The post American Jews Need to Reexamine their Blinding ‘Conzeptzia Too’ first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

The highly unusual statement signed by 120 American Jewish leaders, calling for a boycott of Israel’s finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich, during his just-completed trip to the United States, along with the refusal of major organizations like the Conference of Presidents, the Jewish Federations of North America, the American Jewish Committee, AIPAC and the Anti-Defamation League to meet with him, represents a new low point in relations between a sitting Israeli government and the US Jewish community.

A similar low has also been reached with the US administration. Smotrich, along with Itamar Ben-Gvir, embodies Israel’s far-right extreme and is an obvious target.

But their message is intended for the Israeli government and the man who heads it, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu: Our support for Israel is significant and robust but there is a limit to what we can tolerate.

In the two months since the establishment of the current government of Israel, which will be remembered for its vigorous pursuit of a judicial revolution, it has become a source of deep embarrassment for a large segment of the American Jewish community.

A true grasp of the American community’s distress requires a broader context. The basic facts are that the majority of non-Orthodox American Jews are liberal supporters of the Democratic Party and its values.

Until a few years ago, the Jews were at the center of an American consensus that antisemitism emanated chiefly from the racist fringe of the political Right and occasionally from the left-wing progressives. But the MAGA-Trump reality, the political radicalization of both Right and Left, and American identity politics unrelated to Jews or to Israel have ensnared Jews in an almost impossible conundrum.

They have become associated with white wealth and white subjugation of African Americans, regardless of what they say or do. The success of the Palestinian assertion of intersectional common cause with Black America and in conflating Israel with white oppression (Black Lives Matter = Palestinian Lives Matter) is making identification with and support for Israel increasingly uncomfortable. Expressing solidarity with Israel puts one at risk of being tarred as complicit with persecutors.

Israel’s new government has in a number of ways made it even harder for American Jews to support Israel. In the eyes of most Americans, Ben-Gvir and Smotrich espouse a racist ideology that seeks to legitimize both the abrogation of the Arab minority’s civil rights and the aggressive advance of Israeli control over Judea and Samaria.

Sensitive to racism

American Jews, who are highly sensitive to racism and who have steadily opposed Israeli policy in the West Bank, view the inclusion of Smotrich and Ben-Gvir in the present Israeli government as licensing everything they regard as negative and dangerous for Israel. To this, we may add the government’s race toward a judicial revolution. As American Jews understand the situation in Israel, if this reform is enacted in its current form, Israel will no longer be a liberal democracy.

In that scenario, their desire and ability to identify with an Israel whose values fly in the face of their own core values will be severely limited, at best. Netanyahu’s immediate and unequivocal rejection of a compromise proposed by President Isaac Herzog last Wednesday, the People’s Framework, has only fanned the flames.

The unprecedented appeal by 120 mainstream Jewish leaders to boycott Smotrich in light of his recent offensive statements is the harshest rebuke American Jewish leaders have leveled at Israel’s new government so far. It was preceded by the extraordinary denunciation of the judicial revolution currently underway in Israel by major moderate Jewish leaders, such as Abe Foxman, the legendary national director emeritus of the Anti-Defamation League, and Eric Goldstein, the CEO of UJA-Federation of New York, the largest and strongest of the North American federations.

In private conversations, Jewish leaders are expressing their anguish. They love Israel, want it to flourish and wish to maintain ties with the country and its government but feel they are unable to carry on with business as usual.

It is difficult to overstate the importance of Israel’s strategic and values-based relationship with the American Jewish community. The economic assistance of the American Jewish community may no longer be essential but its support of Israel through AIPAC and in many other ways is nothing less than an existentially vital strategic asset for the state.

In the wake of the recent wave of terror attacks and the ever-present possibility of another confrontation on the Palestinian front, the need for an American political umbrella is only increasing. In times of peace and in times of war,

the American Jewish community has played a significant role in keeping that umbrella open.

