



JPPI Israeli Society Index

» Main Finding

The Jewish People Policy Institute's (JPPI) monthly Israeli Society Index is being published earlier than usual this month, as we reach the one-year mark of the Hamas onslaught and the start of the war. Perhaps its most startling finding is that half of Israelis think the war will continue for another year or more. At the same time, there has been a significant rise in public confidence that Israel can win the war, and an improvement in the Israeli army's image of military strength.


The report has three main parts: confidence in the IDF and victory; a year of war; and trends within Israeli society.

Additional Findings

- In the wake of the IDF's successful operations in Lebanon: a rise in public confidence in the IDF senior command and Israel's chances of winning the war.
- There is relatively low public confidence in the senior command of the Israel Police, especially among the center-left and the ultra-Orthodox.
- There has been an improvement in perceptions of Israel's military power, in light of the past month's events, but there has been further decline in perceptions of the country's economic strength.
- After a year of war, a substantial percentage of Israelis feel "worried"; the dominant emotions on the political right are determination and optimism.
- A small majority agree that the war has been prolonged because "the missions are complex" and because the government has interfered in decision-making.
- Most of the public agrees that international pressure has been an obstacle to Israel completing its war missions.
- Most of the public does not believe that the war has been prolonged because the (Israeli) legal system hinders the IDF; a majority on the right believe this to be the case.
- A small majority agree that the war has been prolonged due to the coalition's political interests; coalition voters reject this idea.
- Among those identifying with the political center and left, there is wide agreement that "Israel has abandoned the hostages and has lost interest in them."
- Those on the right and center-right attribute the situation of the hostages to the fact that the war hasn't ended and Hamas is uninterested in a potential deal.

Confidence in Victory

JPPI's October Israeli Society Index detects a significant rise in confidence among Jewish Israelis that Israel will win the war. The share of those "completely confident" that Israel will win jumped 28% between the September and October surveys. The October survey was conducted after two weeks of IDF operational success in Lebanon, but before the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and the second missile attack from Iran.



Confident Israel will win the war

	Totally confident September %	Totally confident October %
Left	12	13
Center left	14	22
Center	21	24
Center right	34	50
Right	42	54

Confidence in victory rose mainly among those groups self-identifying as right-wing (right and center-right), which constitute a majority of Israel's Jewish population, but there has also been a rise in confidence among those who self-identify as center-left. The table below shows the increase in the percentage of those who gave the highest rating (5 on a scale

of 1 to 5) to their confidence level. In general, the highest level of confidence in victory characterizes the right-wing cohorts and, on the religiosity scale, the group designated "religious." Likud, Shas, and Religious Zionist Party voters (2022 elections) express greater confidence than the voters of other parties. Among the opposition electorate, National Unity voters show a relatively high confidence level compared to voters of the other opposition parties. Forty-one percent of National Unity voters rated their confidence at the highest level (5), versus 20% of Yesh Atid voters and 4% of Yisrael Beiteinu voters.

Confidence in IDF commanders (among Jews)



	September %	October %
Very high	9	21
Moderately high	35	38
Somewhat low	29	25
Very low	27	16
Don't know	1	1

A concomitant rise in confidence was also found this month regarding the IDF's senior command. The share of respondents who attest to "very high" confidence jumped from 9% a month ago to 21% in the present survey. Increased confidence in the senior command is evident across all population groups, but much more pronounced among those on the center-right and leftward. The share of those with very high confidence in the senior command did not rise in the present survey vis-à-vis last month's survey, but the percentage of those who place "fairly high" trust increased significantly among

Confidence in IDF commanders



	Very high confidence September %	Very high confidence October %
Left	11	23
Center left	13	35
Center	15	30
Center right	6	19
Right	5	6

the right-wing cohorts as well (from 15% to 26%). And, as noted, this survey was conducted before the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, which likely sparked an additional increase of confidence in the senior command.

Confidence in senior police command



	Very high %	Moderately high %	Somewhat high %	Very low %	Don't Know %
Israelis (Jews and Arabs)	6	24	30	38	3
Jews	5	25	31	36	2
Arabs	6	17	27	47	3

This month, we added to the survey an assessment of confidence in the senior command of the Israel National Police (INP), due to lively public debate over personnel changes, and the influence of National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir on

the character and conduct of the police. Overall, confidence levels in the INP senior command are low compared to confidence in the IDF senior command. Among Arab Israelis, confidence is especially low, but a significant majority of Jewish Israelis (67%) also express fairly or very low confidence in the INP command echelon.

