The Jewish People Policy Institute\u2019s monthly Israeli Society Index finds that most of the Israeli public does not trust the IDF senior command. Fifty-five percent of Jewish respondents rated their level of trust in the senior command as \u201clow\u201d or \u201cvery low.\u201d This report has five main parts. The first deals with the war and its repercussions, the second with trust in leadership, the third with Israel-US relations, the fourth with the ultra-Orthodox conscription controversy, and the fifth with questions about Israel\u2019s future.<\/p>\n
To download the PDF version, click here<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n Additional Findings<\/strong><\/p>\n Concern about the Situation<\/strong><\/p>\n A large majority of Israeli citizens are very or somewhat concerned about Israel\u2019s security situation. On the right (including the center-right), the tendency is to be \u201csomewhat concerned,\u201d while those in the center and leaning left tend to be \u201cvery concerned.\u201d<\/p>\n A significant, though smaller majority are also concerned about Israel\u2019s economic situation. A majority of those on the political right are not concerned about Israel\u2019s economic condition (40% not very concerned, 18% not at all concerned). But among other groups, a majority of the center-right are concerned, and from the center leftward, a majority are very concerned.<\/p>\n Confidence in Victory<\/strong><\/p>\n July\u2019s Israeli Society Index shows a slight increase compared with May and June in the degree of confidence among Jewish Israelis that Israel will win the war. A third (35%) rated their confidence of victory at 1 or 2 on a scale of 1 to 5. Forty-one percent rated their confidence of victory at 4 or 5. Among Arab Israelis, 45% rated the likelihood of victory at the lower levels, while a quarter (26%) rated it at the higher levels (4 or 5).<\/p>\n Post-War Control of Gaza<\/strong><\/p>\n The July data also shows that most Israeli Jews are not interested in Israeli civilian control of Gaza after the war ends. However, there was a slight increase in the share of Jewish Israelis who want Israel to exercise both security and civilian control in Gaza; among right-wing groups this is now the majority view (54%). Regarding the various options offered in the survey, the largest group (among both Jews and Arabs)<\/p>\n chose \u201ccivilian control by Palestinians and Arab countries with security under Israeli responsibility\u201d as their preferred post-war arrangement. Slightly over a quarter of all Jewish respondents chose the option of full Israeli control, civilian and security related.<\/p>\n Tensions in the North<\/strong><\/p>\n The survey was conducted at a time of heightened tensions in the north, as reflected in increased rocket barrages on various targets within Israel. At the same time, warnings were issued about the damage Israel would suffer as a result of war in the north. This month\u2019s survey shows a slight drop in support for an Israeli offensive in Lebanon (immediately or once the war in Gaza ends), and a small rise in those favoring a diplomatic settlement of tensions in the north.<\/p>\n This change is evident among Jewish Israelis \u2013 among Arab Israelis there continues to be significant majority support for a diplomatic settlement (in the July survey, 67%). However, among Jewish<\/p>\n Israelis a majority still prefer an immediate or post-Gaza-War offensive (56%). Among coalition supporters, except for United Torah Judaism, an immediate offensive in Lebanon remains the main preference. This is the view of 45% of Likud voters, and 60% of Shas and Religious Zionist voters.<\/p>\n Cost of Security<\/strong><\/p>\n This month we detected a slight rise, compared to a similar question from March, in the percentage of Israelis who feel that taxes should be raised and the standard of living lowered in order to maintain Israel\u2019s security. This finding may be the result of reports on the amount of investment required, and the growth of Israel\u2019s deficit over the months of the war. The view in favor of a tax hike is especially pronounced among National Unity voters, and particularly low among the ultra- Orthodox and Arab Israelis. War and Morality<\/strong><\/p>\n The war is affecting Israeli opinion with respect to Israel\u2019s conduct under security threats. Compared with an identical question from two years ago, there has been a significant change (among Jews) in assessments of the right balance between the desire to behave morally in wartime, and the need to defend Israeli interests. Two years ago most of the public supported an emphasis on morality, balanced with concern for the state\u2019s interests (31% favored ethical behavior with exceptions, and 22% favored an equal balance), but today the weight has shifted toward an interest-based policy, with morality coming second (26% for interests only and 32% for interests with exceptions in cases of for serious moral violation).