

Voice of the Jewish People Index

Connected U.S. Jews on the War with Iran, Confidence in World Leaders, and Relations with the Palestinians


Main Findings

- Within two weeks, a slight decline in support for the war against Iran.
- Rising concern that the war will damage Israel's image in the United States and increase antisemitism.
- A worsening sense of threat to Israel's image compared with the first week of the war.
- Half of the Jews surveyed say the war's success depends on regime change in Iran.
- Trump and Netanyahu are rated more favorably on Iran than their overall leadership.
- Netanyahu's leadership regarding Iran is rated more positively than Trump's.
- Most of the Jews surveyed believe that Israeli-Palestinian peace is not possible in the foreseeable future.
- Even so, most think there is no substitute for a peace arrangement with the Palestinians.
- A majority believes the settlements are a burden on the IDF and harm Israel's security.
- Unlike Jews in Israel, most think the State of Israel is Jewish "to the right extent."
- Most respondents expect to host or attend a traditional Passover seder.
- Artificial intelligence: enthusiasm and curiosity among Jews in Israel, concern among Jews in the United States.

Survey Background: Data for the March Voice of the Jewish People Index was collected between March 13 and 17. Over the past month, several notable developments shaped both the selection of survey questions and the attitudes reflected in respondents' answers. Chief among them was the war with Iran. The joint U.S.-Israeli operation, which began on February 28, has included extensive coordinated airstrikes on nuclear facilities and missile launchers, alongside operations against the Tehran regime's military infrastructure. The survey was conducted during the operation's third week and includes comparisons with responses obtained in the war's first week. At the same time, the Lebanese front became active again, leading the IDF to reinforce forces in Israel's north and carry out ground operations. Preparations are now underway for a significant expansion of reserve mobilization. No evacuation of northern residents from their homes is planned.

Methodological Note: In recent months, we have also begun surveying Jews in Canada and the United Kingdom. In both countries, panels are taking shape and slowly growing. In February, approximately 60 participants from the United Kingdom and about 120 from Canada responded to the survey. Accordingly, the data on Jewish attitudes in these countries should be treated with caution. Whenever the report presents findings broken down by ideological orientation, religiosity, or voting behavior, it refers to the U.S. respondent panel only.

War with Iran



A majority of U.S. respondents (62%) support the decision to launch a war against Iran, while 31% oppose it. Support has declined slightly over the past two weeks. In the war's first week, it stood at two-thirds of respondents (68%), with a quarter (26%) opposing it. Support for the war varies according to ideological orientation: the more politically conservative the respondent, the higher the level of support. Among strong liberal respondents, a majority opposes the move (64% versus 25% in support). Among those who self-identify as centrist, support is high (83%), and it rises further in the leaning conservative (95%) and strong conservative cohorts (100%). When broken down by vote choice in the 2024 presidential elections, support for the campaign is nearly unanimous among Trump voters (98%). By contrast, Harris voters are divided – half (49%) oppose the decision to go to war, while 40% support it. Among respondents in Canada and the United Kingdom, support for the war against Iran is even higher: three-quarters of respondents in both countries support the move, compared with one-sixth who oppose it.

Overall, do you support or oppose the decision of the United States to launch a war against Iran? (%)

	Support	Oppose	Do not know
U.S. respondents – first week of the war	68	26	7
U.S. respondents – third week of the war	62	31	7
Canadian respondents	76	15	9
UK respondents	78	17	5
U.S. respondents only			
Strong liberal	25	64	10
Leaning liberal	48	41	12
Center	83	11	6
Leaning conservative	95	3	3
Strong conservative	100	0	0

Half of U.S. Jews (53%) believe that most Jews they know support the war, while one-fifth (20%) think that most Jews they know oppose it. One-quarter of participants (28%) did not know how to answer this question. In Canada and the United Kingdom, estimates of support among those in respondents' surroundings were higher – in Canada, eight in ten respondents (77%) and in the United Kingdom, seven in ten (70%) believe that most Jews they know support the war in Iran.

Just as support for the war rises as one moves from liberal to conservative along the ideological spectrum, so too does the perception that one's Jewish environment supports it. Among strong conservative respondents, eight in ten (81%) believe that most Jews they know support the war; among leaning conservatives, seven in ten (71%) say the same; and among those identifying with the center, two-thirds (65%) do so. By contrast, neither of the liberal cohorts has a majority who think that most in their Jewish environment support the war. Indeed, a quarter of leaning liberals report the opposite – that most Jews they know oppose the war in Iran; among strong liberals, that share reaches 42%. In addition, the proportion of respondents who did not know how to answer this question was high relative to other questions, between a sixth and a third in each ideological group.

