JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People Index

JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People Index

Sunday November 3, 2024

JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People Index is an ongoing analytic survey conducted among thousands of Jews in the United States who are registered members of a panel assembled under the auspices of the Institute’s Diane and Guilford Glazer Information and Consulting Center.

The panel does not constitute a representative sample of the entire U.S. Jewish population, but it includes participants from all points of the Jewish identity spectrum and allows JPPI to identify trends, positions, and differences among U.S. Jews according to religious affiliation, emotional proximity to Israel, political identity, connection to Judaism, and more.

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JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People Index

JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People Index – December 2024

The monthly survey examined the expectations regarding the new Trump administration, the sense of security among US Jews, Jewish identity, and their support of Israel.

To download the PDF version, click here.

Main Findings

  • A majority agree with the statement: “It’s legitimate for Israel to refuse a Gaza ceasefire until all the hostages are released”.
  • Most survey respondents (73%) believe that Israel’s image in the US was damaged during the year of war.
  • Most respondents think Israel’s actions in Syria are “aggressive to the right extent.”
  • A slight drop in the percentage of liberals who think Israel’s actions in Gaza are “too aggressive.”
  • A third of Jews surveyed have strong confidence that Trump will “do the right thing” with respect to Israel-US relations.
  • A quarter have strong confidence that Trump will do the right thing regarding the fight against antisemitism; 42% are not at all confident that he will.
  • A fifth have strong confidence that Trump will do the right thing with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
  • Most Trump-voting Jews (nearly a third of all Jews) believe that Israel has won the war.
  • Most Trump-voting respondents and a third of Harris voters think the US does not support Israel enough.
  • An improvement in Jews’ sense of personal security versus the situation at the onset of the war.
  • Most survey panel respondents say they are more connected to Israel and to Judaism, or connected to the same degree as their parents and/or their children.
  • Most panel respondents (78%) say that they will be lighting candles every night of Hanukkah.

A general comment about the survey period: Data was collected between December 15 and 17. The survey was conducted a month before Donald Trump’s inauguration as the 47th president of the United States, after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, during a period of drone and missile fire on Israel from Yemen, continued fighting in Gaza and Lebanon, and after the start of Netanyahu’s testimony in his corruption trial. This month also saw reports of an approaching hostage-release deal.

Expectations Regarding the Upcoming Trump Administration

This month, with the approach of Donald Trump’s inauguration, our survey assessed respondent confidence regarding Trump’s activities in a variety of spheres. Overall, and as might be expected, we see the level of confidence expressed by conservative Jews in Trump is significantly higher than among liberal Jews.

A similar finding also emerges when the data is broken down by religiosity level: the further one moves on the religious spectrum from liberal to conservative, the higher the confidence respondents have regarding Trump’s future activities. Of the four issues queried – US-Israel relations, the fight against antisemitism, Iran, and the Palestinian question – American Jews expressed the greatest confidence in the issue of US-Israel relations. They expressed the least confidence in Trump’s future handling of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Among liberals, nearly all of whom voted for Kamala Harris, the lowest degree of confidence regarding Trump’s upcoming term pertained to the fight against antisemitism, followed by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A quarter of the “centrist” cohort reported no confidence that Trump will do the right thing regarding these two issues.

Most conservatives on JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People respondent panel say that they are very confident that Trump will “do the right thing” (the survey questionnaire does not define what that is, making it possible or even likely that respondents interpret “the right thing” differently) with respect to US-Israel relations. By contrast, a third of those self-identifying as “centrist,” and less than 10% of self-identifying as liberals, feel this. Seventy percent of “strong-liberal,” 40% of “leaning-liberal,” and a fifth of “centrist” respondents (17%) express a complete lack of confidence that Trump will do the right thing regarding US-Israel relations. In a breakdown by religious stream, a third of Reform and Conservative Jews say they have no confidence that Trump will do the right thing regarding relations between the two countries; by contrast, half of the Orthodox and most ultra-Orthodox (61%) respondents have strong confidence in Trump on this issue.

