese spy balloon over U.S. skies (February 2023). In terms of GDP, China is the second largest economy in the world. It imposes its will on Hong Kong, provokes its neighbors in the South and East China Seas, threatens Taiwan, violates human rights, and mistreats its Muslim minority.

China is also steadily consolidating its penetration into the Middle East, which constitutes a developing market for its products, a transit station for European markets, and above all – an energy source (Saudi Arabia is the source of a fifth of China’s oil and gas imports). More than 20 Arab countries are part of China’s Belt and Road initiative. Over the past decade, Beijing has signed significant strategic agreements and contracts with most of them for infrastructure construction and energy supply. China is the top trading partner of the Arab countries (a combined trade volume of $330 billion) and is also the largest foreign investor in the Middle East. Its regional involvement climbed to new heights over the past year when it helped Saudi Arabia and Iran to reach an agreement on the resumption diplomatic relations (March 2023). In April 2023, it offered to mediate in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well.

The rivalry with the United States motivates Beijing to strengthen its ties with Iran and Russia and to extricate them from the sanctions imposed on them by the West. China does not want to see a Russian defeat in Ukraine, which would strengthen the standing of the United States, and of course it does not want to see a pro-Western leader take Putin’s seat in the Kremlin.

The Iranian threat

The severe sanctions, the difficult economic situation, and covert activities, some of which are attributed to Israel, have not halted the progress of the nuclear project. Despite the significant achievements of the “war between the wars,” Iran is persisting in its efforts to build offensive capabilities on Syrian soil for use against Israel, and it continues to supply Hezbollah with advanced weaponry. Iran continues to employ regional subversion and to act through local proxy militias against the American presence in the region. Iran further boasts that it has established armies under its authority throughout the region: Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, militias in Iraq and Syria, and Palestinian organizations sympathetic to Tehran (especially Palestinian Islamic Jihad).

Indeed, over the past year Iran has registered several achievements: its continued progress toward obtaining nuclear weapons, strengthening relations with Russia and China, and, with the help of these two countries, Tehran is finding ways to circumvent the sanctions imposed on it (Iran supplied Russia with hundreds of UAVs and in return was promised military aid, including Sukhoi-35 fighter jets and possibly S-400 air defense systems; when it comes to China, Iran sells oil to Beijing, with sales tripling over the past three years). A joint statement by the leaders of Iran and China also called for Israel to “place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards;” At the same time, Iran’s relations with Arab countries, are thawing while it continues to cultivate a regional infrastructure directed against Israel and to plan attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets around the world. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant revealed (July 2023) that over the past year-and-a-half, Israel has foiled around 50 such attempted Iranian attacks.

Tehran develops and operates advanced centrifuges and enriches uranium to 60% (nuclear weapons require 90% enrichment). IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi stated (May 2023) that over the past year, Iran has made more progress in enriching uranium than ever before. Gallant said that Iran has accumulated enough fissile material to produce five nuclear bombs (May 2023). According to intelligence assessments, if Iran makes the political decision to go ahead, it will take it about two weeks to enrich the uranium it has accumulated to military grade. Opinions differ on how long it would take Iran to build a detonation mechanism for a bomb and adapt it to the warhead of a ballistic missile. Although Israel estimates that it will take Iran about two years, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley told Congress (March 2023) that Iran would need only “several months.” In this context, one cannot ignore Iran’s announcement (May 2023) that it had conducted a successful test launch of a ballistic missile capable of reaching a range of 2,000 kilometers.

Contrary to Israeli hopes, the United States is not leading an initiative aimed at winning the confrontation with Iran but aims instead to contain it. Increasingly, it seems that the United States is striving for a less-for-less agreement, under which Iran will not enrich uranium beyond 60%, will halt installation of advanced centrifuges, and will cooperate with the IAEA. In return, billions of dollars in Iranian assets will be unfrozen, and sanctions against it will not be tightened. Israel has stated that if such agreements are reached, they would not obligate Israel and it would continue to act against Iran’s nuclear program.