When you think about your Jewish friends or members of your Jewish community, would you say that... (%)

	Most Jews I know support the war in Iran	Most Jews I know oppose the war in Iran	Do not know
U.S. respondents	53	20	28
Canadian respondents	77	9	14
UK respondents	70	6	24
U.S. respondents only			
Strong liberal	29	42	29
Leaning liberal	42	24	34
Center	65	5	30
Leaning conservative	71	5	23
Strong conservative	81	3	16

In all three countries, we found a tendency to view the war in Iran as a success, at least to some extent. The dominant opinion in all three is that “the war is somewhat successful” (42% in the United States and Canada, and 49% in the United Kingdom). At the same time, the share viewing the war as “a major success” is around one-quarter of respondents (24%–28%), and negative assessments are lower: between 10% and 14% think it is a failure, and another 10%–13% see it as somewhat unsuccessful. It should be noted that this data was collected before President Trump announced that the U.S. had entered negotiations to end the war.

The more conservative the respondent, the stronger the tendency to see the war as a success, and especially as “a major success” (71% among the strong conservatives versus 4% among the strong liberals). By contrast, among the strong liberals, a third (35%) see the war as a failure, and an additional 22% consider it somewhat unsuccessful.

Considering the war in Iran and what is currently known about it, is your impression that... (%)					
	The war is a major success for the United States and Israel	The war is somewhat successful	The war is somewhat unsuccessful	The war is a failure for the United States and Israel	Do not know
U.S. respondents	24	42	12	14	8
Canadian respondents	28	42	13	10	7
UK respondents	25	49	10	11	5
U.S. respondents only					
Strong liberal	4	25	22	35	14
Leaning liberal	7	50	19	12	12
Center	27	58	6	3	6
Leaning conservative	45	51	1	1	2
Strong conservative	71	26	1	0	2

Nearly half of U.S. respondents (46%) believe the war will count as a success only if it leads to regime change in Iran. Twenty-one percent think it would be considered a success if it weakens Iran and likely prevents another war for at least five years; 16% if it significantly weakens Iran even if another war is needed in the coming years; and 13% believe the war is a failure regardless of the outcome. Among Canadian and UK respondents, the share who say the war will count as a success only if it brings regime change in Iran is even higher, at 59% and 52%, respectively.

A breakdown by ideological orientation reveals both variation and a degree of agreement around the demand for regime change as a condition for success. Among centrists, leaning conservatives, and strong conservatives, half or more support this formula. By contrast, among strong liberals, the picture is less clear: one-third (35%) see regime change as a condition for success, while another third (33%) believe the war will be a failure regardless of the outcome – a considerably higher share than in the other cohorts. By vote choice in 2024, most Trump voters (59%) would regard the war as a success only if it leads to regime change in Iran. Among Harris voters, the answers are less definitive: four in ten would say the war is a success only if the regime falls (39%), 21% if Iran is weakened enough to make another war unlikely in the coming years, 15% if it is significantly weakened even if another war is required, and 20% think the war will be a failure regardless of its outcome.

Complete the following sentence with the view closest to your own: The war will be a success... (%)


	Only if it leads to regime change in Iran	If it weakens Iran and is likely to prevent another war for at least five years	If it significantly weakens Iran (even if another war is needed in the coming years)	The war is a failure regardless of the outcome	Do not know
U.S. respondents	46	21	16	13	4
Canadian respondents	59	19	12	9	2
UK respondents	52	16	13	13	6
U.S. respondents only					
Strong liberal	35	15	9	33	7
Leaning liberal	43	24	18	12	3
Center	49	29	19	2	1
Leaning conservative	59	21	17	2	1
Strong conservative	56	18	23	0	2

The War and Israel's Image

Fear of Antisemitism growing Concern about Damage to Israel's image




Most fear that the war will harm Israel's image in the U.S.



Nearly half of UK and Canadian respondents estimate that the war will not change Israel's image in their country (49% and 46%, respectively)

Sharp increase in fear that the war will increase antisemitism



The implications of the war with Iran for Israel’s image in the United States are not yet known. While the security coordination between the two countries may indicate closer relations, doubts about the necessity of entering the campaign may erode support for Israel among various population groups. Any criticism will likely compound existing reservations among some groups regarding Israel’s security policy over the past two years, fuel critical discourse, and deepen the divide in American public opinion regarding Israel.

