The draft law promoted by MK Boaz Bismuth and the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) parties is, in essence, a bill to entrench draft evasion and increase subsidies to the Haredi sector. Introducing a full-scale draft-exemption law during wartime is not only a moral disgrace but a knife in the back of those who serve. If the proposed legislation passes, the consequences will be far more disastrous than merely perpetuating the unbearable burden on Israel’s reservists. Israel stands at a historic crossroads: a choice between restoring the Zionist project or continuing to capitulate to the Haredi political leadership – leading, in the not-too-distant future, to Israel’s decline into a third-world state with questionable long-term viability.

Already today, nearly one in three children in Israel’s Hebrew-language public school system is Haredi. In other words, roughly a third of Jewish students in Israel are ultra-Orthodox. Demographic projections indicate that within four decades, a third of all Israelis will be Haredi –without even accounting for the rising number of mostly secular Israelis who are emigrating.

At present, the Haredi community’s economic contribution is negative: the participation of Haredi men in the workforce is low, and the salaries of those who do work are, on average, just 57 percent of what non-Haredi Jewish men earn. They pay significantly lower taxes while receiving far more welfare benefits and subsidies. In economic terms, the monthly fiscal gap between a Haredi household and the average Israeli household amounts to roughly NIS 6,114 ($1,890). The equation is simple: as the relative size of the Haredi population grows, the financial burden it places on the country will increase — until the system collapses under its own weight.

But the economic dimension is only part of the picture. There is also an ideological and civic dimension. The Haredi community lives in a fortified cultural ghetto, detached from – and often hostile to – the core civic values of the Zionist state. Many do not view themselves as part of the collective or as sharing any responsibility for sustaining it. As several Haredi rabbis and political leaders have made clear in recent months, they would prefer to leave the country than shoulder their fair share of the national burden.

But when it comes to political attitudes, the Haredi public is the most hardline in Israel, especially on questions of war, minorities, and national policy – positions that lock Israel into an endless conflict, for which others pay the price in blood. There is also a fundamental security dimension. The debate over Haredi IDF service is no longer just about equality. The war has placed an immense and prolonged strain on Israel’s military manpower. The coming years will require a larger standing army and a much larger reserve force. This will likely mean extending mandatory service for those who already serve, alongside annual reserve duties that routinely exceed 100 days a year. This is an impossible burden – one that fewer and fewer Israelis are willing to bear, especially in light of wholesale Haredi non-service.

The current draft bill does not even pretend to solve this national crisis.

Zionist Israel was built on a shared ethos: participation in the economic, civic, and security burden. A sober look at demographic and social trends shows that unless current patterns change drastically, the number of Israelis carrying that burden will shrink as the burden itself grows. As surveys already show, the willingness of secular, middle-class Israelis – the backbone of Israel’s military and economy – to continue carrying the weight of Haredi non-service is eroding. Many are already contemplating leaving the country.

Zionist Israel will not disappear overnight. In the short term, we will witness a deterioration in public services, a shift in the character of the public sphere, and profound changes in the fabric of Israeli society. But in the longer term, the result may be a fundamental transformation of the state’s identity: no longer a liberal, modern Jewish nation-state, but a more religious and less democratic polity. In the face of constant existential threats that require Israel to maintain close alignment with the West and technological superiority, it is far from clear that such a state could remain viable.

The debate over Haredi conscription has long since ceased to be about fairness or shared sacrifice. It has become a historic moment of reckoning over the very identity of the State of Israel. If the current exemption bill becomes law, it will fortify the Haredi enclave and send Israel hurtling down a steep and dangerous slope – toward the unraveling of the Zionist enterprise as we have known it, and place Israel’s long-term survival in jeopardy.

First published in The Times of Israel

The post The Haredi draft bill will be the end of Zionist Israel first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

In the absence of a law exempting the ultra-Orthodox (Haredim) from military service, tens of thousands have received draft orders. A few evaders caught by police have been arrested. This has led to a “declaration of war” by the Haredi community. Haredi politicians have competed with each other in issuing threats about the bitter fate that would befall Israeli society if the “war on the Torah world continues.” But they soon discovered that they were scaring no one. Simply put, the Haredi contribution to the State of Israel – its economy and core institutions – is so meager that even if they went on strike tomorrow morning, it wouldn’t significantly disrupt life in Israel. Hopefully, the image reflected back at them from this mirror will inspire some moral self-examination.

Even after nearly three years of a right-wing-Haredi government, a new conscription law is nowhere in sight. Given the ongoing war, the unending burden of reserve duty borne by many Israelis, with so many wounded or dead, even Netanyahu’s government cannot manage to pass yet another draft-evasion law for its allies who categorically refuse to share the heavy security burden.

And so, the Haredim now find themselves in the worst position they’ve been in since first receiving sweeping draft exemptions and state-funded support for their way of life, even for draft dodgers. Consequently, as mandated by law, the IDF issued draft notices to tens of thousands of Haredim who, unsurprisingly, did not report for duty. As a result, they are barred from leaving the country and subject to arrest warrants. This is the reason for the recent detention of some Haredi men.

Alongside these measures, the High Court of Justice ruled last year that in the absence of a conscription/exemption law, service-eligible Haredim would not be entitled to a series of budget allocations, benefits, and discounts that have long been granted to them at the taxpayer’s expense. All of this has placed the Haredim in a double bind: growing financial hardship and fear of arrest due to their criminal status.

The recent arrests have marked a new low for Haredi politicians and leaders. In their eyes, it poses an unprecedented threat to the core of their political and religious power, “the Torah world.” Hence, they’ve gone to war. We are witnessing verbal assaults on anyone they view as “fighting the Torah world,” attacks that are unprecedented even by Haredi standards.

