

# UNCHARTED WATERS

From the forthcoming book

## **21<sup>st</sup> Century Global Forces**

*Their Impact on the Jewish People,  
Israel and the U.S.*

**Stuart E. Eizenstat**

With a Foreword by Sir Martin Gilbert



המכון למדיניות העם היהודי (מיסודה של הסוכנות היהודית לא"י) בע"מ

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To my wife Fran. my inspiration for over four decades, who embodies the best of American and Jewish values in a lifetime of service to both the Jewish and general communities.



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# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book emerged from a paper that Avinoam Bar-Yosef, then director general and now president of the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI), asked me to prepare in 2009 on the major developments affecting the Jewish people in Diaspora and for the State of Israel. It was presented at that year's President's Conference in Jerusalem under the auspices of President Shimon Peres. At Avionoam's suggestion, I converted it into a book, and his support and encouragement were essential throughout.

The paper and now my book identified a number of global trends that especially impacted the Jewish world: the shift of power and influence away from the U.S. and the Western democracies to the emerging nations of the East and South; the integration of the world powered by digital technology; the battle between moderates and radicals over the direction of the Muslim world; new security threats from nuclear proliferation, cyber warfare, and environmental, energy, and demographic developments; a new form of anti-Semitism aimed at undermining Israel's legitimacy, and America's evolving relationship with Israel, that is central to Israel's security. Following the upheaval in the Arab world just as the book was nearing completion, I added a chapter I called "Unchartered Waters," because of the uncertainties the revolutionary changes unfolding there mean for their own people, the Jewish world and Israel, and for the United States. Uncharted Waters is printed here as a special edition for the 2011 Israeli Presidential Conference.

Adam Smith, a brilliant young attorney who was an associate at my law firm, Covington & Burling, was indispensable during much of the writing of my paper and this book. Already the author of two books, Adam provided exceptional ideas, research, and editing. He now holds a senior position in the U.S. Treasury Department and is sure to make major contributions through public service in the decades ahead. I am grateful for the time, energy, and talent he brought to my project, from start to finish.

At Covington & Burling, my long-time assistant of over 30 years Carolyn Keene, and my secretary Pat Adams were also helpful in many ways in the preparation of this book.

Lawrence Malkin, a former foreign correspondent for Time Magazine and a respected author and editor, offered initial and final oversight of my manuscript. I am grateful for the same talent and sharp insight that he brought to the editing of my book

“Imperfect Justice: Looted Assets, Slave Labor & the Unfinished Business of World War II” (Public Affairs, 2003), about my negotiations during the Clinton Administration on behalf of Holocaust survivors and families of victims, as well as other victims of Nazi oppression, non-Jewish and Jewish.

Rami Tal of Yediot Books and an associate of JPPI served as the principal editor of the book but was more than that. He supplied ideas, challenged assumptions, and sharpened my thinking about many subjects, but also proved invaluable with his encyclopedic knowledge of Israeli political history. Barry Geltman, a JPPI fellow, made very useful editorial changes toward the end of the process.

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My wife Fran, my partner of 43 years of marriage, sustained me as I wrote this book, while maintaining an active law practice in international trade and finance, serving on a variety of corporate and non-profit boards (including chairing the board of JPPI in Jerusalem), and maintaining my family responsibilities. More broadly, she has been my inspiration over the decades in strengthening my Jewish identity while acting as a public servant of the United States government and engaging in a range of other public activities. If the measure of successful Jewish parents is fostering strong Jewish identities among their children, then the fact that my son Jay and daughter-in-law Jessica, and my son Brian and daughter-in-law Erin are raising a total of seven of our grandchildren (Menachem, Bracha, Eli Kalman, Michal, and Yitzchok, and Julia Mae and Caroline) committed to the Jewish religion and culture, owes more to Fran than to anyone. Her courage and wisdom are a source of strength to me and to all of our family and friends.

**Stuart E. Eizenstat**

Washington, D.C.

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# Foreword

**By Martin Gilbert**

**(As written for the forthcoming book *21st Century Global Forces, Their Impact on the Jewish People, Israel and the U.S.*)**

Stuart Eizenstat is a man of remarkable abilities and achievements. A public servant of distinction, he has made an impact in many branches of administration and international relations. At this testing time for the world, his voice is worth listening to. This book brings that voice to a wide public.

At the centre of this thoughtful, and in many ways provocative book is the Jewish world and the State of Israel: the place of the Jews and Israel in the world, and Israel's internal dynamic: its relations with the Palestinians whose land it occupies, and with the Arab nations around it, and its place in the wider world of economic challenges, global terrorism, and the aspirations of fundamentalist Islam. Stuart Eizenstat stresses the impact of two outside forces, he calls them "21<sup>st</sup> century global forces," on the Jewish Diaspora. One is globalization, which he sees as generally positive. The other is demography, where he sees considerable danger ahead for the Jewish world. Part of the dwindling Jewish numbers worldwide, he points out, is a direct consequence of the successful integration of Jewish communities in most countries, and the continual increase in the rates of intermarriage, now fifty per cent in the United States and forty-five percent in Argentina. Ironically, he writes, at this very hour of our success, many Jews have chosen to abandon their identity, at the very time in history when Diaspora Jews can openly and proudly assert their Jewishness in countries where the rule of law fully protects Jews and others in their religious and cultural expressions, too few are willing to do so. Wise words.

Stuart Eizenstat examines in detail the impact of globalization and demography on both the Jewish people worldwide and on Israel. He also looks at the impact on Israel of the growth of Muslim communities in Europe, looking at the example of France, where there are half a million Jews and four million Muslims, and noting that the street demonstrations there of young Muslims angry at their alienation from French society are replete with anti-Israel and anti-Semitic expletives. The only logical assessment that he can see with regard to European policy towards Israel, a subject of concern to Jews worldwide, is that it will begin to reflect the impact of the emergent political force of European Muslims.

For the Jewish world and for Israel, the United States is of crucial importance. What is to be the role of the United States in the world, as the world lurches from one crisis to another, faces global economic challenges, and has to engage with a Middle East in uncertain transition, Stuart Eizenstat asks. He is in no doubt of the answer. 'The U.S. must remain directly engaged,' he writes, 'on every front in which the radical rejectionists and jihadists and pro-Western elements confront each other, but we must do so with discernment.' He fears that one result of the Iraq War that began in 2003 is that when the United States leaves Iraq, as it may soon do, Iran will be the dominant force in the region, and that the Iranian and Iraq Shiite populations will make common cause.

For Stuart Eizenstat, such a development will be part of the onward march of militant Islam. He saw this perspective through his experience as the co-chair, in 2004, of a Commission - set up by the Center for Global Development - on Weak States and U.S. National Security. The world has become as dangerous a place as it has ever been, with the terrorist dimension making outdated the former confrontations of armies facing each other on the field of battle.

There is much food for thought in these pages. Those who, like Stuart Eizenstat, see Israel as an outpost of Western values and aspirations in the Middle East, will read his diagnosis with close attention. He is concerned with the impact on Israel of potential failed states, whether Lebanon or Syria at some future time, or a more distant Somalia whose pirates could have a 'devastating' impact on Israel's sea-borne oil imports, or a country like Sudan, whose refugees – hitherto unwelcome in Egypt – have found a safe haven in Israel, a country whose historic experiences make it unwilling to turn people away.

Not only instability in Africa, Stuart Eizenstat warns, but even 'the lawless tri-border connecting Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay' could help terrorism – now a global phenomenon – funnel raw materials and other assets back to the Middle East. Reflecting something that the West would ignore at its peril, he notes: 'The rise of violent, jihadist Islamic groups also depends heavily on the sanctuary of failed or failing states unwilling or unable to control their activities.'

This book has many lessons for our time, and disturbing thoughts for the years ahead. Iran, Russia and China are among the countries of which he writes with perceptive foresight. And looming above the problems of individual states are the overarching problems of the continuing reliance of industrialised nations on the Arab oil producers,

the global energy problems, the crises facing the global economy, the imminent massive increase in the global population, the global outreach of Islamic terrorism, and – of immense importance in seeking answers to all the pressing problems – the changing demographic realities, whereby, in the United States, the probability of a non-Caucasian, largely Hispanic majority will impact on every aspect of United States policy, not least, Stuart Eizenstat points out, its relationship with Israel, and the demands of a world in which, by 2050, ninety per cent of the estimated population of ten billion will be ‘outside the developed world where Israel has its closest contacts’.

Of immediate current concern is Stuart Eizenstat’s contention that, even with ‘a healthy demographic increase,’ Israeli Jews will, in his words, ‘still be an increasingly smaller percentage of the world’s population, and – more telling – of the Israeli-Arab and Palestinian populations.’ This, he warns, ‘places a premium on reaching a peace agreement so that Israel can maintain a Jewish majority.’ This is an ongoing debate in which Stuart Eizenstat’s thoughts, based on his devotion to Judaism and to the Jewish State, and his statesmanlike sense of the realities of international affairs, will make a significant contribution. All those interested in the future of Israel, including Israel’s leaders, should read this book with close attention.

On a more optimistic note, in examining the current turmoil in the Arab Muslim world, Stuart Eizenstat concludes that both for the Jewish world and for the United States the upheavals in early 2011 were not ideological or radical revolutions, but popular movements that wanted the same democracy enjoyed in the West, a democracy they saw and were connected to by their cell phones and computers. It was the social media, he writes, particularly Facebook, that was the spark that lit the fire, and enabled young people, without one dominant leader, to coalesce and make common cause on the streets of Tunis, Cairo, Amman, and Sana’a. For Stuart Eizenstat, a man of wide experience far from home, who has traveled widely in the Arab world during and since the Carter and Clinton eras, in which he served each president, these are encouraging words.



# UNCHARTED WATERS

One of the most important global forces of this century is the battle for the direction of the 1.6 billion people in the Muslim world. There is a new urgency as the Middle East has gone through the broadest upheaval since most Arab states gained their independence after World War II, and with breathtaking speed. This is as much an internal struggle for the hearts and minds of the diverse populations of over fifty nations, between Islamic extremists and moderates, modernizing pro-Western regimes in the Middle East, as it is between the Islamic and Western worlds. For the U.S. which is now involved in three wars in Muslim countries, world Jewry, and for Israel, the outcome will have a profound impact on virtually every major 21<sup>st</sup> century force discussed in this book.

The history of the Jewish people was most directly affected by its interaction with Christianity from the 11<sup>th</sup> century onward, when most Jews lived in Europe and the great majority of Europeans were Christians<sup>1</sup>. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the Jewish people will be impacted most heavily by new directions in the Muslim world - particularly Jews in Europe, where there is a surging Muslim population; in the United States, which will remain the predominant power interacting with the Muslim world; and in the State of Israel, which has been in direct confrontation with the Muslim world from its foundation and remains so with parts of it to this day.

The revolutionary developments in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011, followed by similar challenges to the status quo in Jordan, Bahrain, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, and even Syria, have not been about Israel, the Palestinian conflict, or the United States, but about domestic concerns - jobs, democracy, freedom of expression, and a revulsion at the systemic corruption of the ruling elites. The signs demanding the departure of Mubarak in Egypt and Ben Ali in Tunisia, or the democratic reform of the ruling monarchies in Jordan and the Gulf states were historic in what they did *not* proclaim. The traditional slogans "Death to America" and "Death to Israel" were only seen in Iran, where reform movements have been suppressed.

The Middle East will never be the same. The political earthquakes will profoundly change the character of the Middle East and shift the balance of power between the pro-Western Arab states and the Iranian axis of Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas, all with uncertain implications.

The major protests erupted in pro-American, moderate Arab states with the exception of those in Iran, Syria, and Libya—and even Libya in recent years had made overtures to the United States, by giving up its nuclear pretensions and support for global terrorism. Tunisia and Egypt, Jordan and Bahrain, have been firm friends of the United States, allies against Islamic radicalism and Iranian nuclear ambitions.

In Tunisia in less than a month and in Egypt in 18 momentous days, the entrenched rulers, President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and President Hosni Mubarak were swept from office. And not by a traditional military coup or a feared Islamic revolution, nor by a charismatic leader, but by peaceful protests led largely by secular young people and professionals, using the power of Facebook and other social media to organize and galvanize opposition.

The democratic impulse initially exploded in the streets of Tunis, Cairo, and Amman, against firmly pro-Western regimes, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan, the latter two the only Arab states with peace agreements with Israel. While the rule of Jordanian King Abdullah II is not immediately threatened, street protests led him to replace his prime minister, widely viewed as part of a corrupt older order. He was succeeded by Marouf Bakhit, a man with a reputation for honesty, with a royal mandate to introduce economic and political reforms and to meet, for the first time in years, with the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.

