{"id":22803,"date":"2025-03-31T14:41:19","date_gmt":"2025-03-31T11:41:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/?p=22803"},"modified":"2025-03-31T14:45:09","modified_gmt":"2025-03-31T11:45:09","slug":"%d7%9e%d7%93%d7%93-%d7%94%d7%97%d7%91%d7%a8%d7%94-%d7%9c%d7%90%d7%95%d7%a7%d7%98%d7%95%d7%91%d7%a8-2024-%d7%a2%d7%9c%d7%99%d7%99%d7%94-%d7%91%d7%90%d7%9e%d7%95%d7%9f-%d7%91%d7%a1%d7%99%d7%9b%d7%95","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/en\/%d7%9e%d7%93%d7%93-%d7%94%d7%97%d7%91%d7%a8%d7%94-%d7%9c%d7%90%d7%95%d7%a7%d7%98%d7%95%d7%91%d7%a8-2024-%d7%a2%d7%9c%d7%99%d7%99%d7%94-%d7%91%d7%90%d7%9e%d7%95%d7%9f-%d7%91%d7%a1%d7%99%d7%9b%d7%95\/","title":{"rendered":"JPPI Israeli Society Index \u2013 October 2024: Increase in confidence in the possibility of winning the war"},"content":{"rendered":"

Main Finding<\/h1>\n

The Jewish People Policy Institute\u2019s (JPPI) monthly Israeli Society Index is being published earlier than usual this month, as we reach the one-year mark of the Hamas onslaught and the start of the war. Perhaps its most startling finding is that half of Israelis think the war will continue for another year or more. At the same time, there has been a significant rise in public confidence that Israel can win the war, and an improvement in the Israeli army\u2019s image of military strength.<\/p>\n

The report has three main parts: confidence in the IDF and victory; a year of war; and trends within Israeli society.<\/p>\n

To download the PDF version, click here.<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Additional Findings<\/h1>\n
    \n
  • In the wake of the IDF\u2019s successful operations in Lebanon: a rise in public confidence in the IDF senior command and Israel\u2019s chances of winning the war.<\/li>\n
  • There is relatively low public confidence in the senior command of the Israel Police, especially among the center-left and the ultra-Orthodox.<\/li>\n
  • There has been an improvement in perceptions of Israel\u2019s military power, in light of the past month\u2019s events, but there has been further decline in perceptions of the country\u2019s economic strength.<\/li>\n
  • After a year of war, a substantial percentage of Israelis feel \u201cworried\u201d; the dominant emotions on the political right are determination and optimism.<\/li>\n
  • A small majority agree that the war has been prolonged because \u201cthe missions are complex\u201d and because the government has interfered in decision-making.<\/li>\n
  • Most of the public agrees that international pressure has been an obstacle to Israel completing its war missions.<\/li>\n
  • Most of the public does not believe that the war has been prolonged because the (Israeli) legal system hinders the IDF; a majority on the right believe this to be the case.<\/li>\n
  • A small majority agree that the war has been prolonged due to the coalition\u2019s political interests; coalition voters reject this idea.<\/li>\n
  • Among those identifying with the political center and left, there is wide agreement that \u201cIsrael has abandoned the hostages and has lost interest in them.\u201d<\/li>\n
  • Those on the right and center-right attribute the situation of the hostages to the fact that the war hasn\u2019t ended and Hamas is uninterested in a potential deal.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