Regarding the fight against antisemitism, a majority of liberal respondents say they have no confidence that Trump will “do the right thing,” while most of their conservative counterparts express strong confidence that Trump will act appropriately on this issue. A quarter of the “centrist” cohort feel this way as well; a third say they are somewhat confident on this score, while another quarter say they are not confident that Trump will handle the fight against antisemitism appropriately. On this issue, the trends are less clear when the findings are broken down by religious affiliation: half of Reform (49%) and Conservative (42%) Jews say that they are not at all confident that Trump will do the right thing regarding the fight against antisemitism, while nearly half of Orthodox (44%) and ultra-Orthodox (44%) respondents have strong confidence that Trump will act appropriately on this matter.

A majority of conservative respondents and a quarter of those who self-identify as centrist (27%) say they are very confident that Trump will do the right thing in contending with Iran. By contrast, most “strong liberals” (73%) and half (44%) of “leaning liberal” respondents report that they are not at all confident that Trump will do the right thing in contending with Iran. In a breakdown by religious affiliation, most ultra-Orthodox respondents (67%), half of the Orthodox cohort (47%), a quarter of the Conservative group, and a fifth of Reform Jews say they have strong confidence that Trump will do the right thing in dealing with Iran.

Most “strong liberals” (79%), half of the “leaning liberal” cohort, and a quarter of those who self-identify as centrist (23%) say they have no confidence that Trump will do the right thing regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. By contrast, a majority of “strong conservative” respondents (60%), half of those “leaning conservative” (46%), and a fifth of self-identified “centrists” (19%) report that they are very confident that Trump will act appropriately on this issue. In a breakdown by denominational affiliation, 44% of ultra-Orthodox and 37% of Orthodox Jews say that they are somewhat confident that Trump will do the right thing vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

On the issue of Iran, we also looked at levels of confidence in Trump’s secretary of state nominee, Senator Marco Rubio. A majority of conservatives and 41% of those in the “centrist” cohort say they are very confident that Rubio will “do the right thing” in dealing with Iran. By contrast, most “strong liberals” (55%) and a quarter of those in the “leaning liberal” cohort report having no confidence at all that Rubio will act appropriately vis-à-vis Iran. Among liberal respondents, a relatively high percentage responded that they don’t know – 22% of “strong liberals” and 29% of those in the “leaning liberal” cohort. Most Trump voters (76%) are very confident regarding Rubio’s handling of the Iran issue. By contrast, Harris-voting respondents do not hold a monolithic view on this matter – an eighth are very confident that Rubio will do the right thing, a quarter are somewhat confident, 38% are not at all confident, while 22% of Harris voters do not know how to respond on this issue.

Confidence levels regarding Rubio’s future performance on the Israeli-Palestinian issue are lower than those pertaining to his performance on Iran. Most conservatives and a third of centrists (32%) say they are very confident that Rubio will do the right thing on this issue. By contrast, a majority (65%) of “strong liberals” and a third of those in the “leaning liberal” cohort are not at all confident in Rubio. When the findings are broken down by presidential voting pattern, half of Harris voters say they have no confidence in Rubio on this score, while 61% of Trump voters say they are very confident that Rubio will do the right thing with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Support for Israel

This month’s survey showed a continuation of the disparity found in previous months between liberal respondents and those from the other camps regarding US support for Israel. The dominant view among conservatives and centrists is that the US does not support Israel enough. By contrast, 28% of “strong liberals” feel that the US supports Israel too much. The percentage of “centrist” respondents who think that the US does not support Israel enough remained identical to last month – the lowest share reported for this group in the past six months.

When the findings are broken down by denominational affiliation, half of Reform and most Conservative Jews feel that the US does not support Israel enough; the same is true for most respondents in the Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox cohorts. A third of Reform and Conservative respondents and a fifth of the Orthodox believe that the United States supports Israel to the right extent. An overwhelming majority of Trump voters (93%) and a third of Harris voters think the United States does not support Israel enough. Forty-four percent of Harris voters feel that the US support of Israel is at the right level, while 17% of Harris voters believe that the US supports Israel too much.

