Since its founding, the United States has seen itself as a “shining city upon a hill” – a nation with a moral and democratic mission meant to illuminate the world.

Over 250 years of American independence, that self-image has been translated into an inspiring reality: not only economic, military, and scientific preeminence, but also a source of values – a bastion of freedom and progress. This milestone birthday for the American nation is also an appropriate moment to examine the relationship between America and the Jewish people. There is no doubt that this shining beacon has cast abundant light on the State of Israel and Jews around the world. Without it, the Jewish story would have looked very different – and far bleaker.

The bond between America and the Jewish people deepened in the 19th and 20th centuries, when the United States opened its gates to some 2.5 million Jewish immigrants from Europe, most of them destitute. As a result of this immigration – one of the largest in our history – by 1910, there were more Jews in New York than in any other city in the world. In this way, many Jews and their descendants were spared the fate of the six million who perished in Europe during the Holocaust.

President Harry Truman recognized the State of Israel 11 minutes after it declared independence and later spoke of Israel in uniquely moving terms: “I believe that Israel has a glorious future before it – not just as another sovereign nation, but as an embodiment of the great ideals of our civilization.”

These words would echo again and again from the mouths of every American president who followed him. Relations between the two countries rested on bipartisan support from Democrats and Republicans alike.

They stood on two firm pillars: a partnership of values – as Republican president Ronald Reagan put it, “In Israel, free men and women demonstrate every day the power of courage and faith;” and a partnership of interests – as Democratic president Bill Clinton said, “When people ask me what the greatest achievement of our foreign policy has been… I think of the partnership between America and Israel.”

Between these two pillars stands North American Jewry, the largest Jewish community in the world outside Israel, with a central and highly influential voice in American public life and in relations with the State of Israel.

FOR MANY years, an exceptionally important triangular relationship has existed among Washington, Jerusalem, and American Jewry. Over the past several decades, all three sides of this triangle have benefited greatly.

The United States has benefited from its connection to the other two sides of the triangle. Israel serves as a values-based and security outpost in a turbulent Middle East, helping to defend shared Western interests.

The US has also been blessed by the immense contribution of Jewish immigrants who became leaders in science, culture, technology, banking, and many other fields. It is not fanciful to say that America’s rise was strengthened, in part, by the extraordinary talent, energy, and ambition brought by Jewish immigration across the Atlantic.

American Jewry, too, flourished because of its ties to both of the triangle’s other sides. Israel served as a central focus of Jewish identity and a source of pride, while America provided a safe home that opened its doors and enabled a degree of prosperity unique in Jewish history. The same is true of Israel: its reliance on America’s many-sided support and on the flourishing Jewish community of North America has been a blessing that scarcely needs description.

The weakening relationship with the US, Israel, and American Jews

But strength does not last forever. A sober look at this triangular relationship shows that each of its sides has weakened in recent years. On the Washington-Jerusalem axis, American public support for Israel has declined significantly and worryingly.

Significant parts of the Democratic Party now voice sharply critical positions toward Israel, while even among younger Republicans, the once-instinctive warmth toward Israel can no longer be assumed.

On the Washington-American Jewry axis, changes are also evident. Waves of antisemitism from the fringes of both the American right and left have raised the fear that the golden age of American Jewry may be coming to an end. Finally, on the Jerusalem-American Jewry axis, cracks are visible as Israeli governments have failed to invest sufficiently in cultivating the vital ties between the two branches of the family.

The gaps between an American Jewish public that tends toward liberalism and an Israeli society that tends toward conservatism are growing wider. The unfortunate facts are clear: Israel’s position as a central anchor of identity for North American Jewry is no longer what it once was. The government formed after the elections will need to think anew about how to strengthen each side of this triangle.

This will require renewed investment in bipartisan support in Washington, serious engagement with younger Americans across the political spectrum, and a deliberate rebuilding of trust between Israel and Diaspora Jewry.

The resilience of “we, the Jewish people” depends on the success of this effort.

Published in the Jerusalem Post

The post America at 250: The triangular relationship between US, Israel, and Jews is at risk first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

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Just days after Israel and Lebanon reached a framework agreement to begin the withdrawal of Israeli forces from parts of southern Lebanon, Tamar Ish Shalom sits down with one of the key figures behind the negotiations: Israel’s Ambassador to the United States, Yechiel Leiter.

