A majority of connected U.S. Jews (68%) support the U.S. decision to go to war against Iran, versus 26% who oppose it. Support rises with ideological conservatism: strong liberal respondents mostly oppose (62% vs. 28% support), leaning liberals tilt toward support (57%), and support is overwhelming among centrists (88%), leaning conservatives (98%), and strong conservatives (100%). By vote choice in the 2024 presidential election, Trump voters are nearly unanimous (99%), while Harris voters are divided (47% support, 42% oppose).<\/p>\n
Most respondents (58%) favor a comprehensive goal: dismantling Iran\u2019s nuclear and missile programs and its support for terrorism. A quarter (27%) favor regime change in Tehran, and only 3% support confining focus to Iran\u2019s nuclear program. Support for regime change increases as one moves rightward along the ideological spectrum (19% among strong liberals, 41% among strong conservatives), but the comprehensive security goal is the modal choice in every ideological group.<\/p>\n Most respondents (72%) believe President Trump intended to go to war from the outset and needed very little persuasion, whereas 14% think Israel\u2019s Prime Minister Netanyahu persuaded him to do so. As worldviews become more conservative, more respondents attribute the initiative to Trump (54% among strong liberals, 85% among strong conservatives), and fewer attribute it to Netanyahu (25% among strong liberals, 3% among leaning conservatives). Across groups, the dominant view is that Trump pursued the move, with liberals more inclined than others to credit Netanyahu with having pushed it.<\/p>\n The data also suggests that many U.S. Jews expect the war to further harm Israel\u2019s image in the United States: about half (45%) say its image will be harmed, compared with a third (32%) who expect no change and one in ten (10%) who think it will improve. By ideology, large majorities of the strong liberal and leaning liberal cohorts expect Israel\u2019s image to be harmed (72% and 64%, respectively), and only a very small minority expect improvement.<\/p>\n Moving toward the centrist and the conservative ideological camps, expectations of damage decrease, while expectations of no change or even improvement increase: among centrists, the prevailing view is that there will be no change (48%); among the leaning conservative and strong conservative cohorts, the share expecting improvement rises (17% and 29%, respectively) and the share expecting harm markedly declines. In short, liberals anticipate damage to Israel\u2019s image in the United States, whereas conservatives mainly expect stability or even improvement.<\/p>\n About half (52%) of the U.S. Jews surveyed believe the war is likely to increase antisemitism in the United States, compared with a third (33%) who expect no change, and a small minority (4%) who think antisemitism will decline. This pattern appears across most denominational streams, though with different intensities. Majorities of Reform and Conservative respondents expect an increase (52% and 54%, respectively), whereas among Modern Orthodox and Haredi respondents, expectations are more tempered (45% and 38%, respectively). In every cohort, only a small minority expects a decline in antisemitism. Overall, there is broad concern that the war will increase antisemitism, while more religious groups are somewhat more likely to anticipate stability.<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/jppi.org.il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/1-2.png\")
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