



# Attitudes of US Jews in the Third Week of "Iron Swords"

The JPPI and WZO Report

## Main Findings

- A slight decrease in the level of those following the events of the war (still very high) of the Jews sampled
- A significant increase in the feeling among Jews that the war negatively impacts their personal security
- A moderate rise in the proportion of liberals who claim that the war makes them feel "more distant" from Israel
- Widespread agreement that American media coverage is biased against Israel
- Jews are discussing the war with family and friends, less so with co-workers
- A noticeable decrease in the perceived quality of Israeli public relations, particularly among liberals


## Following the Events of the War: Detailed Findings

Among the Jews sampled, there is a discernable but slight decrease in the level of those following the events of the war in almost every segment. Yet the majority of those sampled are still "very closely" following the events, and in our estimation this is not cause for serious concern, but rather a sign of natural burnout over time. The decrease is noticeable across different streams, including political tendencies (as shown in the table), as well as other cases, including a decrease among those who have lived in Israel or visited it numerous times.

		Closing following the war	
		First Week	Third Week
<b>Political Identification</b>	Strong Liberal	85%	78%
	Leaning liberal	86%	79%
	Centrist	96%	91%
	Leaning conservative	92%	88%
	Strong conservative	93%	95%

## Perception of Threat: Detailed Findings


A significant portion of the sample respondents attest to a greater perception of threat due to the war. This finding is noteworthy because already in the first week of the war there was concern about the war's impact on the security of Jews in the United States, and this concern has greatly intensified. Across all sample groups, including by religious stream, political leaning, community affiliation and other factors, there is a noticeable negative shift. The percentage of Jews who believe that their security is not affected stands at around 20% in the group "unaffiliated" with any religious stream, less than 10% among Reform Jews, about 15% among religious and Haredi Jews. We can infer that the increase in the perception that the war is affecting Jewish security arises from the publicity surrounding anti-Semitic incidents, the ongoing events, and the outspoken criticism from groups strongly critical of Israel (and Jewish supporters of Israel).



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### Feeling Less Secure

Comparing changes from week 1 to 3  
(Grouped by stream)





## Closeness to Israel: Detailed Findings

The survey examines whether the events make US Jews feel "closer" or "more distant" from Israel. In this question, there is a substantial decrease in the proportion of very liberal or fairly liberal Jews who


### Political Identification

	Feeling Closer to Israel	
	First Week	Third Week
Strong Liberal	60%	46%
Leaning liberal	65%	58%
Centrist	71%	74%
Leaning conservative	83%	82%
Strong conservative	82%	77%

consider that the events will make them feel closer to Israel, alongside a slight increase in those who estimate that the events will make them feel "more distant" from Israel (notably, among very liberals, from 5% to 13%). Additionally, there is an increase in the proportion of those who believe that the events will "not change" their degree of closeness to Israel. When analyzed by religious affiliation, the primary decrease is observed among Jews who identify as Reform. Among these Jews, the proportion of those who said the events will make them feel closer to Israel dropped from 72% in the first week of the war to 59% in the third week. The main change is expressed in a significant rise in the percentage of those who believe that the events "will not change" their relationship with Israel. The proportion of those who believe that the events will negatively affect their relationship with Israel remains relatively low (5%). In terms of repeat respondents, a relatively high percentage of those who initially said in the first week "it depends on developments" have shifted to "more distant." In other words, the way in which the war is progressing seems to alienate those whose stance was more "wait and see."

## Active Support for Israel: Detailed Findings


In the third week, a slight decrease in "active" support for Israel among respondents was noted. It appears there is a direct connection between maintaining the level of active support and the number of visits to Israel. Those who have lived in or visited Israel more than once are more actively supportive of Israel than others and tend less to change their stance than those who visited Israel only once or have never visited. Note that despite the prominence of reports about Jews engaging in activities that oppose Israeli policy, in our sample there is almost no sign of such activity. Only among those who identified themselves as "very liberal" was there a group of 7% (individual respondents, but this signals an increase of 3% from two weeks ago) who are actively working "against" Israel.



