\u00a0Findings<\/strong><\/p>\n The Hostage Deal<\/strong><\/p>\n Last month, a deal was signed to release the remaining hostages and for a temporary ceasefire in Gaza. The deal was accepted under pressure from President Trump and mediated by the United States, Qatar, and Egypt, after many months of negotiation. This month, with the succeeding phases of hostage release, we examined the views of Israelis on the deal\u2019s continuation. It is important to note that the survey data was collected at the start of February, before the meeting between President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu in Washington; in this dynamic reality, where events unfold at a rapid pace, responses are likely to also change quickly.<\/p>\n JPPI\u2019s February Israeli Society Index indicates that most of the Israeli public, Jews and Arabs, supports completing the hostage deal in full, and delaying the decision about the fate of Hamas rule in Gaza until afterward. A fifth of the public, and a quarter of Jewish Israelis, would prefer to halt the hostage deal after Phase 1, so that the fighting in Gaza could resume with the aim of toppling the Hamas regime. Among Arab Israelis, three in four support completion of the deal, and only a small minority support resuming the fighting. Last month\u2019s JPPI Israeli Society Index (January 2025) showed a similar finding, with 55% of the public supporting the statement \u201cWe can agree to Hamas\u2019s demands and return the hostages, because it will always be possible to find a way to resume fighting.\u201d<\/p>\n In a breakdown by ideological camp, there is a majority across cohorts in support of the statement \u201cFull execution of the hostage deal, and then the decision about the future of Hamas rule in Gaza,\u201d except for the self-identified \u201cright-wing\u201d cohort, in which nearly half (48%) support resuming the war at the end of Phase 1 of the deal, and a third (32%) support continuing with the deal. When the results are broken down by voting pattern and support for the various political parties, we see that supporters of two parties \u2013 National Religious Party\u2013Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit \u2013 clearly favor resuming the war after the first phase of the deal. Seventy percent of National Religious Party\u2013Religious Zionism adherents and 60% of Otzma Yehudit supporters (those who say they would currently vote for these parties) support resuming the war. In terms of religiosity level, however, a majority of religious Jews (not all of whom, of course, vote for the aforementioned parties) prefer completing the deal (45%, versus 38% who prefer halting the deal at the end of Phase 1).<\/p>\n Among Likud voters, a small majority support continuing with the deal (43% versus 40%). Supporters of the opposition parties show a clear and overwhelming preference for continuing with the deal \u2013 89% of Yesh Atid voters, 79% of Yisrael Beiteinu supporters, and 99% of The Democrats backers.<\/p>\n The Trump Plan<\/strong><\/p>\n US President Donald Trump has raised the possibility of relocating Arab residents of the Gaza Strip to another country. Approximately seven in ten Israelis support this idea. The survey also shows that a majority of Jewish Israelis view this as \u201ca practical plan that should be advanced,\u201d even before the February 4 Trump-Netanyahu meeting in Washington. Most Arab Israelis oppose Trump\u2019s proposal.<\/p>\n Forty-three percent of all Israelis think the Trump plan is \u201cpractical\u201d and should be advanced. A small majority of Jewish Israelis (52%) hold this view; another 30% think the plan \u201cis impractical \u2013 but wish that it were.\u201d That is, they support it but do not think it has a real chance of being implemented. Overall, over eight in ten Jewish Israelis support the plan in theory or practice.<\/p>\n In total, 14% of all Israelis (13% of Jews) believe that the plan is a \u201cdistraction,\u201d a response that does not indicate explicit opposition to the proposal but does reflect reluctance to engage with it. The share of Israelis who believe that President Trump\u2019s plan is \u201cimmoral\u201d because it involves an \u201cunacceptable transfer\u201d is 13%, nearly all of them Arab Israelis (54% gave this response). Among Jewish Israelis, 3% think the proposal is \u201cimmoral.\u201d<\/p>\n In a breakdown by ideological orientation, a clear majority of right-wing and center-right respondents embrace the plan and think it is practical (81% among the right, 57% among the center-right). In the centrist and center-left camps, a majority back the plan, but only a minority believe it is practical (31% of centrists). Only in the \u201cleft-wing\u201d cohort, a relatively small group (7% of all Jewish Israelis), is there a majority who express reservations about engaging with the plan or about its morality, although moral reservations do not dominate this cohort either (27% among the left-wing cohort , and a total of 3% of the entire Jewish Israeli population). In terms of support for the plan by political-party affiliation, most Likud voters think the plan is desirable and practical (71%), most National Unity voters think it is desirable but not practical (51%), and a majority of Labor voters think it is a \u201cdistraction\u201d or \u201cimmoral\u201d (62%).