To download the PDF version, click here<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n Continuation of the War<\/strong><\/p>\n As the first anniversary of the October 7 Hamas attacks and the start of the Israel-Hamas War approaches, this month\u2019s Index registered a certain rise in the percentage of Israelis who believe that Israel will win the war compared to recent months, although the percentage remains very low compared with the early months of the war. A majority of Arab Israelis \u201caren\u2019t certain\u201d Israel will win, as in previous months. Among Jews, nearly 40% assume that Israel will win (ratings of 4 and 5 on a scale of 1 to 5), while nearly a third assume that Israel will not win.<\/p>\n The Philadelphi Corridor and a Hostage Deal<\/strong><\/p>\n Data collection for the September Index, which began a few hours after the execution of six hostages in Gaza was disclosed, found a small Jewish majority who feel that \u201cIsrael must not relinquish control over the Philadelphi Corridor (the Egypt-Gaza border), even at the expense of hostage deal\u201d (49%). Among Arab Israelis, a very large majority (84%) favor a hostage deal. Weighting the two positions shows that slightly over half of the entire Israeli public supports a deal with terms that would obligate Israel to make significant concessions (51%). When this figure is compared with findings from other public surveys released around the same time, we find a similar percentage of deal-supporters across the board; JPPI found a slightly larger percentage than other surveys of those (Jewish Israelis) who oppose such a deal.<\/p>\n In view of the debate over Israel remaining (or not) in the Philadelphi Corridor, only a third of Israelis feel that the prime minister\u2019s stance on the hostage-deal issue is objectively based solely on \u201csecurity, humanitarian, and political\u201d considerations. Nearly half of Israelis (45%) think that the prime minister\u2019s considerations include his own \u201cpolitical benefit,\u201d and a fifth say that his considerations mix policy and politics (19%).<\/p>\n An examination of the question regarding Philadelphi and the hostages against the question about the prime minister and his considerations shows the degree to which confidence in the considerations of Israel\u2019s leadership overlaps with respondent views and their willingness to accept the policy that the leadership represents as correct. When responses to both questions are cross-referenced (in the table below, for Jewish Israelis), there is a clear overlap between support for Netanyahu\u2019s position (against leaving the Philadelphi Corridor) and the belief that Netanyahu\u2019s considerations are objective. Thus, among Jewish Israelis who believe that \u201cIsrael must not give up control over the Philadelphi Corridor, even if this means no hostage deal,\u201d the vast majority (74%) say that the prime minister\u2019s considerations are \u201cprimarily security, humanitarian, and political considerations.\u201d By contrast, among those who chose \u201cIsrael should give up control over the Philadelphi Corridor in order to facilitate a deal to free hostages,\u201d an even larger majority (86%) believe that \u201cthe prime minister\u2019s considerations are primarily of political benefit.\u201d<\/p>\n A Year of War<\/strong><\/p>\n The controversy over how to mark the one-year anniversary of the Hamas attacks, and the fact that there will be both a state (filmed) ceremony and a privately organized, crowd-funded civilian ceremony, finds expression in this month\u2019s survey. Most Jewish and Arab Israelis say they do not plan to view the state ceremony. Of all the ideological subgroups, only among the right is there a majority who say that they intend to watch the ceremony, meaning that the ceremony clearly bears a strong sectoral character. Among the religious, half say they will watch the ceremony, while a quarter of traditionalists and a much smaller percentage of the secular \u2013 18% \u2013 plan to do so.<\/p>\n Only a fifth of the Israeli public (and a quarter of Jewish Israelis) feels that \u201ca state ceremony is needed to mark October 7, and the government is right to organize it.\u201d A larger group, 40%, say that \u201cthe war isn\u2019t over yet and so it\u2019s too early to organize a state ceremony to mark October 7.\u201d The only group in which the dominant view is supportive of a government ceremony next month comprises those Israelis who self-identify as \u201cright-wing\u201d \u2013 47% chose the option \u201cA state ceremony is needed to mark October 7, and the government is right to organize it.\u201d All the other ideological groups take the view that the war hasn\u2019t yet ended and so there is no need for a state ceremony.<\/p>\n Opinions on the civil ceremony \u2013 the one that is referred to as the \u201calternative\u201d ceremony \u2013 are divided. A third of Jewish respondents feel that \u201cit\u2019s the right ceremony at this time\u201d (35%), while a similar percentage say that it is \u201ca ceremony that undermines the national character of the state memorial ceremony and shouldn\u2019t be held\u201d (32%). Responses to this question show disagreement along ideological lines, with the right-wing groups (right and center-right) largely opposing the civil ceremony, and the centrist and left-wing groups largely favoring it.<\/p>\n The Fighting in Lebanon<\/strong><\/p>\n As the fighting continues in northern Israel and southern Lebanon there has been a modest uptick in the share of Israelis who believe that Israel should open a second front in Lebanon and mount a military campaign against Hezbollah. This finding results from the changing views in the Jewish sector; a majority of the Arab sector believes that Israel should \u201ctry to reach an agreement with international support that will prevent the need for a war against Hezbollah.\u201d<\/p>\n When looking at the views of Jewish Israelis, we find a certain decline in the percentage of those who favor a de-escalation of the fighting via an agreement, and a rise in the share who think that a second front should be opened without delay \u2013 the latter is now the majority group.