The 8th annual JPPI Pluralism Index is part of the Institute’s Pluralism Project, initiated by the William Davidson Foundation. Compiled by JPPI fellows Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepkov, it is based on a wide-ranging survey in cooperation with pollster Prof. Camil Fuchs. Focused on identifying areas of consensus and controversy, the Index offers new insights regarding major trends in Israeli society. It is published each year on the eve of Israel’s Independence Day.

The post JPPI Event: Presentation of findings from the 2023 Pluralism Index first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

The survey that forms the basis of the Jewish People Policy Institute’s Pluralism Index was conducted this year when Israel and the world were (and still are) under the shadow of the Covid pandemic, and on the eve of the outbreak of war in Ukraine.

Below are a few of the significant findings of this year’s Index, followed by a detailed discussion of some of them:

Jewish-Arab relations

Responsibility for the plight of violence: Most Arabs blame Israeli state institutions for the high rate of crime and violence in Arab society – while most Jews blame Arab society itself.

Partnership between majority and minority: There is a double trend, both an increase in the proportion of Jews who consider Israeli Arabs to be desirable partners, and an increase in the proportion of Jews who object to such a partnership.

Image of extremism: The proportion of Jews who believe that many of the Arabs are “extremist” remains similar. There is an increase in the proportion of Arabs who believe that many Jews are extremists.

Presence in public spaces

Common areas of activity: Most Jews and Arabs in Israel agree that the majority of spaces used episodically, such as hospitals or supermarkets, should be shared by all.

Shared residential spaces: While the majority of Jews are interested in separate neighborhoods, without Arabs (two-thirds), most Arabs are interested in living in neighborhoods with Jews (with one-third supporting separation).

The desire for separation: Religious and Haredi Jews are more interested in separating spaces from Arab citizens than secular and traditional ones, including at beaches, swimming pools, IDF units, and universities.

Partnership and fraternity

The difficulty of reaching a broad consensus: Secular Jews aspire to political partnership with Arabs but not with Haredim; religious and Haredi Jews aspire to political partnership with secular Jews but not with Arabs.

What would be good to have: In principle, most Israelis think it would be good to have friends or acquaintances from other population groups; however, the Haredim and religious people object to friendship with Arabs.

The actual situation: At the practical level, most Israelis have friends or acquaintances from diverse social groups, including acquaintanceship between Jews and Arabs, and between secular and Haredim (but on a limited scale).

Jewish partnership: A large majority of Jews in Israel feel close to Diaspora Jews, but among the secular, a lower-than-average percentage sees a common future for Israel with Diaspora Jewry.

Israeli partnership: Among religious and Haredi Jews, a lower-than-average percentage sees a common future for Jews and Arabs in Israel; a relatively low proportion of them feels a special closeness to all Israelis.

Foreword

This is the eighth year that the Jewish People Policy Institute has published an annual Pluralism Index, and the seventh year that the Index is based, among other things, on a comprehensive survey of attitudes. As in previous years, the survey included Jewish and non-Jewish respondents. This year the survey in the Jewish sector was conducted for the first time through theMadad.com and included a relatively large number of respondents (more than 1,000). The Index has an established list of recurring topics in order to examine their development. The survey was conducted this year (as in previous years) by Prof. Camil Fuchs of Tel Aviv University. The analysis was written, in addition to Fuchs, by JPPI fellows Noah Slepkov and Shmuel Rosner.

Background conditions for the index

The survey underlying the Pluralism Index was conducted under certain social conditions, and against the background of developments that must be factored into the analysis. In the past year, it seems that the main development impacting the data is the new political situation in Israel, which has been led for about a year by a coalition of parties across the political spectrum, from right to left. This coalition does not include the Likud, which had been the ruling party for more than a decade, nor does it include the religious and Haredi parties (Religious Zionist, Shas, and United Torah Judaism). The coalition does include, for the first time in its history, an Arab-Islamic party (Ra’am). It relies on a tiny coalition majority, and enjoys limited public credit, with fierce criticism from its opponents. This state of affairs is also reflected in Pluralism Index data, which indicate a deep polarization in the attitude of various societal groups toward groups in the rival political camp.

Jewish-Arab partnership

More than one-fifth of Israeli citizens are Arabs. About one-eighth of Israel’s citizens are those who define themselves as “Haredim.” Together, these represent approximately a third of the total population – in other words, two groups whose numerical prominence means that they cannot be defined as small minority groups. Their political power, when exerted, is significant. Their ability to shape the social reality in Israel is also significant. Their power to present other groups in Israeli society with fundamental social and economic challenges can be seen in various situations, from the debate over the “Citizenship Law,” through the ongoing discussion on the nature of state-sanctioned conversion, through conflicts and challenges related to the Bedouin diaspora in the Negev, to the unresolved question of use of the Western Wall Plaza.

These challenges, and their impact on the attitudes of other groups in Israeli society toward Arabs and the Haredim, are reflected in almost every one of the Institute’s past surveys, and they have not been absent this year either.  At the same time, against the background of the developments of the past year – which, in addition to the new political configuration, also include the violent events of May last year (mainly, but not only, in mixed cities), which highlighted the tension between Arabs and Jews – a process of change with two aspects can be identified in the data. On one hand, feelings of criticism, and even hostility, toward these groups among those who see them as political rivals; on the other hand, a calming of tensions among those who see the Haredim or the Arabs as political partners (or potential partners).

An example of this process can be identified by looking at a question asked both last year and this year in the same way. Do the respondents agree with the statement that Jews and Arabs have a “common future”? A general look at the answers of Jewish respondents shows that there has been no significant change in their responses. In both the 2021 and the 2022 surveys, the rate of those who answered “strongly agree” or “quite agree” with this statement was close to sixty percent (58%). However, a closer look reveals that within these two similar outcomes a significant change is concealed: it was achieved because in one group of Jews (who define their political position as “right wing”) there was a significant drop in agreement with the statement, while in another group of Jews (who define their political position as “left wing”) there was a substantial increase in agreement with this statement.

In other words, the overall percentage of Jews who agree that Jews and Arabs have a shared future remains the same, but while right-wing adherents, the majority of whom do not support a coalition that includes an Arab party, experienced an erosion of confidence in a shared future this year (whether as a result of the May disturbances, or because of the political context), left-wing adherents this year, most of whom support the coalition, experienced a process of strengthening trust in a shared future.

When examining another of the questions that appeared in a previous survey, asking Jewish respondents to estimate how many “extremists” there are among the Arabs in Israel (a parallel question asks Arab respondents to estimate how many “extremists” there are among Jews in Israel), a change can be identified in only one direction. Four years ago, only about a tenth of Jews estimated the number of extremist Arabs as “very few” (8%). This year, the percentage has doubled (19%), mostly among Jewish groups that define themselves as “secular” and politically positioned on the left. At the same time, there has been no significant change in the proportion of Jews who believe that there are “many” extremist Arabs.  That is, here too we see a parallel process of rapprochement (of one sector of the population) and of distance (of another population sector), based on political stance. It should be emphasized that: 1. there is no question in the survey that enables us to know for certain that the political developments of the past year are the reason for this process; 2. in the 2018 survey there was a “don’t know” option that did not appear in the 2022 survey; and 3. the 2022 survey was conducted before a number of attacks were carried out by Israeli Arabs affiliated with ISIS at the end of March, which could have impacted the findings.

Among Arabs there is a significant decrease in the proportion of those who believe that only a few Jews are political extremists as compared with the 2018 data.  This decrease is detectible in a parallel increase in the number of those who feel that “some” Jews are extremists, or that “many” are extremists.  Several hypotheses can be posited regarding the reasons for this change, including the harsh rhetoric of four election campaigns, the Jewish public’s response to the May 2022 riots, and the fact that a significant portion of the Arab public does not support the participation of an Arab party in the governing coalition. It should also be noted that the survey was conducted at a time when there was ongoing debate in Israel about the “Citizenship Law,” which eventually passed in the Knesset with the support of most of the coalition parties and some of the opposition parties; in order to pass it, the coalition was forced to accept more uncompromising language than it had hoped.

Violence in Arab society

Discussions about the level of violence in Arab society in Israel have been ongoing in the public arena for some time, gaining considerable traction at various times against the background of a violent outbreak, or attempts by the government to come up with ways to deal with the violence. In the first half of 2021 there was widespread preoccupation with an eruption that had a nationalist character, which affected Jewish-Arab relations in mixed cities and mixed neighborhoods.[i] In the second half of 2021, and at the beginning of 2022, the emphasis shifted to the state of internal violence in Arab society.[ii]

During the violence of May 2021, Jews in Israel were asked who they thought was responsible for the outbreak of violence, and were presented with six options for answering, some reflecting the responsibility of the establishment, or the Jewish majority, and others the responsibility of the rioters or the society from which they came.[iii] Most Jews argued in this case that the responsibility fell on the leadership of Arab society or the rioters themselves, but the police and the government also did not receive a high score from the survey respondents. In the pluralism survey, we similarly tried to examine the causes (in the opinion of the respondents) of the ongoing violence in Arab society, which has manifested in high rates of murder, robbery, collection of protection payments, and more. Respondents were asked to rate four options: two of them state that most of the responsibility for this phenomenon lies with the institutions of the state (government and police) that do not properly address the Arab sector, both in general terms (neglect) and in concrete aspects (the fight against violence). The other two reasons available to respondents, Jews and Arabs, focused on the internal characteristics of Arab society, and placed the responsibility on the “public” or, more generally, on the “culture” of Arab society.

This question sharply highlights the different views – contradictory to some degree – of Jews and Arabs on the social reality vis-à-vis Israel’s Arab citizens. While a majority of Jews (albeit a small one, 51%) see the internal factors of Arab society as key factors in the violence, a very significant majority of Arabs place the responsibility on the state (almost 80%).

Whereas the finger of blame among a large percentage of the Arab respondents is pointed at the government and the police, among the Jews, as expected, there is disagreement along political lines. The survey respondents were asked to rank the four reasons mentioned in order, and the rating varies according to political position. A very large majority (82%) of Jewish left-wing adherents consider state neglect as the number one cause of violence in the Arab sector. Adherents of the right, on the other hand, contend by a significant majority (61%) that the reason is “a question of culture in the Arab sector.”  Broken down between internal and institutional reasons, the left is almost entirely focused on the failures of the establishment (92%), compared to the right, which places the blame on the Arab sector and its culture (77%) as the predominant factor (center party voters are divided about fifty-fifty).

Partnership and friendship, in principle and in practice

As stated, we asked Jewish and Arab respondents – as we did last year – to respond to statements concerning “a shared future” and statements regarding “closeness” to various groups.  Jews were asked about closeness to all Israelis, including Arabs, and about a shared future with all Israelis, including Arabs.  They were also asked about closeness and a shared future with all Jews.  We should note that this question was asked before the issue of aliyah (and with it the debate regarding the nature of the state’s Jewish identity) came to the fore in the wake of the war in Ukraine and the arrival of refugees, Jews and non-Jews, in Israel.  For almost all of these questions no significant gaps were seen, on average, between last year’s findings and those of this year.  A large majority of Jews feel a closeness with all Jews (some 70%), and a majority point to a shared future with all Jews (64%).  A small majority feel a special closeness to all Israelis (53%, a certain increase compared with last year), and a greater majority feel a shared future with all Israelis (58%).

The issue of partnership was also examined this year through the political prism, in a question about the goal, in principle, of including different groups in the coalition. This question demonstrated that there are groups that almost the entire public wants to be part of the governing coalition (“secular” and “religious”), and other groups who draw many objections to their possible inclusion in the government (“Haredim” and “Arabs”).  It also revealed an inverse correlation between the desire for a coalition that includes Haredim and the desire for a coalition that includes Arabs.
It shows that the higher up one is on the traditionalism scale (among Jews), the greater the desire for a coalition partnership with Haredim, and the lower the desire for a coalition partnership with the Arabs.  Among the general public, around half are interested, in principle, in a coalition that includes Haredim (53%) and about half are interested, in principle, in a coalition that includes Arabs (52%).  But those who desire one or the other of these options belong to different groups, as can be seen in the graph below.

