You don’t have to be a philosopher of language – or George Orwell – to know that language is not just a tool for describing reality; it also shapes it. Speech changes reality. And yet, it seems that many fail to internalize this and deploy their words with dangerous haste.

The discourse of the government’s supporters is full of examples. Some of them do not hesitate to fire up the “poison machine” that paints not only the opposing camp’s politicians but also state institutions – primarily the judicial system – in the darkest shades of black. And they are not content with sharp language alone. They also call for action, from disobeying these institutions to leveling them altogether. But critics of the government, too, do not hesitate to use caustic language, which, in my view, is destructive. Thus, the leader of a major party warns that “if we lose the elections, it will be the destruction of the Third Temple.” A historical metaphor like this frames the elections not as a political process, but as an existential event. A prominent liberal leader declares that “Israel is no longer a liberal democracy,” thereby, by virtue of his stature, implants in the public consciousness the notion that a decisive change in the state’s character has already occurred.

Former senior officials – prime ministers, heads of the security services, leaders of the justice system – who watch with alarm what has been happening in recent years, use dramatic language according to which Israel is, or is on its way to becoming, a “dictatorship,” bearing “fascist” characteristics; whose government is “revolutionary” and includes elements “more deadly than external enemies.”

This hyperbolic rhetoric is intended to emphasize the depth of the peril the speakers feel regarding our future and to spur their followers to actively protest. That is, of course, a most worthy form of civic engagement. But the speakers, as people of public and national stature, must understand the explosive force of language – “Death and life are in the power of the tongue” (Proverbs 18:21). Extreme depictions of the situation influence public perceptions of reality and exacerbate political and social tensions. Paradoxically, proclaiming a dystopian future, even when the intention is to prevent it, may advance its realization, a self-fulfilling prophecy. Social correction, even when accompanied by an authentic sense of urgency, must be undertaken with discretion, caution, and responsibility.

Thus, if the next elections are described as existential, as having the potential to usher in the state’s annihilation, someone may find moral justification for taking drastic measures to avert the threat. So that I do not commit the very sin I seek to prevent – altering the perception of reality for the worse through dystopian description – I will not elaborate. But all of our imaginations together could fill an entire book of apocalyptic prophecies. Is that what those sounding the alarm intend?

It is possible and proper – indeed vital – to conduct our internal identity struggles candidly, without cosmetic euphemisms. But black-washing reality is dangerous. Israel is not a dictatorship – the broad social protest of 2023 succeeded in preventing the judicial overhaul. The criticism that many in Israel level against the government is not being silenced. There is no doubt that aspects of Israeli democracy are being eroded – a serious undermining of its gatekeepers is one important example – and there is a tendency within the current government to deepen that erosion through radical legislative initiatives. Still, this is a far cry from the factual determination that Israel is no longer a liberal democracy and that single-camp rule prevails here.

The confidence of Israel’s citizens in the continued existence of their state should not be subject to political manipulation. Israel is a well-established nation, and its future depends on the sense of security it projects internally and externally. Extremist rhetoric has a mobilizing power, and that is its purpose, but it also upends the ground on which we all stand. The necessary remedy, for the benefit of us all, is to stabilize the system of government through entrenched constitutional arrangements that secure the democratic rules of the game by which we will conduct this continuing identity struggle. Unfortunately, we are unable to agree on a constitutional bill of human rights; but if, after the next elections, a broad coalition is formed, it could establish a “thin constitution” that would include power-sharing arrangements preventing a “victory” by either side – and thereby ensure Israel’s future as a stable and thriving liberal democracy.

First published in TOI

The post Death and Life Are in the Power of the Tongue first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

The post Prof. Yedidia Stern on i24 News: A Thin Constitution for Israel first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

The initiative is designed to stabilize Israeli governance, strengthen public trust in state institutions, lower the flames of social polarization, and ensure Israel’s continued existence as a Jewish and democratic state over the long term.

JPPI’s monthly Israeli Society Index shows that 79% of Israelis rated the past year as “bad” socially, and about half of the public (49%) expressed pessimism about the future, alongside a consistent deterioration in trust toward state and governmental institutions. Sixty percent of Israelis believe there is a “real and tangible” danger of civil war. In the most recent survey, published ahead of the 30th anniversary of the Rabin assassination, 52% of participants responded that there is a “high likelihood” of a political assassination of a prime minister or other senior political figure even today.

Regrettably, under current conditions of a deep cultural division in Israeli society, the time has not yet come to reach broad agreements on questions of values and identity. However, it is possible to move significantly toward stabilizing Israeli democracy by setting binding and entrenched “rules of the game” for its governance. The “Thin Constitution” is intended to propose fair and effective rules of the game that will allow us to continue clarifying our collective identity without turning the “other” into an “enemy.”

The “Thin Constitution” is being drafted by a team of experts – senior figures from the worlds of public affairs and academia, with diverse views on policy and law. It is based on a central principle: creating a concise constitutional framework that defines the structure of the branches of government, the powers of each branch, and the relations between them, while avoiding identity issues and human-rights issues, which are the subject of heated controversy within Israeli society.

The expert team is preparing a detailed proposal to revise the existing balance of powers between the branches of government to everyone’s benefit. It endeavors to establish stable and clear rules for deciding constitutional disputes, including the procedures for enacting Basic Laws (the component articles of a constitution), a renewed calibration of judicial review, and, at the same time, the entrenchment of mutual oversight mechanisms that prevent excessive concentration of governmental power.

The initiative aims to achieve as broad an agreement as possible, thereby providing a stable constitutional foundation for many years to come. The campaign now being launched will focus on presenting the main elements of the initiative to the general public, explaining its advantages, and fostering an informed, data-based discourse on the importance of agreed-upon and stable “rules of the game” for managing disputes in Israeli society – that is, an orderly constitutional framework, even if it is not yet a full constitution.

The campaign will focus on digital platforms and radio broadcasts. Video clips will also air and open discussions with JPPI experts and external experts will take place.

JPPI President Prof. Yedidia Stern: “The recent political and social reality clearly indicates an urgent need to regulate the system of checks and balances, to anchor the fundamental powers of the branches of government, and to define agreed-upon and stable rules of the game that do not change with every change of government. The ‘Thin Constitution’ does not seek to compete with existing constitutional law, but rather to serve as a shared foundational layer based on broad, cross-camp consensus, which will enable stability, coordination, and the restoration of trust between the country’s citizens and its institutions.

