Few countries occupy as much space in the European Union diplomatic imagination as Israel. EU institutions devote extraordinary attention to Israeli policies, actions, and conflicts, often placing them at the centre of diplomatic discussions in a way that is difficult to explain by Israel\u2019s size, power, or formal relationship with the Union.<\/p>\n
This disproportionate focus raises important questions. Does the EU apply its diplomatic scrutiny consistently across different countries and conflicts? And if not, what are the consequences for its credibility and influence in the Middle East? At the same time, Israel\u2019s growing tendency to dismiss the EU as strategically irrelevant may be creating problems of its own. A new study by the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI) sheds empirical light on these questions. Researchers analysed more than 24,000 official statements, press releases, and diplomatic communications issued by the European External Action Service (EEAS) between 2017 and April 2026. Of these, 895 dealt directly with Israel. The study also examined how Israel was portrayed in EU diplomatic discourse.<\/p>\n
The findings are striking and serve as a warning to both Brussels and Jerusalem. Israel occupies an unusually prominent place in the Union\u2019s diplomatic imagination. It accounted for approximately 4% of all official EEAS diplomatic statements during the period examined. That level of attention is not explained by Israel\u2019s formal relationship with the Union \u2013 Israel is neither an EU member nor a candidate, and is not among the world\u2019s major powers. Yet it commands attention from Brussels far beyond what its size and formal status would suggest.<\/p>\n
The tone of that attention is equally revealing. Across the entire period, 38% of EEAS statements concerning Israel were negative, 49% were neutral, and only 13% were positive. Following the October 7 massacre, the balance shifted even further: negative statements rose from 29% before the attack to nearly 46% afterwards; positive statements fell from almost 20% to just 8%. Criticism of Israel is neither illegitimate nor surprising. Democracies are scrutinised because they are expected to uphold democratic values, and Israel should not be beyond examination. The question is not whether Israel should be criticised. The question is whether similar standards are applied consistently across the international system.<\/p>\n
The comparative findings raise serious doubts. Iran received the most negative treatment among the countries examined, largely because of its military cooperation with Russia and its broader role in regional instability. Turkey presents a different case. Despite years of democratic erosion, restrictions on freedom of expression, and mounting tensions with European capitals, roughly three-quarters of official EEAS statements concerning Turkey were neutral, mostly focused on technical matters connected to its candidacy for EU membership.<\/p>\n
The most revealing comparison is Qatar, for which more than two-thirds of European statements were positive; negative references were almost nonexistent. This is despite the \u201cQatargate affair,\u201d which raised serious questions about foreign influence within the European Parliament. That controversy barely registered in the official rhetoric examined by the researchers.<\/p>\n
The contrast is difficult to ignore: a democratic state fighting a war triggered by the largest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust receives sustained scrutiny and intensifying criticism, while authoritarian actors are often treated with conspicuous caution or leniency. This inconsistency is not merely a public relations problem. It undermines the EU\u2019s ability to present itself as a credible and impartial actor in the Middle East. For decades, European leaders have sought a central role in efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yet influence depends on trust, and trust depends on consistency. By applying visibly different standards to different actors, the EU weakens its own claim to be an indispensable diplomatic broker in the region.<\/p>\n
The JPPI study also reveals a widening intellectual gap between Brussels and Jerusalem. More than half of all EEAS statements concerning Israel included references to the two-state solution or the establishment of a Palestinian state.<\/p>\n
The problem is not that the EU continues to support a two-state outcome; many serious people still regard it as the only viable long-term framework. The problem is that EU diplomacy often invokes it as if October 7 did not fundamentally alter Israeli threat perceptions. A formula that does not address these perceptions will not persuade the Israeli public, whatever its diplomatic pedigree.<\/p>\n
Yet the study\u2019s most important conclusion may not be that the EU talks too much about Israel. It may be that Israel talks too little to Europe. While the EU remains intensely focused on Israel, Israel has largely stopped paying attention to Europe. Since October 7, Israeli diplomacy has concentrated, understandably, on Washington, regional security challenges, and the expansion of the Abraham Accords.<\/p>\n
These are legitimate priorities. But they have come at the expense of sustained engagement with EU institutions, European governments, media, universities, and policy communities. This neglect carries risks. The EU remains Israel\u2019s largest trading partner. Approximately one-third of Israel\u2019s trade in goods is conducted with EU member states. The EU is also Israel\u2019s most important partner in research, innovation, and higher education. No alternative partner offers Israel access to a comparable ecosystem of research funding, academic collaboration, and technological networks.<\/p>\n
At a time when economic competitiveness depends increasingly on scientific excellence and technological innovation, relations with the EU are not a diplomatic luxury. They are a strategic asset. But many Israelis have come to regard Europe as a lost cause, assuming that European attitudes are fixed, EU institutions are irreversibly hostile, and investment in the relationship is unlikely to yield results. This is not realism; it is resignation.<\/p>\n
Foreign policy is not about engaging only with those who already agree with you. It is about shaping debates, building coalitions, and defending national interests even in difficult environments. When Israel withdraws from the European arena, others fill the vacuum. When it stops trying to influence European discourse, it should not be surprised when that discourse evolves without Israeli input.<\/p>\n
The EU should ask why Israel occupies so much space in its diplomatic imagination and whether that hyper focus reflects balanced diplomacy or an entrenched double standard. Israel should ask why the Union occupies so little space in its own strategic thinking and whether it can afford to neglect its most important economic, scientific, and technological partner.<\/p>\n
Neither Brussels nor Jerusalem benefits from the current trajectory. The EU risks its credibility as a diplomatic actor. Israel risks its influence, its economic interests, and its scientific future in a relationship it cannot afford to neglect. Both outcomes are avoidable, but only if both Israel and the EU begin treating this relationship with the seriousness it deserves.<\/p>\n