In that vein, preparing for a possible attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities is a top IDF priority. According to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (June 2023), the attempt to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons through diplomacy has failed: “I don’t think that diplomacy by itself will work. I think diplomacy can only work if it’s coupled with a credible military threat or the willingness to apply the military option if deterrence fails.”

Israel believes that a limited agreement would not prevent Iran from secretly advancing toward the manufacture of nuclear weapons, from fortifying nuclear sites, developing ballistic missiles; nor would it curb its regional subversion, and would instead provide it with considerable resources to step up its aggression. A limited agreement would likely exacerbate the tension between Jerusalem and Washington. The U.S. is reluctant to be dragged into a military confrontation with Iran, even though Washington emphatically reiterates its absolute commitment to Israel’s security, boasts of its extensive military exercises in the region in cooperation with Israel, and says that it will not allow Iran to possess nuclear weapons.

National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan declared (May 2023) that Washington recognizes Israel’s right to freedom of action vis-à-vis Iran. It seems that both countries agree that Iran must be prevented from enriching uranium to the 90% level, and that at this stage Iran is deterred from taking this step. However, President Biden’s remarked (July 2022) that he would use force as a “last resort” leave open a critical question as this phrase is subject to different interpretations.

The Middle East: Threats and opportunities

Over the past year, two contradictory trends in the Middle East have challenged Israel. On one hand, pragmatic compromise processes between countries with a tradition of bitter and long-standing rivalry; on the other hand, the continued force buildup of Iran, which is approaching nuclear threshold state status. The countries of the region are led in part by young and ambitious leaders who seek to lead their nations to prosperity and modernization and understand that violent confrontations will sabotage their plans. Such confrontations also expose poor Arab countries to the risk of instability.

The countries of the region feel that they cannot rely on the United State and are working to ensure their security through new regional alliances and by maneuvering skillfully between superpowers. Regional moves toward reconciliation are aimed at achieving stability even if ancient rivalries are not erased, and of course they do not provide a response to all the flashpoints of violence in the region (in Sudan, this year brought the eruption of an internal “war-of-the-generals” that has worsened the human tragedy in a country that already suffers from poverty and malnutrition). Saudi Arabia, which seeks an end to the war in Yemen, has reached an understanding with Iran; Syrian President Bashar Assad has been welcomed back into the Arab League; Egypt has improved relations with Tehran; and Ankara and Qatar have reconciled with the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Contrary to the regional trend of thawing ties, Israel remains in danger of deteriorating into a violent confrontation with Iran, Hezbollah, Syria, and the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. The level of volatility is evidenced by Operation Shield and Arrow (May 2023), in which Israel killed senior Islamic Jihad figures in Gaza. Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar, who reported (April 2023) that since the beginning of the year his organization had thwarted more than 200 significant attacks, said: “We are in a challenging time. Both at home and abroad. The source is Iranian, Shi’ite, Hamas, Jihadi, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Salafi and many other local phenomena.” A Hezbollah attack near Megiddo (March 2023) was perceived as an escalation in Iranian and Hezbollah activity deep inside Israel. The IDF’s Intelligence Directorate published an assessment (April 2023) predicting an increased likelihood of war in light of rising tensions with Iran and the Palestinians, the erosion in the image of Israel’s power due to the domestic crisis, and the perceived U.S. abandonment of the region. Senior defense officials have warned the government and the Knesset that Israel’s enemies identify the internal crisis as a “historic weak point,” and Air Force Commander Maj. Gen. Tomer Bar warned (July 2023), “It is possible that at a time like this, they will try to test our boundaries, our cohesion, and our vigilance.”

