

JPPI Israeli Society Index

The Iranian Threat, Trust in Leadership and the Army, US-Israel Relations, Separation in the Public Sphere, and Perceptions of Zionism, Racism, and Antisemitism.

Additional Findings:

Most Israelis see Iran as an existential threat; half of Arab respondents believe the threat is small or nonexistent.

Perception of the Iranian threat increases the further one moves to the political right.

Most of the public thinks social polarization is Israel's greatest danger, more than the Iranian threat.

Most Israelis support shortening Netanyahu's trial – half of them only in exchange for his retirement from political life.

The center-left opposes a pardon without Netanyahu's retirement; the right supports his full return to office.

There has been a slight increase in the share of Israelis who "strongly trust" the prime minister – a peak since early 2024.

There has been a significant increase in the share of Arab Israelis who report trusting the IDF.

Even in light of disagreements, most respondents express confidence that Trump will do the right thing regarding Israel.

The share of Israelis who think Israel must make a major effort to preserve its alliance with the United States has significantly increased.

Most Israelis, across all ideological groups, agree: Israel's standing in the world is poor.

Most Israelis say that Zionism is not racism, but a third believe that "some interpret it that way."

Most Arab Israelis believe that Zionism is racism or that it contains racist elements.

Most Jewish Israelis link anti-Zionism and antisemitism, while their Arab counterparts believe that anti-Zionism and antisemitism are separate phenomena.

Most Israelis oppose the Bismuth Haredi conscription bill; support for it grows as one moves rightward along the ideological spectrum.

Most prefer that members of a Commission of Inquiry into the lead-up to October 7 be appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

Jews tend to explain violence in the Arab sector as a product of social factors; Arabs say that the problem originates with the state and its law-enforcement system.

Most Israelis prefer public spaces shared by Jews and Arabs.

The Iranian Threat



The 12-day campaign against Iran ended six months ago. In this light, we again asked this month about Israel's situation vis-à-vis Iran. The responses indicate that a significant share of Israelis have, after half a year, returned to baseline positions that see Iran as a major threat, even though many believe that the level of threat somewhat decreased after the campaign.

As in the July survey, conducted immediately after the campaign, we asked Israelis whether Iran was or was not an existential threat to Israel prior to the 12-day operation. Two-thirds of Israelis (62%) now believe that Iran was a great existential threat before the war, and another fifth (22%) assess that it constituted some threat. Only 14% believe the Iranian threat was small or nonexistent. Among Jewish Israelis, the share who view Iran as having been an existential threat is significantly higher than among Arab Israelis. About three-quarters (71%) of Jewish Israelis see Iran as having been a great existential threat, and only 7% think the threat was small or nonexistent. By contrast, among Arab Israelis, a quarter (24%) assess that Iran was a great existential threat, while another quarter (27%) believe it was not a threat at all.

Compared with data collected this past July, immediately after the campaign against Iran, there has been a slight increase (from 57% to 62%) in the share of Israelis who think Iran had been an existential threat prior to the campaign. This trend is evident among both Jewish and Arab Israelis. At the same time, there

was a decline in the share of Arab respondents who believe Iran was not an existential threat to Israel at all (from 37% to 27%). Despite this decline, the Arab share holding this view is still much higher than among Jews.

In your opinion, before the 12-day campaign, was Iran an “existential threat” to Israel? (%)



	To a great extent	To some extent	To a small extent	Not at all	Don't know
All Israelis – December	62	22	8	6	2
All Israelis – July	57	23	7	9	3
Jews – December	71	21	6	1	1
Jews – July	67	24	6	2	2
Arabs – December	24	24	18	27	8
Arabs – July	21	18	13	37	11

Broken down by ideological orientation, the perception of Iran as an “existential threat” prior to the campaign increases the further one moves rightward along the political spectrum. Among those identifying with the left, a third (30%) believe that Iran was a great existential threat, a third (36%) to some extent, and a third (33%) to a small extent. In the center-left group, threat assessment is also heterogeneous: the two leading assessments are that Iran was a great existential threat to Israel (38%) and to some extent (38%). From the center rightward, the perceived threat rises sharply: 60% in the center, 78% in the center-right, and 88% on the right think that Iran had been a great existential threat to Israel prior to the 12-day campaign.

In your opinion, before the 12-day campaign, was Iran an “existential threat” to Israel? (by ideology, %)



	To a great extent	To some extent	To a small extent	Not at all	Don't know
Left	30	36	33	0	0
Center-left	38	38	17	5	2
Center	60	31	7	1	1
Center-right	78	19	2	1	1
Right	88	11	1	0	0

Half a year after the campaign, most Israelis still view Iran as an existential threat to Israel. On this question, however, we found a much larger change compared to July.

Today, a third (31%) of Israelis believe that Iran is a great existential threat, and another 38% see it as an existential threat “to some extent.” That is, a majority of the public thinks that the existential threat persists even after the campaign. A fifth (20%) of Israelis think that Iran constitutes only a small existential threat, and 8% believe that Iran does not constitute an existential threat to Israel at all. Among Jewish Israelis, the perceived level of threat is somewhat higher: 34% assess that a great existential threat still exists, 41% think it exists to some extent, and 3% believe that there is no threat at all. Among Arab Israelis, perceived threat levels are lower: half (53%) think that after the Iran campaign, the threat it poses is small or nonexistent.