Similar gaps, though less acute, can also be seen in a question that does not relate to political partnership, but rather to the desire, in principle, for personal friendship. We examined, in broad terms, which groups Israeli Jews would be willing to connect with, in principle, on a personal level, and whether there are groups for which there is disapproval in regard to personal friendships.  In general, it can be said that for the most part, that a considerable majority of Jews have no reservations about personal friendships with members of another group of Jews.  There is a willingness (in principle), to connect with Jews from a group that is more or less religious, with Jews of a different ethnic community, and so on.  However, most Haredi and religious Jews are reluctant to associate with Arabs.

When willingness in principle becomes a practical matter, that is, the question of whether Jews in Israel actually have friends or acquaintances from other groups, it turns out that there are groups that almost every Jew in Israel has acquaintance with (secular Jews), while there are groups with which such familiarity is lower.  It should, of course, be noted that the size of the group is of critical significance in the context of whether Israelis know / connect with its members.  For example, the population share of Ethiopian Jews in Israel is small, and therefore it is less surprising to learn that the rate of those who indicate that they have Ethiopian friends or acquaintances is lower (and the same is true for Druze).  However, one should not ignore the fact that the low level of familiarity (and few friends) has an impact on the group’s social status, which can translate into alienation or suspicion.  In fact, as we can see, the groups that have fewer friendships and acquaintances (Arabs and Haredim) are also the groups toward which there are reservations regarding political partnerships.  Of course, this is also a feedback loop so it isn’t always clear what comes first:  Does the small number of friendships make political partnership difficult, or do the political differences (and others, which we will soon discuss) make it harder to establish friendships and acquaintances?

Shared and separate spaces

A key reason for the lack of friendship / acquaintance between different groups is the fact that Israel includes numerous spaces in which the homogenous population living there lacks significant encounters with other groups.  This fact has already been discussed in several previous JPPI papers, mainly in the context of the separation of Jewish groups from each other. Thus, for example, earlier JPPI publications noted that almost all Haredim have mostly Haredi friends (89%),[iv]  and that almost no Haredi wants to send their children to a mixed secular-religious school because such an education “may weaken faith and observance)” (63%), and because “each population needs its own specific education” (27%).[v]  Prior JPPI surveys have found that about half of Haredim are interested in having Haredim and secular Jews live in mixed neighborhoods.  It is worth noting that in regard to the question of residential space, these surveys found that the Haredim were the more tolerant group.  Among secular Jews, a vast majority stated they did not want to live in the same neighborhood as Haredim (78% of those who defined themselves as totally secular).[vi]

Of course, the fact that the separation is perceived as desirable by citizens does not necessarily mean it is good for the state.  Yishai Blank documented in detail how the state “is involved quite aggressively in residential patterns of secular and religious Jews” and how it uses a variety of tools to encourage

separation between different Jewish groups. Blank asserts that this is a misguided policy for several reasons – from jeopardizing the individual’s right to live anywhere he or she wants, to the fear of reinforcing stereotypes and systemic discrimination.  Separation feeds “the growing enmity between Arabs and Jews, secular and Haredim, veteran Israelis and immigrants,” say Blank and Izzy Rosen Zvi.[vii] Some have taken the opposite view:  that separation prevents friction, eliminates quarrels, and allows for a homogeneous life.  “Most people want to live in an environment where they feel like they belong rather than feeling like strangers or feeling threatened,” wrote Ruth Gavison and Uri Schwartz about this issue, when presenting their position that favored, at least partially, the right of citizens to live separately.[viii]

This year’s survey also found that in certain cases separation into distinct neighborhoods is desirable for everyone.  Just over a third of all Jews in Israel (38%) feel that city neighborhoods should be a “shared space for everyone, without separation.”  Others believe it is better for there to be a separation in certain cases (42%) or always (19%).  But this year, we did not focus specifically on neighborhoods, but sought to review a wide range of public spaces and the question of whether Israelis prefer them to be shared or separate – in two cross-sections.  In the first section, we asked respondents whether separation between Jews and Arabs is desirable.  In the second, we asked whether they wanted separation between secular and religious Jews.  Overall, with respect to most spaces used by the public on an occasional basis, that is, intermittent visits for a specific purpose, there was broad agreement about shared spaces.  This was the case for places such as hospitals, supermarkets, the beach, and to a lesser extent swimming pools.  The desire for separation was evident, in the context of Jews and Arabs, with regard to cemeteries.  The main gap between Jews and Arabs was seen in relation to neighborhoods.  Among the Arabs in the sample, the majority stated that they prefer mixed residential neighborhoods; among the Jews, the majority of respondents preferred neighborhoods that were always or sometimes separate.

For questions regarding separation among Jews (secular, religious, Haredim) there was agreement that most areas should be kept as shared spaces, such as hospitals, public transport, universities, and supermarkets. There was wide agreement on the question of neighborhoods (the exception was among traditional Jews, who wanted to see more shared spaces than the other groups). But this was an inverse agreement – not on the need to connect but rather, on the need to remain separate (about 20%) or sometimes separate (around 40%); however, in total, a majority of some 60% felt that city neighborhoods should always include some separate spaces for secular, religious, and Haredi Jews.

It is worth noting that this question was a matter of principle, that is, it did not address the possibility that “you” would live in a shared neighborhood for secular and Haredim (or Arabs and Jews).  Previous surveys have found that when posed as a practical question, the percentage of those wishing to live in homogeneous neighborhoods – with people who belong to the same national group (Jews) and those who keep a similar level of tradition practice – was much higher.  In other words, many secular, religious, and Haredi Jews who say that, in principle, there could be some mixed neighborhoods and some separate neighborhoods, they would choose to live in separate neighborhoods.

In regard to some sites, we observed among religious and Haredi Jews a preference for segregation, which the secular and traditionalist Jews do not share.  Thus, for example, most of the Haredim and almost half of the religious Jews want segregated swimming pools (among the religious there is a significant percentage who sometimes choose separation).  This is compared with most secular Jews (although, not a large majority) who state that swimming pools should be integrated.  A similar phenomenon is evident regarding beaches.  Only a quarter of religious and Haredi Jews (24%) feel that beaches should be shared spaces.

There is a gap connected to processes that have been taking place in recent years related to the question of integration or segregation in armored divisions of the IDF.  It can be assumed that this gap is the result of the rise of gender equality in the IDF and women’s entry into many roles including, in a few cases that have grabbed wide media attention, combat positions.  Without entering the controversy over whether this change in the IDF is necessary or not, its impact is evident in the willingness of certain sectors to embrace partnership in military life.  In examining the attitudes of secular and religious Jews, both sectors have high levels of military service (unlike the Haredim), we can understand that while a large majority of the secular (75%) see no reason to segregate secular soldiers and religious soldiers, almost half of the religious respondents want such separation always or in certain cases (47%).  Especially relating to the second group, we can assume that those “certain cases” when separation is desirable are those where women might be present in the armored division (combat soldiers, and in some cases instructors).

Who do you imagine as neighbors?

One of the more interesting questions that arises through the analysis of the study is what respondents imagine when they think of a “shared space.” When a secular respondent refers to a shared space with Haredim, do they imagine a Haredi man who averts his gaze at the sight of a woman on the street, or do they imagine a Haredi neighborhood in their city, which is an idea that has garnered much support among the Israeli public (as revealed in last year’s survey)?  Does the Jew who is asked if they want to live among Arabs imagine living next door to the Arab doctor who treated him in a Haifa hospital, or does he imagine a mixed neighborhood in Akko (Acre) or Lod during a period rife with tensions between its residents, as we witnessed last year?

This question arose, among other things, in light of the very large gaps in the willingness of Jews affiliated with various ideological groups to reside in mixed neighborhoods alongside Arabs.  Primarily, in light of the fact that among those who identify with the left, only a tiny percentage (2%) state that separate neighborhoods are desirable, while in contrast, a very large majority (70%) prefer shared neighborhoods.  Naturally, this position – as a matter of principle – is fundamentally different from the actual situation presently found in Israel.  Left-wing voters, who generally belong to groups with relatively high incomes, rarely live in neighborhoods shared by Arabs and Jews.  Therefore, when we consider their position, there are actually three options:

First, to understand this position as a matter of principle, which has no practical application whatsoever and is, therefore, easily expressed.

Second, to understand this position as less than fully authentic, given the distinct gap between what is stated and what is practiced.

Third, to assume that the respondents understand the question in a particular way that allows them to respond to it without noticing the tremendous gap between the position in principle and the practical position.

This third option led us to examine the question of “imagined neighbors” and to conduct additional research.  In practice, after the initial survey was completed, we changed the wording of the question concerning space shared by Jews and Arabs and looked at how an additional respondent sample answered the revised version.  In this new version two similar changes were made.  First, in the introductory remarks, we emphasized the possibility that the question deals with Jews and Arabs “with similar incomes and educational backgrounds.” In so doing we attempted to influence how the interviewees image the neighbors we were asking about.  Accordingly, in the response choices, we gave two options for a single shared residential space.  The first was “shared by any Jews and Arabs,” and the second was “shared by Jews and Arabs with similar backgrounds.”

Responses to the revised version were collected for an additional two weeks, in order to see if there was a genuine difference in the answers between the version that leaves room for the respondents to decide for themselves who the “Arabs” being referred to are, and the version that enables respondents to adjust their answer to Arabs who are “like them” in certain respects (but different to the extent that they are Arabs, and the respondents are Jews). The new data did not reveal significant differences in responses.

Technical data

JPPI’s Pluralism Index Survey is one of the products of the Pluralism Project initiated by the William Davidson Foundation. The 2022 survey was conducted by Prof. Camil Fuchs of Tel Aviv University. It included approximately 1100 respondents in the Jewish sector, and another 200 respondents in the non-Jewish sector through a combined online and telephone survey. The respondents constitute a representative sample of the two populations surveyed. The survey in the Jewish sector was conducted by theMadad.com; sampling error 4% at a significance level of 95%. In the non-Jewish sector, the survey was conducted by Afkar. Sampling error 9.7%.

[i] See: “The 2021 Riots” by Israeli Arabs and their implications, Shmuel Rosner, Jewish People Policy Institute, June 2021.

[ii] A discussion of this phenomenon can be found in the reports of the Samuel Neaman Institute, the Executive Committee for Dealing with Crime in Arab Society, the Abraham Initiatives, the Institute for Zionist Strategies, the Institute for National Security Studies, and the State Comptroller’s reports. See: Why is the police having difficulty in eradicating crime in [Arab] society, Shmuel Rosner, Maariv, September 2021.

[iii] See: Who is to blame for the situation? The Arabs and the police (at least, so the Jews think) …, theMadad.com, May 2021.

[iv] Pew Israel, 2015. Secular Jews also have mainly secular friends (90%). For traditional and religious Jews there is a higher percentage of friends from other groups.

[v] From the Pluralism Index, Jewish People Policy Institute, 2018.  Additional data on shared residence in the following paragraphs are taken from the 2017 Pluralism Index.

[vi] A discussion of this issue appears in the book, “Israeli Judaism: A Portrait of a Cultural Revolution,” published by JPPI in cooperation with Devir Publishing.  Shmuel Rosner and Camil Fuchs, 2018, pp. 1445-145.

[vii] “Municipalities Bill:  A Present Without a Past, Reform Without a Future.” Yishai Blank and Izzy Rosen Zvi.  Laws Vol. 1 (2009), 49.

[viii] Residential separation as a component of discrimination:  The American experience.  Ruth Gavison, Uri Schwartz. Law Studies XXV, 2001.

The post Shared Spaces, Challenging Spaces: What the findings of JPPI’s 2022 Pluralism Index survey reveal first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Main Findings

The survey on which the Jewish People Policy Institute’s Pluralism Index is based was conducted this year in the shadow of the coronavirus pandemic, and in the midst of an election season – Israel’s fourth in two years. The survey findings indicate that both have had an impact on Israeli cohesion. Below are a few of the main findings of this year’s Index, followed by a detailed discussion.

The COVID-19 Pandemic

• A substantial majority of Israelis view the behavior of the Haredi sector and, to a lesser degree, the Arab sector, as a blow to Israeli unity.

