

Voice of the Jewish People Index

Connected U.S. Jews on the War with Iran, Trust in World Leaders, Antisemitism, the Relationship between Israel and the Diaspora, and Threats to Humanity's Future


Main Findings

- Half of the respondent panel characterizes the war with Iran as a failure.
- Perceptual gap: Jews in Israel are more confident than U.S. Jews regarding the war's achievements.
- Erosion of confidence in Trump deepens: most rate his performance on Iran negatively.
- Consensus in the Diaspora: antisemitism in the West is becoming a "normal" routine.
- Changing patterns of daily life: most report concealing Jewish markers and heightened vigilance.
- Most respondents believe that Israel bears substantial responsibility for the continued existence of the Jewish people in the Diaspora.
- There is broad support for investing Israeli resources in education and the strengthening of Jewish identity in the Diaspora.
- Israel as a refuge: Most respondents view Israel as a safe haven for Jews.
- Most respondents feel a personal responsibility for the fate of Israeli Jews and feel that they share a common destiny.
- Like Israelis, U.S. Jews perceive nuclear weapons as the gravest threat to humanity.
- Climate-crisis perception gap: deep concern in the United States, relative indifference in Israel.
- Perceptual gap: U.S. Jews view social media as a much more serious threat than Jewish Israelis do.

Survey Background: Data for this month's Voice of the Jewish People Index survey was collected May 14-20. Several key events over the past month shaped the survey questions and the attitudes reflected in the Index. Central among them was the extension of the ceasefire with Iran, which first took effect at the beginning of April. The continuing diplomatic pressure exerted by the U.S. administration to extend the pause and shift the center of gravity to the diplomatic arena prompted an active public discussion about the degree of trust in American and Israeli leadership and in the outcome of the campaign. At the same time, in the U.S. domestic arena, the political system accelerated its preparations for the congressional midterm elections, with U.S. involvement in the Middle East and its economic implications occupying a central place in the public discourse.

Methodological Note: In recent months, we have also begun surveying the views of Jews in Canada and the United Kingdom. In both countries, panels are being assembled and are growing, albeit slowly. In May, approximately 70 participants from the UK and approximately 130 from Canada responded to the survey. Accordingly, the data on Jewish views in these countries should be interpreted with caution. When the report presents data broken down by ideological orientation, denominational affiliation, or voting pattern, it refers only to U.S. respondents.

Support for the War with Iran



This month's Voice of the Jewish People Index survey was conducted about a month after the ceasefire among Iran, the United States, and Israel came into effect. Shortly before the ceasefire was set to expire, President Trump announced its extension. This was the situation at the time of this writing, and it is the central context for assessing public opinion.

An examination of the respondent panel's support for the war with Iran over recent months indicates relative stabilization compared with the beginning of the campaign. This month, the share of panel respondents who support the war still constitutes a 58% majority, only a slight decline from the 60% recorded last month and a cumulative decrease of 10 percentage points since the first week of the war (68%). The share opposing the campaign also remained stable, at 34%. These figures suggest that the prolongation of the ceasefire did not generate dramatic shifts in respondents' opinions.

A breakdown by ideological orientation shows deeply polarized opinions of the war. Consensus exists at the conservative end of the ideological spectrum: both strong-conservative and leaning-conservative respondents support the move overwhelmingly (92%). Support is also high among the centrist cohort (79%), whereas the opposite picture emerges at the liberal pole, where close to three-quarters of the strong liberal cohort (72%) report having opposed the war. The leaning-liberal cohort is the most divided, with slightly more supporters (45%) than opponents (39%); 16% have not yet formed a final position on the issue.

In general, did you support or oppose the decision by the United States to go to war against Iran? (U.S. respondents, %)



	Supported	Opposed	Don't know
First week of Iran war	68	26	7
Third week of Iran war	62	31	7
One week after the ceasefire was signed - April 26	60	34	6
One month after the ceasefire was signed - May 26	58	34	8
Strong liberal	21	72	7
Leaning liberal	45	39	16
Center	79	13	8
Leaning conservative	92	6	2
Strong conservative	92	4	4


Similar to the U.S. Jews surveyed, in recent months, there has also been an erosion of support for the war among Canadian and UK respondents, against the backdrop of the extended ceasefire. Among Canadian respondents, there has been a relatively moderate five-point decline in support (from 81% to 76%), while the share of those opposed to the war remained stable (15%). Among UK respondents, support for the war fell by 12 percentage points and now stands at 63%, alongside an increase in the share who oppose it (to 29%). Despite the downward trend in both countries, a majority of respondents continue to support the decision to go to war against Iran, with Canadian respondents continuing to display the strongest support.