True, Israel is not a US colony and it must manage its own interests and policies but the ability to implement policy, including in the fight against terrorism, requires looking at the big picture. In that panorama, the American Jewish community and the US administration play a crucial role on Israel’s behalf, which must be acknowledged, and their views should be taken into serious consideration moving forward.

First published by The Jerusalem Post.

The post US Jews issue penalty card to the Israeli government first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Following Israel’s fifth election in less than four years, Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s longest-serving prime minister, is poised to return to that office again. Even if divided, the country has clearly moved to the right. The “government of change,” which lasted a year included the left, center, right, and an Arab party for the first time, but it was undone not by its ideological diversity but by violence. Polls showed that in March 2022 a majority of Israeli Jews believed it was a good thing that an Arab party was in the government. That view changed dramatically with Palestinian acts of terror against Israelis during Ramadan – and the right wing’s claim that the government was limited in its response because it depended on an Arab party.

In reality, the Bennett-led government was not soft in its response, but the image stuck and contributed to the growth of the extreme right-wing party led by Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir. No one gained more from the violence and increasing mistrust of Israeli Arabs than the Religious Zionist Party, becoming the third-largest party in Israel.

Yes, Netanyahu is in a position to form a government, and his speech on election night was far more conciliatory than his campaign posture. But he does not face a simple choice. His clearest path to government formation depends on forging a narrow right-wing coalition. Such a government would not only depend on making Ben Gvir and Smotrich senior ministers but permit them to hold the balance of power in the government.

Netanyahu may not be adventurist, but they are. And, that will have consequences in Israel with the Israeli Arabs and the legal system; with the Palestinians and the likely increase in violence; and with Israel’s Arab peace partners. (Abdullah bin Zayed – the foreign minister of the UAE – warned Netanyahu during a trip to Israel before the election that the inclusion of Smotrich and Ben Gvir would affect the relationship with the Emirates.)

The reverberations will be felt here in America as well. Senator Robert Menendez, a centrist Democrat with a strong track record of support for Israel, bluntly warned of the consequences for the US-Israeli relationship if Smotrich and Ben Gvir were to become senior members of the government. That should set off alarm bells in Israel. Menendez was reflecting something fundamental about the US-Israeli relationship; it is rooted in shared values.

Yes, shared interests are important, but Americans identified with Israel because of shared values. It was those values that attracted Harry Truman to support the creation of Israel; Jack Kennedy to be the first to speak of a “special relationship.” Ronald Reagan to identify with the Jewish state. Similarly, shared values produced strong support for Israel among those in Congress, Republican, and Democrat, who have come from districts or states that have negligible Jewish presence. Our shared values created the lens through which the interests came to be seen. It made support for Israel bipartisan.

Lose the sense of shared values and something basic will be lost. Moreover, lose the shared values and Israel’s fiercest critics in the US will be given an enormous boost. Already some in the progressive movement argue that Israel does not share our values – it is the source of their criticism of Israel. They want to distance the US from Israel, change the character of the relationship, vote against military assistance, and even deny Israel the right to defend itself when Hamas or Hezbollah fire rockets against it.

There could be no greater gifts for these progressives than having ministers in the next government that are anti-Arab, incite against them, and oppose an independent judiciary and the separation of powers. Should Prime Minister Netanyahu opt to form a narrow right government, Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich will become its face. Their open hostility toward Israeli Arabs and their intended legal “reforms” will weaken Israel’s image as a democracy.

Those who have no love for Israel will seize on this. They will use it to expand their appeal in the Congress and the country. They will exploit it to try to undo aspects of the relationship, and certainly to challenge Israeli military requests. And, they will see it as an opportunity to join with their European counterparts who seek to delegitimize Israel.