<\/p>\n For this question we find major ideology-driven disparities, with the right showing a significant preference (48%) for conduct solely based on interests (with no moral considerations), the center-right showing a clear preference (50%) for conduct based on interests but with exceptions, and the center and left giving greater priority to a balance or to an emphasis on morality. Religious Zionist voters are the firmest in their prioritization (54%) for interests alone. Among Meretz (left) voters, half prioritize moral considerations alone, or morality with exceptions.<\/p>\n Trust in Leadership<\/strong><\/p>\n July\u2019s findings indicate a slight additional slippage in public confidence in the government. Only 9% of Arab Israelis have fairly or very high confidence in the government. Among Jewish Israelis, 26% have fairly or very high confidence in the government (rightists: 56%).<\/p>\n Israelis who express high confidence in the government are mainly Likud and Shas voters. A small majority of Religious Zionist and Otzma Yehudit voters lack confidence in the government.<\/p>\n Confidence in the Government (Jews)<\/strong><\/p>\n Confidence in Prime Minister Netanyahu, has been low throughout the months of the crisis, and remains so in July. This month we examined support for the IDF command echelon with a question worded differently from those of previous months. Previously, we have asked about \u201ctrust in IDF commanders,\u201d but this month we queried \u201ctrust in the senior IDF command.\u201d<\/p>\n This change (and possibly other factors such as eroding confidence in the IDF\u2019s combat performance) led to a significant decline this month in Israelis\u2019 trust in the IDF command echelon compared with earlier months. The finding indicates that when the public looks explicitly at the senior command, and not at \u201ccommanders\u201d more generally (the term can also refer to mid-level commanders), over half express low or very low trust in the figures in question.<\/p>\n In general, trust in the senior IDF command drops the further right respondents are on the political spectrum (likewise, the further one moves toward the traditionalist and religious end of the religiosity scale). Among Jews who self-define as \u201cright-wing,\u201d eight in ten have low or very low trust in the IDF senior command. Among Jews who self-identify as \u201ccentrist,\u201d two out of three have high or very high trust in the senior command. Anti-Government Protests<\/strong><\/p>\n Nearly half of Israelis (47%) say they have been forced to \u201csit in a major traffic jam due to a protest against the government,\u201d and the likelihood of getting stuck in traffic due to protests was equal regardless of one\u2019s political affiliation or religiosity level. A lower, though still significant, percentage (42%) support the protests \u201cas they are,\u201d and 46% of Israelis think the protests \u201cexcessive\u201d (including some who support them \u201cin principle\u201d).<\/p>\n As expected, support for the protests, and opinions about whether or not they are excessive, differ from sector to sector in accordance with political orientation and religiosity level. Jewish centrists and leftists show high support for the protests, while those on the right show low support. However, a significant disparity between the right and left is worth noting: half of the latter support the demonstrations in principle, even though a large proportion of them think they are \u201cexcessive.\u201d<\/p>\n Interestingly, when we look at both questions (whether someone was stuck in traffic because of a protest and whether someone supports the protest) \u2013 we find no correlation between being personally affected by the protests and support for the protests themselves. That is, the fact of having been stuck or not having been stuck in a traffic jam caused by a demonstration did not lead respondents to change their views about the protests, or their assessment of the protests as excessive or not excessive. For example, the table below shows that the percentage of those who oppose the demonstrations and think they are excessive is 40% among those who have been caught in a traffic jam, and 41% among those who have not.<\/p>\n As Prime Minister Netanyahu\u2019s trip to the US and his speech before Congress approaches, most Israelis with an opinion on the matter would prefer that former President Donald Trump retake the presidency in this November\u2019s election. This preference is pronounced among Jewish Israelis, while the majority of Arab Israelis (64%) have no preference between the two candidates.<\/p>\n The percentage of Jews who \u201cas Israelis\u201d prefer President Biden to former President Trump is similar to the percentage of those who feel that Biden\u2019s support for Israel has remained strong since the start of the war. In February, at the height of the tension between the Biden administration and the Israeli<\/p>\n government, the share of Israelis who rated Biden\u2019s support for Israel as strong fell, but the percentage increased this month to a third of Jewish, and a majority of Arab Israelis (42%). Most Likud, Shas, and Religious Zionist voters feel that Biden did not support Israel even at the onset of the war, and that he doesn\u2019t support Israel today. Accordingly, among voters of the coalition parties, a very large majority (Likud \u2013 82%, Shas \u2013 94%, United Torah Judaism \u2013 89%, Religious Zionist \u2013 87%) would prefer that Trump be elected president of the United States this November.