Compared with the July data, there has been a substantial increase among Jews (from 16% to 34%) and Arabs (from 16% to 19%) in assessing that Iran poses a great existential threat to Israel. In other words, in July, immediately after the campaign, many Israelis believed that the level of the Iranian threat had dropped sharply (62% assessed that Iran was a significant threat before the campaign, but only 16% assessed it as a significant threat directly after the campaign). Now, the gap between perceived threat before and after the campaign has narrowed considerably. Still, a gap remains: 62% said that Iran was a significant threat before the campaign, versus 31% who say it is a significant threat today. Further, there is still a gap in the assessment of Iran as a major threat to Israel – in July it stood at 46 percentage points, when the impression of the campaign was still fresh, and now stands at 31 percentage points. At the same time, there has been a decline in the share who believe that Iran does not constitute an existential threat to Israel at all. Overall, the data reflects a rise in perceived threat, mainly among Jews, compared with the situation at the end of the campaign six months ago.

In your opinion, after the 12-day campaign, is Iran an “existential threat” to Israel? (%)



	Very much a threat	Somewhat a threat	Small threat	Not an existential threat at all	Don't know
All Israelis – December	31	38	20	8	2
All Israelis – July	16	41	25	13	5
Jews – December	34	41	19	3	2
Jews – July	16	46	27	7	3
Arabs – December	19	23	24	29	5
Arabs – July	16	17	17	38	12

Alongside the comparison of identical questions in July and December, which – as we have seen – points to an erosion in the sense of achievement in Israel’s campaign against Iran (more Israelis have become convinced that the threat remained significant), we asked Israelis how they feel today, versus how they felt immediately after the campaign, about the outcome of the campaign against Iran.

A quarter (24%) of Israelis say that they now “understand” that the result of the campaign against Iran is better than they had thought just after it; a little more than a quarter (28%) think the result was worse than they had thought; and 35% say their current assessment is similar to what it was immediately after the campaign. Broken down by ideological orientation, only a small minority on the left and center-left now say that the war’s outcome was better than they thought, while a majority in these camps believe it was similar to, or worse than, what they had previously understood. On the right and center-right, the share is higher (38% and 26%, respectively) of those who think that the campaign’s outcome was better than expected. A similar pattern is evident in a breakdown by religiosity: moving from the secular toward the Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) end of the spectrum, the share of respondents who now say they see the war’s outcome as better than they had thought rises, and the share who think the outcome was worse than they had thought declines.

Thinking about Israel’s situation vis-à-vis Iran today, which of the following best reflects your view? (%)

	The result of the war was better than I thought	The result of the war was worse than I thought	The result of the war was about what I thought	Don't know
All Israelis	24	28	35	13
Jews	25	27	36	12
Arabs	21	31	31	16
Left	6	27	52	15
Center-left	5	50	33	12
Center	16	31	34	19
Center-right	26	30	36	7
Right	38	17	37	8

This month, we asked respondents which of three options they perceive as the “greatest danger” to Israel: the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, polarization and division within Israeli society, or the Iranian threat.

A majority of the Israeli public (55%) considers social polarization the greatest danger. A quarter (23%) single out the Iranian nuclear threat, and a fifth (18%) regard the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as Israel’s greatest danger. Among Jewish Israelis, the figures are even clearer – 59% see polarization and division

within Israeli society as the primary threat. Among Arab Israelis, two in five (39%) consider polarization the main danger, a quarter (27%) cite the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and another quarter single out (28%) the Iranian threat.

Among Israel's left and the center-left, there is a near consensus (76%) that internal polarization is the greatest danger. The Iranian threat is perceived as the primary danger by only a small minority (3%) compared to the other options. As we move to the right, toward the larger ideological groups, the share of respondents who see the Iranian threat as the main danger to Israel rises: a quarter (26%) of those identifying as center-right and a third (34%) of those identifying as right see it that way. Nonetheless, even in the right and center-right groups, half or more (48% and 57%, respectively) believe that Israel's greatest danger is social polarization and division.

Different leaders have presented each of the following three challenges as the “greatest danger” to Israel. Which do you think is the most dangerous? (%)




	Israeli–Palestinian conflict	Polarization and division in Israeli society	Iranian nuclear threat	None of these / Don't know
All Israelis	18	55	23	4
Jews	16	59	21	4
Arabs	27	39	28	7
Left	21	76	3	0
Center-left	17	73	4	5
Center	15	73	8	3
Center-right	16	57	26	1
Right	15	48	34	3

In a final question on “threats” to Israel, we asked respondents to rate eight countries according to the level of threat they pose to Israel. Among all Israelis, Iran is ranked as the greatest threat of all the countries listed, followed by Turkey and Lebanon. Qatar and Syria are perceived as the next tier of threats, while Yemen, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia are ranked as lower-level threats relative to the others on the list. Among Arab respondents, Iran is likewise ranked first; Yemen, however, is perceived as much more significant (second place), while Turkey and Qatar are ranked as lesser threats (fifth and seventh place, respectively).

Thinking about the countries on the following list, which do you see as posing a greater threat and which as posing a lesser threat to Israel? (1 = lowest , 8 = greatest threat) (%)




● All Israelis ● Jews ● Arabs



Trust in Leadership and the IDF High Command

NETANYAHU TRIAL



TRUST IN NETANYAHU



TRUST IN THE IDF COMMAND



Among Arabs: Significant increase in trust (58% vs. 38% in October).