In Yemen, young protestors in Sana'a forced President Ali Abdullah Saleh, a fixture of 33 years in power, to announce a series of steps - none of which have quelled the uprising - to raise military salaries, reduce taxes, and introduce price controls, along with promising he would not continue his three-decade rule beyond 2013. Despite his despotic rule, he has been a key ally of the U.S. in the fight against terrorism and a bulwark against the Yemeni branch of al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the most active and dangerous branch of Osama bin Laden's worldwide terrorist group, both to the Middle East and to the U.S. homeland<sup>2</sup>. He postponed a visit to Washington in order to meet with opposition parties<sup>3</sup>. Facing unrelenting pressure, he promised a parliamentary democracy by the end of 2011, and then that he would surrender power to "safe hands."

He has now lost the support of key military and tribal leaders,<sup>4</sup> and rejected an exit plan negotiated by the Gulf Cooperation Command (GCC), with the agreement of the U.S. His departure will likely create an even more chaotic situation in Yemen, which already confronted a rebellion in its northern region and a secessionist movement in

the south, providing al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula a safer haven to plan global terrorist plots. American-born, Yemeni-based cleric Anwar al-Aulaqi, who was the imam of a mosque in suburban Washington before leaving for Yemen in 2002, is believed to have been the mastermind behind the 2009 shooting rampage at Fort Hood, Texas, and the failed effort by the Christmas day bomber in 2009 to destroy a Detroit-bound airplane. Even if President Saleh survives, which is highly unlikely, he or any successor government will be less capable of attacking al-Aulaqi's stronghold in southern Yemen<sup>5</sup>.

A further complication is the Shiite-Sunni divide, a dangerous fault line stretching from Saudi Arabia through its wealthy neighbors, Bahrain and Kuwait. Bahrain, another key American ally and home to the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet, is a vivid example of sectarian strife. Opposition groups took a page from the youth in Tunis and Cairo to mount a protest, fed by the Shiite majority that has long charged discrimination by the ruling Sunni royal family; for example, although they are between 50 and 70 percent of the population, they are not permitted to serve in the armed forces. Bahrain is among the most progressive countries in the region, with open municipal and parliamentary elections held in the fall of 2010, in which opposition parties captured almost half the seats. It boasts almost universal literacy for women as well as men, women play a role in society, and economic reforms have led to growth and more jobs than in many Arab countries under acute stress<sup>6</sup>. To forestall broader protests in Bahrain, King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa handed out several thousand dollars to every family.

But this was not enough to still the upheaval. When the Bahrain security forces used violence against the largely Shiite demonstrators, the Shiite bloc in parliament, which controls almost half the seats, suspended their participation. Their tough crackdown on the protestors inflamed tensions and led to calls for the king himself to resign or become at most a constitutional monarch. This would have serious consequences for the U.S., not only because of the American military presence, but because Bahrain is connected to Saudi Arabia by a 15-mile causeway.

Its huge and wealthy neighbor is the seat of Sunni authority in the Arab world and a key American oil supplier and ally since 1945. The Saudis could not stand idle for long, and after a month of demonstrations on their doorstep, they sent their own troops, joined by those from the United Arab Emirates as part of the Gulf Cooperation Council agreement, down the causeway to support the King of Bahrain and his beleaguered police.

Since then, the government's repressive actions against the Shiite majority have broadened to include the arrest of hundreds of moderate businessmen and professionals, including physicians who simply treated the injured Shiite demonstrators brought to hospitals for emergency care.

Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and Kuwait, all firm American friends and Sunni-led states with significant Shiite minorities, could be deeply affected by events in Bahrain. The eastern province of Saudi Arabia, one of its largest oil producing areas, is heavily populated by Shiites and they have long resented their treatment by the Sunni establishment. But unlike Bahrain, Saudi Arabia is a majority Sunni nation, with the royal House of Saud generally respected in the country, especially since King Abdullah assumed the throne and introduced significant reforms.

Although the Saudi authorities insist that demonstrations will not be tolerated, the kingdom cannot be considered immune from the upheavals in the region. Members of the Shiite minority staged protests in the eastern province; academics and scholars signed a petition seeking more freedoms. In hopes of maintaining calm, the Saudi government announced an unprecedented economic package early in 2011, \$90 billion in short-term benefits and higher salaries to civil servants, on top of \$37 billion in interest-free loans on homes, debt forgiveness, and unemployment assistance, when divided back out<sup>7</sup>.

In Libya, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi has ruled his country since he seized power in a military coup in 1969, and as of this writing, remains the longest serving non-royal leader of any nation. Demonstrations against his iron rule were inspired by those in Tunisia and Egypt, but he fought back with brutality against civilians that posed a challenge to the United States and Europe's public commitment to support reform in the Arab world. The chief of Libya's UN mission, its Ambassador to the United States, and several cabinet members resigned in protest. Civil war raged in Libya, with Qaddafi's forces, including foreign mercenaries from African nations Qaddafi has richly supported over the years, attacking the opposition, driving into its base in the eastern section of the country. The U.S. froze more than \$30 billion in Libyan assets, half the nation's GDP. Qaddafi's reaction to the revolt was so violent, it led to the first ever condemnation by the Arab League of one of its members, and an extraordinary UN Security Council resolution, which they supported, allowing UN member states to not only enforce a no-fly zone over Libya, but to take "all measures" necessary to protect civilians against the



Libyan forces<sup>8</sup>. Although in more limited form, the U.S. has become engaged in a third conflict in the Arab Middle East, with its military actions under the UN and NATO umbrella. Qaddafi's rule is increasingly tenuous, with major tribes, like the Warfalla, he has skillfully balanced over four decades of rule, threatening to defect<sup>9</sup>.

The Obama administration, after a difficult internal debate, decided to support military action with American Tomahawk missiles taking out Libya's air defenses, and NATO taking over the military action against resilient pro-Qaddafi forces. There is little question that Qaddafi's era is over; the only questions are when, how much blood will be shed in the battle, and who will replace him, since the rebels are a largely unknown and disparate group.

It increasingly appears that yet again, his departure might have the perverse effect of providing an opening for terrorist groups, as in Iraq after the U.S. invasion deposed Saddam Hussein. Recent U.S. intelligence indicates that at least some members of al-Qaeda and even Hezbollah, Israel's enemy in Lebanon, have embedded themselves among the rebels, complicating an American decision over whether to supply them arms to topple Qaddafi, and throwing further into question whether a post-Qaddafi Libya will be more or less pro-Western than it was in his last years in power.

When the U.S. armed the Islamic fundamentalist Mujahadeen fighters to help them expel the Soviet forces from Afghanistan in the 1980s, the weapons ended up being used against the U.S. in Afghanistan over 20 years later, when the Mujahadeen were transformed into today's Taliban<sup>10</sup>.

• • •

I have spent considerable time in the Middle East and North Africa, from Israel and the Maghreb Arab states of North Africa, to the Palestinian territories, Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey in my official responsibilities during the Clinton administration and later in my private activities. I already knew about the grinding poverty in Egypt, the lack of free expression there and throughout much of the Arab world, and the other challenges facing the governments and people of the region. But in frequent meetings with government officials and private business leaders, I have developed a respect for their seriousness of purpose in trying to come to grips with their endemic problems. It also became clear that they were not moving rapidly enough to keep up with the changes of the new century and the desires of the bulk of the young people who make up

more than half their population. Yet, I never anticipated such rapid changes in the firmly entrenched, pro-American order.

At one level, all of these momentous developments were set off by the self-immolation of a young street vendor in Tunis in December 2010, Mohamed Bouaziz, who was frustrated by the misconduct of the security services and the lack of job opportunities. His death sparked street demonstrations against high food prices, unemployment and a lack of political freedom. When this led to the capitulation of President Ben Ali, the democratic impulse spread with literally electronic speed across the Middle East. But at a deeper level, there were common threads. One is a generational gap. The opposition in virtually every Arab country was largely young, technology savvy, and determined to upset the leaders who were blocking their way to join an interdependent world. The common cry for jobs and economic opportunity arose from young people with education but no economic opportunity.

There is also a shared history of outside domination. Many of the countries in the Middle East had been controlled by a series of external forces, from the Crusaders to the Ottoman Empire to virtual colonies of Western powers, mainly France and Britain after World War I. Many achieved independence after World War II, at roughly the same time as Israel. But while Egypt has a proud history of several millennia as one of the world's oldest and richest cultures, it was only in 1952 that an independent Egyptian republic was born, after King Farouk was overthrown by a military coup led by Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Another common thread was strong central control either by monarchs or autocrats. These rulers provided no space for democratic opposition parties to flourish, or for an independent judiciary or a free press to develop as pillars of civil society. In the key countries of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, the monarchies of the Hashemite dynasty, the House of Saud, and the Shah of Iran, were absolute rulers, as were royal houses in the Gulf states. The autocrats in the secular societies of Syria and Egypt, like hereditary monarchs, maintained power through strong security services, a supportive military establishment, and a government-controlled press. Tunisia's Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was president for 23 years; Hosni Mubarak of Egypt for 30 years; Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh for 33 years; Bahrain has had only one prime minister, Sheikh Khalifa ibn Salman Al Khalifa, a relative of the Khalifa monarch, since the country's independence in 1971. This is hard to maintain in the interconnected world of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

All were sustained by the particular circumstances of the Cold War, when the Middle East became a battleground between the Soviet and American superpowers and their allies, aligning with one or the other, and on occasion changing sides. In 1947 the Soviet Union joined with the United States in voting for the UN resolution establishing the State of Israel in the belief that its socialist government would help Moscow establish a beachhead in the Middle East. Israel quickly disabused the Soviets of this hope and firmly allied itself with the United States and the West. France allied itself with Israel when it was fighting Arab nationalists in Algeria, was Israel's main arms supplier in its early years, and then froze arms sales in the midst of the 1967 Six Day War as it saw more opportunities in the newly emerging Arab world.

Because the Middle East with its oil was a key front in the Cold War, the U.S. was content to support the ruling regimes as long as they in turn supported U.S. interests, even when America's client states sharply departed from the democratic values promoted by the United States in other parts of the world. No better example can be found than President Carter's toast to the Shah in Tehran on Christmas Eve of 1977 lauding the Shah's regime as an "island of stability," even as he made human rights a key component of his administration's foreign policy in other regions of the world.

The most dramatic shift was initiated by President Anwar Sadat of Egypt when he expelled Soviet military personnel in 1972, sealing a new strategic relationship with the U.S. Egypt joined Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Jordan, and Muslim Turkey as firm anti-Soviet allies of the U.S. This was followed in 1977 by President Sadat's trip to Israel and his pledge to the Israeli Knesset of "No more war." This dramatic step was in part a consequence of Israel's crushing defeat of the combined Arab armies in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, with emergency U.S. military support granted at the last moment by President Richard Nixon.

Other developments prompted this historic shift. One was the intervention of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the Nixon administration, who persuaded Israel not to destroy the Egyptian army it had encircled during the Yom Kippur War, thereby preserving Egypt's dignity. This was followed by Kissinger's negotiating a partial withdrawal from the Sinai by Israel and Egypt. Then President Sadat realized that Israel could not be crushed by Arab military force and that its nuclear arsenal would assure its long-term existence in the region.

When President Carter engineered a joint U.S.-Soviet appeal in 1977 for an international conference to develop a comprehensive solution to the Middle East disputes, Sadat

became convinced that his goal to regain all of the Egyptian Sinai was out of reach. He took matters into his own hands and launched a unilateral peace initiative with Israel, catching the Carter administration by surprise with a public announcement that he would visit Jerusalem. I was witness to President Carter's initial private reaction: he initially opposed Sadat's trip because he realized that it would lead to a separate peace. But along with other advisers, I urged him to embrace Sadat's historic initiative, which he promptly did, with historic results for Israel.

After the end of the Cold War, American policy did not fundamentally change throughout the final decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. Then came the 9/11 attacks by al-Qaeda, and terrorism immediately topped America's foreign policy agenda. The U.S. used its traditional coalition of Arab nations against the radical Islamic states led by Iran and Syria. The key rulers in the region convinced successive administrations that the only alternative to supporting them was the risk of chaos and religious extremists, like the Muslim Brotherhood. President George W. Bush pressed the idea of a democracy agenda on the region, but his message was heavily undercut by his decision to invade Iraq, which made it appear to many leaders in the Arab Middle East that American-style democracy was being imposed at gunpoint. In 2009, President Obama spoke out in Cairo on the advantages of democratic development. But for decades, there had indeed been no choice, no avenues for democratic expression, and no robust civil society in which democratic institutions could take root and flourish.

