Back then, after my first post-COVID American speaking tour, I was struck by how troubled my peers and my students were. We were raised in Generation Hope – yet everyone seemed stuck in despair. We knew our lives were better than our parents’ and grandparents’ lives – yet took responsibility to roll up our sleeves and make them even better. Too many students – and their parents – while living safe, comfortable lives, lost that confidence. Feeling the same need to try reframing the conversation I had in 2001 when I wrote “Why I am a Zionist,” I wrote a manifesto: “Cancel Me! Un-Woke and anti-Trump.”

I sought a middle path, rejecting the all-or-nothingness and violence of the post-George Floyd riots and January 6. Few Americans, Black and white, want either extreme.

I started writing about Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms, analyzing his expansive, visionary, and relevant liberal-democratic nationalism. This was my nerdy historian’s response to our strange world filled with progressives who don’t believe in progress – and conservatives who don’t conserve institutions.

You can retrace America’s history through these four freedoms. Freedom of Religion replaced God with the people as the basis of sovereignty – the 18th century revolution. Freedom of Speech invigorated democracy – the 19th century breakthrough. Freedom from Want made America fairer – the mid-twentieth-century breakthrough, creating the first mass middle-class civilization. But we’re still seeking Freedom from Fear.

Too abstract

ULTIMATELY, this scheme felt too abstract for the pressing challenges of the moment. I started writing personally, telling my story and my family’s story to illustrate the transformation of millions of Americans from being “Eastern European Boat People” fleeing Old World oppression, liberated by the New World’s opportunities.

Writing in the first person made it more compelling – although I felt awkward writing a memoir: I write about history, I don’t make it. “You’re a teacher,” my astute editor Adam Bellow at Wicked Son urged – “write letters to your students.” So I did, using my life-story to champion Americanism, liberalism, and Zionism.
After October 7, I rewrote the book, strengthening the Zionist message that now became urgent. I rewrote it again during the spring as the Academic Intifada’s encampments assailed Americanism, liberalism and Zionism, along with the critical thinking, open-mindedness, and mutual respect on campus, around which I built my academic career – and my life.

Yesterday we launched the book. To Resist the Academic Intifada: Letters to My Students on Defending the Zionist Dream, is addressed – and dedicated – to my beloved students. “You’re not crazy,” I insist: the masked cowards threatening you, harassing you, yelling anti-American, anti-Zionist and antisemitic slogans are the deviants – as are their heavy-handed, propagandizing professors.

The letters also challenge my peers, my students’ parents. “Buck up!” I proclaim. “Tell your story, your family’s Mayflower or Fleeing-from-Egypt tale. Don’t allow racist ideologues to dismiss you and your kids because of your ‘white privilege’ when so many of our ancestors came from nothing and we made something of ourselves with sweat and smarts.” We – Jews and non-Jews alike – must stop apologizing and start leading ideologically; celebrating the good in America, in Israel, in the West, while fixing the bad.

Meanwhile, let’s sing a new song of Zion, loud, proud, unapologetic – without Jewish guilt, especially while fighting our genocidal enemies.

The title tells it all. While acknowledging the ongoing horrors, I refuse to be cemented in the trauma; we must be positive, proactive, looking ahead. Second, when I call to “Resist,” I refuse to allow these hooligans to romanticize themselves as some kind of righteous resistance.

I ALSO reject the gaslighting of recent years: when thoughtful critics attacked “woke” inanities, defenders said “we’re just seeking justice” or, more aggressively, “what, you’re a MAGA supporter?” – as if those are the only two political paths. When critics called it “postmodernism,” bystanders looked confused – it sounds too abstract. And when critics rejected “critical race theory” or the race obsessions of “anti-racism,” defenders called them “racist.” Ironically, the radicals first embraced each label – until criticism grew.

The term “academic intifada” locates much of the poison on campus – while noting that not every academic propagandizes. But the radicals seek to “Globalize the Intifada” and vow “Freedom for Palestine means Death to America.”

Balancing the title, the subtitle gives the punchline. The phrase “the Zionist dream” evokes “the American dream.” My letters champion both.