The Lithuanian daily Yated Neeman declared a “war,” and addressed the arrested deserters with a headline featuring the biblical lament: “Zion, will you not ask after the welfare of your captives?” – as though the detainees had been seized by the Cossacks. Knesset member Meir Porush of United Torah Judaism threatened a “terrifying struggle.” At a gathering of rabbis hosted by Lithuanian leader Rabbi Landau, it was declared that “World Haredi Jewry will embark on a struggle like no other.” Some threatened to “shut down the country,” and so on.

But the Haredim are threatening Israeli society with an unloaded pistol. Compared to other sectors that contribute significantly to the state and share in its economic and security burdens, the Haredim receive far more from the state than most Israelis and contribute almost nothing in return. What will the Haredim do? Stop paying taxes? Their contribution to the tax burden is so negligible that it wouldn’t matter. Refuse to volunteer for the army? The number of Haredim who serve is minuscule. Launch a general strike? Many Haredim – those who work at all – are employed within their own community and institutions and would harm themselves more than anyone else.

True, the Haredim are very active in welfare and charitable services, and their Torah study does have Jewish and symbolic value for a Jewish state. But ultimately, the only tool left for them to disturb the rest of Israeli society is violence and civil disobedience – and they do occasionally employ it by blocking major roads. Yet even this tactic is likely to backfire catastrophically. No Israeli driver stuck in a massive traffic jam on their way home from work or reserve duty will sympathize with deserters blocking their path.

This situation should confront the Haredim with a harsh mirror. What stares back is an unflattering image of a community whose share of the Israeli population is growing, yet whose contribution remains marginal. If the Haredi leadership possessed even a sliver of Jewish morality, they would cry out, not because of the arrest of deserters, but because of the degeneration and destitution visible throughout Haredi cities and neighborhoods. Idleness, abject poverty, thousands of young people dropping out of various frameworks and ending up on the street – a community in crisis and disarray.

Sadly, the Haredi leadership is incapable of such reflection. Moreover, to preserve their power, they may actually prefer to keep their followers destitute and uneducated. Therefore, it is the duty of Israeli society to integrate the Haredim – while preserving their identity – into the army, the economy, the education system, and state institutions. This would be a lifeline not just for the Haredim, but also for Israeli society.

Published by The Times of Israel

The post The ultra-Orthodox are firing blanks in their war on the draft first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Last month, Yitzhak Goldknopf and Meir Porush, two ministers from Agudat Yisrael, resigned from the government. Earlier this week, the Degel HaTorah party pulled out of the coalition, followed by Agudat Yisrael. Most commentators have treated these developments with some cynicism, convinced that a formula for a conscription law will be found before the resignations take effect, and everyone will return to the fold.

I am not certain they are right. There is a reasonable chance that the Haredim (ultra-Orthodox) — at least the Ashkenazi faction — will “go all the way” and leave the government, even if it brings it down. We should consider the possibility that the Haredim are changing their attitude toward Israeli society writ large, and are returning to their historical stance of oppositionalism — resistant to authority and expectations.

The Haredim see themselves as the “surviving remnant” — the authentic Jews who were not swept up by the waves of modernity, secularism, and nationalism. and therefore stand apart from the broader Jewish public. They maintain a separate and parallel system of public institutions alongside those of the broader Jewish and Israeli society — not only schools and synagogues, but also free-loan societies and charitable welfare organizations. Their fundamental ideological position is that they are “in exile among Jews,” to use the title of a famous article by one of their leaders in Poland, Nathan Birnbaum (1864-1937).

The Haredi parties have been part of Likud-led coalitions for nearly 50 years, since Menachem Begin’s political upheaval in 1977. Over the years, Likud essentially invited the Haredim to abandon their oppositional stance and join the broad right-wing coalition of traditionalists, religious Zionists, and Haredim — the “coalition of believers,” as Shimon Riklin calls it. The Haredim responded that they were willing to do so, but only if their most basic and important interests were safeguarded. These included a complete exemption from military service for all Haredi men devoted to full-time Torah study. For a time, such a demand was politically untenable, due to the presence in Likud coalitions of secular (Yisrael Beiteinu) or centrist (Yesh Atid) parties. Yet there was an expectation that with the rise of “full right-wing” governments, a Haredi draft exemption law might finally pass. Of course, that has not happened, and Netanyahu has essentially stalled them for two years.

What is important is not only that it didn’t happen, but that the Haredi leadership is increasingly convinced it cannot happen. They understand that it is not the politicians who are the problem, but rather Israeli society itself — including Religious Zionists and Likud supporters — who oppose such a move. In other words, they now understand that they are returning to an oppositional relationship with the broader Israeli society. This is a script they know well — one could say it is their foundational script. In such a scenario, the Haredim will once again be in the opposition, as they were for decades before 1977. They will be in the opposition because they fundamentally oppose the Zionist framework of the State of Israel, and they recognize that a Zionist state has, in essence, no place for Haredi society and its values. That is to say, the radical Haredi leadership is prepared — and perhaps even desires — to return to the opposition.

Naturally, such a move would have consequences, as commentators have noted, but it is not clear that these consequences are decisive. Aryeh Deri (Shas) does not want to bring down a right-wing government. But it is doubtful whether this matters to Rabbis Lando and Hirsch or to the Gur Rebbe For them, right and left are almost indistinguishable — both comprise Jews who have abandoned the Torah path and joined the false ideology of Zionism. True, they will lose significant funding. Yet even this may not trouble them much.