<\/p>\n Overall, a proposal involving the transfer of a significant number of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip \u2013 a move many Israelis once considered illegitimate \u2013 now has broad support among Jewish Israelis, and to the extent that it is disfavored, the reason is usually practicability (\u201ca distraction\u201d), not principle. Surveys from the 1990s and the first decade of this century that examined views about a transfer of the Arabs in the territories generally found Jewish support in the 40 to 50% range.<\/p>\n As noted, survey data was collected just prior to the Netanyahu-Trump meeting, and points to a slight drop in the percentage of Israelis who say they are \u201cvery confident\u201d the president will \u201cdo the right thing\u201d with regard to US-Israel relations \u2013 although this finding is surely more likely than other survey findings to be subject to change in the wake of the meeting. While last month a third (32%) of Israelis attested to great confidence in Trump, this month a fifth (20%) did so. However, this month as well most Israelis said they are confident in Trump (very confident + somewhat confident).<\/p>\n Confidence in the Country\u2019s Leadership and in Victory<\/strong><\/p>\n This month we reworded our question on confidence of an Israeli victory in the war, and that change is reflected in the survey results. Until now, we posed a future- oriented question about the war \u2013 how confident respondents are that Israel \u201cwill win.\u201d This month, given the ceasefire, which currently appears to be a major pause in the war, we queried confidence levels in the present tense \u2013 \u201cTo what extent do you believe that Israel is winning and\/or has won the war?\u201d<\/p>\n The disparity is clear: last month two in five Jewish Israelis said they were \u201ctotally confident\u201d that Israel would win, but this month less than 10% said that Israel is \u201cwinning or has won.\u201d There has also been a rise in the share of respondents who are \u201cnot at all confident\u201d that Israel \u201cis winning or has won\u201d the war. There is lack of consensus across cohorts that Israel is winning or has won the war. In a breakdown of voters in the 2022 elections, the two parties with the highest respondent share certain that Israel is winning or has won the war are Shas (20%) and Likud (17%).<\/p>\n Among all Israelis, half (50%) say that their confidence in the government is \u201cvery low,\u201d versus 8% who say it is \u201cvery high.\u201d Most Jewish Israelis say their confidence in the government is low (very low + somewhat low), while a third say that it is high (very high + somewhat high). There was no significant change this month in levels of confidence in the government. This month, a fifth (17%) of Arab Israelis say that their confidence level is high (very high + somewhat high), while three in four (78%) say their confidence in the government is low (very low + somewhat low).<\/p>\n Twenty-nine percent of Likud voters, 48% of National Religious Party\u2013Religious Zionism voters, and 32% of United Torah Judaism voters say that their confidence in the government is low (very low + somewhat low).<\/p>\n Some two-thirds of Israelis report that their level of confidence in Prime Minister Netanyahu, is low (very low + somewhat low), while a third say their confidence in the prime minister is high (very high + somewhat high). This breakdown has remained stable throughout the past year. A large majority of secular Israelis (78%) and most religious (Dati) Israelis (54%) say that their degree of confidence in<\/p>\n Netanyahu is low (very low + somewhat low). A fifth (22%) of those who voted Likud in the 2022 elections say this as well.<\/p>\n Attitudes on Social Situation<\/strong><\/p>\n This month, we looked at various aspects of cohesion in Israeli society. Most Israeli citizens are concerned (very concerned + somewhat concerned) about the state of social conditions in Israel. There has been little change over the last year. More than a third of Israeli citizens are \u201cvery concerned\u201d about the social situation (38%); the share among Arabs is higher (45%). This concern about the social situation is shared by all sectors of the Jewish public. It is higher among the secular (91% are very or quite concerned) but is also shared by a majority of the religious (Dati\u2019im) (71%), religious traditionalists (Masortim) (73%), non-religious traditionalists (79%), and the ultra-Orthodox (Haredim) (61%).<\/p>\n Perceptions of Political Extremism<\/strong><\/p>\n Among Jewish Israelis, 29% believe that most Arab Israelis are politically extremist, 28% say that many Arab Israelis are politically extremist, 34% think some Arab Israelis are politically extremist, and 7% say that few Arab Israelis are politically extremist. In the past year there has been a slight uptick in the percentage of Jewish respondents who feel that many or most Arab Israelis are politically extremist. This month, we also looked at Arab-sector responses to the same question \u2013 36% of Arab Israelis believe that very few Arabs in Israel are politically extremist, 31% say that some are extremist, 16% think many are extremist, and 7% feel that most are extremist.