As noted, the regional arena poses threats, but also opportunities. Declining U.S. involvement and fatigue vis-à-vis the Palestinian issue are pushing the Arab and Muslim world to cooperate with Israel. Azerbaijan, feeling threatened by Iran, opened an embassy in Israel (November 2022) and hosted Israeli President Isaac Herzog (May 2023). Saudi Arabia has allowed overflight of Israeli carriers (February 2023) and the King of Morocco invited Prime Minister Netanyahu to visit following Israel’s recognition of his country’s sovereignty over Western Sahara (July 2023). Israel continues to export gas to Egypt and Jordan, and overall trade with countries in the region has doubled in the past two years (trade with the UAE increased 14-fold in those two years, reaching $2.5 billion).

Below follow some other developments in the Middle East that affect Israel’s resilience:

Syria – President Bashar Assad’s participation in the May 2003 Arab League summit in Saudi Arabia (he had been expelled from it in 2011 due to the civil war in Syria) symbolizes his add a space between symbolizes and his continued reign – Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s visit to Syria (May 2023) was exploited to project the victory of the “Axis of Resistance.”

Assad now controls about two-thirds of the country, which Iran uses to train local militias and transfer weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel is waging an ongoing battle against this Iranian activity, but the escalation of the great power competition may lead Russia to take decisions that will make it difficult for the Israeli Air Force to operate in Syrian skies. The Arab states, most of which supported the rebel forces, have been forced to accept Assad’s victory. Some of these countries expect economic gains in the event that international resources are directed to the rehabilitation of Syria ($400 billion is needed), the repatriation of refugees who found sanctuary on their soil (mainly Jordan and Turkey), and the curbing of the spread of captagon (fenethylline), a synthetic amphetamine known as the “poor man’s cocaine,” which is illicitly manufactured in Syria and in great demand in the region.

Lebanon – The country is facing a major economic collapse. Since the outbreak of the crisis in 2019, the local currency has lost 98% of its value. Lebanon suffers from shortages of food, medicine, fuel, and electricity. Many citizens cannot withdraw their funds from failing banks, and the government finds it difficult to implement reforms, a pre-condition for International Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance. Lebanon, in desperate needs of revenue, wants to begin developing its offshore gas fields, and to this end it allowed the U.S. to help reach an agreement with Israel to determine the maritime border between the countries (October 2022).

Hezbollah continues to strengthen its military power and, with Iran’s help, is focused on improving the precision of its missile arsenal. Ostensibly, the organization has no interest in another war with Israel, but in a situation where Lebanon is crumbling, an unplanned escalation may occur. The constitutional crisis in Israel contributes to Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah’s smugness, and he has repeatedly threatened Israel. Hezbollah staged a well-publicized military exercise in southern Lebanon simulating the occupation of a village inside Israel; its operatives set up tents on the Israeli side of the border at Har Dov (April 2023). In the event of war, Israel will face a trained army with some 140,000 missiles and rockets, some of which are precision missiles. The IDF is preparing for the possibility of a flare-up and is also preparing to deploy ground forces deep in Lebanese territory. In a war exercise, the IDF drilled a scenario in which 1,500 rockets and missiles are fired at Israel each day of a conflict with Hezbollah.

Jordan – The Jordanian economy is faltering and adversely affecting the stability of the regime. From time to time, demonstrations break out in the country, some of them violent. The more than one million Syrian refugees who fled to Jordan add to the economic burden. The kingdom, which relies on external aid, received $845 million from the United States last year.

Israel has an interest in Jordan’s stability and the countries cooperate in the security and economic fields (Israel supplies Jordan with water and gas). Both fear the kingdom will become a target of Iranian subversion. However, relations remain sensitive to upheavals caused whenever there are rising tensions over the Palestinian issue (more than half of Jordan’s population is of Palestinian origin). The weakness of the Palestinian Authority and the approaching end to the era of its long-time President Mahmoud Abbas increase fears that violent succession battles may seep across the river and destabilize the kingdom. Amman also fears that the Israeli government will take advantage of the situation to advance annexation in the West Bank, encourage Palestinians to move to Jordan, and act to realize the vision of “Jordan is Palestine.” Jordan is also concerned that the Israeli government’s conduct in this context, as well as its attitude toward the Temple Mount issue, will spark political and religious riots in the kingdom.

