



# JPPI Israeli Society Index


## » Main Finding

**JPPI's monthly Israeli Society Index for November focuses on "the day after" the war. Most Israelis would prefer a diplomatic arrangement in Lebanon to an attempt to dismantle Hezbollah. The report has four parts: the day after the war, confidence in the country's leadership/confidence of victory, Haredi military conscription, and Israel-world relations.**


## Additional Findings

- A continued rise in confidence among Jewish Israelis that Israel will win the war.
- A third of Jewish Israelis are in favor of establishing settlements in the Gaza Strip.
- A large majority of Israelis have low confidence in the government and the prime minister.
- A quarter of Israelis (a fifth of Israeli Jews) are in favor of working toward a peace treaty with moderate Palestinians.
- Most religious Jews (Datiim) in Israel are in favor of imposing sanctions on ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) draft resisters.
- Nearly half of Jewish Israelis (47%) know other Israelis who are "considering relocating abroad."
- Half of the Israeli public thinks Israel's international standing is poor.
- Only a quarter of Israelis feel that France is friendly to Israel.
- Two-thirds (66%) believe that Russia is unfriendly to Israel.

# The Day After the War



A small majority of Israelis are optimistic about the country's future (very optimistic + somewhat optimistic = 57%). By contrast, 41% are pessimistic about Israel's future (very pessimistic + somewhat pessimistic). The optimism levels of Jewish Israelis are higher than among Arab Israelis. Seventy percent of those who self-identify as "left-wing" (left + center-left) and half of those who self-identify as "centrist," are pessimistic about Israel's future, whereas 73% of those who self-identify as "center-right" and



87% of those who self-identify as "right-wing" are optimistic about the country's future. In a breakdown by religiosity level, most secular Israelis are pessimistic about Israel's future, while most of those in the other survey cohorts are optimistic.

The optimism levels among Jewish Israelis dropped slightly this month compared to March 2024. But the year's overall trend regarding optimism remains without significant change.

## After the War in Lebanon

Forty-three percent of all Israelis think that when the war with Lebanon ends there should be a diplomatic arrangement that will keep Hezbollah far from the northern border, with no Israeli presence in Lebanese territory. A third believe that the goal for the end of the war on the northern front should be Hezbollah's disarmament or complete removal from Lebanon, while a fifth of Israelis think that when the war ends an Israeli security presence should remain in Lebanese territory to keep Hezbollah away from the northern border. Half of the Arab Israeli respondents feel that a diplomatic arrangement is the correct objective for the end of the war.

**Of the following goals, which position is closest to yours regarding what should happen when the war in Lebanon ends?**



	Disarming Hezbollah or completely removing it from Lebanon %	Maintaining an Israeli security presence within Lebanon that will keep Hezbollah away from the northern border %	A political settlement that will keep Hezbollah away from the northern border without an Israeli presence in Lebanon %	None of these / Don't know %
<b>Israelis</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Jews</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Arabs</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>22</b>

Half of those who self-identify as “right-wing” believe that Hezbollah should be disarmed, a third are in favor of maintaining an Israeli presence on Lebanese territory, and 10% are in favor of a diplomatic arrangement. By contrast, three-quarters of those who self-identify as “left-wing” support the idea of a diplomatic arrangement, and 10% believe that Hezbollah should be disarmed. Half of those who self-identify as “centrist” support a diplomatic arrangement, and a third of them believe that Hezbollah should be dismantled or removed from Lebanon.