The reality is that no one should take the character of the US-Israeli relationship for granted. Yes, there are inherent enduring strengths because, notwithstanding its critics, five elections remind everyone that Israel is a democracy in which the Israeli public has the final say. And, yes Israel is also the “Start-Up Nation” and offers much to its region and the world on water, food, health, and cyber security. (Moreover, with Russian and Iranian drones signaling new dangers and threats to the world, Israeli developments that can be game-changers, like laser-based defenses, are likely to add further to the importance of Israel as a partner.)

Still, there is a campaign against Israel and it is important not to strengthen the hand of those determined to weaken the relationship. Government formation in Israel is an Israeli decision. In normal circumstances, we, as Americans, would not be offering our counsel on it. But these are not normal circumstances, and, in good conscience, we cannot remain silent knowing the enormous impact that the words and actions of Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich as senior ministers would have on the US-Israeli relationship. That relationship is too precious and important to both countries and the Middle East as a whole – given Iranian threats – for it to be harmed. Even though it would mean resisting the rising tide of the far right, Netanyahu would be wise to form not a narrow-based government but a broad-based one that embodies and does not undermine Israel’s democratic values.

First published by ‘The Times of Israel.‘

The post A narrow government with Ben Gvir and Smotrich threatens US-Israel ties first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Herzl’s vision came true beyond all expectations. Zionism achieved one of the greatest successes of the Jewish people, if not the greatest. The Jewish people were finally granted independence. However, even with the establishment of the State of Israel, majority of Jewish people live across all corners of the world, many with no intention to make Aliyah. Almost 8 million people, half of the entire Jewish population, choose to live, flourish, strive and build vibrant communities outside of Israel.

This leads us to crucial questions. Where does Israel, as the nation State of the Jewish people, actually stand vis-à-vis the Jewish people? Do we care for them and they for us? And is the Zionist dream only about Aliyah? Or perhaps there is a wider, bigger definition of what Zionism is all about?

On this historic occasion of celebrating this quasquicentennial of the First Zionist Congress, I would like to propose a novel and different thesis about how this intertwined relationship between us should look going forward.

In Israel’s Declaration of Independence, there is a paragraph turning to world Jewry, asking them to participate in this extraordinary part of history: “We appeal to the Jewish people throughout the Diaspora to rally around the Jews of the Land of Israel, in the tasks of immigration and upbuilding, and to stand by them in the great struggle for the realization of the age-old dream—the redemption of Israel.”

Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and Jacob Blaustein, President of the American Jewish Committee signed an agreement that defined the relationship between Israel and American Jewry. This document cleverly captured the state of relations at the time. It emphasized “the delicate balance between involvement and non-interference.”

While we must indeed cherish this balanced principle, today, I would argue the exact opposite.

I believe it is time to formulate a new “Blaustein – Ben-Gurion” agreement. Rather than non-interference, we need to encourage a relationship of engagement. Instead of staying sidelined, we need a relationship of involvement. It is time to challenge the present relationship between Israel and the Jewish Diaspora, and to take it to a new strategic level.

We have to adopt a new paradigm, one which I shall call The Jewish peoplehood paradigm – Israel and Diaspora as partners.

In 1999, the government of Israel decided to establish a government ministry focused only on these relations, after realizing the importance of keeping connection between us. This new ministry became the chief coordinator between the State of Israel and the Jewish world, and it gradually built and promoted new initiatives and connections with Jewish communities around the world.

Nine years later in 2018, there was a significant development. The Knesset voted in favor of the new Nation State law, which manifests a major legal change. Paragraph 6 of the Nation State law, a law of constitutional status, articulates Israel’s new legal responsibility to the Jewish people: “The State will strive to ensure the safety of the members of the Jewish people and of its citizens in trouble or in captivity due to the fact of their Jewishness or their citizenship.”

This was a breakthrough. 

This law anchors Israel’s obligation to world Jewry,  which is not tied to considerations of Zionism and Aliyah, but from the perception of Diaspora Jewry as a partner of the State of Israel. And Israel, now a strong and blossoming state, takes on its duty to secure the resilience of the Jewish people, in Israel and around the world.