Saudi Arabia – Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), is determined to lead his country into an era of modernization and prepare it for the time when its oil reserves are depleted. In this context, he is leading a national identity revolution whose main goal is to strengthen identification with the royal family while pushing out extremist religious clerics. The powers of the religious police have been curbed, women in the kingdom are permitted to drive and work, and cultural life is flourishing. Bin Salman is skeptical of Washington’s willingness to come to his country’s defense if the time comes. The 2019 Iranian attack on Aramco oil facilities taught him a lesson about Iran’s destructive potential and America’s hesitancy to act against Tehran. Therefore, he is in no hurry to tie himself to the United States, has not acceded to President Biden’s request to increase oil production, and has chosen to coordinate his oil output policy with Moscow. Riyadh also has no intention of damaging its relations with China, which purchases a quarter of Saudi oil production. With China’s mediation, Saudi Arabia reached a reconciliation agreement with Iran, hoping it would bring an end to the war in Yemen, after Riyadh despaired of subduing Iranian-allied Houthi rebels in the country.

Despite the reconciliation agreement, Saudi Arabia has no illusions about Iran. It is building a modern army and was ranked fifth in the world in 2022 in military investments. Bin Salman’s pragmatic approach raised the possibility that Saudi Arabia would normalize its relations with Israel, and in effect abandon the terms of the Arab peace initiative it had shaped in the past. Saudi Arabia has given the U.S. a set of demands in return for normalizing relations with Israel. These include formal security guarantees, high-quality weaponry, allowing the Saudis to develop a civil nuclear program, and progress on the Palestinian issue. If the U.S. government wants to accede to these demands, it will need Israel’s help to persuade Congress to accept them. Such sensitive coordination may prove problematic in a situation in which Jerusalem’s relations with Washington are troubled, and also in light of the composition of the current Israeli government and the difficulties it may have in reaching agreements with Saudi Arabia on the Palestinian issue.

Egypt – The Egyptian economy is in crisis. It has been hurt by the war in Ukraine and by rising oil and grain prices, which in turn contribute to across-the-board price increases (in June 2023, the annual inflation rate was 36.8%). The government provides subsidized bread to 80% of the country’s 112 million people, a third of whom live on a budget of less than $2 a day. Investors are increasingly taking their money out of Egypt, whose economy relies on foreign loans and where half of government revenues are used to repay loans and make interest payments. Egypt’s lender countries and financial institutions face an ongoing dilemma: if they stop providing loans, the Egyptian economy could collapse and may lead to waves of migration, civil disobedience, and the overthrow of a regime that cooperates with the West. On the other hand, continued provision of loans without significant economic reforms (including an end to the army’s massive involvement in the economy) perpetuates the corrupt management of the Egyptian economy and disrupts the functioning of an efficient and competitive free market. The Gulf states have despaired of Egypt’s conduct and are paring down their donations to the country.

As far as Israel is concerned, Egypt under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi is an effective partner in security cooperation and plays a role in calming the Gaza Strip (including in the last round of conflict against Islamic Jihad in early May 2023).

Turkey – President Erdogan’s election victory (May 2023) raises the question of whether he will continue the relatively conciliatory line he took in his foreign policy over the past year. Erdogan modified his conduct against the backdrop of serious domestic challenges: an economic crisis with inflation at around 80%, the reconstruction following the earthquake that claimed the lives of some 50,000 civilians, and the presence of 3.6 million Syrian refugees who place a heavy burden on the country’s resources. Erdogan continues to maneuver between the West and Russia. He gave his approval of Finland and Sweden joining NATO after demanding and receiving fitting compensation, including an end to the American embargo on the sale of F-16 aircraft to the Turkish military (the embargo was imposed after Turkey purchased anti-aircraft systems from Russia).

