{"id":20943,"date":"2025-01-10T10:45:50","date_gmt":"2025-01-10T08:45:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/?p=20943"},"modified":"2025-01-10T10:45:50","modified_gmt":"2025-01-10T08:45:50","slug":"katz-halevi-clash-weakens-israels-security","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/en\/katz-halevi-clash-weakens-israels-security\/","title":{"rendered":"Katz-Halevi clash weakens Israel&#8217;s security"},"content":{"rendered":"<h3 style=\"direction: ltr;\">Our enemies are constantly watching, waiting for an opportunity to exploit any weakness in Israeli society.<\/h3>\n<p style=\"direction: ltr;\">Here is something that might not be easy to accept \u2013 two truths can exist side-by-side.<\/p>\n<p style=\"direction: ltr;\">This week, we saw an example of this when Defense Minister Israel Katz harshly criticized IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi and Spokesperson Brig.-Gen. Daniel Hagari for failing to cooperate with the State Comptroller\u2019s inquiry into the IDF\u2019s failures leading up to October 7.<\/p>\n<p style=\"direction: ltr;\">The comptroller sent a stern letter to Halevi on Monday, accusing the top IDF leadership of intimidating senior officers who were giving testimony in the investigation and of coaching them on how to answer questions. The comptroller also accused Halevi of attempting to suppress the truth.<\/p>\n<p style=\"direction: ltr;\">This latest conflict between Katz and Halevi is part of a broader, ongoing battle at the top of Israel\u2019s defense establishment. Last month, Katz announced that he would not approve the promotion of senior officers who had not been cleared of responsibility for the October 7 failures. Katz also ordered Halevi to complete the internal IDF inquiries into the events by the end of January and to present them to the families of the fallen soldiers and to the public.<\/p>\n<p style=\"direction: ltr;\">Contrary to how the IDF has historically operated \u2013 as an army with a country attached rather than a country with an army \u2013 the defense minister is the civilian authority responsible for directing the military. Halevi, as the head of the IDF, is subordinate to Katz and, by extension, to the government. In any democracy, no one is above the law, and the defense minister is within his rights to demand accountability from the military.<\/p>\n<p style=\"direction: ltr;\">If the defense minister orders an investigation, then that investigation must be carried out. Similarly, the defense minister has every right to withhold approval for promotions until those responsible for the October 7 failures have been cleared.<\/p>\n<p style=\"direction: ltr;\">Many of Katz\u2019s predecessors acted as rubber stamps when it came to senior IDF appointments, but they were wrong to do so. Maintaining civilian oversight, especially in the wake of a catastrophic event such as October 7, is essential. The IDF\u2019s leadership, particularly Halevi, must be held to account. This is truth number one.<\/p>\n<p style=\"direction: ltr;\">TRUTH NUMBER two, however, complicates the matter. Part of Katz\u2019s reasoning appears to be political, with a clear intention to pressure Halevi into resigning and finally accepting responsibility for the failures that allowed Hamas to launch its successful invasion on October 7.<\/p>\n<p style=\"direction: ltr;\">If Halevi resigns, Katz and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will be able to assert that it was the chief of staff who failed in his role. They can claim that, after Halevi took responsibility and stepped down, the country can move forward. This would allow Netanyahu and Katz to deflect any blame from themselves, placing it squarely on the IDF. This political maneuver would help them avoid personal accountability.<\/p>\n<p style=\"direction: ltr;\">Katz is absolutely justified in demanding transparency and the adherence to civilian oversight, particularly in light of the October 7 failures. In a democracy, the military cannot operate independently of civilian authority, and Katz\u2019s insistence on investigations and promotions is in line with the democratic expectation of holding those in power accountable.<\/p>\n<p style=\"direction: ltr;\">On the other hand, the uncomfortable truth is that Katz\u2019s actions may not be motivated purely by a commitment to transparency and justice. Both of these truths \u2013 Katz\u2019s right to demand accountability and his potential political motives \u2013 exist side-by-side, influencing one another in a tangled web of responsibility and politics.<\/p>\n<p style=\"direction: ltr;\">It is also difficult to ignore the underlying tensions between Katz and Halevi in the context of the current coalition battle over the IDF draft bill. This bill aims to create a path for ultra-Orthodox Israelis to serve in the IDF while also allowing most of them to remain in yeshivas and avoid service.<\/p>\n<p style=\"direction: ltr;\">On Tuesday, Katz attempted to conceal from the High Court the IDF\u2019s position on its ability to enlist the 80,000 haredim who currently enjoy exemption from service. While the IDF had initially stated that it would take years to implement such a change, Halevi recently revised this position and informed the court accordingly.<\/p>\n<p style=\"direction: ltr;\">Faced with serious political challenges within the coalition, Katz\u2019s response with his public blasting of the chief of staff on Wednesday was almost predictable.<\/p>\n<p style=\"direction: ltr;\">Putting that aside, there are two primary points to consider. First, it is time for Halevi\u2019s term as chief of staff to come to an end. This has been apparent for many months now, and personally, I believe he should have resigned back in April, after Military Intelligence chief Aharon Haliva stepped down due to his role in the October 7 debacle. If Halevi could appoint a replacement for Haliva \u2013 someone else who was tainted by the failures of that day \u2013 and then embark on a round of appointments of generals, then there\u2019s no reason why Halevi himself cannot be replaced.<\/p>\n<p style=\"direction: ltr;\">FURTHERMORE, HALEVI\u2019S continued tenure is eroding the very ethos a military should stand for. Officers who fail in their roles and cause costly mistakes, as we saw on October 7, cannot remain in their positions. What message does Halevi\u2019s persistence in office send to young cadets currently training to become officers? What do they learn about accountability and personal responsibility when senior officers are not held to the same standards?<\/p>\n<p style=\"direction: ltr;\">The second consideration is more immediate: Katz is making a strategic mistake. His public feud with Halevi is undermining Israeli security. Our enemies are constantly watching, waiting for an opportunity to exploit any weakness in Israeli society. After all, it was precisely during the vulnerability of the 2023 judicial overhaul that Hamas launched its deadly attack.<\/p>\n<p style=\"direction: ltr;\">Katz and Halevi should sit down and work out a process for resolving the ongoing issues. After a week in which six soldiers were killed in Gaza, is this the message the military leadership should be sending to their families? These are people who are paying the ultimate price, and yet, at the highest levels of the IDF and Defense Ministry, the minister and the chief of staff are engaged in a public dispute. Do they have no shame?<\/p>\n<p style=\"direction: ltr;\">Katz and Halevi \u2013 Stop and figure it out.<\/p>\n<p style=\"direction: ltr;\"><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/www.jpost.com\/opinion\/article-836856\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Published by Jerusalem Post<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n\n<!-- AddThis Advanced Settings generic via filter on the_content --><!-- AddThis Share Buttons generic via filter on the_content -->","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Our enemies are constantly watching, waiting for an opportunity to exploit any weakness in Israeli society.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":20944,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"tags":[],"class_list":["post-20943","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","topics-geopolitics","library-op-ed","library-publications"],"acf":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/20943","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=20943"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/20943\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":20945,"href":"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/20943\/revisions\/20945"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/20944"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=20943"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=20943"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}