

JPPI Israeli Society Index

Two Years into the War

Coalition supporters are optimistic and determined, while opposition supporters are mostly worried. This report addresses the war in Gaza, confidence in leadership and in victory, and Israel's relations with key countries.

Additional Findings:

- » Two years after the war began, one-third of Israelis feel mostly worried.
- » After another year of war, the national mood has remained largely unchanged.
- » Most Israelis agree that the war dragged on because it lacked clear and realistic objectives.
- » The majority of Israelis believe the war was prolonged because the government did not make the right decisions quickly enough.
- » Most do not agree that the war dragged on because the IDF senior command was not determined enough to win.
- » There has been a decline in the share of Israelis who believe international pressure impeded Israel and prolonged the war.
- » Most agree that the war is being prolonged due to the coalition's political interests.
- » Regarding future relations with the Palestinians: a third support expanding Israeli control, a third support separation, and a quarter support reaching a peace agreement.
- » Israelis' trust in key allies, France and the UK, has collapsed (trust in Germany has declined as well).
- » A majority of Israelis support mandatory conscription for most draft-eligible ultra-Orthodox men and punitive measures for those who evade IDF service.
- » Half of Israel's National-Religious Jews endorse requiring most ultra-Orthodox men to enlist and applying punitive measures to those who evade IDF service.
- » About half of Israelis know other Israelis who are considering moving abroad.
- » About a quarter of Israelis say that if they had the opportunity to emigrate, they would.
- » Among Arab Israelis, a higher share say they would emigrate if they had the opportunity to do so.
- » Over the past year, optimism about Israel's future declined; half of Israelis are optimistic. There has been a sharp decline in Arab Israelis' optimism about Israel's future over the last year.

After the late-September meeting between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Donald Trump, an American 20-point plan for a ceasefire and the release of the hostages was published. Netanyahu publicly stated that the proposal was acceptable to Israel. This survey was conducted prior to the meeting.


Confidence in Victory

This month, the share of Jewish Israelis who believe Israel is winning or has won the war remained stable; among Arab Israelis, there was a further uptick in the share who do not think Israel is winning. Over the past four months, the share of Arab Israelis who believe Israel is winning rose sharply: from roughly a quarter of respondents to nearly half.

Feelings of victory are strongly shaped by political orientation: among respondents self-identifying as “left,” there is a significant lack of confidence regarding Israeli victory – almost half answered that they “do not at all feel” that Israel is winning; only a tiny minority (under 10%) say they are “completely certain” that Israel will win. As one moves rightward on the political spectrum, optimism rises – among those identifying as “right” and

“center-right” (most Jewish Israelis), a majority placed themselves at levels 4–5, meaning they feel mostly or fully confident that Israel is winning the war.

Please rate from 1 (“not at all”) to 5 (“completely”) the extent to which you feel that Israel is winning and/or has won the war (including all fronts since October 7) (%)



Please rate from 1 to 5 (1 = "Not at all" and 5 = "Completely") the extent to which you feel Israel is winning or has won the war (including all fronts since October 7). (%)




	1 Not at all	2	3	4	5 Completely
All Israelis – July	10	12	24	39	15
All Israelis – August	19	15	25	28	13
All Israelis – September	20	12	25	28	15
All Israelis – October	21	11	25	25	18
Jews – July	10	11	25	35	18
Jews – August	15	15	23	33	15
Jews – September	15	10	26	32	17
Jews – October	15	11	24	30	19
Arabs – July	28	18	33	14	8
Arabs – August	38	16	32	8	6
Arabs – September	38	19	23	10	10
Arabs – October	45	10	28	7	11

Confidence/Trust in the Political Leadership and the IDF

JPPI's October Israeli Society Index survey found that the level of trust in the government among the Jewish public was similar to that recorded in August. Currently, about three in five Jewish Israelis report low trust in the government, while about two in five report

Level of Confidence in the Government
(Jewish Israelis, %)




high trust – one of the highest levels recorded over the past 18 months. Among Arab Israelis, trust is low: 83% report low trust, compared with 59% among Jews.

Trust levels in the IDF senior command are significantly higher than in the political leadership. Sixty-three percent of the general public expresses

trust in the IDF senior command (15% very high + 48% somewhat high). Among Jewish Israelis, the figure is even higher, 69%. By contrast, a majority of Arab respondents (53%) say they do not trust the IDF senior command, and only 38% say they do. Relative to last month, the share of Arab Israelis reporting high trust in the IDF senior command rose (38% vs. 33%), and the share reporting low trust declined (53% vs. 61%).