In general, did you support or oppose the decision by the United States to go to war against Iran? (%)



	Supported	Opposed	Don't know
Canadian respondents - April	81	15	4
Canadian respondents - May	76	15	9
UK respondents - April	75	23	2
UK respondents - May	63	29	8

Success in the War with Iran



One month into the ceasefire, the respondent panel’s assessment of the war’s achievements is marked by disappointment and skepticism, with only 9% regarding its results as very successful. Conversely, close to half of the respondents (47%) view the war as either a failure or somewhat of a failure. The middle group, which regards the war’s results as a “partial success,” constitutes a substantial share, four in ten respondents (39%). This data reflects a significant gap among the U.S. Jews surveyed between the war’s stated objectives and their achievement.

A breakdown by ideological orientation reveals a clear correlation between political outlook and the level of criticism regarding the results of the fighting. At the liberal end of the ideological spectrum, the war is regarded as a failure: three-quarters (78%) of the strong liberal cohort and half (51%) of the leaning-liberal cohort characterize it as such. Among the centrist and the two conservative cohorts, the dominant position is more moderate and tends to regard the outcomes so far as representing some degree of success. Still, it is worth noting that even in the strong conservative cohort, the share identifying the outcome as very successful is only a third (31%). This seems to reflect a general dissatisfaction with the framework under which the fighting was halted.

**Thinking about the war with Iran, are you under the impression that it is...
 (U.S. respondents, %)**




	Very successful	Somewhat successful	Somewhat of a failure	Failure	Don't know
U.S. respondents - March	24	42	12	14	8
U.S. respondents - April	14	42	15	25	4
U.S. respondents - May	9	39	15	32	6
Strong liberal	0	14	14	67	5
Leaning liberal	2	29	23	40	6
Center	8	54	17	13	7
Leaning conservative	16	66	9	6	3
Strong conservative	31	58	2	4	6

Perception of Success: The War with Iran (by ideological orientation)



■ Very successful
 ■ Somewhat successful
 ■ Somewhat of a failure
 ■ Failure
 ■ Don't know



The erosion in the assessment of the war's achievements is also clearly evident among Canadian and UK respondents. In Canada, the share of respondents who see the campaign as very successful fell to just 9%, while the total share assessing the results negatively rose to 37%. In the UK, the retreat is even sharper: the share characterizing the war as very successful dropped to a negligible 3%, while almost half of respondents (46%) see the results as negative: 26% view it as a failure, 20% as somewhat of a failure. Nevertheless, in both countries, most respondents still tend toward a moderate assessment, characterizing the war as somewhat successful.

Thinking about the war with Iran, are you under the impression that it is... (%)



	Very successful	Somewhat successful	Somewhat of a failure	Failure	Don't know
Canadian respondents - March	28	42	13	10	7
Canadian respondents - April	16	50	15	16	4
Canadian respondents - May	9	50	19	18	4
UK respondents - March	25	49	10	11	5
UK respondents - April	13	54	13	21	0
UK respondents - May	3	49	20	26	2

An examination of the sense of victory in the multi-front war that began after the October 7 Hamas massacre shows stability in the views of the U.S. respondent panel over the past year, alongside a small gap compared with Jewish Israelis. This month, one-third of the U.S. Jews surveyed (30%) believe that Israel has won or is winning (ratings of 4 or 5), a figure very similar to those recorded in July and August 2025. By contrast, more than a third (38%) feel that Israel is not winning (ratings of 1 and 2); 33% hold an intermediate position. A somewhat different picture appears among Jewish Israelis this month (as per the May 2026 JPPI Israeli Society Index). Jews in Israel show greater confidence in the achievements of the campaign: four in ten (42%) feel that Israel is winning or has won, including 16% who feel this completely (compared with only 4% of the U.S. respondent panel), while only 32% share the sense that Israel is not winning.

Assessment of the war's outcome correlates directly with ideological orientation. At the conservative end of the ideological spectrum, majorities among the strong conservative and leaning-conservative cohorts believe Israel has won or is winning (57% and 59%, respectively). This position weakens among centrist respondents and weakens further among the leaning-liberal cohort, where only 15% perceive that Israel has won or is winning in the multi-front campaign. Among those who self-identify as strong liberals, 65% assert that Israel is not winning the war, with only 9% believing it is.