The Haredi society in Israel is fundamentally elitist. It was originally meant to include only those willing to dedicate their lives to Torah study out of self-sacrifice, while living materially modest lives — along with their families. Over the years, the Haredi population expanded, and with it came increased political influence and a flow of public funding. It is quite possible that the Haredi leadership is now prepared to return to the old model — higher quality in exchange for lower quantity.

It is hard to imagine that elderly rabbis and rebbes are bothered by Haredi families not going out to cafés on Saturday nights or taking vacations abroad. Nor would it trouble them if the “modern Haredim” were to leave the community. What matters is that the “surviving remnant” will remain — the faithful of Israel loyal to the path of their forefathers.

The post Return to “Exile Among Jews”? The Haredi Community is Changing Its Attitude Toward Broader Israeli Society first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

For most Israelis, the World Zionist Congress is a memory from boring high school history lessons: a momentous gathering held in 1897 Basel, where Theodor Herzl, the father of Zionism, unveiled his utopian vision for a Jewish national homeland in the Land of Israel. Yet despite its archaic name and image, the Congress is still very much alive. Today it is a fiercely contested arena for influence over billions of shekels in Israeli public funds – and more importantly, over how that money is distributed.

Indeed, beneath its nostalgic façade wedges as a historical footnotes somewhere between Balfour and Ben-Gurion, the Zionist Congress holds real sway, particularly when it comes to land use and matters of religion and state. This is largely due to its impact on key national institutions like the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund (Keren Kayemeth LeIsrael), both of which oversee significant annual budgets. Through its delegates, the Congress effectively decides how these funds are allocated.

Elections to the Congress are held every five years and began last month in the United States – the most influential voting bloc, accounting for roughly a third of the Congress’s composition. Another third comes from Israel, its share distributed in line with the current Knesset’s party makeup. The final third is drawn from other Jewish communities around the world. And here is where things start to get interesting – or perhaps, surprisingly revealing.

Despite their long-standing opposition to women’s participation in politics, the parties billed as ultra-Orthodox, Shas and United Torah Judaism (UTJ, comprised of Agudat Yisrael and Degel HaTorah), are showing unexpected flexibility on this issue. The same parties that bar women from running on their slates for the Knesset are suddenly embracing gender equality, or at least when it comes to the Zionist Congress.

Take Eretz HaKodesh, for example, a list affiliated with UTJ. Not only did it meet the Congress’s mandatory female representation quota, it exceeded it. According to unpublished data from the Glazer Center at the Jewish People Policy Institute, 56 percent of Eretz HaKodesh candidates are women, while only 9 percent are rabbis.

Shas, for its part, claims that its international slate, Shas Olami, was formed to give voice to traditional Sephardi communities in shaping Jewish education and religious life. Its list includes 10 rabbis and 17 women, meaning over 40 percent of its 42 candidates are female.

It’s a striking contrast from a party that still refuses to allow a single woman to run for the Israeli parliament.

The dissonance is strange. How does a party like UTJ, one that enforces rabbinical decrees down to the precise cut of a suit or the angle of a hat, suddenly field a list where women outnumber men?

The answer is simple: they had no choice.

Several years ago, the Zionist Congress instituted a rule: every list must include at least 30 percent women. That quota later rose to 40 percent. The ultra-Orthodox parties realized that if they wanted to continue to have access to the significant financial resources funneled through the World Zionist Organization, they would have to play by the rules. That meant including women on their lists.

There were no protests. No boycotts. No fiery speeches in the Knesset or last-minute walkouts. Just compliance. When presented with an immovable condition and clear incentives – money, power, influence – the ultra-Orthodox parties adapted. And quickly.

It’s a lesson Israel’s domestic leadership should take seriously, especially in dealing with the long-standing tensions between the state and the Haredi sector: specifically refusal to teach core curriculum subjects in schools or the blanket exemption from otherwise mandatory military service.

Take Housing Minister Yitzhak Goldknopf, for example. Just a few weeks ago, he was filmed dancing at a wedding to the lyrics of an anti-Zionist, anti-IDF song. It was a reminder of the duality some Haredi politicians embody: by day they serve in government, by night they celebrate sedition. And they do so with impunity, because there are no clear red lines, no enforcement and no consequences.

But what’s happening at the Zionist Congress tells a different story. It shows that when conditions are non-negotiable, and when a tangible reward is offered for cooperation, the ultra-Orthodox fall in line.

This isn’t about shaming or alienating an entire sector. It’s about establishing enforceable norms that apply equally to all segments of society.

Israel’s civil society, and more importantly, its political leadership, can draw an important conclusion here: rules matter and they also work. When boundaries are put in place and enforced, the ultra-Orthodox adapt, even those who have spent decades resisting the very premise of change.

No, they didn’t suddenly embrace feminism, nor did they have a cultural revolution. They simply made a pragmatic calculation. Faced with a choice between adaptation and losing influence, they chose the former. As Herzl famously said: If you will it, it is no dream.

Published in Haaretz

The post How the World Zionist Congress Got the ultra-Orthodox to Comply first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

After more than 14 months of intense fighting, the army’s burden has hardly decreased. Reservists have stopped counting how many times they have been called up, and regular soldiers are expected to extend their service for many additional months.

Meanwhile, the government is promoting a law that perpetuates the moral disgrace of haredi [ultra-Orthodox] draft evasion, even during wartime.

It is surprising and disappointing that the IDF, through silence and explicit statements, seems ready to support the government. The Chief of the General Staff, Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi must understand that without a firm directive requiring the enlistment of most haredim, the “People’s Army” will cease to exist.