A comparison between the results of a flash JPPI survey during the war’s first week and the present survey (three weeks in) shows growing concern about damage to Israel’s image. The share believing the war will harm Israel’s image rose over the past two weeks from 45% to 56%, and the share who think its image will remain unchanged declined from 32% to 27%. The share who sees a possibility of improvement remained low and even fell slightly (from 10% to 8%). At the same time, the share of respondents who did not know how to answer also declined (from 13% to 9%), suggesting increasing exposure and greater ability to form an opinion as the war progresses. Already in the war’s first week, respondents tended to think that its consequences for Israel would be negative, and that perception has only strengthened over time.

When the data is broken down by ideological orientation, the gaps are especially sharp. While most respondents in the two liberal groups and half of those self-identifying as centrists believe the war will harm Israel’s image in the United States, the prevailing view among the two conservative cohorts is that the war will not affect Israel’s image. In addition, uncertainty is higher among conservatives, which may indicate a less settled view than among liberals (or a reluctance to state that the war will have a harmful effect). By vote choice, while 77% of Harris voters believe the war will damage Israel’s image, only 22% of Trump voters think so. Forty-five percent of Trump voters believe the war will not affect Israel’s image, and another 19% think it will improve it.

In your view, the war... (%)				
	Will improve Israel’s image in the United States	Will not change Israel’s image in the United States	Will harm Israel’s image in the United States	Do not know
U.S. respondents – first week of the war	10	32	45	13
U.S. respondents – third week of the war	8	27	56	9
Strong liberal	1	13	82	4
Leaning liberal	3	14	77	6
Center	8	38	46	8
Leaning conservative	14	44	24	17
Strong conservative	23	45	16	16

Nearly half of UK and Canadian respondents estimate that the war will not change Israel’s image in their country (49% and 46%, respectively), while 41% believe it will damage it, and only a negligible share foresee

improvement. In other words, in these countries, too, there is concern that the war will damage Israel’s image, although Israel’s starting point in these countries is significantly different, and the effect of such erosion on Israel’s overall position is less consequential.

In your view, the war... (%)				
	Will improve Israel’s image in the United Kingdom	Will not change Israel’s image in the United Kingdom	Will harm Israel’s image in the United Kingdom	Do not know
UK respondents	5	49	41	5
	Will improve Israel’s image in Canada	Will not change Israel’s image in Canada	Will harm Israel’s image in Canada	Do not know
Canadian respondents	6	46	41	7

A comparison between the first and third weeks of the war also shows a clear intensification of concern about rising antisemitism. The share who believe the war will increase antisemitism rose substantially from 52% to 65%, while the share who think there will be no change fell from 33% to 28%. At the same time, the proportion believing that antisemitism will decline remained negligible and even decreased, and the share of respondents who did not know how to answer this question fell from 11% to 6%.



A breakdown by denominational affiliation shows relatively broad agreement across cohorts that the war can be expected to lead to an increase in antisemitism, though with varying intensity. Among Reform Jews (74%) and Conservatives (65%), this is the dominant view. Among Modern Orthodox respondents, the share is lower (55%), alongside a relatively high share who think there will be no change (38%).

In your view, the war... (%)				
	Will increase the level of antisemitism in the United States	Will not change the level of antisemitism in the United States	Will reduce the level of antisemitism in the United States	Do not know
U.S. respondents – first week of the war	52	33	4	11
U.S. respondents – third week of the war	65	28	1	6
Reform	74	21	0	5
Conservative	65	28	2	5
Modern Orthodox	55	38	0	8
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	40	20	13	27
Other	62	31	1	7
No stream	62	30	1	7

Most UK and Canadian respondents (63% and 65%, respectively) think the war will increase the level of antisemitism in their country, while about one-third (32% and 30%, respectively) believe it will have no impact on antisemitism levels. Only a negligible share thinks the war will reduce antisemitism. Again, it is worth recalling that the starting point in these countries differs from that of the United States.