The book concludes by making two essential arguments. First, that in many ways, even now, Israelis today live the American dream – in Zion, in a free, prosperous Jewish democracy, rooted in tradition and values, while forever seeking to improve. And, on October 7, my students, our kids, that extraordinary next generation, mobilized in Israel to save Israel – while mobilizing worldwide against this wave of Jew-hatred and America-hatred. Although the Israeli government and the IDF failed that day, Zionism succeeded – and was vindicated by these courageous children we’ve raised.

Finally, I’m clear. If you don’t agree with me on the fundamental morality of Americanism, Zionism, and liberalism: cancel me. If you do, read this book – but please question, disagree, argue with me: That’s the best way we learn and grow together.

The post To Resist the Academic Intifada’ first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Main Recommendations

• Diaspora communities (with the assistance of Israel) should prioritize significant Jewish education projects – financially, socially, and institutionally

• Philanthropy in Israel, by both individuals and institutions, should be encouraged, emphasizing the Jewish value of giving as is customary in Diaspora communities worldwide

• A comprehensive social and political response must be formulated to an expected increase in the number of Israelis who belong to the Jewish majority population but are not recognized as Jews

• Continued rapid growth of the ultra-Orthodox community requires intra- and extra-sectoral attention to the socioeconomic ramifications of this trend

• Dialogue with Jews who support the Democratic Party must be deepened

Jewish People Policy Institute’s Annual Assessment of the Situation and Dynamics of the Jewish People is published this year during turbulent times for world Jewry.

A war raging in Europe that threatens global stability and the current world order and is affecting the lives and movement of Ukrainian and Russian Jews. Israel-Diaspora relations are in a crisis; and continued rapid growth of ultra-Orthodox communities are just some of the major issues examined in JPPI’s just released Annual Assessment.

The 124-page report written by JPPI expert analysts and brimming with graphs and charts illustrating trends by the numbers, undertakes to determine whether the past year’s developments have affected Israel and the Jewish world positively or negatively. This year, the arrows point negatively on virtually all matters pertaining to the safety and well-being of world Jewry.

The report delves into geopolitical uncertainty that has intensified in the last year, with implications for Israel and the Jewish people, the need for Israel to strengthen dialogue with the Jewish community in the United States, most of whom support the Democratic Party which is trending leftward with serious implications for American policy toward Israel and the rise of antisemitism worldwide.

The Assessment, which includes policy recommendations, has been presented to the Government of Israel and shared with Jewish communal leaders worldwide.

Israel-Diaspora Relations

JPPI President, Prof. Yedidia Stern said that the report emphasizes the crisis in Israel-Diaspora relations: “The core beliefs and emotional ties that ‘made us one’ are dramatically weakening while the those on the margins are growing, ideologically and identity-wise within Israel and outside it.”

According to the report, distancing from Israel is becoming such a significant issue among college-aged Jews; Zionism is a very problematic word in some of the elite universities in the United States. In their Judaism there is little religious or national currency, mostly just a cultural connection. Only a third of the young Jews, under 30, say that it is very important that their grandchildren be Jews. The overall result is threefold: a reduction and dilution of the share of non-religious Jewish identity in the Diaspora; a reduction of the pro-Israel resolve among the elite of the next generation of Jews; and increased polarization among American Jews – political, religious, cultural.

Prof. Stern noted the responsibility of the State of Israel to deal with these crucial strategic issues. “We have a constitutional obligation – Article 6 of the Nation-State Law says: The state will work in the Diaspora to preserve the connection between the state and the Jewish people, and the state will work to preserve the cultural, historical and religious heritage of the Jewish people among Diaspora Jewry.”

Israel has national institutions and the Jewish Agency to deal with these issues – and a Ministry of Diaspora Affairs and a president who make them their highest priority, “The State of Israel still does not have a strategic plan of action to fulfil its responsibilities under the law for the preservation of Jewish identity in the Diaspora and for the preservation of the bonds of connection and belonging between the two parts of the people,” notes Stern.

JPPI recommends that Diaspora communities, with the assistance of Israel, prioritize significant Jewish education projects – financially, socially, and institutionally.

Increased Israeli Philanthropy

Regarding funding, it is noted that the great success of Israel’s high-tech sector has created a class of wealthy Israelis whose numbers have increased significantly. Data on individual and corporate philanthropy in Israel point to low contribution levels compared to other Western countries, and especially with Jews abroad, who are leaders in the philanthropic sphere. Although Israeli philanthropy is trending upward to a degree, it is still far from the desirable levels. The flourishing of high-tech constitutes an opportunity for Israelis to step up their support of the development of Israeli society. Increased philanthropy will make it possible to strengthen efforts in the educational, cultural, and social welfare spheres; it will promote mutual responsibility on the part of different groups in Israeli society and it will embody a unifying Jewish value for Israel and the Diaspora.