<\/p>\n The West Bank (Judea and Samaria)<\/strong><\/p>\n several reported attacks by West Bank settlers against Palestinians, and of the debate sparked regarding their causes, the correct response to them, their scope, and the collective responsibility of \u201call settlers\u201d for extreme incidents, we sought to determine how the Jewish public relates to these questions. Of the entire Jewish respondent pool, half characterized the incidents as \u201cdeplorable\u201d; a third said that the phenomenon is \u201cexaggerated\u201d; and a fifth felt that the attackers\u2019 actions were reasonable given what is happening in Judea and Samaria. As one might expect, the responses differ by ideological subgroup, with a third of those on the right (33%) choosing the \u201creasonable reaction\u201d option and 49% choosing the \u201cexaggerated\u201d option. Among centrist (75%) and left-wing respondents (93%) a large majority chose the \u201cdeplorable\u201d option.<\/p>\n Confidence in Leadership<\/strong><\/p>\n This month\u2019s survey showed no significant change in levels of confidence in the government. Less than a third of Israelis (and a third of Jews) have high or somewhat high levels of confidence in the government. A substantial majority of Israelis have low confidence in the government.<\/p>\n Confidence in the prime minister, like confidence in the government as a whole, remains low as well. Thirty percent of Israelis have high confidence in Benjamin Netanyahu, versus 68% who have low confidence in him. Among Jewish Israelis, 35% have high confidence in the prime minister, while 63% have low confidence in him. The only group with a majority of those with relatively high confidence in the prime minister is that of Jews who self-identify as \u201cright-wing\u201d (on a scale of 1 to 5). Within this group, 71% of respondents have high or somewhat high confidence in Netanyahu. Among the center- right, a majority do not have confidence in Netanyahu (55%). The highest level of confidence in the prime minister is found among Shas and United Torah Judaism voters. Among Likud voters, 78% have confidence Netanyahu \u2013 48% high confidence, 30% somewhat high confidence.<\/p>\n Confidence in the IDF senior command remains similar to what it was in July, when the question\u2019s wording changed from \u201cconfidence in IDF commanders,\u201d to \u201cconfidence in the senior IDF command.\u201d A steep decline was found between March and September in the share of respondents who have confidence in the senior command. Between the July and the September surveys there was no meaningful change in confidence levels. In this month\u2019s Index, a small majority of survey respondents, 56%, reported very low or somewhat low confidence in the IDF senior command.<\/p>\n When to Hold Elections<\/strong><\/p>\n Along with the relatively low trust in Israel\u2019s leadership most Israelis want early elections: half believe that elections should be held as soon as possible (within three months); a fifth believe that elections should be held some time after the war ends; and a third say that elections should be held at their scheduled time (October 2026). Among coalition-party voters, a majority of respondents feel that elections should be held at their scheduled time. However, a third believe that elections should be moved up to some degree (although not right away).<\/p>\n Compared with earlier questions about the timing of the elections, in which the response options varied in accordance with when the surveys were conducted, we can see that the percentage of those who want elections within three months is on the rise. One reason for this is that some respondents had expected a date for elections to have been set by now. The percentage who believe that elections should be held at their scheduled time remains quite similar to what it was in the past.<\/p>\n The Education System<\/strong><\/p>\n As the school year opened, with high school teachers on strike at the time the survey was conducted, a very low percentage of Israelis (18%), and a particularly low percentage of Jewish Israelis (14%) felt that the Israeli education system could be called \u201cgood.\u201d The dominant respondent view (and the majority view among Jewish respondents) is that the education system is \u201cmediocre.\u201d A third of respondents with an opinion on the matter believe that the education system is not good (the data refers to respondents who currently have or once had children in the education system).<\/p>\n On a question regarding Bible studies in Jewish schools, half of the respondents believe that the Bible should be studied in the schools \u2013 \u201ceach sector in its own way.\u201d Another quarter say that the Bible should be studied as cultural material, while a fifth believe it should be taught as religious study material. In all sectors except for the ultra-Orthodox, the majority response was that the Bible should be taught in each sector in its own way.<\/p>\n Religion and State<\/strong><\/p>\n Most of Israel\u2019s Jewish public supports the attorney general\u2019s ruling (whose implementation has in the meantime been delayed) that ultra- Orthodox families in which men obligated to enlist have not done so, will be unable to receive subsidized child day care. A third of the public (36%) feel that the ruling is \u201cexcessive.\u201d Among the ultra-Orthodox, unsurprisingly, a large majority oppose the decision. The religious subgroup, however, is almost evenly divided on the issue: 49% say that the decision is \u201cexcessive,\u201d while 43% say that it is correct.<\/p>\n Most of those who expressed an opinion, and half of the Jewish public, think the IDF is taking too long to draft yeshiva students, now that the Supreme Court has ruled against their exemption from IDF conscription. Regarding the pace at which the IDF is acting on this issue, there is a major difference in views between Jews at the less-traditional end of the spectrum and those at the more-traditional end.