In your view, the war... (%)				
	Will increase the level of antisemitism in the United Kingdom	Will not change the level of antisemitism in the United Kingdom	Will reduce the level of antisemitism in the United Kingdom	Do not know
UK respondents	63	32	3	2
	Will increase the level of antisemitism in Canada	Will not change the level of antisemitism in Canada	Will reduce the level of antisemitism in Canada	Do not know
Canadian respondents	65	30	1	4

Confidence in World Leaders

 <p>On the subject of Iran, how would you rate Prime Minister Netanyahu's leadership?</p>	 <p>On the issue of Iran, how would you rate President Trump's leadership?</p>
<p>54% Good "Very good" or "Somewhat good"</p>	<p>46% Good "Very good" or "Somewhat good"</p>
<p>38% Poor "Somewhat poor" or "Very poor"</p>	<p>48% Poor "Somewhat poor" or "Very poor"</p>
<p>Among the strong conservative and leaning conservative cohorts: 95% rate him as a good leader in relation to Iran</p> <p>Among the strong liberal cohorts: 59% see him as a very bad leader in relation to Iran</p>	<p>Trump voters: 97% rate him as a good leader on Iran</p> <p>Harris voters: 60% rate him as poor leader on on Iran</p>

There is no consensus among U.S. respondents on the quality of Trump’s leadership vis-à-vis Iran: 46% rate him as a good leader (very or somewhat), and 48% regard him as a poor leader (somewhat or very); the rating receiving the largest share among the five options presented is “very poor leader” (37%). The share of neutral respondents and those who do not know is relatively low, indicating fairly settled views.

In a breakdown by ideological orientation and voting pattern, the polarization becomes even sharper. Among strong conservatives and leaning conservatives, Trump’s rating in the Iran context is high, whereas among strong liberals and leaning liberals, his leadership in this context is viewed negatively, with large majorities seeing him as “a very poor leader” (75% and 48%, respectively). The centrist cohort has a relatively positive view, with a majority rating Trump as a good leader (very or somewhat). The division is stark between Trump and Harris voters. Among 2024 Trump voters, 97% rate him as a good leader on Iran, whereas 60% of Harris voters see him as a very poor leader on this issue.

On the issue of Iran, how would you rate President Trump’s leadership? (%)						
	Very good	Somewhat good	Neither poor nor good	Somewhat poor	Very poor	Don’t know
U.S. respondents	28	18	4	11	37	2
Strong liberal	2	5	2	14	75	2
Leaning liberal	6	13	6	23	48	3
Center	32	33	6	8	19	1
Leaning conservative	61	28	4	3	5	0
Strong conservative	81	18	1	0	0	0
Trump voters	73	24	1	2	1	0
Harris voters	5	12	5	16	60	2

Among the U.S. respondent panel, the picture is mixed but leans somewhat positive in evaluating Prime Minister Netanyahu’s leadership vis-à-vis Iran: 54% rate him as a good leader (35% very good and 19% somewhat good), compared with 38% who regard him as a poor leader (12% somewhat poor and 26% very poor). When broken down by ideological orientation, the gap widens: among strong conservatives and leaning conservatives, support is nearly sweeping (up to 95% positive assessment), whereas among strong liberals, a majority see him as a very poor leader (59%). The center clearly leans positive (73%).

The picture in Canada and the United Kingdom is more positive and less polarized. Two-thirds (67%) of Canadian respondents rate Netanyahu positively and only a quarter (25%) negatively; in the United Kingdom, the positive rating is even higher (70%) and the negative rating relatively low (19%). In other

words, while Netanyahu’s leadership remains hotly contested in the U.S., UK and Canadian respondents tend to view him as a successful leader with respect to Iran, with less pronounced gaps between camps.

On the issue of Iran, how would you rate Prime Minister Netanyahu’s leadership? (%)						
	Very good	Somewhat good	Neither poor nor good	Somewhat poor	Very poor	Don’t know
U.S. respondents	35	19	5	12	26	4
Canadian respondents	43	24	8	10	15	0
UK respondents	32	38	8	6	13	3
U.S. respondents only						
Strong liberal	4	11	4	17	59	5
Leaning liberal	9	25	10	21	31	5
Center	45	28	5	10	6	5
Leaning conservative	73	22	1	1	3	1
Strong conservative	88	7	1	0	0	3

In both the United Kingdom and Canada, respondents evaluate their respective national leaders negatively on the Iran issue. In the UK, a majority (68%) rate Keir Starmer’s handling of Iran negatively, with 44% seeing his leadership as very poor and another 24% as somewhat poor; only a small minority (18%) rate him positively. In Canada, the picture is similar but slightly less sharp. Mark Carney receives mainly negative evaluations on Iran (60%), though with a somewhat higher positive rating (26%) than in the United Kingdom.