JPPI recommends that philanthropy in Israel, by both individuals and institutions, should be encouraged, emphasizing the Jewish value of giving as is customary in Diaspora communities worldwide.

Challenge of Ultra-Orthodox Growth

In about 15 years the ultra-Orthodox will constitute 25% of world Jewry (doubling themselves every 20 years, while the rest of the Jews double themselves every 300 years). This is a challenge for the ultra-Orthodox themselves as they will have to shed the ethos of a minority community and think seriously about their responsibility to the whole, including the non-ultra-Orthodox. Within the State of Israel, this is one of the two issues prudent public policy – governmental and civic – can influence and change.

JPPI recommends that the continued rapid growth of the ultra-Orthodox community requires intra- and extra-sectoral attention to the socioeconomic ramifications of this trend.

Assessment of Russian and Ukrainian Jewry: Demography and Society

The challenges facing Israel are becoming more complex against the background of great power rivalry, which has intensified in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. At the same time, the war in Ukraine has caused many Jews to leave both countries at a time when the overall Jewish populations were already declining. This year’s Assessment focuses on these communities and provides an overview of their situation.

JPPI recommends that global Jewish cooperation to provide assistance to the Jews of Ukraine and Russia be expanded and that an effort should be made to retain the immigrants from Ukraine in Israel, along with family members who have been left behind, and to encourage immigration from Russia.

With all the new immigrants from Ukraine and Russia in Israel, the gap between the Orthodox establishment’s demand for conversion according to its system, and the attitude of most Israeli Jews, who believe the conversion process should be eased. Many feel conversion is either: entirely unnecessary (because self-definition is enough); essential but not necessarily via an Orthodox rabbinate; or essential and should be accomplished via an Orthodox beit din (religious court) that adopts lenient halachic tests is growing. This gap has implications on the public’s relations with the conversion establishment which is perceived as imposing the system of the minority on the majority and this gap affects the willingness of Israelis to convert.

JPPI recommends that a comprehensive social and political response must be formulated to an expected increase in the number of Israelis who belong to the Jewish majority population but are not recognized as Jews.

Deepen Dialogue with Democrats

The younger generation of Jews in the United States and the rapid shift to a progressive agenda among the Democratic base is examined.

While 71% of U.S. Jews are Democrats and the vast majority (70%) support Israel, young Democrats are moving away from unquestioning support for the State of Israel, only 48% unequivocally support it.

JPPI recommends that dialogue with Jews affiliated with the Democratic Party must be deepened to harness their support and assistance in advancing Israel’s positions on the Iran nuclear issue and other urgent strategic matters. In addition, the political context (in terms of ideological and right-left polarization) should be ameliorated wherever possible in managing Israel-Diaspora relations.

Antisemitism

The challenges of rising antisemitism worldwide and the impact social media has on this trend is part of the analysis contained in this year’s report. Antisemitism is persistent and growing in severity. On both the left and the right, antisemitism continues to erode Jewish security. More than half of the Jews in the United States (53%) report feeling less safe, as Jews, than five years ago. Young Jews are lowering their Jewish profile due to the fear of harm to them or their social status. Efforts thus far to alleviate the crisis of growing antisemitism have largely failed.

JPPI Recommends that Israel entrust the response to antisemitism to a single action-oriented integrative body with implementation capabilities.

Local Culture War in Israel Heats Up

Divisions between Israelis regarding their identity, Israel, Jew, a combination of both, as well as Jewish identity in the Diaspora continue to be played out in the cultural realm. A.B. Yehoshua, a pillar of Israeli culture, passed away this past year and his passing reignited the debate in Israel concerning, who is a Jews, who is an Israeli? Yehoshua’s core argument regarding this issue was that “Israeli identity is the complete Jewish identity.” Yehoshua himself had long understood that his was a minority voice, that Israel, as he understood it, is becoming more Jewish and less Israeli. Yehoshua’s views on the question of Jewish identity in the Israeli era were challenged by Diaspora Jews, who saw them as negating the possibility of a meaningful Jewishness outside of Israel, and by Israeli Jews, who saw them as an attempt to rid Jewish identity of the elements it had accumulated over the long years of exile – in particular, the religious-halachic element. These are foundational questions that underlie the disparate visions fueling the local culture war.