    Confidence in Victory<\/h1>\n

    JPPI\u2019s October Israeli Society Index detects a significant rise in confidence among Jewish Israelis that Israel will win the war. The share of those \u201ccompletely confident\u201d that Israel will win jumped 28% between the September and October surveys. The October survey was conducted after two weeks of IDF operational success in Lebanon, but before the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and the second missile attack from Iran.
    \n\"\"
    \n\"\"
    \nConfidence in victory rose mainly among those groups self-identifying as right-wing (right and center-right), which constitute a majority of Israel\u2019s Jewish population, but there has also been a rise in confidence among those who self-identify as center-left. The table below shows the increase in the percentage of those who gave the highest rating (5 on a scale of 1 to 5) to their confidence level. In general, the highest level of confidence in victory characterizes the right-wing cohorts and, on the religiosity scale, the group designated \u201creligious.\u201d Likud, Shas, and Religious Zionist Party voters (2022 elections) express greater confidence than the voters of other parties. Among the opposition electorate, National Unity voters show a relatively high confidence level compared to voters of the other opposition parties. Forty-one percent of National Unity voters rated their confidence at the highest level (5), versus 20% of Yesh Atid voters and 4% of Yisrael Beiteinu voters.
    \n\"\"
    \n\"\"
    \nA concomitant rise in confidence was also found this month regarding the IDF\u2019s senior command. The share of respondents who attest to \u201cvery high\u201d confidence jumped from 9% a month ago to 21% in the present survey. Increased confidence in the senior command is evident across all population groups, but much more pronounced among those on the center-right and leftward. The share of those with very high confidence in the senior command did not rise in the present survey vis-\u00e0-vis last month\u2019s survey, but the percentage of those who place \u201cfairly high\u201d trust increased significantly among the right-wing cohorts as well (from 15% to 26%). And, as noted, this survey was conducted before the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, which likely sparked an additional increase of confidence in the senior command.
    \n\"\"
    \nThis month, we added to the survey an assessment of confidence in the senior command of the Israel National Police (INP), due to lively public debate over personnel changes, and the influence of National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir on the character and conduct of the police. Overall, confidence levels in the INP senior command are low compared to confidence in the IDF senior command. Among Arab Israelis, confidence is especially low, but a significant majority of Jewish Israelis (67%) also express fairly or very low confidence in the INP command echelon.
    \n\"\"
    \nConfidence in the senior INP command is quite low among all groups, but it is influenced both by political and religious orientation. Generally, as one moves rightward on the ideological spectrum, one\u2019s confidence in the INP senior command rises, but that rise is curtailed by the fact that confidence in the police command among the ultra-Orthodox (Haredim) \u2013 a large majority of whom self-identify as \u201cright-wing\u201d \u2013 is low. Sixty-two percent of the Haredim express low levels of confidence in the INP command.<\/p>\n

    Image of Strength<\/h1>\n

    The rise in Israelis\u2019 sense of the country\u2019s capabilities in light of the Lebanon successes is also reflected in a rapid and sharp change in their assessment of Israel\u2019s strength. This month, like last month, we asked respondents to rate Israel\u2019s military strength on a scale of -5 (weakness) to +5 (strength). The change is evident in the rising averages for both Jewish and Arab Israelis in rating Israel\u2019s military strength.
    \n\"\"
    \nAt the same time, a further decline vis-\u00e0-vis last month was noted in how Israel\u2019s economic strength is rated, despite the fact that the survey was conducted before the official announcement of Moody\u2019s second downgrading of Israel\u2019s credit rating this year (at the time the survey was conducted, reports of a probable additional downgrade were circulating, but the steepness of the drop (two notches) came as a surprise).
    \n\"\"<\/p>\n

    A Year of War<\/h1>\n

    As the first year of war ends, a large majority of Israelis do not expect the war to end in the near future (days or weeks). A plurality of respondents say that the war will last another few months (31%), but a sizeable group believes the war will continue for another year, more than a year, or even two years (44% in total). Among those who self-identify as right-wing, a 60% majority believes the war will continue for at least another year. Among the other cohorts, there is a significant gap between Jewish and Arab Israelis on this question. A fifth of Arab Israelis (21%) believe the war will end within a few weeks, compared to a significantly smaller share (9%) of Jewish Israelis who believe so.
    \n\"\"
    \nAs the war reaches the end of its first year and enters its second, the dominant emotion among Israelis is \u201cworry.\u201d Worry was rated the top emotion among the six listed by all groups, Jews and Arabs, except Jewish Israelis who identify with the political right. In this group, which amounts to a third of all Jewish Israelis, the top emotions identified were \u201cdetermination\u201d (31%), and \u201coptimism\u201d (27%). Among the center-right, too, a sizeable share (25%) indicated \u201cdetermination\u201d as their dominant emotion. Among those who self-identify as center-left and left, a significant share chose \u201cdespair\u201d as their dominant emotion (21% and 32% respectively). Among Arab Israelis, a very sizeable share chose \u201csorrow\u201d as their main emotion (30%).<\/p>\n