On the issue of Iran, how would you rate Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s leadership? (%)						
	Very good	Somewhat good	Neither poor nor good	Somewhat poor	Very poor	Do not know
UK respondents	5	13	13	24	44	2

On the issue of Iran, how would you rate Prime Minister Mark Carney’s leadership? (%)						
	Very good	Somewhat good	Neither poor nor good	Somewhat poor	Very poor	Do not know
Canadian respondents	6	20	14	20	40	1

For both Trump and Netanyahu, leadership ratings are higher when the issue is Iran than when respondents evaluate their leadership more generally. When we asked how respondents view their national leaders in general – rather than in the specific context of the war – a large majority of U.S. respondents rated Trump negatively: (52% see him as a very poor leader, 11% as somewhat poor, and only a small minority define him as a very good leader (15%) or a somewhat good leader (17%).

When the distribution is examined by political inclination, a clear trend emerges: the more liberal the stance, the more negative the assessment of Trump. Among the strong liberal respondents, there is almost no support, with 92% defining him as a very poor leader. By contrast, among leaning conservative and strong conservative respondents, the picture reverses. In these groups, large majorities evaluate Trump positively, especially among the strong conservatives, where 65% see him as a very good leader and another 31% as somewhat good. The center presents a more mixed position, though with a tendency toward a negative evaluation of his leadership.

Overall, how would you rate President Trump as a leader? (%)

	Very good	Somewhat good	Neither poor nor good	Somewhat poor	Very poor	Do not know
Overall leadership	15	17	4	11	52	1
Leadership on Iran	28	18	4	11	37	2
Strong liberal	1	1	0	5	92	0
Leaning liberal	3	3	1	16	76	1
Center	10	22	9	21	37	1
Leaning conservative	27	47	9	12	5	0
Strong conservative	65	31	2	2	0	0

One-third (35%) of U.S. panel participants see Netanyahu as a very good or somewhat good leader, while a majority (56%) rate him as somewhat poor or very poor. Among respondents in Canada and the United Kingdom, evaluations of Netanyahu are more positive (48% and 47%, respectively).

A breakdown by ideological orientation shows that strong liberals and leaning liberals rate Netanyahu as a very poor leader (77% and 55%, respectively). By contrast, leaning conservatives and strong conservatives give him a highly positive rating, with an outright majority of strong conservatives (66%) regarding him as a very good leader, while 41% of leaning conservatives do so. The centrist cohort gives more mixed evaluations with a slight negative tilt.


Overall, how would you rate Prime Minister Netanyahu as a leader? (%)

	Very good	Somewhat good	Neither poor nor good	Somewhat poor	Very poor	Do not know
Overall leadership (U.S. responses)	20	15	6	17	39	3
Leadership on Iran (U.S. responses)	35	19	5	12	26	4
Strong liberal	1	4	2	14	77	2
Leaning liberal	5	6	3	26	55	4
Center	19	17	12	29	17	5
Leaning conservative	41	34	11	7	5	2
Strong conservative	66	28	2	0	0	4


Relations with the Palestinians

Israeli-Palestinian relations **JPPI**

Agree that there is no substitute for a long-term peace arrangement between Israel and the Palestinians



Don't think Israeli-Palestinian peace is possible in the foreseeable future



Settlements: Most U.S. respondents (55%) believe that Jewish West Bank settlements are “a burden”

This month, the Voice of the Jewish People Index survey revisited several questions about Israeli-Palestinian relations that were asked exactly one year ago. The data shows that most of the U.S. respondent panel (75%) do not think Israeli-Palestinian peace is possible in the foreseeable future. There has been no change compared with last year. The U.S. respondent panel and respondents in the UK and Canada concur with this assessment.

Broken down by ideological orientation, a majority across cohorts agrees (completely or somewhat) with the statement, “There is no chance of a peace agreement with the Palestinians in the foreseeable future.” Compared to a year ago, there has been a decline in the share of conservatives who strongly agree with this statement (from 75% to 69%). Eighty-eight percent of Trump voters agree with this statement, as do 67% of Harris voters, which marks an increase compared with a year ago, when 56% of her voters answered this way.

There is no chance of a peace agreement with the Palestinians in the foreseeable future. (%)

	Completely agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Completely disagree	Do not know
U.S. respondents – March 25	48	28	11	6	7
U.S. respondents – March 26	46	29	13	6	6
Canadian respondents	49	35	12	1	3
UK respondents	49	33	10	5	3
U.S. respondents only					
Strong liberal	27	29	20	12	11
Leaning liberal	34	38	16	5	8
Center	55	32	9	1	3
Leaning conservative	66	23	7	3	2
Strong conservative	69	19	3	6	2

On the question of the need to reach a long-term peace settlement as well, attitudes in the United States have remained stable over the past year: two-thirds of respondents agree (completely or somewhat) that there is no substitute for a long-term peace arrangement, while one-quarter disagree. In Canada and the United Kingdom there is likewise relatively broad support for this approach, even slightly higher than in the United States, with about three-quarters agreeing and lower rates of opposition. The share of respondents who did not know how to answer this question remained relatively low in all countries, indicating settled views.