**Of the following goals, which position is closest to yours regarding what should happen when the war in Lebanon ends?**



	Disarming Hezbollah or completely removing it from Lebanon %	Maintaining an Israeli security presence within Lebanon that will keep Hezbollah away from the northern border %	A political settlement that will keep Hezbollah away from the northern border without an Israeli presence in Lebanon %	None of these / Don't know %
Left	11	5	78	6
Center left	17	3	75	5
Center	30	13	52	5
Center right	39	19	36	5
Right	52	32	11	6


**After the War in Gaza**

A similar question about the fighting in Gaza produced quite similar results: 41% of all Israelis feel that an effort should be made to reach a diplomatic arrangement with a new government to be formed in Gaza, without an Israeli presence there. A quarter believe that the end-of-war aim in Gaza should be the disarming of Hamas or its removal from Gaza, while another quarter are in favor of maintaining an Israeli security presence within Gaza that would prevent Hamas from regaining control. In this instance as well, the responses correspond with ideological outlook (right-left) and position on the religiosity scale. Most secular Israelis support the idea of a diplomatic arrangement with a new government to be formed in Gaza; traditionalists (Masortiim) support the three ideas in equal measure, and half of the religious cohort (Datiim) supports maintaining an Israeli security presence inside the Gaza Strip.

**Of the following goals, which position is closest to yours regarding what should happen when the war in Gaza ends?**



	Disarming Hamas or removing it from Gaza %	Maintaining an Israeli security presence inside the Gaza Strip that will prevent Hamas from returning to power %	A political settlement with a new non-Hamas government established in Gaza without an Israeli presence there %	None of these / Don't know %
Israelis	27	23	41	9
Jews	30	26	39	5
Arabs	16	11	49	25




(Due to rounding, some of the results do not add up to 100%)

A third of Israeli Jews believe that new settlements should be established in Gaza – 19% favor their establishment in northern Gaza (that is, not a return to Gush Katif, but rather settlements in the Israeli border area), while 16% think that the Gush Katif settlements should be reestablished (some or most of them). Two-thirds of Jewish Israelis believe that Jewish settlements should not be established in Gaza.

Most of those who belong to the “left-wing,” “centrist,” and “center-right” camps oppose establishing Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip. By contrast, 31% of those in the “right-wing” camp (the largest subgroup of Israeli Jews) support reestablishing the Gush Katif settlements, 41% support establishing Jewish settlements in northern Gaza, and 23% oppose establishing Jewish settlements in Gaza. Support for the establishment of settlements can be seen among ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) and religious (Dati) Jews, and among half of the traditionalist-religious (Masorti-Dati). By contrast, most of the secular (80%) and traditionalist-non-religious (Lo Dati) (57%) oppose establishing settlements in Gaza.

**In Israel, there are voices supporting and opposing Jewish settlement in the Gaza Strip. Which of the following positions is closest to yours?**



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	There is no need to establish Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip %	Jewish settlements should be established in the northern Gaza Strip in the area that currently borders Israel %	The Gush Katif settlements (some or most of them) that are within the Gaza Strip should also be reestablished %	Don't know %
<b>Left</b>	96	3	1	0
<b>Center left</b>	96	2	1	1
<b>Center</b>	79	9	6	6
<b>Center right</b>	61	20	15	4
<b>Right</b>	23	41	31	5

This month, we also asked about general attitudes regarding the correct arrangement to be reached with the Palestinians. Based on the responses, a third of all Israelis believe that Israel should strive for complete separation from the Palestinians, 29% believe that the state should strengthen its control over the Palestinians, and a quarter feel that Israel should try to reach a peace agreement with moderate Palestinians and allow a Palestinian state to be established that would live in peace alongside Israel. When we look at those who support a peace agreement, we find that a fifth of Jewish Israelis and two-thirds of Arab Israelis belong to this group. A fifth of the religious cohort (Datim), a quarter of traditionalist-religious (Masorti-Dati), and 47% of traditionalist-non-religious (Masorti lo Dati) favor full separation from the Palestinians, dismantling settlements outside of the large settlement blocs, and focusing on maintaining the IDF's freedom of action to prevent the growth of terrorist organizations in the territories.