At the beginning of the month, Prime Minister Netanyahu formally requested a presidential pardon from President Herzog. His main justification for the request was "an attempt to bring about reconciliation among the sectors of the people." The request was submitted without any admission of guilt for the offenses with which the prime minister is charged. The pardon request was also submitted against the backdrop of a public appeal by President Trump to Herzog, both orally and in writing, stating that "the time has come to pardon Bibi so that he can unite Israel."

Public attitudes toward a pardon for Netanyahu were examined by repeating the identical question we asked before the pardon request. Comparing the pre- and post-request answers shows that public attitudes have hardly changed. Most Israelis believe that a way should be found to bring Netanyahu's trial to a rapid end – 37% believe that this should be done while allowing him to return to normal functioning as prime minister, and 36% believe that this should be done in exchange for his retirement from political life. A fifth (22%) of Israelis think that an early end to the trial should not be allowed and that it should proceed as usual. Among Jewish Israelis, a higher share (44%) think the trial should end rapidly and that Netanyahu should be allowed to return to normal functioning as prime minister.

As noted, the answers remain almost identical to those given this past July, though there has been a small shift in Arab attitudes. Among Arab Israelis, 43% believe that there should be no attempt to end the trial rapidly, and only one in eight (12%) favors attenuating the trial without political sanction. This reflects an increase in opposition to intervention in the judicial process (from 35% in July to 43% now), alongside a decline in support for finding a quick solution to the trial (from 18% to 12%).

In your opinion, should a way be found to rapidly end Netanyahu's trial? (%)



	Yes – and allow him to return to normal functioning	Yes – in exchange for retirement from political life	No – the trial should continue	Don't know
All Israelis – December	37	36	22	5
All Israelis – July	39	35	20	6
Jews – December	44	36	16	4
Jews – July	44	36	16	4
Arabs – December	12	36	43	10
Arabs – July	18	34	35	13

As expected, on the question of ending the trial, there are substantial gaps between ideological camps. Among those identifying as center-right, 43% support a rapid conclusion that would allow Netanyahu to return to normal functioning as prime minister, while a similar share (39%) prefer a rapid conclusion in exchange for his retirement. On the right, where most are also coalition supporters, the picture is clear: 77% want the trial to end and think Netanyahu should be permitted to return to full political functioning. Eleven percent of right-wing respondents believe the trial should continue, and another 8% think it should be attenuated in exchange for Netanyahu's retirement from political life. In the center, a majority of 55% favor shortening the trial in exchange for Netanyahu's retirement from political life, 24% think the trial should continue, and another 17% support shortening it without political sanctions. In the center-left, support for exchanging an end to the trial for Netanyahu's retirement is especially high at 80%. Half of those identifying as left

In your opinion, should a way be found to rapidly end Netanyahu's trial? (by ideology) (%)




	Yes – and allow return to normal functioning	Yes – in exchange for retirement from political life	No – the trial should continue	Don't know
Left	0	52	48	0
Center-left	5	80	15	0
Center	17	55	24	3
Center-right	43	39	14	4
Right	77	8	11	4

(52%) support a rapid arrangement that would include retirement from political life, while 48% prefer the trial to continue as normal. No respondents in the left-wing cohort support a rapid end to the trial that would allow Netanyahu to return to normal

functioning as prime minister.


Trust in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu? (%)



A majority of Israelis (56%) report that they do not trust (don't trust at all + don't trust somewhat) Prime Minister Netanyahu, while 42% do trust him (very much + somewhat). Among Arab Israelis, the lack of trust is even greater: three-quarters (74%)

do not trust Netanyahu, and only a fifth (22%) trust him to any degree. However, compared with previous months, this month saw an increase in the share of Israelis who "trust the prime minister very much." In fact, this month recorded the highest share of respondents reporting this level of trust since January 2024.

Trust in the IDF Senior Command (Jewish Israelis, %)



Trust levels in the senior IDF command are high, certainly in comparison with trust in the prime minister. Sixty-eight percent of the public express trust in the army's commanders (17% "trust very much" and 51% "trust somewhat"), with the share among Jewish Israelis even higher at 70%. Among Arab Israelis, there is also a


majority (58%) who trust the IDF high command. Relative to October, there has been a significant increase in the share of Arabs who say they trust the IDF (58% versus 38%), and a decline in the share whose trust is low (38% versus 53% in October).

US-Israel Relations

Trust that President Trump Will Act Appropriately regarding US-Israel Relations




Among Jews (70% trust)



There was a slight slip in public trust of Trump over the past month. Last month's survey was conducted very close to the hostage release deal, which may account for the decrease.

Lack of trust (Ideological gaps)



The further one moves from right to left, the level of trust in Trump decreases consistently and significantly.

Although there are reports about disagreements between Israel and the United States regarding the next steps in the Gaza arena, most Israelis (67%) continue to express trust that the US president will "do the right thing" regarding US-Israel relations, but that trust is generally qualified. They tend to choose "some trust" rather than "a great deal of trust." A little more than a quarter (28%) say that they place no trust in the president.