Cohesion and Partnership

• A slight majority of Jews and Arabs agree that “All Israeli citizens, Jews and Arabs, have a shared future.”
• A majority of Israeli Jews agree that “All Jews, in Israel and the Diaspora, have a shared future.”

A Jewish State

• Israel’s Jewish public is divided over whether Israel should be “less Jewish,” “more Jewish,” or “as it is today.”
• There is a strong consensus among Jews that the Jewish state should have a Jewish majority and encourage Jewish creative activity.
• Only a tiny minority of Jews in Israel (1%) would prefer that Israel cease to be a Jewish state.
• Arabs would overwhelmingly prefer that Israel be a “state of all its citizens,” with no religious or national particularities.

A Democratic State

• A substantial majority of Arabs, and a majority of Jews, want Israel to be “more democratic.”
• A substantial majority of Arab Israelis do not regard Israel as a democracy.
• There is a near-total consensus among Jews and Arabs that a democratic state should safeguard human rights and not discriminate against minorities.

Introduction

This is JPPI’s seventh annual Pluralism Index, and the sixth year that it is based, among other things, on a comprehensive opinion survey. As in past years, the survey included Jewish and non-Jewish respondents. In the case of the Jewish respondents, it drew on the large respondent base of JPPI’s comprehensive 2018 Israeli Judaism Survey. The Index comprises a list of set topics – issues whose development is assessed each year. We also examine various developments relative to a baseline by which the Institute strikes a balance between the positions and desires of different groups within Israeli society.[i] This year’s survey, like its predecessors, was conducted by Professor Camil Fuchs of Tel Aviv University. The Index project is edited by JPPI fellows Noah Slepkov and Shmuel Rosner. The Index baseline was written by JPPI fellow Brig. Gen. (Res.) Michael Herzog.

COVID-19 and the Elections

The Pluralism Index is not directly linked to immediate political developments, or to the health and economic crises in which Israel and the rest of the world were mired during the period of its compilation. Its purpose is to identify long-term trends, not to respond to short-term developments. However, crises often precipitate turning points whose effects persist even after the crises have passed. In this context, it is worth looking at some of the findings presented in the Index, especially those relating to groups that stood out during the pandemic.

There has been much discussion of the way in which the Haredi and the Arab Israeli sectors have responded to the governmental coronavirus guidelines. At different times during the crisis, these two groups drew attention for their inconsistent compliance with health system directives. The infection rate of both sectors was high relative to their population share. Each year, the Pluralism Index examines attitudes toward different population groups. Israel’s Haredi and Arab sectors both rank consistently low on the “contribution to the state” scale (this does not mean they don’t contribute, but rather that other Israelis perceive them as not contributing). Both groups rank low on the scale again this year.

This year’s Index also looked at the degree to which Israelis agree with two statements that reflect discomfort with the behavior of the two aforementioned sectors over the past year. “The behavior of the Haredim/the Arabs during the coronavirus pandemic undermined Israeli unity.” Both statements met with high levels of agreement among Jews, and moderate agreement among non-Jews. It should be noted, however, that both statements elicited very low agreement levels among the Haredim, but significant agreement among Arab Israelis. That is, the Haredim were inclined to assert that the behavior of the two sectors did not undermine civic unity, while the Arabs tended to say that the behavior of both sectors (including the Arab sector) did have a negative impact on civic unity.

Eight of every ten Jews (81%) respond the same in regard both to Arabs and Haredim. Of respondents, 13% maintained that only Haredim undermined civic unity and 5% claimed that only Arabs undermined unity. Among those who defined themselves as right-wing and non-Haredi, 9% stated that the Arabs alone undermine unity.

2021 witnessed Israel’s fourth election cycle in two years. The Index is not the place to expand on this issue. However, JPPI’s use of the same samples in its data assessments for the past four years makes it possible to identify long-term trends even in political contexts. Through comparative analysis of the responses of Israeli Jews to questions about self-definition, including responses in the political data field, we can identify rightward or leftward movements along the (5-step) scale, especially movements of one step up or down.

Thus, of the Israeli Jews who self-identified as “right” four years ago, 12% now identify as “center right” (while another 2% self-identify as “center”). Similarly, a third of those who self-identified as “left” four years ago (a small segment of the Israeli populace, amounting to 5 percent) now self-identify as “center left.” As far as we can tell from the available data, these moves do not bespeak a major change in political opinions, but rather a flexible attitude toward self-identification, one that is less concerned with rigid points of identification than with general comfort zones along the social-political spectrum. The political identification index puts half to two-thirds of Israeli Jews on the right-wing side of the spectrum (right and center right), a quarter at the center, and the rest on the left-wing side (mostly center left, with a small number self-identifying as “left”).

Areas of Partnership and Consensus

In this year’s Index, we focused on identifying partnership and consensus (or their absence) within three different circles: the general Jewish circle (Israel and the Diaspora), the general Israeli circle (Jews and non-Jews), and the Jewish Israeli circle (Jews in Israel). We delineated these circles via two frames of reference. One was that of people’s feelings and beliefs regarding other groups present in the given circle (e.g.: Do all Jews have a “shared future?”). The other was that of outlooks regarding the principles that shape the joint framework (e.g.: What does the concept of a “democratic state” entail?).

We identified areas of consensus and disagreement in all three circles, and different degrees to which respondents expressed a sense of partnership and their willingness to be in partnership. Naturally, as might have been expected, issues of major social and political controversy presented greater difficulty in terms of delineating circles of partnership. However, it should also be noted that a focus on controversy often obscures the existence of strong consensus on many other issues – consensus that could provide a foundation for defusing tensions, strengthening cohesion, and improving the joint quality of life of the groups in question.

The Supreme Court

To introduce our discussion of the areas of disagreement and consensus, we decided to mark out the dispute over the power and status of Israel’s “judicial system” as a disagreement directly linked to the past year’s political developments – the issue having also been of major consequence in this year’s elections. The image and powers of Israel’s Supreme Court are topics far beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, they have become major points of contention along which lines are drawn between political groups. This has been particularly palpable in the past two years, due to several high-profile deliberations and rulings (the recent recognition of Reform conversions in Israel for purposes of Law of Return eligibility), the indictments filed against the Prime Minister, the intra-governmental disputes over the powers of the Attorney General, the appointment of a state attorney, and a few other issues pertaining to the judicial sphere – which in the public consciousness is connected with the status of the Court .

A serious dispute that has agitated Israeli governmental authorities for quite a few years now concerns the power the Court claimed, with the enactment of the Basic Laws of the 1990s, to invalidate Knesset legislation. This controversy, which has been reignited whenever the Court has overruled decisions on a wide range of issues, from how to handle illegal immigration to matters of religion and state, has long exceeded the bounds of polite discussion among jurists. It constitutes a major litmus test in the political arena, where elected officials have to commit to reforming the Court or to fighting it, to defending the Court or determining that it is dangerous, or is itself endangered – each faction according to its reasons and beliefs.

In Israel’s Arab sector, support for the Supreme Court power of judicial review is widespread (81%). Half of Arab Israelis attach “very great importance” to the issue. Most Arabs in Israel feel that it is important to maintain the existing power of legislative oversight in matters arising in the political sphere. In the Jewish sector the issue cuts across camps in a nearly equal manner. Slightly over half of Jewish Israelis (54%) support “the power of the Supreme Court to overturn laws passed by the Knesset,” while slightly less than half (46%) oppose this “power.” Among groups self-defining as “right” or “center right,” the number of those who oppose the Court’s authority exceeds the number of those who support it. This is also true for all religiously-observant groups, including the Haredim. In contrast, among those who self-define as left or center, and among the secular, there is overwhelming support for broad judicial powers (reaching 96% on the left).

The issue’s high-profile status, and its clear correspondence to the political affiliations of the Israeli populace, makes it hard for public debate to be conducted calmly, and amplifies its importance in the eyes of both “supporters” and “opponents.” Over half of both sides feel that the issue is “very important,” personally which could make it difficult for them to reach a compromise even if the fundamental disparity between the two camps isn’t as great as it sometimes appears.

Circle 1: Israel-Diaspora

The circle of Israel-Diaspora partnership is, paradoxically, at once the most comfortable and the most challenging.

Comfortable – because the Jews of Israel and of the Diaspora have no shared space in which practical conflict prevails on any subject. In recent years there has been extensive discussion of the “distancing” of Jews from each other, due to a variety of factors (a small number of them rooted in policy, but the majority arising from social or historical processes). And yet, even if there is a noticeable distancing, it is a phenomenon that develops in a slow process that is mostly hidden from view. Israeli and Diaspora Jews – certainly during a pandemic that hinders encounters and interactions – are managing their affairs in parallel. If a conflict arises between them, most do not become aware of it except by accident, and in such a way that its impact on everyday life is very limited.

Challenging – because the lack of conflict is itself a factor that breeds apathy and distancing. Because Jews in Israel and the Diaspora do not have a shared space, it is relatively easy for them to become indifferent to each other’s affairs. And more: it is becoming difficult for some of them to understand why interaction is necessary between people who aren’t partners in the building of a concrete enterprise. This year’s Pluralism Index findings show that the challenge has grown particularly acute among those Jews in Israel who are situated at the least-traditional pole of Jewish Israeli society. One may speculate that, for these Jews, the sense of a shared tradition and religion is not part of their worldview. There is a stronger feeling of distance with respect to those who don’t belong to the national-communal world in which they identify their major circle of commonality.

Accordingly, the data show agreement among two-thirds of Jewish Israelis that Israeli and Diaspora Jews have a shared future (62%). Nearly three out of every four Jewish Israelis feel an “attachment” to all Jews in Israel and abroad (72%). This gap, between a weaker sense of shared destiny and a stronger sense of attachment, is a conclusion that might reasonably be drawn from the differing life circumstances of Israeli and Diaspora Jews. The sense of closeness is an emotion that can be maintained even from a distance – in contrast to the sense of commonality that would seem to entail a more focused feeling of having a shared future.

In this context, it is worth noting that many Arab Israelis also have a sense of a “shared future” with other Arabs, though the percentage is lower (49%) than the corresponding figure for Jewish Israelis vis-à-vis all Jews. Arab Israelis also exhibit a stronger sense of closeness to all Arabs than of having a shared future with them (62%).

Circle 2: Jews and non-Jews

The degree of partnership between Israeli Jews and non-Jews was a matter of public debate during the most recent election cycle. Longstanding conventions were shattered this time around, with the possibility of an Arab-party joining the coalition or providing it critical support while technically remaining in the opposition.

This new development was exemplified by the idea of the Joint List aligning with centrist and leftist parties to try to create an “obstructing bloc” to prevent the formation of a right-wing government under Benjamin Netanyahu. More importantly, it manifested in the Islamist party, Ra’am, backing several Knesset moves by the Prime Minister and the rightist bloc, and in Ra’am’s identification during the elections as a party that could potentially join either a right- or left-wing coalition.[2] Israeli public debate on the possibility of alignment between Jewish and Arab parties and voters gained momentum when the Prime Minister, a leader of the Israeli right for the past several decades, openly courted the Arab vote, visited Arab localities, and argued that the Arab electorate would do well to choose him.

Whether this constituted a serious effort or a tactical election-campaign move, its impact on the Israeli electorate, Jewish and Arab, cannot be overstated. The 2021 elections brought Arab parties and voters closer to full-partner status in the Israeli political game. This is also likely an outcome of processes noted in last year’s Index, where we reported a dramatic rise in the percentage of Arab Israelis who define their primary identity as “Israeli,” and a correspondingly steep drop in the percentage of those who identify as “Palestinian.”[3]

Most of the political debate in the political arena regarding Jewish-Arab relations revolved around the question of partnership and active Arab engagement in the political sphere. In the past few decades, there has been a gradual but very significant decline in Arab electoral support for “Jewish” parties, and a switch to near-exclusive support for parties identified with the Arab sector.[4] Accordingly, most of the discussion regarding this active partnership took place between political parties that directly target Arab voters. The sector’s main party, the Joint List, was challenged by Ra’am, which is identified with the southern branch of the Islamic Movement. The Arab parties have traditionally found themselves, whether involuntarily or by choice, outside of the coalition formation and stabilization negotiations. But Ra’am (and those Arab mayors who have expressed themselves on these issues) has been conducting itself as a party willing to use its support to safeguard its voters’ interests. There has been a particular emphasis on focused and thorough resolution of the problem of violence in the Arab sector, and on budget allocations for education, construction, and healthcare. This approach, should it become a long-term trend, would likely accustom the Israeli public to Jewish-Arab partnership on decisions relating to legislation, budgeting, domestic and foreign policy, and others.

