

Voice of the Jewish People

U.S. Jews on the War with Iran, the Fighting in Gaza, and Jewish-Israeli Ties

» Main Findings


- ▶ Most respondents believe that Israel did the right thing in deciding to go to war with Iran.
- ▶ A third of respondents support the U.S. joining an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities.
- ▶ 44% say they have no confidence at all that Trump will do the right thing in dealing with Iran.
- ▶ However, the war has led to a certain rise in confidence among U.S. Jews in Trump on the Iran issue.
- ▶ Nearly half (45%) of respondents who voted for Kamala Harris think the current Gaza campaign is "much too aggressive."
- ▶ Most Trump-voting respondents think Israel's current Gaza campaign is "not aggressive enough."
- ▶ Most respondents reject the claim that Israel is carrying out a genocide in Gaza, but there has been a rise in the percentage of liberals who agree with the genocide allegation.
- ▶ A third of the respondent panel says the "situation" has increased the likelihood that they will participate in Israel-related events.
- ▶ A quarter of the respondent panel says the "situation" has diminished the likelihood that they will participate in Israel-related events.
- ▶ There has been a drop in the share of respondents who self-identify as "Zionists" compared to a year ago.
- ▶ There has been a drop in the share of respondents who say most of their Jewish friends are "Zionists," compared to a year ago.
- ▶ A third of respondents "definitely identify" with the statement: "being Jewish has become more dangerous than in the past."

A general note on the survey period: Most of the data was collected between June 9 and 11, before the war with Iran started. On June 15-16, after the war had begun, additional data was collected, solely on issues pertaining Iran. As of this writing, the U.S. had not actively joined in the Israeli strikes on Iran. During the war’s first week, U.S. President Donald Trump made conflicting statements about the possibility of the U.S. joining in the offensive, and his true intentions remained obscure.

The War with Iran

On June 13, Israel launched a large-scale surprise attack on Iran, which included targeted assassinations and strikes on nuclear facilities and ballistic missile sites. The operation, known as “Rising Lion,” is still going on as of this writing, and it wasn’t clear whether the U.S. would actively join forces with Israel against Iran.



Generally speaking, do you think Israel did the right thing when it decided to go to war with Iran (%)



Most (69%) of JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People respondent panel thinks Israel did the right thing in deciding to go to war with Iran. A fifth (18%) are unsure whether this was the right step to take, and an eighth (13%) think Israel acted in error when it decided to go to war with Iran. While an overwhelming majority of those who self-identify as conservative or centrist believe going to war with Iran was the right thing to do, a smaller majority in the leaning liberal cohort (64%) and less than half (37%) in the strong liberal group think this way. A third (33%) of strong liberal respondents think Israel did not do the right thing in deciding to go to war with Iran, while a third (31%) are unsure whether this was a correct decision. These disparities are also reflected in a breakdown by voting pattern: While the vast majority (93%) of Trump voters believe that going to war with Iran was the right thing for Israel to do, half (53%) of Harris voters feel this way.

A quarter of Harris voters (26%) are unsure whether this was the right decision, and a fifth (21%) think that Israel was incorrect in launching its surprise attack on Iran.

As of this writing, the U.S. was assisting Israel's campaign through missile interception and the supply of munitions. At the same time, the question of whether the U.S. ought to join in the campaign is being vigorously debated there. When we questioned U.S. Jews about the appropriate level of U.S. involvement, half of the respondents (51%) said the U.S. should help Israel by supplying weapons and equipment for the offensive. Half (49%) felt that the U.S. should help Israel defend itself from Iranian reprisals – i.e., active involvement in defense but not offense. A third of respondents (32%) believed the U.S. should actively join in the strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities, while an eighth (12%) thought the U.S. was under no obligation to assist Israel at all in this war, as it "isn't America's war." Given the panel's demographic composition, it can be said that a majority of U.S. Jews oppose the U.S. actively entering into offensive operations in Iran – an engagement most Israeli Jews want to see.





Half of the respondent panel's conservatives and centrists felt the U.S. should join in the attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. A quarter (27%) of strong liberals felt the U.S. is under no obligation to assist Israel in this war, as it isn't America's war. As expected, this question evinced major disparities when broken down by voting pattern. While half of Trump-voting respondents (52%)

thought the U.S. should join in the attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, only a fifth (18%) of Harris voters felt this way. Half (47%) of Harris voters and 57% of Trump voters think the U.S. is obligated to assist Israel

by supplying weapons and equipment. While 16% of Harris voters thought the U.S. is not obligated to aid Israel in the war, only 4% of Trump voters expressed this view.