The fact that President Assad successfully survived the civil war in Syria has led to renewed Turkish demands that the Syrian refugees return to their country. At the same time, the de facto Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria continues to exist and Erdogan regards it as a terrorist threat. Erdogan’s conciliatory attitude toward Israel was expressed in his recent invitation to Prime Minister Netanyahu to visit Ankara (July 2023). Trade between Israel and Turkey will likely expand in view of improved ties, but even in a time of diplomatic tensions between the countries trade blossomed (trade stood at $5.7 billion last year, an increase of 63% in two years).

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The Israeli-Palestinian issue is characterized by many instability factors. Adding to them now is a right-wing Israeli government that seems intent on not presenting a political initiative or a horizon for a solution to the plight of the Palestinians. Government moves and declarations by its ministers in this context have drawn strong criticism in the international arena and raised concerns in various capitals that Israel is proceeding with annexation in Judea and Samaria, contrary to the commitments of previous governments. In the absence of progress toward a political solution, Israel risks sliding into a bi-national reality that would threaten its Jewish character. This was reflected in the words of Muhammad Dahlan (March 2023), one of the contenders to replace the 88-year-old Mahmoud Abbas as PA president, who said of the two-state solution: “Instead of nurturing illusions that will never be fulfilled, we should start internalizing the notion of one state for two peoples, and demand full rights for the Palestinians.”

The PA is perceived by the Palestinian public as a corrupt and failed government. Accordingly, the PA finds it increasingly difficult to impose its authority over the population, and this year there has been an increase in incidents of violence and lawlessness. Outbreaks of violence on the Temple Mount and a series of terrorist attacks in the past year attest to the escalation potential in the Palestinian arena. Revenge attacks by settlers (primarily a violent riot with severe damage to property in the village of Hawara in February 2023) have exacerbated tensions. While the United States is no longer focusing its efforts on dealing with the Palestinian issue and does not see sufficient ripeness for a permanent settlement, it fears a violent deterioration. This year, other international bodies have promoted several initiatives on the Palestinian front. The UN General Assembly asked the International Court of Justice in the Hague to provide an advisory opinion on the legality of the ongoing Israeli occupation (December 2022). The European Parliament passed a resolution calling on the International Criminal Court in the Hague to investigate allegations of war crimes committed by Israel in the occupied territories (July 2023). In response to the criticism, and also out of concerns that the territories will deteriorate into chaos, the cabinet passed a resolution (July 2023) according to which “Israel will act to prevent the collapse of the Palestinian Authority.”

In the Gaza Strip, the situation remains dire: lack of infrastructure, water, and electricity shortages, 45% unemployment, and severe poverty. The demonstrations that broke out recently (July 2023), in which slogans were voiced against Hamas leaders, attest to the gravity of the situation. Allowing Palestinian workers into Israel and increasing the quota to 20,000 a day is intended to provide relief and incentive to maintain quiet. Another source of reprieve may be an Israeli decision to approve the development of the Gaza Marine natural gas field, off the shore of Khan Yunis, which could improve the situation of Gaza residents – provided the forecasted revenues of billions of dollars will indeed be directed to serve the pressing needs of the poor masses. Hamas, under Egyptian pressure, generally maintains the ceasefire with Israel and did not participate in the fighting when Israel launched Operation Shield and Arrow against Islamic Jihad (May 2023). However, Hamas leaders openly incite acts of violence and terrorism in the West Bank, and the organization, which continues to build its power, is cultivating a Lebanese wing under the auspices of Hezbollah.

The Jerusalem-Washington-American Jewry triangle

The current government’s performance has not benefited the triangular relationship: Jerusalem – Washington – American Jewry. In recent months, significant disagreements between Jerusalem and the U.S. administration have arisen (constitutional reform, dealing with the Iranian threat, the Palestinian issue, aid to Ukraine). The Israeli government’s policies on these and other issues (religion and state, the status of non-orthodox Jewish streams, human rights) has also highlighted trends of alienation from Israel among American Jews. These trends are not new, of course, and they have arisen for a variety of reasons (see Israel-Diaspora Index, p. 105). Most American Jews (some 70%) back the Democratic Party and to varying degrees are critical of the government’s moves to change Israel’s legal system.