Israel at war

After more than a year of Israel at war, there is no consensus among survey respondents on the question of Israeli victory. The further one moves along the ideological spectrum from liberal to conservative, the higher the percentage of respondents who believe Israel has won the war. Most conservatives, 42% of those in the “centrist” cohort, a quarter of those “leaning liberal”, and 17% of “strong liberals” feel this way. By contrast, a sizeable proportion of respondents feel that Israel has neither won nor lost the war. A small percentage across all respondent groups think Israel has lost the war, while 10% to 15% among all groups say it is too early to tell who won. In a breakdown by presidential voting pattern, most Trump voters believe Israel has won the war, while most Harris voters think Israel has neither won nor lost the war.

This month’s survey detected a halt to the rise in share of self-identifying liberals and centrists who believe that Israel’s military actions in Gaza are too aggressive. The percentage of conservatives who think Israel is overly aggressive has remained very low throughout 2024, while the share of liberals and centrists who feel this way had been growing until this month.

This month’s data also indicates a slight drop in the share of liberals who feel that Israel’s response to the October 7 attack has been “much too aggressive” or “somewhat too aggressive.” This change is small but significant, as it interrupts the trend of recent months toward rising shares of liberals who think this way. Despite the trend change, most liberals continue to believe that Israel’s response to the October 7 onslaught has been too aggressive (much too aggressive or somewhat too aggressive).

This month’s dramatic geopolitical development was the fall of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Israel responded to this by taking over a number of positions in Syria, including on Mount Hermon, as well as with a massive bombardment of military infrastructure with the aim of keeping equipment and arms from falling into the hands of the rebel groups. Most members of the respondent panel believe that Israel’s response to the developments in Syria has been “aggressive to the right extent.” The further one moves along the ideological spectrum from liberal to conservative, the higher the share of those who think this way (except for the “strong conservatives,” a quarter of whom feel that Israeli activity has not been aggressive enough). Both a majority of Trump voters (76%) and a majority of Harris voters (63%) feel that IDF activity in Syria is aggressive to the right extent.

Most survey respondents (73%) feel that Israel’s image in the United States has been damaged by the war. A majority of liberals and centrists, half of those in the “leaning conservative” category, and 37% of “strong conservatives” hold this view. There is a disparity between how Trump and Harris voters understand the war’s effect on Israel’s image. Most Harris voters (85%) believe Israel’s image has been damaged over the past year of war, while 43% of Trump voters feel this way. A fifth of those who voted for the president-elect think that Israel’s image in the US has not changed over the past year, while a quarter feel that Israel’s image has improved during that time.

Most survey respondents agree with the statement “It’s legitimate for Israel to refuse a ceasefire in Gaza until all of the hostages are released.” The further one moves along the ideological spectrum from liberal to conservative, the higher the share of respondents who agree with this statement. While 52% of “strong liberals” agree with the statement, the percentage of “strong conservatives” who agree with it is 99%. Most Harris voters (65%) and the vast majority of Trump voters (98%) agree with the statement. A fifth of Harris voters do not agree with it, while an eighth of them said that they “don’t know.”

Sense of Security

Over a third (36%) of the respondent panel say the war in Israel has caused them to feel less secure, while 46% report that the war has somewhat affected their sense of security. The further one moves along the ideological spectrum from conservative to liberal, the higher the percentage of respondents who say they feel less secure as a result of the war. Less than a fifth of those in all ideological cohorts (except “strong conservatives”) say that the war in Israel has not affected, or no longer affects, their sense of security.

However, when we look back at previous months, we can see that panel members’ sense of security is higher than it was in the early months of the war. A certain improvement can be seen among some of the groups, compared to September’s findings.

Closeness to Israel and to Judaism

The Voice of the Jewish People survey has assessed the sense of closeness to Israel several times since October 7. When we compare responses across several months, we find that, relative to the start of the war, Jews who self-define as “conservative” or “centrist” currently feel an almost identical degree of closeness to Israel, while the liberal subgroups show an erosion of the sense of closeness to Israel since the start of the war. In this month’s survey, 40% of “strong liberals” said the war was causing them to feel more distant from Israel.

The December Voice of the Jewish People survey also assessed attachment to Israel and Judaism with generational questions. Respondents were asked to indicate their attitudes toward these identity components relative to their parents and/or their children (if the children are old enough for answers to be possible). Most respondents said they are connected to Israel at about the same degree as their parents, or more than their parents are. Among “strong liberals,” 14% said they are less connected to Israel than their parents. The cohort in which half or more respondents said that they are more connected to Israel than their parents were the “strong conservatives” (57%) and the self-identified centrists (51%). It should be noted that this finding is directly related to the fact that the Voice of the Jewish People panel comprises Jews whose level of connection to the Jewish community and to Israel is relatively high (as can be seen from the general data on the panel participants presented at the end of the report).