Read the Annual Assessment here

The post Annual assessment for 2022 – main recommendations first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Despite (some of) the gloomy headlines from the recent Pew Study of American Jewry, along with reports about anti-Semitism, BDS and American Jews turning on Israel, there is much in the Pew data to be optimistic about. These were the main messages delivered by Professor Len Saxe, who heads the Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies at Brandeis University, in a presentation (13.7.21) to the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI).

The myth of the vanishing American Jew

Presenting his analysis of the recently published 2020 Pew Study of American Jewry, Saxe sought to refute the pervasive myth of the vanishing American Jew, a widespread assumption that growing rates of intermarriage were leading not only to assimilation but to Jewish disidentification; intermarried Jews are not shedding their Jewish identities and Judaism at the rates that were prevalent in past generations. The 2020 study places the number of American Jews at 7.5 million (5.8 million adults and 1.8 million children), which reflects a 36% increase since the 1990 National Jewish Population Study.

Saxe notes that the 7.5 million estimate is close to a consensus view among researchers today. Its reliability is suggested by the fact that different methods: a national sample developed as Pew did, combinations of local studies, and the synthesis of religion data from hundreds of studies done by Brandeis’ American Jewish Population project, come to similar conclusions. Each documents increasing numbers of identified Jews, using the same criteria for inclusion that have long been used by social scientists studying American Jewry.

This growth can be attributed to multiple factors, most notably, immigration and intermarriage. The immigration to the US of Jews from the former Soviet Union, Latin America and Israel has led to a net growth of American Jewry since 1990. At the same time, Saxe notes that the rate of intermarriage has brought new members to the community, particularly children of inter-married couples.  Over the span of a single generation, children of intermarriage have doubled the rate at which they identify as Jews.

Who is a Jew and who isn’t?

Saxe explained that Pew’s estimate of 7.5 million American Jews is based, as with previous surveys, on a self-definition of who consider themselves Jewish, and who have an acceptable basis for claiming Jewish identity. Most of these individuals consider their religion to be Judaism (JBRs – Jews by Religion), but it also includes about a quarter of the Jewish population who think of themselves as Jews, even though they are agnostic or atheist. Pew labels these individuals as “Jews not by religion” (JNR).

Saxe likens these Jews to Israeli “hiloni” Jews (secular).  He notes that the in past surveys, many of these non-religious Jews would have responded that this is their “religion,” but that it has become more acceptable to be non-religious.  The JNR population includes Jewish spouses in intermarried households, along with their children.

The JNR group does not, however, include some 2.8 million adults who have Jewish parentage, but  do not consider themselves Jewish and or have another religion. These individuals are labeled as having “Jewish Background” and not counted as part of the Jewish population. It also doesn’t include non-Jewish members of Jewish households; for example, a spouse who has not converted.  Local Jewish communal leaders often want to include these individuals, but for demographic study purposes, they are not.

Intermarriage is changing the landscape of American Jewry

According to Saxe, one of the most important reasons that the population has increased is that, among millennials (born after 1981), the majority who are offspring of intermarriages identify as Jews when they turn 18. Thus, more than 60% of millennial Jews born to interfaith parents choose to identify as Jewish, versus fewer than 30% in the previous generation.

A number of factors explain this shift, however, the major element seems to be that the collective Jewish world began to recognize the Jewishness of such individuals, and actively sought to engage with, rather than exclude them. The Reform Movement went so far as to recognize that those with patrilineal descent are also considered Jewish.

Overall, 70% of non-Orthodox weddings in the past decade have been inter-faith marriages. And yet, if Saxe wished to point out one major cause for concern among Jewish leaders, it is that two in-married Jews are 93% likely to raise their children as Jewish by religion (JBR), while inter-married couples are only 57% likely to raise their children as Jewish (28% as JBR and 29% as JNR).

Denominational trends

Saxe pointed to a few key denominational trends taking place in American Jewry – some that can be seen in the Pew data, and some that are less visible, but that arise from the community studies he has conducted.

