{"id":12583,"date":"2023-12-01T23:17:12","date_gmt":"2023-12-01T21:17:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/?p=12583"},"modified":"2024-02-27T14:02:30","modified_gmt":"2024-02-27T12:02:30","slug":"ending-the-war","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/en\/ending-the-war\/","title":{"rendered":"Ending the War"},"content":{"rendered":"

Hamas’ surrender would break the binary choice between conflict and ceasefire. \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 <\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

T<\/span>his call for Hamas to<\/strong> lay down its arms may be viewed as a throwaway line in the Biden administration\u2019s campaign to counter the graphic images of Palestinian civilians dying at the hands of Israeli troops armed with American weapons. After all, the predicate is clear: Hamas\u2019 conscious use of Palestinian civilians\u2014including women, children, and hospital patients\u2014as human shields shows that it does not care for Palestinian lives. But on closer inspection, Biden was right to raise the prospect of Hamas\u2019 surrender. Actively pursuing that goal might be the best way to save Palestinian lives and to achieve U.S. strategic objectives in the Israel-Hamas war.<\/p>\n

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S<\/span>ince October 7, President Biden has held fast to the principle that Israel has both the right and the obligation to wage war against Hamas for its unprovoked aggression against civilian communities in southern Israel. Two conditions have been layered on that foundational principle. One is tactical\u2014that Israel operate within international humanitarian law that requires combatants neither to target civilians nor cause them disproportionate harm;\u00a0and one is strategic\u2014that victory on the battlefield should pave the way for a political process that results in the establishment of a Palestinian state next to Israel, on terms commensurate with Israeli security requirements.<\/p>\n

For its part, Israel has accepted the tactical constraint. It has implemented numerous operational procedures to keep the tragically high civilian death toll from climbing substantially higher; it has also allowed inspected humanitarian goods to flow into the war-zone. At the same time, while Israel has neither accepted nor rejected the strategic principle regarding the long-term goal of \u201cday-after\u201d planning, its leadership has at least ruled out permanent occupation of the Gaza Strip and the forced expulsion of its civilian population. It does, however, plan to maintain a security presence there for the foreseeable future.<\/p>\n

Although Washington and Jerusalem do not currently see eye to eye on the strategic question, both recognize that the precondition for any effort to bridge those differences is Israeli victory over Hamas. That is to say, any talk of a post-war political process is meaningless without Israel battlefield success: There can be no serious discussion of a two-state solution or any other political objective with Hamas either still governing Gaza or commanding a coherent military force.<\/p>\n

This strategic reality\u2014as much as his post-October 7 sympathy for Israel\u2014animates Biden\u2019s opposition to a ceasefire, which would leave Hamas battered but still potent. Put another way, President Biden recognized early that \u201cceasefire now\u201d presents an insurmountable obstacle to any \u201cpolitical process later\u201d and his decision\u2014correct and courageous\u2014has been to fight the growing chorus for a ceasefire and to play the long game.<\/p>\n

Sustaining this policy will become increasingly difficult. Biden has shown remarkable resilience in keeping his finger in the dike of international opinion and rejecting calls for a ceasefire, but his ability to do so may be finite. In the best of circumstances, Israel will soon turn its attention to southern Gaza, where it will have to operate with different tactics than its bombing-heavy, scorched-earth approach that appears to have largely driven Hamas out of the north.<\/p>\n

Success for Israel is certainly possible but it will take time. Along the way, the pursuit of Hamas leadership in the vast warren of underground tunnels or in the sea of displaced people in southern Gaza may itself produce precisely the type of unintended civilian calamity that would heighten calls for a ceasefire. How long the White House can resist calls for a ceasefire from within the president\u2019s own party and his closest international partners is uncertain.<\/p>\n

Even then, there is little clarity as to what precisely defines success\u2014is it killing or capturing the senior Hamas decision-makers? Decimating the upper ranks of Hamas political and military leaders? Destroying the organizational structure of Hamas military forces? Killing the vast majority of Hamas fighters in the field? What mix of these objectives will end Hamas control of Gaza and also convince the vast majority of Israel\u2019s evacuated southern citizens that it is safe to return to their homes in order to rebuild their lives and communities\u2014the most tangible human test of Israel\u2019s military success? Is achieving 90 percent of these goals necessary? Will 70 percent suffice? Will Israel be allotted the time and space to turn 70 percent to 90 percent?<\/p>\n

In the fog of war in Gaza, the only certainty is that the survival of a substantial element of Hamas would be a political and diplomatic disaster. Such an outcome will make it impossible for any Arab, international, or UN force to police the post-conflict environment in Gaza; impossible for any concerted effort by UN specialized agencies, major NGOs or international donors to invest in the needed repair and reconstruction in Gaza; and impossible for the United States to lead an international diplomatic initiative to advance a negotiated outcome to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.<\/p>\n