To paraphrase the words of John F. Kennedy; Israel now tells the diaspora: “Ask not what the diaspora can do for Israel – ask what Israel can do for the Diaspora”.

The Diaspora Affairs Ministry is responsible for implementing this law and duty. We promote formal and informal Jewish education in the Diaspora; encouraging affinity towards Israel, and with an emphasis on the younger generation. We assist Jewish communities in crisis, like Ukraine and Russia, defending the rights of Jews to live a full Jewish life wherever they are in the world. Additionally, we are at the forefront of combatting antisemitism and steer activities aimed at strengthening community resilience.

But, there is still much more to be done.

Throughout my time as the Minister of Diaspora Affairs, I have come to learn that there is a lack of understanding within Israel of the essence of the strategic relationship between Israel and the Diaspora. At the moment, we do not even have a way to hear the yearns and concerns of Jewish communities around the world when it comes to decision making in Israel. It is of utmost importance that we find ways to integrate the voices of the diaspora into the decision-making processes of Israel.

In that way, the Israeli public will be exposed to another side of the equation, perhaps even develop an understanding and sensitivity towards the needs of diaspora Jewry.  A clear example of where such a mechanism could have made a difference is when it comes to the issue of the Kotel. An issue that is a bleeding wound, that we as a society need to mend. Had we had a clear consultation process with Diaspora Jewry from the start, the Western Wall crisis would not have played out as it did.

I know that in 125 years from today, we will gather in Basel once again to celebrate the 250th anniversary of the first Zionist Congress. But by then, I’ve no doubt the State of Israel and our world will look different. There are some things however that will not change. The State of Israel will continue to exist and blossom in our land, and world Jewry will carry on residing across all corners of the world. We’ll face new challenges – that are hard and impossible to imagine.

Perhaps we would need a new vision, a new Herzl for then?

The post Minister Nachman Shai: It is time for a new paradigm in Israeli-Diaspora first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

The true nature of the current Jewish Agency crisis with Russia is unclear. Russia claims its basis is legal: the Agency has violated local procedures governing the operation of foreign organizations on its soil. In Israel, however, the cause is thought to be political – that the crisis is Putin’s way of expressing his dissatisfaction with Israel’s conduct in the Ukrainian arena (Lapid’s pro-Ukraine stance), in the Syrian arena (IDF activity within the territory of the Russia-sponsored regime), or in the arena of Jerusalem real estate (the promise to transfer ownership of Alexander’s Courtyard to Russia remains unfulfilled).

This quagmire is a wake-up call for the State of Israel to conduct a systematic, thoughtful examination of the proper balance between the “Israeli interest” and the “Jewish interest” when tension emerges between them. In the present context, assuming that aggressive action by the Israeli government would help preserve the Jewish Agency’s standing as a promoter of Jewish identity in Russia, and as a vehicle of Aliyah for Russian Jews, would it be appropriate to take such action even if it would exact a real price from the state? It is possible, for example, that in response to aggressive Israeli measures, Russia might choose to sell advanced anti-aircraft missiles to Syria (it was previously reported that Russia is considering this), thereby intensifying the risk to Israeli Air Force planes operating over Syria.

The question of whether, and to what extent, Israel should take into consideration the interests of Jews who are not its citizens arises in many contexts – military, political, economic, and others.

In the military context, the dilemma arose in connection to the IDF operation to assassinate Abbas al-Musawi, Secretary General of Hezbollah, 30 years ago. To avenge his death, Hezbollah carried out terror attacks against the Israeli embassy in Argentina and the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (the AMIA – a Jewish community center). The result was shocking: 111 people murdered in retaliation for the IDF’s actions. The then-head of the IDF’s Military Intelligence Directorate, General Uri Sagi, admitted, in retrospect, that had he been aware of possible reprisals against Jews abroad, he would have reconsidered the decision to launch the operation. Is he right? Should Israel’s hands be tied out of fear for the security of Jews around the world? When an Israeli operation in Gaza sparks antisemitism internationally, and an anti-Jewish wave on US campuses, should Israel reconsider its actions?