Confidence in senior police command



	High confidence %	Low confidence %
Left	6	90
Center left	10	89
Center	20	78
Center right	42	56
Right	48	49

Confidence in the senior INP command is quite low among all groups, but it is influenced both by political and religious orientation. Generally, as one moves rightward on the ideological spectrum, one's confidence in the INP senior command rises, but that rise is curtailed by the fact

that confidence in the police command among the ultra-Orthodox (Haredim) – a large majority of whom self-identify as “right-wing” – is low. Sixty-two percent of the Haredim express low levels of confidence in the INP command.

Image of Strength

On a scale from -5 (weakness) to +5 (strength), how would you rate Israel's military strength



	January %	September %	October %
Israelis (Jews and Arabs)		2.95	3.45
Jews	3.66	3.26	3.77
Arabs		1.71	2.16

The rise in Israelis' sense of the country's capabilities in light of the Lebanon successes is also reflected in a rapid and sharp change in their assessment of Israel's strength. This month, like last month, we asked respondents to rate Israel's military strength on a scale of -5 (weakness)

to +5 (strength). The change is evident in the rising averages for both Jewish and Arab Israelis in rating Israel's military strength.

At the same time, a further decline vis-à-vis last month was noted in how Israel's economic strength is rated, despite the fact that the survey was conducted before the official announcement of Moody's second downgrading of Israel's credit rating this year (at the time the survey was conducted, reports of a probable additional downgrade were circulating, but the steepness of the drop (two notches) came as a surprise).

On a scale from -5 (weakness) to +5 (strength), how would you rate Israel's economic strength




	January %	September %	October %
Israelis (Jews and Arabs)		2.26	2.08
Jews	3.21	2.75	2.44
Arabs		0.29	0.66

A Year of War

As the first year of war ends, a large majority of Israelis do not expect the war to end in the near future (days or weeks). A plurality of respondents say that the war will last another few months (31%), but a sizeable group believes the war will continue for another year, more than a year, or even two years (44% in total). Among those who self-identify as right-wing, a 60% majority believes the war will continue for at least another year. Among the other cohorts, there is a significant gap between Jewish and Arab Israelis on this question. A fifth of Arab Israelis (21%) believe the war will end within a few weeks, compared to a significantly smaller share (9%) of Jewish Israelis who believe so.

How long will the war continue?



	A few weeks %	A few months %	A year %	Over a year %	Two years %	Don't know %
Israelis (Jews and Arabs)	11	31	18	17	9	13
Jews	9	31	20	19	9	13
Arabs	21	33	9	11	10	16

As the war reaches the end of its first year and enters its second, the dominant emotion among Israelis is “worry.” Worry was rated the

top emotion among the six listed by all groups, Jews and Arabs, except Jewish Israelis who identify with the political right. In this group, which amounts to a third of all Jewish Israelis, the top emotions identified were “determination” (31%), and “optimism” (27%). Among the center-right, too, a sizeable share (25%) indicated “determination” as their dominant emotion. Among those who self-identify as center-left and left, a significant share chose “despair” as their dominant emotion (21% and 32% respectively). Among Arab Israelis, a very sizeable share chose “sorrow” as their main emotion (30%).

What is your main feeling a year into the war?




	Sorrow %	Worry %	Anger %	Determination %	Despair %	Optimism %	Other / don't know %
Israelis (Jews and Arabs)	15	31	11	14	14	11	4
Jews	11	30	12	18	14	13	3
Arabs	30	37	5	2	16	4	6

The War's Prolongation


As noted, half of the public believes the war will continue for another year or more. Opinions differ as to why the war is lasting so long. Most Arab Israelis and nearly half of Jewish Israelis do not agree with the statement: "The war has been prolonged because the missions are complicated, and it takes a long time to complete them." There are major gaps regarding this statement based on political orientation, with the right-wing groups showing a significantly higher degree of agreement than their centrist and left-wing counterparts.

The war is prolonged because the missions are complex and take a long time to carry out



	Agree %	Somewhat agree %	Disagree %	Don't know %
Israelis (Jews and Arabs)	26	26	45	3
Jews	29	29	41	2
Arabs	17	17	60	5

The war is prolonged because the objectives are not clearly defined and unrealistic




	Agree %	Somewhat agree %	Disagree %	Don't know %
Israelis (Jews and Arabs)	39	18	39	4
Jews	37	17	42	3
Arabs	47	21	26	7

Most of the public agrees or somewhat agrees that the war has been prolonged because clear and realistic goals that would make it possible to end the fighting were not defined. This majority rests on a high level of agreement among the center and left, and on relatively low agreement on the right.