<\/p>\n The general perception of Jewish Israelis is that the level of political extremism within their own ranks is significantly lower than their Arab-Israeli counterparts. Half of Jews (51%) believe that some Jewish Israelis are extremist, a quarter (26%) say that few Jews are extremist, and a fifth (19%) think that many Jews are extremist. There were no major changes in Jewish responses to this question compared to last year.<\/p>\n Arab-Israeli perceptions of Jewish-Israeli political extremism differ widely from those of the Jews themselves. A quarter (28%) of Arab Israelis believe that most Jewish Israelis are extremist, a third (35%) say that many are extremist, a fifth (18%) think that some Jews are extremist, while a tenth (9%) think that few Jewish Israelis are politically extremist. Arab-Israeli responses are similar to a year ago, but about 10% have changed their response from \u201cmost of them\u201d to \u201cmany of them\u201d \u2013 a slight trend toward moderation (although one can see that in the three surveys noted here, the degree of fluctuation between response options is quite high).<\/p>\n Perceptions of Different Social Groups<\/strong><\/p>\n This month\u2019s survey also looked at how the social situation affects attitudes toward different sectors of society. The survey questionnaire allowed participants to choose their \u201cmain feelings\u201d regarding different groups, and gave respondents eight options: closeness, partnership, appreciation, indifference, fear, anger, hatred, or \u201cnone of the above.\u201d The two groups that elicited the highest share of positive sentiment were IDF soldiers and the Druze (84%).<\/p>\n Results for the population as a whole indicate a dominant feeling of \u201ccloseness\u201d when the question pertains to IDF soldiers (47% of the total population, 56% of Jews). The feeling of \u201cpartnership\u201d predominates among Jews with regard to the Druze (51%). \u201cAnger\u201d predominates among non-ultra-Orthodox Jews with regard to the ultra-Orthodox (42%). Most Arab responses with regard to most sectors were \u201cindifference\u201d or \u201cnone of the above.\u201d<\/p>\n As can be seen from the overall ranking of sentiments (broken down into negative and positive), the major change compared to last year is how the ultra-Orthodox are regarded \u2013 feelings about whom became significantly more negative, possibly a result of the conscription controversy. We see a rise in positive attitudes toward the \u201cNational Religious\u201d (Dati Leumi) and toward \u201csettlers.\u201d<\/p>\n There has also been an increase in positive regard toward \u201chigh-tech entrepreneurs,\u201d mainly due to a significant jump in the sentiment of \u201cappreciation\u201d \u2013 from 36% last year to 45% this year. There has been a decline in positive sentiment toward the \u201cBedouin,\u201d stemming from a drop in \u201cappreciation\u201d and a rise in \u201cfear.\u201d<\/p>\n Arab sentiment rankings differ substantially from Jewish rankings; therefore, we have displayed them separately.<\/p>\n Many Arab Israelis have an attitude of \u201cindifference\u201d toward a large proportion of Israel\u2019s social sectors. When we look at the rankings for those sectors toward which Arab feelings are positive, we find that most are, above all, minority sectors (Muslims, Bedouin, Druze), or Jewish sectors identified with centrist and left-wing views (leftists, kibbutzniks, high-tech entrepreneurs, \u201cTel Avivim\u201d).<\/p>\n Settlers elicited a higher level of positive sentiment among Jews over last year, but the greatest degree of negativity among Arabs. When breaking down this heightened positivity by specific sentiments, we find that most of the change stems from increased \u201cappreciation\u201d among the secular. Half of secular respondents still regard settlers negatively (49%), especially with \u201canger.\u201d However, compared to<\/p>\n last year the share of the secular who regard settlers with \u201canger\u201d dropped from 42 to 35%, with an 8% overall decline in negativ feelings. The area in which the shift toward positive sentiment is evident is secular \u201cappreciation\u201d for settlers. In last year\u2019s survey, one in ten secular respondents expressed \u201cappreciation\u201d for settlers; this year the share is 17%. This change may stem from the prominence of settlers in IDF combat units, and among the war\u2019s wounded and fallen.<\/p>\n This year, in the survey\u2019s breakdown of sentiment toward different sectors, we again looked at how the religious (Dati\u2019im) feel about the ultra-Orthodox (Haredim), versus how Haredim feel about the Dati\u2019im. In this comparison we see that the Haredim have almost no negative feelings about Dati\u2019im, but a sizeable subset of Dati\u2019im (43%) cite \u201canger\u201d toward the Haredim as their dominant sentiment. While a third (30%) of Haredim say their main feeling toward Dati\u2019im is appreciation, less than a tenth (8%) of Dati\u2019im say the same about the Haredim.<\/p>\n\n
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