How much trust do you have that Donald Trump will do “the right thing” regarding US-Israel relations? (all Israelis, %)



2025	A great deal of trust	Some trust	No trust	Don't know
January	32	40	21	7
February	20	56	17	7
March	28	40	25	8
June	12	46	38	5
July	19	45	30	6
November	22	52	20	6
December	18	49	28	5

Among Jewish Israelis, trust levels are slightly higher: 70% express some degree of trust (18% a great deal and 52% some), and a quarter (27%) lack trust. Among Arab Israelis, too, a majority express some trust in Trump (55%), but this majority is smaller than among Jews. Compared with last month, there has been a slight decline in Israelis’

trust in Trump. It is possible that the higher level of trust last month stemmed from the immediate impact of the hostage-release deal signed around the time of the survey, which boosted the sense of US support. Now, trust has reverted to levels similar to those recorded before the agreement’s signing.

How much trust do you have that Donald Trump will do “the right thing” regarding US-Israel relations? (all Israelis, %)



December 2025	A great deal of trust	Some trust	No trust	Don't know
Left	3	15	76	6
Center-left	1	47	46	6
Center	8	49	39	4
Center-right	21	55	21	3
Right	32	57	10	1

The further one moves along the ideological spectrum from right to left, the lower the share of respondents who trust Trump to do the right thing regarding US-Israel relations. Among those identifying with the Israeli left, there is a consensus (76%) that

Trump cannot be trusted to act appropriately in this context. Among those identifying with the center-left, almost half (46%) report that they do not trust the president. A majority of those in the center express some level of trust (8% a great deal and 49% some), though 39% do not trust him. In the center-right, 76% express some degree of trust, and in the right, 89% say they trust him (57% some trust and 32% a great deal).

This survey also found a slight increase, relative to a few months ago, in the share of Israelis who think that Israel must make a “major effort, including compromises” to preserve its alliance with the United States.

In March 2025, 35% of Israelis held this view; over the past nine months, the figure grew to 39%. There has been no change in the share who believe that Israel does not always need to adopt US positions, and that in cases of disagreement, Israel should do “what it sees as right.” Half of Israelis take this view. Six percent of Israelis believe that the United States is still an ally but that its importance is diminishing, and an even smaller share believes that the US has done Israel more harm than good in recent years. Most coalition voters (in the 2022 elections) believe that the US is an important ally, but that in cases of disagreement, Israel should do what it believes is right.

Of the following options, which is closest to your position? (%)



	The US is an important ally, and we must make a great effort to maintain the alliance, including concessions that do not endanger Israel's security	The US is an important ally, but that does not mean we have to accept its positions. When we agree – great, when we disagree – Israel should do what it sees fit	The US is an ally, but its importance is decreasing, Israel should not behave as if its existence depends on friendship with the US	The US was an important ally, but in recent years it has caused Israel more harm than good, and we should carefully consider how much coordination and dialogue with the US really strengthens Israel	Don't know
All Israelis – March '25	35	50	8	6	1
All Israelis – Dec. '25	39	49	6	4	3
Jews – Nov. '24	42	45	6	4	3
Jews – March '25	36	54	6	2	1
Jews – Dec. '25	39	55	5	1	1
Arabs – Nov. '24	46	16	12	8	18
Arabs – March '25	32	31	19	19	/
Arabs – Dec. '25	38	25	13	15	9

Rising Antisemitism

What is the main source of antisemitism in the US?



Jews in Israel



55% Concerned about both political sides equally

34% Concerned mainly about the left

5% Concerned mainly about the right

Jews in US



62% Concerned about both political sides equally

20% Concerned mainly about the left

17% Concerned mainly about the right

In the past two years, there has been an increase in antisemitism worldwide. This trend has been reflected, among other things, in a rise in violent incidents, vandalism against Jewish institutions, and the spread of antisemitic rhetoric on social media. The issue of antisemitism has recently returned to the headlines following the election of Zohran Mamdani as mayor of New York City and antisemitic statements by prominent figures on the American conservative right.

This month, we asked Israelis about the source of antisemitism in the US, and more specifically, which “side” of the political map is more concerning. Half (50%) of Israelis are concerned about both political sides to a similar extent, while 29% see the left as the main source of concern, and only 8% see the right as such. A majority of Jewish Israelis (55%) are concerned about both sides, and a third (34%) see the left as the main threat. These findings among Israelis differ substantially from those among the American Jews who responded last month to the JPPI – Voice of the Jewish People Index. Among the US Jews surveyed, 62% see antisemitism as emanating from both political camps. Moreover, unlike Israeli Jews, American Jews show similar shares who are concerned about the right (17%) and the left (20%).

Among the Israeli left and center, a majority of Jews see both sides as a similar source of concern – 67% of the left, 73% of the center-left, and 67% of the center. By contrast, 50% of right-wing Jewish Israelis and 39% on the center-right identify the American left as the main locus of antisemitism.

When you think about antisemitism in the US, your concern is ... (mark the answer closest to your view) (%)




	Mainly on the left	Mainly on the right	From both sides equally	I am not concerned about antisemitism	Don't know
All Israelis	29	8	50	7	7
Israeli Jews	34	5	55	3	4
US Jews	20	17	62	1	0
Israeli Arabs	9	21	30	22	17
Left	6	15	67	9	3
Center-left	15	4	73	4	3
Center	23	2	67	2	6
Center-right	39	3	54	1	2
Right	50	5	41	1	3

Israel's International Standing

Israel's Standing in the World – Key Findings



Israel's standing in the world is bad (by ideology)



52% of Israelis believe that Israel's standing in the world is bad.

25% think Israel's standing in the world is mediocre.

