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<\/a><\/span>This radical course is a recipe for disaster. You cannot entrench the rule of law by means that undermine it. Preferring ends over process is not a slippery slope; it is a gaping abyss beneath our feet. Instrumentalizing rules destroys public trust in them. Formal rules exist to restrain power; once they are breached, nothing ensures that power will be wielded exclusively for \u201cgood\u201d cause.<\/p>\n
Nor is it realistic to imagine that domestic law can be violated while relying on international standards and institutions \u201coutside the national bubble.\u201d That proposal exemplifies the disconnect between academic constructs and political and social reality; inviting external norms to override the sovereign law of the Knesset will not heal polarization.<\/p>\n
The minimal consensus on which democracy depends \u2013 that the losers consent to accept the rules until the next round \u2013 will collapse if the liberal camp chooses to act outside the law. The moment winners are prepared to break the law \u201cto fix things,\u201d they erode that consensus and undermine the very foundation that allows us to live together while disagreeing. Even a \u201cliberal revolution\u201d that refrains from overt illegality yet radically rewrites the law would also be destructive and unwise. It would deepen the conflict, accelerate the cycle of institutional revenge already underway, and turn governance into coercion.<\/p>\n
The attempt to advance a conservative revolution brought masses into the streets and created a destructive atmosphere in which the ideological other is treated not merely as an opponent but as an enemy. Reversing the polarity would amplify the damage. The two paths outlined so far \u2013 incremental and revolutionary \u2013 pose a false dilemma. We are not confined to a choice between a slow, reversible path and an unlawful or radical leap. There is a third option that is both effective and lawful: constitutional reform by adopting a \u201cthin constitution.\u201d<\/p>\n
Israel\u2019s rules of the game are not anchored in a constitution and can be changed by a simple Knesset majority. That endangers everyone. Whoever wins an election \u2013 conservative or liberal \u2013 can legally reshape the regime. Judicial review constrains this only at the margins, and judicial review of Basic Laws is itself contested; it has been used only once, by the narrowest of majorities, a majority that no longer exists. In such a system, each side fears that the other can \u2013 and will \u2013 use the momentary levers of power to impose sweeping structural change.<\/p>\n
For the past two years, the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI) has convened a group of constitutional scholars \u2013 both liberal and conservative \u2013 to draft a thin constitution. Unlike a full constitution, which also codifies the state\u2019s identity and fundamental values, a thin constitution deals \u201conly\u201d with the rules of the game for managing our deepest disagreements: the overarching Israeli dispute. It would comprise Basic Laws on legislation, adjudication of the judiciary, and the operation of the three branches of government, with related arrangements. In other words, it is a regime-focused constitution. Durable constitutional legitimacy requires enactment by a supermajority (or through a constituent assembly or referendum). Given the current culture war, such a majority is not attainable for identity-and-values questions. But there is a realistic prospect of broad agreement \u2013 across society and in the Knesset \u2013 on the governmental administrative portion: the rules of the game.<\/p>\n
All political actors know their camp might lose the next election \u2013 or the one after \u2013 and then watch Israel\u2019s character dramatically shift in ways they highly dislike. We are all, conservatives and liberals alike, behind a \u201cveil of ignorance\u201d regarding who will win. That uncertainty creates a shared interest in fair, efficient, and stable rules, even if they fall short of fully realizing any camp\u2019s dream.<\/p>\n
Though it pains many to postpone codifying equality and other noble values \u2013 and I am one of them \u2013 political reality counsels that, for now, we make do with enacting a regime-focused constitution \u2013 a thin constitution. A thin constitution would foreclose the possibility of any revolution \u2013 by either side \u2013 in how public life is conducted. It would not decide the culture war\u2019s substantive winners and losers. Rather, it would set agreed limits to the possible and return our struggle to a bounded field of play. Armored against dramatic change of the Israeli regime\u2019s nature by occasional coalition majorities, it would reduce the appetite and leverage of fringe actors who thrive on brinkmanship. By draining the mutual threat that \u201cthe other side\u201d will impose a sweeping transformation of Israeli democracy upon regime change, it would diminish polarization and help us become opponents again, not enemies.<\/p>\n
This approach also addresses the weaknesses of the other two paths. The drawbacks of incremental reform \u2013 its slowness, inefficiency, and reversibility \u2013 are overcome because a thin constitution would be harder to amend without a supermajority and could be enacted through a transparent, time-bound process. The dangers of revolutionary reform \u2013 its polarizing, law-breaking logic \u2013 are avoided because a thin constitution is rooted in broad consent, encourages inclusion, and stabilizes the future without coercion.<\/p>\n
The key condition is political: a broad coalition capable of mustering the necessary supermajority. That requirement should already shape leaders\u2019 conduct during the campaign. Yes, electioneering rewards sharp contrasts. But Israelis increasingly yearn for non-partisan leadership that can knit society back together and steady our democracy. Recent polls show that about two-thirds of the public are more concerned about Israel\u2019s internal tensions than about external security threats. If the war ends before the elections, this overwhelming majority will likely grow even larger.<\/p>\n
Therefore, parties that declare \u2013 before the vote \u2013 that alleviating internal tensions is their central mission are likely to garner broad support. A thin constitution is a necessary condition for delivering on that mission; its adoption is substantively right and politically rewarding. Whoever is chosen to form the next coalition \u2013 liberal or conservative, Right or Left, religious or secular \u2013 could enter the annals of the Jewish people as an Israeli nation-builder by choosing partners committed to stabilizing Israel through a thin constitution and by implementing that vision with resolve.<\/p>\n