In this wide-ranging conversation with host Tamar and Ambassador Leiter discuss the strategic implications of the Lebanon agreement, the continuing challenge posed by Iran, and the evolving relationship between Jerusalem and Washington. They also explore the global rise of antizionism and disinformation, the future of Israel–Diaspora relations, and the difficult questions surrounding religious pluralism, Jewish identity, and the boundaries of the Jewish community.

The post Tamar Ish Shalom in conversation with Amb. Yechiel Leiter first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

The Iranian regime has for now survived. Its missile production infrastructure remains largely intact, and whatever agreement ultimately emerges from the current negotiations will almost certainly leave Tehran with the ability – whether in 15 or 20 years – to resume uranium enrichment on an industrial scale.

Yes, Iran was weakened. Its nuclear program has been set back, and its military capabilities suffered significant damage. But while the threat has been degraded, it has not been eliminated. This does not mean that the war was a mistake. Israel had an opportunity to deepen its military partnership with the United States and strike at a regime that has spent nearly five decades funding terrorism, destabilizing the region, and openly working towards Israel’s destruction.

The campaign may not have achieved its most important objective – toppling the ayatollahs – but it demonstrated an unprecedented level of operational cooperation between Israel and the United States and inflicted meaningful damage on Iran’s military and nuclear infrastructure.

Yet – and this is the source of the disappointment – when Israel embarked on this war at the end of February, it did so with a vision of fundamentally changing the reality posed by Iran. The agreement now taking shape does not deliver that outcome. Part of this has led to reactions by prominent Israelis that can only be described as ridiculously immature. Some are portraying President Donald Trump as a traitor, a flip-flopper, and a man who abandoned Israel. One news magazine put a headline on its front page with the title: “No longer a friend.” Journalists aligned with the Right who proudly posted photos of themselves interviewing Trump in the past are now putting Xs over those pictures.

Unfortunately, these people misunderstood how relations work with the United States.

Trump went to war expecting a certain outcome, and when that outcome did not materialize, he made a decision to cut his losses and do what he believes serves America’s interests: to end the war now, under terms that many of us wish were stronger and more favorable. We can disagree with the deal and think it’s deeply flawed – I definitely do – but Trump’s decision was never about Israel’s interests alone. It was about America’s interests.

What these Israelis are also failing to recognize is that now is not the time to grieve and just think about what we failed to achieve, but rather to use this moment to try and benefit from the strategic opportunities that emerge from this new reality. One way to do that is to stop focusing on the US-Iran MoU and to instead get working on a new US-Israel MoU. To some extent, this is a similar situation to what happened after US president Barack Obama concluded his landmark nuclear agreement with Iran in 2015.

Netanyahu takes advantage of Obama’s nuclear deal with Iran

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu waged an unprecedented campaign against the deal, culminating in his controversial speech before Congress. He invested enormous political capital in trying to stop it, and even though he failed, once the agreement was signed, he quickly pivoted.

Rather than stay stuck on the failure to stop the deal, Netanyahu understood that he had an opportunity to bolster Israel’s military capabilities and the alliance with the United States. The result was the largest MoU in the history of the US-Israel relationship – a $38 billion military assistance package spread out over 10 years.

Netanyahu was able to tell Israelis that although he had failed to stop the nuclear deal, he had secured the largest military aid package in the country’s history. Obama was able to reassure Americans that despite disagreements with Israel over Iran, the United States remained fully committed to Israel’s security. Both sides benefited, and the episode demonstrated that even when Washington and Jerusalem disagree on Iran, they can still find ways to strengthen the broader strategic relationship. Today, as another Iran agreement takes shape – one that Israelis are deeply concerned about – there is an opportunity to replicate that model. Technically, the Obama-era MoU expires next year, and if a new package is to be negotiated, discussions need to already be underway.

Nevertheless, simply negotiating a larger version of the existing arrangement – under which Washington provides funding that Israel uses to purchase American weapons – would be a missed opportunity. The last two-and-a-half years have transformed the region and exposed new strategic realities, allowing for a more ambitious vision.

One possibility, for example, would be to explore the possibility of the Americans opening a base in Israel either instead of, or in addition to, the major military installations the US already has throughout the Middle East. Israel has a good case to make. It is a stable democracy, shares similar values as the US, is a proven military power, and, as the recent war has shown, is America’s most capable partner. It is true that an American base would raise questions about Israeli operational freedom, but this might be outweighed by the level of deterrence a US presence in Israel would provide.