What is your confidence level in the IDF senior command? (Jewish Israelis, %)



Two Years into the War


The October 2025 JPPI Index survey finds that, two years into the war, a large share of Israelis – about a third – feel “mostly worried.” This is the most dominant feeling among the six options presented to respondents. Beyond this, more than four in ten Israelis (43%) feel “angry,” “sad,” or “despairing.” In contrast, about a quarter (26%) feel “optimistic” and “determined.”

Please indicate the feeling most dominant for you two years into the war (%)




Findings at the two-year mark are quite similar to those measured a year ago and a year and a half ago. Feelings shaped during the first year of the war have remained largely unchanged. In broad strokes: those who were determined or optimistic a year ago remain so (25% then vs. 26% now); those who were despairing a year ago (14%) remain so today (15%). While conditions on the ground have not been static, with dramatic developments on several fronts, the overall emotional state of most Israelis is similar to a year ago.

Please indicate the feeling most dominant for you two years into the war (%)



As in previous iterations, the predominant feeling differs widely across groups. Among Jews the worry is the chief emotion, and among Arabs, it is sorrow. Among secular and traditional Israelis, worry predominates. Among religious and Haredi Israelis, optimism predominates. Among the small Christian subsample (results not statistically robust), anger is the foremost emotion. Among right-wing Jews, worry slightly prevails (33%), with nearly the same share selecting despair (31%).

Please indicate the feeling most dominant for you two years into the war (%)




Emotions also differ by political party affiliation. Likud supporters primarily report determination (42%). Yisrael Beiteinu supporters report worry (49%), as do supporters of parties headed by Gadi Eisenkot (49%), Yoaz Hendel (45%), and Naftali Bennett (42%). Among supporters of the Democrats (the left-most party), the foremost feeling is also worry, but anger and despair are also prominent – more than half expressed one of these two (26% and 27%, respectively). Supporters of Otzma Yehudit resemble Likud supporters in feeling determined. Supporters of the religious and ultra-Orthodox parties (Religious Zionism, Shas, United Torah Judaism) express optimism at very high rates.

The Prolonged War

Opinions differ as to why the war has lasted two years. We asked about this in previous surveys (at the one-year and year-and-a-half marks), and again in the present survey. Just as responses to most options changed little over the past year, so too have public views on why the war continues. A majority of Jewish Israelis (55%) and half of Arab Israelis (48%) agree that “the war was prolonged because the tasks are complex and take a long time to complete.” By political camp, agreement with this statement is highest on the right, and significantly lower for the centrist and left-wing respondents.

The war was prolonged because the tasks are complex and take a long time to complete (%)




The war was prolonged because the tasks are complex and take a long time to complete (All Israelis; %)



	Agree	Somewhat agree	Do not agree	Don't know
Oct. 2024	26	26	45	3
May 2025	24	30	43	3
Oct. 2025	29	26	43	2

A majority of Israelis (agree + somewhat agree) say the war was prolonged because it lacked clear and realistic goals that would allow it to end. This majority is driven by very high agreement in the center and left, and lower agreement on the right. Among Arab Israelis, agreement is higher – 72% vs. 60% among Jews.

The war was prolonged because there were no clear and realistic goals that would allow it to end (%)




The war was prolonged because there were no clear and realistic goals that would allow it to end (All israelis; %)



	Agree	Somewhat agree	Do not agree	Don't know
Oct. 2024	39	18	39	4
May 2025	44	22	31	3
Oct. 2025	39	23	34	4

The assertion that the war was prolonged because the IDF senior command lacked sufficient determination to secure a quick victory does not have majority support: 40% agree, and 54% disagree. Broken down by ideological orientation, the right is the only cohort in which a majority (agree + somewhat agree) accepts the claim; in the center-right and all other cohorts, a majority disagree.

The war was prolonged because the IDF senior command lacked the determination to secure a quick victory (%)




The war was prolonged because the IDF senior command lacked the determination to secure a quick victory (All israelis; %)



	Agree	Somewhat agree	Do not agree	Don't know
Oct. 2024	18	22	54	6
May 2025	19	22	54	5
Oct. 2025	24	14	57	5

Large majorities of both Jews (76%) and Arabs (77%) agree (agree + somewhat agree) that the war was prolonged because the government did not make the right decisions quickly enough. Although agreement is lower on the right, a majority still agrees (64% of the right-wing cohort, and 76% of the center-right) – both higher than a year ago (60% and 67%, respectively).