In JPPI’s 2021 survey, both Jews and non-Jews were asked whether they see a “shared future” for all Israelis, and whether they feel “close” to all Israelis. The questions were formulated to explicitly convey that they referred to both Jews and Arabs, and the (Jewish) responses obviously correspond to existing political camps, with the sense of partnership intensifying as the self-definitions move leftward. Among non-Jews, the Druze expressed a high level of agreement with the partnership statement.

With regard to the gaps between Jews in response to questions about “partnership” and “attachment,” we see an interesting pattern. While nearly half the respondents (49%) gave the same answer to both questions, a substantial number (25%) can be described as having “attachment hesitancy.” These are Jews whose attitude to partnership is more positive than to attachment– the difference is nearly always one level on the scale. For example: If they “greatly agree” with the claim that there is a “shared future,” they only “somewhat agree” that there is “attachment”; if they “somewhat agree” that there is a “shared future,” then they “somewhat disagree” that there is an “attachment” – and so on. It may be that the explanation for the lower shared level of attachment is on the one hand recognition by Jews that the Arabs are here to stay and that partnership is essential, along with a difficulty in turning such a partnership into attachment with an emotional dimension. Incidentally, among Arabs the phenomenon of attachment hesitancy” is not noticeable – 60% of them respond similarly to the question of partnership and attachment, and among the rest, there is no repeat pattern, but rather what appears to be a random combination of answers.

Jews-Arabs: A Democratic State

Jews and Arabs in Israel are deeply divided over whether Israel is a “democratic state,” i.e., whether it meets the standards of such a state. However, there is a significant consensus between the two groups about quite a few of the standards themselves, that is, the standards a state must uphold if it is to be considered democratic. The two sectors also share a desire for Israel to be no less democratic than it is today, and a feeling that it should ideally become more so. Most Jews (52%) and a substantial majority of Arabs (78%) say that Israel should be more democratic than it currently is. Only a tiny minority of Arabs, and a small minority of Jews (14%), feel that Israel should be “less democratic.” It should, however, be noted that the degree of democracy is directly related to political positions. Within the Israeli sector, the aspiration to be a “more democratic” country is a central component of the political agenda for those who self-define as center or left. In the two right-wing groups (right and center right), the largest share of respondents feel that Israel already strikes the correct democratic balance, while among the right itself the share who believe that Israel would do well to become less democratic (a quarter) is close to the share who think that Israel should be more democratic.

Many volumes have already been written on the question of what a democratic state is and what its characteristics are, and it is difficult to find an agreed decision on the rule. However, when the characteristics of a “democratic state” are presented to Israeli Jews and non-Jews, a broad consensus does emerge. Jews and non-Jews agree in high percentages about the principles of “majority rule,” “safeguarding human rights,” and “no discrimination.” A large majority of Jews and Arabs also agree that an independent judicial system is required of a democratic state. And it is interesting that even regarding the principle of separation of religion and state as a criterion of democracy – a principle about which internal disagreement is robust – we can see that Jews and Arabs are divided to a similar degree. A third of Muslim Arabs (34%) reject the separation of religion and state as a criterion of democracy, and a similar proportion of Jews (28%) share that view. The opposition intensifies as one moves along the religiosity scale from secular to traditional, and is highly visible among those who self-define as right-wing (a majority), and those situated along the Haredi and religious end of the spectrum.

Thus, Jews and Arabs do not agree about whether Israel currently deserves to be called democratic, but they do agree, though not in full, that Israel should become more democratic than it presently is. Moreover, they agree about whether most of the criteria presented constitute necessary conditions of democracy.

Nevertheless, these broad areas of consensus are no guarantee that major controversies over Israel’s “democratic” level can easily be resolved. This is because, as noted, a substantial proportion of Arabs (31%) feel that Israel is not a democratic state, with a slightly higher proportion (39%) saying that it is “not democratic enough.” At the same time, a slight majority of Jews (51%) do feel that Israel is a democratic state, with only a small minority (13%) averring that it is insufficiently democratic. Also, and more crucially, a large majority of Arab Israelis say that Israel, to be considered a democratic state, should be a “state of all its citizens,” an assertion that numerous studies have shown to be unacceptable to Jewish Israelis.

The statement presented to the non-Jewish survey respondents was: “A democratic state should be a ‘state of all its citizens’, that is, a state that does not emphasize the national or religious character of any specific group.” The share of non-Jews who agree with this statement is very high, 91%, with no significant differences between population groups, age groups, levels of religiosity, or religious affiliations. Many different conjectures can, of course, be raised about how the respondents understand the concept of “a state of all its citizens.” This concept, which has gained currency in Israeli public discourse since the 1990s, has taken on a variety of meanings. Among others, a demand to make Israel a “state of all its citizens” was presented at the so-called “Equality Conference,” the aim being to institute policy that would further the integration of non-Jewish citizens based on recognition of them as a national minority.

This demand raises a question about which there is no consensus, namely, whether the demand for “a state of all its citizens” contradicts the definition of Israel as a Jewish state. The High Court of Justice rejected the idea that the demand should be so understood. “It is our opinion that the definition of the State of Israel as a state of all its citizens does not preclude its existence as a Jewish state,” the justices wrote.[5] Experts who have studied the subject in depth have also found that “it is important to stress that the claim of a Jewish character of the state is usually not countered by claims to neutrality or to ‘a state of all its citizens,’ In the sense of privatizing all non-civic identities (as in France). Rather, it is countered by claims of different, possibly incompatible, identities and meanings (religious, national or a combination thereof). Many of the leaders of the Arab minority in Israel do not advocate a neutral, civic state; they aspire to reconstitute Israel as a bi-national or multicultural state.”[6]

Nevertheless, such appears to be the public’s understanding of this demand (and as it understood by many lawmakers, who expressed that understanding in the deliberations over the Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People). This view was explained by the Kohelet Policy Forum, which supported the law: “The law would affirm that all those who wish to see a bi-national state established here, or to revoke the Jewish national recognition and establish a state of all its citizens, are deluding themselves.”[7]

To conclude this section: The question of what Israel’s Arab citizens mean when they assert that a “state of all its citizens” is a condition of democracy, is one of the keys to determining whether there is an unbridgeable gap on this important issue between a substantial majority of Jewish Israelis and a substantial majority of Arab Israelis – or whether a fundamental consensus actually exists regarding the criteria for democracy, such that what appears to be a disagreement is in fact a simple misunderstanding about the meaning of the term.

Jews-Arabs: the Nation-State Law

In the attempt to examine areas of agreement and disagreement, we also sought to clarify the degree of intensity Israelis express in relation to various issues. In other words, not only whether they are “for” or “against” a particular issue, but also how important it is to them. Clarification of this sort is a critical component of policy making, because often a group with a high intensity of opinion will be more significant in deciding an issue, even if holds a minority position. For example, one might have the impression that this is what happened in a debate on a compromise with regard to the additional plaza at the Western Wall several years ago, when the government preferred the wishes of a determined minority over those of a relatively indifferent majority.[8]

In this context, we sought to examine the 2018 Basic Law: Israel, the Nation State of the Jewish People.[9] This law, also mentioned in the previous section, states that “the State of Israel is the nation state of the Jewish people, in which it exercises its natural, cultural, religious, and historical right to self-determination.” It further states that “exercise of the right to national self-determination in the State of Israel is unique to the Jewish people.” This law largely eliminates both the possibility of defining Israel as a “state of all its citizens,” whether it is a definition that negates its nature as a Jewish state, or if it is a definition that allows parallel national realization to other groups. To a large extent, this was the purpose of its legislation, which was and still is a matter of fierce public debate.

Even when the law was enacted, it was clear that it was supported by Israel’s Jewish majority, and opposed by most of Israel’s Arab minority.[10] This is also evident in this year’s JPPI survey, which found that among Jews, support “for the existing version of the Nation State Law” stands at 53%, while among non-Jews, opposition to the existing version stands at 83%. The question focusing on the “existing version” was necessary because many argue that the Nation State Law could have been acceptable to them in other versions (in many cases, the addition of an equality clause to the law is an essential condition for supporting it).

As stated, in this year’s survey we wanted to examine not only public opinion, but also the level of importance opponents and supporters ascribe to the issue. The following segmentation of the positions of supporters and opponents, Jews and non-Jews, in regard to the Nation State Law shows that among Jews, the issue is more important for those who support the law, while among non-Jews, the issue is more important for those who oppose the law (almost 60% of opponents say that it is “very important” to them). The conclusion drawn from such data is that it will be difficult, in principle and practice, to reach an agreeable compromise on the wording of the law. The Jews who will oppose a change are both the majority, and also those who are more determined to support it. In contrast, non-Jews strongly oppose law’s wording to a great degree.

Another issue we examined is the construction and expansion of settlements in Judea and Samaria. Among non-Jews, it is clear that there is sweeping opposition to such settlement activity, and at a high intensity level. About two-thirds of non-Jewish respondents deemed it important or very important (50% of them said “very important”). A parallel examination of a slightly different question among the Jewish public (the wording of the questions differed at the recommendation of the pollsters in the two sectors) revealed that a large majority (66%) opposes “giving up the territories of Israel as part of a political settlement.” It further showed that the intensity of resistance to evacuating territories far exceeds the intensity of support for relinquishment of territories, as the following segmentation shows. Among those who oppose any evacuation, a significant two-thirds majority of the opponents attach great importance to the issue, while among those who support evacuation, it is clear that the issue is of much less importance. About 40% of supporters of evacuation rate it as “unimportant” or “somewhat important.”

As with the Nation State Law, data in regard to the public debate on the future of Judea and Samaria also show that at present the opponents of evacuation enjoy a significant advantage, both because they hold the majority position, and because the issue is of greater importance to them than for those who oppose it.

Circle 3: Israeli Jews

Most Israeli Jews believe Israel deserves the designation: “Jewish state.” Those who say it is either “too Jewish” and those who say it is “not Jewish Enough” are roughly equal in size with each composing one-fifth of the population. When Jews are asked how they would like Israel to be in the Jewish context, about 40% of them believe that Israel should remain “about as Jewish as it is today,” while the majority want Israel to be either “more Jewish” (37%) or “less Jewish” (23%). Only a tiny minority (1%) would prefer Israel to cease to be a Jewish state. And this figure is of course of great significance, because it makes it possible to identify a shared desire for Israel to be a Jewish state even if there is sharp disagreement over the desirable degree of its Jewishness.

As one might assume, it is clear from the data that those wanting the state to be “less Jewish” than it is today are largely at the secular pole of the religious spectrum, while the groups ranging from traditional to religious and Haredi want the state to be “more Jewish.” It is worth noting, however, that among secular Jews, only a minority desire a “less Jewish” state, whereas among most of the religious groups, a “more Jewish” state is an almost sweeping desire. Of course, such cohesion gaps can have a real impact on the translation of public sentiment into policy action. While some of the secular public may wonder whether they are expected to maintain the status quo or to try to bring about a fundamental change in the degree of Jewishness of the state, representatives of the traditional and religious public enthusiastically advocate shaping clear policy aimed at making the state “more Jewish” than it is today.

Of course, the way in which Jewishness is interpreted, whether one wants “more” of it or “less,” is of great practical significance. Therefore, the survey examined the conditions required, in the eyes of the Jews, for the state to be considered a Jewish state. Unlike the findings with regard to the conditions of a democratic state, in the case of the conditions of the Jewish state there are fewer across-the-board agreements. However, these can also be found. For example: a large majority of Jews agree that a condition for a Jewish state is a Jewish majority (88%). The few who oppose this condition are mostly left-wing and center-left people, about one-sixth of whom believe that a Jewish majority is not a necessary condition for a Jewish state.