Most Jewish and Arab Israelis agree (or somewhat agree) with the statement: "The war has been prolonged because the government hasn't made the correct decisions quick enough." For this statement as well, we found major disparities based on political orientation

The war is prolonged because the government did not make good decisions quickly enough



	Agree %	Somewhat agree %	Disagree %	Don't know %
Israelis (Jews and Arabs)	53	23	20	4
Jews	52	24	21	3
Arabs	57	17	19	7


and position on the religiosity scale. However, even among the right-wing subgroups, whose tendency to agree with the statement is lower, a majority agrees with it. Sixty percent of those self-identifying as “right-wing” agree with the statement, and 67% of those who self-identify as “center-right” do so. Of course, agreement with the statement doesn’t give a clear indication of which decisions ought to have been made more quickly, and one may assume that there would be differences of opinion between different ideological subgroups. However, the very existence of a consensus that the government didn’t make decisions at an appropriate pace points to a certain degree of shared frustration with how the military campaign developed.

Most Israelis also point a finger at the international community and agree, at least in part, with the claim that its interference made it hard for the war to proceed at a faster pace, and impeded Israel from completing its missions. Among the left-wing cohorts (center-left and left) there isn’t agreement with this assertion, but there is majority agreement in all other ideological subgroups.

Among right-wing respondents, 62% agree with the contention and 20%


somewhat agree with it. Among the center-right, 35% agree and 19% somewhat agree.

The war is prolonged because international pressure hinders Israel from completing the mission



	Agree %	Somewhat agree %	Disagree %	Don't know %
Israelis (Jews and Arabs)	37	24	38	2
Jews	41	27	32	0
Arabs	20	12	62	6

The war is prolonged because the (Israeli) legal system delays the IDF and prevents it from carrying out missions



	Agree %	Somewhat agree %	Disagree %	Don't know %
Israelis (Jews and Arabs)	29	11	55	5
Jews	32	11	53	4
Arabs	19	10	63	8

The war is prolonged because the coalition has a political interest in prolonging it



	Agree %	Somewhat agree %	Disagree %	Don't know %
Israelis (Jews and Arabs)	45	10	40	5
Jews	39	9	48	4
Arabs	69	13	11	7

Further, more than half the Israeli public agrees that the war is being prolonged because it is in the coalition’s political interest to extend its duration. A large majority of Arab Israelis agree with this notion, while there is near parity among Jewish Israelis between those who agree or somewhat agree with it, and those who do not agree with it. As expected, among coalition-

party voters an overwhelming majority do not agree with the statement. Eighty-four percent of Likud voters don’t agree with it, nor do 90% of Religious Zionist Party voters, 94% of Shas voters, and 85% of United Torah Judaism voters. A majority of all opposition-party voters agree or partly (“somewhat”) agree with the assertion.

The war is prolonged because protesters and pressure groups diminish the determination to win



	Agree %	Somewhat agree %	Disagree %	Don't know %
Israelis (Jews and Arabs)	26	13	59	2
Jews	29	14	55	1
Arabs	14	7	72	7

Regarding the claim that the war has been prolonged due to protests against it and the action of pressure groups; the majority of the Israeli public does not agree with this. However, the contention finds a high level of agreement among those on the right (60% agree and 23% somewhat agree), and the center-right (31% and 25%).

Returning the Hostages

Regarding the hostages, Israelis disagree on the fundamental reason why they have yet to be returned. Slightly more than a quarter of Jewish Israelis believe that the only way to return the hostages is to win the war. This group appears to think that the hostages haven't been returned because Israel has not yet won. Another group, amounting to nearly a third of respondents, believes that Israel has abandoned the hostages and is no longer interested in their fate. This group tends to assume that the responsibility for the fact that the hostages remain in captivity lies with the Israeli government. A third group, constituting a little over a third of all Israelis, thinks that the hostages haven't returned because no deal exists to which Israel can agree. This group places most of the responsibility for the hostages' fate on Hamas's intransigence.

Which of the following statements heard widely in recent weeks do you agree with most?



	The hostages are very dear to our hearts, but the only way to get them back is to win the war %	The State of Israel abandoned the hostages and lost interest in them %	We are ready for any reasonable deal to return the hostages, and Hamas is simply not interested %	Don't know %
Jews	27	32	36	5

The response distribution by ideological orientation shows that the dominant view among the center and left-wing cohorts is that Israel has “abandoned the hostages”; among the center-right, the dominant view is that there has been no hostage deal to which Israel could agree; and among the right, the dominant view is that victory is a prerequisite for the hostages' release.

