Main Finding<\/strong><\/p>\n In August, the Jewish People Policy Institute\u2019s (JPPI) monthly Israeli Society Index focused on the opinions and changing attitudes of secular Israeli Jews in relation to Judaism.<\/p>\n The report has three main parts: the first looks at changing attitudes regarding Jewish values; the second assesses changes in outlook and behavior in the wake of the Israel-Hamas war; the third examines the connection between secular Israeli Jews and the Diaspora.<\/p>\n Additional Findings<\/strong><\/p>\n Jewish Values<\/strong><\/p>\n This month\u2019s JPPI Israeli Society Index survey was devoted to secular Israeli Jews, particularly their attitudes toward issues pertaining to the \u201cJewishness\u201d of the individual and of society. Some questions were identical to those posed in JPPI\u2019s 2018 Survey of Israeli Judaism. Response comparisons make it possible to determine whether the beliefs and behaviors of secular Israeli Jews have changed significantly over the past six years. Other questions examined whether respondents feel that this past year\u2019s events (since the October 7 attacks) had an impact on their beliefs and behaviors with respect to \u201cJewishness.\u201d<\/p>\n The findings indicate that a large majority of secular Israeli Jews attach importance to their Jewish identity, and most express a strong sense of Jewishness. When respondents were asked to rate, on a scale of 1 to 10, the degree to which they \u201cfeel Jewish,\u201d the weighted result obtained for all secular Israeli Jews was on average 8.5 out of 10. Responses to this question, and several others, showed a significant disparity between the \u201ctotally secular\u201d subgroup and the subgroup that self-identified as \u201csecular-traditional.\u201d<\/p>\n Together, these two subgroups comprise half of all Israeli Jews (49% per the 2018 Israeli Judaism survey). It should be noted that Israeli Jewish society is divided into religiosity sectors in several different ways, each of which changes the picture to a certain degree. According to the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 45% of Israeli Jews self-identify as \u201csecular,\u201d while another 19% self-define as \u201csecular-traditional\u201d. For purposes of the JPPI survey, respondents were asked to self-identify anew, and the data in this report refers solely to the two groups that are clearly secular (totally secular or secular-traditional). The size of these two groups within the Israeli populace is not equal; 30% of Israeli Jews are \u201ctotally secular,\u201d while 20% are \u201csecular-traditional.\u201d<\/p>\n As mentioned, there is a consistent and substantial disparity between these two groups on a large share of the questions. This is also true for the question: \u201cTo what extent is it important to you that your children are Jewish?\u201d For this question, no significant change was found between the 2018 and 2024 findings. However, the gap between the two secular groups persisted, with 60% of the totally secular saying that it is important to them (important or very important) that their children be Jews, and a significantly higher share, 90%, of the secular-traditional saying the same.<\/p>\n We also looked at a number of beliefs and behaviors and asked respondents to agree or disagree whether they are essential to being \u201cgood Jew.\u201d These sort of judgments are, of course, subjective; we offered no rigorous clarification of the concept of a \u201cJew\u201d or of what constitutes \u201cgood.\u201d However, the ability to compare findings from this survey with those obtained six years ago in JPPI\u2019s Israeli Judaism survey, allows us to identify shifts in the views of Israelis (in this case, secular Jews) with respect to \u201cvalues\u201d over time.<\/p>\n A comparative analysis of the responses from both surveys reveals that attitudes toward Jewishness (traditions and religious observance) have remained substantially unchanged in recent years among secular Israeli Jews. However, there has been a certain upswing in the attribution of \u201cJewish value\u201d to several behaviors with a national dimension, such as serving in the IDF and having concern for all Jews. Because the comparison is between a survey conducted two weeks ago and one conducted six years ago, we have no way of knowing with absolute certainty whether the recent findings reflect the direct impact of the war, in the higher degree of attribution of \u201cJewishness\u201d to actions of a national character, but such a supposition would not be unreasonable.