Israel stands at a historic crossroads. To ensure a stable and shared future, we must agree on basic principles that are stable, clear, and practical. The ‘Thin Constitution’ was born of the understanding that Israeli society cannot wait for a resolution of every disputed constitutional issue; but it does need a stable foundation, on which a healthy national discourse can be built. The campaign we are now launching is intended to reach every home in Israel – and, of course, the country’s leaders.”

The post ”Let’s Stop Before It’s Too Late”: JPPI Launches Campaign to Promote a “Thin Constitution” for Israel first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

We have entered an election year. What will the “day after” look like? If the current coalition wins again, the prevailing assumption is that the judicial overhaul will resume – this time with renewed legitimacy and greater intensity. But if a different government emerges and truly seeks to ease social polarization and stabilize Israeli democracy over the long term, what should it do?

Three paths present themselves: incremental reform (pursuing new policies through ordinary legislation), revolutionary reform (using unconventional or extralegal tools to “correct” reality), or constitutional reform (changing the rules of the game). Incremental reform will not suffice. Revolutionary reform is dangerous. Only constitutional reform – through adoption of a “thin constitution” – can reduce polarization and stabilize democracy.

Incremental reform is the default: a new government governs within the existing rules. The Bennett–Lapid “change government” chose this route. It projected competence, pragmatism, and statesmanship, and recorded real achievements. Yet its impact was short-lived. With a slim Knesset majority, it fell as soon as that majority evaporated. In retrospect, from a liberal perspective, this proved to be a missed opportunity. Workmanlike governance, however impressive, is reversible and ephemeral.

The current government chose a radical course. Immediately upon its formation, the justice minister advanced a plan aiming at a revolution in Israel’s constitutional order. Narrow elements were enacted, but the core remains unrealized. Tactical victories come and go, and while some democratic foundations have been shaken, Israel’s essential democratic character endures. Should a new coalition respond with revolution in the opposite direction?

Some advocate exactly that. They claim the earth has been scorched, the rule of law compromised, and “mines” have been planted to obstruct future repair. If incremental tools cannot defuse those mines, they argue, then decisive steps must be taken even if “technically” illegal: purging public systems, closing a broadcast channel, or otherwise wielding state power to reset the board. The liberal camp, on this account, must assume it is operating on borrowed time and act accordingly.

This radical course is a recipe for disaster. You cannot entrench the rule of law by means that undermine it. Preferring ends over process is not a slippery slope; it is a gaping abyss beneath our feet. Instrumentalizing rules destroys public trust in them. Formal rules exist to restrain power; once they are breached, nothing ensures that power will be wielded exclusively for “good” cause.

Nor is it realistic to imagine that domestic law can be violated while relying on international standards and institutions “outside the national bubble.” That proposal exemplifies the disconnect between academic constructs and political and social reality; inviting external norms to override the sovereign law of the Knesset will not heal polarization.

The minimal consensus on which democracy depends – that the losers consent to accept the rules until the next round – will collapse if the liberal camp chooses to act outside the law. The moment winners are prepared to break the law “to fix things,” they erode that consensus and undermine the very foundation that allows us to live together while disagreeing. Even a “liberal revolution” that refrains from overt illegality yet radically rewrites the law would also be destructive and unwise. It would deepen the conflict, accelerate the cycle of institutional revenge already underway, and turn governance into coercion.

The attempt to advance a conservative revolution brought masses into the streets and created a destructive atmosphere in which the ideological other is treated not merely as an opponent but as an enemy. Reversing the polarity would amplify the damage. The two paths outlined so far – incremental and revolutionary – pose a false dilemma. We are not confined to a choice between a slow, reversible path and an unlawful or radical leap. There is a third option that is both effective and lawful: constitutional reform by adopting a “thin constitution.”

Israel’s rules of the game are not anchored in a constitution and can be changed by a simple Knesset majority. That endangers everyone. Whoever wins an election – conservative or liberal – can legally reshape the regime. Judicial review constrains this only at the margins, and judicial review of Basic Laws is itself contested; it has been used only once, by the narrowest of majorities, a majority that no longer exists. In such a system, each side fears that the other can – and will – use the momentary levers of power to impose sweeping structural change.

For the past two years, the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI) has convened a group of constitutional scholars – both liberal and conservative – to draft a thin constitution. Unlike a full constitution, which also codifies the state’s identity and fundamental values, a thin constitution deals “only” with the rules of the game for managing our deepest disagreements: the overarching Israeli dispute. It would comprise Basic Laws on legislation, adjudication of the judiciary, and the operation of the three branches of government, with related arrangements. In other words, it is a regime-focused constitution. Durable constitutional legitimacy requires enactment by a supermajority (or through a constituent assembly or referendum). Given the current culture war, such a majority is not attainable for identity-and-values questions. But there is a realistic prospect of broad agreement – across society and in the Knesset – on the governmental administrative portion: the rules of the game.

All political actors know their camp might lose the next election – or the one after – and then watch Israel’s character dramatically shift in ways they highly dislike. We are all, conservatives and liberals alike, behind a “veil of ignorance” regarding who will win. That uncertainty creates a shared interest in fair, efficient, and stable rules, even if they fall short of fully realizing any camp’s dream.

Though it pains many to postpone codifying equality and other noble values – and I am one of them – political reality counsels that, for now, we make do with enacting a regime-focused constitution – a thin constitution. A thin constitution would foreclose the possibility of any revolution – by either side – in how public life is conducted. It would not decide the culture war’s substantive winners and losers. Rather, it would set agreed limits to the possible and return our struggle to a bounded field of play. Armored against dramatic change of the Israeli regime’s nature by occasional coalition majorities, it would reduce the appetite and leverage of fringe actors who thrive on brinkmanship. By draining the mutual threat that “the other side” will impose a sweeping transformation of Israeli democracy upon regime change, it would diminish polarization and help us become opponents again, not enemies.

This approach also addresses the weaknesses of the other two paths. The drawbacks of incremental reform – its slowness, inefficiency, and reversibility – are overcome because a thin constitution would be harder to amend without a supermajority and could be enacted through a transparent, time-bound process. The dangers of revolutionary reform – its polarizing, law-breaking logic – are avoided because a thin constitution is rooted in broad consent, encourages inclusion, and stabilizes the future without coercion.