From 1 (not at all) to 5 (completely), to what extent do you feel that Israel has won or is winning the war that began on October 7, 2023? (This refers to the war on all its fronts)



	1 - Do not feel at all that it is winning / has won	2	3	4	5 - Completely feel that it is winning / has won
U.S. respondents - July 2025	23	16	28	29	4
U.S. respondents - August 2025	22	15	31	28	4
U.S. respondents - May 2026	21	17	33	26	4
Jewish Israelis - May 2026	19	13	26	26	16
U.S. respondents only					
Strong liberal	40	25	26	7	2
Leaning liberal	19	21	45	14	1
Center	12	15	37	33	3
Leaning conservative	7	3	31	54	5
Strong conservative	9	10	24	44	13

Among Canadian and UK respondents, too, the sense of victory remains qualified, although they display slightly greater confidence than U.S. Jews. A third of Canadian respondents (36%) feel that Israel is winning/has won the war, compared with another third (34%) who believe that Israel has not won or is not winning. Similarly, among UK respondents, the share identifying an Israeli victory stands at one-third (31%), as does the share rejecting that view (32%). In both countries, as in the U.S., the share of respondents who feel that Israel is completely winning remains negligible.

From 1 (not at all) to 5 (completely), to what extent do you feel that Israel has won or is winning the war that began on October 7, 2023? (This refers to the war on all its fronts)




	1 - Do not feel at all that it is winning / has won	2	3	4	5 - Completely feel that it is winning / has won
Canadian respondents	13	21	31	33	3
UK respondents	15	17	37	29	2

Trust in Leaders


Trust in Leadership on Iran – President Trump



On the issue of Iran, how would you rate President Trump's leadership?



Erosion of Trust Over Time
(very good + somewhat good)



55% rate his leadership on Iran negatively

The erosion of respondents' confidence in President Trump's handling of Iran deepened over the past month. The data shows that the share of respondents giving Trump's leadership the maximum rating, "very good," has been in consistent decline, falling from 28% in March to 23% in April and to only 18% this month. At the same time, criticism of the president is intensifying: the share rating his leadership as "very poor" in the Iranian context has risen consistently in recent months. Overall, a majority (55%) of the respondent panel now assesses Trump's leadership on Iran negatively.

On the issue of Iran, how would you rate President Trump's leadership? (%)




	Very good	Somewhat good	Neither poor nor good	Somewhat poor	Very poor	Don't know
U.S. respondents - March	28	18	4	11	37	2
U.S. respondents - April	23	20	4	9	43	1
U.S. respondents - May	18	22	4	9	46	1
Strong liberal	2	5	1	6	86	0
Leaning liberal	4	13	3	16	64	1
Center	16	34	9	15	24	2
Leaning conservative	38	42	5	6	9	0
Strong conservative	62	33	2	0	4	0

Assessment of the president's leadership also correlates with ideological orientation. At the conservative end of the ideological spectrum, support for Trump is nearly sweeping (95% among the strong conservative cohort and 80% among the leaning-conservative group). The opposite picture emerges in the liberal camp,

where an overwhelming majority of the strong liberal (92%) and the leaning liberal (80%) cohorts view Trump’s leadership as poor, with 86% of the strong liberal cohort rating his leadership as very poor.

The data show that U.S. respondents’ confidence in Prime Minister Netanyahu’s leadership in the Iran context is low. Three in ten (31%) respondents characterize Netanyahu’s leadership as very poor. Overall, 45% assess the prime minister’s leadership negatively. Conversely, the core of positive support for Netanyahu’s leadership remains limited but stable, with 25% giving his leadership a positive assessment.




At the conservative end of the ideological spectrum, there is a near-consensus positive assessment of the prime minister: nine in ten (94%) strong conservative respondents and eight in ten (86%) leaning-conservative respondents characterize his leadership in the Iranian context as good. An opposite picture emerges in the two liberal cohorts: an overwhelming majority of strong liberals (83%) and leaning liberals (63%) reject his leadership. The centrist group presents a nuanced position but skews negative.