For a fleeting moment in 1979, the Iranian revolution seemed to offer a popular break from the Iranian monarchy, but the result was catastrophic. Iran became a theocratic republic, even more dictatorial and repressive than the regime it supplanted, with a zealous mission to support terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, to erase any vestige of American or Western presence in the Middle East, to eliminate Israel as a Jewish state, and to impose a radical form of Islam on the region. This catastrophic development, whose dangers are heightened by Iran's nuclear ambitions, only further reinforced the American policy of treading lightly in trying to change the internal governance of the Arab world, in exchange for its leaders accepting American leadership on security issues, supporting peace with Israel, and working with American agencies to combat terrorism. Whatever its benefits, this cooperation strengthened the security services that helped keep Arab autocrats in power.

Another force behind the upheavals in the region is a demographic reality: a surge of population only emphasized the failure of Middle East governments to create economic

opportunity (Chapter IV). In most of the Arab Middle East, including the Palestinian territories, almost half of the population is under the age of 25. This youth bulge creates tremendous social and economic pressures because the stagnant economies in the region cannot generate the jobs necessary to satisfy this surging demographic cohort. Sometimes this turns them toward terrorism. But, in most cases, it has led to a general feeling of disappointment and anger at their governments. Many have college degrees and cannot get jobs commensurate with their education. With slow growth and high unemployment, the ingredients for a political revolution were at hand.

Finally there is Globalization and the Digital Era (Chapter II). No longer are young people in the Arab states cut off from the world. It is at their fingertips, with Arab cable networks like Al Jazeera and Al Arabia and the new social media. The upheavals were energized by a wired group of college-educated young people. Critically important to the U.S. and the Jewish world, these were not ideological or radical revolutionaries. They wanted the same democratic advantages enjoyed by the West, which they saw on their screens and were connected to by their cell phones and computers. Other factors—a desire for a separate identity from foreign nations, strong, suffocating governments, lack of economic opportunity—served as kindling, but it was the social media, particularly Facebook and Twitter, that touched off an explosion among young people without even a dominant leader to articulate and galvanize their common cause on the streets of Tunis, Cairo, Amman, and Sana'a.

The Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings were not as disconnected, nor as spontaneous as they initially appeared. Observers noted it went back as far as 2005, when a group of highly educated young people began communicating with each other through Facebook, led by Ahmed Maher, a young civil engineer who organized Youth for Change. Egyptian security forces decimated their ranks, and they effectively went underground, communicating by computers and blogs. On April 6, 2008, they called for a nationwide strike through a Facebook group they had created, naming the group the April 6 Youth Movement. It became the leading force in the 2011 demonstrations that brought down the Mubarak regime. The Egyptian Youth Movement had been communicating through Facebook with a group of digitally wired young people in Tunisia, who organized Progressive Youth of Tunisia.

At the same time, the Egyptian group learned of the non-violent techniques that had been used more than a decade before by young Serbs to help bring down the dictator Slobodan Milosevic. These Serbs drew on the thinking of an American, Gene Sharp,

who advocates nonviolence as the best way to bring down a police state. These efforts were further augmented by another Facebook group, organized by a young Egyptian Google executive, Wael Ghonim, whose imprisonment and release became a solidifying force for the 2011 demonstrations<sup>11</sup>.

Thus, a seemingly impregnable regime was ousted by combining non-violent tactics with electronic gadgetry to mobilize supporters. It capitalized on broad-based public dissatisfaction with the Mubarak government arising from economic factors of soaring food prices and unemployment, bureaucratic corruption and crony capitalism, and a repressive state security apparatus that restricted free expression. Nothing like this had happened before in the modern Middle East, which is why a page of history turned early in 2011.



As inspiring as the democratic movements in the Arab world are, it is critical to take a clear-eyed view of what comes next. The huge void left by the departure of pro-Western autocratic leaders will have to be filled; politics no less than physics abhors a vacuum. It can be filled by democratic forces alone, now weak and disorganized; by Islamic forces, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood and their allies; or by the military. Most likely there will be an uneasy balance among all three for years to come, differing in degree from country to country in the region.

The uncertainties have emerged directly in Israel's own backyard. While it was delayed, the impact of the Arab revolutions came to the Palestinians as well. Young people demonstrated by the thousands in the West Bank and Gaza, the first spontaneous demonstrations in Gaza since Hamas took control in a bloody battle with Fatah, to insist that the rival factions, Fatah and the Palestinian Authority - which control the West Bank, and Hamas, which runs Gaza, end their divisions and present a united front to Israel. The result was that another political earthquake erupted, this one at Israel's doorstep. Under the auspices of the new, post-Mubarak Egyptian government, the two factions formally signed in Cairo on May 4, a framework to form an interim unity government of technocrats, which will exclude the most trusted person in the Palestinian leadership for Israel, the U.S., and the West, Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, and prepare the way for elections in 2012. The two groups will nominate members of the new interim government and a 12-judge panel to prepare for elections.

Ominously, the agreement will establish an oversight committee to regulate security. While the Fatah security forces, which have cooperated with Israel in providing security and rooting out Hamas terrorists, will remain in charge of the West Bank, clearly they will not arrest or cooperate as before in dealing with Hamas terrorists<sup>12</sup>.

The agreement underscores how relationships in the region have been upended with the Arab upheavals. Fatah and Hamas were passionate enemies, fighting a bitter battle in 2007 for control of Gaza. Now, public pressure is pushing them together like unwitting conjoined twins. Some dozen small Palestinian factions will countersign the agreement; the first time ever so many disparate factions have forged a common front.

The staying power of the agreement is in doubt, because so many crucial issues remain unresolved, demonstrating the deep gulf between the factions, from whether to recognize Israel's right to exist or keep up an armed resistance, to whether Palestinian President Abbas will continue to be empowered to negotiate a peace agreement with Israel<sup>13</sup>. But already, immediately following the signing of the pact, live coverage from the official television station of the Palestinian Authority could be seen for the first time in four years in Gaza, and Al Aqsa, the Hamas-run satellite station showed live interviews from the West Bank<sup>14</sup>.

Whether Hamas will come out the winner is uncertain. They are the best-organized party, and have support in Fatah's West Bank, as well as in their home base of Gaza. But the house of cards in the region is being so thoroughly re-shuffled, that their refusal to back Bashar al-Assad in his brutal confrontation against an energized opposition inspired by the other Arab revolutions, and their agreement with Fatah, without Syrian consent, threatens the Damascus base of the Hamas political wing, headed by Khaled Meshal, and leaves it with an uncertain future<sup>15</sup>.

What is clear is that the ramifications of the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation for the U.S. and for Israel are enormous. The agreement gives President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority headwind going into the September UN General Assembly meeting, representing a "united" Palestinian people in both parts of the Palestinian territories. He can achieve recognition of a Palestinian state, in pre-1967 borders and with East Jerusalem as its capital, without having to make any of the political compromises on security, land swaps, formal recognition of Israel, and refugees he would have been required to concede in a negotiated two- state agreement with Israel.

Prime Minister Netanyahu announced that Israel would withhold the tax revenues it collects for the Palestinian Authority in retaliation. U.S. Congressional leaders,



including the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, Steve Chabot, are threatening to cut off hundreds of millions of dollars of aid to the Palestinians, arguing, like the Israeli prime minister, that the funds may end up in the pockets of Hamas, which has pledged to destroy Israel, and continues to lob rockets into Israel. Already announcing he will not run for President of a united “Palestinian state,” Abbas can make his legacy a pact with Hamas, rather than one with Israel. He reinforced his desire to embed himself in the Arab consensus by praising the coordinated effort by Palestinians to breach Israel’s borders from Gaza, the West Bank, Syria, and Lebanon on the anniversary of Israel’s independence, May 15, 2011, and condemning Israel’s attacks on them.

Clearly the Palestinian center has collapsed, dramatized by the sidelining of the prime minister of the Palestinian Authority and genuine moderate, Salam Fayyad, who apparently will have no role even in the technocratic government that will be in place pending elections in 2012. While Abbas tried to reassure a vesting group of Israeli dignitaries, including business and academic leaders and former security officials who publicly urged their government to offer a detailed peace plan, that he would remain in charge of peace negotiations with Israel, this is a hollow promise. He has no mandate to make concessions, nor the desire to do so. Nor can an unelected caretaker government of technocrats negotiate with Israel. Nothing in the new Fatah-Hamas pact commits Hamas to recognize Israel, or to modify its own charter, which pledges to destroy Israel, much like the old PLO charter did before the 1993 Oslo Accords.

It is critically important that wise heads prevail in an exceedingly complex situation. To cut off the tax revenues of the Palestinians would prevent the payment of salaries to West Bank civil servants, just as economic growth is spurting. To cut off American aid would diminish the clout of the U.S. and prevent needed projects on the ground, which help the Palestinian people. It would only serve to alienate the remaining moderates<sup>16</sup>. By mid-May, Israel transferred the frozen tax revenues, leading the Palestinian Authority to claim a “success of the Palestinian campaign that called on the international community to pressure Israel to transfer the funds.”<sup>17</sup> This handed the Palestinians an unnecessary public relations victory.

There are now legitimate concerns about where the tax revenues will be allocated, following the Fatah-Hamas agreement I suggest the following: Israel should rebate future Palestinian revenues into a special account managed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to assure that it is used strictly for civilian purposes, and not for



Hamas arms. The IMF is a respected international institution, to which Israel's Central Bank head, Stanley Fischer, had been chief economist. The Fund has experience in operating in post-conflict and bailout situations with difficult governments, in assuring that money goes to the right places.

For the U.S., much of its foreign assistance funding supports specific projects, often going to NGOs rather than directly to the Palestinian Authority. To the extent there are any direct payments to the Palestinian Authority, they likewise should be routed through the IMF. The training of Palestinian police by the U.S. military should continue, to increase their professionalism, and to encourage them to continue to be alert to terrorism and to provide security to their own people.

It is almost certainly true that no government that includes Hamas will permit any peace agreement to which Israel could agree. The best one can hope for is not to take steps that would foreclose an eventual agreement, however long that might be.

In Israel, there are advantages to being pro-active. If even under these trying circumstances, Israel can dramatize its commitment to a negotiated agreement for a Palestinian state by setting forth its own comprehensive view of what peace with the Palestinians would look like, if the Palestinians seek a peaceful rather than violent solution, it would have several advantages, even if it is not immediately accepted by the divided Palestinian leadership. Prime Minister Netanyahu took a first but not different step in his May 24, 2011 address to a joint session of Congress. Netanyahu received a rapturous response from Congress. But it may prove to be a pyrrhic victory if he fails to provide the Obama administration with the tools necessary to head off the September 2011 UN General Assembly vote on Palestinian statehood.

While it will not stop a vote in the UN General Assembly creating a Palestinian state, it would make it easier for major players, like the 27 member states of the European Union, Canada, some Central and Latin American countries, Australia and New Zealand, as well as the U.S., to oppose a unilateral UN vote. Perhaps, Russia and China might abstain. In addition, it can further undercut the appeal of radicals at a critical time, when militant Islam has been dealt a blow, if it is rejected.

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There are several political combinations that can emerge in the broader Arab Middle East. The democratic, secular revolutions could promptly coalesce around stable,

secular parties that will dominate politics with the support of a military that acquiesces to civilian control. This best-case outcome is unlikely in the short term. This is not meant to be a repetition of the cliché that the Arab public is not ready for democracy; it is. Arab rulers have so crippled institutions, that within months the democratic forces would have to rebuild them from the ground up, a task that took generations in established Western democracies. Because the autocratic regimes left no space for non-violent political parties, for free expression, nor for non-governmental groups to organize, courageous but unorganized civilians have no practical experience in creating viable political parties with a clear agenda around which large numbers of the demonstrators can come together. Moreover, the military establishments are too powerful to suddenly cede power to an unorganized group of pro-democracy supporters. This situation is not only a failure of the autocrats but of American foreign policy, since successive administrations bought into the rulers' argument that their authoritarian governance was the only alternative to rule by radical Islamists. So democracy will happen, sooner rather than later, but not overnight.

The difficult transition to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe following decades of Communist repression will be even more complicated in the Arab world. Bringing down an autocratic regime in Tunisia and Egypt virtually overnight will seem easy by comparison to building a functioning democracy. Nor will there be uniformity across the Arab landscape. The autocratic rulers in the secular Arab republics were more vulnerable than the entrenched and often revered Arab monarchies in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and the Maghreb.

As democratic norms and practices take hold, the will of the people will have to be given greater voice. But the publics in Egypt and Jordan, the two countries with peace treaties with Israel, have been cool at best to normalized relations with a country that many still see as an enemy; they were never educated by their rulers or by the press in the benefits of peace, so they feel less stake in them than their fallen leaders. Indeed, Israel was often sharply criticized in the pro-government press in Egypt. And while many of the secular youth admire America in the abstract and hope to emulate the American standard of life, they were angered by Washington's support of Mubarak almost to the end, and are likely to accept considerably less foreign influence on whatever regime succeeds him.