An adversary would know that an attack on Israel would be risking a direct confrontation with the United States. This is something no aid package, no matter how generous, would be able to provide.

If permanent basing proves unrealistic, there are other options such as America deploying F-22 Raptor fighter jets or the strategic B-2 bombers in Israel, or even a framework that would allow Israel access to such platforms under certain circumstances. These are just some ideas being thrown around within the defense establishment. Whatever the government decides to ask for, it will do so with the recognition that the war with Iran, the regional upheaval that has followed October 7, and the prospect of a new nuclear agreement have together created a rare strategic moment.

Israel may not get everything it wanted from the war, and it may not get everything it wants from the negotiations that will now begin. But just as Netanyahu turned the disappointment of 2015 into a major strategic achievement, Israel has an opportunity to do so again.

Published in the Jerusalem Post

The post Iran deal is Israel’s chance to reshape its own MoU with the US first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

“I can’t fight the shadows all the time.”

That was the European Union’s (EU) foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas’s response on X/Twitter to Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar after reports that she had likened Israel’s policies to apartheid South Africa during a closed-door diplomatic meeting.

The phrase did not calm the dispute. It deepened it.

According to reports from Jerusalem, some Israeli officials interpreted the remark as a veiled political message directed at Germany, and as further evidence that Kallas had come under growing French influence within the EU. Israel’s objection was understandable. If the EU’s top diplomat compared Israel to apartheid South Africa, Israel had every right to reject the accusation forcefully. That is not the issue.

The issue is what came next.

The more revealing aspect of the exchange may not be what Kallas intended, but how quickly her unusual choice of words was interpreted primarily through a political lens. The controversy reveals a larger diplomatic problem: too often, unfamiliar language is treated as strategy before it is examined as culture. Diplomacy begins with language. Yet language is never merely vocabulary. Every language carries its own history, literature, symbols, and collective memory. Words rarely travel alone. They arrive shaped by the culture that produced them. When diplomats forget this, they risk misunderstanding not only individual expressions but also the intentions behind them.

To a native English speaker, “I can’t fight the shadows” sounds unusual. English reaches more naturally for expressions such as “I can’t fight ghosts,” “I can’t chase every rumor,” or “I won’t respond to every allegation.” Kallas chose none of them.

One possible explanation lies in her own cultural background.

Readers familiar with Estonian literature may recognize the recurring presence of forests, silence, darkness, memory, and shadows. These are more than descriptions of nature. They often serve as images through which writers explore identity, survival, fear, historical trauma, and the unseen forces that shape individual and collective life.

This symbolic language reflects Estonia’s history. Centuries of foreign domination, followed by Soviet occupation, censorship, and the struggle to preserve language and national identity, encouraged writers to communicate through metaphor as much as through direct political speech. Within that tradition, shadows often evoke realities that are present yet difficult to grasp or confront directly. In Estonian cultural memory, nature often becomes a language for history: forest as refuge, silence as survival, darkness as danger, and shadows as the presence of realities difficult to grasp or confront directly.

Against this backdrop, an expression such as voidelda varjudega, literally “to fight with shadows,” sounds entirely natural in a literary Estonian register, even though it is not a fixed idiom.

Whether Kallas, former prime minister of Estonia, consciously carried such imagery into English is impossible to know. Nor can anyone say with confidence that this was her intended meaning in her exchange with Sa’ar. That uncertainty, however, is precisely the point. Diplomacy rarely offers certainty. It demands the discipline of weighing competing interpretations before determining motive.

Anyone familiar with Estonian language and literature would at least recognize Kallas’s wording as a plausible cultural metaphor, not necessarily a concealed strategic message. That possibility alone should have encouraged greater caution before a hidden meaning was assigned to an unfamiliar phrase.

The first duty of diplomacy is curiosity, not certainty.

Whether the Israeli interpretation ultimately proves correct is therefore almost beside the point. One can hold Kallas fully accountable for her reported remarks while still asking whether her language was interpreted with sufficient cultural awareness. Those are separate questions.

Nor is this uniquely an Israeli challenge. Diplomatic history is full of misunderstandings born not of bad intentions but of cultural assumptions. American diplomats have misread indirect communication in Asia. Europeans have misjudged rhetorical traditions in the Middle East. Cross-cultural misunderstanding is among diplomacy’s oldest hazards.