The key condition is political: a broad coalition capable of mustering the necessary supermajority. That requirement should already shape leaders’ conduct during the campaign. Yes, electioneering rewards sharp contrasts. But Israelis increasingly yearn for non-partisan leadership that can knit society back together and steady our democracy. Recent polls show that about two-thirds of the public are more concerned about Israel’s internal tensions than about external security threats. If the war ends before the elections, this overwhelming majority will likely grow even larger.

Therefore, parties that declare – before the vote – that alleviating internal tensions is their central mission are likely to garner broad support. A thin constitution is a necessary condition for delivering on that mission; its adoption is substantively right and politically rewarding. Whoever is chosen to form the next coalition – liberal or conservative, Right or Left, religious or secular – could enter the annals of the Jewish people as an Israeli nation-builder by choosing partners committed to stabilizing Israel through a thin constitution and by implementing that vision with resolve.

Published by Jerusalem Post

The post Thin constitution needed to stabilize the government amid political crisis first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

The battle for the presidency of the Supreme Court has been decided. After 16 months of struggle, the highest position in Israel’s judiciary has once again been filled.

In accordance with what has been the customary practice since the establishment of the state, the most senior judge on the Supreme Court bench – Justice Isaac Amit – was backed by five of nine committee members, and thus, seemingly, order has been restored. But is this really so?

Opposition to the appointment, obsessively led by Justice Minister Yariv Levin, did indeed fail, but it would be a mistake to frame the conflict as mere “background noise” that can be ignored now that the decision has been made.

Certainly, this was a tactical achievement for Israel’s liberal camp, but it is worth examining the situation from a strategic perspective that considers the status of the court and the notion of the rule of law in Israel in the long term.

The protracted saga, which in recent weeks hit a fever pitch of personal accusations and sharp exchanges between the justice minister and Justice Amit, has widened the cracks in the wall of public trust, which is meant to protect the judiciary from subversive forces with populist tendencies and self-serving agendas.

I would suggest that now, with the court’s directive to appoint the president of the Supreme Court implemented, the liberal forces in Israel reconsider their stance on the ongoing struggle over the Supreme Court. And this time from a non-dogmatic perspective that realistically considers the good of the system from a strategic, long-term angle.

A proposal by Levin and Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar to change the law determining the procedure for selecting judges in Israel is currently on the table of the Knesset’s Constitution, Law and Justice Committee. This proposal is significantly better than Levin and Rothman’s original plan that roiled the country in 2023. Nevertheless, although it does not signal the “end of democracy,” it has substantial flaws and should not be enacted in its current form.

If passed, it would politicize the judicial selection process and likely erode the professionalism of Israeli judges in the years to come. The Levin-Sa’ar framework risks altering the professional DNA and ethos of the Israeli judicial system.

A series of critical amendments to their proposal must therefore be demanded – changing the proposed decision-making rule (from five out of 9 to six out of 9), revising the process for selecting the two attorneys, creating an alternative mechanism for resolving deadlocks, and more.

On the surface, it appears that the proposed improvements to the Levin-Sa’ar outline – which were discussed at The Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI)’s Thin Constitution conference last week and in the media – will cook up spirited debate when brought to the Knesset.

It is not known what the final dish will look like, but there is significant concern that it will be bland. Instead, I believe it is possible and appropriate to propose a broader package deal with far better results.

Levin previously proposed appointing his associate, Dr. Aviad Bakshi, to the Supreme Court. An objection was raised: Bakshi’s professional and academic track record does not meet the usual criteria for Supreme Court appointments, and he is one of the chief architects of the judicial reform/revolution Levin originally proposed.

Levin’s insistence on Bakshi, despite the existence of excellent conservative candidates who do meet the standards, is not about merit, but is rather an expression of Levin’s need to win his confrontation with “the system.” It is unfortunate that he has chosen to “boycott” Amit.

In any case, from a strategic perspective, it seems to me that appointing Dr. Bakshi – an honest, wise, patriotic man who has the best interests of the rule of law at heart, even if his interpretation of this principle is, in my opinion, quite wrong – is not a tiebreaker move.

In order to prevent the inclusion of one voice, albeit a discordant one, in an orchestra of 15, is it worth risking the enactment of a Basic Law that undermines the process for appointing judges to the Supreme Court and all other courts?

Most legal experts in Israel believe that the existing law (which Sa’ar had a hand in drafting) is far better than the Levin-Sa’ar outline. Given the Israeli culture war and the potential consequences of the return of the judicial overhaul, which is creeping its way back onto the national agenda, what is needed now is a “ceasefire” until after the next Knesset elections. Removing “the law” from the battleground (especially during wartime) is a strategic necessity.

If my advice were followed, the incoming president of the Supreme Court – contrary to all expectations – could raise the flag of compromise in the form of the victor’s outstretched hand and allow Levin’s candidate to be appointed to the court.

But only if it is agreed in advance that the judicial selection process will not be adulterated, that the committee will work to fill all vacancies in the Supreme Court and other courts, and that the constellation of relations essential to the functioning of the justice system – led by the Supreme Court president and the justice minister – will return to normal.

To the purists, I say: “Jerusalem was destroyed only because they strictly upheld Torah law and did not go beyond the letter of the law” (Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 30b).

Published by Jerusalem Post

The post We should all compromise to protect Israel’s judiciary from political strife first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Recently published data shows that the balance of migration to and from Israel has become negative in recent years. In 2023, the number of Israeli émigrés outstripped the number of returning Israelis by 27,500. And the negative balance more than doubled in 2024: About 59,000 more left than returned. As an illustration, imagine that two-thirds of the population of Ra’anana left Israel last year.

Alongside these figures, it is important to note the continued aliyah of Jews to Israel, but here, too, a downturn is evident. In 2023, Israel welcomed some 47,000 immigrants, but only 32,800 in the past year.

Why is Israel less attractive, and is, as many fear, a significant wave of emigration ahead?

At the present moment, it is clear that the economic and security situation is a key driver of out-migration. But in the long term, these difficulties do not pose a significant threat to Israel’s growth.

In the past, Israel has overcome economic (hundreds of percent inflation) and security (the Yom Kippur War) challenges that sparked waves of emigration, but they were halted and the country returned to impressive growth.

Yet it seems the current wave may be different – more severe and lasting, and therefore more dangerous than its predecessors. This is because we are experiencing a different kind of crisis now, one we have never seen before: an undermining of the social order.

First, society: Israel is in the process of replacing its elites. This is the way of the world, but it is most excruciating for the groups that are being pushed out of national leadership. One can understand the fear, disappointment, and frustration of those who feel that although “they” built this country, with talent and sacrifice, the steering wheel is slipping from their grip as a result of demographic and social processes.