The tension between the countries was clearly reflected in President Biden’s sharp criticism of legislation initiated by the Israeli government (the judicial reform), and in the fact that Prime Minister Netanyahu has yet to be invited to the White House. The American president openly supports the Israeli camp that opposes its government (the U.S. Embassy did not invite Ministers Ben-Gvir and Smotrich to its American Independence Day reception).

At the same time, Israel’s conduct in the West Bank (especially settler attacks on Palestinians) is seen by the American administration as a moral deterioration that goes hand in hand with the misbegotten (in the eyes of the administration) judicial reform package. The language used by administration spokespeople this year often reflected not only the freedom the administration takes to critically intervene in Israel’s internal affairs, but also a patronizing approach. For example, U.S. Ambassador Tom Nides said (February 2023): “We’re telling the prime minister – as I tell my kids – pump the brakes, slow down, try to get a consensus, bring the parties together.”

The Biden administration has sharpened tensions with Israel by criticizing the decisions and actions of the Israeli government over the past year – sometimes bluntly. This is not the place to list all the cases (which were more numerous than in previous years), but two instances that stood out were criticism voiced following the decision to allow a settler presence in Homesh (a community that was evacuated during the 2005 disengagement), and also the American response to Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich’s statement following a lethal terrorist attack that “the village of Hawara must be erased” (Smotrich later clarified that he did not intend a situation in which Jewish settlers would take the law into their own hands, as happened when Jewish settlers rampaged in the village in the wake of a terror attack). In addition to the administration’s reservations about the Israeli government, there has also been an erosion in the Democratic Party support for Israel. A March 2023 poll reflected a turnaround: the Palestinians side garnered greater sympathy than the Israelis (49% vs. 38%). There is concern in Israel that the critical trend in the progressive wing of the Democratic Party – still a vocal minority – will penetrate the mainstream. However, it is important to emphasize that alongside the harsh criticism, administration officials continue to reiterate the United States’ “unshakeable commitment” to Israel’s security. The administration received President Herzog with demonstrable respect, and he received rousing applause in his speech to Congress (July 2023).

Summary

The Israeli government’s desire to promote legal reform, without broad consensus, has triggered an unprecedented social crisis. Thus, beyond the external strategic threats to Israel – which we have reviewed on an annual basis – in the past year, a new and significant threat of strategic significance has emerged from within Israeli society. Its immediate effects are already being felt, but its long-term ramifications must also be considered, especially with regard to the cohesion of Israeli society. We believe that Israeli society will know how to unite in times of future security crisis, but the societal fissures may serve as a motivating factor for Israel’s enemies to act against it.

Strength of Attachment to Israel and Attitude Toward the Israeli Government

As part of the Voice of the People project, the Jewish People Policy Institute’s new platform for tracking public opinion throughout the Jewish world, we looked at the attitudes of North American Jews toward the current Israeli government. In Israel, the current government is in office because a majority of voters elected it and gave it a mandate in the Knesset. In North America, a large majority of Jews who responded to a recent questionnaire expressed concern, for all kinds of reasons, about the composition of the current coalition and government. When we examined the relationship between the strength of attachment of Jews to Israel and their reaction to the coalition, a few interesting findings emerged.

Even among those whose attachment to Israel is strongest (“completely agree”), only a small number expressed explicit satisfaction with the government’s composition (slightly more than 10%). They do not appear in the following table because, due to sampling considerations, we included only those items that were supported by more than a fifth of the respondents. As can be seen, more than half of the respondents who “completely agree” (that connection to Israel is important) are concerned about the Israeli government’s composition for various reasons that were noted (too right-wing, too religious, anti-democratic, and the like).

However, among the group most strongly attached to Israel (“completely agree”), there is a fairly large subgroup (a fifth) who say that their opinion is unimportant because they “respect the choice of Israelis.” Here it should be noted that, in many instances, the strength of attachment to Israel among American Jews is indicative of less-critical views regarding right-wing and center-right Israeli governments.