<\/p>\n When we cross-reference the election-preference question (whom respondents want as US president) with the question about Biden\u2019s support for Israel, we see a correlation between the two questions. Of those who prefer Biden, 75% feel that his support for Israel is strong. Among those who prefer Trump, most (25% and 29%) feel that Biden has not been supportive of Israel, either at the beginning of the war or in its later stages.<\/p>\n Israelis\u2019 assessment of the importance of Israel-US relations has not changed significantly in recent months. A large majority of Jewish and Arab Israelis agree that the US is an important ally of Israel. Among Jews, half feel that this fact demands that Israel compromise on its positions so as to maintain the alliance, while the other half feel that it does not necessitate compromise by Israel on its positions. These findings are very similar to those of the March survey. Willingness to compromise on positions is very high among the left and fairly high among centrists (61%), while among the right (including the center-right) a majority feel that \u201cthe US is an important ally, but that doesn\u2019t mean we have to accept its views. If we agree \u2013 great. If we disagree \u2013 Israel should do as it sees fit.\u201d<\/p>\n Most of Israel\u2019s Jewish population supports the recent Supreme Court ruling that affirmed that all young ultra-Orthodox men are eligible for conscription. As expected, the majority of the ultra-Orthodox do not favor this view, and the present survey\u2019s findings indicate that this is true of religious Israelis as well. Half of the religious respondents believe that the current situation is not equitable, but that it should be rectified \u201cgradually and through persuasion,\u201d and this is the reason why they do not support the Supreme Court ruling (this \u2013 or the distrust with which religious Jews regard the Supreme Court and its rulings overall).<\/p>\n In general, a small majority of those with an opinion on the matter support drafting yeshiva students into the IDF \u201cby any means, including coercion (or withholding funding).\u201d Among the secular the majority is more pronounced, but other groups prefer \u201cgradualism and persuasion.\u201d It should be noted that other versions of this question with options specifying different \u201csanctions\u201d to promote conscription produce a different breakdown of views, with a majority of traditionalists and the religious joining the consensus on conscription-promoting measures other than \u201cpersuasion.\u201d<\/p>\n In light of the recent months\u2019 demonstrations against the conscription of yeshiva students into the IDF, we looked at the level of support for these protests. A large majority of the respondents (72%) said that they had not been \u201cforced to sit in a traffic jam\u201d due to anti-conscription demonstrations. However, a majority do not support the protests, and feel that they are \u201cexcessive\u201d (this majority also includes Israelis who support the protests in principle).<\/p>\n Israel\u2019s Future <\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n In recent weeks, there have been lively discussions on social media regarding the possibility that many Israelis will emigrate to other countries. The July survey does not detect a change in the percentage of those seeking to leave Israel compared with a corresponding survey from March. A quarter of Jewish Israelis and four in ten Arab Israelis agree with the statement: \u201cIf I had a practical opportunity to emigrate, I would do so.\u201d Arab respondents showed a certain increase over March, but the sample is smaller, and it is too early to tell whether this constitutes a trend. Among Jewish Israelis, there has been almost no change on the issue of emigration since March. The percentage of those agreeing with the statement on emigration is higher among secular Israelis who identify with the center and the left (center \u2013 33%, center-left \u2013 36%), and significantly lower among religious Israelis (4%).<\/p>\n Among both Jewish and Arab Israelis, there has been a slight decline in optimism regarding Israel\u2019s future compared with the March survey, and a rise (mainly among Arabs) in the percentage of those who are pessimistic about the future of the state. Within the population as a whole, a small majority of pessimists outweighs optimists (51% versus 47%).<\/p>\n\n
The Ongoing War<\/h3>\n
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<\/a><\/p>\nIsrael and the US<\/u><\/strong><\/h3>\n
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<\/a><\/p>\nUltra-Orthodox Conscription<\/h3>\n
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