Second, ideology: A struggle is underway between identity groups, each of which seeks to achieve different national goals from the others. The fault lines between these groups touch on a range of fundamental issues: religion, nationality, culture, and ethos. The multiple fronts and intensity of the struggle have ignited a firestorm of controversy in the public sphere, fueled, with abject shortsightedness, by a political leadership that thrives on it.

The tug-of-war is becoming increasingly hysterical and undermines Israeli unity to the point of fraying the bonds of mutual responsibility. It foments alienation from Israel – the place and the idea – and is driving tens of thousands to leave the country.

Third, democracy: The Zionist movement has been committed to democratic principles since its founding. This is the Israeli DNA. However, the judicial reform/revolution that tore us apart in 2023, and is rearing its head once again, has subverted confidence in Israel’s commitment to democratic precepts.

Those who voted for the current coalition are disappointed that, even though they won the last elections, they have been unable to advance the reform. For them, the majority-rule democratic system has failed in the face of opposition from the elites, who thwart the “will of the people.”

And on the other side, opposition voters have discovered with great alarm that a slim majority in the Knesset is plotting to “steal” the country, through a takeover that would upend the “natural order.”

Hundreds of thousands took to the streets calling for “democracy” because they felt it was in real danger. And so, for the first time in the history of the Zionist project, there are many – from the Right, the Center, and the Left – who are no longer sure that the democratic system is a stable, fundamental fact of our national life.

IT APPEARS that the right way to strengthen Israel’s allure, for all its citizens and for world Jewry, is through the restabilization of Israeli democracy.

The threat to the social order lies in the fact that we do not have consensus-based “rules of the game” by which we conduct the dispute over the character of the state and manage the ideological struggle between different identity groups.

We do not have a constitution, and therefore any casual Knesset majority may attempt – as is currently the case – to change the rules of the game unilaterally. This possibility exacerbates the potential harm of the Israeli dispute, because it tempts election victors, at any given moment, to exploit it to decide the struggle in favor of one of the identity groups.

The absence of stable, codified rules of the game shakes the confidence of many Israelis in a shared future. If this situation continues, the wave of Israeli abandonment may intensify.

The analysis clarifies the importance of establishing a “thin constitution,” intended to propose a limited constitutional instrument that does not decide the ideological disputes between identity groups but establishes rules of conduct among government authorities based on broad, pan-Israeli consensus.

A thin constitution would deploy a safety net for all of us, because in Israel – “a state of all its minorities” – there is no immutable hegemonic majority. If we are all potential minorities, we should all want the rules of the game to be accepted through, and only through, broad consensus. A “thin constitution” is the recipe that will enable Israel to return to what it should be: the most attractive place for the individual and the collective.

Published by Jerusalem Post

The post To stop the Israeli exodus, we need a constitution first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Rational observers of Israel may be pulling their hair out: What are the country’s leaders, in all three branches of government, busying themselves with at this historic moment? What is the dominant question in the public and media debate?

The Middle East is indeed being reshaped; IDF soldiers are fighting – boots on the ground – in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria; for the first time, a realistic opportunity has arisen, one that must not be missed, to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program; a new administration is about to take office in Washington, which carries both opportunities and risks for Israel; the society and the economy are groaning under enormous strain; and most important – we are still digging graves for those who fell in uniform, and a hundred of our daughters and sons remain in enemy captivity.

All of these are, of course, monumental, but nevertheless Israeli leadership pays much more attention to the question of whether the seniority system in appointing the chief justice of the Supreme Court should be maintained. This is complete madness and unparalleled irresponsibility.

And to add to this absurdity, the prime minister, the most central figure in shaping Israel`s future at this historic juncture, is required to appear three days a week in the basement of the Tel Aviv District Court to defend his innocence. Even in times of calm, it is said that the Israeli prime minister’s desk is busier than any other, and all the more so now, when the instability across the entire region requires undivided attention. There can be no doubt: we have lost our faculty of judgment.

AND AS in a Greek tragedy, the shrill drone of a refusenik chorus is heard from upstage: a former attorney-general who recommends that IDF reservists refuse to volunteer to serve if the judicial reform is relaunched; a former chief rabbi who calls on the ultra-Orthodox, one-eighth of the population, to refuse to enlist, advocating noncompliance with the Compulsory Service Law; a sitting minister of justice and members of Knesset who publicly air the possibility of refusing to yield to a High Court ruling. One Israeli cabinet minister has declared, with fanatical audacity, that he has not ruled out “regime change.”

These individuals are subverting the very ability to maintain the rule of law here, which is the only basis that keeps us from “swallowing each other alive.”

Amazingly, Israel has been successful on seven external fronts against its enemies, but it is dangerously close to losing on the eighth: the internal front against itself. The price of losing the internal war is structural and cannot be easily reversed: state institutions are undermining public trust in state institutions. The current government majority is exploiting the democratic system in order to erode its foundations.

And the main point: social solidarity – in a time of war – is cracking more and more. It seems that the immune system of the Israeli body politic is attacking itself.

THE MAIN responsibility for the situation lies with those in power: the prime minister and the entire governing coalition. They are determined to relaunch the judicial reform. The colossal damage caused by their attempt in 2023 has taught them nothing, and the folly of attempting to change the rules of the game unilaterally, without broad consensus, has returned to center stage. But others in high office are also participating in the tragedy: is it right to dig our heels in and insist on every single issue?

For example, in the case of the attorney-general – what would we have to lose if the state were to agree to conduct a criminal mediation process in the Netanyahu cases for a limited period of time so that a plea agreement might be reached by the court? This would immediately free the prime minister from having to give testimony and allow him to focus on fulfilling his role at this especially critical moment in time. Perhaps, if the mediation were to succeed and put a just end to the saga, it would be possible to heal an open wound that has been festering for years.

At the same time, in the case of the Judicial Appointments Committee – would the appointment of one judge who advocates the positions supported by a significant group of the ideologically conservative right cause irreparable harm to the Supreme Court? I am acquainted with one of the justice minister’s two candidates. His views do indeed differ from some on the current bench, but he is completely committed to the system itself and could represent another voice in the judicial orchestra – which, while not necessarily harmonious, would be valuable.

The bitter truth is that although the multi-front struggle is the result of genuine, patriotic anxiety on both sides regarding our shared future, the generals of the different camps lack intellectual flexibility and expansive vision. Each is entrenched in their own “Masada,” eyes shut to the overall good, which by definition requires compromise.