Indeed, with a ceasefire leaving a battered but still operational Hamas in control of key parts of Gaza and therefore able to claim victory, Hamas\u2019 rejectionist ideology will likely gain traction among Palestinians and throughout the Middle East. This would put Arab states on the defensive, and they would hesitate to take risks to advance their rhetorical calls for a reinvigorated Arab-Israeli peace process. By the same token, Hamas\u2019 survival would validate the desire by some in Israel for a long-term \u201cforward defense\u201d presence deep inside Gaza territory, almost ensuring a perpetual conflict.<\/p>\n

It makes sense, therefore, for the United States to pursue an outcome to the Israel-Hamas war that ends in Israeli victory. However, given that battlefield success is inherently uncertain (if for no other reason than that civilian casualties may at any moment exceed the tipping point that compels the Biden administration to acquiesce to calls for a ceasefire), the White House should consider embracing another option that breaks the stranglehold of the binary choice\u2014war or ceasefire\u2014that is currently being debated. One option that achieves an outcome similar to Israeli victory but at lower risk and fewer civilian casualties, is Hamas\u2019 surrender.<\/p>\n

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M<\/span>odern wars rarely end in surrender. It is rarer still for surrender to mean the effective dissolution of one of the warring parties. Serbia, for example, was forced to capitulate to NATO in the Kosovo War but the result was its withdrawal from Kosovo territory, not its destruction as a political entity. Conversely, there are recent examples of insurgencies led by non-state actors that ended in the annihilation of the latter\u2014such as Russia\u2019s victory over separatists in the Second Chechen War and Sri Lanka\u2019s victory over the Tamil Tigers\u2014but both took over a decade to achieve, with intermittent bouts of diplomacy as well as many multiples of the current Gaza death toll.<\/p>\n

There is no example of surrender\u2014or, to use the more felicitous term, \u201claying down arms\u201d\u2014in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Past wars have ended in armistice agreements, UN Security Council resolutions, and sometimes even peace treaties. But there have been two \u201cfirst cousins\u201d to surrender: the August 1982 sea-borne departure from Beirut of about 11,000 armed PLO fighters, with most heading to Tunis, where Yasir Arafat re-established his headquarters; and Arafat\u2019s October 2004 departure from the Muqata in Ramallah after a year\u2019s siege and his relocation to Paris, where he died two weeks later. Neither is analogous to the current situation\u2014the latter was focused solely on getting rid of Arafat, not the entire PLO\/Palestinian Authority structure, and the former was viewed by many of its advocates as a way to preserve the PLO\u2019s role as the Arab League-endorsed \u201csole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.\u201d But the Beirut example does provide some aspects of a template, especially as it was brokered by the United States and other regional actors in order to end the siege of Lebanon\u2019s capital and to safeguard the city\u2019s population.<\/p>\n

In the current situation, Hamas is probably not close enough to battlefield defeat to consider the option of laying down its arms. It retains significant military capacity in southern Gaza and few of its highest-level leaders have been killed. If Israeli military operations in, around, and under Khan Younis begin to achieve their objectives however, this situation could change rapidly. If it appears that Hamas has lost command\/control of most of its military units, if a critical mass of senior leaders are captured or killed, or if the trickle of street protest against Hamas rule in Gaza becomes a flood, pursuing Hamas\u2019 capitulation would become a real policy option. It is important, therefore, to begin discussing and assessing the idea now.<\/p>\n

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I<\/span>n practical terms, Hamas is unlikely to consider laying down its arms\u2014that is, to surrender\u2014unless its leadership believes it faces imminent annihilation. Even then, it may require the collective will of a coalition of forces\u2014including key Arab states, PLO\/Palestinian Authority leadership figures, and key foreign capitals (including those in the so-called \u201cglobal south\u201d)\u2014to transform this from a talking point to a concrete policy option. No doubt, many of them would frame this proposal as a way to spare the Palestinians of Gaza further suffering and death. Similarly,\u00a0one can assume that Hamas would not only do its best to claim it was acting to save Gazans, but would add that it was trying to protect what remains of organizational cohesion (in order to preserve the option of fighting another day).<\/p>\n

For its part, Israel could consider Hamas\u2019 surrender much earlier, in order to escape the inexorable ticking of the political clock that may soon expire for waging war with the support of its principal ally in Washington. But even so, Israel would be thinking of Hamas\u2019 agreement to lay down its arms as a way to achieve its original war aims without having to complete the military mission of destroying Hamas in Gaza. Domestic politics would weigh heavily on decision-makers, because not only would Hamas\u2019 surrender look very different from its promised destruction, but also getting to that outcome would require Israeli leaders to grapple with hot-button political issues for which the War Cabinet, the governing coalition, and the nation at large may not be ready.<\/p>\n

In this environment, reconciling the two views of Hamas\u2019 surrender is difficult but not impossible, especially if the alternatives are war-to-the-finish or an imposed ceasefire. This would require clarity on several critical issues, including:<\/p>\n