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## Actively Supporting Israel

Comparing changes from week 1 to 3  
(Grouped by number of visits to Israel)



## War Coverage in the Media: Detailed Findings


A substantial portion of the sampled Jews believe that the coverage of the war in the American media is unfair and biased against Israel. Only a small percentage of them think that the coverage is biased against the Palestinians. About a quarter of them consider that the coverage is fair overall, with this group being particularly prominent among liberal Jews who belong to progressive religious streams or who are unaffiliated with any religious stream. Among the "very liberals," just over a third (36%) believe that the coverage is fair, while about a third (33%) think it is biased against Israel (but only 10% think it is biased against the Palestinians). Among conservatives, less than a tenth maintain that the coverage is fair.



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## US Media Coverage of the War

(Grouped by stream)



## Conversations About the War: Detailed Findings

As expected, Jews are discussing the war – which has been at the forefront of newspaper headlines and television for three weeks – with family members and friends, but much less so with co-workers. There is also a difference in the proportion of those who engage in conversations about the war with Jewish friends as compared to non-Jewish friends. However, regarding this gap, we should take into consideration that Orthodox and Haredi Jews, and to a lesser extent among Conservatives, have a higher proportion of Jewish friends (we did not ask about the difference between conversations with Jewish and non-Jewish family members). It is interesting to note that within the categories themselves, the differences between the streams are negligible. For instance, unaffiliated Jews, Conservative Jews, and Orthodox Jews conduct conversations in a somewhat similar manner regarding the war with family members, Jewish and non-Jewish friends, and co-workers.

		Having conversations about Israel with:			
		Family	Jewish Friends	Non-Jewish Friends	Co-Workers
Stream	No Stream	85%	80%	65%	24%
	Reform	90%	90%	77%	25%
	Conservative	88%	88%	67%	22%
	Orthodox	90%	93%	66%	27%
	Ultra-Orthodox	84%	89%	58%	33%

## Israeli Public Relations: Detailed Findings

In the third week, we see a significant decrease in how Israeli public relations is perceived, primarily among very liberal and quite liberal Jews. This decrease may stem from several factors, including the transition from absorption to attack, the fact that the initial shock of the atrocities has subsided, a change in the tone of American media in general, growing discomfort with Israeli policy among liberals, and more. Nevertheless, the gap is evident in several segments of examination, including the political one (as presented in the table), as well as parallel segments.

		Israel does a very good or good job at communicating its side of the story	
		Week 1	Week 3
Political Identification	Strong Liberal	71%	51%
	Leaning liberal	68%	55%
	Centrist	77%	72%
	Leaning conservative	73%	78%
	Strong conservative	89%	80%

Furthermore, in comparison to the data presented here two weeks ago, there is a noticeable decrease in the assessment of Israeli public relations across all groups based on the frequency of visits to Israel.

		Israel does a very good or good job at communicating its side of the story	
		Week 1	Week 3
Number of Visits to Israel	Never visited Israel	75%	65%
	Visited once	75%	65%
	Visited more than once	75%	61%
	Lived in Israel	72%	63%

## Data About the Survey and Its Significance

This report is an analysis of a survey conducted among 696 Jews in the United States who are registered with the Jewish People Policy Institute panel. The report does not provide weighted data representing all US Jews. However, the number of individuals participating from various groups allows us to identify trends, distinct attitudes, and differences among diverse groups of Jews based on factors such as religious affiliation, closeness to Israel, political stance, connection to Judaism, and more.

Below are some data about the survey participants: 52% of them identify as liberal or very liberal. Around 20% consider themselves in the political center, and the rest lean towards conservatism. This data does not diverge from the typical political division among Jews (the percentage of conservatives in the JPPI survey is slightly higher). Survey participants are much more likely to have visited Israel compared to the general Jewish population in the United States (80% have visited Israel at least once). The percentage of conservatives is higher compared to the overall Jewish population, and the percentage of non-affiliated Jews is relatively low (about 20%). The rate of interfaith marriages is relatively low in the JPPI panel compared to the entire Jewish population (over 50% of all US Jews, but about a quarter of the JPPI panel sample). Nevertheless, even among groups not represented in the survey according to the average Jewish population, responses were received from a significant number of respondents.