As noted, I do not believe there is an equivalence of responsibility here: the government is more responsible than any other party, because it holds the power and is obliged to wield it in a way becoming to statesmen. The fact that the coalition, which vaingloriously embraces the “conservative” label, is attempting to change the rules of the game is ironic in the worst sense of the word. All the polls show that public trust in the government is exceedingly low, and it certainly does not enjoy the support of the majority of Israelis.

A CEASEFIRE is needed on the eighth front, without which victory on the other seven fronts may prove pyrrhic. A ceasefire does not mean the dispute has been settled, but rather is a call for its removal from the nation’s immediate agenda. The debate must continue, but it must be conducted with the sincere intention of reaching an equitable balance of power between the branches of government, not by exploiting a political moment when one of the parties has the upper hand.

The parties to the dispute must understand that a decisive victory for one of them is a loss for all of us. A unilateral victory is not a state of equilibrium in Israel, because each of the camps is too large to agree to surrender. The losing side will regroup for another round in the struggle. Thus, for example, if the justice minister manages to pass some of the proposed changes in the Knesset, it is very likely that after the next elections those changes will be repealed by a new coalition. And along the way – we all lose. Not just the losers in the current round, but also the winners, who will lose in the next round.

“Compromise” is seen as a waiver of principles and an expression of ideological weakness. This is a grave mistake: compromise is the life blood of those who seek the good of the State of Israel, given the deep social divides within it. In compromise, no one comes out with all their desires fulfilled, but no one is defeated in a way that triggers extreme moves that could be destructive.

Those who have not yet understood this should take an unblinking look at where we are right now: a public sphere that is operating with a centrifugal force that has destructive consequences. The great Israeli poet Yehuda Amichai stressed this when he looked into the depths of the public psyche and determined that “from the place where we are right, flowers will never grow in the spring.”

The rules of the game for managing the Israeli dispute are unstable. A simple majority can – and is currently trying to – change them unilaterally. Israel’s future depends on the ability of our leadership, in all branches of government, to promote broad consensus on fair rules to be anchored in a “thin constitution,” which cannot be changed with a simple majority. A “thin constitution” is the necessary antidote for this crisis. Until it is enacted – and in times of war – a ceasefire is required. Only then will flowers grow here in the spring.

Published by Jerusalem Post

The post The wrong priorities: The absurdity of today’s Israel is on full display first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

We our living in a time unlike any other in the history of the State of Israel. I say this unequivocally from the perspective of someone who recently turned 77. Nothing similar to the events of October 7 had ever happened before in the history of the state, indeed nothing like it has happened since the Holocaust. (Incidentally, I believe the October 7 War is the best name for this war. I certainly can’t call it the Simchat Torah War.) The behavior of the Hamas monsters on that bitter day was Nazi in nature. This is not an empty comparison. Mass murder of people in their beds, in their homes, rape, pillage – all because they were Jews and Israelis – cannot be called by any other name.

We remain in the midst of the war. Hamas has been weakened but not yet eliminated, and the hostages cry out for redemption. There are other fronts. But part of our collective therapy is going on with life in a way that is as close to normal as possible. Therefore, what is being done here today is not disconnected from the grief over those we have lost, the hope that the captives are released, the wish to see the wounded heal, with the grace of God, or the desire to see the evacuees return to their homes and begin the process of restoration.

As for myself, my great hope is placed in the soldiers, the hundreds of thousands gradually released from the reserves, in which the brotherhood of warriors is sanctified in blood. If Jew and non-Jew, religious and secular, Ashkenazi and Sephardi, left- and right-wing – all the tribes of the People of Israel and the State of Israel – can fight together, shoulder to shoulder, and trust their comrades in arms, quite literally, through fire and mud – then why should they not continue their dialogue of trust as civilians. Hope has been sown; I hope it will take root.

Between January and October 2023, we were swept up in the frenzy of the judicial revolution. The storm came mostly by surprise. It was not the central issue the November 2022 elections. My wife Miriam and I found ourselves demonstrating week after week, the Israeli flag in our hands. It was a trauma for both of us, public servants since a young age. These events, however, were pushed aside by the enormity of the war effort, which locked the dispute away for the moment and led us to focus on the more immediate challenge. The psychic energies are in the war effort.

Moshe Dayan, whom I served under as his assistant at the Foreign Ministry, early in my career, used to quote David Ben-Gurion and would sometimes impersonate him as saying there are things that are “dead” but can be resurrected and there is “dead and buried” – when resurrection is no longer possible. I assume that the judicial overhaul is “dead” but not “dead and buried.” But it seems that many, perhaps a great majority, understand that to advance such issues that go to our very essence, a broad consensus is required. Here, we will discuss one of these possibilities, as a look toward the future.

I will not talk about the ruling nullifying the reasonableness law, the leak of which was a dark day in the history of the Supreme Court. There is no need to say much about the problematic of “woe unto me from my Creator and woe unto me from my inclination” that was before the court. Much will yet be said about this.

In times almost forgotten, the United Nations partition plan of November 29,1947 called for the Jewish and Arab nascent states to establish constitutions. This seemed obvious, primarily because there was a need to ensure the rights of minorities in each of the states. Indeed, many talented people worked on a draft, but that is beyond the scope of this essay. The Constituent Assembly was elected to create a permanent constitution and later changed its name to the First Knesset.

Ben-Gurion decided, with characteristic pragmatism, not to enact a constitution. Among his reasons were that only a relatively small part of the Jewish people lived in Israel, that the conflict with Israel’s neighbors and with Israel’s Arab population had not yet been resolved, and therefore it was not advisable there and then to obligate future generations. Surely there was a tangible pragmatic consideration behind this. It was classic Ben-Gurion – the reluctance to tie the hands of the government, and we should remember that in those days Israel’s Arab citizens were under military rule, something we cannot imagine today. In his exceptionally polemical Knesset speech on February 20, 1950, Ben-Gurion explained, in less than a fully explicit way, why in his opinion there was no place for a constitution at that time, and strongly sanctified the Declaration of Independence even in the absence of its formal enshrinement in law. In his view, there was no need for freedoms to be anchored in a constitution because, after all, Israel was a free country. Rather, he saw the need for bill of obligations that would focus on immigration, settlement and security, and for this purpose there was no need to be confined to a rigid framework and artificial tools. All this led to the well-known “Harari Decision” of June 13, 1950 (named after Knesset House Committee Chairman Yizhar Harari), which established a framework of Basic Laws. Today Israel has 13 Basic Laws, of which eight can be called “governmental” (The President of the State, The Knesset, The Government, The Judiciary, The State Comptroller, The Military, The State Economy, Israel Lands), and the rest of which have varying national, political, and diplomatic value. But the Basic Laws never coalesced into a general constitution, as anticipated by the Harari Decision.