There is relatively broad agreement against the condition that a Jewish state requires a majority of observant people. Four out of five Israeli Jews (78%) do not accept this condition. The Haredi group is the only one in which the majority feel that a condition for a “Jewish state” is a majority of observant people. This may explain why about one-fifth of Haredim believe that Israel today is not a Jewish state, and why most of them want it to be more Jewish. It may also make clear that, in the eyes of a majority of Haredim (51%), Israel will only be considered a sufficiently Jewish state when the majority of Jews become observant.

Similarly, a large majority of Israeli Jews (69%) do not believe that a condition for a Jewish state is a legal system “based on Halacha.” However, it is worth pointing out that this is a smaller majority than the overwhelming majority against the conditions of observance of the mitzvot. Still, there is a more significant group (22%) of Jews in Israel who believe that a condition for Jewish statehood is basing its law on Halacha. This is because the majority of Haredim (70%) also join the majorities of the “religious” (53%) and the “National Religious” (65%) on this issue. Let us be precise and clarify that the question did not refer to the possibility that Halacha be the law, but rather that the law be based on Halacha. This is not exactly the same thing, and it is important not to confuse the two.

There is consensus around the condition that a Jewish state should encourage Jewish cultural creation, for which there is agreement by a majority of the secular (57%), and large majorities all other Jewish sectors. With regard to the condition that a Jewish state must preserve the Jewish characteristics of the public space, significant gaps appear. The majority of the completely secular public – which constitutes close to a third of Israel’s Jews (32% in this year’s survey) – does not support it (37% support it), and slightly more than half of the somewhat traditional secularists support it (55%). Within the more traditional and religious groups there is much greater support for emphasizing Judaism in the public sphere, from around 73% among the traditional to almost complete support among the Haredim (96%).

Another significant controversy arises around whether “Jewish values ​​must be more important than democratic values” as a condition for a Jewish state. In this case, only a minority of secular, traditional and religious liberals agree, whereas a majority of religious and Haredim agree. There are also divisions according to political orientation. Among those who self-identify as “right-wing,” a small majority gives preference to Jewish values ​​(51%); in other political groups there is no majority for such a condition. In this context, however, it should be mentioned that the “right-wing” is the largest group of the five political groups in the survey (31%).

Yet another significant controversy arises around whether “a Jewish state must give legal preference to Jews over non-Jews.” In this case a significant majority of completely secular and somewhat traditional secular Jews oppose this proposition , but support rises as religiosity intensifies – from traditional to Haredi – (with the exception of the religious liberals). Among the Haredim, where support for this condition is the highest, it is about two-thirds (68%). Again, the division by political orientation paints a similar, although not identical, picture. In this case, support in the right-wing group is even more significant (61%), and there is support from a small majority even in the center-right group (51%). The gap between the political camps around this question is acute, with sweeping opposition to this condition from the center and the left (who are the minority, together making up 42% of Jews).

To sum up: there is almost complete agreement among Jews that Israel should be a “Jewish state.” In defining what this entails, points of relative agreement arise, such as the desirability of a Jewish majority and Jewish culture, as well as points of disagreement that relate to two aspects of the state’s Jewishness. One is the question of the extent to which “Jewishness” means “religiosity,” in the sense of religious observance, reliance on Halacha, and, to a lesser extent, aspects relating to the public sphere. The second is the aspects of the state’s Jewishness that have implications for the relationship between the Jewish majority and the non-Jewish minority. In this context, it is clear that a significant part of the Jewish population is interested in emphasizing Jewishness, even at the cost of violating other values, such as equality before the law, and “democracy.”

Shabbat and Marriage

Again, as part of the attempt to examine areas of agreement and disagreement, we also wanted to find out the degree of intensity that Israelis express in relation to various issues – something that is critically important in policy making. Thus, in questions about the Nation State Law, control of Judea and Samaria, Shabbat in the public sphere, the controversy over military conscription of the Haredim, the status of the court and more, we examined not only whether Jews in Israel support one position or another, but also the extent to which the issue is perceived as a priority. In general, it can be said that respondents tend to deem almost every issue “important,” and yet it is possible to distinguish between “importance” that is intensely felt and articulated, and a more detached “importance.”

An example we have already presented clearly shows that for those in support of keeping all the “territories of the Land of Israel,” the issue of transferring land as part of a political settlement is of much more importance than for those willing to consider evacuating areas certain areas. This can also be seen in the intra-Jewish context, that is, around issues that do not relate to Jewish-Arab relations, or to relations between Israel and its neighbors. For example: the issue of operating public transportation on Shabbat, a contentious issue in Israel for many years, is much more important to those who support it than to those who oppose it. As we also mentioned in last year’s Pluralism Index, in recent years (before the Covid epidemic, which disrupted all public transportation) it was possible to identify an uptick of the operation of public transportation on Saturdays, initiated and funded by municipalities across the country. This change was made possible when cities and municipal councils took advantage of a period in which the national political system was preoccupied with repeated elections as an opportunity to establish facts on the ground.

A significant majority of the public supports operating public transportation on Saturdays even though the official government position does not. As the data showed last year, support for unbridled public transportation on Shabbat is not great (about one-fifth of the Jewish public), but support for partial operation, whether by avoiding entering religious residential areas, or by enabling each municipality or local council to determine its own arrangements, rises to 75% among Jewish Israelis.

This finding has intensified according to the data collected this year: not only is the proportion of those who support public transportation on Shabbat higher, the importance of the issue is also greater in their eyes. This is probably due in large part to the fact that operating public transportation on Shabbat has become emblematic in the ongoing “religious coercion” debate and is therefore seen as a necessity by many who do not actually need it at all (last year’s data showed that car ownership does not significantly change one’s position on public transportation on Shabbat). The data also show that for most opponents of transportation on Shabbat the issue is rated between “unimportant” and “slightly important.” The question of why this matter has not yet been resolved is doubly valid. After all, on the one hand there is a small group of opponents for whom the issue is not very important, and on the other hand, a large group of supporters for whom the issue is important.

It is not easy to answer this question, but some suggestions can be made to untangle it.

First, the political structure of the coalition in Israel sometimes allows this type of anomaly to exist for a long time. At the same time, it must be said that in most cases anomalies eventually end in victory of the public over the political system. A clear example of this can be seen in the long struggle over opening cinemas on Shabbat, which eventually ended with a comprehensive victory for the supporters of opening.[11]

Second, what transportation supporters consider “important” and what their opponents consider “important” is not on the same scale. That is, the “not important” of the opponents is no less powerful, and perhaps more powerful than the “important” of the supporters. At least according to the level of energy invested in preventing transportation by opponents of the Knesset and the government, compared to the lower level of energy invested in preventing public transportation on Shabbat by representatives of the opponents in the Knesset and government, one might suspect that the scale of importance is indeed not the same. In other words – the same words are used (very important, not important), but the meaning is different.

Third, because the importance of the issue is largely symbolic, it is conceivable that it is expedient for both sides to maintain the conflict rather than resolving it because it serves as a tool with which to hit the other camp. Of course, this is not a deliberate, cynical move by those seeking to prevent a solution in order to sustain a conflict, but a natural dynamic of practical significance.

Either way, the conclusion of the data we have presented in the last two years with respect to public transportation on Saturdays is that this is an issue that could – and in our opinion should – be resolved by a compromise both sides could tolerate.

It is interesting to contrast this issue with another issue from the arena of religion and state – civil marriage.

Of course, the issue of marriage is far more complex than the issue of transportation, and concerns fundamental questions about the unity of the people, the ability of all Jews in Israel to enter into marriage, the human rights of those who are not allowed to marry because of some doubt regarding their Judaism, and more. Debate over marriage does not just pertain the type of marriage permitted (civil versus religious), but also to the institution responsible for registration and marriage. In the case of Jews, this is the Chief Rabbinate, whose poor image in the eyes of a significant portion of Jews (especially at the secular end of the spectrum, but not only) makes relevant discussion even more difficult (we discussed the image of the rabbinate briefly in last year’s report).

In addition to these complexities, and perhaps because of them, there is also a public sense of heightened importance, both for advocates of allowing civil marriage in Israel (a clear majority of the Jewish public, 66%), and for those who oppose it. A majority (around 60%) of those who oppose civil marriage characterize the issue as important or very important. Nearly 75% of Jews in the majority who support civil marriage define the issue as important to very important. From these data it may be concluded, or at least the concern may be raised, that resolution of the marriage issue through dialogue will be more difficult than resolution of public transportation on Shabbat issue. Such strong opposition and strong support is usually a recipe for intractable conflict, because both sides feel that the matter is too important to offer a concession.

However, it must be stated that unlike the issue of transportation on Shabbat, which is easy to understand, and its results noticeable (there is or is not a bus on my street), resolution of the marriage issue through dialogue, or even by forcing a new arrangement through a chance majority in the Knesset, requires expertise in complex issues of law, family, society, and Halacha. In other words: legislation or regulations that allow public transportation on Shabbat can be written and passed relatively easily when there is the required majority to do so, or given a fairly simple compromise struck through dialogue. On the other hand, a decision to move to another system of marriage and divorce in the State of Israel requires in-depth study of complex questions, where it is doubtful whether and to what extent the general public will want to delve beyond the headline of “there is / is not” civil marriage.

Enlistment of Yeshiva Students

An issue that is even more difficult to resolve, as both the political system and the courts have proved time and time again, is enlistment of yeshiva students into the IDF. Without delving into this matter, which is well known to every Israeli citizen, we will merely describe the findings that relate to it and some of the possible conclusions that derive from them.

About 80% of Israeli Jews support IDF enlistment of yeshiva students. In fact, the only group that opposes enlistment at a high rate (83%) is the one in which a significant proportion of its sons (and all its daughters) do not enlist. Among the National Religious group, there is still a small majority against enlistment of yeshiva students (57%), and in all the other groups support for enlistment is over 75% (and in most of them it is closer to 90%). As can be seen in the graph below, the issue is important for many Jews in Israel, at least according to their testimony. It is more important to those who are in favor of enlistment than to those who are against it, although when the opponents are separated from the Haredim (and it should be remembered that the percentage of opponents is very small) there is a reduction in the importance gap.

According to these indices, one might posit – as has been suggested above in the public transportation context – that this is a problem that will probably be resolved according to the will of the public. But the question of recruiting yeshiva students mainly concerns one sector, whose opposition to enlistment leads it, at least at this stage, to a rhetoric of practical and strident opposition, to the point where enlistment will require resources that are not justified by the benefit that can come from it.

Solutions to this situation have been widely proposed in the conceptual, political, and legal fields. Each has advantages and disadvantages, and most of them fall into one of three categories. The first is to relinquish the model of a “people’s army” because there is no way to realize it, and it therefore results in unacceptable inequality. The second is to levy sanctions against yeshiva students in order to dismantle the yeshiva framework as it has developed in recent decades, in the hope that such harm will lead Haredi society to a change of path, including recognition of the necessity of military service. The third is to adhere to the “people’s army” model, and exempt the Haredim from it, in parallel with an attempt to address other problems stemming from the current state of affairs (that is, participation in the labor force).

In this year’s survey, we did not examine the degree of agreement or opposition to these models, but it must be said that the data collected suggest that the time is not necessarily ripe for a discussion requiring a compromise on matters relating to the relationship between non-Haredi groups and the Haredim. This relationship is very charged, both politically, due to the recent frequency of national elections and the full affiliation of Haredi voters with one political camp, and socially, as a result of the conduct of Haredi groups and part of the Haredi leadership during the coronavirus pandemic. Without going into the question of whether the spotlight on Haredi conduct was justified or excessive, its effect is evident in the data. Surveys conducted earlier this year identified a high rate of anger and even hatred against the Haredim. Three out of four Israelis said they were “angry” with the Haredim because of their conduct as a group during the pandemic. More than a third of Israelis (37%) said they felt “hatred” for the Haredim because of their conduct during the pandemic. A minority (13%) said they “agree” with the statement “I feel hatred for the Haredim.” Another quarter of Israelis “somewhat agree” with this statement.[12]

In “contribution to Israeli Society” scale that appears every year in JPPI’s Pluralism Index, the Haredim have ranked low. Nearly half the Jews in Israel rate the contribution of the Haredim as negative (48%). Among the Arabs, almost eight out of ten (78%) rate the contribution of the Haredim as negative (it must be said that a significant majority of the Haredim, 66%, rate the contribution of the Arabs as negative).