And in the political context: Should Israel’s prime minister take into account the sensitivities of a large segment of Diaspora Jewry on issues of religion and state – such as the Kotel compromise or the recognition of non-Orthodox conversions – when he sets policy, even if he will be required to pay a political price in front of potential coalition partners? In the past, I was asked by the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs to examine the legality of having a certain percentage of Knesset seats allocated by law to elected representatives of Diaspora Jewry. In so doing, some claimed it would guarantee that the voice of Diaspora Jewry would be heard in the legislative processes of the Jewish nation-state. Is this appropriate?

And in the economic context: For many years, Diaspora Jewry provided massive support to the State of Israel and its society, which faced daunting economic difficulties. That support continues to this day. However, in recent years Israel’s flourishing economy has drawn a different picture: Israel is no longer the poor nephew of a rich American uncle. Has the moment come for Israel to return the favor to Diaspora Jewry, where necessary? Would it be appropriate to establish a two-way, equal relationship through the flow of Israeli resources, funded by Israeli taxpayers, to benefit Jewish interests outside of Israel, such as subsidizing Birthright Israel or financing aspects of Jewish education in the Diaspora?

Although each of the above examples differs from the others, they all raise the question Vladimir Putin has put before us: To what extent is the Israeli nation-state responsible for members of the Jewish people who are not citizens of Israel? Most Israelis support solidarity with Diaspora Jewry. But are they willing to pay a price for this – militarily, politically, economically, or otherwise – and to what degree?

The Basic Law: Israel – The Nation-State of the Jewish People imposes a constitutional obligation on the state to ensure the safety of members of the Jewish people who are in straits and in captivity due to their Jewishness and to work to preserve the heritage of the Jewish people among Diaspora Jewry. In its narrow sense, the law does not oblige Israel to go to the mat with Putin: the Jews of Russia are not currently “in straits and in captivity.” The Iron Curtain has not slammed down again and atheistic Communism is not the law in the Russian Federation. Russian Jews can emigrate as they wish and are not prevented from realizing their Judaism through organized religious, national, or cultural activity in their homeland. However, even though the Nation-State Law does not directly apply under present circumstances, its spirit is extremely relevant. Its intent is to task the Jewish state with the responsibility to act on behalf of its brethren in the Diaspora. Putin’s intransigence is pushing the Israeli government to consider the extent of its readiness to fulfill that responsibility, by weighing broader Jewish interests against internal Israeli interests.

This is not a simple question: the sovereign statehood enjoyed by today’s Jews is the most important Jewish innovation in 2,000 years. Sovereignty distinguishes between a citizen, Jew or non-Jew, and others – even if they are Jewish. Any seemingly “normal” country would prioritize its civic interests under any circumstances. Thus, the celebrated late writer A.B. Yehoshua believed that Israel need not consider the interests of Diaspora Jews. They could choose to be Israeli and would be welcomed as promised in the Law of Return, but if they prefer to remain in the Diaspora, the State of Israel owes them nothing. This, however, is a minority opinion. The vast majority of Israeli Jews feel that, because Israel is not only a “democratic state” but also a “Jewish state,” it must give significant consideration to the interests of those who belong to the circle of Jewish identity, even if they stand outside the circle of Israeli civic identity – and even if this comes at a cost. Menachem Begin famously said, on the night he was elected Prime Minister of Israel, that he saw himself as the Prime Minister of the Jewish people.