	The hostages are very dear to our hearts, but the only way to get them back is to win the war %	The State of Israel abandoned the hostages and lost interest in them %	We are ready for any reasonable deal to return the hostages, and Hamas is simply not interested %	Don't know %
Left	3	85	8	3
Center left	0	77	18	5
Center	9	51	30	10
Center right	30	12	53	5
Right	60	2	37	2

How the Government is Functioning

As a year of war comes to its end, the public gives the government a relatively low rating for its handling of the economy, the evacuees, and internal security. On a scale of 1 (very poor) to 5 (very good), with the middle range being “reasonable,” the government’s average rating for its handling of these issues ranges from “poor” to “reasonable.”

Handling the economy	Handling evacuated Israelis	Handling internal security
2.13	2.33	2.17

Coalition-voters rate the government’s handling of these issues more favorably than opposition voters, but even those ratings do not reflect a high degree of satisfaction. For example, a majority of Likud voters rate the government’s handling of the economy as “reasonable” or less. The government received the highest rating for its handling of the evacuees; most center-right and right-wing Jewish Israelis placed it at reasonable or better.

Handling the economy



	Very good %	Good %	Ok %	Bad %	Very bad %	Don't know %
Likud voters	15	23	38	12	11	2
National Unity voters	0	0	8	20	71	2
Yesh Atid voters	0	1	6	17	76	0

Israeli Society

Between June and September there have been no significant changes in the assessment of social tensions within Israel. Most of those with an opinion on the matter feel that right-left tensions “[have had] the greatest impact on social cohesion.” Slightly more than a quarter of Jewish Israelis rate religious-secular divides as the primary source of tension. Among Arab Israelis, a different finding was obtained this month compared to June: the percentage of those citing Jewish-Arab tensions dropped from a majority (55%) to a plurality (39%), and there was a concomitant rise in the share of those choosing the right-left option (32%).




Greatest social tension

	Secular-religious %	Jews-Arabs %	Mizrachim-Ashkenazim %	Rich-poor %	Left-right %	Don't know %
Overall June	27	13	4	3	49	5
Overall October	25	10	5	3	52	4
	Secular-religious %	Jews-Arabs %	Mizrachim-Ashkenazim %	Rich-poor %	Left-right %	Don't know %
Jews June	31	3	4	3	56	4
Jews October	27	3	5	2	57	5
	Secular-religious %	Jews-Arabs %	Mizrachim-Ashkenazim %	Rich-poor %	Left-right %	Don't know %
Arabs June	13	55	3	1	20	8
Arabs October	19	39	5	5	32	0

Share of Extremists


October saw a decline in the share of Arab Israelis who feel that most Jews are “politically extreme.” The share of Jewish Israelis who attribute extremism to Jews at different levels exhibited no real change compared to February, when the extremism question was last posed.

This month also showed no change compared to the February Index in how Jews describe the extremism level of Arab Israelis. A quarter of Jewish Israelis feel that “most” of their Arab counterparts are “politically extreme.” A similar percentage believe that “many of them” are extreme, while a plurality of Jewish respondents (38%) say that “some” Arab Israelis are “politically extreme.” It should be noted that even among those who self-identify as “left,” “center-left,” and “centrist,” a majority of Jewish Israelis believe that “some” Arabs are extremist, while a minority feel that only “very few” Arabs are “extreme.” Among Arab Israelis, a 55% majority say that “very few” Arabs are “politically extreme.”



The Israel-Diaspora Relationship

During the war period, a rise was observed in the share of Israeli Jews who express feelings of closeness and partnership with Diaspora Jews. This month found a moderation of the trend, perhaps in light of the fact that the anti-Israel and anti-Jewish incidents on college campuses are no longer prominent in news headlines. The percentage of Israeli Jews who agree with the statement “All Jews, in Israel and the Diaspora, have a common future” declined this month compared with June.



The most notable change in agreement level with this statement was found among secular respondents. In June, the share of secular respondents who agreed strongly with the “common future” statement was 41%, while this month it dropped to 32%.

	Strongly agree %	Somewhat agree %	Somewhat disagree %	Strongly disagree %	Don't know %
Secular June	41	29	17	9	4
Secular October	32	36	20	11	3

Due to the Jewish holidays, JPPI’s October Israeli Society Index survey was conducted from September 25-27. Data was collected by theMadad.com (612 Jewish respondents via an online poll) and Afkar Research (200 Arab respondents, half online and half by phone). Data was analyzed and weighted by political affiliation and religiosity level to represent Israel’s adult population. Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepov compile the JPPI Israeli Society Index; Professor David Steinberg serves as statistical consultant.