


Flash Survey among Connected U.S. Jews: The War with Iran

- » Most respondents support going to war against Iran.
- » Preferred objectives: Dismantling Iran's nuclear program, its ballistic missile capabilities, and its terrorism infrastructure.
- » Majority assessment: Trump pursued war and required little persuasion from Netanyahu.
- » Half of respondents expect the war to harm Israel's image and increase antisemitism.


A majority of connected U.S. Jews (68%) support the U.S. decision to go to war against Iran, versus 26% who oppose it. Support rises with ideological conservatism: strong liberal respondents mostly oppose (62% vs. 28% support), leaning liberals tilt toward support (57%), and support is overwhelming among centrists (88%), leaning conservatives (98%), and strong conservatives (100%). By vote choice in the 2024 presidential election, Trump voters are nearly unanimous (99%), while Harris voters are divided (47% support, 42% oppose).



Overall, do you support or oppose the U.S. decision to go to war against Iran? (%)

	Support	Oppose	Don't know
U.S. Jews	68	26	7
Strong liberal	28	62	10
Leaning liberal	57	28	15
Center	88	9	4
Leaning conservative	98	1	1
Strong conservative	100	0	0


Most respondents (58%) favor a comprehensive goal: dismantling Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and its support for terrorism. A quarter (27%) favor regime change in Tehran, and only 3% support confining focus to Iran’s nuclear program. Support for regime change increases as one moves rightward along the ideological spectrum (19% among strong liberals, 41% among strong conservatives), but the comprehensive security goal is the modal choice in every ideological group.



Now that there is a war, what should its primary objective be? (%)

	Regime change in Tehran	Eliminate nuclear program	Eliminate nuclear program, ballistic missile capabilities, and support of terror	None of the above	Don't know
U.S. Jews	27	3	58	7	5
Strong liberal	19	5	43	21	13
Leaning liberal	22	7	64	4	3
Center	30	1	68	0	2
Leaning conservative	31	2	66	0	1
Strong conservative	41	0	58	0	1


Most respondents (72%) believe President Trump intended to go to war from the outset and needed very little persuasion, whereas 14% think Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu persuaded him to do so. As worldviews become more conservative, more respondents attribute the initiative to Trump (54% among strong liberals, 85% among strong conservatives), and fewer attribute it to Netanyahu (25% among strong liberals, 3% among leaning conservatives). Across groups, the dominant view is that Trump pursued the move, with liberals more inclined than others to credit Netanyahu with having pushed it.



Considering the following two viewpoints – both appeared in different reports in recent days – which is closer to your view? (%)

	Netanyahu persuaded Trump to go to war	Trump intended to go to war and needed very little persuasion	Don't know
U.S. Jews	14	72	14
Strong liberal	25	54	21
Leaning liberal	13	74	13
Center	10	78	11
Leaning conservative	3	83	14
Strong conservative	8	85	6


The data also suggests that many U.S. Jews expect the war to further harm Israel's image in the United States: about half (45%) say its image will be harmed, compared with a third (32%) who expect no change and one in ten (10%) who think it will improve. By ideology, large majorities of the strong liberal and leaning liberal cohorts expect Israel's image to be harmed (72% and 64%, respectively), and only a very small minority expect improvement. Moving toward the centrist and the conservative ideological camps, expectations of damage decrease, while expectations of no change or even improvement increase: among centrists, the prevailing view is that there will be no change (48%); among the leaning conservative and strong conservative cohorts, the share expecting improvement rises (17% and 29%, respectively) and the share expecting harm markedly declines. In short, liberals anticipate damage to Israel's image in the United States, whereas conservatives mainly expect stability or even improvement.



In your view, the war will... (%)

	improve Israel's image in the U.S.	not change Israel's image in the U.S.	harm Israel's image in the U.S.	Don't know
U.S. Jews	10	32	45	13
Strong liberal	3	14	72	11
Leaning liberal	3	24	64	9
Center	10	48	30	12
Leaning conservative	17	44	22	17
Strong conservative	29	42	9	19

About half (52%) of the U.S. Jews surveyed believe the war is likely to increase antisemitism in the United States, compared with a third (33%) who expect no change, and a small minority (4%) who think antisemitism will decline. This pattern appears across most denominational streams, though with different intensities. Majorities of Reform and Conservative respondents expect an increase (52% and 54%, respectively), whereas among Modern Orthodox and Haredi respondents, expectations are more tempered (45% and 38%, respectively). In every cohort, only a small minority expects a decline in antisemitism. Overall, there is broad concern that the war will increase antisemitism, while more religious groups are somewhat more likely to anticipate stability.



In your view, the war will... (%)

	increase antisemitism in the U.S.	not change antisemitism in the U.S.	reduce antisemitism in the U.S.	Don't know
U.S. Jews	52	33	4	11
Reform	52	34	1	13
Conservative	54	33	6	7
Modern Orthodox	45	36	5	14
Haredi	38	38	6	19
Other	55	30	3	12
No denom.	49	33	3	14

This report is based on a survey of 692 Jews registered for the JPPI – Voice of the Jewish People Index respondent panel. In general, the survey tends to reflect the views of “connected” American Jews – those with relatively strong ties to the Jewish community, and/or Israel, and/or Jewish identity. The JPPI Jewish People’s Voice Index survey was conducted by Institute fellows Shmuel Rosner, Noah Slepko, and Yael Levinovsky. Prof. David Steinberg served as statistical consultant.

This table includes data on the survey participants:



January 2026 Survey: Participant Data		
	%	#
Reform	23	157
Conservative	31	217
Modern Orthodox	13	92
Ultra-Orthodox	2	16
Other	17	119
No stream	13	91
Strong liberal	28	192
Leaning liberal	21	143
Centrist	23	162
Leaning conservative	14	100
Strong conservative	14	95
Single / divorced / widowed	25	176
Married/in long-term relationship with a Jewish spouse	59	406
Married/in long-term relationship with a non-Jewish spouse	16	110
Affiliated	86	598
Non-affiliated	14	94
Never visited Israel	19	130
Visited Israel once	15	102
Visited Israel more than once	46	320
Lived in Israel	20	140
Jewish by religion	92	640
Jew by no religion (JBNR)	3	20
Partially Jewish	3	18
No religion	2	14