    \"\"<\/p>\n

    The War\u2019s Prolongation<\/h1>\n

    As noted, half of the public believes the war will continue for another year or more. Opinions differ as to why the war is lasting so long. Most Arab Israelis and nearly half of Jewish Israelis do not agree with the statement: \u201cThe war has been prolonged because the missions are complicated, and it takes a long time to complete them.\u201d There are major gaps regarding this statement based on political orientation, with the right-wing groups showing a significantly higher degree of agreement than their centrist and left-wing counterparts.
    \n\"\"
    \nMost of the public agrees or somewhat agrees that the war has been prolonged because clear and realistic goals that would make it possible to end the fighting were not defined. This majority rests on a high level of agreement among the center and left, and on relatively low agreement on the right.
    \n\"\"
    \nMost Jewish and Arab Israelis agree (or somewhat agree) with the statement: \u201cThe war has been prolonged because the government hasn\u2019t made the correct decisions quick enough.\u201d For this statement as well, we found major disparities based on political orientation and position on the religiosity scale. However, even among the right-wing subgroups, whose tendency to agree with the statement is lower, a majority agrees with it. Sixty percent of those self-identifying as \u201cright-wing\u201d agree with the statement, and 67% of those who self-identify as \u201ccenter-right\u201d do so. Of course, agreement with the statement doesn\u2019t give a clear indication of which decisions ought to have been made more quickly, and one may assume that there would be differences of opinion between different ideological subgroups. However, the very existence of a consensus that the government didn\u2019t make decisions at an appropriate pace points to a certain degree of shared frustration with how the military campaign developed.<\/p>\n

    \"\"<\/p>\n

    \"\"
    \nMost Israelis also point a finger at the international community and agree, at least in part, with the claim that its interference made it hard for the war to proceed at a faster pace, and impeded Israel from completing its missions. Among the left-wing cohorts (center-left and left) there isn\u2019t agreement with this assertion, but there is majority agreement in all other ideological subgroups.
    \n\"\"
    \nAmong right-wing respondents, 62% agree with the contention and 20% somewhat agree with it. Among the center-right, 35% agree and 19% somewhat agree.
    \n\"\"
    \nFurther, more than half the Israeli public agrees that the war is being prolonged because it is in the coalition\u2019s political interest to extend its duration. A large majority of Arab Israelis agree with this notion, while there is near parity among Jewish Israelis between those who agree or somewhat agree with it, and those who do not agree with it. As expected, among coalition-party voters an overwhelming majority do not agree with the statement. Eighty-four percent of Likud voters don\u2019t agree with it, nor do 90% of Religious Zionist Party voters, 94% of Shas voters, and 85% of United Torah Judaism voters. A majority of all opposition-party voters agree or partly (\u201csomewhat\u201d) agree with the assertion.
    \n\"\"
    \nRegarding the claim that the war has been prolonged due to protests against it and the action of pressure groups; the majority of the Israeli public does not agree with this. However, the contention finds a high level of agreement among those on the right (60% agree and 23% somewhat agree), and the center-right (31% and 25%).<\/p>\n

    Returning the Hostages<\/h1>\n

    Regarding the hostages, Israelis disagree on the fundamental reason why they have yet to be returned. Slightly more than a quarter of Jewish Israelis believe that the only way to return the hostages is to win the war. This group appears to think that the hostages haven\u2019t been returned because Israel has not yet won. Another group, amounting to nearly a third of respondents, believes that Israel has abandoned the hostages and is no longer interested in their fate. This group tends to assume that the responsibility for the fact that the hostages remain in captivity lies with the Israeli government. A third group, constituting a little over a third of all Israelis, thinks that the hostages haven\u2019t returned because no deal exists to which Israel can agree. This group places most of the responsibility for the hostages\u2019 fate on Hamas\u2019s intransigence.
    \n\"\"
    \nThe response distribution by ideological orientation shows that the dominant view among the center and left-wing cohorts is that Israel has \u201cabandoned the hostages\u201d; among the center-right, the dominant view is that there has been no hostage deal to which Israel could agree; and among the right, the dominant view is that victory is a prerequisite for the hostages\u2019 release.
    \n\"\"<\/p>\n