Among respondents who participated in both JPPI’s 2020 and 2021 pluralism surveys, 62% did not change their opinion about the Haredim’s contribution to Israel, and the percentage of respondents who changed their opinion negatively is the same as the percentage of those who changed their opinion positively (20%). In response to the question of whether they agree that groups of Haredim acted irresponsibly during the pandemic, there was only a marginal impact on their view regarding the Haredim’s total contribution to the state. However, those who contended that the Haredim acted irresponsibly gave them, on average, a lower score for their contribution compared to last year, and those who believed that the Haredim did not act irresponsibly gave them on average a higher score than last year.[13]

And yet, the Haredim themselves rank their contribution as positive at a very high rate, higher than any other group examined this year (e.g., the Haredim value their contribution as higher than that of police officers, doctors, soldiers, and others). But this self-satisfaction does not convince other sectors. Most of them, as already mentioned, also believe at a high rate that “the conduct of the Haredim during the coronavirus pandemic has harmed the unity of the citizens of Israel.”

It is hard to see how, in such circumstances, it is possible to convince the many proponents of Haredi enlistment, who attach great importance to the issue, to accept a compromise that will exempt the Haredim from IDF service. Similarly, it is difficult to identify any interest among the Haredim in waiving the exemption. The March 2021 election results, which only highlighted the political power of the Haredi parties, and the assumption that no coalition will be possible without their support, have certainly not created an opportunity for a move whose long-term goal is to enforce enlistment, whether through economic sanctions or other forms of state coercion.

Summary

Results of the Knesset elections held in March 2021 – the fourth round in two years – provide a relevant and updated framework for summarizing the findings presented here. These elections ended without a definitive winner on either side of the political map regarding the main questions: Who will be the next prime minister? and How will the next coalition be assembled? Nevertheless, there were also a few signs that make it possible to identify what the public wants in regard to certain issues.[14] In effect, as with many of the issues that have been raised in this report, it is difficult to translate the public’s priorities into effective political action, and we end up yet again in another cycle of elections (at the time of this writing, it appears that there is a distinct possibility of a fifth round of elections in the Fall of 2021).

The difficulty in translating the public agenda and priorities into political action is evident in almost every section of this report.

In the first circle, along with the feeling of a shared destiny between Israeli Jews and Diaspora Jews, there is a tendency in the political system to ignore different decisions (as in the case of the Kotel arrangement) that reflect this feeling in favor of political considerations. This highlights a paradox already seen in the past. The feeling of closeness to Diaspora Jewry is actually stronger among Israelis who voted for the ruling coalition over the past decade. However, it is these same Israelis who tend to be less supportive of measures that have real potential to bring certain groups of Diaspora Jews, who feel distanced from Israel, closer. The population groups that feel close to Diaspora Jews are also those whose positions on many issues – some related to religious and cultural pluralism, others related to political matters (peace and security) – make it difficult to bring the two groups closer together.

In the second circle, which concerns relations between Jews and non-Jews in Israel, we can discern a recognition among most Israelis that the two groups have a shared future (even if this recognition has not yet translated into a feeling of emotional closeness). This recognition was also evident in the recent elections, where an interesting new element was the controversy among Israeli Arabs regarding the scope of cooperation between the Arab political factions and the majority Jewish factions. Even in the parties that represent Jews, including those with groups with major ideological reservations about Israeli Arab views on national issues, there is a discernible degree of potential acceptance of Israeli Arab cooperation in the political arena in a way that has not been seen in the past.

Along with this positive development, we should note that there are still fundamental issues that make cooperation between Jews and non-Jews in Israel difficult. Many Arab representatives claim that Israel takes an exclusionary stance in legislation and resource allocation (passage of the controversial Nation-State Basic Law is cited as a clear illustration of this state of affairs). On the other hand, many Jews will find it difficult to ignore the fact that along with the clear willingness to cooperate in recent years, there are still prevalent Arab public attitudes on national issues the Jewish majority finds hard to accept. This is both with regard to the state’s Jewishness and other general political issues (the opposition by key Arab representatives to the Abraham Accords highlight the fault line), as well as the Jews’ main cultural narrative, as illustrated in the past year in the question related to the Jews’ link to the Temple Mount (only one in five Israeli Arabs in Israel recognize the fact that there was a Jewish temple on the Temple Mount).

The tension created between the growing willingness to cooperate and both groups’ attitudes on major issues will certainly contribute to the difficulty of turning the positive signs cited in this report into specific governmental political action. However, the very fact that Israel is finding it difficult to extricate itself from the political stalemate and must engage in yet further elections in an attempt to stabilize the government, points to the possibility of breaking down the political and psychological barriers between Jews and Arabs. Cooperation on a practical level just might, in the future, lead to diminishing the remaining ideological gaps.

The third circle, which relates to intra-Jewish controversy surrounding the very image of the state, highlights even more than the others the difficulty in turning the clear and unequivocal priorities of a substantial majority of the public into practical policy. (This difficulty, to a certain degree, also contributes to political stagnation by leading to secondary conflicts that thwart cooperation between groups otherwise in accord on most issues). And so, despite overwhelming Jewish public support for rescinding the current arrangement that exempts Haredim from military service, the political system has failed to find any solution under the pressure of one group’s uncompromising insistence on continuing this arrangement.

Additionally, although there is broad consensus among the Jewish public about the need to permit civil marriage in Israel, the political system, again and again, privileges the minority position and does not attempt to find a solution for this issue. And, even with regard to a seemingly simple matter of public transportation on Shabbat, which according to our findings should not present a significant obstacle in reaching an understanding, the government refrains from pursuing any resolution. As with other issues in the past (for instance, businesses opening on Shabbat, which is ostensibly prohibited but in fact is fairly widespread), it appears as if the government, in hindsight, comes to terms with steps already taken “in the field” instead of taking an orderly policy approach.

All of these examples clearly raise the possibility that the main obstacle to resolving tensions in Israeli society does not derive (in many cases) from profound gaps between groups, but rather from the structure – and even more so the culture – of Israel’s political arena. This arena, which is supposed to be a space for providing practical solutions for complex issues, often appears as a battlefield in which every compromise is interpreted as a defeat, and every issue is decided according to group and faction priorities, and not according to the wishes of the majority of the Israeli public.

Technical data

JPPI’s Pluralism Index Survey is one of the products of the Pluralism Project initiated by the William Davidson Foundation. The 2021 survey was conducted by Prof. Camil Fuchs of Tel Aviv University. It included 603 respondents in the Jewish sector, via an online panel, and another 203 respondents in the non-Jewish sector through a combined online and telephone survey. The Jewish sector’s religiosity levels in the 2021 and 2019 surveys are based on those of the 2017 survey respondents. The respondents constitute a representative sample of the two populations surveyed. The survey in the Jewish sector was conducted by the Midgam Project, headed by Dr. Ariel Ayalon. Sampling error 4% at a significance level of 95%. In the non-Jewish sector, the survey was conducted by Afkar. Sampling error 9.7%.

[1] The baseline appears in full at the end of the data presentation.

[2] See: “After Decades Have Passed: Arab Society Has a Right and a Left,” Muhammad Majedele, Globes, March 2021.

[3] See: Pluralism Index 2020, Jewish People Policy Institute. jppi.org.il/en/article/index2020/#.YFxA2q8zaUk

[4] See: Arab Voter Turnout in the Knesset Elections, Policy Study 148, Dr. Arik Rudnitsky, Israel Democracy Institute, 2020.

[5] CAA 231696 Meron Izikson v. the Registrar of Political Parties, 1996. cjdl.org.il/files/izikson.pdf

[6] Constitutional Anchoring of Israel’s Vision, Ruth Gavison, p. 20. media.wix.com/ugd/ebbe78_44305ffd44d34f77a40db8623be25a89.pdf

[7] Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About the Nation-State Law but Were Afraid to Ask, Kohelet Forum website, kohelet.org.il/publication/מה-שרציתם-לדעת-על-חוק-הלאום-ולא-העזתם-לש

[8] See: Putting the Kotel Decision in Context, Shmuel Rosner, Dan Feferman, JPPI, 2017. jppi.org.il/en/article/english-putting-the-kotel-decision-in-context/#.YFMWEi0Rrq0

[9] fs.knesset.gov.il/20/law/20_lsr_504220.pdf

[10] See, for example, the Democracy Institute survey www.peaceindex.org/files/Peace_Index_Data_July_2018-Heb(1).pdf

[11]For more information, see: #Israeli Judaism, Portrait of a Cultural Revolution, Shmuel Rosner, Camil Fuchs, published by the Jewish People Policy Institute and Dvir, 2018. Pages 51, 118.

[12] Data from theMadad and Kan News. Does anger against the Haredim border on anti-Semitism?, theMadad, February 17, 2021.

[13] With respect to the Arabs, it appears that the pandemic is having a greater impact on general contribution to society opinion. About half the respondents changed their opinion about the Arabs’ contribution to Israel during the previous year, and nearly a third ranked the contribution more negatively. Those who felt the Arabs acted irresponsibly during the pandemic changed their general view for the worse with respect to the Arabs’ contribution. Those who did not agree with the statement that the Arabs acted irresponsibly changed their general opinion regarding the Arabs’ contribution for the better only slightly.
[14] See: The Elections in Israel – Initial Lessons, Shmuel Rosner, Jewish People Policy Institute, March 25, 2021 jppi.org.il/en/article

The post The 2021 Israel Pluralism Index: Consensus and Disagreements first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

The survey reveals that these events have not, at least up to this point, significantly undermined the Israeli sense of cohesion. The “comfort index,” which looks at whether Israelis feel “comfortable being themselves in Israel,” there was virtually no change compared with last year. Similarly, most Israelis, both Jews and non-Jews, feel like “real Israelis,” at least to some degree.

Below are a few of the findings from this year’s Pluralism Index, followed by a detailed discussion of their significance:

1. A dramatic increase, compared with last year, in the percentage of non-Jews who consider their primary identity to be “Israeli,” and a concurrent sharp decline in the percentage of those who define their identity as “Palestinian.”
2. At the same time, only one out of five non-Jews believes that there was once a (Jewish) temple on the Temple Mount. A substantial majority of Muslims in Israel believe that there was no temple on the Temple Mount. Additionally, most non-Jews think that a large proportion of, or most, Israeli Jews are “extremist.”
3. The Chief Rabbinate’s negative image in the eyes of Israeli Jews. Only 14% of Israeli Jews feel that the Chief Rabbinate is a vital, well-functioning institution. However, only one in five Israeli Jews supports dissolving the Chief Rabbinate.
4. Other findings attest to the Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) sector’s negative image regarding its contribution to the state. Most secular Israelis feel that Israeli society treats the Haredim too well.
5. Nearly half of Israeli Jews think that the Law of Return should remain in its current form. Most of the others feel that sections of the Law should be modified to stiffen eligibility criteria. Very few (6%) think the Law should be repealed.
6. A substantial majority of Israeli Jews support the operation of public transportation on Shabbat. Car ownership (or non-ownership) has no real impact on Israeli opinions regarding this issue.

Introduction

This is the sixth year the Jewish People Policy Institute is releasing its annual Pluralism Index, and the fifth year in which the Index is based, among other things, on a comprehensive opinion survey. As in past years, the survey included Jewish and non-Jewish respondents. in the case of the Jewish respondents, it drew on the large respondent base of the JPPI’s comprehensive 2018 Israeli Judaism.

The Pluralism Index consists of a set list of topics with a predetermined baseline, a kind of snapshot that strikes a balance between the attitudes and desires of different groups in Israeli society. Each year, relevant data are positioned against this baseline, making it possible to study evolving trends and gauge the degree to which Israeli reality approaches or diverges from the baseline.

This year’s survey, like last year’s, was conducted by Professor Camil Fuchs of Tel Aviv University. The Index project is administered by JPPI’s Noah Slepkov and Shmuel Rosner. The Index baseline was written by JPPI Senior Fellow Brig. Gen. (Res.) Michael Herzog. The following JPPI fellows contributed to the analysis: Dr. Shlomo Fischer, Amb. Avi Gil and Dr. Dov Maimon.