This month, as in earlier months, and in light of recent security developments, we also examined how confident respondents are that U.S. President Donald Trump will “do the right thing” in terms of dealing with Iran. This question was posed twice – once a few days before the start of the Israeli offensive, and again a few days afterward.

After the war with Iran started, it was found that 44% of respondents had no confidence that Trump would do the right thing in dealing with Iran, a third (32%) said reported having “a little” confidence, while a fifth (19%) said they had a lot of confidence in the U.S. president in this regard. Even before the war started, the declining trend of the proportion of respondents reporting a lot of confidence in the president in dealing with Iran had abated. Once the war started, there was a slight increase in the confidence of U.S. Jews that Trump would act appropriately in dealing with Iran.




As expected, the further along the ideological spectrum from liberal to conservative, the higher the confidence that Trump would do the right thing on this issue. While the share of liberals who report having a lot of confidence in the U.S. president is virtually nil, a fifth (21%) of centrists gave this response, as did a third (37%) of those in the leaning liberal cohort and two-thirds (63%) in the strong conservative group. Broken down by voting pattern, most Trump voters (59%) report having a great deal of confidence that he will do the right thing in dealing with Iran, while just 1% of Harris voters expressed this view. This pattern was also reflected among those reporting no confidence in the U.S. president on this issue – after the war had started, most Harris voters (68%) reported having no confidence in Trump vis-à-vis Iran, and 1% of Trump voters gave this response.

U.S.-Israel Relations

This month (only in questions posed before the onset of Israel's war with Iran), we also assessed the respondent panel's confidence in Trump to do the right thing concerning U.S.-Israel relations. Half (49%) of respondents reported having no confidence that the U.S. president will act appropriately in the sphere of U.S.-Israel relations. Twenty-nine percent have some confidence in him on this issue, while a fifth (18%) say they have a lot of confidence in Trump in this sphere.

In the past month, there has been a slight rise in respondents' confidence that Trump will do the right thing in regard to relations between the two countries. Last month, an eighth of respondents (13%) said they had a lot of confidence in him, but this month a fifth (18%) gave this response. This trend was found across ideological cohorts except in the leaning conservative cohort. Likewise, a decline was found this month across cohorts in the percentage who report having no confidence that President Trump will do the right thing regarding U.S.-Israel relations.


How much confidence do you have Donald Trump will do the right thing in dealing with Iran? (%)



	A lot			A little			None at all			Don't know		
	March	May	June	March	May	June	March	May	June	March	May	June
Total	27	13	18	32	28	29	38	53	49	3	6	4
Strong liberal	4	0	2	15	10	10	79	86	85	2	3	3
Leaning liberal	5	1	3	46	20	22	43	73	70	6	6	5
Centrist	31	11	16	45	39	40	20	43	38	4	7	5
Leaning conservative	59	33	30	36	43	52	6	17	13	0	7	5
Strong conservative	78	41	66	22	48	32	0	5	1	0	7	1

Broken down by ideological orientation, most liberals and 38% of centrists report having no confidence that Trump will do the right thing regarding U.S.-Israel relations. Half of the leaning conservative (52%), a third (32%) of the strong conservative, and 40% of the centrist cohorts say they have a little confidence in Trump on this issue. A third (30%) of the leaning conservative cohort and most (66%) in the strong conservative group report having a lot of confidence in the U.S. president on this matter. Broken down by voting pattern, half (52%) of Trump voters say they have a lot of confidence that he will do the right thing in the sphere of U.S.-Israel relations, while 43% say they have a little confidence in him on this issue. By contrast, most Harris voters (78%) report having no confidence that President Trump will do the right thing in this sphere.


The Fighting in Gaza



In addition to its Iran offensive, Israel has continued its military campaign in Gaza, intending to achieve its war objectives. In light of the ongoing ground operation, international criticism of Israel has risen, and some formal protests and punitive measures have been taken against Israel. This month, we examine


the respondent panel's attitudes regarding Israel's combat modality, which has drawn castigation.