Michael Oren, a distinguished historian now serving as Israel's ambassador to the United States, recently noted that the Youth Movement spearheading the revolution

demanded that Egypt cut off its natural gas supplies to Israel, which depends on its neighbor for 40 percent of its supply. And, Ayman Nour, who ran against Hosni Mubarak in the last presidential race only to be arrested, declared shortly after Mubarak left office that “the era of Camp David is over.”<sup>18</sup>

Another alternative path would be the hijacking of the popular revolutions by radical Islamists, as they were in Iran and, more recently, after the 2006 elections in Gaza. The Gaza elections were strongly encouraged by the Bush administration, but produced a Hamas victory and a year later, a military conflict that expelled the Palestinian Authority from Gaza. Now, the fear is that the well-organized Muslim Brotherhood will use new democratic openings to govern themselves. As Thomas Friedman succinctly put it, “these Arab regimes have been determined to prevent any civil society or progressive parties from emerging under their rule. So when these regimes break at the top, the elevator goes from the palace straight to the mosque. There is nothing else in between - no legitimate parties or institutions.”<sup>19</sup> While most mainstream American Jewish leaders voiced hope that democracy would flourish in Egypt, David Harris, executive director of the American Jewish Committee, spoke for many Diaspora Jews when he said “hope is not a policy.” He continued: “You could end up not with Jeffersonian democracy, but with Hezbollah, Hamas, and the likes of the Iranian regime.”<sup>20</sup> More likely, they will not want the respectability of political power, but will try to share it with secular forces they expect to fail, all the while pressing for their Islamic agenda.

Revolutions rarely follow a straight line to democracy from the overthrow of a repressive regime. The 1789 French Revolution endured the Reign of Terror under the Jacobins, military rule under Napoleon Bonaparte (who liberated the Jews of the European countries he conquered), and then two later revolutions before France, as we know it today, began to take shape in the latter part of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The 1917 Russian Revolution led to even worse repression as the Bolsheviks seized control. The 1949 Communist revolution in China, originally seen as a peasant uprising, led to a repressive regime that killed millions with policies that produced mass famine and repression. This culminated in Mao Zedong’s catastrophic Cultural Revolution, before modern economic reforms were begun in 1979 by Deng Tzo Ping, although with little political freedom. The 1959 Cuban Revolution under Fidel Castro overthrew a pro-American strongman, Fulgencio Batista, but led to a Communist government dependent on the Soviet Union, that proved even worse for the

Cuban people and for peace in the Western Hemisphere than the government it supplanted.

Niall Ferguson, the eminent Harvard historian, has forecast that the most likely outcome, “as in past revolutions, is that power will pass to the best organized, most radical, and most ruthless elements in the revolution, which in this case means Islamists, like the Muslim Brotherhood.”<sup>21</sup> But the examples of history, plus the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood as the most disciplined and organized organization in many of the Arab countries - or even worse, al-Qaeda - do not mean that the revolutions in the Arab world will lead to a similar catastrophe.

In failing Arab states like Yemen and Somalia, where the central governments do not fully control the country, the prospect of radical groups gaining power is very real. In Yemen, Abdjul Majid al-Zidani, a radical cleric and one-time mentor of Osama bin Laden, has joined the protests against long-time President Ali Abdullah Saleh, stating that “an Islamic state is coming.” Under intense pressure, President Saleh himself, despite receiving hundreds of millions of dollars of aid from the U.S. to battle Islamic radicals, felt compelled to say that the waves of protest throughout the Arab world were being “managed by Tel Aviv and under the supervision of Washington.”<sup>22</sup>

For the more established Arab states, a radical Islamic regime is not a likely outcome. The major countries are moderate Sunni Arab states, not Shiite majority nations like Iran. In Egypt a large secular population, as well as the Coptic Christian minority, would go into open revolt if the Muslim Brotherhood gained control. The military depends upon America as its source of arms and has ties to Israel’s military as well. And there is no one charismatic religious leader with the authority exercised in 1979 in Iran by Ayatollah Khomeini. Likewise in Jordan, the King enjoys wide respect and admiration.

But there will be a struggle. The banned Islamist parties that worked quietly in the background will now openly contend for public support. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood initially planned to field candidates for 35 percent of the parliamentary seats, and not nominate a candidate for the presidency. Now sensing a political opening while secular parties struggle to organize, they will contest half of the seats in the Egyptian parliament.

In Tunisia, the Muslim political movement, Ennahda (Renaissance), was also banned and is now developing its own program. It has announced it will oppose

the imposition of sharia (Islamic law) on what is one of the most secular societies in the Arab world<sup>23</sup>, would not force women to wear veils, and has supported a rule requiring equal numbers of men and women on ballots for July 2011 elections. It is modeling itself after Turkey's relatively moderate Islamic party. But Ennahda is viewed with deep suspicion by secular forces in Tunisia, and its influence is bound to grow in Tunisia's more open, democratic atmosphere, and it will likely seek to incorporate religion in public life.

Ennahda, like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, is well organized, energized, and popular for its long-time opposition to President Ben Ali's increasingly unpopular rule. The party newspaper, Dawn, has resumed publication after being banned for 20 years, and is selling some 70,000 copies per week. Ennahda has opened dozens of offices around the country, and imams are preaching on its behalf in mosques. Public opinion polls put it well ahead of any of the secular parties<sup>24</sup>.

However, the secular, pro-democratic forces, which made the revolutions possible, are equally unlikely to cede their hard-earned gains. In Tunisia, for example, advocates for women's rights demonstrated to prevent losing their rights under an Islamic revival; eleven thousand signed a petition to the ruling Army Council protesting the exclusion of women on the committee to draft a new constitution. And anti-Ennahda Facebook groups have drawn tens of thousands of supporters, while protestors on the ground have denounced the threat to Tunisia's secular traditions<sup>25</sup>.

In Egypt, where the existing Mubarak-era constitution established Islamic law as a principal source of legislation, there is a rise of Islamic Salafism, a rigid, conservative form of Islam. Its adherents have called for full veiling of women, and for segregation of the sexes in universities. Their following is growing, with an increasing number of women wearing the full face-covering veil, the hijab. But highly educated Egyptian women, liberated during the Mubarak era, will not be silent if their rights are threatened. As one commentator noted, "women's groups in Tunisia and Egypt will have to forge alliances with moderate religious leaders who promote progressive interpretations of sharia."<sup>26</sup> The same might be said for all secular, pro-democratic groups.

A third possible option is that the revolutions will lead to military dictatorships exerting control in the midst of a power vacuum. The unwillingness of the military to shoot at its own people made the peaceful revolutions possible in Tunisia and Egypt. Each military establishment will want to protect its interests, but seem unlikely to return to the old days of government by military coup. The Egyptian military, in

particular, realizes that it was its soldiers' and officers' restraint during the tumultuous demonstrations, in contrast to the behavior of Mubarak's internal security forces, which won them such public admiration and made Mubarak's peaceful departure possible. While the opposition that brought down the Mubarak regime began to show signs of division after he resigned, they would return united in force if they believed the military was co-opting their democratic revolution. Those same soldiers would be forced to confront the very people they had benevolently allowed to overturn the old order.

The Egyptian military leadership has moved promptly to satisfy many of the demands of the young: it dissolved the parliament elected in 2010 in widely condemned elections; dismissed the prime minister; set dates for ending the emergency laws in force since 1981, after Sadat's assassination; dismantled the dreaded security service that suppressed and tortured the opposition<sup>27</sup>; as well as set dates for revising the constitution to allow opposition parties and organized elections. Its principal goal is to retain the vast economic empire it controls. The same is occurring in Tunisia, where a commission dominated by civilians is rewriting the constitution.

The fourth and most likely outcome over time is a difficult and fractious transition to a democratic Egypt and Tunisia, and more political openness in Jordan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. This uncertain process will be characterized by an uneasy and changing balance between new secular, pro-democracy parties, a highly disciplined and organized Muslim Brotherhood, and a dominating military role in the background. One sobering example is Iraq. Eight years after Saddam Hussein was removed from power by the United States, the country is still struggling with contending forces, largely along sectarian lines, with the Shiite-dominated leadership unable to create a functioning government for months following elections. Divisions between Shiite and Sunni parties have led to constant tensions. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki forcefully cracked down against civilians demanding the government provide security, jobs, and basic services<sup>28</sup>.

In Egypt, the military is the nation's most powerful and respected institution, and owns major parts of the Egyptian economy. It is unlikely to put up one of its own as a military candidate for the presidency, but any civilian elected will serve with the knowledge that he will have to satisfy the military. In Tunisia, Jordan, and Egypt, the military will remain the power behind the throne and the key institution to prevent chaos during a necessarily lengthy transition to a democratic society.

The United States can help retain its influence by maintaining its military assistance programs that involve extensive American training for rising military officers from countries like Egypt. Moreover, the Egyptian military has traditionally had a good relationship with the Israel Defense Forces, and this is likely to continue unless there is a political freeze, which could arise from continued Israeli settlement activity and lack of progress in the peace process, just as easily as any adjustment of Egypt's relations with other Arab states. The Egyptian military has already publicly reconfirmed its strategic alliance with the U.S. and its treaty commitments to Israel.

The most positive model for reform can be found in Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in the world, but its prosperity and relative stability indicates the time that it can take to move from a dictatorship to democracy. After Indonesia gained independence from the Dutch at the end of World War II, two dictators ruled with military support, Sukarno from 1945 to 1967, and Suharto from 1967 to 1998. Then began a transition to a more liberal economic, political, and social environment. The process was eased by the prevailing practice of an Islam that is much less rigid in Indonesia than in most of the Middle East. Nevertheless, the government has had to strike a balance among a powerful military, growing though moderate Islamic forces, and separatist movements arising in different islands of the far-flung Indonesian archipelago. Several short-term elected presidents held office after Suharto, until the election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2004 and his re-election five years later. His coalition of military, business and Islamic figures could become a pattern for the Middle East<sup>29</sup>.

Turkey is also cited as a likely model for Egypt and Tunisia, rather than the Iranian, radical theocratic model, but it will take time to evolve just as it did in Turkey. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk arose from the military after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire following World War I to lead a Turkish national movement. He expelled the European powers that had partitioned The Ottoman Empire, abolished the Muslim caliphate, and established a fiercely secular, democratic republic in 1923. With the army as guarantor of a secular state and Ataturk as its founding symbol visible everywhere, women were granted full equality, Western-style education was introduced and Roman letters adopted instead of Arabic script. Neutral during World War II, the Turkish government fully protected its large Jewish community from Hitler, as the Ottoman Empire gave safe haven to the Sephardic Jews expelled from Spain in 1492.

Following Ataturk's death in 1938, the military often intervened to overthrow weak civilian governments, but its influence has receded in recent years with the rise of



a moderate Islamic government that exercised firm control over the military by the early years of this century. Turkey remains democratic. Indeed, when there still seemed a prospect for membership in the European Union, more democratic reforms were passed than under the military-dominated, secular governments.

Yet if Turkey today is the best that the West can hope for from the upheavals in the Arab world, it is cause for concern. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his relatively moderate Islamic Justice and Development Party (AK Party) have taken Turkey in a more Islamic direction. Rejected repeatedly for membership in the European Union, Turkey is now looking more to the East than the West, strengthening ties with the Arab world and with Iran, and distancing itself from its historic relationship with Israel, aggravated by Israel's 2008-9 Gaza conflict and the 2010 Turkish flotilla incident.

Erdogan has embraced Iranian President Ahmadinajad, and tried to broker an agreement with Iran on its nuclear program at the time the U.S. was seeking to impose a new round of UN sanctions against Iran. It is not only in foreign policy that Turkey is changing. Internally, journalists have been arrested in 2011 for writing negative articles about the government; a new Internet censoring system will require Internet service providers to limit the access of their users to many sites, and will ban the use of dozens of innocuous words, like "girl."<sup>30</sup> Islamic-oriented judges are being appointed; hundreds of officers have been arrested in the Turkish military, which for decades saw itself as the bastion of secularism, and have been replaced by officers with an Islamic tilt.

Secular Turks have told me of the vicious anti-Israel propaganda, which they had never before seen, and have shared with me the fears they have for the direction of their country. And thousands of protestors of Turkey's new Internet filtering system, organized through a Facebook page, took to the streets of Istanbul and Ankara to shout, "Yes, we ban!" a pun on Barack Obama's 2008 campaign slogan, "Yes, we can!", and "the Internet is ours and will remain ours"<sup>31</sup>.