<\/p>\n When we looked at the question of whether one must observe \u201cholidays, rituals, and customs\u201d in the home to be a \u201cgood Jew,\u201d we found that most of the \u201ctotally\u201d secular answered no \u2013 as in the 2018 survey.<\/p>\n By contrast, most of the \u201csecular-traditional\u201d answered yes \u2013 again consistent with the 2018 findings. Overall, the comprehensive 2018 Israeli Judaism study, whose detailed findings and analysis<\/p>\n were published in a book by Shmuel Rosner and Camil Fuchs (#IsraeliJudaism: Portrait of a Cultural Revolution) determined that there is a major difference in the observance of rituals and customs between Israeli Jews from the \u201ctotally secular\u201d and \u201csecular-traditional\u201d subgroups. That is, self- identification as secular (\u201cthis is who I am\u201d) manifests itself both in terms of views (\u201cthis is what I believe\u201d) and customs (\u201cthis is what I do\u201d).<\/p>\n As the following table shows, the 2024 findings show a slight drop in the percentage of totally secular Jews who feel that performing rituals indicates a \u201cgood Jewishness,\u201d and a contrasting rise in the share of the \u201csecular-traditional\u201d subgroup who feel that observing rituals does indicate \u201cgood Jewishness.\u201d<\/p>\n While there was no significant change in findings vis-\u00e0-vis 2018 for Israel\u2019s secular Jewish population as a whole regarding views on the observance of Jewish traditions, a change common to both secular subgroups was detected in views that link \u201cJewish value\u201d to certain issues of a national character: greater \u201cJewish value\u201d is attributed to actions such as \u201cserving in the IDF.\u201d<\/p>\n As one can see, greater numbers among both the totally secular and the secular-traditional currently feel, \u201cto a very large degree,\u201d that IDF service is an indicator of being a good Jew.<\/p>\n Again, the assumption that this finding is inextricably linked the moment in time the survey was conducted \u2013 in the midst of war \u2013 would not be unreasonable.<\/p>\n Another question for which a significant disparity was found between the totally secular and the secular-traditional subgroups was whether, in order to be good Jew, one has to \u201cteach your children living in Israel.”<\/p>\n On this question there is also a substantial discrepancy between the survey from six years ago, when most of the totally secular felt that raising children to live in Israel was not a major condition for being a \u201cgood Jew,\u201d while most of the secular-traditional felt that instilling this value was an important factor in being a \u201cgood Jew.\u201d In the present survey this disparity not only persisted, it widened substantially. Among the totally secular there was no significant change in the attachment of Jewish value to teaching one\u2019s children to live in Israel compared with the 2018 survey, but among the secular-traditional there was an additional rise in the share of those who attach Jewish value to it.<\/p>\n In this context, it is worth recalling findings from JPPI\u2019s May 2024 Israeli Society Index, which found a highly significant gap between the \u201csecular\u201d and the \u201ctraditionalist, not so religious\u201d subgroups on the question \u201cWhere, in your opinion, should your children\/grandchildren live?\u201d The comparison between the 2018 survey and the one from this past May should be qualified, as the analysis was performed according to slightly different religiosity designations (for the former it was \u201ctotally secular\u201d and \u201csecular- traditional\u201d and for the latter it was the \u201csecular\u201d versus \u201ctraditionalist, not so religious\u201d).<\/p>\n Nevertheless, there is a certain overlap between these groups. One can see that the group with a relatively small majority (55%) who are certain the right place to live is Israel \u2013 the secular \u2013 is also the group with a lower proportion attributing \u201cJewish value\u201d to teaching the importance of living in Israel. By contrast, the group with the largest majority (79%) of those who are sure the right place for their children and grandchildren to live is Israel \u2013 the \u201ctraditionalist, not so religious\u201d\u2013 also have the largest share of those ascribing \u201cJewish value\u201d to raising one\u2019s children to live in Israel.