Israel\u2019s national security doctrine, formulated by David Ben-Gurion in the 1950s, rests on three pillars: deterrence, early warning, and decisive victory.<\/p>\n
Deterrence is meant to persuade the enemy that it cannot defeat Israel and therefore, rationally, should refrain from attacking. If deterrence fails, intelligence must provide sufficient warning to mobilize the reserves, allowing Israel to maintain a relatively small standing army in peacetime. And decisive victory means seeking unequivocal wins as quickly as possible while shifting the fighting onto enemy territory. Victory restores deterrence, postpones the next war, and gives Israel time to grow stronger between conflicts.<\/p>\n
Is this doctrine still valid after October 7?<\/p>\n
Some say no. Hamas was not deterred, intelligence failed to provide warning, and Israel did not achieve a swift, decisive victory. This, they argue, was no accident but the result of a changed reality: many of our enemies are now terrorist organizations rather than state actors; their motivations are ideological and religious and do not necessarily conform to conventional calculations of deterrence; the arena itself has changed \u2013 our enemies are no longer only those massed along our borders. The doctrine, therefore, must be rethought.<\/p>\n
Others argue that the classical doctrine remains sound, but that Israel, lulled by overconfidence, failed to follow it. We did not create deterrence \u2013 we simply assumed it existed, and we were wrong. We dismissed warning signs that were, in fact, there. And for years, we abandoned the pursuit of decisive victory in favor of \u201cmanaging the conflict\u201d and \u201cquiet in return for quiet.\u201d On this view, Israel must return to Ben-Gurion\u2019s principles and apply them with resolve. A third approach would preserve the classical doctrine while adding two further elements: defense \u2013 the ability to withstand a surprise attack if deterrence and advance warning fail \u2013 and preemption \u2013 taking the initiative to eliminate emerging threats before they fully ripen.<\/p>\n
But this debate is taking place on too narrow a field. National security doctrine must address not only how we confront enemies waging physical war against us, but also those waging a battle to shape global consciousness \u2013 the perceptions and narratives through which Israel is understood. National security is measured not only by our ability to defend our borders, but also by Israel\u2019s standing in the international arena.<\/p>\n
Until recently, Israel\u2019s relations with the United States and several leading European countries constituted a formidable diplomatic Iron Dome, protecting us in critical arenas \u2013 security, economics, diplomacy, law, and culture. In recent years, and especially since October 7, we have been losing ground in the battle over global consciousness. Negative views of Israel are becoming increasingly entrenched. Challenges to the legitimacy of the Jewish nation-state are finding traction. The demonization of Israel is gaining ground both in the European Union, Israel\u2019s largest trading partner, and in the United States, our most important security and diplomatic ally.<\/p>\n
The evidence is mounting not only in public opinion polls but also in concrete actions. Our adversaries could achieve their own \u201ctotal victory\u201d in this struggle if a future American president decided to impose an arms embargo on Israel. Is that really inconceivable? The consequences could be devastating. Not everything is within our control. Deep currents of antisemitism, polarizing identity politics, social media platforms that traffic in hatred, social inequality, and other forces are poisoning the international arena. But much does depend on us \u2013 both through what we fail to do and through what we actually do.<\/p>\n
Our failure to act has been profound. Israel has largely been absent from this battlefield \u2013 if by presence we mean the formulation and implementation of a coherent strategy. For too many years, our national investment in this arena was negligible \u2013 less than the cost of a single Israeli Air Force squadron. And some of our own actions hand our enemies ammunition. We alienate the world \u2013 including our friends \u2013 when we tolerate Jewish terrorism, use disproportionate force, engage in racist rhetoric, and erode confidence in our own democratic institutions.<\/p>\n
The bottom line is clear: if we lose the battle over global consciousness, Israel\u2019s national security will be gravely weakened. Israel will not be able to flourish as it once did if it comes to be regarded as a \u201cSparta\u201d \u2013 an embattled fortress-state living by the sword behind high walls.<\/p>\n
We need to change course.<\/p>\n
First, Israel must establish an authoritative institutional framework for this mission. Alongside the three organizations responsible for our physical security \u2013 the IDF at our borders, the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) at home, and the Mossad abroad \u2013 we need a fourth national body of comparable authority and stature charged with conducting the battle over global consciousness.<\/p>\n
Second, Israeli policy across the board, including the use of military force, must be shaped by a national security doctrine that recognizes this battle as critical to securing our future.<\/p>\n