Like Turkey—a member of the North Atlantic Alliance—the Egyptian military has a strong bond with the United States, and will try to keep the country in the American orbit. But Egypt's officers will not give up their control over major parts of the Egyptian economy and will continue to oppose liberalization. Because the Egyptian public equates privatization with the crony capitalism it produced during the Mubarak years, one ironic outcome of the Egyptian revolution is likely to be a retreat from a more open economy that had begun to grow more strongly, with reforms instituted in the



last years of the Mubarak regime. Instead, Egypt is likely to revert toward greater state control, which in turn will lead to weaker growth, more unemployment, and the eventual discontent of the same young people who made the revolution. No sooner had Mubarak left, than the military dismissed Finance Minister Youssef Boutros-Ghali (a respected figure I have known for years), and froze the assets of former Trade Minister Rashid Mohamed Rashid, another widely respected figure outside Egypt<sup>32</sup>.

But, if the military remains the dominant force, the Muslim Brotherhood will exercise power too. The panel appointed by the military to recommend changes to the Mubarak-era constitution included legal experts with Islamic leanings, including its chairman, Tareq al-Bishri, prompting objections from 30 secular and democratic organizations<sup>33</sup>. By setting early dates for the referendum on constitutional changes, and for parliamentary and presidential elections, the Military Council has favored the more organized Muslim Brotherhood, and disadvantaged the secular forces that produced the Egyptian revolution, which argued for more time to establish their parties and agendas.



The best outcome that can be expected by the U.S. and Israel may be an uneasy balance among the new democratic forces, the military and emboldened Islamic parties, if they are willing to play by democratic rules. There is no reason why the United States cannot have significant influence on all three of these likely power centers, although it will be almost certainly less than the influence it had on their autocratic predecessor. Although the U.S. will be remembered by many of the young generation of democratic advocates for its support of the very regimes they peacefully deposed, America will also remain the global model of freedom, democracy, tolerance, and the rule of law, as well as virtually unparalleled prosperity and creativity.

By pivoting promptly, as the Obama administration has done to embrace the new democratic forces and help them learn how to organize into political parties, reinforced in his May 19, 2011 speech, Washington can enhance its influence in the very countries from which its closest allies have been overthrown, with an indirect benefit to Israel. This may also help blunt the appeal of China, which reacted harshly to its own democratic elements seeking a “Jasmine Revolution” at home, and could buttress U.S. global standing in the new multi-polar world (Chapter I).

The most complicated challenge will be dealing with the Islamic movements that will increase their influence in the three liberal Middle Eastern nations: Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia. It is essential not to fall into the trap of lumping them together as hopelessly antagonistic, which the Obama administration has so far avoided. In an internal assessment just after the political upheavals, Washington drew careful distinctions between various Islamic groups, from al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups with an anti-Western and anti-Israel agenda, to more home-grown groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and Egypt. Well before then, President Obama sought a “new beginning” with Islam in his 2009 Cairo speech, arguing that Muslim belief and democracy were not incompatible. Outreach to these Islamic groups will require great delicacy. The risk is that a U.S. embrace may empower them at the expense of secular democratic forces in the Arab world.

The Obama administration is searching for a way to begin to engage with radical groups like the Taliban in Afghanistan and Hezbollah in Lebanon, to see if more moderate elements can be coaxed from violence to dialogue, much like the British ultimately did in the 1990s with Sinn Fein, the political wing of the terrorist Irish Republican Army (IRA), after fighting the IRA year after year<sup>34</sup>.

While they clearly cannot be ignored, especially if they are already a part of the fabric of the government, like Hezbollah is in Lebanon, it is important for the U.S., and critical for neighboring Israel, to encourage the military and democratic forces to set clear standards for the participation of Islamic parties in the political system. Otherwise, they may play by democratic rules to gain a foothold in a new democratic order, only to throw the system overboard when they gain sufficient power against less organized democratic forces. This is precisely what Hamas did in Gaza after free elections were held at the insistence of the Bush administration over Israeli objections, and what Hezbollah has done following the Lebanese war with Israel, now becoming the kingmaker in Lebanese politics. Instead, the U.S. should encourage democratic forces to set clear rules for participation in elections, including explicit commitments to avoid violence and to respect existing international treaties, including the peace treaties with Israel<sup>35</sup>.

While the Taliban’s goal is to control Afghanistan and expel the U.S., just as the IRA’s goal was an independent Northern Ireland without British control, and the Palestinian Authority’s objective is an independent Palestinian state within pre-1967 borders, Hezbollah and Hamas have a different goal: the destruction of Israel.

Natan Sharansky, the most famous Soviet-era refusenik, who spent nine years in the Soviet Gulag, only to become a cabinet minister in several Israeli governments and now chairman of the Jewish Agency for Israel, is optimistic about the democratic wave in the Arab Middle East. He believes the key is to make “real partners” with the newly emerged democratic forces while the Muslim Brotherhood is not yet strong enough to seize power, and with the U.S. and EU helping to guide the process of reform. He likewise calls for “clear and enforceable conditions” on participation by parties in the new democratic process<sup>36</sup>. This is wise advice. Forcing elections in the West Bank and Gaza without setting any conditions on the participation of Hamas, eventually led to Hamas seizing power by force in Gaza after free elections.

But Israel’s hope to make the new democratic forces partners in a new Middle East will only succeed if there is genuine progress toward a true two-state solution, with the same political freedom for the Palestinians that the new democratic forces throughout the Arab world are asserting for themselves.



For the United States and Israel, the geo-political implications of the political earthquakes in the Arab world are profound, however they finally settle. There is now a fluid and unpredictable environment, which will remain so for the near term, with significant variations from country to country.

There is a real danger that the moderate pro-American Arab alliance anchored by Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and the Palestinian Authority, will be weakened in its confrontations with Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas. The Fatah-Hamas pact, agreed to despite clear warnings by the U.S. and Israel of the consequences to the peace process and U.S. aid to the Palestinians, and the elimination of the most moderate Palestinian leader, Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, deals a further blow to the alliance with the U.S. It appears that one of the factors behind the Fatah decision to throw their future in with Hamas and not the U.S. was the February 2011 U.S. veto of the UN resolution condemning Israeli settlement construction, along with the frozen peace process (for which the Palestinian Authority bears more than its share of responsibility). Already, counterterrorism cooperation and intelligence sharing with the U.S. and their counterparts in Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen, the site of a significant al-Qaeda presence, has been weakened significantly. This puts a greater burden on the U.S. to use electronic means, satellites, and informants on the ground to imperfectly compensate<sup>37</sup>.

Even before the latest Middle East upheavals, Lebanon had moved more into the Iranian orbit, when its pro-Western prime minister was replaced by one supported by Hezbollah. Iran will be the dominant foreign force in Iraq, once the American troops withdraw. Oman and Qatar are looking across the Gulf to Iran more than to the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. As one commentator noted, the uprisings “have already shredded a regional paradigm in which a trio of states aligned with the West supported engaging Israel and containing Israel’s enemies, including Hamas and Hezbollah. The pro-engagement camp of Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia is now in tatters.”<sup>38</sup> To one degree or another, all have supported the fight against terrorism, radicalism, and the projection of Iranian influence in the region. Saudi King Abdullah is unlikely to re-launch the Arab peace initiative of 2002 and 2007, given the turmoil in the region. Egypt will go through an extended period of uncertainty, which will require it to focus internally, but wants to lead the Arab world again, rather than following the U.S.-led policy followed by Hosni Mubarak of actively opposing Iran and Hamas.

The new leaders of Egypt will not abrogate the peace agreement with Israel, because with that agreement comes massive U.S. military and economic assistance. It is little recognized that next to tourism and fees from the Suez Canal, U.S. government assistance is the third largest source of income for Egypt. But, if the peace with Egypt was a “cold peace,” it may seem warm by comparison with the near future. Egypt’s likely civilian successors are men like Mohamad El-Baradei, the Nobel Prize-winning former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), or Amr Moussa, former Egyptian foreign minister and former head of the Arab League. El-Baradei’s record at the IAEA, notwithstanding his Nobel Peace Prize, was mixed in terms of his opposition and unwillingness to publicly call Iran to task for its repeated violations of UN Security Council resolutions on its nuclear program. Moussa is a passionate supporter of the Palestinians, has supported Iran’s right to a civilian nuclear program under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and has stressed that Iran has never been proven to have a nuclear military program. Both champion the idea of making the Middle East a nuclear-free zone, which is aimed at forcing Israel to either give up its nuclear deterrent, or at a minimum, subject its nuclear facilities to international inspection under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Both El-Baradei and Moussa would be likely to seek more independence from the U.S. while bidding to regain Egypt’s political leadership of the Arab world. They may identify more with the emerging giants of Brazil and India<sup>39</sup>.

There have been several troubling geo-political developments in Egypt in the wake of Mubarak's departure. Egypt agreed to an Iranian request for two warships to cross through the Suez Canal en route to Syria, the first such transit since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman of Israel called this a "provocation."<sup>40</sup> It sets a precedent in giving Iran access to the Mediterranean, thus facilitating Iran's delivery of sophisticated arms through Syria to Hezbollah, which already has over 40,000 rockets trained on Israel. Most originated in Iran and are within range of Israeli population centers. Only a few weeks later, Israel interdicted another ship that left from the same Syrian port bound for Turkey and ultimately Egypt, to transport Iranian weapons overland from Egypt to Gaza<sup>41</sup>. Meanwhile, Egypt re-opened a border crossing with Gaza, which will provide a route to smuggle weapons to Hamas<sup>42</sup>.

Egypt's new, post-Mubarak Foreign Minister Nabil Elaraby, a member of Egypt's Camp David negotiating team with Israel in 1978, is invested in maintaining the peace treaty with Israel. But he has long criticized parts of the treaty, will take a harder line on Israel's West Bank activities, and will seek to open diplomatic relations with Iran, strengthen ties to Syria, and open a dialogue with Hezbollah, all contrary to Israel's interests, and to America's as well<sup>43</sup>.

A further sign of how far Egypt has moved from the U.S. orbit to assume a more independent leadership position in the Arab world, is the role its new, post-Mubarak government played in brokering the May 4, 2011 Fatah-Hamas agreement to create an interim unity government, with elections in 2012. Egypt clearly knew this would displease both the U.S. and Israel, but by deepening ties with Hamas, which is on the U.S. terrorist list, it has chosen Arab unity as the first priority of its foreign policy<sup>44</sup>.

In a possible sign that Islamic forces may exploit the Egyptian revolution, Sheik Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a major cleric in the Sunni world, has been allowed to deliver his first public sermon in Cairo in 50 years. He has been banned from the U.S. and the U.K. because of his support for suicide bombings in Israel and attacks on American military forces in Iraq. But he addressed over a million Egyptians in Tahrir Square to celebrate the successful revolution and to remember those who died in the demonstrations. Sheik al-Qaradawi is a major inspiration to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and elsewhere. His message was one of conciliation with the Christian Coptic community, whose religious facilities were recently bombed, and he called for a civilian government based upon political pluralism, democracy and freedom, which he believes is consistent with Islamic law<sup>45</sup>. But his unyielding stance toward Israel, and his anti-

American attitude, reinforced by America's long support for President Mubarak, are emblematic of the challenges the U.S. and Israel will face in the days ahead. Another worrying event is the appeal by the head of Al-Azhar, an Egyptian religious institution, for its leadership to be elected rather than appointed by the government<sup>46</sup>.

As if these straws in the wind were not enough reason for concern, Egypt's governing military council, which should be the most pro-Western institution in the new Egypt, released the younger brother of al-Qaeda's second in command, Ayman al-Zawahri, who had been imprisoned for some ten years on charges of conspiracy to overthrow the Mubarak government. And he is only one of many terrorism suspects released from jail<sup>47</sup>.

While the young secularists who led the Egyptian revolution continue to debate how to organize themselves for the parliamentary elections now set for September and the presidential elections for November, 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood is already demonstrating its political and organizational prowess, at the expense of the secular leaders. A Brotherhood member was appointed to the committee that drafted Egypt's new post-Mubarak constitution. And the speed-up in the election process was also done at the insistence of the Brotherhood. Its clout was further underscored by the prominent position given to a member of the Brotherhood, Mohamed el-Beltagi, who stood directly to the right of the new prime minister, Essam Sharaf, when he addressed a crowd at Tahrir Square, the epicenter of the Egyptian revolution, in March 2011.

What this means is not that the Muslim Brotherhood will make Egypt an Islamic republic on the order of Iran. While Egypt is a religious society, it is a moderate Sunni Muslim society, with a strong secular base and professional and business elite. Mubarak's National Democratic Party will be a countervailing force along with the army. There are alternative Islamic forces, the Salafists who are even more conservative, and the Al-Wassat party, which is more liberal than the Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood professes not to want power, and I believe they could not seize it or gain it through elections. But it clearly will be a major force in the new Egyptian parliament in trying to turn Egypt in a more conservative direction religiously, and a more anti-Western, anti-Israel direction in foreign affairs<sup>48</sup>.