The war was prolonged because the government did not make the right decisions quickly enough (%)




The war was prolonged because the government did not make the right decisions quickly enough (All israelis; %)



	Agree	Somewhat agree	Do not agree	Don't know
Oct. 2024	53	23	20	4
May 2025	51	27	19	2
Oct. 2025	52	24	21	3

In recent months, international criticism of Israel has intensified due to the ongoing fighting in Gaza, with concern about the civilian humanitarian situation. Calls for sanctions and legal investigations are emblematic of declining international legitimacy. Large demonstrations against Israel were held, and incidents targeting Israelis and Jews were recorded. Most Israelis believe such international clamor has impeded Israel's wartime progress and slowed fulfillment of its objectives; agreement with this contention is higher on the right, while there is no majority agreement among the center and left respondent cohorts.

The war was prolonged because international pressure hindered Israel from fulfilling its objectives (%)




The war was prolonged because international pressure hindered Israel from fulfilling its objectives (All israelis; %)



	Agree	Somewhat agree	Do not agree	Don't know
Oct. 2024	37	24	38	2
May 2025	38	25	35	3
Oct. 2025	29	25	42	3

Most Israelis do not agree with the claim – sometimes voiced by coalition members – that the war was prolonged because of constraints imposed by the legal system on the IDF. On the right, however, agreement is relatively high: 54% agree (down from 62% last year), and another 20% somewhat agree (down from 25% last year).

The war was prolonged because the legal system delays the IDF and prevents it from carrying out its mission (%)




A majority (55%) agree that the war has been prolonged due to the coalition's political interest in extending it. Among Arab Israelis, a large majority agrees (77%); among Jewish Israelis, a smaller majority (55%) agrees. As expected, among coalition party voters, an overwhelming majority disagrees: 88% of Likud voters, 87% of Religious Zionism voters, 84% of Shas voters, and 88% of United Torah Judaism voters. Across all opposition parties, a majority agrees or somewhat agrees.

The war was prolonged because the legal system delays the IDF and prevents it from carrying out its mission (All Israelis; %)



	Agree	Somewhat agree	Do not agree	Don't know
Oct. 2024	29	11	55	5
May 2025	28	14	53	5
Oct. 2025	27	14	54	5

The war was prolonged because the coalition had a political interest in extending it (%)




The war was prolonged because the coalition had a political interest in extending it (All Israelis; %)



	Agree	Somewhat agree	Do not agree	Don't know
Oct. 2024	29	11	55	5
May 2025	28	14	53	5
Oct. 2025	27	14	54	5

There is no majority support for the claim that protests and pressure groups are prolonging the war by weakening the determination to win. Agreement is highest among right-wing respondents: 53% agree and another 29% somewhat agree. Among center-right respondents, 33% agree and 20% somewhat agree.



The war was prolonged because protesters and pressure groups weakened the determination to win (All israelis; %)

	Agree	Somewhat agree	Do not agree	Don't know
Oct. 2024	26	13	59	2
May 2025	28	17	52	3
Oct. 2025	27	18	52	3

Relations with the Palestinians

Following recognition of a Palestinian state by several countries in the past month, we repeated a question about Israelis' preferred approach to a future settlement with the Palestinians. Roughly one-third (35%) of all Israelis think Israel should strengthen its control over the Palestinians, expand settlements, consider dismantling the Palestinian Authority, and possibly annex parts of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). Another third (30%) think Israel should pursue full separation from the Palestinians, dismantle settlements outside the large blocs, and focus on maintaining the IDF's freedom of action to prevent terror groups from growing. Another quarter (25%) believe Israel should strive for a peace agreement with moderate Palestinians and allow the establishment of a Palestinian state that lives in peace alongside Israel (a Gallup poll last month, with a differently phrased question, found a very similar share of Israelis supporting a two-state solution – 27%).

Here are three statements that represent different worldviews, which is closest to your own? (%)




	Strengthen control/expand settlements/consider dismantling PA/possible annexation	Full separation/dismantle non-bloc settlements/maintain IDF freedom of action	Seek peace agreement and allow a Palestinian state	Don't know
Israelis – Nov. 2024	29	35	28	8
Israelis – March 2025	39	33	22	6
Israelis – Oct. 2025	35	30	25	10
Jews – Nov. 2024	34	40	19	7
Jews – March 2025	47	36	11	6
Jews – Oct. 2025	42	34	15	10
Arabs – Nov. 2024	9	15	65	12
Arabs – March 2025	9	19	63	9
Arabs – Oct. 2025	6	16	67	11

Israel and the World

We asked Israelis how “friendly” certain key countries are toward Israel. The table below shows the share of respondents who think specific countries are friendly. Among the countries presented, Germany received the highest friendliness rating. Next came India, then the United Kingdom and France, and lastly China and Russia. There are differences between Jewish and Arab Israelis – Arab respondents generally attribute higher friendliness scores than their Jewish counterparts.