A principled discussion regarding the correct balance between the Israeli interest and the Jewish interest must be conducted. But it is important to remember that even if the State of Israel may pay a real price for standing by the Jewish interest in the current crisis – for example, raising the risk level of air force operations in Syria – this is a short-term cost. In the long term, the equation will be reversed: translating the vision of Israel as a “Jewish state” into a set of actions – such as extending its hand, through its support of the Jewish Agency, to the Jews of Ukraine and Russia – is the realization of our raison d’être. Indeed, the Jewish interest, at the end of the day, is an Israeli interest.

First published in The Jerusalem Post

The post How Much Should Israel Value Jewish Interests Over its Own? first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

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• 66% of Congressional Democrats and 94% of Congressional Republicans have tweeted about Israel during the current session of Congress.
• During the past two sessions of Congress there has been a dramatic increase in the percent of tweets that politicize Israel.
• In the previous session of Congress, Republicans and Democrats mentioned politics more frequently in their tweets about Israel than in their non-Israel related tweets.
• In the current session of Congress, 23% of Congressional Republicans mention Democrats in the majority of their tweets about Israel.

Since its founding, Israel has strived to maintain bipartisan support from the body that acts as an overall expression of the US-Israel relationship, and which is responsible for allocating military aid to Israel: The United States Congress. But has the long-term trend toward political polarization caused Israel to lose the air of bipartisanship and emerge as another overly politicized, wedge issue in American politics like abortion and gun control? If bipartisan congressional support for Israel is a pillar of a strong US-Israel relationship and if politicization erodes bipartisanship, knowing the extent to which Israel is politicized by members of Congress is a useful metric in assessing the strength of the US-Israel relationship.

While previous studies, such as those by Cavari (2013) and Cavari & Nyer (2014) measured political polarization through public opinion surveys and congressional actions, this study measures the politicization of Israel in Congress through an analysis of tweets made by members of the House and Senate over the past decade. Politicization of Israel is used here to describe the situation in which Israel is mentioned in combination with a reference to a specific political party, an individual who symbolizes the party, or a highly charged term that is used, often negatively, to refer to a political party. Although the methodology used here differs from that of previous studies, the findings ultimately concur.

The study was executed by collecting the Twitter timelines of all current and former members of Congress from the 112^th session (2011) until January 2022. By 2011, Twitter had become a popular mode of communication, widely adopted by the American political class, with roughly 90% of members of Congress using it. In total, the collection includes over 2.5 million tweets, from 407 Democrats, 472 Republicans, and 7 independent members of Congress.

Using the quantitative analysis technique of text mining, each tweet was analyzed to determine whether it mentioned Israel – a total of 12,098 tweets. The table below shows the percentage of Democrats and Republicans who tweeted about Israel at least once, by session of Congress.  A contrast emerges between the two parties: a majority of Republicans in both the House and Senate tweeted about Israel in each session of Congress, while only in the past two congresses a majority of Democrats tweet about Israel. In each session of Congress, the percent of Democrats who tweet about Israel was significantly less than that of Republicans.

To determine whether a tweet included some form politicization, the text of each tweet was analyzed through a form of sentiment analysis to determine if it contained keywords and names that are highly associated with either the Republican or Democratic Parties. This process enables the identification of tweets about Israel that are political in nature. As an example, the following is a tweet about Israel made by Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) on May 21, 2021:

“As our friend and ally is being attacked, we should be standing up unequivocally with Israel. Instead, Bernie Sanders and AOC are trying to prevent Israel from defending itself.”

Since Cruz mentions Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (AOC), two prominent Democrats, the tweet is flagged as political.

By contrast, on the same day, one of Cruz’s Republican colleagues in the House, Congressman Fred Keller (R-PA), tweeted:

“Proud to support various legislative initiatives this week to reaffirm my commitment to Israel. Hesitating to support Israel at this critical juncture not only jeopardizes its security—it sends a dangerous message to America’s allies around the globe.”

Since this tweet by Keller does not mention any keywords associated with either political party, it is not considered by the analysis to be politicized.