Information without cultural interpretation

The recent exchange between Jerusalem and Brussels simply offers an unusually vivid example. Diplomats are typically trained in international law, political science, economics, security studies, negotiation, conflict resolution, and public administration. These disciplines remain indispensable.

Yet foreign relations are conducted not only through legal texts and policy papers, but through people whose thinking has been shaped by literature, history, religion, folklore, and national memory. Understanding Estonia requires more than reading European Council conclusions. It requires appreciating a society whose modern identity was secured by preserving its language under foreign rule.

It requires recognizing that Estonian literature developed a symbolic vocabulary in which nature frequently became a language for history itself. Forests, silence, darkness, and shadows are not decorative images. Together they form a cultural vocabulary through which public life is understood.

The same principle applies far beyond Estonia. Every European society speaks through its own historical experience. French political language reflects republican universalism. German public discourse remains deeply shaped by 20th-century historical responsibility. Polish political debate repeatedly invokes national resistance and martyrdom. Successful diplomacy requires understanding not only institutions but also these cultural languages.

Too often, however, foreign ministries continue to treat cultural knowledge as secondary, something appropriate for universities but peripheral to statecraft. History suggests otherwise.

Many of history’s finest diplomats were not only lawyers or politicians. They were historians, linguists, writers, classicists, and scholars of civilization. They understood that political communication rarely operates on the literal level alone. People speak through metaphor, inherited memory, and cultural references that no intelligence report or briefing paper can fully capture.

Israel has invested enormous resources in intelligence gathering and has become exceptionally skilled at collecting information. Yet information without cultural interpretation remains incomplete. Knowing exactly what someone said is fundamentally different from understanding why those particular words were chosen.

Israel has invested heavily in intelligence. It should invest just as seriously in cultural literacy. If Israel wishes to deepen its engagement with Europe, it should broaden the education of its future diplomats. Political science remains essential. International law remains indispensable. But they are not enough. This need not mean turning diplomats into literary scholars. It means making cultural interpretation a formal part of diplomatic training: language study, literary briefings, historical memory seminars, and country-specific cultural mentoring before postings.

Those who represent Israel abroad should learn not only how nations negotiate but also how nations remember, how metaphors travel across languages, and how culture quietly shapes diplomacy long before negotiations begin. Diplomacy is often described as the art of choosing the right words. It is equally the art of understanding the words others choose.

Sometimes diplomatic success or failure depends on understanding a metaphor before assigning it a motive. Or, as Kaja Kallas might say, learning to see the shadows.

Published in the Jerusalem Post

The post When diplomats can’t read the shadows first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Few countries occupy as much space in the European Union diplomatic imagination as Israel. EU institutions devote extraordinary attention to Israeli policies, actions, and conflicts, often placing them at the centre of diplomatic discussions in a way that is difficult to explain by Israel’s size, power, or formal relationship with the Union.

This disproportionate focus raises important questions. Does the EU apply its diplomatic scrutiny consistently across different countries and conflicts? And if not, what are the consequences for its credibility and influence in the Middle East? At the same time, Israel’s growing tendency to dismiss the EU as strategically irrelevant may be creating problems of its own. A new study by the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI) sheds empirical light on these questions. Researchers analysed more than 24,000 official statements, press releases, and diplomatic communications issued by the European External Action Service (EEAS) between 2017 and April 2026. Of these, 895 dealt directly with Israel. The study also examined how Israel was portrayed in EU diplomatic discourse.

The findings are striking and serve as a warning to both Brussels and Jerusalem. Israel occupies an unusually prominent place in the Union’s diplomatic imagination. It accounted for approximately 4% of all official EEAS diplomatic statements during the period examined. That level of attention is not explained by Israel’s formal relationship with the Union – Israel is neither an EU member nor a candidate, and is not among the world’s major powers. Yet it commands attention from Brussels far beyond what its size and formal status would suggest.

The tone of that attention is equally revealing. Across the entire period, 38% of EEAS statements concerning Israel were negative, 49% were neutral, and only 13% were positive. Following the October 7 massacre, the balance shifted even further: negative statements rose from 29% before the attack to nearly 46% afterwards; positive statements fell from almost 20% to just 8%. Criticism of Israel is neither illegitimate nor surprising. Democracies are scrutinised because they are expected to uphold democratic values, and Israel should not be beyond examination. The question is not whether Israel should be criticised. The question is whether similar standards are applied consistently across the international system.