The first is the collapse of Conservative Judaism – once the central movement in American Jewry. Part of this had to do with intermarried couples (especially men) in Conservative synagogues, feeling less at home, and moving to Reform congregations. Subsequently, this had the side-effect of bringing more traditional observance and knowledge to the Reform movement, which has remained steady.

Secondly, Saxe pointed to the increase in those without a denominational identity. If in the past, this meant they were less likely to care about their Jewish identities, this increasingly means they might not have neat labels to express their Judaism (of course, many are relatively unengaged in Jewish life).

Lastly, Saxe referred to what seemed to be a dramatic spike in the number of young Orthodox Americans. However, while there was a slight growth in the Orthodox population, the spike seen in Pew may be a methodological artifact (young Orthodox are more likely to be married and have a permanent address – making them easier to sample).

Political Divisions, Anti-Semitism and Discrimination

The Pew study pointed out that American Jews are as politically polarized as much of the general population, with 75% identifying as Democrats and 26% as Republicans. Among the various sub-groups, only the Orthodox primarily identify as Republicans.

A point of interest – while all Jews perceived levels of anti-Semitism in society as worrying and at roughly equal numbers, Democrat Jews perceived discrimination against Blacks and Muslims at much higher levels than did Republican Jews. This might stem from Democratic Jews seeing anti-Semitism in a wider societal context than do Republican leaning Jews, who view it as specifically aimed at Jews. This difference has policy implications, when it comes to coalition building among civic, racial, and religious groups.

Lastly on this matter, despite all Jews noting increased levels of anti-Semitism, it has yet to stop them from participating in Jewish life.

Birthright Israel – the Case of Successful Policy Interventions and Covid-19 as a Live Test Case

Saxe noted that, even if one is concerned about rates of engagement (religious and otherwise) that the Pew data also make clear that these trends are not fixed.  The Pew 2020 data validate research that he has conducted – including a study of 4,000 young Jews who applied to Birthright during its first decade.   Just as his research indicated, Pew found that among those who had been age-eligible for Birthright, those who participated were significantly more engaged Jewishly and more highly emotionally attached to Israel.  Along with dramatic effects on Jewish identity, they also were much more likely to marry other Jews and near-universally, raise their children as Jews.

Birthright’s success is suggested by the Pew data which indicates that among those who were eligible for Birthright, the majority of those who visited Israel went through Birthright. Among US Jews aged 25-34, one-quarter are Birthright alumni.

He also pointed out that, while Pew reported that more than 70% of recent marriages of non-Orthodox Jewish marriages were to non-Jews, this doesn’t describe Birthright alumni. Among their respondents who were alumni, 54% were married to another Jew, vs 19% of those who had not been to Israel on Birthright.

And while the 2021 Hamas conflict is too recent to examine, data from the 2014 conflict showed a significant difference between how non-participants felt vs participants, (33% of non-participants felt the 2014 conflict was unjustified versus 20% of participants).

Similarly, having been to Israel greatly impacted one’s support for Israel during the 2014 conflict. Furthermore, while all those who had been to Israel showed significant increases in their levels of connection to and support for Israel, the greatest increases were among those who had the least connection to their Jewish identities and Israel prior to participating.  Birthright alumni also had significantly more confidence in their understanding of the current situation in Israel than non-participants.

The past year has served the Jewish community as a living test-case in many regards. Thus, Saxe attributes many of these successes to American Birthright participants forming personal connections to Israeli Jews, especially soldiers of varying political affiliations, during the trip. He assesses that these connections are critical in helping shape the understanding of Birthright participants about Israel and their connection to Israeli Jews, something that was disrupted during the past year.

Key Takeaways 

Saxe presented several key takeaways for policy makers that arise from the Pew data, and the past year of living with Covid.

First, the growth of American Jewry should be seen by Israel as a very positive development.  American Jews are a strategic asset. Second, American Jewry – perhaps no different than Israel – is diverse. American Jews think about their Judaism in different ways and have a different opinions about American and Israeli politics. Third, most American Jews, despite what might be believed in Israel, are connected to and supportive of Israel. And more importantly, this connection can be nurtured and developed through policy interventions, like Birthright. Fourth, establishing a human connection between American and Israeli Jews is crucial to forming relationships between the communities and shaping each group’s views on the other. The Covid experiment shows us what happens in the absence of such contact.