The future direction of Egypt is of critical importance to Israel for many obvious security reasons, but there is an economic dimension as well. Egypt supplies 40 percent of Israel's natural gas, and is threatening to cut off deliveries. Beyond this, peace with Egypt has been a cornerstone of Israel's economic miracle, freeing up resources for

productive civil use that had been devoted to military expenditures on the Egyptian border. Over the past 30 years, since the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, Israel's defense expenditures have dropped from over 25 percent to 9 percent of GDP.

My contacts in Egypt tell me that the situation is rapidly deteriorating. Some 500 leading businessmen have left the country for fear of arrest, even though there are no charges against them. Economic growth has stalled. The Muslim Brotherhood has developed an alliance with the military and is calling the shots. The judges who are hearing cases against anyone with ties to the Mubarak government are being intimidated and are denying bail. Former President Hosni Mubarak and his sons Alaa and Gamal face charges of murder, illegally wasting public funds, and unlawfully profiting from public coffers. The Israeli embassy in Cairo was recently attacked, with more than a dozen people injured before the Egyptian police turned the demonstrators back. Crime is rampant. The Muslim Brotherhood disrupted rallies by a leading presidential contender, Amr Moussa, forcing him to try to reach an accommodation with them. They are likely to get at least 30 percent of the vote in the upcoming parliamentary elections, and together with smaller splinter groups, may have a near majority.

To break this cycle, the U.S. needs to deploy every resource at its disposal. The economic package announced on May 19 by President Obama needs to be dramatically increased with an emphasis on quick start help and immediate debt relief. Leading American business leaders and bankers need to work with their Egyptian counterparts, and former U.S. military leaders need to help buck up the Egyptian military. The U.S. should also urge Egypt to follow the model of Nelson Mandela used in South Africa of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission rather than criminal retribution against its former leaders, which could tear the country asunder as well as put the U.S. in a difficult position. If action is not taken promptly, we may see an Egypt that is almost unrecognizable by the end of 2011.

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Since 1945, the keystone in the American alliance in the Middle East has been Saudi Arabia, the world's largest exporter of crude oil. The birthplace of the prophet Muhammad and of the Muslim faith, the location of Mecca, Medina, and other sacred shrines, Saudi Arabia is critical to the course of the Islamic world. Unlike other Arab states, largely carved out of the Ottoman Empire and given independence after World War II, Saudi Arabia emerged in 1750, while the modern Saudi kingdom was



founded by King Abdul Aziz Al Saud in 1902. The House of Saud has ruled continuously ever since, serving as a bulwark first against Soviet Communism and then Iranian radicalism<sup>49</sup>.

Its critical role explains why the Carter, Reagan, and first Bush administrations agreed to billion-dollar sales of jet fighters and surveillance aircraft over fierce opposition from pro-Israel organizations. Only after arms sales were made to Israel during the George W. Bush administration, did the American Jewish community quietly acquiesce to a massive \$60 billion sale to Saudi Arabia.

Then came the attacks of September 11, 2001, carried out almost entirely by Saudi nationals, who were inspired by the fundamentalist Wahabbi sect of Islam that is virtually the state religion of the House of Saud. Badly burned by the Saudi involvement and determined to strengthen the alliance against Iran and other radicals, Saudi Arabia in 2002 proposed a plan for peace and fully normalized relations with Israel. Many aspects were unacceptable to the Israeli government, especially a complete return to its 1967 borders and a Palestinian capital in Jerusalem. But the Saudi proposal left room for negotiation over the longstanding Arab demand for all Palestinians to return to their ancestral homes. The Arab League endorsed the proposal in 2002 and again in 2007, and then the larger Organization of Islamic States, with only Iran dissenting, followed suit. Israel never attempted to test the seriousness of the proposal, although it should have done so long ago. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia felt increasingly threatened by al-Qaeda and Iran. In 2003 and 2004, al-Qaeda launched major attacks against Saudi and American facilities; in 2006, a major Saudi oil refinery was attacked; again in 2009, al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula tried to assassinate a senior official of the Ministry of Interior and a member of the Saudi royal family.

No Middle Eastern state feels as challenged by the latest upheavals in the Arab world as Saudi Arabia. When these are added to Turkey's pro-Iranian tilt, the Shiite revolt in neighboring Bahrain, and the increasing Islamic passions in Pakistan, the House of Saud sees radical forces gaining strength at the expense of moderate, pro-American states. King Abdullah had several difficult telephone conversations with President Obama urging America to support Mubarak in Egypt or at least assist him in a dignified exit from office. With Bahrain in turmoil as well as Yemen to their south, the Saudis do not focus on democracy rising but on the pro-American Sunni alliance crumbling. I believe the Obama administration acted in the only way possible in Egypt, but the Saudis angrily saw America abandoning a strong ally. Fear that they



may be next could lead the House of Saud to hedge its bets and repair relations with Iran, which would be a disaster that Washington must do all it can to prevent<sup>50</sup>.

But it is by no means certain that the radical axis of Iran, Syria, and its Hezbollah and Hamas clients will benefit from the drive for democracy in the region. Iran will be further isolated from the West following its brutal crackdown on the Green opposition that courageously returned to the streets after the upheavals in Tunis and Cairo. It is possible that Iran's continued suppression of its democratic opposition forces may serve as a model for other rulers threatened by popular revolts. But if the youthful democratic movements have staying power, just the opposite may occur. The biggest losers could be the remaining dictatorships - Iran, Libya, and Syria - whom the emerging generation will judge as being on the wrong side of history. As Jackson Diehl perceptively wrote in the *Washington Post*, "Egypt's transformation will spell the final doom of the Arab governing model of autocratic nationalism, some 60 years after it was created in Cairo. How long can Syria's Bashar al-Assad, whose regime was built on the model of Gamal Abdel Nasser, survive in a world of Arab democracy? And how will Iranians whose popular revolution in 2009 fell short, react to the triumph of people-power in Cairo?" Another analyst concluded: "In light of their recent experiences, new Arab leaders and restive populations may find the Islamic Republic's repression of its people repulsive," making it "easier for the U.S. to forge an anti-Iran coalition in the Arab world."<sup>51</sup>

Just as the post-Soviet states in Central Europe looked to the U.S. and the European Union as models following the collapse of Communism in 1989-1990, the new democratic forces in the Middle East and North Africa may look to the West and not toward dictatorial Iran as a lodestar. A string of Iranian diplomats defected after the recent suppression of dissent. Ahmed Maleki, vice consul of Iran's consulate in Milan, said that Iranians had been inspired by the popular revolts in the region but faced a regime even more brutal than those in Egypt, Tunisia, or even Libya, and are "willing to... resort to whatever measure, including slaughter and bloodshed to the extreme, in order to retain power."<sup>52</sup>

The outcome depends upon how much brutality regimes are willing and able to exact on their own people. In the end, for all of their suppression and brutal internal security services, Western-supported autocratic regimes in the region, Egypt and Tunisia, like those in the 1980s, from Suharto in Indonesia and Marcos in the Philippines to the South Korean military government, were ultimately unwilling to put down broad-based

democratic movements. This is not the case with Syria, where President Bashar al-Assad has used brute military force against demonstrators. Syria's ally, Iran, has shown itself perfectly willing to kill its own people through the 120,000 strong Revolutionary Guard, a military and police force separate from the army, both in 2009 following its widely discredited presidential elections, and in 2011, in the wake of the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt<sup>53</sup>. Some 1,500 people were arrested in the February 2011 protests, and several protestors were killed. Although the Iranian parliament voted overwhelmingly to execute opposition leaders Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karubi, who ran against President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in June 2009, if the sentences are carried out the regime risks re-igniting the domestic opposition<sup>54</sup>.

Libya's Qaddafi has no inhibitions about using all his military forces to suppress the opposition, and the country is in a virtual state of civil war. But the international community has isolated Libya, frozen its foreign assets, and imposed sanctions through the UN Security Council. But the U.S. and its NATO allies intervened without a clear knowledge whether the rebels will be better than Qaddafi, whether they are capable of governing, and whether NATO air forces alone can defeat the forces loyal to Colonel Qaddafi. Perhaps revealingly, one opposition poster pictured in a rebel stronghold said, "Qaddafi was born a Jew."<sup>55</sup>

Militant groups like al-Qaeda will do everything possible to derail the democratic movement in the Middle East, which is their most powerful competition. The bombing of a Christian Coptic church in Alexandria, Egypt at the start of 2011 was only one example of a terrorist effort to sow dissension. Al-Qaeda's number two leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has Egyptian origins. Some Egyptian observers believe al-Qaeda will even try to assassinate Muslim Brotherhood leaders to prevent their participation in a democratic process<sup>56</sup>. While Iran and the anti-Western, radical forces may appear to gain from an unstable transition, I believe that they will end up as losers in the long run. The combination of an educated generation of young people, digital communications, and a desire to integrate into the world, will eventually reduce the appeal of radicalism; rather than be a pariah state, Iran may eventually temper its radicalism - but that will be a long time coming.



While the path has not been straight, there has been a movement toward democracy since the end of the Cold War. A study at George Mason University found that the

number of autocracies had declined from 89 in 1977 to only 23 by 2009. It defined 47 in-between countries as “anocracies” - fragile states with elements of both democracy and autocracy. Still, the study concluded that for the first time in history, the majority of the world is democratic<sup>57</sup>. The latest Middle East revolutions are bound to inspire democratic forces around the world, even including China.

What the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions and the concomitant upheavals among their neighbors indicate is that the Middle East is no longer immune from this historical movement toward democracy. The states in the region may go through varying transitions toward a vibrant civil society, but the result will be a far cry from the traditional absolute rule enforced by brutal security services. In the new digital era, the human impulse to have a voice in one’s own future is strengthened.

In short, emerging democratic movements in the Middle East are a positive development as long as they do not lead to radical Islamic takeovers. They will help release the creativity of the people, lead to economic reforms, and provide a safety valve for young people frustrated by repression and deprivation. In the long run, these nations could become closer partners of the United States and join the democracies of the emerging world, like Brazil, Indonesia, and South Korea, which shed autocracies during the past several decades. Israel could benefit if it can conclude a peace agreement with the Palestinians. If the Egyptian people and others in the Middle East no longer feel they are under the thumb of the U.S. and no longer feel they have to support American policies in exchange for American military largesse, they may at last place the responsibility for failure on their own governments instead of using Israel or the U.S. as scapegoats<sup>58</sup>.



Into this boiling Arab cauldron came the remarkable, brilliantly planned and executed Obama administration operation, which on May 1, 2011, killed Osama bin Laden, in a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, less than a hundred miles from the capital of Islamabad, and a close neighbor to Pakistan’s Military Academy and a city laced with military personnel.

Bin Laden’s was the face of 21<sup>st</sup> century militant Islamic terrorism with a global reach, the founder of al-Qaeda in 1988, as an offshoot of the Mujahadeen who drove the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. He was the inspiration and major financier, with his ties to wealthy Saudi Arabians, of a new breed of ruthless jihadists. He fused a

fundamentalist, radical violent vision of an Islamic caliphate with the use of modern digital era technology - what the *New York Times* called waging “holy war with distinctly modern methods,” including encrypted documents on laptop computers<sup>59</sup>.

The Navy Seals found all the paraphernalia of a 21<sup>st</sup> century business in bin Laden’s compound, from thumb drives and CDs to hard drives on computers used to send e-mails to al-Qaeda operatives by couriers from Internet cafes in Pakistan. And he took this fearsome combination global in a globalized, interconnected world, with terrorist actions on a worldwide basis, against the U.S., the West, Jews, and secular, moderate Muslim regimes.

He created, inspired, or blessed a decentralized franchise of al-Qaeda affiliates and supporters - al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, with cells in Somalia, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia; al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, in Iraq; al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb, with operations in Tunisia, Libya, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal; Al Shabab in Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, and Yemen; and Tehrik-e-Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan<sup>60</sup>.

In a remarkable mixture of the modern and the fundamentalist, al-Qaeda supporters created a Facebook page, “We Are All Osama bin Laden,” following his death, to permit messages of defiance to be posted on the Internet<sup>61</sup>.