Friendly or unfriendly toward Israel?



Against the backdrop of the UN General Assembly debates and recognition of a Palestinian state by several countries, most Jewish Israelis (and a minority of Arab Israelis) view France as “not friendly.” Last year, about four in ten Jews said so; this year, nearly two-thirds (64%) do. Accordingly, whereas last year about a fifth viewed

Is France friendly or unfriendly toward Israel? (%)

	Friendly	Neither friendly nor unfriendly	Unfriendly	Don't know
All Israelis – Nov. 2024	27	33	34	6
All Israelis – Oct. 2025	19	22	55	4
Jews – Nov 2024	19	38	40	3
Jews – Oct 2025	12	23	64	1
Arabs – Nov. 2024	61	15	9	15
Arabs – Oct. 2025	48	20	19	13

France as friendly, this year the share is closer to a tenth (12%). Among Arab Israelis, friendliness ratings for France also declined –a majority viewed it as friendly a year ago; this year, fewer than half (48%) do.

A similar picture appears for other European countries. Regarding the United Kingdom, the share of Jews who say the UK is not friendly more than doubled this year – from 18% in September 2024 to 42% now; about a third (37%) say the UK is neither friendly nor unfriendly. The share that thinks the UK is friendly roughly halved – from almost 40% last year to less than 20% (19%) this year. Among Arab Israelis, 60% say the UK is friendly – a majority, though down from 70% last year.

Is the United Kingdom friendly or unfriendly toward Israel? (%)



	Friendly	Neither friendly nor unfriendly	Unfriendly	Don't know
All Israelis – Nov. 2024	45	34	15	5
All Israelis – Oct. 2025	27	33	36	4
Jews – Nov 2024	39	39	18	3
Jews – Oct 2025	19	36	42	3
Arabs – Nov. 2024	70	13	4	13
Arabs – Oct. 2025	60	20	8	12

Germany remains the only European country most Israelis still view as friendly. Among Jews, nearly two-thirds (64%) describe Germany as friendly. Even among those who self-identify as right-wing – critical of France and Germany – almost half (46%) say Germany is friendly. Still, sentiment cooled compared to last year:

Is Germany friendly or unfriendly toward Israel? (%)




	Friendly	Neither friendly nor unfriendly	Unfriendly	Don't know
All Israelis – Nov. 2024	80	13	3	4
All Israelis – Oct. 2025	64	23	9	4
Jews – Nov 2024	83	14	2	2
Jews – Oct 2025	64	25	9	2
Arabs – Nov. 2024	68	11	6	15
Arabs – Oct. 2025	65	12	13	11

among Jews, friendliness fell from 83% to 64%. The share who says Germany is unfriendly remains relatively low, under 10%.

Future in Israel

About half of Israelis (51%) know Israelis who, because of the situation, are considering moving abroad. Among Jews, the figure is 44%; among Arabs, 79%. Broken down by ideological orientation, the share who know such Israelis is higher on the left; as one moves rightward, fewer say they know other Israelis considering leaving, and more say they know none.

True or not true: "I know Israelis who, because of the situation, are considering moving abroad." (%)




There has been little change since November 2024 among Jews who know other Israelis considering emigration, and there has been a slight rise in those who know none. Broken down by ideological orientation, the shifts diverge: in the left-wing cohort, there has been an increase in those who know many or at least some (89% in Oct 2025 vs. 77% in Nov 2024). On the right, the opposite is true: fewer report knowing such Israelis, and significantly more say they know none (from 37% to 47%).

True or not true: "I know Israelis who, because of the situation, are considering moving abroad." (%)

	Very true (know many)	Somewhat true (know some)	Somewhat not true (know few)	Not true at all (know none)	Don't know
Jews – Nov. 2024	17	30	27	23	3
Jews – Oct. 2025	16	28	22	29	5
Left – Nov. 2024	34	43	15	4	5
Left – Oct. 2025	37	52	4	4	2
Center-left – Nov. 2024	30	50	10	6	3
Center-left – Oct. 2025	37	41	13	1	7
Center – Nov. 2024	25	38	20	14	2
Center – Oct. 2025	25	41	17	11	5
Center-right – Nov. 2024	18	22	31	26	3
Center-right – Oct. 2025	10	27	30	28	4
Right – Nov. 2024	3	20	37	37	3
Right – Oct. 2025	4	16	29	47	4

Agree or disagree: If I had an opportunity to emigrate abroad, I would (%)




Agree or disagree: If I had an opportunity to emigrate abroad, I would (%)