21% think Israel's standing in the world is good.

Since the outbreak of the war in Gaza, Israel's international standing has undergone a seismic shift. In the early stages of the fighting, Israel enjoyed broad international support, mainly from the US and Western countries, which emphasized its right to self-defense. As the war dragged on, the rising number of casualties in Gaza and growing fears of a humanitarian crisis led to criticism, demonstrations, and

even boycotts of Israel. Relations with some European allies became more complex, and diplomatic confrontations intensified. This month, the question of Israel's participation in the 2026 Eurovision Song Contest was the subject of controversy. After a majority vote in favor of Israel's participation in the event next May, four countries decided to withdraw from the competition.

Half of Israelis (52%) believe that Israel's standing in the world is bad (very bad + somewhat bad). Jews and Arabs agree on this. Relative to a year ago, there has been an increase in the share of Jews who say that Israel's situation is very bad, and in the share of Arabs who think that it is "somewhat bad." A quarter of Israelis (25%) think that Israel's international situation is fair, and a fifth (21%) believe that its status in the international community is good (very good + somewhat good).

When you think about Israel's standing in the world, its relations with other countries, and its general position in the international community, would you say that Israel's situation is... (%)



	Very good	Somewhat good	Fair	Somewhat bad	Very bad	Don't know
All Israelis – Dec. '25	5	16	25	30	22	1
All Israelis – Nov. '24	5	17	25	30	20	3
Jews – Dec. '25	6	17	25	30	21	0
Jews – Nov. '24	5	18	24	33	18	2
Arabs – Dec. '25	4	10	27	30	26	3
Arabs – Nov. '24	4	13	31	18	28	6


Perceptions of Israel's international standing are strongly shaped by ideological orientation. The further one moves along the ideological spectrum from right to left, the higher the share of respondents who believe that Israel's situation in the world is bad. With the exception of the right-wing cohort, majorities in all ideological groups believe that Israel's international situation is bad. Ninety-seven percent of those on the left, 83% of the center-left, 76% of the center, and half (50%) of the center-right say that Israel's international standing is bad. None of the ideological cohorts comprises a majority that believes Israel's international situation is good.

When you think about Israel's standing in the world... would you say that Israel's situation is... (by ideology, %)



	Very good	Somewhat good	Fair	Somewhat bad	Very bad	Don't know
Left	0	0	3	33	64	0
Center-left	1	2	14	42	41	0
Center	3	4	17	42	34	0
Center-right	3	17	31	34	16	0
Right	9	35	32	19	4	1

Zionism and Racism



Last month marked 50 years since the 1975 UN resolution declaring that “Zionism is Racism” (Resolution 3379). The resolution sparked broad public debate and drew harsh criticism of the UN, even damaging the organization’s image. Sixteen years later, in 1991, the General Assembly adopted a counter-resolution (4686) rescinding the comparison. However, the claim that Zionism is a racist movement remains common in global public discourse and is used as a rhetorical tool against Israel and its policies.

Among all Israelis, 44% believe that Zionism contains no racist components whatsoever, and a third (30%) think that Zionism itself is not racist “but there are those who interpret it that way.” One in eight (12%) thinks Zionism is not racism but does contain racist elements, and a tenth believe that Zionism is racism. Among Jews, in Israel and the US, positions are more clear-cut: more than half of Jews in both groups believe that there is no racist component in Zionism, and only a small percentage define it as racism.

Overall, “connected” American Jews (the population surveyed monthly in the JPPI – Voice of the Jewish People Index) view Zionism similarly to Jews in Israel, with minor differences: a slightly higher share of American Jews believe that Zionism contains no racist component at all, and a slightly higher share of Israeli Jews believe that some interpret it in a racist way. Among Arab Israelis, the picture is markedly different: 42% see Zionism as racist, and a quarter (26%) think Zionism contains racist elements. In all, 68% of Arab Israelis ascribe racist elements to Zionism. Only a small minority (7%) of Arab Israelis think that Zionism has no racist components at all, highlighting the deep gap between population groups in their attitude toward

Zionism (among Arabs, the Druze minority stands out as somewhat less inclined to associate Zionism with racism, though even among Druze respondents, a 53% majority see racist components in Zionism).

A breakdown by ideological orientation sharpens these distinctions: the right presents a uniform view – 79% deny any connection between Zionism and racism. Among the center and center-right cohorts, the dominant group likewise believes that Zionism has no racist component (41% and 56%, respectively). In the center-left cohort, a majority believes that Zionism is not racism but that some interpret it as such. On the left, a narrow majority defines Zionism as a movement that has racist elements.