**Which of the following statements is closest to your position (even if not completely):**



	Israel needs to strengthen its control over the Palestinians, expand the settlements, consider dissolving the Palestinian Authority and possibly annex Judea and Samaria	Israel should strive for complete separation from the Palestinians, the dismantling of settlements outside the major blocs, and focus on maintaining the IDF's freedom of action to prevent the growth of terrorist organizations in the territories	Israel should try to reach a peace agreement with moderate Palestinians, and allow the establishment of a Palestinian state that will live in peace alongside the State of Israel	Can't answer this question
	%	%	%	%
Israelis	29	35	28	8
Jews	34	40	19	7
Arabs	9	15	65	12

The general findings pertaining to relations with the Palestinians show no significant change since last March.

### Which of the following statements is closest to your position (even if not completely):



	Israel needs to strengthen its control over the Palestinians, expand the settlements, consider dissolving the Palestinian Authority and possibly annex Judea and Samaria	Israel should strive for complete separation from the Palestinians, the dismantling of settlements outside the major blocs, and focus on maintaining the IDF's freedom of action to prevent the growth of terrorist organizations in the territories	Israel should try to reach a peace agreement with moderate Palestinians, and allow the establishment of a Palestinian state that will live in peace alongside the State of Israel	Can't answer this question
	%	%	%	%
Jews				
October	34	40	19	7
March	38	39	17	7

## The Strike Against Iran

### Which of the following is closest to your opinion about the Israeli counterattack in Iran a few days ago?



	It was too strong	It was about as strong as it should have been	It was too weak	Don't know
	%	%	%	%
Israelis	2	51	29	17

A third of all Israelis think that last month's Israeli attack on Iran was "too weak," half say it was "about as strong as it should have been," and virtually no one feels that it was "too strong." Thirty-eight percent of

Jews on the political right, a quarter of centrist Jews, and 10% of Jews on the left think the strike was too weak, as do 35% of the religious cohort (Datiim) and 21% of the secular.



# Israel's Future

**Yes or no: "I know Israelis who are considering moving abroad because of the situation"**



	Yes, I know many %	Yes, I know a few %	Not really, I hardly know any %	No, I don't know any %	Don't know %
<b>Jews</b>	17	30	27	23	3
<b>Left</b>	34	43	15	4	5
<b>Center left</b>	30	50	10	6	3
<b>Center</b>	25	38	20	14	2
<b>Center right</b>	18	22	31	26	3
<b>Right</b>	3	20	37	37	3

Half of Jewish Israelis "know other Israelis" who, due to the situation, are considering relocating abroad. Among those who identify as "left-wing," the percentage of those who know such Israelis is higher. The further one moves from left to right along the ideological spectrum, the lower

the percentage of respondents who know Israelis who want to leave, and the higher the percentage who do not know such Israelis. Similar findings are obtained along the religiosity scale – the percentage of secular people who know Israelis who are considering leaving Israel is the highest, while the percentage of religious (Dati) and ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) respondents who know such Israelis is the lowest.

As was found in March 2024, a quarter of Israelis say that if they had a practical possibility of emigrating, they would do so (strongly agree + somewhat agree). By contrast, half of Israelis "do not at all agree" that they would do this. The percentage of Arab respondents who "strongly agree" with the statement "If I had a practical possibility to emigrate abroad, I would do so" is higher than the percentage of Jewish respondents who strongly agree with the statement. Half of those who self-identify as "left-wing" say that if they had a practical possibility of emigrating, they would do so (strongly agree + somewhat agree). By contrast, most of those who self-identify as "right-wing" do not agree with this statement (strongly disagree + somewhat disagree).