He left behind a string of spectacular suicide attacks, which he planned, funded, backed, or inspired, on a scale, scope, and ferocity never seen before - the 1993 New York World Trade Center (six killed, more than a thousand injured); the 1996 Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia (19 American military men killed and hundreds wounded); 1998 U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya (224 killed, thousands wounded); 2000 U.S.S. Cole in Yemen (17 U.S. servicemen killed); 2001 attempt to blow up an American Airlines flight from Paris to Boston; 2002 attack on a Tunisian synagogue (19 killed); 2002 Bali, Indonesia attack on a resort area (more than 200 killed); 2003 bombing attacks in Casablanca, Morocco (33 killed, some 100 injured); 2004 Madrid trains (190 killed, over 1300 injured); 2005 London bus and subway bombings (52 killed); 2005 Amman, Jordan hotels (57 killed); 2006 Mumbai, India, trains and commuter stations (200 killed); 2007 plot against Ft. Dix, New Jersey military base; 2008 Mumbai attacks against two hotels and the Chabad Jewish Center (163 killed, including the Chabad rabbi, his wife, and visiting Israelis); 2009 murders at Ft. Hood, Texas (13 killed); 2009 attempted Christmas Day bombing of a Northwest Airlines flight to Detroit; 2010 failed attempt to detonate a car bomb in Times Square; 2010 package bombs in UPS

cargo planes in England and Dubai, with two powerful bombs hidden in HP printer cartridges addressed to synagogues in Chicago<sup>62</sup>.

But his most devastating attack was the greatest act of violence against the U.S. homeland since Pearl Harbor in 1941, the simultaneous attacks on September 11, 2001 - an al-Qaeda signature - using four hijacked civilian planes in the U.S., against the Twin Towers in Manhattan, the Pentagon in Washington, and an aborted effort to destroy either the White House or the U.S. Capitol. While Israelis had been subject to terrorist attacks for decades, it was this act of terrorism that marked the era of terrorism for Americans and the world. Just as December 7, 1941, was, in Franklin Roosevelt's immortal words, "a date which will live in infamy" that has become a part of the American psyche, so too "9/11" was emblazoned on the minds of another generation of Americans, who will always remember where they were when they heard of the attacks. The way of life of Americans was profoundly changed, from airport metal detectors, to security guards in office buildings, to fear anytime a stray package was left in a public place. The 9/11 attacks led to the longest war in American history, in Afghanistan, which continues ten years after it began in a failed attempt to kill bin Laden and to rout the Afghan Taliban who harbored him, and, indirectly, to the War in Iraq. The inability to find and kill Osama bin Laden had rested like a dark cloud over the American psyche.

His death has very different implications for Israel, Jews in the Diaspora, the United States, and the Muslim world.

Israel's greatest terrorist threats come from Iran and the terrorist groups it supports, Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, none of whom had any ties to al-Qaeda, nor drew support or succor from bin Laden. Indeed, Iran saw al-Qaeda as a competitor, which, along with the Taliban, could destabilize Afghanistan on its border. His death, while welcomed in Israel, will have little direct effect on Israel's security. But it may have an indirect benefit of isolating Hamas and Hezbollah, making their violent extremism less attractive even within the Arab world, and at a time of popular upheaval.

However, the U.S. operation against bin Laden underscored the depth of the differences between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority. While President Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad applauded the American attack, Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniya condemned it, mourned his death, and lauded bin Laden as a "Muslim and Arab warrior,"<sup>63</sup> further demonstrating the implacable position Hamas brings to

the “unity” agreement with Fatah, and its devastating implications for any potential peace with Israel.

For Diaspora Jews, the U.S., and moderate Arab nations, the terrorist threat is somewhat diminished, but by no means eliminated. By the time of his death, his personal popularity had already dropped precipitously, for an Arab world in the midst of a series of popular uprisings, seeking not the fundamentalist vision of bin Laden, but democracy, freedom, personal empowerment, an end to corruption, and jobs and economic opportunity. The Arab Spring revolutions sought to bring the Arab world into the 21<sup>st</sup> century, not back to the 7<sup>th</sup> century of the Prophet Muhammad. In much of the Arab world, bin Laden had fallen by 2010 from an almost mythic figure, who had embodied in 9/11 the outrage many felt toward the U.S. and the West, to support rates of 18 percent in Pakistan, 13 percent in Jordan, and one percent in Lebanon<sup>64</sup>.

Al-Qaeda remains a threat, both through its affiliates in Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa, and may try to launch a series of attacks against American, Jewish, and pro-Western Arab regimes, to show they remain relevant. Even before his death, if bin Laden was chairman of the board of al-Qaeda central in the Afghan-Pakistan area, his chief operating officer was Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian militant. U.S. intelligence felt the greatest threat to the U.S. homeland came not directly from bin Laden, but from American-born radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen, who uses his American background and a sophisticated knowledge of the Internet to recruit young militants. New militant leaders, like Nair al-Wahishi, the leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, will try to fill the void<sup>65</sup>.

But their ability to mount the kind of spectacular attacks fomented in Osama bin Laden’s perverted brain, to recruit ever more jihadists inspired by bin Laden, and to substitute the large sums bin Laden could raise, will be seriously compromised. Al-Zawahiri has none of bin Laden’s charismatic appeal to disaffected Islamic youth, and is a divisive figure of Egyptian heritage, who is resented by many in al-Qaeda.

But the most profound, positive impact will be on the U.S., and this will also redound to the benefit of Israel, Jews, and, of the moderate Arab world. The May exploit will instill a new confidence in the American people and in President Obama, and fear in America’s adversaries, because it was so stunningly successful, so bold and audacious, so unique in the capacity to combine superior intelligence, sophisticated technology from spy satellites to stealth helicopters, remarkable bravery by the Navy

Seals of the secret Team Six, and firepower, so well planned even down to burying bin Laden at sea to deny him a shrine his worshippers could hallow on land<sup>66</sup>.

The U.S. sent a signal to militants in the Islamic world that if you kill Americans, their deaths will be avenged, no matter how long it takes; that the long arm of the U.S. has a boundless reach.

There are other implications for the U.S. It gives President Obama more flexibility in the Afghanistan War, whose purpose had been to eliminate the al-Qaeda threat there to the U.S. homeland, and to defeat the Taliban, which harbored bin Laden. Afghan President Karzai has already reached out to the Taliban, to see if they can be induced into seeking a peaceful solution. The U.S. administration had made it a precondition that it would negotiate directly with the largest Taliban faction, headed by Mohammad Omar, only if it broke its alliance with al-Qaeda<sup>67</sup>. This might be easier, with al-Qaeda's head buried at sea. While al-Qaeda affiliates retain substantial power, the Afghan-Pakistan central headquarters is a shadow of itself, given the pounding of Predator drones and the loss of Osama bin Laden.

The best way to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table, however, is to continue to take the fight to them, as the U.S. and NATO have been increasingly able to do with the "surge" of troops President Obama ordered. It would be a serious mistake to precipitously pivot and leave Afghanistan to the militants. Being able to tame the Taliban sufficiently to give an Afghan government the chance to avoid the fundamentalist Islamic doctrine they would impose, would deal another blow to Islamic terrorism.

The bin Laden operation put greater focus on nuclear-armed Pakistan, the recipient of billions of dollars of U.S. military and economic assistance, which is facing a major challenge from the Pakistani Taliban, at the same time as a surging anti-Western Islamic movement puts great pressure on Pakistan's elected pro-American Prime Minister Asif Ali Zardari. Within two months, early in 2011, the moderate governor of the populous province of Punjab, Salman Taseer, was killed by a member of his own security detail for supporting religious tolerance and opposing a strict Muslim anti-blasphemy law. Overnight, the guard became a national hero, even to pro-democratic forces. And then the only Christian in the cabinet, Shaba Bhatt, was also murdered by Islamic extremists. And Zardari himself had come to power only because his wife, Benazir Bhutto, was assassinated by Muslim extremists three years before<sup>68</sup>.



Osama bin Laden's dramatic killing on May 1, 2011, further aggravated relations with Pakistan, which was embarrassed by the ability of the U.S. to complete the entire project without their military or intelligence knowing about it, and by their lack of forewarning. Rather than take their anger out on al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or their own failure to discover the world's most notorious terrorist in their midst for at least five years; rather than redouble their determination to root out the terrorism that directly threatens their own stability; rather than shut down the notorious Haqqani network which operates with impunity from their territory sending militants into Afghanistan to kill American and NATO troops and innocent Afghan civilians, they have taken out their anger on the U.S.

U.S.-Pakistan relations, already hobbled by mutual distrust, will never be the same, despite having received over \$20 billion from the U.S. since 9/11, and with a fresh five-year package of \$7.5 billion in economic and military assistance.

The sudden knowledge that bin Laden had been living in an enormous, costly compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, for over five years, not holed up in a cave in the mountainous border region of Pakistan and Afghanistan, means that either the vaunted Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Pakistani military were unable to locate the world's most wanted terrorist under their own noses, within earshot of the Pakistan Military Academy, or elements of these institutions shielded him from the U.S. The condemnation of the American attack as a violation of Pakistani sovereignty will only add more poison to the relationship.

Just as there will be pressure in the U.S. Congress to cut off aid to the Palestinians, in the wake of the Hamas-Fatah pact, so too there is pressure to punish Pakistan. In the best of all worlds, this might make sense. But the civilian Pakistani government, weak as it is, was popularly elected, and has maintained a positive relationship with the U.S. It is no secret that the ISI and the Pakistan military have been using elements of the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network for years to maintain influence in Afghanistan after the U.S. leaves, and to blunt the influence there of their arch-enemy, India.

The U.S. must deal with the imperfect world as it is, and try to buck-up Pakistan to weaken the militant forces that pour over its border to murder American troops in Afghanistan. The embarrassment of having bin Laden in their midst might make them more willing to fight the militants more aggressively, who threaten not only the U.S., but Pakistan itself. But that remains in doubt<sup>69</sup>.



One way to diminish Pakistan's strategy of playing ball with militants is to put more emphasis on resolving the India-Pakistan dispute, by getting India to thin out its troops on their common border, and to assure Pakistan that a settlement of the Afghan War will not leave them exposed to greater Indian pressure.

In the end, Pakistan and the U.S. need each other. The U.S. has a deep security interest in a stable Pakistan, which is the fastest growing nuclear power in the world, to avoid "loose nukes" getting into the hands of terrorists, and to keep supply lines open to Afghanistan. Pakistan likewise realizes that for all of its angst at the U.S. over the bin Laden killing, and the continued use of American drones against terrorist targets in its mountainous areas, they can only go so far to alienate the country that is supplying them with billions of dollars of military and economic aid, and whose partnership they need to settle the Afghan war in ways that give Pakistan a major voice in the future of Afghanistan.

The U.S., in the wake of the successful attack against bin Laden, may feel more emboldened to urge Israel to join in a new peace offensive, at an hour when militant Islam has been dealt a set-back, to signal to the leaders of the new Arab Spring that a peaceful approach can solve not only the internal problems within their own countries, but the Palestinian-Israeli problem as well<sup>70</sup>.

President Obama's May 19 address on the U.S. reaction to the Arab Spring, embracing the democratic forces in the region, included a significant component designed to break the impasse in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, as controversial as it became.

If the Palestinians are unable to respond to a forthcoming Israeli proposal, the burden of history will fall on them, not on Israel. It is critically important that the Arab revolutions not stand for a peaceful toppling of their own autocrats, while simultaneously seeking to solve the Palestinian desire for statehood through violent means against Israel.

Most broadly, the demise of bin Laden will strengthen America's overall image in the world, as the continued global leader, at a time when the U.S. leads in so many areas, has been eroded by the rising giants in Asia and Latin America. Nothing breeds success like success. Countries from China to Iran respect power, and its successful operation. If the U.S. could take out bin Laden, it might be willing, if all other options were exhausted, to take out an Iranian nuclear weapon, or to take an even firmer stand on behalf of its Asian allies against Chinese territorial demands in the South

China Sea. Bin Laden mused that Arabs respected the strongest horse; that has proven to be the U.S., not al-Qaeda's brand of militant, violent, nihilistic Islam.



Israel must act promptly in light of the democratic convulsions in the region, rather than be a passive bystander (Chapter III). The unfortunate tendency in Israel may be only to draw up its defenses and focus on any increased security threat arising from instability within the two Arab nations with which it has peace agreements. Israel has every reason to be concerned about rising influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan. Arms smuggling through the Rafah tunnels from Egypt to Gaza may increase. A radical Islamic group operating in the Egyptian Sinai, Takfir wal-Hijra, launched attacks at the Gaza border and tried to blow up the Sinai gas terminal that supplies Israel with nearly half its natural gas. Hezbollah in Lebanon has gained political power. And Iranian enriched uranium production, even in the face of the successful Stuxnet cyber attack against its centrifuges, continues to increase<sup>71</sup>.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has just released an explosive finding that Iran has been working on sophisticated nuclear trigger technology that has only one purpose - not the civilian nuclear use Iran asserts as the basis for its nuclear enrichment, but for igniting a nuclear weapon<sup>72</sup>.