Last month marked 50 years since the UN “Zionism is Racism” resolution. In your opinion.... (%)



	Zionism is racism	Zionism is not racism, but it has racist elements	Zionism is not racism, but some interpret it in a racist way	There is no racist component at all in Zionism	Don't know
All Israelis	9	12	30	44	5
Jews in Israel	1	8	34	53	3
Jews in the US	4	8	28	59	2
Arabs	42	26	14	7	12
Left	3	48	42	6	0
Center-left	2	20	61	15	1
Center	3	11	42	41	3
Center-right	1	4	38	56	1
Right	0	1	16	79	4

Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism

55%

of all Israelis view anti-Zionism as Antisemitism

65%

of Jewish Israelis see close link between anti-Zionism and antisemitism

42%

of Arab Israelis View Zionism and antisemitism as two separate phenomena

Identify as Zionists

All Israelis

68%

Jews

85%

Arabs

4%

This month we also examined the relationship that respondents discern between anti-Zionism and antisemitism. A majority of Israelis (55%) see anti-Zionism as a phenomenon that is usually linked to antisemitism – a quarter (23%) say that

“anti-Zionism is antisemitism,” and a third (32%) think that anti-Zionism is “usually antisemitism.” Among Jews in Israel, the connection is perceived as strong: 27% see anti-Zionism as antisemitism, and another 38% believe that it is “usually” antisemitism. Among Arabs, the picture is reversed: 42% say that anti-Zionism and antisemitism are “two different phenomena,” and only a small minority sees a link between them. Data from the Voice of the Jewish People survey among US Jews, conducted last month, indicate a gap between US Jews and Israeli Jews on this question. Almost half of US Jews surveyed (47%) see anti-Zionism as antisemitism, a far higher share than among Jews in Israel (27%).

In your opinion... (%)					
	Anti-Zionism is antisemitism	Anti-Zionism is usually antisemitism	Anti-Zionism is sometimes antisemitism	Anti-Zionism and antisemitism are two separate phenomena	Don't know
All Israelis	23	32	16	20	9
Israeli Jews	27	38	16	14	5
US Jews	47	25	17	11	1
Israeli Arabs	8	9	14	42	27
Left	0	12	42	45	0
Center-left	8	33	34	21	4
Center	23	38	16	17	6
Center-right	25	46	17	9	3
Right	43	37	7	9	3

By ideological breakdown, US Jews’ responses resemble those found on the Israeli right: 43% of those on the right in Israel believe that anti-Zionism is antisemitism, 37% think that anti-Zionism is usually antisemitic, and a tenth believe that anti-Zionism and antisemitism are two separate phenomena. On the left, almost no one sees anti-Zionism as antisemitism, and a large majority (87%) believe that it is an entirely separate phenomenon, or at most one that sometimes has a connection to antisemitism. Those in the center-left and center cohorts tend to see a relatively weak link between the two phenomena. The further one moves to the right, the stronger the perceived connection: in the center-right cohort, 71% see anti-Zionism as antisemitism or “usually” antisemitic; in the right-wing cohort, the share rises to 80%. A similar pattern – of conflating anti-Zionism with antisemitism the further one moves from strong liberal to strong conservative – was found among US Jews: while a quarter (24%) of strong liberal respondents saw it that way, three-quarters (77%) of the “very conservative” did.

Following the questions on the nature of Zionism, we examined whether Israelis self-identify as Zionists. To this end, we presented a scale with various degrees of identification: Zionist, non-Zionist, post-Zionist, and anti-Zionist. Seven in ten Israelis (68%) define themselves as Zionists; a tenth (9%) define themselves as non-Zionists; and a sixth (16%) did not know how to answer. Naturally, there are large gaps in answers between Jewish and Arab respondents. Among Jews, the share of Zionists is about 85%, whereas it is only 4% among Arabs. Two in five (39%) Arab Israelis self-identify as “non-Zionists,” a sixth (15%) define themselves as “anti-Zionists,” and a sizable share (39%) refrained from choosing any of the categories. Among Jewish Israelis, by contrast, the shares self-identifying as non-Zionist, anti-Zionist or post-Zionist are negligible.

We also examined this question among US Jews in last month’s JPPI – Voice of the Jewish People Index. The question was identical, but the answer options differed slightly: Zionist, non-Zionist but supportive of Zionism, neither supportive nor opposed to Zionism, post-Zionist, anti-Zionist. Seventy percent of the US Jews surveyed defined themselves as Zionists, an eighth (12%) as non-Zionists who support Zionism, 7% as neither supportive nor opposed to Zionism, 5% as post-Zionists, 3% as anti-Zionists, and 4% did not know how to answer. That is, the share of Jews in Israel who define themselves as Zionists is higher than the share of “connected” US Jews who do so.

Do you Identify as... (%)					
	Zionist	Non-Zionist	Post-Zionist	Anti-Zionist	None of these
All Israelis	68	9	2	4	16
Jews	85	2	2	1	11
Arabs	4	39	3	15	39

Haredi Conscription



MK Boaz Bismuth's Haredi Draft Bill

60%

Oppose the Bill

54%: The law will not lead to significant Haredi Conscription
6%: The law exert unfair pressure on Haredim

25%

Support the Proposal as a Practical Compromise

13%

Don't Know

Support for the law – (only on the right). Almost total opposition on the Center-Left and Center

Right	Center-Right	Center	Left + Center-Left
32% Opposition	63% Opposition	78% Opposition	100% Opposition

Most Israelis (60%) oppose MK Boaz Bismuth's proposed law to regulate Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) draft/exemption arrangements – 54% because it “will not lead to significant Haredi enlistment,” and 6% because it “places unfair pressure on the Haredim.” Relative to last month, there has been an increase in the share who oppose the law on the grounds that it will not produce meaningful Haredi recruitment. At the same time, support for it as a practical compromise remains stable, with a quarter of the public (25%) backing the Bismuth proposal. The share of those who do not know has fallen from a fifth (20%) to an eighth (13%), indicating a consolidation of attitudes in light of the public debate over the past month. Among Jews, opposition to the law is stronger than among Arabs: 59% think that the law will not lead to genuine recruitment, up from 53% last month (November). Among Arabs, the share of opponents on grounds of ineffectiveness has also risen (from 27% to 31%), but support for the compromise has also increased (from 18% to 27%), while the share of those without an opinion declined.