### Agree or disagree: "If I had a practical possibility of emigrating abroad, I would do so"




	Strongly disagree %	Somewhat disagree %	Neither agree nor disagree %	Somewhat agree %	Strongly agree %	Don't know %
Israelis	52	9	9	13	14	3
Jews	52	10	9	13	13	3
Arabs	50	7	7	11	20	4

## Confidence in the Country's Leadership and in Victory

### Confident Israel will win the war

(Among Jewish Israelis, data from October 2023 through November 2024)





The past half-year's slow rise in the confidence among Jewish Israelis that Israel will win the war continues. At the same time, there has been a continuing decline in the share of those who "are not at all confident" of an Israeli victory. The survey was conducted after a month in which

the intensity of ground operations in Lebanon increased and Israel attacked Iran for a second time, and not long after the elimination of Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader who planned and supervised the October 7 massacre, and of Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary-general and leader of Hezbollah. We can see that the percentage of those who rate their confidence of victory as high (ratings of 4 + 5) rose from 49% in September to 64% in October, and 68% in November. Right-wing respondents showed a particular increase in confidence of victory this month, and a similar rise, slow but steady, can be seen among the

“centrist” and “left-wing” groups. Thirty-seven percent of left-wing respondents, 58% of centrists, and 91% of right-wing respondents are confident (4 + 5) that Israel will win the war.


This month, like last month, 59% of Jewish Israelis have a moderately high or very high degree of confidence in the IDF senior command. Among respondents who vote left (left + center-left) and among centrist voters there was a drop in the percentage who said this month that their

confidence in the IDF senior command is “very high.” By contrast, those who vote for right-wing parties (right + center-right) showed no change from last month. Most Jewish Israelis say that their confidence in the senior command is high. This finding also stands out when we look at the breakdown by ideological subgroup: the majority in all subgroups feel this way, except for the “right-wing,” 41% of whom express high confidence.



Most Jewish Israelis say that their confidence in the government is low (very low + somewhat low), while a third say that their confidence is high (very high + moderately high). Half of all Israelis say that their confidence in the government is “very low,” and 9% say their confidence in the government is “very

high.” This survey was conducted before the dismissal of Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, which may have led to a change in levels of confidence in the government.




Out of all Israelis, two-thirds say that their confidence in Prime Minister Netanyahu is low, while a third say that their confidence in the prime minister is high. One can see that this breakdown has remained stable over the past year. Seventy percent of secular Israelis say that their

confidence in Netanyahu is very low, versus 17% whose confidence in him is very high. The religious sub-group (Datiim) is equally divided between the four confidence levels, and 61% of Likud voters (in the 2022 elections) say their confidence in the prime minister is very high.

# Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) Conscription

Most Israeli Jews (62%) believe that the Knesset should make conscription mandatory for most Haredim. The majority of those who hold this view feel that benefits and entitlements should be withheld from those who do not report for duty, and a small number of them think that those who do not serve should be prosecuted and punished. Between a quarter and a third of Israeli Jews believe that a law should be passed that exempts Haredim “engaged in serious Torah study” from the draft, while a smaller percentage favor a law exempting all Haredim from conscription. Most of those who self-identify as “left-wing” or “centrist” are in favor of drafting most Haredim and of withholding benefits and entitlements from those who do not enlist. A third of those who self-identify as “right-wing” also take this approach, while half are in favor of passing a law that exempts Haredim “engaged in serious Torah study,” but of drafting the rest. Only 5% of those on the right favor a law that exempts all Haredim from the draft; and just 4% of Religious (Datiim) favor such a law, while over half of Religious (Datiim) (56%) favor requiring Haredim to enlist and imposing sanctions on those who do not.

**In your opinion, what should the Knesset do regarding IDF service for Haredim?**



	Pass a law that exempts Haredim from conscription, as was the case until recently / Pass a law that exempts Haredim who are engaged in serious Torah study, but draft the rest %	Require the majority of Haredim to enlist, and withhold benefits and entitlements from those who do not serve %	Require the majority of Haredim to enlist and prosecute and punish those who do not serve %	None of these / Don't know %
Jews	31	50	12	7

In the past two months there has been a rise in the share of Jewish Israelis who think that pressure through sanctions on Haredim should be increased with regard to IDF conscription. This trend can be seen in all of the religious (Dati) streams. At present, half of traditionalist (Masorti) and religious (Dati) respondents, and 75% of the secular cohort feel that sanctions should be imposed on those who are draft-eligible but do not report for service. A third of those who self-identify as “right-wing,” half of those who self-identify as “center-right,” and 80% of those who self-identify as “centrist” support intensifying pressure and sanctions. By contrast, 57% of right-wing respondents and 43% of those on the center-right believe that young Haredim cannot be drafted by force, and that there should be a return to dialogue.