Lastly, educational and outreach efforts should focus more on “amcha”, Ordinary Jews, not just those perceived to have leadership potential as has been done in the past. Many young Jews, especially those from interfaith backgrounds, seek a connection to Judaism and the Jewish community, yet feel they do not “know enough” to participate. Communal organizations and initiatives must work to better reach out to these, “meeting them where they are”, without judgement or a sense of elitism. For each sub-category of Jews, there must be different messaging and approaches.

The post Despite the Gloomy Headlines, American Jewry has Grown in Size first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

These questions should be asked not so much in terms of the Jewish community’s current attitudes and support, but in terms of the trends that the Pew and other studies have revealed. We view these issues as the determining part of the socio-cultural infrastructure of American Jewish communal life in general,including the triangular relationship between Washington, Jerusalem, and the American Jewish community.

To read the full paper: Implications of the Pew Report for the Public and Political Involvement of the Jewish Community

The post Implications of the Pew Report first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

– Jews “not by religion” are not “cultural” Jews, they are disconnected Jews

– The Jewish community must decide how much to invest in them vs. other priorities

– The alternatives for action are basically three:

1. Write them off (but this means a problematic abandonment of many Jews)

2. “Convert” them back to Jews “by religion” (but why would they want to transform)?

3. Develop new expressions of Judaism to fit their needs (but it’s not clear if needs exist)

To read the full paper: ‘Jews Not by Religion’:  How to Respond to American Jewry’s New Challenge

The post ’Jews Not by Religion' first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Since its publication on October 1, 2013, the Pew report, A Portrait of Jewish Americans, has generated copious commentary and debate, mainly around its findings concerning the more than one million “Jews of no religion.” I suggest that much of the commentary reflects a misunderstanding about the meaning of the findings, and indeed, the structure of Jewish identity in America. Most of the reaction relates to the term “religion” as it appears in the two key categories: “Jews by religion” and “Jews of no religion.” At face value, these designations relate to things divine – belief in God, in an afterlife, divine commandments, synagogue rites and the like. I claim that a close reading of the Pew Study data and other studies of American Jews do not support such an understanding. Rather, the categories “Jews by religion” and “Jews of no religion” denote different ways of relating to Jewish ethnicity and peoplehood and in the main are not concerned with God, liturgy or dogma. In fact, according to the survey most “Jews by religion” are not religious. What differentiates them from “Jews of no religion” is that their Jewish ethnicity is 1) important to them and 2) seems to have a normative, “sacred” dimension that induces them to action on behalf of the Jewish people. Most “Jews of no religion” feel no such compulsion. Their ethnicity is just another neutral fact of their lives.

As noted by many, the Pew report highlighted those “Jews of no religion.” It especially emphasized this group’s overall lack of Jewish connection: They are much more likely to have a non-Jewish spouse (79% of married Jews of no religion vs. 36% of Jews by religion), they are much less likely to raise their children Jewish (67% will not raise their children Jewish vs. 7% of Jews by religion). They are less attached to Israel (only 12% are very attached); they belong to Jewish organizations of any kind to a much lesser extent; and they give much less, if at all, to Jewish causes.

It is not at all obvious that this should be the case. Jewish secularism has a long and honorable history involving intense Jewish engagement, especially in Eastern Europe, in the Zionist movement and the Yishuv/State of Israel (the movements and organizations that spring to mind are The General Jewish Workers Bund and the various Zionist-Marxist parties). As some commentators have noted, it also left its footprint in America, mainly through the thought of Mordecai Kaplan. Given such a history, in which commitment to the Jewish religion in whatever form was not a requirement for Jewish engagement, why are Jews of no religion so minimally engaged with Jewish life, with the Jewish community, and with Jewish organizations?

We can start to understand this by clarifying that the Jews of no religion phenomenon is very different from Jewish secularism in Eastern Europe. We can get a purchase on this if we examine, first, more closely the other category – Jews by religion.