Among the tweets that do not mention Israel, 9.6% reference the Democratic Party and 9.1% reference the Republican Party. Of the tweets that mention Israel, 13.9% mention the Democratic Party and 10.5% the Republican Party. This shows that overall, tweets about Israel tend to make more reference to politics than tweets not about Israel, although not to a large extent. However, when comparing the two most recent sessions of congress (116^th and 117^th) with the previous sessions (112^th to 115^th) there is a dramatic increase in the percent of tweets about Israel that mention the political parties. Tweets mentioning the Democratic Party and Israel increased from 7.0% to 19.9% and tweets mentioning the Republican Party and Israel increased from 4.2% to 16.0%. This increase in political tweets was not observed to the same extent in tweets that do not mention Israel.[i] This finding indicates that tweets about Israel are becoming increasingly politicized.

If members of Congress on Twitter did not politicize Israel any differently than they politicize all other topics, we would expect to see the percent of Israel tweets politicized approximately the same as the percent of non-Israel related tweets politicized. The graph below tracks how the politicization of Israel compares to general politicization.

In all sessions of Congress except for the previous session, Democrats tweeted more about politics when they were not discussing Israel. However, during the 116^th session of Congress, Democrat’s tweets about Israel were more political than their other tweets. This can be explained by the fact that congressional Democrats began accusing Trump and Republicans of politicizing Israel. They argued, as exemplified in the tweets below, that then Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Donald Trump were determined to help each other politically and that their decisions involving the US-Israel relationship were not in the best interest of their respective countries. Furthermore, the August 2019 incident of Israel denying entry permits to Democratic Congresswomen Rashida Tlaib and Ilhan Omar sparked a major backlash among Democrats, who took to Twitter in outrage.

Since the 114^th session of Congress (January 2015), the final years of the Obama presidency, when Republicans held majorities in both the House and Senate, Republicans politicized their tweets more often when they were tweeting about Israel than not tweeting about Israel. Like Democrats, Republican tweets about Israel were at their most politicized relative to non-Israel related tweets during the 116^th session (January 2019 to January 2021).

The graph below shows the percent of tweets about Israel that mention Democrats (the top box) and Republicans (the lower box). In the 116^th congress we observe a sharp spike in the average percent of Israel tweets made by Republicans that mention the Republican Party (32.4%). This spike can be explained by Republicans lavishing praise on President Trump for achieving successive peace deals between Israel and Arab states. During the same session of Congress, Republicans rarely mentioned Democrats in their Tweets about Israel. Among Democrats in the 116^th Congress, we observe a highpoint in the average percent of their Israel tweets that mention Republicans (17.9%), a result of their outrage described above. In the current session (117^th) there has been a spike in the average percent of Republican tweets that mention Israel and Democrats (28.5%).

One contributing factor for the spike in Republican Tweets about Israel and Democrats was the May 2021 Israel-Gaza conflict which created a high volume of congressional tweets (see timeline below). During the conflict, a group of 14 House Democrats led by Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) attempted unsuccessfully to block a US arms sale of $735 million of weapons to Israel which the Biden administration announced days before the outbreak of the conflict. Although the attempt was mostly symbolic and did not have the support of Democratic leaders, congressional Republicans jumped at the opportunity to castigate the entire Democratic party as unsupportive of Israel.

If congressional Democrats and Republicans were engaged in the same conversation on Twitter, reacting to the day’s events and debating the same issues, one would expect to find similar patterns in their choice of words and topics. For example, if there was a snowstorm in DC around the Capital building and members of Congress inside were tweeting about the weather, you would expect that the percent of tweets mentioning snow would be roughly the same among Democrats and Republicans. The same should be true of Tweets about Israel. If there is a discussion on Twitter about Israel among members of Congress, as part of that discussion you would not expect the percent of Republicans referring to Democrats and Israel to be considerably greater than the percent of Democrats referring to Democrats and Israel. The fact that congressional Republicans in the current session are tweeting about Israel and mentioning Democrats disproportionately relative to Democrats suggests some degree of politicization. A thorough analysis of that data indicates that indeed many Republicans in Congress are using their tweets about Israel to score political points against Democrats.