Of the Haredi youth who were summoned to report for the draft in recent months, only a few appeared at the recruitment office. Which of the following two positions is closest to your position?



	This proves that it is impossible to recruit Haredim by force, and there should be a return to dialogue %	This proves that Haredim are not willing to enlist and there should be greater pressure through sanctions %	Don't know %
Jews - September	36	53	10
Jews - November	35	59	7
Secular - September	22	72	6
Secular - November	18	76	6
Non-religious traditionalist - September	41	45	14
Non-religious traditionalist - November	45	49	6
Religious traditionalist - September	50	44	6
Religious traditionalist - November	41	51	8
Religious - September	47	43	10
Religious - November	38	48	14
Ultra-Orthodox - September	80	10	10
Ultra-Orthodox - November	80	14	5

# Foreign Relations

Half of Israelis think that Israel's standing in the world, its relations with other countries, and its overall status in the international arena, is poor (somewhat poor + very poor). A quarter rate Israel's status as fair, while only a fifth think that it is good (good + very good). The Arab population's assessment is relatively close to that of the Jewish population. Forty-eight percent of those who self-identify as "right-wing" think that Israel's standing is good, in contrast to 83% of those who self-identify as "left-wing" and feel that Israel's status is poor; 36% of Datiim and 13% of the secular feel that Israel's standing in the world is good. The voters most optimistic about Israel's international status (those who voted in the 2022 elections) are Shas voters (53%), United Torah Judaism voters (52%), and Likud voters (46%).

**When you think about Israel's standing in the world, its relations with other countries, and its overall status in the international arena, would you say that its status is...**



	Very good %	Good %	Fair %	Somewhat poor %	Very poor %	Don't know %
Israelis	5	17	25	30	20	3
Jews	5	18	24	33	18	2
Arabs	4	13	31	18	28	6

## Trump versus Harris

**In the US presidential elections that will be held in a few days, who do you think is the best candidate for the US?**



	Kamala Harris %	Donald Trump %	Neither of them %	Don't know %
Israelis	34	36	21	9
Jews	34	40	19	7
Arabs	33	22	31	14

As this month's US presidential election approached, we sought to determine which candidate, in the eyes of Israelis, would be better for the United States and which candidate would be better for Israel. A third of Israelis thought that



Harris was the better candidate for the US, while a nearly-identical percentage said that Trump would be better for the US. Among Jews, a higher percentage believed that Trump would be preferable to Harris for the US, while among Arabs, a higher percentage felt that Harris was the better candidate for America.

**In the US presidential elections that will be held in a few days, who do you think is the best candidate for the US?**



	Kamala Harris %	Donald Trump %	Neither of them %	Don't know %
Israelis	20	56	15	9
Jews	20	61	12	6
Arabs	21	35	25	19

Before he won the election, most Israelis thought that Trump was the better candidate as far as Israel was concerned, while only a fifth of all Israelis thought that Harris was the preferable candidate for Israel. The share of Jewish respondents who believed that Trump was preferable for Israel was even higher.

Forty-five percent of all Israelis see the US as an important ally and believe that a great effort should be made to preserve the alliance with the US, including concessions in cases of disagreement. Thirty-eight percent said that the US is an important ally, but that that doesn't mean Israel must accept the American worldview. These findings represent no significant change vis-à-vis an identical question posed last March.