On the issue of Iran, how would you rate Prime Minister Netanyahu’s leadership? (%)

	Very good	Somewhat good	Neither poor nor good	Somewhat poor	Very poor	Don't know
U.S. respondents – March	35	19	5	12	26	4
U.S. respondents – April	30	19	4	13	31	2
U.S. respondents – May	25	21	7	14	31	2
Strong liberal	5	6	5	13	70	3
Leaning liberal	6	15	15	29	34	1
Center	29	33	7	15	11	4
Leaning conservative	47	39	8	3	3	0
Strong conservative	74	20	0	2	3	1

This month, a continued erosion in assessments of Netanyahu’s leadership on Iran was also recorded among Canadian and UK respondents. The share viewing his leadership as poor reached 32% in Canada and 41% in the UK. Despite this trend, Netanyahu’s overall rating remains higher among Canadian respondents than among U.S. respondents; the figures for UK and U.S. respondents are almost identical.


On the issue of Iran, how would you rate Prime Minister Netanyahu’s leadership? (%)



	Very good	Somewhat good	Neither poor nor good	Somewhat poor	Very poor	Don't know
Canadian respondents - March	43	24	8	10	15	0
Canadian respondents - April	38	25	8	8	20	0
Canadian respondents - May	33	27	8	11	21	1
UK respondents - March	32	38	8	6	13	3
UK respondents - April	27	25	13	8	23	4
UK respondents - May	23	23	12	15	26	0

Assessments of British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s leadership in the Iranian context indicate a gradual improvement among UK respondents over the past month, despite an overall negative position. The share of UK respondents characterizing his leadership as very poor fell by 10 points compared with March.

On the issue of Iran, how would you rate Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s leadership? (%)



	Very good	Somewhat good	Neither poor nor good	Somewhat poor	Very poor	Don't know
UK respondents - March	5	13	13	24	44	2
UK respondents - April	10	8	15	25	40	2
UK respondents - May	12	9	22	23	34	0

Assessments of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s leadership in relation to Iran stabilized after the decline in confidence recorded in April but remain largely negative. Positive assessments of his performance are at 19% this month, compared with 12% last month. Conversely, criticism of Carney remains broad, with two-thirds of Canadian respondents (65%) rating his leadership negatively.

On the issue of Iran, how would you rate Prime Minister Mark Carney's leadership? (%)




	Very good	Somewhat good	Neither poor nor good	Somewhat poor	Very poor	Don't know
Canadian respondents - March	6	20	14	20	40	1
Canadian respondents - April	5	7	19	18	46	5
Canadian respondents - May	7	12	15	20	45	2

Antisemitism

Normalization of Antisemitism in Western Countries



Share Who Agree that Antisemitism Has Become Normalized in the Following Countries



Consensus: Britain and France lead the list of countries where antisemitism is normalized

This month, we examined whether respondents feel that antisemitism is becoming normalized and is not being treated with sufficient seriousness. This followed a series of attacks on Jews in London that attracted considerable attention and led to an unusual public response from Britain's chief rabbi.

The data indicates broad, cross-community agreement that antisemitism is becoming normalized in Western countries, with Britain, France, Canada, and Australia perceived as the principal centers of risk. Britain leads the list of countries in which the phenomenon is perceived as most severe, with sweeping levels of agreement ranging from 82% among UK respondents themselves to 92% among their Canadian counterparts. Canada is also rated highly, peaking at 91% among local respondents. Canadian respondents express the most critical and concerned stance toward most of the countries examined, including Australia (85%) and the United States (76%). By contrast, UK respondents take a relatively moderate stance in their assessment of the overall situation, expressing less concern with respect to the United States (55%) and

Germany (31%), but sharing the general concern about developments in France (75%) and Belgium (72%). Only a negligible share rejects the claim entirely.

After an attack on Jews in London, Britain’s chief rabbi said that “we are witnessing the normalization of antisemitism and that it is not being treated seriously enough.” Please mark the countries below for which, in your view, this statement is true. (%)

	Argentina	Australia	Belgium	Brazil	Canada	France	Germany	Hungary	Netherlands	Russia	Ukraine	UK	U.S.	None
U.S. respondents	27	76	67	29	70	79	37	29	61	47	19	84	74	4
Canadian respondents	23	85	76	42	91	89	42	28	73	49	21	92	76	2
UK respondents	18	69	72	20	69	75	31	17	63	54	9	82	55	5

At the beginning of this month, The New York Times reported that many American Jews have changed their behavior in response to the surge in antisemitic incidents in recent years, and especially since the October 7 attack. According to the report, the change is reflected in the concealment of public expressions of worship and identity, increased vigilance in public spaces, and the circulation of warnings and alerts within the community.