    How the Government is Functioning<\/h1>\n

    As a year of war comes to its end, the public gives the government a relatively low rating for its handling of the economy, the evacuees, and internal security. On a scale of 1 (very poor) to 5 (very good), with the middle range being \u201creasonable,\u201d the government\u2019s average rating for its handling of these issues ranges from \u201cpoor\u201d to \u201creasonable.\u201d
    \n\"\"
    \nCoalition-voters rate the government\u2019s handling of these issues more favorably than opposition voters, but even those ratings do not reflect a high degree of satisfaction. For example, a majority of Likud voters rate the government\u2019s handling of the economy as \u201creasonable\u201d or less. The government received the highest rating for its handling of the evacuees; most center-right and right-wing Jewish Israelis placed it at reasonable or better.
    \n\"\"<\/p>\n

    Israeli Society<\/h1>\n

    Between June and September there have been no significant changes in the assessment of social tensions within Israel. Most of those with an opinion on the matter feel that right-left tensions \u201c[have had] the greatest impact on social cohesion.\u201d Slightly more than a quarter of Jewish Israelis rate religious-secular divides as the primary source of tension. Among Arab Israelis, a different finding was obtained this month compared to June: the percentage of those citing Jewish-Arab tensions dropped from a majority (55%) to a plurality (39%), and there was a concomitant rise in the share of those choosing the right-left option (32%).
    \n\"\"<\/p>\n

    Share of Extremists<\/h1>\n

    October saw a decline in the share of Arab Israelis who feel that most Jews are \u201cpolitically extreme.\u201d The share of Jewish Israelis who attribute extremism to Jews at different levels exhibited no real change compared to February, when the extremism question was last posed.
    \n\"\"
    \nThis month also showed no change compared to the February Index in how Jews describe the extremism level of Arab Israelis. A quarter of Jewish Israelis feel that \u201cmost\u201d of their Arab counterparts are \u201cpolitically extreme.\u201d A similar percentage believe that \u201cmany of them\u201d are extreme, while a plurality of Jewish respondents (38%) say that \u201csome\u201d Arab Israelis are \u201cpolitically extreme.\u201d It should be noted that even among those who self-identify as \u201cleft,\u201d \u201ccenter-left,\u201d and \u201ccentrist,\u201d a majority of Jewish Israelis believe that \u201csome\u201d Arabs are extremist, while a minority feel that only \u201cvery few\u201d Arabs are \u201cextreme.\u201d Among Arab Israelis, a 55% majority say that \u201cvery few\u201d Arabs are \u201cpolitically extreme.\u201d
    \n\"\"
    \n\"\"<\/p>\n

    The Israel-Diaspora Relationship<\/h1>\n

    During the war period, a rise was observed in the share of Israeli Jews who express feelings of closeness and partnership with Diaspora Jews. This month found a moderation of the trend, perhaps in light of the fact that the anti-Israel and anti-Jewish incidents on college campuses are no longer prominent in news headlines. The percentage of Israeli Jews who agree with the statement \u201cAll Jews, in Israel and the Diaspora, have a common future\u201d declined this month compared with June.
    \n\"\"
    \nThe most notable change in agreement level with this statement was found among secular respondents. In June, the share of secular respondents who agreed strongly with the \u201ccommon future\u201d statement was 41%, while this month it dropped to 32%.
    \n\"\"
    \nDue to the Jewish holidays, JPPI\u2019s October Israeli Society Index survey was conducted from September 25-27. Data was collected by\u00a0theMadad.com\u00a0(612 Jewish respondents via an online poll) and Afkar Research (200 Arab respondents, half online and half by phone). Data was analyzed and weighted by political affiliation and religiosity level to represent Israel\u2019s adult population. Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepkov compile the JPPI Israeli Society Index; Professor David Steinberg serves as statistical consultant.\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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