The Coronavirus Crisis

The health and economic crisis in which Israel and the world were mired while the Pluralism Index was under preparation, had no direct bearing on the Index. The purpose of the Index is to identify long-term trends, not to respond to short-term developments. Nevertheless, crises often generate turning points whose impacts persist after the crisis has passed. In this context, it is worth looking at certain Index data relating to groups that have figured prominently in the current crisis.

Two such statistics relate to the attitude of non-Haredi Israelis toward Haredi Israelis. Over the course of the coronavirus crisis, much attention has been paid to the way Haredi society has coped with the government issued directives that have necessitated severe modifications of daily life in Israel. Haredi society has relatively little trust in the major state institutions, and this has been reflected in the fact that major subgroups within it were slow to implement guidelines issued by the Ministry of Health and other governmental decision-makers.[1] The conspicuousness of these groups – the need to attend to them separately, their infection rates, and the necessity of devoting special resources to them – may have an impact on both the internal Haredi system (leadership, values, attitudes toward state institutions) and on the attitudes of other Israelis toward the Haredim.

Each year, the Pluralism Index assesses attitudes toward different groups within Israeli society, and the Haredim consistently place at the bottom of the “contribution to the state” scale (this doesn’t mean they don’t contribute, but rather that other Israelis perceive them as not contributing). They rank low on the scale again this year, and when we adjust for the responses of Jews and non-Jews, the Haredi contribution to the state is perceived as the lowest of all the groups assessed (the current Index looked at 17 groups; for most of them, there was no real change from last year).

This year, the “contribution to the state” query was supplemented by a more detailed question aimed at discovering whether Israelis feel that Jewish societal attitudes toward various minority groups are “not positive enough,” “positive,” or “too positive.” On this question (as on the “contribution to the state” question), there was a real disparity in the responses according to the respondent’s place on the religiosity scale. Half the secular population feels that attitudes toward Haredim are too positive. In contrast, half of the Masorti (traditionalist) and religiously observant (non-Haredi religious) respondents indicated that attitudes toward the Haredim are positive, or not positive enough. That is, they think that current attitudes should be maintained, or improved. As noted, these data were gathered during, and against the background of, the coronavirus crisis. They reflect attitudes toward the Haredim during a given period characterized by the tumult of the crisis. The data need to be reexamined in the coming years, to determine whether, and to what degree, they changed after the crisis, and also in relation to developments within Haredi society itself, if any.

Religion and State

In the three election campaigns held in Israel over the past year, points of disagreement on issues of religion and state were often prominent. This was true of questions relating to budget allocations or Haredi Torah studies, laws that limit public transportation on Shabbat/holidays and that regulate kashrut, and the authority granted by the state to the Chief Rabbinate with regard to marriage and burial. In the past year, at least until the start of the coronavirus crisis, which forced Israelis to seclude themselves in their homes, real change could be discerned regarding the operation of public transportation on Shabbat – change initiated and funded by municipalities across the country. This development emerged during the period when the national political discourse was preoccupied with election issues; municipalities and local councils saw an opportunity to create facts on the ground.

It has been known for some time, and proven by numerous opinion polls, that the Israeli public supports public transportation on Shabbat.[2] However, the common claim that public transportation is of special importance to Israelis who lack access to private cars, has not been evaluated in depth. The JPPI index indicates that this argument is specious, for two reasons. First, a large proportion of those with no access to private cars are Israelis who vehemently object to public transportation on Shabbat (mainly Haredim). Second, among those that support full or partial transportation on Shabbat, there is no significant difference between car owners and those without access to private vehicles. That is, most Israelis take principled stands on the issue of public transportation on Shabbat – stands that are rooted, not in their specific life circumstances, but in where they are situated along the religiosity spectrum. Fifty-six percent of the total sample and 52 percent of non-car-owners feel that public transportation should operate on Shabbat (either with no restrictions, or with the exception of religious cities and neighborhoods).

Where Israeli Jews are situated on the religiosity scale has a strong influence, but is not the sole determining variable, regarding their attitude toward the role and functional status of Israel’s Chief Rabbinate. This institution’s image has been tarnished for many years,[3] and the JPPI survey indicates that only a small percentage of Israeli Jews (14%) feel both that the Chief Rabbinate is necessary and that it functions properly. The rest of the Jewish population feels that its functionality should be improved, or that its powers should be curtailed, or that it should be dissolved entirely. When the respondents are divided into two groups – those who want a functioning Chief Rabbinate with powers, and those who either want a curtailed Chief Rabbinate or feel that the institution is altogether unnecessary – one finds disparities based on religiosity. Most of those who fall into the religiously observant category do not think the Chief Rabbinate functions properly but would like it to. In contrast, the majority of slightly-Masorti secular Jews feel that the Chief Rabbinate’s powers should be severely curtailed (not just that its functionality should be improved, 54%), while half of “totally secular” Jews (48%) think that the institution should be eliminated.[4]

An interesting example of the gap between public opinion and Chief Rabbinate positions – the kind of gap that causes alienation from the institution and its leaders – can be seen in attitudes toward conversion. According to the JPPI findings, only a minority of Israeli Jews accept the Chief Rabbinate’s stance that a Jew is someone who was born to a Jewish mother or has undergone Orthodox conversion (38%). In essence, this position commands a majority only among Jews who self-define as religiously observant or Haredi. Among other Jews, there is a willingness to accept other, non-Orthodox, conversion channels; and secular Jews are willing to accept patrilineal descent. It should be noted, however, that only a small minority of Israeli Jews (7%) are prepared to accept self-definition only (someone saying that he or she is Jewish) as a sufficient criterion for Jewishness.[5]

Jews and Non-Jews

For the past four years, the Jewish People Policy Institute’s Israeli Pluralism Survey has also included non-Jews as a group. The survey is administered by phone in Arabic and looks at issues that are both the same and different from those covered by the questionnaire for Jews. Among other things, the survey investigates aspects of identity via different cross-sections, including the question of what one’s primary identity is, from among several options: Arab, Israeli, Palestinian, or Arab Israeli. This year a very meaningful difference was detected on this question, compared with last year, mainly in the responses of Muslim Arabs (who constitute the decisive majority of non-Jews in Israel). The change consists primarily of a steep rise in the percentage of those who define their primary identity as “Israeli,” versus a substantial decline in the percentage of those who define themselves as “Arab,” and a sharp drop in the percentage of those who define themselves as “Palestinian.” In fact, in this year’s survey fewer than one in ten non-Jews in Israel said that their primary identity was “Palestinian,” while a quarter of the respondents (23%) defined themselves as “Israeli.” The percentage of respondents who self-defined as “Arab Israeli” remained virtually unchanged, such that, on the whole, nearly three out of four non-Jews in Israel defined themselves as “Israeli” or “Arab Israeli.”

The reasons behind this development are not clearly known. We need to wait for other surveys to see whether the change is a real one that will persist over the long term. It should be noted that other surveys, with unidentical questions, have already shown that the percentage of Arabs in Israel who self-identify as “Palestinian” is declining.[6] If this is indeed a development with staying power, there can be no doubt that a significant change has taken place in Arab Israeli society. A consultation with two statisticians (Professor Camil Fuchs and STATNET research institute founder Yosef Miklada) raised two hypotheses regarding the nature of the change which, as noted, will be verified or refuted only once additional surveys have been conducted.

One of these hypotheses is that the change reflects one of two technical issues. It is possible that sampling disparities caused a certain discrepancy between the surveys (though the differences between the findings are significant, making it hard to assume that a sampling gap was the sole factor). Another possible technical reason for the difference would be questionnaire structure. Because the question about the degree to which respondents feel like real Israelis appeared earlier in the questionnaire, it could be that this had a priming influence on the subsequent responses about identity.

The other, more important, hypothesis is that this year’s significant change was election-related: that it resulted from the discourse surrounding the elections; the substantial Arab election-day turnouts; and the notable presence of the party representing most Arab voters (the Joint List[7]) in the Israeli political arena, including coalition-building efforts and other parliamentary maneuvers. To this we may add the high visibility of Arab medical personnel during the coronavirus crisis. Much has been said and written this year about the 2019-2020 election period as a turning point in terms of Arab willingness to participate in the national political sphere.[8] It is likely that the JPPI survey reflects this change and the way in which it is also reshaping Arab Israeli consciousness.

Arab Israeli participation in Israel’s political system is, of course, a desirable trend. However, a number of obstacles remain that make it hard for the community’s political representation to join the Jewish-majority parties in full, or even in unstable (“outside support”) coalition structures. Israeli social researchers would obviously have a much easier time of it if all of the data from all public opinion polls pointed in the same direction, but that is not the case. Despite the sharp upturn, shown by the 2020 JPPI survey, in the share of Arabs attesting to an Israeli identity, and saying that they feel like “real Israelis” (two-thirds, if we include those who share that sentiment to a certain degree as well as those who fully embrace the attitude), one can discern stumbling blocks that hamper the minority’s complete integration in Jewish-majority society. This year, such signs are clearly visible in the non-Jewish responses to the question of whether a Jewish temple ever stood on the Temple Mount.

This is a highly fraught issue for both sides of the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict, given the “denial by religious Muslims and many others of the historical link of Jews to the Temple Mount, the Western Wall, and the city [Jerusalem] in general, and on the Jewish side, non-recognition of the importance of Jerusalem to Muslims prior to the emergence of Zionism.”[9] Without touching on archeological findings or historical evidence, it is clear that a decisive majority of Jews in Israel (and elsewhere) believe that a Jewish temple stood on the Temple Mount. This belief transcends political camps and is not influenced by views on how to resolve the conflict. In the eyes of the Jews, the Temple is a historical fact, the denial of which (and such denial has increased in recent years[10]) can be understood only as an attempt to undercut the historical link between the Jewish people and the Land of Israel. This is true when the denial comes from the leaders of the Palestinian Authority and is undoubtedly also true when it surfaces in Arab Israeli public opinion polling.[11]

Half of non-Jewish Israelis, and a substantial majority of Muslim Israelis (59%) believe that no Jewish temple ever stood on the Temple Mount. Another third say they don’t know, that is, they are not persuaded that there was a Jewish temple but they do not deny it (this figure may hint at educational potential, at least regarding those who have yet to form an opinion). Among Christian and Druze survey respondents (they were few, meaning that the possibility of a sampling problem exists), half say they don’t know, while a quarter explicitly deny that there was ever a Jewish temple on the Temple Mount.

Israel-Diaspora Relations

The Pluralism Index is primarily concerned with Israeli society, but it also includes elements of obvious interest to Diaspora Jewry. For example, there are questions about attitudes toward streams of Judaism to which a large proportion of Diaspora Jews belong. There are also questions about Israeli positions on issues that link Diaspora Jewry to Israel. This year, in the Pluralism Index framework, we looked at Jewish-Israeli positions on two highly sensitive issues bearing on Israel-Diaspora relations. One was the question of who is a Jew. The other, which is of course closely related to the first question, was the Law of Return.