Since the 1995 High Court of Justice ruling in the Mizrahi Bank case (which had some origins in the Court’s 1969 Bergman decision), the Supreme Court, which was originally sitting as a High Court of Justice, serves as a Constitutional Court. It has interfered with some Knesset legislation, mainly on the basis of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. It has done so sparingly – twenty-four interventions in nearly thirty years, out of some five hundred constitutional petitions. Some of its interventions have been minor, but the very existence of its authority to do so, which, over time, has been accepted as fact, today is almost unquestioned. This has caused religious politicians (especially) to oppose any enactment of a Basic Law on Human Rights for fear that it would be interpreted by the High Court in a liberal/secular/left manner – a very exaggerated concern.

The constitutional project has yet to be completed. Basic Law: Legislation is a missing piece. While this may not go to the heart of the difficulties, without such a law most of the Basic Laws are not entrenched and can be changed with a simple Knesset majority as if they were insignificant municipal bylaws.  A futile debate over the Judicial Override Clause was, among other things, detrimental to the cause. I have been complaining for many years about the inability to complete the constitutional project, despite the great efforts of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary bodies, for example, the committee at the Israel Democracy Institute headed by the late Supreme Court President Meir Shamgar, a liberal-nationalist, an exemplary nationalist and an exemplary liberal, and the efforts of MK Michael Eitan as chairman of the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee.

Why do I believe a constitution is important? It is not somuchinthe “net” substantialcontext,becauseif, for example, theissue of equality is taken up,evenifitdoesnotappearintheBasicLaws,the High Courtwillupholdit through its interpretation of the BasicLaw:HumanDignityandLibertyandtheDeclaration of Independence; it didsoinpetitionsregarding the 2018 BasicLaw:Israel – The Nation-Stateof the JewishPeople(“Nationality Bill”).

The most important value of having a constitution, in my view, is the educational aspect. In the United States, every high school graduate knows what the First Amendment, which guarantees freedom of speech, is; many know about the Second Amendment, which guarantees the right to bear arms; the Fourth Amendment, which protects individuals from unreasonable government searches and seizures, and the Fifth Amendment, which shields individuals from self-incrimination.

Incidentally, amending the United States Constitution is a lengthy process requiring a privileged supermajority of Congress and ratification by three-fourths of the individual state legislatures. We don’t have any such document to be taught in our schools.

Israel’s Declaration of Independence fills part of this vacuum and is of great importance, but it certainly does not fill it entirely. The Nation-State Basic Law could have played a certain role – and could have served as a kind of first chapter of the constitution – had it not lacked any reference to civil equality (as opposed to national equality), so that every non-Jewish citizen would have a sense of partnership in the state, a feeling that should be encouraged and which is in great demand.

Unfortunately, a full constitution, something I would very much like to see, is not on the horizon. In my view, as I have already mentioned, an equality clause is of particular importance. It exists in the Declaration of Independence and the courts apply it as part of the interpretation of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. A few years ago, I joined forces with a Druze brigadier general and several professors to draft a proposed amendment to the Nation-State Law, which could have served as a sort of preamble for a constitution, in a way that would have considered all the major questions. The endeavor did not take off. I now see the current initiative of Prof. Yedidia Stern and the Jewish People Policy Institute to draft a “thin constitution” as a first stage toward completion of the constitution, including an equality clause. Perhaps sharing the burden of the war will open new doors.

Constitution (hukah in Hebrew) is an uplifting word. Together with its derivatives, the word appears in Hebrew in the Bible 100 times, including the grouping “a law of justice” (Numbers 27:11, concerning laws of inheritance, including daughters, and chapter 35 verse 29 concerning cities of refuge.) Other common groupings are “an eternal statute” (for example, in Exodus 27:21 concerning the Ner Tamid [eternal flame]); “My commandments, My laws and My teachings” (for example, Genesis 26:5 on Abraham’s path). The biblical term does not refer to a “supra-legal” document of the kind we are familiar with today, but to something analogous to the law (see Ben-Gurion’s speech to the Knesset mentioned above). Nor do the Ten Commandments exactly make up a constitution, the specifications of which in law are to be found in the Torah portion Mishpatim (laws) in the Book of Exodus. ButHansKelsen’s hierarchy ofnormsplacesatitsheadtheconstitution,theconstituentdocument.

Some wish to see in the Declaration of Independence the nucleus of a constitution – and I too find supreme educational importance in it – and of course its principles are mentioned as an interpretive basis in the Basic Laws of rights, human dignity and liberty, and freedom of occupation, with perhaps equality being the most important principle of all. Nevertheless, the Declaration of Independence is not a constitution. Some 25 years ago, my colleague Justice Noam Solberg and I wrote an article in which we did not go so far as to confer legal validity to the Declaration of Independence, but we talked about an expansive interpretive model, although not about the declaration as an independent source of human rights. In any event, after decades of statehood, the result of the absence of any overarching governing framework (I do not like the phrase “rules of the game”) is constitutional chaos. The main ill is – as already stated – the ease of amending a Basic Law.

Basic Law: The Knesset, for example, has been amended some 50 times, many of them to serve transitory political needs. The one-year budget stipulated by Basic Law: The State Economy has repeatedly been transformed through temporary orders, into a two-year budget to make things politically expedient for the government, and this is just one of many examples. In order to enable so-and-so to serve as a minister, Basic Laws can be amended at will, like changing socks.

Given such impudence, which also affects the position of the Knesset, which is not supposed to act as a band of cheerleaders for the government (as I had occasion to write in one of my judgments), the Basic Laws are often relegated to an ordinary law that masquerades as a Basic Law in name only. In England, where there is also no constitution, there is a phrase “it isn’t done,” something that wouldn’t be done even in the absence of a written rule saying so; here however, it is done, again and again. Any coalition majority, even theoretically a 2:1 majority in the plenum, can, at will, change most of the Basic Laws.