Looking closely at “Jews by religion” shows that they are, in fact, not very religious, at least as the concept is understood and practiced by American non-Jewish society. In response to the question, “How important is religion in your life?” only 29% (including the Orthodox who are 10% of the Jewish population) answered “very important.” In contrast, among the general American population, 56% answered that it was very important, and among the population that defined itself as Christian, 69% said it was very important. We find similar numbers in regard to belief in God. 39% of Jews by religion (including Orthodox) indicated that they are absolutely certain regarding their belief in God. Among the general population, 69% said that they were absolutely certain of God’s existence, and among the Christian population, 78% were absolutely certain. Attendance at religious services shows the same pattern. Among the general American public, 50% report at least monthly attendance, while 62% of Christians report attending at least once a month. Among Jews by religion, in contrast, only 29% report monthly attendance.

Jews by religion even think about being Jewish in a non-religious fashion. 55% state that being Jewish is mainly a matter of ancestry and culture. Only 23% say that it is tied to religion. Two thirds say it is not necessary to believe in God to be Jewish. The vast majority of Jews by religion do not seem to think that religion or things connected to religion are essential to being Jewish. When responding to a nine-item list, 76% said that remembering the Holocaust was essential to be being Jewish; 73% said living an ethical and moral life, and 60% said working for Justice/equality were essential. Low on the list at 23% was observing Jewish [religious] law, which was exceeded by “having a good sense of humor” (33%).

In other words, Jews affiliate with religion but are not religious, either in belief or in practice. What does this mean? What does it mean to be a Jew by religion?

We can start to get a sense of this if we look at the things that Jews by religion do and do identify with as opposed to the things that they don’t (i.e. religion). First of all, being Jewish is important to them: 90% said that being Jewish is very or somewhat important to them (56% very important). In contrast, only 46% of Jews of no religion said so, and only 12% said it was very important). Even more significant, 85% said that they have a strong sense of belonging to the Jewish people, and 71% indicated that they have a special responsibility to care for Jews in in need (among Jews of no religion, 42% and 36% respectively). Regarding Israel, 76% have an emotional attachment to Israel and 91% say that caring about Israel is an essential or important part of being Jewish. These feelings and attitudes are also backed up by behavior and action – 61% are members of synagogues or other Jewish organizations, and 67% have made a donation to a Jewish organization in the past year. So being Jewish by religion does not designate religious belief or practice, but does involve identification and solidarity with the Jewish people and commitment – in sentiment and in practice – to their welfare.

I suggest that being Jewish by religion means participating in the “Jewish civil religion.” The Jewish civil religion entails transnational Jewish solidarity and the sense of belonging to and promoting Jewish political, economic, and social flourishing (e.g. helping communities in distress, promoting Israel and its causes, advancing Jewish education and continuity). Its major practices involve membership in Jewish organizations, donations to Jewish causes, and mobilization for specific campaigns (e.g. political support for Israel or, in the past, freeing Soviet Jewry). As a “religion,” Jewish civil religion has a sacred aspect and rests upon a feeling of Jewish sacred ethnicity. The “sacredness” of Jewish sacred ethnicity expresses itself in a variety of ways: in the sense of Jewish “chosenness” or specialness, that Jews have special obligations to be moral or fight for justice, and in the normative obligations that it imposes – especially regarding Jewish identity itself and continuity – one ought to identify as a Jew! This sense of sacredness is not doctrinal, but rather, it is experienced. It does not necessarily entail formal religious belief. Indeed there are Jews who feel that Jews are somehow special but do not believe in God.

The Pew data enables us to deepen our understanding of Jewish civil religion because it presents us with a group that does not share in it – the Jews of no religion.

I am suggesting that what separates “Jews by religion” from “Jews of no religion” is not religion as it is commonly understood – related to synagogue, prayer, dogma, ritual commandments etc. that comprise “sacramental religion.” Both Jews by religion and Jews of no religion are, in the main, not religious. What separates them is their different relationship to Jewish ethnicity. Jews by religion as we have seen share a sense of sacred ethnicity, Jews of no religion have a sense of “ordinary” or “descriptive” ethnicity. Jews of no religion are indeed proud of their Jewishness (83%), however only 12% said that it was “very important” to them. Most of these Jews of no religion, as we have seen, do not wish to pass on their Jewishness to their children, nor do they have a strong sense of belonging to the Jewish people. In other words, Jewish ethnicity for these people is a fact about themselves. It is a fact that most are not ashamed of and are even proud of. However, it is not very important to them – for the most part, it does not incur any special sense of belonging or obligation. And if their children will not feel or be Jewish, that’s fine too. Thus, the ethnicity of Jews of no religion is very similar to the ethnicity of other white ethnics described by Richard Alba as being in a “twilight.” For the most part white ethnics are totally assimilated into the American heartland with very high rates of intermarriage. For some their ethnic or increasingly multi-ethnic background can be occasionally highlighted “symbolically” or “optionally” in those situations in which it can provide “spice,” status or interest. It certainly does not contain any sacred or normative dimension, and it is sparsely passed on to their children.