A quarter (28%) of the respondent panel thinks that Israel's actions in Gaza are "much too aggressive," a quarter (27%) thinks they are "not aggressive enough," another quarter (23%) thinks they are at the right level, and 17% thinks Israel's response to the October 7 onslaught is a little too aggressive. While most (63%) of the strong conservative cohort feel that Israel's actions in Gaza are not aggressive enough, most strong liberals (62%) think those actions are much too aggressive. Broken down by religiosity, a similar pattern emerges – the further along the spectrum from liberal to conservative, the higher the percentage of respondents who think Israel's actions in Gaza are not aggressive enough. Most (61%) Trump voters feel this way. Among Harris voters, nearly half (45%) think Israel's actions in Gaza are much too aggressive, a quarter (24%) that they are a little too aggressive, 16% that they are at the right level, and a tenth (10%) that they are not aggressive enough.



Compared to the April Voice of the Jewish People survey, when we last posed this question, there has been a rise in the share of strong liberals who believe Israel is acting much too aggressively in Gaza. This month saw the highest percentage of respondents with this view (62%) since our measurement began in January 2024. A fifth of strong liberals (17%) think Israel's response to the October 7 attack is "a little too aggressive," a tenth (10%) think it is at the right level, and 7% feel Israel's response in Gaza is not aggressive enough.


Compared to the April Voice of the Jewish People survey, when we last posed this question, there has been a rise in the share of strong liberals who believe Israel is acting much too aggressively in Gaza. This month saw the highest percentage of respondents with this view (62%) since our measurement began in January 2024. A fifth of strong liberals (17%) think Israel's response to the October 7 attack is "a little too aggressive," a tenth (10%) think it is at the right level, and 7% feel Israel's response in Gaza is not aggressive enough.



Most American Jews (82%) disagree (strongly disagree + somewhat disagree) with the allegation voiced in certain circles that Israel is carrying out a genocide in Gaza. By contrast, 15% agree (strongly agree + somewhat agree) with this allegation. A tenth of respondents neither agree nor disagree with this statement. In all ideological cohorts except

the strong liberal group, a majority of respondents strongly disagree with the allegation that Israel is guilty of genocide. Among strong liberals, 21% strongly agree with this claim, while another 17% somewhat agree with it. That is, two in five in the strong liberal cohort agree with the contention that Israel is committing genocide.


Israel has been accused of genocide by pro-Palestinian activists. Do you agree or disagree with this assertion?



Compared to a year ago, there has been a significant rise in the strong liberal cohort strongly agreeing with the claim that Israel is carrying out genocide in Gaza. A year ago, just 8% felt this way, but this year a full fifth (21%) do. The leaning liberal and centrist cohorts also show an increase in the percentage of respondents who agree with the allegation, but the change is less substantial – in both cases, less than a tenth of respondents hold this view.

Jewish and Israeli Connection

Does the current situation make you less likely or more likely to attend public 'Jewish events' (such as Jewish celebrations, synagogue services, community festivals, etc.) ? (%)




Most of the respondent panel (54%) believes that the current security and social situation does not affect their participation in Jewish public events. A quarter of respondents (28%) say the current situation increases the likelihood that they will participate in such events, while 14% say it lowers their

inclination to do so. Broken down by religiosity, the Orthodox cohort has the highest share (37%) of respondents who say the current situation is increasing the likelihood of their participation in Jewish public events. A quarter of Conservative (28%) and Reform (29%) respondents also gave this answer. Across religious cohorts, half or more report that the current situation is not affecting their participation in Jewish events. The further along the religious spectrum from liberal to conservative, the lower the share who say

the current situation is reducing the likelihood that they will take part in Jewish events. Whereas 17% of Reform respondents report that it is less likely that they will participate in such events, no ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) respondents say this is the case.


Broken down by Jewish communal affiliation, a higher share of affiliated respondents (30%) say the situation is boosting their participation in Jewish events, while 13% say the situation lessens their participation. By contrast, among unaffiliated Jews, the share saying that the situation is raising or lowering the probability they will participate in Jewish events is identical (21% in both cases).