<\/p>\n Jewishness in Wartime<\/strong><\/p>\n JPPI\u2019s August Israeli Society Index survey included two questions aimed at determining whether there has been a change in the attitudes and behaviors of secular Israeli Jews with respect to Jewish tradition. More precisely: the questions sought to determine whether the respondents feel there has been a change of any kind in their attitudes (actual attitudes have to be assessed via comparable questions from before and after October 7).<\/p>\n As expected, most respondents said that their sense of closeness to Judaism and the degree to which they engage in Jewish practices has not changed in the wake of October 7. However, both questions reveal something of the war\u2019s polarizing effect \u2013 in this case, between two secular subgroups, but the effect is also discernible when we distinguish between the views of secular Israeli Jews generally and the views of the rest of the Israeli population.<\/p>\n A large majority of all secular Jews, in both of the aforementioned subgroups, say that the events of October 7 and its aftermath have not affected their sense of closeness or distance from Judaism. However, among those who did report having been affected by the events, opposite effects were found among the two secular subgroups: a larger share of the totally secular felt distanced from Judaism by October 7 and its aftermath, while a larger percentage of secular-traditional say it has brought them closer to Judaism. Notably, these findings comport with findings from other recent surveys.<\/p>\n For example, a survey that looked at Israel\u2019s entire Jewish population broken down by Central Bureau of Statistics religiosity designations (a theMadad.com<\/a> survey) found a disparity between the sizeable percentage of secular Jews who said that \u201cthe grave events of October 7 and the war\u201d had distanced them from Judaism (24%) and the higher percentage of all the other groups (traditionalist, not so religious; traditionalist, religious; religious; ultra-Orthodox) who reported that the events had brought them closer to Judaism.<\/p>\n Also notable is that the gap between the two secular subgroups is not necessarily a matter of religiosity but is, rather, clearly linked to political orientation. A stronger left-wing orientation correlates with an increased probability that an Israeli will be \u201ctotally secular\u201d and the likelihood of their having been distanced from Judaism by the events of October 7 and its aftermath.<\/p>\n A comparison of the responses of all survey participants broken down by support levels for Israel\u2019s two centrist parties, Yesh Atid and National Unity, most of whose voters belong to the two secular subgroups, affirms this disparity \u2013 in traditional observance and with respect to the reaction to the events of October 7 and its aftermath (please note that the results do not reflect the views of all those who voted for the two parties, only the views of voters from the totally secular and secular-traditional subgroups).<\/p>\n This same polarizing effect, albeit at a lower level, can be seen in a question that does not pertain to general \u201ccloseness\u201d to Judaism, but rather to engagement in \u201cactions connected with Jewish tradition.\u201d Only a small percentage of secular Israeli Jews, a tenth in total, say they have changed their level of tradition-observance in the aftermath of October 7, and the main shift among the totally secular is in the direction of \u201clesser\u201d observance, while among the secular-traditional the more prevalent change is of \u201cadded\u201d observance.<\/p>\n Secular Israeli Jews and the Diaspora<\/strong><\/p>\n The trend once again takes on a uniform hue when the question of closeness versus distancing is posed regarding the attitudes of secular Israeli Jews toward Diaspora Jewry.<\/p>\n The June Israeli Society Index found, with regard to all Israeli Jews, that \u201cagainst the backdrop of anti-Israel demonstrations whose tone slid into antisemitism, and growing anxiety among Diaspora Jews [regarding] a wave of antisemitism, a significant rise has been detected this year in the sense of a shared fate between Israeli and Diaspora Jews. Compared with data from previous years, the percentage of Israeli Jews who \u2018strongly agree\u2019 that all Jews have a \u2018common future\u2019 has surged. If we add those who \u2018somewhat agree\u2019 with that statement, we find that eight in ten Israeli Jews see a \u2018common future\u2019 for Israeli and Diaspora Jews.<\/p>\n The consensus among the secular on this statement is smaller though still amounting to 70%, and 62% among left-wing Israelis. It is even larger among all other groups.\u201d<\/p>\n\n
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