After more than a year of fighting, the relative calm along the borders in recent weeks may be deceiving. The war is not yet over.

For the first time since the Yom Kippur War, the IDF holds territory in Syria while also maintaining a substantial presence in Lebanon, in the Gaza Strip, and, of course, in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), not to mention along Israel’s borders with Egypt and Jordan.

The scale of IDF forces required to address these security challenges is nearly unprecedented, and it will not decrease significantly in the coming months or even years.

The heavy security burden is borne by a group of reservists who have been fighting with only short respites, if any, since October 7, and they are no longer able to carry this load. Families are breaking apart, reservists are losing their businesses or being fired from their civilian jobs, and national security itself is being compromised.

Anyone familiar with the situation knows that entire companies that initially enlisted at 130% capacity during the war are now reporting significantly lower turnout rates. Teams that once numbered dozens of soldiers are struggling to meet minimum quotas.

Regular soldiers are also paying the price, facing unbearable workloads and extended service periods. Some new recruits are being required to commit to serve beyond the standard 36 months.

In the face of this severe crisis and to ensure its political survival, the government is advancing a law that perpetuates the disgrace of haredi draft evasion. The proposed draft law includes the enlistment of only a relatively small number of haredim, about 5% of those currently evading service.

Moreover, it includes no meaningful sanctions to compel haredim to enlist. This is yet another instance of Israeli-style deception designed to buy the haredim more time to avoid service.

The proposed law is so flawed that even the Finance Ministry has issued a detailed opinion stating that if the government does not enact a conscription law with harsh penalties for haredi refuseniks, the economic harm to the state will be intolerable.

In light of all this, the IDF’s silence is particularly puzzling and troubling. Given the unprecedented manpower crisis, one would expect the army to have long ago informed the government that conscripting tens of thousands of haredim is a vital security necessity.

Instead, the army has resigned itself to an impotent inability to enlist a significant number of haredim. The government intends to legislate a haredi draft exemption law soon, and the appalling silence of IDF commanders is deafening and a moral failure.

How can they repeatedly issue call-up orders to reservists while supporting what amounts to an evasion law? It also poses a genuine security risk. As the percentage of reservists showing up for duty declines, the burden is falling on too few.

Imagine how reservists would feel if the army, in explicit statements or silence, supported a law exempting haredim from IDF service. This would harm unit morale and cohesion and diminish the willingness to continue serving.

There is genuine concern that young non-haredim slated to enlist will become less willing to do so. The “People’s Army,” which saved Israel on October 7 and throughout its existence, could collapse.

Hope that the government would prioritize the national interest over its political survival has long since faded. But if IDF commanders fail to understand the gravity of this moment, it could be the straw that breaks the back of all those who do serve.

It is the moral, ethical, and professional duty of IDF commanders to take a clear and unequivocal stand: a significant conscription law is an existential necessity.

Only a law that includes minimal exemptions for a few “exceptional Torah scholars” and mandates the enlistment of most haredim, alongside harsh penalties for draft dodgers, will preserve the “People’s Army.”

Only a conscription law with teeth will enable the continued defense of Israel’s security – and its prosperity.

Published by Jerusalem Post

The post IDF needs to act on recruiting haredim first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

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Findings

• A large majority (79%) of the ultra-Orthodox oppose full conscription even if those eligible were to serve in units adapted to their distinctive way of life.
• A majority of Haredi Israelis also oppose the possibility of IDF induction by serving in Haredi volunteer organizations.
• The Haredi community’s trust in the IDF’s senior command is very low relative to other population groups.
• Haredi Israelis have high levels of trust in the government and the prime minister; their policy views are consistent with those who self-identify as being on the right-wing of the Israeli political spectrum.
• There has been a rise in the percentage of Haredi Israelis who believe the war will not reinforce Haredi integration into the broader society.
• In contrast to last year, most ultra-Orthodox observe a rise in tension between non-Haredi and Haredi Israelis due to the war.
• There has been a rise in the share of Haredim who support cutting Haredi budgets more than other budget areas.
• 41% of Haredi Israelis say that the leaders of the Haredi parties do not represent them (an increase over last year).
• A majority of Haredi Israelis (68%) are concerned about the state of social cohesion in the country.
• Most Haredi Israelis express high confidence that Israel will win the war.
• 74% of Haredi Israelis are optimistic about the country’s future – a larger percentage than for any other sector.

Haredi Conscription

A majority of ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) Israelis (63%) anticipate that the war will not significantly change Haredi society. Twenty-nine percent say the war will lead to some degree of positive change in Haredi integration into general Israeli society, but only 5% believe the war will generate significant movement in societal integration.

These figures reflect a change compared to findings from a year ago: the percentage of ultra-Orthodox who feel that the war will not significantly alter Haredi society has risen, and the share of ultra-Orthodox Israelis who think the war will effectuate some degree of change in Haredi society has dropped.

Regarding the three main Haredi subgroups, as commonly defined: a third of Sephardi ultra-Orthodox (32%) feel there will be a degree of change regarding Haredi integration into the broader Israeli society, a similar percentage was found among the Litvaks (Lithuanians) (30%), while the lowest percentage was found among the Hasidim (21%). Seventy-four percent of Haredi United Torah Judaism voters said that the war will not significantly change ultra-Orthodox society. The percentage of Chabad Hasidim who believe the war will lead to a measure of change in Haredi integration into the broader Israeli society is the highest of all (45%), but they are a relatively small subgroup within Israel’s ultra-Orthodox population (4% of the survey respondents).