A third of liberals, and 40% of those who self-identify as centrist or conservative, responded that they are more connected to Israel than their children are. A third of respondents in each cohort (except for the “strong liberals”) said that they are connected to Israel in approximately the same degree as their children. A very small percentage said they are less connected to Israel than their children are. Between 20% and 40% said they didn’t know or that it’s too early to tell. The higher the age, the greater the number of respondents who said that they are more connected to Israel than their children are. Most respondents over the age of 65 who responded to the question said that they are more connected to Israel than their children are.

Most respondents, across ideological groups, said that being Jewish matters to them to a similar degree as their parents. Less than 10% of respondents said that being Jewish matters to them less than to their parents.

A third of liberal respondents said that being Jewish matters more to them than to their children, a third said that being Jewish matters to them as much as it does to their children, and 38% said they didn’t know. Among conservatives, a third responded that being Jewish matters more to them than to their children, and half said that being Jewish matters to them to the same degree as to their children. The further one moves along the religious spectrum from liberal to conservative, the lower the share of respondents who said that closeness to Judaism matters to them more than to their children, and the higher the share who said it matters to them to the same degree as to their children.

When we cross-referenced the data, we found that, of all this month’s (582) survey respondents, 152 said they feel more connected both to Israel and to Judaism than their parents do, while 203 said that they are connected both to Israel and to Judaism to the same degree as their parents.

When we cross-referenced findings from these questions with the children’s views (as understood by parents), 149 said that they are connected both to Israel and to Judaism more than their children are, while 152 answered that they are connected both to Israel and to Judaism to the same degree as their children. 161 of respondent panel members answered that they didn’t know or were unable answer these questions. In both cases – parents and children – it is worth noting the relatively large number of those who feel that the strength of their connection to Judaism is similar to that of their children and their parents, but that their connection to Israel is stronger than that of their children and their parents (marked in blue).

December Holidays

With the approach of Hanukkah and Christmas, we posed a few questions pertaining to traditional observance. Most survey respondents said they plan to light Hanukkah candles this year on all eight nights. The further one moves along the religious spectrum from liberal to conservative, the higher the share of respondents who plan to light candles on all of the days of Hanukkah. When the findings are broken down by ideological orientation, we see that three in four respondents in all of the subgroups plan to light candles on every night of Hanukkah. According to Pew Research Center data, eight out of ten Jews have Hanukkah menorahs in their homes (nine out of ten “Jews by Religion”). But the candle-lighting rate found in this survey is higher than the share of Jews who say they light candles every night (or most nights) in surveys that are representative of all American Jews.

A large majority of the respondents (90%) said they would not have Christmas trees in their homes this year; a tenth said they would. This is a lower percentage than the 2013 Pew survey finding, according to which some 32% of American Jews had Christmas trees in their homes during that year’s holiday season (27% of Jews by Religion).

Survey Data and Its Implications

This report is an analysis of a survey administered to 582 American Jews registered for JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People respondent panel. The report does not provide a weighted representative sample of American Jewry as a whole. However, the number of panel respondents who self-identify as belonging to various groups within the Jewish population enables us to identify trends, views, and differences between Jews based on religious affiliation, emotional attachment to Israel, political orientation, attachment to Judaism, and more.

Roughly speaking, this survey tends to reflect the attitudes of US Jews with some connection to the Jewish community, as indicated by a specific question in this regard (which includes data for anyone who noted a connection to some Jewish institution, such as a synagogue, community center, Jewish organization, etc.), as well as Jews with an attachment of some kind to Israel, as reflected in the data on visits to Israel, which are significantly more numerous than the average for all US Jews.

Data on this month’s survey participants (see table): About half self-identify as liberal; the percentage of intermarried respondents is significantly lower than the average for US Jews generally; the share of Conservative respondents is higher than their share in the American Jewish population as a whole. The percentage of respondents unaffiliated with any religious stream is lower than for American Jewry in general.

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