<\/p>\n Views also diverge regarding the lesson to be learned from the low level of ultra-Orthodox compliance with the requirement to report to the army recruiting offices since their exemption expired. For a large majority of secular Israelis, who constitute the country\u2019s largest population group, the lesson is that increased financial pressure in the form of sanctions should be applied in order to incentivize ultra- Orthodox draft-reporting compliance. The other groups (except for the ultra-Orthodox), are divided between those who feel that the low reporting levels are proof of a failed attempt to conscript yeshiva students against their will, and of the need to return to \u201cdialogue,\u201d and those who think that increased pressure should be exerted on those who do not report for the draft.<\/p>\n Arab Conscription<\/strong><\/p>\n Against the background of the debate over ultra-Orthodox conscription into the IDF, we also posed draft- related questions to Arab-sector respondents. The first question asked whether, \u201cin your opinion, this debate is also relevant to Israel\u2019s Arab sector.\u201d Nearly a third responded affirmatively (30%); the largest group (42%) responded negatively (\u201cnot relevant\u201d); and nearly a third said that they don\u2019t know.<\/p>\n A quarter of Arab Israeli respondents said that they \u201chope\u201d Israel \u201cwill also aspire to draft young Arab men for military or national service.\u201d Half responded that they hope this \u201cwon\u2019t happen.\u201d<\/p>\n Accordingly, when asked what the appropriate reaction to an Arab conscription initiative should be, half of the respondents said that the Arab Israeli leadership should oppose such an initiative, a quarter said that they don\u2019t know, and the remaining quarter, corresponding to those who \u201chope\u201d for such an initiative, said that it should be accepted or that there should be a dialogue about the details.<\/p>\n Prayer Services in Tel Aviv<\/strong><\/p>\n Most Israeli Jews oppose the Tel Aviv Municipality\u2019s decision to prohibit prayer services in public spaces during the High Holidays, due to its opposition to gender separation in the public sphere. Nearly half of the public (45%) oppose the decision because they believe \u201cthere is no problem with gender separation in the public sphere when there are those who want it.\u201d Another 16% think the decision was mistaken because \u201cthere is a limited place for gender separation in the public sphere.\u201d However, a small majority of the secular (52%) support the decision.<\/p>\n Israel\u2019s Future<\/strong><\/p>\n In recent months there has been a lowering of Israelis\u2019 assessment of the country\u2019s security and economic resilience. On a scale of -5 (weakness) to 5 (strength), Israelis gave the country\u2019s security strength an average rating of 2.75, and its economic strength a rating of 2.26. For both parameters there is a large rating disparity between Jews (who feel that Israel is stronger) and Arabs (who think the country is less strong).<\/p>\n Compared with the findings for an identical question asked in January (to Jewish Israelis), assessments have grown more negative regarding Israel\u2019s strength. It should be noted that, unlike many other questions, the strength rating does not significantly overlap with political orientation. The highest rating of Israel\u2019s security strength was given by the center-right and centrist groups (3.5). The highest economic strength rating was given by the right (3.46). However, in both cases the ratings are substantially lower among the center-left and the left.<\/p>\n Optimism Levels<\/strong><\/p>\n There was no significant change this month in the optimism\/pessimism levels of Israelis compared with previous months. On a scale of -5 (pessimism) to 5 (optimism), the Israeli average is 1.2. As in previous months, a large gap was found between Jews (1.71) and Arabs (-0.84). Optimism levels vary greatly<\/p>\n in accordance with traditionalism levels and political orientation; in general, the closer one is to the Traditionalist\/religious and right-wing end of the spectrum, the more optimism expressed.<\/p>\nAdditional Findings<\/strong><\/h3>\n
\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/11-3.png\")
<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/WhatsApp-Image-2024-09-15-at-9.57.20-AM.jpeg\")
<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/12-2.png\")
<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/13-3.png\")
<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/14-3.png\")
<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/15-1.png\")
<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/16-2.png\")
<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/17-3.png\")
<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/WhatsApp-Image-2024-09-15-at-9.57.01-AM.jpeg\")
<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/18-1.png\")
<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/19-3.png\")
<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/WhatsApp-Image-2024-09-15-at-9.57.20-AM-2.jpeg\")
<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/20-1.png\")
<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/WhatsApp-Image-2024-09-15-at-9.57.20-AM-1.jpeg\")
<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/21-3.png\")
<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/22-3.png\")
<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/24-2.png\")
<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/26-1.png\")
<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/28.png\")
<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/29-2.png\")
<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/30-2.png\")
<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/31-1.png\")
<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/32-1.png\")
<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/33-1.png\")
<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/34-1.png\")
<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/35-1.png\")
<\/a><\/p>\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/36-1.png\")
<\/a><\/p>\n