This survey looks at a number of options for resolving the issue of drafting Haredi yeshiva-students. Respondents were presented with each option separately, so we could determine which options generate a greater or lesser degree of consensus (acceptable to me/unacceptable to me). Most respondents (81%) say a full draft exemption for yeshiva students is acceptable to them. This constitutes a slight increase compared to a similar question posed last year, when 78% said that “The existing situation of full draft exemption for yeshiva students is acceptable to me.” (Last year’s respondents were not presented with each option separately, but rather asked to mark, in a single question, the options acceptable to them, meaning that a comparison between the questions gives an indication of change but cannot explicitly attest to it). An eighth of ultra-Orthodox respondents this year (13%) find a blanket Haredi exemption unacceptable.

The share of those who say a blanket Haredi exemption is unacceptable was especially high among Chabad Hasidim, a quarter of whom gave this response. Furthermore, ultra-Orthodox who voted for the Religious Zionism Party and for the Likud said that the existing situation is unacceptable to them (70% and 58%, respectively). This is in contrast to a large majority of ultra-Orthodox United Torah Judaism voters (91%) and Shas voters (84%), who constitute a large majority of Haredi Israelis, as well as to ultra-Orthodox Otzma Yehudit voters (70%), who said that the existing situation of full draft exemption for yeshiva students is acceptable to them.

An overwhelming majority of Haredi Israelis (93%) say that full compulsory conscription, similar to conscription for all other Israeli Jewish subgroups, is unacceptable to them (last year, 1% of the respondents said that full compulsory conscription was acceptable to them). On this question there are no major differences between the various streams in Haredi society – all show a large majority of over 85% who oppose the full compulsory conscription of all young ultra-Orthodox males similar to conscription for all other Jewish populations.

An overwhelming majority of Haredi Israelis (93%) say that full compulsory conscription, similar to conscription for all other Israeli Jewish subgroups, is unacceptable to them (last year, 1% of the respondents said that full compulsory conscription was acceptable to them). On this question there are no major differences between the various streams in Haredi society – all show a large majority of over 85% who oppose the full compulsory conscription of all young ultra-Orthodox males similar to conscription for all other Jewish populations.

A large majority of ultra-Orthodox (79%) oppose the option of full compulsory conscription of all draft-eligible young Haredi Israelis, even if they were to serve in units adapted to the Haredi way of life. Among all ultra-Orthodox streams, a majority oppose this option. Among Sephardim, three in four respondents consider this option unacceptable. Among Hasidic and Lithuanian respondents, over 80% consider it unacceptable. Most Haredi Netanyahu voters, a third of Haredi Likud and Religious Zionism Party voters, and a quarter of Haredi Otzma Yehudit voters consider this option to be acceptable.

Most ultra-Orthodox (81%) oppose the option of conscription of most young Haredim, even if there were an exemption for a few thousand iluyim or “prodigies” who would remain in yeshiva. Approximately one in every eight respondents finds this option acceptable. A majority of each of the main Haredi subgroups (and half of Chabad) say that this option is unacceptable to them.

Most ultra-Orthodox Israelis (60%) oppose the option of young Haredim being inducted but then serving with Haredi volunteer organizations such as ZAKA or United Hatzalah, while 29% find this option acceptable. A quarter of Haredi Shas voters and a fifth of Haredi United Torah Judaism voters consider this option acceptable. Half of Chabad, a third of Hasidim and Sephardim, and a fifth of Lithuanians find the option acceptable.

We sought to determine whom the respondents consider the main party responsible for the Knesset not passing a new exemption law for young Haredim, after the Supreme Court revoked the legality of the torato umanuto (“Torah study is his occupation”) arrangement. Twenty-eight percent of respondents think the Attorney General bears responsibility, and this response received the highest percentage, significantly outstripping other options. A fifth of Haredim think the heads of the ultra-Orthodox political parties bear the responsibility, and a tenth think the prime minister is primarily responsible for the non-enactment of a new exemption law.

Trust in Leadership and Confidence of Victory

Most ultra-Orthodox Israelis (64%) rate their confidence that Israel will win the war as high (4 + 5 out of 5), a percentage nearly identical to that of Israel’s general Jewish population (68% as of last month). At the time this survey was conducted, a ceasefire with Lebanon had been declared, while the fighting in Gaza continued. The survey was conducted after the dismissal of the defense minister, Yoav Gallant.

The Haredi groups showing the highest confidence levels regarding the possibility of Israeli victory in the war are the Sephardim (70%), the Hasidim (67%), and the Lithuanians (53%). Most ultra-Orthodox Shas voters (74%), Likud voters (88%), Otzma Yehudit voters (76%), and Religious Zionism Party voters (70%) demonstrated high levels of confidence (4 + 5) about the possibility of Israel winning the war.

This year’s survey shows a decline in the ultra-Orthodox community’s level of trust in the IDF command, relative to a year ago. In November 2023, most ultra-Orthodox expressed high trust (very high + somewhat high) in the IDF command. However, the wording of the question was different last year (last year: IDF commanders; this year: the IDF senior command), and this change explains a significant portion of the discrepancy in the findings, one that also appears in JPPI surveys of the general Israeli population (on this issue see the JPPI survey for July 2024). However, even when we take this into account, there is a major gap between Haredi trust in the IDF senior command and that of Israeli Jews generally. Last month’s JPPI Israeli Society Index (November 2024), showed that 59% of all Jews attested to somewhat high or very high levels of trust in the IDF senior command, while only a quarter of the ultra-Orthodox population showed such trust levels.