The comparative findings raise serious doubts. Iran received the most negative treatment among the countries examined, largely because of its military cooperation with Russia and its broader role in regional instability. Turkey presents a different case. Despite years of democratic erosion, restrictions on freedom of expression, and mounting tensions with European capitals, roughly three-quarters of official EEAS statements concerning Turkey were neutral, mostly focused on technical matters connected to its candidacy for EU membership.

The most revealing comparison is Qatar, for which more than two-thirds of European statements were positive; negative references were almost nonexistent. This is despite the “Qatargate affair,” which raised serious questions about foreign influence within the European Parliament. That controversy barely registered in the official rhetoric examined by the researchers.

The contrast is difficult to ignore: a democratic state fighting a war triggered by the largest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust receives sustained scrutiny and intensifying criticism, while authoritarian actors are often treated with conspicuous caution or leniency. This inconsistency is not merely a public relations problem. It undermines the EU’s ability to present itself as a credible and impartial actor in the Middle East. For decades, European leaders have sought a central role in efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yet influence depends on trust, and trust depends on consistency. By applying visibly different standards to different actors, the EU weakens its own claim to be an indispensable diplomatic broker in the region.

The JPPI study also reveals a widening intellectual gap between Brussels and Jerusalem. More than half of all EEAS statements concerning Israel included references to the two-state solution or the establishment of a Palestinian state.

The problem is not that the EU continues to support a two-state outcome; many serious people still regard it as the only viable long-term framework. The problem is that EU diplomacy often invokes it as if October 7 did not fundamentally alter Israeli threat perceptions. A formula that does not address these perceptions will not persuade the Israeli public, whatever its diplomatic pedigree.

Yet the study’s most important conclusion may not be that the EU talks too much about Israel. It may be that Israel talks too little to Europe. While the EU remains intensely focused on Israel, Israel has largely stopped paying attention to Europe. Since October 7, Israeli diplomacy has concentrated, understandably, on Washington, regional security challenges, and the expansion of the Abraham Accords.

These are legitimate priorities. But they have come at the expense of sustained engagement with EU institutions, European governments, media, universities, and policy communities. This neglect carries risks. The EU remains Israel’s largest trading partner. Approximately one-third of Israel’s trade in goods is conducted with EU member states. The EU is also Israel’s most important partner in research, innovation, and higher education. No alternative partner offers Israel access to a comparable ecosystem of research funding, academic collaboration, and technological networks.

At a time when economic competitiveness depends increasingly on scientific excellence and technological innovation, relations with the EU are not a diplomatic luxury. They are a strategic asset. But many Israelis have come to regard Europe as a lost cause, assuming that European attitudes are fixed, EU institutions are irreversibly hostile, and investment in the relationship is unlikely to yield results. This is not realism; it is resignation.

Foreign policy is not about engaging only with those who already agree with you. It is about shaping debates, building coalitions, and defending national interests even in difficult environments. When Israel withdraws from the European arena, others fill the vacuum. When it stops trying to influence European discourse, it should not be surprised when that discourse evolves without Israeli input.

The EU should ask why Israel occupies so much space in its diplomatic imagination and whether that hyper focus reflects balanced diplomacy or an entrenched double standard. Israel should ask why the Union occupies so little space in its own strategic thinking and whether it can afford to neglect its most important economic, scientific, and technological partner.

Neither Brussels nor Jerusalem benefits from the current trajectory. The EU risks its credibility as a diplomatic actor. Israel risks its influence, its economic interests, and its scientific future in a relationship it cannot afford to neglect. Both outcomes are avoidable, but only if both Israel and the EU begin treating this relationship with the seriousness it deserves.

Published in Euractiv

The post Europe’s obsession with Israel first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, more than 2 million Jews arrived in Manhattan’s Lower East Side. This mass immigration turned New York into the cornerstone of Diaspora Jewry and cemented its status as the largest Jewish city in the world. From this vast community emerged a long line of Jewish politicians with historic influence. Chief among them is Sen. Chuck Schumer.

Schumer currently serves as Senate minority leader, after serving as majority leader from 2020 to 2024 under the Biden administration. He is the Jew elected to the highest office in American history and for many years placed the cultivation and strengthening of U.S.-Israel ties at the top of his agenda. In recent years, however, Schumer has been forced to contend with growing pressure inside his party, leading him to adopt more cautious positions.

