The US-Israel relationship has rarely been stronger militarily \u2013 even if at the same time, it currently seems strained politically.<\/p>\n
On the one hand, ask almost any senior IDF officer \u2013 from the chief of staff down \u2013 and they will tell you that cooperation with the United States military, particularly the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), has never been closer.<\/p>\n
The American military presence in Israel is unprecedented, with personnel deployed at Air Force bases and other locations across the country.<\/p>\n
Discussions are already underway about turning parts of this deployment into a more permanent presence, one that would include joint analysis of enemies and targets, enhanced intelligence sharing, and expanded training in Israel and neighboring countries alongside American and other allied militaries.<\/p>\n
Yet, while at the operational level, the relationship between both countries is extraordinarily close, at the political level a very different picture is emerging.<\/p>\n
It is no secret that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government have limited influence over decision-making in Washington right now, particularly when it comes to Iran. While the US is attacking Iran every night, Israel has been ordered to sit on the sidelines. It has not even been invited to join the operation in the Strait of Hormuz, even as the US openly calls on other nations to do so.<\/p>\n
And then there were Vice President JD Vance\u2019s comments this week on Joe Rogan\u2019s podcast \u2013 specifically his accusations that Israel has been running a campaign against him personally to pressure the US into widening the war with Iran. This can only be described as a Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM)-like precision strike against the foundations of the US-Israel alliance.<\/p>\n
These were not the comments of a fringe commentator or an isolationist member of Congress. They came from the vice president of the United States, a leading contender to inherit the MAGA movement and potentially the presidency itself. Then there was President Donald Trump\u2019s apparent decision to move ahead with the sale of the fifth-generation F-35 to Turkey, which would make it only the second country in the region, after Israel, to operate the stealth aircraft.<\/p>\n
Add to that Wednesday night\u2019s signing of an agreement on a civilian nuclear program with Saudi Arabia \u2013 initially announced without connection to the Abraham Accords, something Trump later clarified was in fact connected \u2013 and it is hard to escape the conclusion that Israel has, at least for the moment, been pushed somewhat to the side.<\/p>\n
The F-35 sale to Turkey will directly challenge Israel\u2019s qualitative military edge. It is possible that Ankara will receive a modified version of the aircraft with capabilities slightly inferior to those of the Israeli fleet. It is also possible that Israel will be compensated with technological upgrades, new weapons systems, or other capabilities designed to preserve its advantage.<\/p>\n
But none of that changes the broader strategic reality. Turkey is a dominant power in the region whose leader has a close relationship with Trump.<\/p>\n
The Saudi agreement is no less consequential. A civilian nuclear program was originally supposed to be one of Washington\u2019s primary cards for drawing Riyadh into a normalization agreement with Israel. Even though Trump has said that it is connected to the Abraham Accords, time will tell. For now, Saudi Arabia is saying that it will not normalize relations as long as Israel remains in a state of conflict in Gaza.<\/p>\n
Could something more be happening beneath the surface, beyond what the public \u2013 and perhaps even many government officials \u2013 currently know? Of course. The Abraham Accords themselves were known to only a small number of people before their announcement in August 2020. It is possible that the Saudi nuclear agreement is one piece of a broader process that will eventually lead to normalization with Israel.<\/p>\n
But as of now, there is no indication that this is the case.<\/p>\n
Even if such a process were underway, it is difficult to imagine what Israel\u2019s contribution could currently be. The idea that this government, particularly in the run-up to the upcoming election, could meaningfully advance a political process with the Palestinians is detached from political reality.<\/p>\n
Netanyahu cannot afford to make any serious concessions at the same time that he is fighting for his political survival. Any move that could be portrayed as a concession to the Palestinians runs the risk of alienating even his most loyal and dedicated followers.<\/p>\n
Add to the mix recent meetings Trump has had with Arab leaders while refusing to schedule a meeting with Netanyahu (it is possible that something will change on that front next week, now that the funeral plans for the late Sen. Lindsey Graham have been announced).<\/p>\n
This week, President Joseph Aoun became the first Lebanese head of state to visit the White House in almost two decades. The week before, Trump hosted Iraq\u2019s new prime minister, Ali al-Zaidi. Earlier this month, Trump met with Ahmed al-Sharaa, the former al-Qaeda jihadist who now serves as president of Syria, on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Ankara.<\/p>\n
Taken individually, each meeting can be explained. Viewed together, they begin to form a pattern, one that does not include Israel.<\/p>\n
Israel\u2019s victories, others\u2019 diplomacy<\/strong><\/p>\n Ironically, though, while Israel might be left out of the room, the fact that cannot be ignored is that many of the regional changes that these leaders are discussing with Trump would not have come about had it not been for Israel. Zaidi is working closely with the US to weaken and dismantle Iranian-backed militias in Iraq. Sharaa would almost certainly not have come to power had Israel not devastated the Iranian axis and, in particular, Hezbollah.<\/p>\n Aoun would not be treated as a regional leader worthy of presidential attention had Israel not dramatically weakened Hezbollah and created an opening for the Lebanese state to begin asserting itself. That opening has now led to a new pilot program under which the IDF has started withdrawing from several villages in southern Lebanon and allowing the Lebanese Armed Forces to try to take control and prevent Hezbollah from returning.<\/p>\n Over the last three years, Israel weakened Iran, shattered Hezbollah, helped bring about the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, struck the Houthis in Yemen, and severely degraded Hamas in Gaza.<\/p>\n The scale of the transformation is difficult to overstate.<\/p>\n Which raises the obvious question: How is it that Israel, after paying such a tremendous price and doing so much to transform the region, now appears to be sidelined from some of the diplomacy and strategic planning that this transformation has made possible?<\/p>\n Whether it is the emerging American relationships with Lebanon and Iraq, negotiations over Iran, the Saudi nuclear agreement, Turkey\u2019s return to the F-35 program, or even the future of Gaza, Israel increasingly appears to be watching others shape the regional order.<\/p>\n The answer is not that Israel has suddenly become militarily irrelevant. The unprecedented cooperation with CENTCOM proves the opposite. Instead, the problem appears to be political. After a meeting this week between representatives of the Board of Peace and Netanyahu, it became strikingly clear to its members that almost nothing significant will move forward while Israel remains in an election cycle.<\/p>\n Of all the unresolved issues, Gaza is the most politically explosive for Netanyahu.<\/p>\n Any step \u2013 even something as limited as allowing caravans into Gaza to provide temporary shelter for displaced civilians \u2013 risks being framed by his coalition partners and political rivals as a concession.<\/p>\n Ahead of an election, Netanyahu will not take that risk.<\/p>\n Israel, therefore, finds itself in a deeply troubling position. Its soldiers have created new opportunities across the Middle East, but its political leadership is having trouble converting those achievements into formidable strategic gains. Military power can weaken enemies, destroy infrastructure, and open diplomatic doors. It cannot, by itself, decide what lies on the other side.<\/p>\n That requires political initiative, creativity, and a government capable of looking beyond the next election. Without this, Israel risks discovering that it fought the wars, paid the price, and transformed the region \u2013 only for others to write the new Middle East without it.<\/p>\n