Regarding trust in the government, there has been no significant change compared to last year. In November 2023, when the ultra-Orthodox survey looked at trust “in the emergency government,” 53% expressed high or very high levels of trust, while 35% expressed low or very low levels of trust. This year, an identical share of the ultra-Orthodox say their trust in the government is high (very high + somewhat high), a third say that their trust level is “somewhat low,” while a tenth say that their trust level is “very low.” The groups that showed the highest levels of trust in the government are the Sephardim (58%) and the Hasidim (54%); with trust levels among Lithuanians and Chabad at 49% and 40% respectively. A fifth of Haredi Likud and Religious Zionism Party voters, a third of Shas voters, and over a third of United Torah Judaism and Otzma Yehudit voters say that their trust in the government is low (very low + somewhat low).

The ultra-Orthodox public’s trust in the prime minister also remains unchanged since last year (November 2023). The trust level expressed by most ultra-Orthodox in the prime minister is high (very high + somewhat high). A quarter of Haredim report their trust in the prime minister as “somewhat low,” and a tenth say it is “very low.” Haredi trust in the prime minister is higher than that of the rest of the Jewish population. Last month, 32% of all Jewish Israelis said their trust in the prime minister was high (very high + somewhat high), while 53% of the ultra-Orthodox sector gave similar ratings.

Economy and Policy

This year, like last year, we looked at Haredi views regarding war-related budget cuts. Forty-one percent of Haredim support budget cuts for their community to the same degree as those directed at other budget areas, a fifth support the option of Haredi budgets being reduced to a greater degree than other budgets, while a third favor lesser reductions than those affecting other budgets. Compared with last year, the percentage of Haredim supporting the reduction of Haredi budgets to a greater degree than other budgets significantly increased. Sephardi Haredim showed the highest share (27%) of supporters of deeper Haredi budget cuts relative to other budgets, while the Hasidim are the Haredi subgroup with the highest percentage (34%) in support of smaller cuts for ultra-Orthodox budgets than for other budgets.

This year, like last year, we asked whether the ultra-Orthodox think that the politicians associated with the Haredi political parties represent them or not: 44% feel that these politicians do represent them, while 41% feel they do not. Compared to last year, there has been a rise in the share of those who feel that the Haredi politicians do not represent them, and a drop in the share of those who think the politicians do represent them. More than half of Hasidim (53%) feel represented by the politicians of the Haredi parties (except for Chabad Hasidim, 70% of whom maintain that the Haredi party politicians do not represent them).

Most United Torah Judaism voters (65%) feel represented, while a fifth do not. As expected, ultra-Orthodox Likud, Religious Zionism Party, and Otzma Yehudit voters say the Haredi party politicians do not represent the Haredi community.

On a question about Israeli policy in the wake of the war – a question that we also posed to the general population – most ultra-Orthodox (66%) feel that Israel should tighten its control over the Palestinians, expand the settlements, consider dissolving the Palestinian Authority, and perhaps annex Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). A fifth of Haredi Israelis believe that Israel should strive for complete separation from the Palestinians, dismantle settlements outside the large settlement blocs, and focus on maintaining the IDF’s freedom of action to prevent the growth of terrorist organizations in the territories. These views position most Haredi Israelis at the “right-wing” end of the political spectrum.

For comparison, last month 77% of those who self-identify as right-wing said Israel “needs to strengthen its control over the Palestinians, expand the settlements, consider dissolving the Palestinian Authority, and possibly annex Judea and Samaria.” In all of the other ideological groups (including the center-right), “complete separation from the Palestinians” was preferred.

Israeli Social Cohesion

A majority of ultra-Orthodox (68%) are concerned (very concerned + fairly concerned) about the state of Israeli social cohesion. A fifth of ultra-Orthodox are “fairly unconcerned” while a tenth are “not at all concerned.” Among Haredi subgroups, the most concerned (very + fairly concerned) are the Sephardim (74%), followed by the Hasidim and the Lithuanians (66%), and finally Chabad (60%). When the responses are broken down by political-party support, the most concerned voters are Shas voters (75%) and United Torah Judaism voters (70%), followed by Likud voters (65%) and Religious Zionism Party voters (60%), and finally by Otzma Yehudit voters (49%).

Most ultra-Orthodox (59%) feel that the area of tension most strongly impacting Israeli social cohesion is that between the political right and left. A quarter feel that the area of tension with the greatest impact is between the religious and the secular.

There is no consensus within the ultra-Orthodox population about how the war will affect tensions between the Haredim and other population subgroups. A third of ultra-Orthodox Israelis feel that tensions between the Haredim and other population subgroups will intensify due to the war; 23% feel that tensions will remain as they are now; 22% believe that they will weaken, and 15% think that there will be no tension. Compared with last year, there has been a major decline in the percentage of Haredi Israelis who think the war will cause tensions to abate – last year half felt this way. Now, a fifth think tensions will intensify – last year only a tenth thought so.

Respondents were asked whether the war had affected their sense of closeness to or distance from other listed Israeli subgroups. Most ultra-Orthodox (73%) say the war has distanced them from Arab Israelis, while a quarter say that the war has not affected their sense of closeness to, or distance from, them. Chabad is the ultra-Orthodox stream with the highest percentage (90%) of respondents saying the war has distanced them from Arab Israelis.

The Lithuanian Haredim have the lowest percentage feeling this way (69%). In a breakdown by voting patterns, 83% of Haredi Otzma Yehudit voters, 80% of Haredi Religious Zionism Party voters, 75% of Haredi Shas voters, 70% of Haredi United Torah Judaism voters, and 65% of Haredi Likud voters say the war has distanced them from Arab Israelis.