In recent years, we have witnessed a troubling and dangerous shift in New York City. Beyond the broader rise in hostility toward Israel, there is a growing trend of candidates being elected to public office precisely on that ticket. The driving force behind this profound change is the radical wing of the Democratic Party, especially the Democratic Socialists of America, or DSA.

The peak of this radicalization process was reflected in the election of DSA figure Zohran Mamdani as mayor of New York City. Mamdani has pursued a hostile and extreme line against Israel, including a conspicuous refusal to take part in the Israel parade.

The mayor-elect has called for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s arrest, and his policies are reflected on the ground in his veto of municipal legislation intended to prevent intimidating protests outside Jewish schools.

His attitude toward Israel and the Jewish community is clearer than ever, as seen in the sharp attack he launched last week against the AIPAC lobby, which he called a “monster.”

Despite these positions, he continues to enjoy enormous popularity. Mamdani bet on support for radical candidates such as Claire Valdez, Brad Lander and Darializa Avila Chevalier. The long line of people waiting in a park to take selfies with him after the Knicks won the NBA championship shows the depth of his support. In effect, New York underwent a political upheaval overnight: Mamdani’s candidates won, and supporters of Israel received a warning sign.

The danger of Chevalier

The most worrying focal point is Chevalier, who defeated veteran Rep. Adriano Espaillat in District 13. Chevalier’s background, including her conversion to Islam, dovetails with her extreme political positions against Israel. At the same time, the hostile atmosphere directed at Jewish elected officials is evident, and troubling footage shows her organizing the pro-Palestinian protest held just two days after the October 7 massacre.

This toxic atmosphere is seeping into the city’s streets and creating the painful sense that Jews are no longer welcome in their own home, as reflected in reports of growing feelings of insecurity.

The case of Jewish Rep. Dan Goldman, who lost the primary to Brad Lander, offers a glimpse into the loss of a sense of safety among Jewish figures in the public sphere. Lander, identified with the far-left wing, has become a vocal critic of Israel and has led a sharply oppositional line against its policies. Goldman was disgracefully expelled this week from a cafe in his own city, an incident that illustrates the depth of the rupture.

The current election campaign centered in large part on the demand to halt arms sales to Israel, a watershed issue for the winning candidates who sanctified their hostility. From the outside, New York, the city that created the Israel parade in the 1960s, is now becoming the spearhead of the fight against it.

Anyone who sees all this as an inevitable “demographic process” is wrong and misleading others. This is cold, calculated political engineering. In midterm primaries, candidates are elected on the basis of just tens of thousands of votes in safe seats. This system allows for the relatively easy takeover of districts, flooding Congress and local authorities with radical representatives, just as the Tea Party did to the Republican Party, only in the opposite and more extreme direction.

This is a systematic attempt, from within, to change the DNA of the Democratic Party and turn it into a fringe party. Americans watching from the sidelines understand that this is a culture war over the character of America. If the Democratic Party does not stop this internal radicalization, it may find itself not only out of power in 2026 and 2028, but completely disconnected from the American public in whose name it claims to speak.

Published on Ynet

The post New York: from global Jewish capital to anti-Israel hub first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

The post Bibi’s Tightrope, Eisenkot’s Rise, Iran’s Shadow, and the U.S. Primary Wars first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

The postmortem seems to have raised more questions than it answered—and the role of pro-Israel policy may only be one of them.

Yet when the autopsy finally arrived, the much-anticipated words (or even topics) “Gaza,” “Israel” or “Jews” did not appear even once in the 192 pages of what “Pod Save America” host Jon Favreau called “gobbledygook.” Finally, it seemed to some that transparency would distinguish legitimate policy debate from claims that unfairly assigned collective responsibility to Jewish or pro-Israel Democrats.

However, rather than accept the data and analysis of the report, progressives pivoted again—suggesting that the glaring exclusion of Gaza was suspect and that their suspicions about its role in 2024 remain.

What can be made of these sins of (possible) omission, and where does this leave some Jewish Democrats who still feel singled out for blame at the ballot box?

At very least, it was clear from the summer of 2024 that Gaza was emerging as a divisive issue in the campaign—and therefore could be considered as part of a multi-causal analysis in the autopsy. After all, by the time Harris became the Democratic nominee without competing in a primary, she had distanced herself from then-President Joe Biden’s handling of the Israel-Hamas war but didn’t offer much in the way of her own alternative vision.