In a similar question, we asked the respondent panel whether, in light of the situation, the likelihood of encouraging their children or other young relatives to participate in Jewish events is increasing or decreasing. Half (52%) say the current situation is not affecting their encouragement, a quarter (26%) say the current situation raises the likelihood that they will encourage young family members to take part in Jewish events, and 15% say the current situation is lowering the likelihood of such encouragement. On this question as well, the Modern Orthodox cohort has the highest share (39%) of respondents who say the current situation is raising the probability that they will encourage young family members to participate in Jewish activities. A third of the Conservative (32%) and a fifth of the Reform and ultra-Orthodox cohorts also gave this answer. Across religious cohorts, half or more of respondents say the present situation is not affecting their likelihood of encouraging their children to participate in Jewish events. A fifth of Reform (18%) and an eighth of Conservative and Orthodox respondents say the likelihood of their encouraging their children or other young family members to attend Jewish events has decreased.


With a similar line of questions, we assessed the willingness of respondents to participate in Israel-related public events. A third of the respondent panel (34%) says the current situation is not affecting their participation in such events. A third of respondents (36%) say the situation increases the likelihood that they will attend events of this kind, while a quarter (27%) say the current situation has diminished the probability of their attending Israel-related public events. Insofar as Israel-related events are concerned, there has been a significant rise in the share of respondents saying they are likely to avoid such events due to the current situation.

Does the current situation make you less likely or more likely to attend public events connected to Israel (such as Israeli festivals, rallies for Israel, prayer gatherings for Israel, etc.)? (%)



Broken down by ideological orientation, there are significant disparities between the responses of liberals and conservatives. While half of conservative respondents say that, in light of the current situation, the likelihood of their participation in Israel-related events has risen, 41% of the strong liberal and 31% of the leaning liberal cohorts say the situation has made them less likely to participate in such events. Among centrist respondents, 44% say the current situation has increased their inclination to attend Israel-related public events, a third (34%) say the current situation has not affected their participation in these events, and a fifth (19%) report that the current situation reduces their inclination to attend events of this kind.

Does the current situation make you less likely or more likely to encourage your children or other young relatives to attend public events connected to Israel (such as Israeli festivals, rallies for Israel, prayer gatherings for Israel, etc.)? (%)




A third (36%) of the respondent panel says the current situation has not affected their willingness to encourage their children or other young family members to participate in Israel-related public events. A quarter of respondents (28%) say the likelihood of their encouraging young relatives to take part in

such events has risen, and an identical percentage say the current situation lowers the likelihood of their encouraging young family members to attend Israel-related events. The main difference we observed between responses to questions about Israel-related events as opposed to “Jewish” events is an increased tendency to refrain from encouraging participation. Among ideologically conservative respondents, nearly half say the situation has increased the probability that they will encourage young family members to participate in Israel-related events, compared to a fifth (18%) in the leaning liberal cohort and an eighth (13%) among strong liberals. Accordingly, a higher share of liberals than conservatives say the likelihood of their encouraging their children to take part in events of this kind is lower than it had been.

This month, we repeated a question posed a year ago about wearing Jewish symbols (necklace, bracelet, kippa – any identifiably Jewish attire). Nearly half of the respondent panel (45%) reports not wearing Jewish symbols of any kind. Two in five respondents (38%) say they continue to wear Jewish symbols as in the past, 13% have added a Jewish item to their attire, while a small percentage of respondents have, in recent months, removed a Jewish symbol they once wore. Compared to a year ago, there has been a rise in the share of respondents who say they do not wear Jewish symbols, and a decline in the percentage of those who have added a Jewish symbol to their attire. However, the share of respondents who say they continue to wear a Jewish symbol has increased.

In recent months... (%)



	I've added a Jewish symbol to what I wear in public		I've removed a Jewish symbol that I used to wear in public		I don't wear a Jewish symbol in public		I continue to wear a Jewish symbol in public		Don't know	
	June '24	June '25	June '24	June '25	June '24	June '25	June '24	June '25	June '24	June '25
Total	29	13	4	2	37	45	27	38	3	3
Reform	28	10	5	1	41	49	24	36	2	3
Conservative	32	16	4	2	35	43	26	36	3	3
Modern Orthodox	29	11	2	3	23	28	42	57	3	1
Ultra-Orthodox	12	13	4	0	21	0	62	73	0	13
No stream	24	9	5	1	41	52	24	37	4	2
Other	31	15	3	3	48	62	15	21	3	0