The late Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, of blessed memory, said there are some things that may not be written but are obvious to everyone. Nowhere does it say that one cannot put a cat in the Torah ark, but would anyone think to do so? Unfortunately, we have not created a legislative parliamentary culture that acts by these “unwritten rules” and therefore we need a framework that protects the Knesset from the government. A framework that prevents chaos and instability, such as Basic Law: Legislation, which would establish rules and set boundaries, does not exist.

I can testify to this personally, both as a former cabinet secretary, attorney general and judge. Let me present another example: In one of the iterations of Basic Law: The Government, the government could have no more than 18 ministers. In 1999, the elected government, for political reasons, needed to increase the number of ministers. This was something that had already happened in the past, for example in the National Unity governments of 1984-1990. In 1999, I was attorney general and based on my earlier experience as cabinet secretary I tried to dissuade the government from increasing the number of ministers. In an article I published 28 years ago concerning Basic Law: The Government, I wrote: “On the balance of considerations, it seems that there is reason to limit the number of members of the government, first and foremost for public reasons, related to the large expense from the public treasury inherent in each ministerial position – the minister’s office and accompanying allowences. Experience shows that all government functions can be fulfilled without difficulty with a composition of up to 18 government ministers. Governments that reached 26 ministers […] were no more effective than governments with a much smaller number of ministers.” I can therefore state unequivocally: All government missions can be conducted successfully and effectively with 18 ministers.

A framework to regulate this would have served the state well. The large number of ministers, which has reached new records, is superfluous from both a public service and financial perspective. Moreover, sitting in court, I was often saddened, not to mention horrified, by how the Knesset was losing its identity as a legislature and as a body supervising the government, and how the government controlled the Knesset like a puppet on a string. Petitions are submitted; what should the court do? Should it, like the three monkeys, see no evil, hear no evil and speak no evil? As our sages say: “My handiwork is drowning in the sea, and you are reciting a song?” Should it betray its role and say, “the elected representatives have decided, and peace be upon you” even if the result is instability that rocks the ship to and fro, a driven leaf?   And then, when the court speaks, comes the cry, “Why are you interfering”? After all, we know that constitutional intervention should be used sparingly, and that only 5% of constitutional petitions have been accepted.

Everything so far shows that the status of the Knesset is at a low point compared to the government. And the implications for the status of the court are clear, and humiliate it as well, exposing it not only to criticism but also to attempts to undermine it like the ones we have witnessed, especially in the past year. The question of intervention in Basic Laws, with all its problems, has now been determined in the affirmative. How do we extricate ourselves, at least to a significant extent, from this situation? By the way, contrary to the prevailing image among certain publics, the court is not really “searching for cases” in order to undermine the government and the Knesset. Quite the opposite.

In the absence of any possibility of a full constitution at the present time, Prof. Yedidia Stern has proposed a “thin constitution,” in other words a regulating framework of rules that can be agreed upon and is not heavily burdened by contrasting ideologies, and can thus contribute to stability. He has convened a group of scholars and advisers to attain this goal. A substantial portion of this “thin constitution” can already be found in the Basic Laws. Now the time has come to bind them together and add to them the keystone of this framework – Basic Law: Legislation. As already stated, we should see in this idea a step on the way to a constitutional text that will also include equality; it will be the beginning of the redemption, atchlata de’geula.

Prof. Ariel Bendor has catalogued the issues that need to be dealt with – the legislative process, its principles and stages – be they with regard to regular legislation or Basic Laws, judicial oversight including over Basic Laws, override and more. I should note here that I have long believed that if Basic Law: Legislation is passed and Basic Laws are adopted and amended by special procedure, there will be little need for judicial review of Basic Laws, as opposed to ordinary laws, although there will be those who disagree with me, for their own reasons, which should not be ignored.

Professor Stern has acted according to the Talmudic maxim, “If you grasped many, you did not grasp anything; if you grasped few, you grasped something.” It is for this reason that we have come together. Perhaps, also because of the approaching ruling, and I would like to hope that it will be for good, and that the double upheaval we all went through this year – “the judicial revolution” and the terrible war – will serve as a source of motivation for change, and perhaps will also pave the way for change. We hope not to be disappointed. This will require preparatory work, building on the legacy of our predecessors, but no less, and clearly so, we will be tasked with persuading the political establishment to learn the lessons of the difficult period we have been through.

And just one more thing: Modesty, which Nachmanides talks of as “the best of all virtues.” The effort we are engaged in must also be undertaken with modesty, not only because many good people have tried before us and not succeeded, but because of the very gravity of the issue.

Hoping for good luck, and the help of heaven.

To read the article on ‘The Jerusalem Report’ click here.

The post On a Thin Constitution first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Prof. Yedidia Stern, President of the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI) and a prominent legal scholar, proposes that Israel, which has no formal constitution at present, enact a “thin constitution” to manage national life at a time when the country is not ripe for the sweeping changes needed to truly stabilize the nation.

In this interview with Jewish Business News, Professor Stern explains his ideas to help Israel move out of the current political, economic, and social morass it finds itself in.

Professor Stern, what exactly is a “Thin Constitution” as opposed to a regular or full constitution, and why does Israel need it?

“Israel’s social and ideological divide makes it impossible to decisively settle the current culture war. But this divide would likely not prevent us from accepting the authority of a thin constitution, which is a mutually agreeable framework for managing our conflicts in the future. Furthermore, the three proposals currently on the national table: comprehensive judicial reform, a full constitution, and canonization are a dangerous illusion, demanding decisive action in an Israeli reality that is not ripe for such sweeping change.”

Why does Israel need this now and not a full constitution?

“A thin constitution, sometimes called a “procedural constitution,” differs from a full constitution in several ways. Unlike a full constitution, it would not include a full human rights bill since Israelis are divided on this issue. It would be limited to the regulation of Israel’s three branches of government – their composition, their powers, and the division of responsibilities between them. It would also codify and regulate such national institutions as the presidency, the state comptroller, the national budget and the military.”

But judicial reform negotiations are ongoing. How do we know they won’t end in an agreement?

“It has yet to be determined how the negotiations will end. The prime minister will likely navigate through the minefield in which he has entrapped himself into a position that will spare him from making a tough decision. This way he will preserve his coalition without rekindling the full force of the protest movement that began this past January. But anyone who thinks such avoidance can turn back the clock is mistaken. Even if the prime minister makes it out of the present crisis with no additional damage, things will not return to how they were. The depth of the past six months’ events has already been ingrained into an entire generation’s consciousness.”

You are focused in this effort on Israeli society and its center, the group that makes up the majority of the nation.