The matter came to a head at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, when the “Uncommitted” movement, primarily composed of Arab and Muslim voters, and progressive and campus activists, was not offered a speaking timeslot (although the Goldberg-Polin family was). Controversy also swirled over the vice-presidential selection process, including as Pennsylvania’s Jewish Gov. Josh Shapiro later confirmed in his best-selling memoir, Where We Keep the Light: Stories From a Life of Service, that he had been grilled by vetters asking whether he had ever worked as an agent of Israel.

While Harris highlighted her family connection to the Jewish community, she offered few specific commitments on issues many Jewish and Zionist voters prioritized, and spent considerable energy appealing to other constituencies.

After the election, progressive activists and Democratic-adjacent commentators leaned into the explanation that Gaza—or, more broadly, Israel and the pro-Israel community—was a decisive factor in the 2024 loss, and could endanger both the midterms and 2028. Several Democratic figures and candidates, including Reps. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez of New York and Ro Khanna of California, and presidential hopefuls California Gov. Gavin Newsom and former Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel, wondered aloud about allegations of genocide in Gaza, conditioning or cutting U.S. aid to Israel, and a reassessment of U.S. relations with Israel and the Palestinians.

In her 2025 memoir 107 Days, Harris criticized Biden’s “blank check to Netanyahu” and “inadequate and forced” concern for Gazans as contributing to her loss. The DNC seemed to have engaged with the role of Gaza when it leaked to Axios that it was working with the Institute for Middle East Understanding (IMEU) Policy Project, a pro-Palestinian advocacy organization, to investigate the issue, although IMEU later accused the DNC of burying their contribution. By spring, when Harris began gearing up for a renewed presidential push, she pointedly told donors that she wanted the autopsy released.

Is the report’s omission of Gaza suspect or simply not relevant? Certainly, it was a divisive issue, and a lack of data on voter attitudes and behavior in the report means that we can’t know how determinative it was at the ballot box either way. Further, the fact that DNC chair Ken Martin suddenly reversed course in hastily publishing the report, with the caveat that he felt under pressure to release it and didn’t “endorse” it, hasn’t helped allay concerns about what it does and does not contain.

Democratic analysts have also noted other striking omissions and incomplete sections, including discussions of Biden’s age and health status, and Harris’s rushed nomination. Was this a report that wasn’t quite ready for primetime, though it generally contained the major explanatory points? Or was it an unfinished document that didn’t follow through on its remit, by omission, commission or otherwise of topics that related to the 2024 defeat?

The postmortem seems to have raised more questions than it answered—and the role of pro-Israel policy may only be one of them.

But acknowledging the odd and opaque circumstances surrounding the report does not justify saying that “the Zionists,” Jewish donors, or pro-Israel Democrats cost Harris the election. The question is not whether Gaza and Israel matter to many Democrats. The answer is still that Gaza and Israel are unlikely to explain everything about the 2024 election.

The Democrats have many lessons to learn about their failures for the midterms and the 2028 general election. But the most important should be that a blame game can’t replace rigorous data and analysis-driven interrogation of the party’s successes and failures at the ballot box, especially at the cost of its loyal Jewish and Zionist constituencies. If it takes a second autopsy to get to the truth, including about Gaza, so be it.

Posted in JNS

The post The DNC autopsy doesn’t mention the Jewish state first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

The latest scandal that emerged overnight marks a troubling escalation in the subterranean conflict unfolding within the American establishment against Israel.

The dramatic leak to NBC News, according to which the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) raised Israel’s espionage threat level to the highest “critical” category, is not a routine security incident. To understand its significance, historical context is essential.

Since the Jonathan Pollard affair in the 1980s, Israel has been careful to avoid spying on U.S. soil or monitoring senior American officials. For that reason, the current report raises numerous questions, particularly given that the leaked document reportedly contains no forensic evidence or concrete findings proving a breach, only alleged “concerns.” The absence of evidence raises an obvious question: Is this merely a coincidence, or could the document represent a kind of land mine or parting gift left behind by departing intelligence officials? To answer that question, one must look at the timing.

It is highly noteworthy that anonymous intelligence-community “sources” chose to leak the information precisely as Congress is considering Section 224 as part of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2027.

A dramatic initiative

Section 224 is a dramatic and critical initiative intended to deepen, synchronize and accelerate U.S.-Israel defense technology cooperation. The provision focuses on shared challenges at the forefront of military technology, including counter-drone systems, missile defense, artificial intelligence and cybersecurity.