Broken down by religious affiliation, most ultra-Orthodox (73%) and Modern Orthodox (57%) say they continue to wear Jewish symbols in public. A third (36%) of Conservative and Reform respondents say this as well. However, half of Reform (49%), 43% of Conservative, and a quarter (28%) of Modern Orthodox respondents say they do not wear Jewish symbols in public. Between 10 and 16% of respondents across

all religious cohorts say they have added a Jewish item to their attire in recent months. Compared to last year, all religious cohorts showed a higher share of respondents who say they “continue to wear a Jewish symbol” and a lower percentage who have added a Jewish symbol in recent months (except the ultra-Orthodox, who showed an identical share who added a Jewish symbol this year as well).

The Zionism Question

Another question we repeated after a year relates to identification with Zionism. Zionism has become a fraught concept in recent years, often used as a slur at anti-Israel and anti-war demonstrations. A clear majority of JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People respondent panel, in all cohorts, self-identify as Zionists or as “somewhat Zionist.” However, the panel does include some Jews who are not Zionists or who are anti-Zionist.

Compared to a year ago, there has been a decline in the share of respondents who self-identify as Zionists. This trend was found in all ideological cohorts except the leaning liberal group. Broken down by religious affiliation, the Modern Orthodox cohort comprises the highest share of Zionists (98%), followed by the Conservative (86%) and Reform (75%) cohorts. The ultra-Orthodox cohort has the highest percentage (40%) of respondents who do not self-identify as Zionist. In a breakdown by voting pattern, a higher share of Zionists was found among Trump voters (83%) than among Harris voters (66%) – in both cases, Zionists constitute a majority.

Of the following options, which is closest to how you self-identify? (%)



	I am a Zionist		I am somewhat Zionist		I am not a Zionist		I am anti-Zionist		Don't know	
	June '24	June '25	June '24	June '25	June '24	June '25	June '24	June '25	June	June '25
Total	79	73	12	13	5	8	2	2	2	3
Strong liberal	64	55	16	17	8	14	7	8	5	6
Leaning liberal	73	75	19	19	6	5	1	0	1	1
Centrist	91	86	7	8	3	4	0	0		2
Leaning conservative	83	80	12	12	4	7	0	0	1	1
Strong conservative	91	83	3	4	3	7	0	1	2	4
Reform	75	69	13	17	6	8	3	3	3	4
Conservative	86	83	10	11	2	4	1	0	1	2
Modern Orthodox	98	92	2	7		1	0	0		0
Ultra-Orthodox	50	27	25	27	21	40	0	0	4	7
No stream	74	72	14	9	6	9	2	3	3	8
Other	66	57	17	16	7	15	5	8	4	4

When respondents were asked whether, generally speaking, their Jewish friends are Zionists or not, the results obtained indicate a greater prevalence of non-Zionist Jews than reflected in the respondent panel. For example, 73% of respondents self-identify as Zionists, but a significantly lower percentage (48%) report that most of their friends are Zionists (they attested to a higher percentage of “somewhat Zionist” friends). But even taking into account respondents who say that there is no clear majority of any particular stripe of Zionist among their friends, it is still clear that the Jewish social circle of most respondents consists primarily of Zionist or somewhat Zionist Jews. Compared with a year ago, there has been a drop in the share of respondents who say that most of their friends are Zionists, and a rise in the share who say that most of their friends are somewhat Zionist or that there is no clear majority of any type.

When thinking about your Jewish friends, which of the following options is closest to how they self-identify? (%)




	The majority are Zionists		The majority are somewhat Zionists		The majority are not Zionists		They majority are anti-Zionists		There is no clear majority of any type of Zionist		I have no Jewish friends		Don't know	
	June '24	June '25	June '24	June '25	June '24	June '25	June '24	June '25	June '24	June '25	June '24	June '25	June '24	June '25
Total	59	48	20	25	5	6	1	2	8	13	1	0	6	5
Strong liberal	48	36	24	22	5	10	4	5	11	23	1	0	7	5
Leaning liberal	58	48	19	32	4	3	1	0	10	10	0	1	7	4
Centrist	68	56	15	28	5	5	0	0	6	6	1	1	5	4
Leaning conservative	62	55	25	25	4	5	1	1	4	8	0	1	4	2
Strong conservative	59	54	18	14	10	7	1	2	4	11	2	0	6	10

Coping with Antisemitism

In light of the antisemitism that has surged in the U.S. in recent months, we asked the respondent panel to comment on a quote from a New York Times article: “The drumbeat of violence erupting across the country [...] has deepened anxieties among many American Jews, and contributed to a sense that simply existing in public as a Jewish person is increasingly dangerous.” This month, we asked respondents whether they personally feel that “simply existing in public as a Jew is increasingly dangerous.”