“Yes, for years our entire national conversation has been swallowed up by a black hole: the question of the territories. Israeli public debate has focused on where the borders should be, not on how the state inside those borders should look. At this time, however, when many Israelis on the right, the center, and even parts of the left see no chance for a peace process vis-à-vis the Palestinians, the black hole’s gravitational pull has weakened. The main axis around which the Israeli political discourse revolved, the future of Judea and Samaria – the debate that defined “right” versus “left” – has rusted out in the past decade. Israel has shifted its attention inward.”

What was the game-changing moment?

“January 4, 2023, when Justice Minister Yariv Levin announced the first phase of a four-stage reform with no attempt to clarify the next stops along the way, or about what awaits Israel at the final stop. This roused the Israeli center in a game changing way. It became clear to many that a government unique in Israeli history – a “fully” right-wing government – could decide the Israeli culture war in favor of particular identity groups, those constituting the current ruling coalition. The sheer audacity of the plan, and the aggressive way it was marketed, punched a hole in the fabric of Israeli national life, and through it poured the boiling lava of identity discord. Even if a way is found to patch over the hole – through a compromise arrangement – it will not provide an infrastructural solution to the identity crisis. It is only a matter of time before the lava erupts again. This concern is the driving force behind the creative energy working to devise a broad and principled response to the identity dispute. As mentioned, various proposals have been raised.”

Many voices have called for a constitution to be written and enacted now. What is wrong with that?

“A constitution is a noble idea. I have dedicated years to the design of a constitution for the State of Israel, and no one would be happier than I to see one enacted. But in the current situation, I must oppose such a move. Today’s identity politics, which is based on differentiation from, and demonization of, the other, is a killing field for constitutional politics, which is based on compromise over fundamental issues. The thought that a broad Israeli consensus on questions of identity and values could be reached at this time is an illusion, and it would be irresponsible to make that idea a political objective. Even the canonical text of the Declaration of Independence – sacrosanct in the secular sense – is unfortunately becoming a subject of controversy in Israeli society.”

What about the idea of federations or what is being called canonization?

“Canonization is a bad idea. It would provide normative legitimacy and political solidity to the identity dispute. Instead of managing it, it would intensify it. If Israel becomes “a state of all its tribes,” as described by former President Ruby Rivlin, it is likely that the centrifugal forces that drive us apart today would accelerate dramatically. The hope that the tribes– secular Jews, national religious Orthodox Jews, ultra-Orthodox Haredi Jews, and Arabs–would all live side by side in peace, thanks to their autonomy, would be shattered by a reality in which each tribe is organized independently, and with legal backing. The competition that would ensue for control, influence, and dominance in shaping the public ethos would heighten and fortify the walls that already separate us today, unscalable obstacles that would frustrate any attempt at joint action to achieve national goals.”

So a thin constitution is the answer?

“Rather than aiming for a unifying constitution or a divisive canonization, it would be more appropriate to pursue this relatively modest but reasonably feasible thin constitution. A thin constitution does not deal with identity-related matters, but it sets the rules of the game for the operation of the state.”

But doesn’t Israel have Basic Laws that regulate the government?

“Some Basic Laws regulate the government but stand on shaky ground because a coalition can cancel or amend them without any special procedure, with a few exceptions. A simple Knesset majority can also enact new Basic Laws in a routine legislative proceeding.

“This flaw places Israeli democracy on a slippery and dangerous slope. The Basic Laws, which aspire to be part of the Israeli constitution, are putty in the hands of the Knesset and easy prey for the whims of the governing coalition, which can advance revolutionary changes of all sorts, such as divesting the Supreme Court of its authority, restricting the voting rights of some citizens, altering the state’s Jewish character or modifying the state’s democratic character. Additionally, if it is decided that the Supreme Court lacks the authority to conduct judicial review of Basic Laws, there would be no legal backstop to a determined majority’s desire to change Israel as it sees fit.

“This is not a theoretical concern: all of Israel’s recent prime ministers chose to amend Basic Laws in accordance with their immediate political exigencies, such as the “rotation government” whereby the premiership changes hands part way through its term. The judicial reform currently proposed is just another step, although an extraordinarily extreme one, along a path already charted by others.

“In constitutional democracies, the rules of the game cannot be changed casually – with a simple parliamentary majority. Because of their vital importance, the rules are embedded in an entrenched constitution, meaning that they can only be changed in accordance with strict requirements, such as a parliamentary supermajority, consent of both houses of a bicameral legislature, approval by all or most of the states in a federal framework or by public referendum, among others. Further, in most countries a constitutional culture prevails that precludes changing the rules to suit momentary convenience.”

Can you sum up why a thin constitution is the answer of the moment and could help move the country in the right direction?

“The social and ideological divide within Israel makes it impossible to settle the current culture war decisively. But this divide would not prevent us from accepting the authority of a thin constitution – a mutually agreeable framework for managing our conflicts in the future. We are likely to reach a consensus on the game’s rules, as they do not deal with the different value systems that fuel the culture war. True, at this moment in time, the Knesset is regarded as a body where sensitivity to the state’s Jewishness is strong. At the same time, the Supreme Court is perceived as more acutely sensitive to the state’s liberal character. That is why the current coalition, which is not liberal, wants to transfer power from the judiciary to the political arena. But this is a shortsighted calculation; the present situation is not a law of nature.

“Thus, for example, there is no safe bet on who will win the next election and form a governing coalition. Therefore, everyone is interested in optimally stabilizing the system, as every party could potentially find itself sitting in the opposition. Entrenched rules would protect them. This is also true regarding the composition of the Supreme Court: at one time, a large majority of its justices could be classified as liberals, but today the balance of power is changing; at least a third of the justices are conservatives. If the selection method for the chief justice remains unchanged, a conservative judge will inevitably be appointed to lead that respected institution. The Supreme Court of the United States already provides us with an example of a leopard changing its spots: the Court has radically changed in recent years, becoming the nation’s bastion of conservatism. There is no way to know whether something similar will or will not happen here.

“The uncertainty regarding the future composition of the Knesset and the Supreme Court is an excellent basis for conducting a discussion on the game’s rules that will lead to an optimal result. This ensures that the discussion will be conducted impartial and unbiased. Although the opponents in today’s culture war have well-known ideological preferences, they are superfluous to refiguring the separation of the branches of government and the complex relations between them and offer neither side an escape from the proper position for making fair decisions.”

First published by JBN.

The post Interview: Prof. Yedidia Stern on a “Thin Constitution” for Israel first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.