The ideological breakdown reveals significant gaps between groups. Among the two liberal cohorts, there is sweeping agreement with the statement about the need for a long-term arrangement. Seventy-three percent of strong liberal respondents and 55% of leaning liberal respondents completely agree, and another large majority somewhat agree. Among conservative respondents, by contrast, the picture is reversed: among the strong conservative cohort, only 37% agree (fully or partly), while an identical share (37%) completely disagrees. Leaning conservatives show a more mixed position, but still one tending toward opposition. The center stands out for its relative split between agreement and disagreement, with a comparatively high share of intermediate positions and uncertainty.

Ultimately, there is no substitute for a long-term peace arrangement between Israel and the Palestinians. (%)

	Completely agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Completely disagree	Do not know
U.S. respondents – March 2025	44	22	12	15	8
U.S. respondents – March 2026	44	22	13	13	8
Canadian respondents	46	28	11	9	6
UK respondents	49	24	11	10	6
U.S. respondents only					
Strong liberal	73	13	3	4	6
Leaning liberal	55	24	10	6	5
Center	28	28	25	10	10
Leaning conservative	16	33	18	23	10
Strong conservative	22	15	17	37	9

After a year, we also revisited two statements about Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). The first reflects the view that “the settlements are a burden,” and the second posits that “the settlements are an asset.” When the two are juxtaposed, a very similar pattern of agreement and disagreement emerges for each. Between March 2025 and March 2026, attitudes among the U.S. respondent panel have been relatively stable: the share who “do not agree at all” with the statement that settlements create deterrence and contribute to security rose slightly from 30% to 33%, while the share who “completely agree” fell slightly from 25% to 22%. That is, there has been slight erosion in strong support for the claim that settlements contribute to security, alongside a strengthening of sharp opposition to it.

The more conservative the respondent, the greater the support for the claim that Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) provide deterrence and contribute to the security of all Israeli citizens. Among the strong conservative cohort, a clear majority supports the statement (63% completely agree

and 24% somewhat agree). Still, there is sweeping opposition in the strong liberal cohort (66% completely disagree, while only a small minority supports it). The middle groups show a gradual transition: the leaning liberal cohort tends to oppose the statement but not absolutely, while the centrist cohort tends toward relative agreement (55% full or partial agreement). A clear majority in the leaning conservative group agrees (69%), though less sharply than in the strong conservative cohort.

Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) create deterrence and contribute to the security of all Israeli citizens

	Completely agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Completely disagree	Do not know
U.S. respondents – March 2025	25	18	17	30	9
U.S. respondents – March 2026	22	19	17	33	10
Canadian respondents – March 2026	25	25	18	24	7
UK respondents – March 2026	19	21	21	30	10
U.S. respondents only					
Strong liberal	4	8	12	66	10
Leaning liberal	5	12	29	45	9
Center	29	26	23	10	12
Leaning conservative	35	34	12	7	12
Strong conservative	63	24	4	1	7

We also asked a question on the settlement issue from the opposite perspective – whether the settlements are “a burden” – and obtained a mirror image of the answers to the previous question. Most U.S. respondents (55%) believe that Jewish West Bank settlements are a burden on the IDF and harm the security of all Israelis. By contrast, 35% do not agree with this claim, and 10% did not know how to answer. Compared to a year ago, only small changes have occurred – the image of the settlements has not changed over the past year in the eyes of the U.S. Jews surveyed. The United Kingdom stands out with a higher rate of agreement (60%) with the claim that the settlements are “a burden,” while in Canada, the gap between those who agree (51%) and those who oppose (41%) is smaller.

Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria (West Bank) are a burden on the IDF and harm the security of all Israeli citizens (%)

	Completely agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Completely disagree	Do not know
U.S. respondents March 2025	29	28	15	21	7
U.S. respondents March 2026	27	28	13	22	10
Canadian respondents	23	28	17	24	8
UK respondents	27	33	11	17	11
U.S. respondents only					
Strong liberal	59	22	2	7	10
Leaning liberal	37	41	10	7	6
Center	7	37	18	26	12
Leaning conservative	4	23	26	35	13
Strong conservative	1	7	23	59	10

The Jewish Character of Israel

Identity and religion



48%

Half of the U.S. respondent panel says religion is very important in their lives



66%

Most of the U.S. respondent panel believes Israel is Jewish to the right extent



23%

Nearly one-quarter of the U.S. respondent panel attends synagogue weekly (more than for Canadian respondents (17%) but fairly similar to those in the UK (21%))

Most of the U.S. respondent panel (66%) believes Israel is “Jewish to the right extent,” and only relatively small minorities think it is either not Jewish enough (12%) or too Jewish (11%). This position differs from that of Jewish Israelis, as reflected in the results of JPPI’s Israeli Society Index survey last month. In Israel, 38% think Israel is Jewish “to the right extent,” while 36% believe it is not Jewish enough; 24% think it is too

Jewish. UK and Canadian respondents are more in line with U.S. Jews than Israeli Jews. Large majorities of UK respondents (78%) and Canadian respondents (75%) think Israel is Jewish to the right extent. The shares who think Israel is either not Jewish enough or too Jewish are small in both countries.

A breakdown by denominational affiliation reveals sharp gaps: among the ultra-Orthodox (Haredim) in the United States (as in Israel), an overwhelming majority (80%) think Israel is not Jewish enough, while almost none think it is too Jewish. A similar, though more moderate, tendency is also evident among Modern Orthodox respondents. By contrast, Reform, Conservative, and unaffiliated respondents tend to think Israel is Jewish to the right extent, alongside a small share who believe it is too Jewish.

Israel is defined in its Declaration of Independence as a Jewish state. In your view, today the State of Israel is... (%)

	Not Jewish enough	Jewish to the right extent	Too Jewish	Do not know
U.S. respondents	12	66	11	11
Israeli respondents	36	38	24	2
Canadian respondents	10	75	7	9
UK respondents	8	78	10	5
U.S. respondents only				
Reform	7	67	12	14
Conservative	8	75	11	6
Modern Orthodox	25	67	3	5
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	80	13	0	7
Other	10	57	14	19
No stream	9	64	13	15

Half of the U.S. respondent panel (48%) says that religion is very important in their lives, a higher share than in Canada (35%) and the United Kingdom (32%). In Canada and UK by contrast, the view that religion is somewhat important is more prominent (44% and 48%, respectively). The share of those who regard religion as not especially important is similar across the three countries, though slightly higher in Canada and the UK than in the U.S.

As one might expect, religion is very important to the ultra-Orthodox cohort, as it is for the Modern Orthodox cohort (85%). Among the Conservative cohort, a majority sees religion as a very important life component (50%), while the Reform cohort tends to fall in the middle, when somewhat and very important are combined. Among other things, this finding illustrates how JPPI’s U.S. panel of “connected” Jews differs from other survey findings on the attitudes of the broader U.S. Jewish population. A Pew Research Center survey from February 2025 found that for 27% of Jews think religion is “very important,” 30% think it is somewhat important, and 43% consider it not important.

How important is religion in your life? (%)

	Very important	Somewhat important	Not very important
U.S. respondents	48	35	17
Canadian respondents	35	44	21
UK respondents	32	48	21
U.S. respondents only			
Reform	37	43	20
Conservative	50	41	9
Modern Orthodox	85	13	2
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	100	0	0
Other	44	38	18
No stream	24	32	44

Following the question on the importance of religion, we examined synagogue attendance. Nearly one-quarter (23%) of the U.S. respondent panel attends synagogue weekly, more than for Canadian respondents (17%) but fairly similar to those in the UK (21%). In both Canada and the United Kingdom, a significant share report attending only rarely (44% and 38%, respectively); among UK respondents, a relatively high share never attends synagogue (13%). Overall, in all three countries, the most common pattern is infrequent attendance.

As one would expect, a denominational breakdown shows significant differences in synagogue attendance patterns. Among ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) and Modern Orthodox respondents, attendance is very high, with majorities attending synagogue every week (73% and 57%, respectively). Conservatives also show relatively high attendance rates, though lower (25%). Reform respondents tend to attend less frequently, and many do so only rarely. Among unaffiliated respondents, a particularly high share never attends at all (29%) or do so only rarely (43%).