Moreover, political inertia is fed by the fact that Israelis see prosperity and a welcome, precipitous drop in violence. The years 2009 and 2010 were the most peaceful in Israel since 1948, although shattered by the brutal killing of a West Bank Jewish family and a Jerusalem bomb attack late in the winter of 2011.

While Israel must maintain and enhance its security edge, it must work to resolve the Palestinian issue once and for all, sooner rather than later. If Arab citizens throughout the Middle East are taking to the streets against their own governments and demanding a voice in their future, will Palestinians in the West Bank do exactly the same and rise up against Israeli control? A third Intifada is not impossible, and may have been presaged by the May 15, 2011 efforts by Palestinians on the anniversary of Israel's independence, what the Palestinians call the "Nakba" (catastrophe), to breach Israel's borders from Lebanon, Syria's Golan Heights, Gaza and the West Bank.

This is not the time for politics as usual in Israel. Prime Minister Netanyahu, at the height of his political popularity, should seek to broaden his existing coalition

and form a unity government, with the Labor Party and Kadima, to face the new external challenges with a common front and prepare for the difficult but necessary compromises to achieve peace with the Palestinians, made even more difficult by the Hamas-Fatah reconciliation pact. For their part, the Palestinians need to abandon their demand for a complete settlement freeze before entering negotiations. Both sides could be engulfed by demonstrations, with the Palestinians demanding an end to the Israeli occupation and full control over their lives.

External shocks have often produced results. Sadat's dramatic trip to Jerusalem led to the Camp David Accords and the Egypt-Israel peace treaty. The first Intifada in 1987 and the Gulf War against Iraq led to the 1991 Madrid Conference, which for the first time brought together the major Arab nations and Israel, to start a process based upon land for peace. Two years later the Oslo Accords were signed on the White House lawn. A year later, in 1994, the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty was signed. Arafat's rejection of the generous peace proposal from then Prime Minister Ehud Barak at the 2000 Camp David Summit prompted him to ignite a Second Intifada to divert attention from his own failures. This, in turn, led to the U.S.-backed 2003 Road Map, which set benchmarks for the creation of a Palestinian state.

The relative calm in the West Bank is a reflection of the economic progress made through the Netanyahu government's removal of many West Bank checkpoints. The result was freer movement of people and goods, and a reduction of Israel's military presence in major Palestinian cities, enhanced by substantial economic, political and security reforms by Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. At the height of the Egyptian crisis, Prime Minister Netanyahu acted correctly in announcing new measures to develop the Palestinian infrastructure in Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, speed construction of schools and health clinics in Israeli-controlled areas of the West Bank, extend the Palestinian Authority's control over security in seven towns now under Israeli security control, and approve electricity, sanitation, and water projects in Gaza<sup>73</sup>. In contrast, his response to the senseless killing of a young Israeli couple and their three children was to announce more settlements, which can hardly lead to conciliation and to strengthening moderate Palestinian forces, who strongly condemned the killings.

But my own experience indicates these desirable economic steps will not be sufficient to avoid a Palestinian democratic revolt, in the absence of political progress toward the mutual recognition of two states: Israel and Palestine. During the Clinton

administration, I helped organize a variety of economic measures that led to strong Palestinian economic growth and lower unemployment from 1997-2000. These included the Gaza Industrial Estate, which allowed goods with a small Israeli content made in the Estate to enter the U.S. duty-free; opening an airport in Gaza for the direct export of Palestinian products; permitting some 100,000 Palestinians to work daily in Israel with earnings that amounted to 40 percent of the occupied territories' GDP; VIP passes for 20,000 Palestinian businessmen to enter Israel. But even this was not enough to avoid the Second Intifada.

For Israel this now means a willingness to accept an agreement substantially similar to the ones put forward by then Prime Minister and now Defense Minister Barak in 2000 and embraced by then President Clinton at Camp David and by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in 2008. In the Spring of 2011, 40 prominent Israelis, including a former head of the Mossad, Israel's intelligence service (Danny Yatom), a former head of Shin Bet, Israel's internal security service (Yaacov Perry), leading business people, and scholars sent a letter to Prime Minister Netanyahu calling for a similar plan, with a Palestinian state on most of the West Bank and Gaza, with its capital in part of East Jerusalem, along with security assurances and economic cooperation projects. The 1967 lines would be a basis for borders, with land swaps for up to seven percent of the West Bank<sup>74</sup>. For the Palestinian Authority, it means entering negotiations now, with a willingness to accept strong security guarantees for Israel, and recognition of Israel as the state of the Jews. But at the height of the Egyptian crisis, Abbas backed away from his pledge to hold presidential and parliamentary elections in the fall of 2011, when Hamas rejected them<sup>75</sup>. The Palestinian leadership then began actively seeking worldwide recognition of a Palestinian state in pre-1967 borders. Already 11 nations have done so, including Brazil and Argentina. I raised this with Argentine Foreign Minister Hector Timmerman, in Buenos Aires in December, and he defended the decision as one that would strengthen moderates in the Palestinian Authority at the expense of Hamas.

The plan of Palestinian Prime Minister Fayyad has been clear and public. He wants first to build the institutions of a state from the ground up. Then, rather than face painful compromises in negotiations he may have trouble selling to his own people, with an Israeli government he believes is unwilling to make tough compromises on issues like Jerusalem and the dismantling of some settlements, he and the Palestinian leadership have a different strategy.

They are likely to go to the United Nations and seek a General Assembly declaration of support for a Palestinian state - like Israel in 1947. But as Fayyad put it recently, “over the next few months, if we manage to project a sense of maturity, mature institutions of the state functioning, performing up to high international standards, then to the whole world this must look like a case where the only thing that is anomalous about the situation is the continuing Israeli occupation. That is when there will be tremendous pressure on the political process to end the occupation. Will that entail going to the United Nations? Sooner or later, we have to go to the United Nations, but my concept of that is to go to the United Nations holding hands with all of humanity. The idea is for the reality of the state to just be there in a manner that cannot be overlooked by anyone.”<sup>76</sup>

The UN plan is now explicit following the Hamas-Fatah pact. Taking to the Op-Ed page of the *New York Times*, Mahmoud Abbas, chairman of the PLO and president of the Palestinian National Authority, clearly spelled out his strategy, despite U.S. and Israeli objections: “This September, at the United Nations General Assembly, we will request international recognition of the State of Palestine on the 1967 border and that our state be admitted as a full member of the United Nations.” Perverting the November 1947 UN vote, which created a Jewish and Arab state in the former British Mandate, and the history immediately thereafter of the Arab rejection of a two-state solution and an Arab military attack on the new Jewish state, Abbas now claims in his *New York Times* article that following the UN vote, “Zionist forces expelled Palestinian Arabs to ensure a decisive Jewish majority in the future state of Israel, and Arab armies intervened.” He excuses the violent attempt to breach Israel’s borders on May 15 as Palestinians trying to “symbolically exercise their right of return to their families’ homes.” While stating that his first option is still negotiations, he states that “the choice is not between Palestinian unity or peace with Israel; it is between a two-state solution or settlement-colonies.”

Abbas is also clear that he would use a UN vote to pave the way for “us to pursue claims against Israel at the United Nations, before human rights treaty bodies, and at the International Court of Justice.”

Further, Abbas sees a UN vote as creating more leverage, since “Palestine would be negotiating from the position of one United Nations member whose territory is militarily occupied by another...and not as a vanquished people ready to accept whatever terms are put in front of us.”<sup>77</sup>

Israel dare not put itself in this isolated position, or even worse, rely once again on the United States to exercise its Security Council veto. Even with a likely U.S. veto, as Abbas indicates, the Palestinians will seek a vote in the UN General Assembly, which will overwhelmingly support them, under the “Uniting for Peace” precedent used by the U.S. at the outset of the Korean War to avoid a Soviet veto.

Without a strong commitment to a political settlement, the winds of change from Tunis and Cairo will certainly blow in the Palestinian territories, with risks to Israel and the moderate Palestinian leadership. Almost encircled by radical forces supported by Iran, and confronted by an uncertain partner in a newly evolving Egypt, Israel is moving into uncharted waters. Only the relationship with the United States remains constant (Chapter VI), built on a solid foundation of public support and enhanced by the recognition that Israel shares American values as a democratic outpost against Islamic extremism. But with the potential threats to the moderate Arab alliance rising, the relationship with the U.S. takes on even greater importance for Israel. Even though the recent revolutionary events have demonstrated the limits of American influence over developments in the Arab world, no other nation can rally the forces of moderation and peace. While Israel must make its own sovereign decisions, it nevertheless must rely increasingly on the United States for support. It is important to align its policies with the United States wherever possible on the peace process, settlements, and the UN vote, and for both sides to nurture the relationship; nothing is static in today’s world.

The U.S. can expect to be under even greater pressure to help resolve the Israeli-Palestinian impasse from the new governments emerging from the Arab upheavals, as well as from those governments that remain in power but fear an uncertain future. These huge changes were not originally connected to the Israeli-Palestinian issue. But the Palestinian cause will quickly rise to the top of the Middle East agenda with the new democratic forces urging the same freedoms for all Arabs they are starting to taste<sup>78</sup>.

At a time when Israel is more integrated into the fabric of the global economy than at any time in its history, it is also more politically isolated in its politically convulsed region, and globally, in the dispute over West Bank settlements. In early 2011, the U.S. was the only country to veto the Security Council resolution condemning Israel over its settlement policy at the height of the turmoil in the Middle East. Even Germany, Israel’s closest partner in Europe, supported the

resolution. The Obama administration deserves great credit for its stand; it made enormous efforts to get the Palestinian Authority to drop the resolution, including a personal plea from President Obama to Palestinian President Abbas, with sweeteners that would have included a change in the terms of reference for the peace process, clearly supporting a return to pre-1967 borders with mutually agreed land swaps. The Palestinians went ahead, provoking the U.S. veto. But, the Obama administration issued a statement expressing concern over the settlements and urging that the issue be resolved by negotiation and not a UN resolution. Israel should do everything it can, at this pivotal moment in Middle East history, to support U.S. policy and the Middle East peace process. Settlement expansion should not be given priority over Israel's supreme security interest with the United States.

To be in the strongest position to counter the Palestinian effort to garner overwhelming UN General Assembly support for a unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood, the Israeli government should do everything possible to seek solutions, putting the onus on the Palestinian Authority to respond, and making it easier for the U.S. to establish strong relationships with the new order in the Middle East. However the fluid and unpredictable new order is formed, it can never be the same as the old, and Israel must change and adjust.

Before the Fatah-Hamas pact, there was some reason to hope this change might come. In his May 2011 address to the U.S. Congress, Prime Minister Netanyahu tried to take the initiative by indicating a willingness to accept a Palestinian state and give up substantial parts of the West Bank, although not East Jerusalem, in return for security guarantees, including the presence of Israeli troops in the Jordan Valley. He would leave to bilateral negotiations the final permanent borders and the future of Palestinian refugees. While this will certainly be rejected by the Palestinians, it is a significant step forward that would shift the burden of moving forward to the Palestinians. A respected and independent Israeli legal authority, Robbie Sabel, has noted that while it postpones political decisions, Israel's political recognition of a Palestinian state within provisional borders has international legal credibility. It was one of the stages of the Middle East Roadmap from the Bush administration, was approved by the UN Security Council, and would be buttressed by a 1969 International Court of Justice decision in a border dispute between Germany and Denmark<sup>79</sup>.



While many in the Israeli government may view such a preemptive move by Prime Minister Netanyahu impossible in light of the Fatah-Hamas pact, and the inability to have a meaningful peace partner, either from the Palestinian Authority or an interim government of technocrats without a popular mandate, it remains in Israel's interest to set forth its vision of a two-state solution. The more specific Israel can be in the run-up to the September UN General Assembly vote, the more likely it will be that the major European nations will feel they can join the U.S. in opposing a Palestinian state created without negotiations.

Netanyahu's speech before a joint session of Congress was a beginning, but his proposals will need to be fleshed out if the U.S. is to have ammunition enough to encourage the EU countries and other major allies to oppose the UN's declaration of a Palestinian state in September.

The Palestinians would bear the burden of history for turning down a forthcoming Israeli peace proposal. In the meantime, and at a bare minimum, Israel should avoid further steps in settlement expansion, that would further isolate it in world opinion, and shift the blame for the failure of progress to itself, rather than the Palestinians, where it now clearly belongs. While it is a modest policy, the old Hippocratic corpus, which still guides modern medicine: "First do no harm," may be the best that can be expected, while the Arab upheavals, which have now reached Israel's borders, play themselves out.



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