The survey data indicates that the rise in antisemitism has had a significant effect on the lives of respondents, with a majority (54%) reporting concealing Jewish markers and increased vigilance. This sentiment crosses political camps and illustrates that security and social anxiety among most of the U.S. Jewish community is front and center. Just one-fifth of respondents (18%) report that the characterization does not correspond at all to their situation.

Examining the findings by religious stream shows that the sense of vulnerability and the need to change behavior are felt particularly strongly among those affiliated with institutional streams, especially those who tend to wear public religious markers or frequently attend communal institutions. Agreement peaks among Orthodox (65%) and Conservative respondents (61%). Half of Reform respondents (51%) also report a broad effect of antisemitism on their conduct.

A recent New York Times article reported that "from concealing public signs of their faith, to heightened vigilance, to warning other community members, many American Jews say they have changed their behavior in response to the rise in antisemitic violence in recent years, especially since the October 7 attacks." This report is...



	Strongly accurate	Somewhat accurate	Slightly accurate	Inaccurate	Don't know
U.S. respondents	20	34	24	18	3
Reform	15	36	29	17	3
Conservative	24	37	24	15	2
Modern Orthodox	28	37	19	14	3
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	27	23	9	23	18
Unaffiliated	17	23	27	26	7
Other	16	38	23	21	2

The question of circumcision in Belgium reached a legal crisis point in recent weeks, when authorities filed criminal indictments against three Belgian mohels (circumcizers) who allegedly performed the procedure contrary to guidelines and in violation of the law, which requires physician-performed circumcisions. Most respondents believe that this has antisemitic undertones that restrict the Jewish community's freedom of action in the country.

Half (50%) of all U.S. respondents believe the physician-only Belgian circumcision law is antisemitic. An additional quarter (25%) believe that although the law may be reasonable in itself, in the specific case of Belgium, it takes on an antisemitic character, bringing the total share identifying intentional harm to the Jewish community to a 75% majority. By contrast, the minority who believe there is no problem with the Belgian law and that local mohels should comply with it remains negligible, at 9% of the total sample; 16% of respondents did not know how to answer this question.

A breakdown by denominational affiliation reveals a direct correlation between religiosity and the severity of the interpretation of the Belgian case. Among Haredi and Modern Orthodox respondents, there is sweeping rejection of the law: three-quarters (77% of Haredim and 72% of Orthodox respondents) consider it antisemitic, and support for the Belgian state authorities is effectively nonexistent. This position moderates gradually as one moves along the denominational spectrum toward the liberal end: 56% of Conservative respondents view the law as antisemitic, while 37% of Reform respondents do so.

Belgian law states that only a licensed physician may perform circumcisions. Recently, criminal indictments were filed against three Belgian mohels who allegedly violated the law. Do you think the law is... (%)





	Antisemitic	Reasonable in principle, but likely antisemitic in the Belgian context	Reasonable and mohels should obey the law	Don't know
U.S. respondents	50	25	9	16
Reform	37	26	12	26
Conservative	56	28	7	10
Modern Orthodox	72	22	1	5
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	77	14	0	9
Unaffiliated	40	26	15	19
Other	43	23	12	21

Special National Shabbat

Trump Initiative: Special National Shabbat in the U.S.



Intention to Observe this Special Shabbat



As part of Jewish American Heritage Month (JAHM), President Trump declared the weekend of May 15-16 a “special national Shabbat” marking 250 years of American independence. The move sets a historic precedent in which the White House officially calls for a distinctly religious act of Shabbat observance, while integrating the initiative into conservative prayer events. While the Orthodox U.S. Jewish community supported the initiative and held official events in cooperation with the administration, Reform and Conservative Jewish organizations condemned the move, arguing that it violates the principle of separation of religion and state and erodes governmental neutrality.

The willingness to take part in the initiative was high among the Voice of the Jewish People respondent panel, though mostly among those who already observe Shabbat. Half of the connected U.S. Jews surveyed (48%) said they intended to observe this special Shabbat. Conversely, a substantial 21% explicitly stated that they would not observe this special Shabbat, and a similar share of respondents (19%) said that they had heard of the initiative but had not yet decided what to do or had not heard of it at all.