We mentioned the who-is-a-Jew question earlier, in the section on religion and state, noting that Israeli Jews take a conservative approach: nearly anyone who wishes to be considered Jewish needs either to have a Jewish parent, or to undergo conversion. Even so, the vast majority do not insist on the Orthodox format as the exclusive conversion channel. The Law of Return issue, which we addressed this year, adds perspective to our discussion with regard to Jews in Israel and abroad. Of course, such perspective may suffer from bias due to the coronavirus crisis, and its ramifications on public attitudes toward immigration generally. But in this instance, what emerges from the survey seems to be rooted in additional factors, including a recognition that, in recent years, most immigrants to Israel under the Law of Return have not been Jewish, and that the percentage of non-Jews immigrating under the Law of Return is rising. This fact has often come up in the public discourse, especially in the past few years (including the 2019-2020 election cycles).[12]

The large share of non-Jews among recent immigrants, which is fundamentally undisputed though different interpretations exist regarding the exact numbers, is already causing some leaders, especially within the religiously observant and Haredi sectors, to suggest that the time has come to change the Law of Return’s criteria. Chief Rabbi David Lau has proposed reassessing the Law, noting that “Israel needs to decide if it wants to be a welfare state for the Third World, bringing in everyone who has a connection with Judaism, or perhaps only those who are Jews.”[13] The Sephardi Chief Rabbi, Yitzhak Yosef, has endorsed this view, stating that “Those who bring in masses of non-Jews to Israel through [the grandchild] clause due to alien considerations are being unfair first and foremost toward those immigrants, and placing them at every stage of their lives before the untenable reality of living in a Jewish state. Amending the Law of Return is first and foremost in the interest of those immigrants.”[14]

The Index data suggest that support for the Law of Return in its current form is eroding, and that less than half of the Jewish population approves of it unreservedly. That there is support for the idea that any Jew has the unconditional right to become an Israeli citizen is not really in question. Many past surveys have shown that “Israeli Jews of every kind – native-born and immigrant, young and old, secular and highly religious – agree that all Jews everywhere should have the right to make Aliyah, to move to Israel and receive immediate citizenship.”[15] But JPPI’s Pluralism Survey found that there are many Jews in Israel who feel that the Law of Return in its present formulation is too broad, and would like to circumscribe it. Some of them would be content with the elimination of the Law’s grandchild clause (which allows the grandchild of a Jew to immigrate to Israel), while others favor an additional eligibility restriction that would allow only those who are themselves Jews to immigrate and become citizens. The support for a Law of Return with stricter criteria is particularly evident among the religiously observant and Haredi populations. This fact takes on additional importance given that a large share of those who support eligibility restrictions are also those who advocate limiting conversion recognition to the Orthodox sphere. The religiously observant/Haredi sector thus supports restrictions on two fronts – both in terms of the number of paths enabling one to join the Jewish people, and in terms of the criteria that allow those interested in doing so, to immigrate to Israel.

Here it is worth noting that a stiffening of the Law of Return criteria, even should it spark controversy, would not necessarily be unacceptable to Diaspora Jewry as a whole. In a JPPI Structured Dialogue on the Jewish spectrum from a few years ago, it emerged that “the growing fluidity of identity in Jewish communities around the world is not leading all Jews to expect Israel relax its criteria for the Law of Return. In fact, the opposite may be true. The Dialogue participants tended to argue for further eligibility restrictions.” The Dialogue discussions revealed that a large share of participants from non-Israeli communities felt that “the current definition, which refers to the grandparents’ generation, is too broad.” In accordance with those findings, JPPI also explicitly recommended reassessing “the criteria of the Law of Return,” based on the rationale that, “in light of the cultural and demographic changes in the Jewish world, Israel may want to consider whether changes in those criteria are necessary.”[16] However, JPPI recommended that the Law of Return not be amended “without a frank and thoroughgoing process of consultation with Diaspora Jewry.”[17]

Technical Information

The Jewish People Policy Institute’s annual Pluralism Index is one of the products of JPPI’s broader Pluralism Project, which is supported by the William Davidson Foundation. The 2020 Pluralism Survey was conducted by Prof. Camil Fuchs of Tel Aviv University. The Survey included 604 respondents from Israel’s Jewish sector through an internet panel, and another 273 respondents from Israel’s non-Jewish sector via telephone. Respondents comprised a representative sample of the two populations surveyed. The Jewish sector survey was carried out by the Migdam Project, led by Dr. Ariel Ayalon. The sampling error is 4% at a significance level of 95%. The sampling error for the Arab survey, conducted by pollster Yosef Maklada, Director of the Statnet Research Institute, is 5.9%.

Footnotes

[1] See Shmuel Rosner, Maariv, www.maariv.co.il/journalists/Article-757989

[2] See the Hiddush surveys indicating that two-thirds of the Jewish public support the operation of partial or full public transportation on Shabbat: www.hiddush.org.il/Framework/Upload/ArticleImage_f014d6e2-bbc0-4249-a817-f4ec26549ddc_280.jpg

[3] See the Israel Democracy Index, in which the Chief Rabbinate regularly ranks at the bottom of the institutional scale. According to the 2017 Index, only 20% of Jews expressed trust in the Rabbinate: www.idi.org.il/articles/20082

[4] In this context it is worth mentioning a finding of the Jewish People Policy Institute’s #IsraeliJudaism project, namely that most young secular Israelis (under age 35) say they do not plan to marry via the Chief Rabbinate.

[5] For a detailed analysis of this issue see: Exploring the Jewish Spectrum in a Time of Fluid Identity, Shmuel Rosner, John Ruskay, the Jewish People Policy Institute, 2016.

[6] See the 2017 Shaharit survey, in which 14.6% defined their identity as Palestinian.

[7] It is worth noting that, along with the rise in Arab electoral support for the Joint List, the 2020 elections showed a drop in Arab votes for “Jewish” lists, such as Blue and White and Labor-Meretz.

[8] See: “The Spring’s Back in Their Steps: Arab Politics Following the Twenty-Second Knesset Elections,” Mohammad Darawshe, in Bayan, the Moshe Dayan Center.

[9] Quote from: Barriers to Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, (Yaakov Bar-Siman-Tov, ed.), Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2010. jerusaleminstitute.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/PUB_barriers_eng.pdf .

[10] See: From Jerusalem to Mecca and Back: the Islamic Consolidation of Jerusalem, Yitzhak Reiter, Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2005.

[11] Less explicit signs of this denial can also be found in a Shaharit survey (2017) on the Jews’ historical relationship to Jerusalem and the Land of Israel.

[12] See “A Problematic Aliya: Only 53% of Immigrants to Israel in Recent Years are Jews,” Binyamin Lashkar, Mida, 2018.

[13] “Chief Rabbi Lau to Haaretz: Law of Return a Problem,” Yair Ettinger, Haaretz, April 14, 2014. www.haaretz.com/.premium-lau-law-of-return-a-problem-1.5245039

[14] “Rabbi Yosef Responds: Amending the Law of Return is First and Foremost in the Immigrants’ Interest,” Arik Bendar, Maariv, 2020.

[15] See: Israel’s Religiously Divided Society, Pew 2015. www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2016/03/israel_survey_overview.hebrew_final.pdf [English version (2016): www.pewforum.org/2016/03/08/israels-religiously-divided-society/]

[16] Exploring the Jewish Spectrum in a Time of Fluid Identity, Shmuel Rosner, John Ruskay, the Jewish People Policy Institute, 2016.

[17] 70 Years of Israel-Diaspora Relations: the Next Generation, Shmuel Rosner, John Ruskay, the Jewish People Policy Institute, 2018.

The post 2020 Pluralism Index first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

New data from the Institute’s Annual Survey of Israelis will be unveiled, and an analysis of some key trends in Israeli society will be presented.

• Israeli elections and the identificational shift of Israeli Arabs
• Israel’s Haredi society and the Corona crisis
• Public attitudes on aspects of religion and state relations
• Public preferences on Israel-Diaspora relations

Program

Opening Remarks by Avinoam Bar-Yosef, President of JPPI

Explanation of the Annual Survey, Prof. Camil Fuchs

Presentation of the 2020 Pluralism Index, Shmuel Rosner

Summation

JPPI’s Pluralism Project is supported by the William Davidson Foundation

The event will be conducted in English and moderated by Noah Slepkov.

Participants will be able to submit questions to the Index team in real time (Camil Fuchs, Shmuel Rosner, and Noah Slepkov).

Register by sending an email to: info@jppi.org.il
(You will then receive an email with a Zoom link and password)

Number of places is limited.

Following the event, a video will be available here along with a report analyzing some of the major trends emerging from the index.

The post 2020 JPPI Pluralism Index: Digital Event first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

On Israel’s Independence Day, Noah Slepkov, a fellow at The Jewish People Policy Institute, discusses results of a survey from across Israeli society on identity, religious beliefs and coexistence. With Teisha Bader of the Jewish Broadcasting Service.

The post JBS: Pluralism in Israel first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

These are some of the findings of a study published on Thursday by the Jewish People Policy Institute, an independent think tank based in Jerusalem.

This is the second year that JPPI has published its so-called “Pluralism Index,” which attempts to gauge the level of openness among Israelis to diversity. The findings were based on a relatively large sample of 1,300 respondents, with a 5.6 percent error margin for Arabs and 3.1 percent for Jews.

Among Arab respondents, 73 percent were opposed to living in mixed neighborhoods with Jews, while among Jewish respondents, 68 percent were opposed to living in mixed neighborhoods with Arabs. More than 75 percent of the Arab respondents, however, said they “totally” or “slightly” favored having their children study in mixed schools with Jews. Among Jews, just over 45 percent said they viewed this option favorably. The overwhelming majority of Jews and Arabs in Israel study in separate schools. Except for a few mixed cities – Haifa and Acre are prominent examples – Jews and Arabs also tend to live separately.

Among Jews, the study found that nonobservant Israelis were more resistant to living in mixed neighborhoods with ultra-Orthodox Jews than the ultra-Orthodox were to living with nonobservant Israelis. Whereas 49 percent of the ultra-Orthodox questioned said they favored living in mixed neighborhoods with non-observant Jews, barely 20 percent of non-observant Jews wanted to live among the ultra-Orthodox. Among the Arab respondents, Muslim and Christians were overwhelmingly opposed to living together in mixed neighborhoods. Not even one Christian respondent looked favorably upon such an option, while among Muslims, close to 90 percent were opposed.

The respondents were asked to rank different groups according to their contribution to Israeli society.  Among Jews, soldiers were ranked at the top of the list and Arab Muslims at the bottom. Other groups at the bottom of the Jewish ranking were settlers, the ultra-Orthodox, Bedouin, Reform Jews and leftists. The Arab respondents ranked themselves at the top of the list and relegated settlers and ultra-Orthodox Jews to the bottom. They also ranked soldiers fairly high up.

The survey found that the vast majority of Jews (close to 90 percent) feel “quite” or “very” comfortable living in Israel as they are, with Orthodox Jews feeling more comfortable than nonobservant Jews and right-wing Jews feeling more comfortable than left-wing Jews. Among Arabs, close to 80 percent said they felt “quite” or “very” comfortable living in Israel as they are, with those who identified primarily as “Arabs” or “Israelis” more comfortable than those who identified as “Palestinians.”

The survey also found that about half of Israelis believe there is too much freedom of press in the country (the percentage was significantly higher among Arabs).

www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.784680

The post Most Israeli Arabs Wouldn’t Live With Jews but Want Their Children to Study With Them, Study Says first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

The Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI) on Thursday released its second annual Pluralism Index, which finds that more than 90% of Jewish Israelis and almost 80% of Arab Israelis feel “comfortable” or “very comfortable” to be “who they are” in Israel. However, a significant majority of both Jews and Arabs do not think it is wise for them to live together.

According to the new survey, a majority of Jews do think it is wise for secular and religious Jews to live together, but not for secular and Haredi Jews. Interestingly, in both cases the “totally secular” group is most reluctant to encourage such mixing. JPPI also found that Jews with political and/or intra-Jewish ethnic differences recommend living in the same neighborhoods. Similarly, a significant majority of Muslim Arabs and more than 90% of Christian Arabs in Israel do not think it is wise for their respective groups to live together.

Among Jews, the sense of comfort is greater for those who define themselves further to the right on the political or religious spectrum. Among Arabs, the sense of comfort is greater for those who define their main identity as “Israeli” and is lower (but still high) among those who define their main identity as “Arab” or “Palestinian.”

Public perceptions of which sectors of Israeli society “contribute” more or less to the success of the country show that soldiers are perceived most positively, significantly more than any other group (the 2016 JPPI survey found the same result). The two groups whose children tend not to serve in the military, Muslim-Arabs and ultra-Orthodox Jews, are perceived as contributing least to the success of the country, and this year – having added some new groups to the questionnaire – they are joined by Bedouins.

Other interesting findings: Arab Israelis rank Israeli soldiers higher than most other groups. That they rank “settlers” at the bottom of the list. And, like Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs also take a dim view of the contribution of ultra-Orthodox Jews to Israel’s success.

The survey was conducted by Panels Politics using a sample of 1300 Israelis.

The post JPPI Survey: Israeli Jews and Arabs Happy to Live in Israel, Just Not Together first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

The post 2017 Pluralism in Israel Index first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.