The further right respondents are politically, the higher their support for Bismuth's outline. Among Likud voters in the 2022 elections, half (48%) support the law and see it as a reasonable compromise, a quarter (28%) oppose it because it will not lead to significant Haredi recruitment, and 7% support it because it will preserve the coalition. In the broad right-wing camp, whose members make up the bulk of coalition supporters, a third (32%) oppose the law because they think it will be ineffective, while 44% support it as a practical compromise, and 6% see it as a way to preserve the coalition. On the center-right, where

some support the coalition, opposition to the law predominates: a majority (63%) oppose it because they don't believe it will lead to substantial recruitment, while a fifth (20%) support it as a compromise, and an insignificant share support it for reasons of coalition stability. In the left, center-left, and center cohorts, there is near-unanimous opposition to the Bismuth proposal. One hundred percent of those on the left and 98% of those in the center-left believe that the law will not lead to significant recruitment; there is no support for the bill in these camps. Among centrists, a large majority oppose the bill on the same grounds (78%), while a relatively small proportion (11%) see it as a reasonable compromise.


Do you support or oppose MK Boaz Bismuth's proposed draft law? (%)

	Oppose – because it will not lead to significant Haredi enlistment	Oppose – because it places unfair pressure on the Haredim	Support – because it is a reasonable compromise that will lead to enlistment of those who can serve	Support – because it will preserve the coalition and that is more important	Don't know
All Israelis – December	54	6	25	3	13
All Israelis – November	48	6	24	2	20
Jews – December	59	4	25	3	10
Jews – November	53	4	25	2	16
Arabs – December	31	14	27	4	24
Arabs – November	27	15	18	3	37

Do you support or oppose MK Boaz Bismuth's proposed draft law? (by ideological orientation, %)

	Oppose – ineffective	Oppose – unfair pressure on Haredim	Support – reasonable compromise	Support – coalition preservation	Don't know
Left	100	0	0	0	0
Center-left	98	0	2	0	0
Center	78	1	11	0	10
Center-right	63	1	20	3	13
Right	32	5	44	6	13

Commission of Inquiry



Public opinion on establishing a State Commission of Inquiry to examine the failures that led to the October 7 attack has been divided, as shown in previous surveys. This month, we presented several options concerning **who should appoint the members** of such a commission.

Of the options presented – all of which have been raised by various actors – the two with the greatest support are appointment jointly by Supreme Court Chief Justice Hayut's successor, Justice Amit, and Justice Solberg (27%), and a model in which members are appointed by a balanced political division – half by the coalition and half by the opposition (28%). A fifth (21%) of Israelis support a commission assembled by Chief Justice Amit. Only a small minority supports a government-appointed commission (7%), or one appointed by the Knesset (8%). Among Jewish Israelis, support for the balanced coalition-opposition model is stronger (34%). Among Arabs, a third (32%) prefer that the commission be appointed by Chief Justice Amit, a fifth support joint appointment by Amit and Solberg, a tenth (10%) prefer appointment by the government, and another tenth (10%) by the Knesset. A relatively high share (17%) of Arab respondents did not answer this question.

A breakdown by ideological orientation reveals substantial gaps: on the left and center-left there is an almost complete preference for appointment by the Supreme Court: over 90% in both groups favor a commission appointed either by Amit alone or jointly by Amit and Solberg. Among centrists, there is also a clear preference for appointment by the Supreme Court (75%), but there is also some support for mechanisms that ensure political balance. In the center-right and right, the strongest support is for the coalition-opposition model – 37% in the center-right and 55% on the right favor this option. The right, which is the largest ideological group, is also the only group where there is some support for appointment by the government or the Knesset (12% and 15%, respectively). In other words, the right prefers that elected officials serve as the appointing authority, without Supreme Court involvement.

Of the following options, who would you like to appoint the members of the commission of inquiry? (%)



	Supreme Court Chief Justice Amit	Justices Amit and Solberg	The Government	The Knesset	Half by the coalition, half by the opposition	No commission is needed	Don't know
All Israelis	21	27	7	8	28	3	5
Jews	18	29	6	8	34	3	3
Arabs	32	20	10	10	6	4	17
Left	48	45	0	0	6	0	0
Center-left	42	50	0	1	6	0	1
Center	31	44	1	2	16	2	3
Center-right	14	32	7	7	37	1	2
Right	2	8	12	15	55	5	2

Violence in Arab Society

Main Reason for Arab Community Violence



33%

**A cultural
issue**

31%

**Discrimination
and prolonged
neglect**

21%

**The police
are not doing
their job**

Arab Israelis only

50%

Discrimination and prolonged neglect

31%

The police are to blame

Violence in Arab society remained very high this year. A third of Israelis (33%) believe that the main reason for this phenomenon is a “cultural issue” within Arab society, while another third (31%) see it as the result of many years of “neglect and discrimination” against

the Arab sector. A fifth (21%) believe that the police do not do their job properly, and a sixth (15%) think that the Arab public does not allow the Israeli government to eradicate the violence. These options were presented and examined by JPPI (in a slightly different way) three years ago.