It requires the Pentagon to appoint a senior official to coordinate that cooperation, ensuring that American and Israeli forces maintain a qualitative advantage on the battlefield. The isolationist wing in the United States has mounted a forceful campaign against the provision, spreading what the author views as myths that it would “merge” the two militaries, give Israel influence over Pentagon supply chains and, above all, grant Israel unrestricted access to sensitive U.S. military data.

Now, just as the provision faces a critical test, an intelligence document surfaces warning that Israel is aggressively spying on the United States. The institutional logic of the leakers is, in the author’s view, entirely clear: How can Congress approve legislation that expands information-sharing and technological cooperation with a country simultaneously designated a “critical espionage threat”? This amounts to a targeted effort to derail the legislation. To connect the dots behind this campaign, it is worth revisiting the controversy surrounding Joe Kent’s departure two months ago.

Kent, the Trump-appointed director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), resigned and launched an unprecedented attack on Israel. He argued that Iran does not pose an immediate threat and accused Israel and its supporters of dragging America into an unnecessary war. He also linked his wife’s death in Syria to a conflict that he claimed Israel helped create. Kent is not operating in a vacuum. Does his worldview also reflect the outlook of former Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard? Throughout her tenure, Gabbard displayed deep opposition to any military confrontation with Iran. Although she presented her resignation as a personal decision related to her spouse’s illness, there are indications behind the scenes suggesting that she was actually forced out because of those disagreements.

Tying the president’s hands?

The DIA is structurally subordinate to the Pentagon, but as director of national intelligence, Gabbard controlled the National Intelligence Program budget and defined intelligence priorities.

Could the bureaucratic infrastructure left behind by her and Kent now be producing documents lacking forensic support in an effort to derail Section 224, tie the president’s hands and deepen the rift between the two countries? But the broader picture extends far beyond a struggle within the intelligence community.

The isolationist and nationalist current within the Republican Party and Trump’s political orbit is waging a multifront campaign to distance the United States from Israel. Intelligence matters and legislation are only one vector in that effort.

Another major vector currently being employed is the Christian issue, which played a significant role during the campaign in Lebanon. To understand this from a geostrategic perspective, one must remember that Trump pledged to protect Christians wherever they live around the world. Supporters point to actions such as the use of military force against Boko Haram in Africa, which Trump described as part of protecting Christians globally.

Against that backdrop, the unusual invitation extended to the Greek patriarch to visit the White House should be viewed in a different light.

The patriarch is not a head of state who would ordinarily be expected to meet with the president of the United States. Rather, the author argues, it was a calculated move by the same nationalist faction seeking to advance an anti-Israel narrative. The patriarch focused specifically on Lebanon and the Holy Land when he said that ancient communities seek to preserve their faith and freedom of worship, and that ensuring access to the Holy Land is a prerequisite for regional stability. Those pressures, according to the author, were reflected in a heated exchange between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Trump regarding the continuation of military operations in Lebanon.

It must also be acknowledged, the author argues, that the campaign there was ultimately affected by irresponsible actions by some Israeli soldiers who desecrated Christian symbols, including a cross associated with Jesus and a statue of Mary. Such conduct, together with the troubling phenomenon of ultra-Orthodox Jews spitting at tourists and clergy members in Jerusalem, provided officials in Washington with precisely the ammunition they were seeking to constrain Israel’s actions.

Add to that inflammatory comments from politicians discussing the takeover of southern Lebanon, including Christian villages, and a perfect campaign emerges portraying Israel as carrying out ethnic cleansing.

Israel’s Foreign Ministry has been making important efforts to counter what the author describes as this distortion on social media. In that context, the recent decision by Foreign Minister Gideon Saar to appoint a special envoy at the ambassadorial level to engage with the Christian world deserves mention. The appointment of Ambassador George Deek to the position is a strategic step intended to bring order to the issue, moderate tensions and centralize engagement with these communities, with particular emphasis on Christian Zionists.

When all of these developments are viewed together — the allegedly evidence-free DIA leak coinciding with the advancement of Section 224 in Congress and the pressure campaign surrounding Christian communities in Lebanon and Jerusalem — they form a coherent picture. This is a coordinated effort by the isolationist camp to apply pressure on the president and drive a deep wedge into U.S.-Israel relations.

Published on Ynet

The post The espionage affair: Who is driving a wedge between the US and Israel? first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.