How often do you attend synagogue? (%)

	Every week	Almost every week	About once a month	Rarely	Never
U.S. respondents	23	14	22	34	8
Canadian respondents	17	11	20	44	8
UK respondents	21	13	16	38	13
U.S. respondents only					
Reform	12	17	25	39	6
Conservative	25	14	26	32	2
Modern Orthodox	57	13	11	17	2
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	73	0	7	13	7
Other	14	14	25	36	10
No stream	9	9	10	43	29

Passover

Ahead of Passover, we examined respondents' plans for the coming holiday in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The data shows that the seder remains a central and meaningful event among Jews in the various countries. A large majority of U.S. respondents (80%) say that they expect to host or attend a traditional seder, with stability over time (the same share as last year). The figure is similar in Canada (79%), and slightly lower in the United Kingdom (73%), though still a clear majority. Only a small share of respondents in all three countries say they have no plans to celebrate at all.

Among Modern Orthodox and Haredi respondents, almost all plan to participate in a traditional seder (93%-94%). Participation rates among Conservative and Reform respondents are also quite high (86% and 78%, respectively). Among unaffiliated respondents, by contrast, 55% plan to participate in a traditional seder, 25% say they do not intend to participate in any special Passover event, and 18% had not yet decided.

This coming Passover, I expect to... (%)				
	Host or attend a traditional seder	Host or attend a festive meal with few or no traditional elements	I have no plans to host or participate in a special Passover event	I still do not know what I will do
U.S. respondents March 2025	79	3	6	12
U.S. respondents March 2026	80	3	8	9
Canadian respondents	79	5	8	8
UK respondents	73	5	10	13
U.S. respondents only				
Reform	78	5	9	8
Conservative	86	2	5	8
Modern Orthodox	94	1	0	5
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	93	0	7	0
Other	78	4	6	12
No stream	55	3	25	18

Artificial Intelligence

In recent months, artificial intelligence (AI) systems have occupied a prominent place in the global discourse, arousing both interest and concern. This month, we examined how respondents in the three countries (and Israel earlier in the month) relate to the improved capabilities of artificial intelligence. Among U.S. respondents, 36% report that AI mainly frightens them, 38% say they are mainly curious, and 9% find it exciting. When compared with Jewish Israelis, a clear difference emerges: in Israel, fear of AI is less pronounced (22%), while curiosity is higher (44%) and the sense of excitement about the field is also significantly greater (20%). In addition, among Jewish Israelis, a lower share of respondents reported not being interested in AI.

A breakdown by ideological orientation reveals significant differences in attitudes toward AI. Notably, fear is substantially higher (49%) among strong liberal respondents, while curiosity and excitement are relatively low. In the other groups, by contrast, the share of those who are curious or excited exceeds the share who are apprehensive.

In recent months, public discussion around the world of the improved capabilities of artificial intelligence (AI) has increased significantly. Which of the following options is closest to your view on AI? (%)

	AI mainly frightens me	AI mainly makes me curious	AI mainly excites me	I am not interested in AI	I do not know enough about artificial intelligence
U.S. respondents	36	38	9	7	10
Israeli respondents	22	44	20	2	11
Canadian respondents	33	41	8	7	11
UK respondents	27	41	10	10	13
U.S. respondents only					
Strong liberal	49	28	6	6	10
Leaning liberal	35	37	4	10	13
Center	25	50	12	7	6
Leaning conservative	28	43	16	5	8
Strong conservative	31	38	13	4	14

Survey Data and Implications

This report is based on a survey of 906 U.S. Jews registered with JPPI’s “Voice of the Jewish People” panel. Broadly speaking, the survey reflects the views of “connected” American Jews – that is, Jews with a relatively strong connection to the Jewish community, and/or Israel, and/or Jewish identity. The survey also included 60 respondents in the United Kingdom and 120 in Canada. Unless otherwise noted, the results reflect the views of respondents from the United States only. JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People Index survey was conducted by JPPI fellows Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepko, with assistance from Yael Levinovsky. Statistical supervision: Prof. David Steinberg.

This table includes data on U.S. respondents in March 2026.



March 2026 Survey: Participant Data		
	%	#
Reform	23	169
Conservative	32	228
Modern Orthodox	12	88
Ultra-Orthodox	2	15
Other	16	118
No stream	14	102
Strong liberal	28	205
Leaning liberal	22	155
Centrist	22	155
Leaning conservative	15	111
Strong conservative	13	94
Single / divorced / widowed	25	180
Married/in long-term relationship with a Jewish spouse	59	424
Married/in long-term relationship with a non-Jewish spouse	16	116
Affiliated	83	598
Non-affiliated	17	122
Never visited Israel	20	144
Visited Israel once	16	113
Visited Israel more than once	46	330
Lived in Israel	18	133
Jewish by religion	94	675
Jew by no religion (JBNR)	2	13
Partially Jewish	3	19
No religion	2	13