**Which of the following positions best reflects your position?**




	The US is an important ally, and we must make a great effort to maintain the alliance including concessions on things that do not endanger Israel's security %	The US is an important ally, but that does not mean that we have to accept its positions. When we agree – great, when we disagree – Israel should do what it deems right %	The US is an ally, but its importance is decreasing, and Israel should not behave as if its existence depends on friendship with the US %	The US was an important ally, but in recent years it has caused Israel more harm than good, and we should carefully consider how much coordination and dialogue with the US really strengthens Israel %	Don't know %
Israelis	45%	38%	8%	4%	4%
Jews	45%	43%	8%	3%	1%
Arabs	46%	18%	10%	9%	17%



A consensus that the United States is an important ally exists across all ideological camps, but there is a major gap between different groups in terms of how they think the alliance should manifest. Over three-quarters of those on the left think that a great effort should be made, including concessions that do not put Israeli security at risk, to maintain the alliance with the US, while only an eighth of those on the right feel this way. Most supporters of the right (two-thirds) believe that when Israel does not agree with US positions, it should do what it deems best. Half of those belonging to the “center-right” feel this way, while 41% think that an effort should be made to accommodate the American stance, including concessions that do not endanger Israeli security.

**Which of the following positions best reflects your position?**




	The US is an important ally, and we must make a great effort to maintain the alliance including concessions on things that do not endanger Israel's security %	The US is an important ally, but that does not mean that we have to accept its positions. When we agree – great, when we disagree – Israel should do what it deems right %	The US is an ally, but its importance is decreasing, and Israel should not behave as if its existence depends on friendship with the US %	The US was an important ally, but in recent years it has caused Israel more harm than good, and we should carefully consider how much coordination and dialogue with the US really strengthens Israel %	Don't know %
<b>Left</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Center left</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Center</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Center right</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Right</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>0</b>

## Who Is Friendly to Israel?

This month, we looked at what Israelis think about the “friendliness” of several other countries toward Israel. The question posed was worded thus: “In your opinion, is [name of country] friendly or unfriendly to Israel?” The table below displays the weighted score for each country (scores of up to 10, with 10 being the maximum that a country can receive if all respondents say it is “friendly” to Israel). Germany earned the highest score on the friendliness scale from Israelis in general, and from Jews in particular. After Germany came India, the UK, and then France, China, and (in last place) Russia. There are differences in how Jews and Arabs perceive the friendliness of these countries – in most cases the degree of friendliness that Arabs attribute to a country is higher than the degree of friendliness attributed to it by Jews. For most countries, there was relatively high agreement between the left and the right about their degree of friendliness toward Israel.


Against the background of last month’s public confrontation between the president of France and Israel’s prime minister, it is interesting to note that most Israeli Jews do not feel that France is a friendly country (Arab Israelis do feel this way).

### Who Is friendly to Israel?



	China	Russia	India	France	Germany	UK
Israelis	5.1	4.5	8.6	6.4	9.3	7.7
Jews	4.9	4.2	8.7	5.9	9.4	7.4
Arabs	6.4	6.2	8.1	8.7	9.1	9.2

### Do you think France is friendly or unfriendly to Israel?



	Friendly %	Neither friendly nor unfriendly %	Unfriendly %	Don't know %
Israelis	27	33	34	6
Jews	19	38	40	3
Arabs	61	15	9	15

Only a fifth of Jews identified France as friendly; in no Israeli ideological sector is there a majority who feel that France is a friendly country. A third of Israelis, and forty percent of Jews, said that France is “unfriendly.” This is a

high percentage compared to other European countries. 15% said that the UK is unfriendly, and only 3% said that Germany is unfriendly. Two-thirds of Israelis (66%) feel that Russia is an unfriendly country. Nearly half (47%) feel that way about China.

The Jewish People Policy Institute’s November Israeli Society Index survey was conducted on October 30-31. Data was collected by theMadad.com (686 Jewish respondents via an online poll) and by Afkar Research (200 Arab respondents, half online and half by phone). Data was analyzed and weighted by political affiliation and religiosity level to represent Israel’s adult population. Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepov compile the JPPI Israeli Society Index; Professor David Steinberg serves as a statistical consultant.