Most ultra-Orthodox (55%) say that the war has not affected their sense of closeness to, or distance from Religious Jews (“kippa sruga”), a group comprising Religious Zionists, Traditionalists, and Modern Orthodox; 29% say the war has brought them closer to Religious Jews; and an eighth (13%) say the war has distanced them from Religious Jews. Hasidim are the Haredi subgroup with the highest share (16%) of respondents who say that the war has distanced them from Religious Jews (except for Chabad, 50% of whom said that the war has brought them closer to them).

A majority of ultra-Orthodox Israelis (63%) say the war has not affected their sense of closeness to, or distance from, the secular. A fifth report feeling closer to the secular public due to the war, while an eighth feel more distant. The Haredi subgroup with the highest percentage (30%) of respondents saying the war has brought them closer to the secular is Chabad, while the stream with the lowest share (16%) who gave this response is the Lithuanians.

Most ultra-Orthodox (75%) say that the war has not affected their degree of closeness to, or distance from, Diaspora Jewry. A fifth of Haredim say the war has brought them closer to Jews living outside of Israel. The stream with the lowest percentage saying the war has brought them closer to Diaspora Jewry is the Hasidim (excluding Chabad).

Most ultra-Orthodox (74%) are optimistic (very optimistic + somewhat optimistic) about the State of Israel’s future; a fifth (19%) say that they are pessimistic (very pessimistic + somewhat pessimistic). The percentage of Haredim who are optimistic about Israel’s future is higher than that of the total Jewish population – 60%. Relative to last year, there have been no changes in Haredi optimism levels regarding Israel’s future. All Haredi groups have similar optimism levels, but we can discern a difference in optimism levels between men and women – across Haredi streams, the percentage of women who say that they are “very optimistic” about Israel’s future is lower than that of men.

The Jewish People Policy Institute’s December Israeli Society Index survey was conducted between November 25 and December 1, 2024. Data was collected by Askaria (501 ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)-sector respondents via an online poll). Data was analyzed and compared to data collected via the Askaria online panel in November 2023. Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepkov compile the JPPI Israeli Society Index; Professor David Steinberg serves as a statistical consultant.

The post JPPI Israeli Society Index, December 2024 – Special Survey of Ultra-Orthodox Society first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Last Thursday, I jogged by Jerusalem’s recruiting station – and saw a few dozen ultra-Orthodox protesters. I was furious. If they’re supposed to be defending us by studying Torah full-time, how could they find time to protest? Did they arrange a secret multi-front ceasefire? Most outrageous was their arrogance and callousness. It’s hard enough saying goodbye to your children on army enlistment day. During a bloody war, how dare these brats add a scintilla of stress to any parent – or recruit.

Even worse, dozens of soldiers and police were there, and at other recruiting stations – distracted from defending us against evil enemies to stop these unholy hooligans from harassing self-sacrificing patriots.

The scene highlighted the inequity tormenting Israel. Too many have lost lives, limbs, peace of mind – or time itself. One of my sons has served 307 days; my new son-in-law has served 255 days. Hundreds of thousands more have served countless days and nights, stressing their spouses and children.

Moreover, we keep hearing from the front that our soldiers are poorly equipped. We have raised money from generous North American friends and Israeli neighbors to buy our kids – and their buddies – kevlar armor plates to fill the empty vests they received, comfortable combat boots, quality helmets, etc. We also tapped extraordinary multi-million dollar efforts subsidizing soldiers – and know of individuals who maxed out their credit cards – usually provisioning not just their kids, but everyone in the unit.

While demanding that the government function better, shouldn’t the government also reallocate some money funding ultra-Orthodox draft-dodgers to better protect our soldiers? And why shouldn’t ultra-Orthodox leaders help raise these funds – to thank those ready to sacrifice their lives to also defend them?

UNIVERSAL SERVICE involves more than filling the army’s personnel shortfall. That’s the most pressing reason why we must phase in more and more ultra-Orthodox recruits.

There’s a deeper reason, too. The army has been Israel’s greatest integrator, unifier, and leveler. Coming from different sectors, with diverse political, religious, and cultural orientations, soldiers live together and befriend one another. It’s one of the secrets to Israel’s cohesion – and battlefield success. If haredi identity can’t survive close contact with others, maybe ultra-Orthodoxy itself is flawed.

By contrast, consider America’s fragmentation. When we historians analyze this insane election – and painful period – we will highlight the Big Sort that created Democratic and Republican enclaves. We will blame social media, Trumpians, woke Democrats and others for the Loud Shouts that replaced reasoned debate with all-or-nothing, my-way-or-the-highway, tribal shrieks. But we will also target the Great Escape: how Americans withdrew from interacting with one another – and especially those who differ politically – on Main Street, at church, online and in the military.

US draft ended in 1973

America’s draft ended in 1973. Back then, veterans made up 80% of the Congress; by 2023 it was barely 20%. More broadly, in 1980, some 18% of American adults were veterans; by 2022, it was just a third of that – 6%.

Reservists spend lots of time together. They can place each comrade on the religious and political spectrum. But it’s irrelevant when they divvy-up everyday tasks or combat missions. And they all show up to their army friends’ weddings, bar mitzvahs – and, alas, funerals.

So beware, “the religious” risk alienating us all. Gotcha. Of course, we’re not talking about “the religious.” Especially this past week, we in Jerusalem again mourned so many wonderful religious Zionist soldiers who had so much to live for – yet fell in battle. I don’t want to calculate the percentages of who has died from which sector. All I know is that much of the nation has sacrificed to save the nation and Western civilization – with religious Zionists leading the way honorably, and yes, disproportionately.