	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
All Israelis – Nov. 2024	14	13	9	9	52	3
All Israelis – Oct. 2025	11	14	9	9	55	2
Jews – Nov. 2024	13	13	9	10	52	3
Jews – Oct. 2025	9	13	7	9	60	3
Arabs – Nov. 2024	20	11	7	7	50	4
Arabs – Oct. 2025	19	19	16	8	37	0

Israel's Future



Half of Israelis (50%) are optimistic about Israel's future (very + somewhat), and nearly as many (49%) are pessimistic (very + somewhat). Optimism is higher among Jews than among Arabs. About 77% of the center-left cohort and a majority of the centrist group (61%) are pessimistic. By contrast, 64% of the center-right and 85% of the right-wing cohorts are optimistic. Broken down by religiosity, most secular Israelis (60%) are pessimistic, while most other groups are optimistic.

Overall, are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future of the State of Israel?" (%)

	Very optimistic	Somewhat optimistic	Somewhat pessimistic	Very pessimistic	Don't know
Israelis – Nov. 2024	33	24	22	19	3
Israelis – Oct. 2025	30	20	22	25	2
Jews – March 2024	31	25	26	16	2
Jews – Nov. 2024	37	23	22	16	2
Jews – Oct. 2025	36	22	22	19	1
Arabs – Nov. 2024	13	27	22	29	10
Arabs – Oct. 2025	8	12	25	50	4

Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) Conscription

Ahead of the start of the Knesset's winter session and the ultra-Orthodox parties' demand of passing a Haredi draft exemption law as a condition for continued coalition support, most Jewish Israelis (68%) believe the Knesset should mandate that most Haredim serve in the IDF. Most who take this view also believe that punitive measures (revocation of certain rights and government subsidies) should be taken against those who evade service; a smaller share think draft evaders should be prosecuted and punished. About a fifth (19%) say that only persuasion should be used; 4% say pass a law that exempts Haredim from IDF service as was the case "until recently." Majorities of left, center, and center-right respondents support requiring most Haredim to serve or have them face revocation of rights/benefits. Two in five in the right-wing cohort (where most coalition supporters are) also support this, while a third (34%) favor persuasion only. Just 5% of the right support a blanket exemption law.

Broken down by religiosity, majorities (or at least half) of all groups except the Haredim say most Haredim should be required to serve and that rights/benefits should be revoked for draft evaders. Among National-Religious Jews, 50% support punitive measures, and a quarter (23%) support persuasion only.


In your opinion, what should the Knesset do regarding Haredi conscription? (%)



	Pass a law again exempting Haredim from service	Persuasion only	Require most Haredim to serve and revoke rights/benefits from evaders	Require most Haredim to serve and prosecute/punish evaders	None of these	Don't know
All Israelis	6	18	44	18	8	6
Jews	4	19	52	16	7	2
Arabs	14	15	16	26	9	22
Left	0	0	65	24	9	2
Center-left	0	0	71	23	6	0
Center	1	8	67	20	3	1
Center-right	2	19	56	13	7	2
Right	5	34	40	11	7	4

This year's answer choices were changed slightly from those offered in November 2024. Instead of the option "Pass a law exempting Haredim who seriously study Torah and draft the rest," we added "Persuasion only." Despite this change, Jewish respondents' answers were similar to last year. There was a rise in those who say that most Haredim should be required to serve (up two percentage points for those who also support revoking rights/benefits; up four points for those who support prosecution/punishment).

In your opinion, what should the Knesset do regarding Haredi service in the IDF? (Jews, %)



In recent months, only a few Haredi draftees actually reported to the conscription office. Which of the following is closest to your view? (%)



	This proves you cannot draft Haredi youth by force; return to dialogue	This proves Haredi youth will not comply; increase sanctions	Don't know
Jews – Sep. 2024	36	53	10
Jews – Nov. 2024	35	59	7
Jews – Oct. 2025	34	57	9
Secular – Nov. 2024	18	76	6
Secular – Oct. 2025	17	76	7
Traditionalist (Masortim) not religious – Oct. 2025	45	49	6
Traditionalist (Masortim) not religious – Nov. 2024	38	55	7
Religious (Datiim) – Nov. 2024	38	48	14
Religious (Datiim) – Oct. 2025	45	43	13

Due to the holiday period, JPPI's October survey was conducted between September 25 and 28, 2025. The survey was administered to 774 Israeli respondents, Jews and Arabs. Data was collected by the Madad.com (568 Jewish sector respondents in an online survey), and Afkar Research (206 Arab sector respondents, about half online and half by phone). The data was weighted and analyzed according to voting patterns and religiosity to represent the adult population of Israel. The JPPI Israeli Society Index is compiled by Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepko. Prof. David Steinberg serves as statistical consultant.