A third of the respondent panel (34%) said the quote reflects their own feelings. Another 44% said that it reflects their feelings to a certain degree, a fifth (19%) think it is an overstatement, and a negligible percentage said that existing in public as a Jew is not at all dangerous.

According to a report in The New York Times, “The drumbeat of violence erupting across the country... has deepened anxieties among many American Jews, and contributed to a sense that simply existing in public as a Jewish person is increasingly dangerous.” Do you personally feel that “simply existing in public as a Jewish person is increasingly dangerous”? (%)



The Trump Administration's Immigration Policy

The Trump administration recently broadened the authority of the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE) to expedite the deportation of illegal immigrants. Because this issue is widely debated in the U.S., and many Jewish organizations have openly expressed their policies in this regard, this month we examined the respondent panel's views regarding the Trump administration's plan to find and deport immigrants who have been residing in the U.S. illegally. Most respondents (57%) do not approve of this plan (strongly disapprove + somewhat disapprove). By contrast, 42% do approve of the initiative (definitely approve + somewhat approve). The views of U.S. Jews on this issue deviate from the views of Americans in general. An April CBS survey that posed an identically worded question found that 56% of Americans approve of the Trump plan, versus 44% who oppose it.



As expected, there are also significant disparities between liberal and conservative U.S. Jews views on this issue. While most strong liberals (85%) strongly disapprove of President Trump's immigration agenda, most strong conservatives (88%) strongly approve of it. Broken down by voting pattern, we can see that most Trump voters (73%) strongly approve of the administration's immigration policy, while most Harris voters (70%) strongly disapprove of it.

Survey Data and its Implications

The respondent panel whose views are reflected in JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People survey consists of Jews who, by and large, have a relatively strong connection to Jewish identity, and/or Jewish institutions, and/or Israel. Our January 2025 report included a methodological appendix detailing the composition and characteristics of the Voice of the Jewish People panel and the differences between it and the American Jewish cohorts surveyed by other organizations.

The present report is based on a survey administered to 607 participants in the first round of questions, and to 405 participants in the second round. All are American Jews registered for JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People panel.

The following tables provide data on the respondents in both rounds of the June 2025 Voice of the Jewish People.

First June 2025 Survey: Participant Data		
	%	#
Reform	143	24
Conservative	184	30
Modern Orthodox	75	12
Ultra-Orthodox	15	2
Other	18	112
No stream	13	78
Strong liberal	31	186
Leaning liberal	19	117
Centrist	22	131
Leaning conservative	14	83
Strong conservative	15	90
Single / divorced / widowed	28	171
Married/in long-term relationship with a Jewish spouse	55	334
Married/in long-term relationship with a non-Jewish spouse	17	102
Affiliated	83	506
Non-affiliated	17	101
Never visited Israel	23	138
Visited Israel once	16	98
Visited Israel more than once	45	276
Lived in Israel	16	95
Jewish by religion	92	558
Jew by no religion (JBNR)	3	18
Partially Jewish	3	20
No religion	2	11

Second June 2025 Survey: Participant Data		
	%	#
Reform	21	84
Conservative	32	128
Modern Orthodox	12	47
Ultra-Orthodox	3	12
Other	21	86
No stream	12	48
Strong liberal	32	131
Leaning liberal	21	84
Centrist	19	77
Leaning conservative	13	52
Strong conservative	15	61
Single / divorced / widowed	28	115
Married/in long-term relationship with a Jewish spouse	57	229
Married/in long-term relationship with a non-Jewish spouse	15	61
Affiliated	85	346
Non-affiliated	15	59
Never visited Israel	22	90
Visited Israel once	17	69
Visited Israel more than once	44	178
Lived in Israel	17	68
Jewish by religion	93	377
Jew by no religion (JBNR)	2	8
Partially Jewish	3	14
No religion	1	6