IT’S JUST “the haredim” who will suffer a huge political backlash. Gotcha again. I attack the haredi draft dodgers, not “the haredim.”

I didn’t know it last Thursday, but these protesting slacker scholars mobilized because, as Ynet later reported, “about 150 young ultra-Orthodox men completed a training course in preparation for enlistment through a project that recruits haredim for regular military service. This initiative was launched last November by haredi activists, including Major (Res.) Moshe Turgeman, CEO of the Future of Israel Association, and is supported by the IDF and the Jerusalem Municipality.” The haredi world is highly sectorial – we should find and encourage more of its patriotic sects, willing to serve.

Here, then, are 150 rays of hope – demonstrating more courage, more patriotism, and more Zionist spirit, than many Likud members thrice their age. But, perhaps, the ground is starting to shift. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant is demanding 7,000 new haredi draft orders.

One Likud rookie, MK Dan Illouz, has bravely spoken up in favor – and deserves massive support. “Exempting such a large group of people from their obligation to serve in the IDF at such a critical time is anti-Zionist,” he boldly tweeted on X. When Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu tried bullying him, the 38-year-old Illouz resisted, affirming the “deep Zionism” that brought him from Montreal to Israel – and motivates him.

A Likud leader, Yuli Edelstein, also finally rebelled, opposing “any law that attempts to circumvent our ceaseless efforts to expand the conscription base in the State of Israel.” And Gideon Sa’ar’s New Hope Party will also oppose the “Daycare Bill,” subsidizing draft-dodgers’ children, and thus “encouraging evasion from service in the IDF.”

These Likud rebels deserve our gratitude. They have also undoubtedly earned thanks from many soldiers and Religious Zionists – and haredi warriors, too.

Originally published in JPost

The post How are Ultra-Orthodox Jews Protesting IDF Service if They’re Too Busy Studying Torah? first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Supreme Court ruling on ultra-Orthodox (haredi) IDF conscription could be a historic turning point. Just before the point of no return, the Court has given Israeli society an opportunity to right the ship and save Israel’s future.

But the ruling alone will not bring about change. To expedite haredi enlistment and integration into Israeli society writ large, significant sanctions must be imposed. The haredi leadership would be glad to exploit pictures of the military police herding yeshiva students onto armored buses headed for military prison. This must not happen.

However, there are a number of tools that can bring young haredi men to the induction centers and safeguard Israel’s continued existence.

The Court waited seven years for the Knesset to pass a proper conscription law. Extension after extension, and one legal gambit after another enabled yeshiva students to avoid military service, even in the absence of a conscription law. The Court could wait no longer. After all other options were exhausted and in light of the war in the south and the risk of war in the north, the Court obliged the state to mobilize the haredim.

The petitions, the Court hearings and the language of the ruling are no longer just about equality. Haredi conscription has become an existential necessity.

Before Oct. 7, we believed that the IDF could be a “small and smart army,” but reality cruelly slapped us in the face. The IDF, which is fighting the longest war in Israel’s history, is hungry for soldiers. So, now and for the foreseeable future the IDF’s order of battle must be substantially larger. It is no longer just a matter of “national burden equality.” This is a fight for our survival.

Today, the haredim number around 1.36 million people, 15% of the Israeli population. Some 60% are under the age of 20. In 2030, one out of four young Israelis will be haredi and the proportion of haredi youth in Israel’s Jewish population is expected to be around a third. These are dramatic numbers in terms of potential candidates for military service.

There are already 13,000 haredi youth in the conscription cohort, about 10% of the total. This rate will increase rapidly and the proportion of haredim among all conscription candidates is expected to grow significantly. Without the haredim, it will not be possible to sustain the army. First of all numerically but also in order to maintain the “people’s army” model, on which there is broad consensus—everyone must enlist.

Initial reactions from haredi leaders to the Supreme Court ruling indicate that, from their perspective, what has been the case will continue to be the case. Most haredim do not want to enlist. If there was any hope in the weeks following Oct. 7 that something might change, it has long since been dashed. Only a small percentage of haredim, between 10% and 20%, believe they should be drafted. The readiness to enlist is minimal. Haredi conscription must, therefore, include significant sanctions for those who do not enlist.

It is not enough to require the haredim to enlist or send them call-up orders. Complementary steps must be added based on the following principles:

All haredi males will be conscripted, except for a small quota of exemptions (“elite scholars”). The obligation to enlist is personal, not communal. This means that everyone enlists without the sectoral “goals” and “quotas” of previous laws.

Haredim who do not enlist will be designated deserters. They will not be imprisoned but they will bear a criminal stigma. They will not be able to leave the country, hold civil service jobs and more. Deferral of military service for the sake of Torah study will not be longer than three years. Haredi recruitment will be for the entire IDF (within adapted frameworks). Government stipends for those who do not serve will cease and institutions where those who do not serve study will not receive state funding. Support for Torah students who have served will also be limited in order to encourage the haredim to join the labor market after their military service. Those who do not serve will not receive state benefits beyond the basic social safety net (health services, food assistance, etc.). Those who do serve will receive preference in any state resource: real estate tenders, civil service jobs, etc.

One of the haredims’ justified concerns is identity erosion during military service. To enable them to serve in a way that is consistent with the haredi way of life, the IDF must build frameworks adapted to their needs. One possible solution is the establishment of a border corps, in which haredim will be stationed at separate bases in a way that “protects” their identity.

All this must happen not just because we need equality but because without haredi military service, we will not be able to survive in the face of the security challenges ahead.

JNS

The post Don’t arrest haredi draft resisters first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.