Until the publication of this study we had thought that Jewish ethnicity was one thing – a dimension of Jewish identity people either shared or did not. Now we see that this is not the case; there is ethnicity and there is ethnicity. There is ethnicity which is sacred and normative and there is ethnicity which is matter of fact and descriptive. My conclusion is that in the majority of cases when Jews say that their religion is Jewish, what they really mean is that their ethnicity is sacred. That is, the Jewish religion is an explicit, adequate symbol for the sacredness of Jewish ethnicity. Thus, I would claim that for most American Jews Jewish civil religion goes together with synagogue membership.

We must realize that the real meaning of the Pew study is that it introduces a new factor into discussions around Jewish identity and education. Most current discussions are concerned with prioritizing programming for two subgroups within the Jews by religion category – The Orthodox (whether Modern, Yeshivish, or Hassidic) who are strongly committed to Jewish education and a Jewish religious lifestyle, or the non-Orthodox and indeed not very religious majority who are still committed to the Jewish people, to Jewish organizations, and to Jewish philanthropy. The Pew study highlights a third large and significant group. This group, Jews of no religion, accepts their Jewishness as a matter of fact, like having blue eyes. It does not enjoin much of a sense of solidarity or any normative commitment to the welfare or continuity of the Jewish people or to Jewish culture (only 4% can minimally read Hebrew).

If we are to adopt interventions regarding Jews not by religion, we must realize that moving from a matter of fact, descriptive ethnicity to sacred, normative ethnicity would seem to involve some kind of conversion experience. It is a change in the very essence of one’s Jewishness. Such an intervention would be unlike almost anything major Jewish organizations habitually do and we would have to learn how to make it work. Thus, It is not enough to offer more activities, however diverse. There are enough of those. What is needed is to understand the mechanisms that could lead Jews who do not think their Jewishness compels them to act on behalf of the Jewish people to change their mind and begin to take part in its ongoing welfare and continuity.

The post Who are the “Jews by Religion” in the Pew Report? first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

American Jewry’s contemporary character and future destiny are closely intertwined with the demography, complexion, politics, and religious life of the country’s 750,000 Russian-speaking Jews (RSJ), who comprise some 15% of all American Jews (AJ). As American Jewry considers how to deal with the special challenges associated with this community, as well as the opportunities these newcomers have to offer, two stand out, one is more preventive in nature, the other more proactively forward-looking:

1. Having to deal with the consequences of disintegration of the close-knit immigrant society of the newly arrived.

2. Utilizing the Russian-speaking Jews’ special strengths to benefit the wider American Jewish community.

This paper, which is an invitation for further discussion and an attempt to draw public attention to this timely concern, highlights the key issues and offers recommendations for responding to these challenges

To read the paper: Toward a Comprehensive Policy Planning for Russian-Speaking Jews in North America

The post Russian-Speaking Jews in North America first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Many advocates, including the influential Rabbi Alexander Schindler, celebrated the decision as promoting “the full equality of men and women in religious life.” However, Sylvia Barack Fishman’s in-depth study of the sociological results of the Patrilineal Descent decision over the past 30 years reveals many unintended consequences.

Patrlineal Descent accelerates declining numbers of mothers in Jewish families who identify as Jews, increasing Patrilineal Jewish families with Jewish fathers who are among the least Jewishly connected Jews in America today. The study documents the differences between inmarried, Patrilineal, and Matrilineal Jewish families and offers policy suggestions based on that research.

To read full paper: Fathers of the Faith? Three Decades of Patrilineal Descent in American Reform Judaism

The post Patrilineal Descent in American Reform Judaism first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

To read more: Jewish Federation Hosts Powerhouse Delegation from JPPI

To St. Louis Jewish Federation website

The post St. Louis Federation Hosts Powerhouse Delegation from Jewish Think Tank in Jerusalem first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.