The extent to which Republicans have politicized their tweets about Israel is visualized in the boxplot below. Each dot represents a member of Congress and the percent of their Israel related tweets that mention Democrats. Almost a quarter (23%) of Congressional Republicans mention Democrats in the majority of their tweets about Israel, compared to only 8% among Democrats. On average, Republican members of Congress tweeted about Democrats in 28.5% of their Israel-related tweets, compared to only 12% among Democrats.

Reviewing 2021 Tweets about Israel by congressional Republicans, there seems to be a deliberate campaign to aggressively spin major news stories involving Israel to promote a narrative that Democrats are hostile to or unsupportive of Israel. The illustration below is the timeline of Republican tweets about Israel during 2021. The red dots are tweets that reference Democrats and the black dots are tweets that do not. The illustration clearly shows barrages of tweets by Republicans about Israel that mention Democrats following specific events.

According to Pew Research Center 15% of US adults get their news from Twitter. Through their statements on Twitter, members of Congress have the ability to shape and influence how their constituents and other followers perceive the world around them, including the US-Israel relationship. In his 2013 study, Amnon Cavari shows the impact political elites have on Americans who lack “sufficient knowledge and thus rely heavily on leaders’ cues” in determining foreign policy positions regarding Israel. Based on his quantitative research, Cavari concludes: “The American electorate responds to elite change about foreign policy and about views of Israel by following the respective views of their party elites.”

In the current era of hyper partisanship and “cancel culture,” becoming associated with a specific political party or brand could be detrimental to maintaining broad-based public support. A 2019 Pew  study found that party affiliation (not race, religious attendance, education, age, or gender) was the strongest predictor of attitudes on a wide range of issues, including foreign policy.

Support for Israel is not immune from partisan considerations. The graph below from a 2018 Pew study shows the extent of the growing gap between the percent of Republicans and Democrats who sympathize with Israel more in “the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians,” with 79% of Republicans saying they sympathize more with Israel as opposed to only 27% of Democrats.

The Twitter data presented here, although coming at the issue from a different angle and with a different set of tools, complements and strengthens the two main findings of the research by Cavari and Nyer (2014), “From Bipartisanship to Dysergia: Trends in Congressional Actions Toward Israel”. They show through an analysis of congressional bills and resolution that, in recent decades, there is an increasing interest in Israel by members of Congress and that members of Congress express their support toward Israel through “uni-partisan resolutions” with intra-party, not inter-party, coordination.

If this partisan divide over Israel continues, fueled in part by politically charged statements about Israel on Twitter evidenced here, there is an increasing likelihood that Americans uninformed about Israel and who identify as Democrats will be primed to be unsupportive of Israel because they will consider it a Republican position. An even greater concern is a feedback loop in which Democrats, pandering to their base to gain political support, become increasingly critical of Israel.

Politicians, however, cannot not be expected to refrain from attacking their political opponents when they have powerful ammunition at their disposal. With support for Israel increasingly becoming integral to the Republican identity, and with a fringe group of Democrats vocal in their opposition toward Israel and the US-Israel relationship, outside intervention is needed to help reshape the narrative that the congressional relationship with Israel remains bipartisan. Those working to strengthen the US-Israel relationship need to focus attention on congressional Republicans whose relationship with Israel seems to be based on statements attacking Democrats. While Republicans might not be able to resist attacking Democrats over Israel, they should be encouraged to see Israel beyond the blinders of American politics.

[i] Among tweets that do not mention Israel mentioning the Democratic Party increased from 7.8% to 11.4% and tweets mentioning the Republican Party increased from 7.8% to 10.5%.

The post Measuring the Politicization of Israel in Congress first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.