Among Jewish Israelis, 39% attribute violence in the Arab sector to a “cultural issue,” while a quarter

(26%) see it as the result of prolonged discrimination. A fifth (18%) of Jewish Israelis blame the police for not doing their job properly, and another fifth (17%) believe that the Arab public itself does not allow the government to act. Among Arab Israelis, the picture is reversed: half (50%) see the violence as a direct result of years of neglect and discrimination, and a third (31%) blame the police – that is, 81% of the Arab public see state institutions as the main source of the problem. One in eight (12%) Arab respondents point to cultural factors, and fewer than a tenth (7%) blame the Arab public itself.

In winter 2022, we asked an identical question. Respondents were asked to rank the same four options, indicating which is the primary, secondary, and tertiary cause, etc. The distribution among Jewish Israelis that year was as follows: 37% thought that violence was a “cultural issue” in Arab society; 35% that it was the result of years of neglect and discrimination; 15% that the police were not doing their job properly; and 14% that the Arab public did not allow the government to eradicate the phenomenon. Arab responses in 2022 were as follows: 40% saw violence as the result of prolonged discrimination; 37% thought the police were not doing their job properly; 14% thought it was a “cultural issue”; and a tenth (9%) thought the Arab public did not allow the government to eradicate the violence. That is, as in the past, Jews tend to assume – perhaps even somewhat more than in the past – that responsibility for violence in the Arab sector stems largely from social dynamics within Arab society, while Arabs assume that the blame lies with the Israeli authorities, which fail to pursue an adequate policy.

In the past year, there has been much talk about rising violence in Israel, most prominently in the Arab sector. Of the options listed below, what do you think is the main reason for the violence in the Arab sector? (%)

	Result of many years of neglect and discrimination against the Arab sector	The police are not doing their job properly	The Arab public does not allow the government to eradicate the violence	A cultural issue within the Arab sector
All Israelis	31	21	15	33
Jews	26	18	17	39
(Arabs (total	50	31	7	12
Muslims	51	33	6	11
Christians	61	30	4	4
Druze	33	24	19	24

Separation between Sectors

Jews and Arabs – where together and where apart? (%)



SHARED HOSPITAL ROOMS

67% Jews in favor


76% Arabs in favor

SHARED SWIMMING POOLS

65% Jews in favor

71% Arabs in favor

SHARED RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORHOODS



In recent years, the question of separation between sectors in public spaces has arisen repeatedly. Similar to the previous question, this issue was examined in a previous JPPI survey, and we revisited it this month to assess agreement and disagreement regarding the co-presence of Jews and Arabs in public spaces. The comparison is between a 2022 JPPI survey and the present survey. Some shifts are evident in the shares choosing various answers, but overall support for shared public spaces – apart from residential neighborhoods – remains high.

In healthcare settings, such as hospital wards and HMOs (health-fund clinics), support for shared spaces remains high, but there has been some degree of change relative to three years ago. Among Jewish Israelis, there has been a decline in support for shared hospital wards (from 81% to 67%), while among Arab Israelis, support has actually risen slightly (from 74% to 76%). With respect to HMOs, support has remained stable: 85% of Jews and 84% of Arabs support non-segregated spaces. Thus, even after these changes, healthcare settings continue to be perceived by most of the public as places where integration is desirable and acceptable.

In leisure spaces, such as swimming pools and beaches, attitudes are similar to those in 2022. About 65% of Jewish Israelis and 71% of Arab Israelis support shared swimming pools; the figures are similar for beaches (75% and 80%, respectively). The share preferring separation in these domains remains relatively low, and the number of undecided respondents has declined.

The most striking gap concerns residential neighborhoods. Among Jews, a third (33%) support mixed neighborhoods, while Arab support for mixed neighborhoods has risen from 59% to 70% over the past three years. In this same period, the share of Arabs favoring separation in residential neighborhoods has dropped from 21% to 12%. Among Jews, by contrast, there has been no change: a third (33%) support mixed neighborhoods, a third (31%) prefer separate neighborhoods, and a third (34%) prefer “sometimes separate and sometimes mixed.”

Jews and Arabs – where together and where apart? (%)

		Shared space, no separation		Sometimes separate and sometimes shared		Separate spaces		Don't know	
		Jews	Arabs	Jews	Arabs	Jews	Arabs	Jews	Arabs
Hospital wards	2022	81	74	10	12	9	6	0	8
	2025	67	76	19	11	12	9	2	4
Swimming pools	2022	63	67	21	12	15	14	1	8
	2025	65	71	18	14	15	11	2	3
HMOs (health-fund clinics)	2022	88	82	6	6	5	6	1	7
	2025	85	84	7	9	6	5	1	3
Beaches	2022	75	75	13	9	12	9	1	7
	2025	75	80	11	9	13	8	2	3
Urban neighborhoods	2022	32	59	35	14	31	21	2	9
	2025	33	70	34	14	31	12	2	3

Survey Data and Methodology

Data for JPPI's December 2025 Israeli Society Index was collected between December 1 and 4, 2025. Data collection was conducted via the “theMadad” website panel (634 Jewish respondents in an online survey) and Afkar Research (200 Arab respondents, roughly half online and half by telephone). The data was analyzed and weighted by voting pattern and religiosity to represent the views of the adult population in Israel. The JPPI Israeli Society Index is compiled by Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepko with research, production, and writing assistance by Yael Levinovsky. Prof. David Steinberg serves as statistical consultant.