Among Modern Orthodox and Haredi religious respondents, there was an almost complete consensus, with the share of those who routinely observe Shabbat ranging between 81% and 95%, alongside a small percentage who honored the specific initiative. A more varied picture emerges as one moves toward the liberal end of the religious axis: in the Conservative cohort, the response was moderate, with four in ten (38%) observing Shabbat regularly and an additional 12% mobilized by the president’s initiative. Among Reform respondents, reservations about the initiative are evident: only 7% chose to join the initiative specifically, alongside one-quarter who observe Shabbat as a matter of routine. The largest group in this stream (31%) stated that they did not intend to participate in Trump’s special Shabbat initiative.

President Trump encouraged American Jews to observe a national Shabbat from the start of Shabbat on May 15 until its conclusion on May 16, in honor of 250 years of American independence. What do you intend to do? (%)



	I always observe Shabbat; will observe this one too	I intend to observe this Shabbat	I've heard about it, but haven't decided	I haven't heard about it, but I'll look into it	I will not observe this Shabbat	I do not observe Shabbat	Don't know
U.S. respondents	39	9	9	10	21	10	3
Reform	23	7	12	12	31	11	5
Conservative	38	12	11	12	18	6	3
Modern Orthodox	81	7	3	3	4	2	0
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	95	5	0	0	0	0	0
Unaffiliated	18	17	12	7	20	25	3
Other	36	6	7	11	26	13	1

Threats to Humanity's Future



This month, we asked respondents to rate, on a scale from 1 (not a threat at all) to 5 (a very serious threat), several issues that some have asserted over the past decade constitute “threats to humanity’s future.” This examination is designed to compare attitudes among Jews surveyed in the United States and among Jewish Israelis, who were asked the same questions at the beginning of the month.

Across the four risk domains presented, Jewish Israelis and connected U.S. Jews alike identify the proliferation of nuclear weapons as the most serious existential threat to humanity. A majority of respondents in both places gave this issue the highest score (a very serious threat): 64% among Jewish Israelis and 58% among U.S. respondents. When the two highest risk levels (scores of 4 and 5 combined) are calculated together, the figure rises to more than 80% in both samples. This broad consensus highlights that despite rapid technological change, the nuclear threat remains the central and most consistent concern, crossing geographic boundaries.

In contrast to the agreement on the nuclear issue, a significant gap appears in the perception of global warming as a threat, reflecting substantial differences between the two communities. While the U.S. Jews surveyed view the climate crisis as a serious and immediate threat, with 61% rating the issue at 4 or 5 (including 43% as a very serious threat), Jewish Israelis display relative indifference, with a different distribution of responses. Forty-three percent of Jewish Israelis placed the risk in the high-threat categories, and only 21% gave it the maximum score. Similar but more moderate gaps were also recorded regarding the impact of social media, which is perceived as far more of a threat by the U.S. Jews surveyed (77% compared with 53% in Israel), and regarding the development of artificial intelligence (AI), which in both

samples was rated as the least serious of the four threats, with a large share of respondents in both Israel and the United States ranking it a 3.

Please rate, from 1 (not a threat at all) to 5 (a very serious threat), how dangerous the following issues are to humanity's future



Global Warming

	1 - Not a threat at all	2	3	4	5 - Very serious threat
U.S. respondents	12	12	15	18	43
Jewish Israelis	15	16	27	22	21

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

	1 - Not a threat at all	2	3	4	5 - Very serious threat
U.S. respondents	1	4	13	24	58
Jewish Israelis	1	4	10	21	64

Development of Artificial Intelligence (AI)

	1 - Not dangerous at all	2	3	4	5 - Very dangerous
U.S. respondents	3	12	39	24	22
Jewish Israelis	11	21	36	18	14

Impact of Social Media

	1 - Not dangerous at all	2	3	4	5 - Very dangerous
U.S. respondents	1	3	19	32	45
Jewish Israelis	7	10	29	30	23


Content Consumption: Israel and Judaism



Patterns of consumption of literature about Israel among the connected U.S. Jews surveyed point to a sustained and active intellectual interest, with a majority (70%) of respondents reporting that they had read a book on this topic in the past year. The distribution of responses indicates an active and dynamic readership: one-fifth of the connected U.S. Jews surveyed (21%) say they are currently reading a book about Israel, alongside another fifth (20%) who have read such a book in the past month. Conversely, a quarter of respondents (27%) report not having read a book on Israel for a long time, while only a negligible share (3%) states that they have never read an Israel-related book.

There is a clear and consistent correlation between ideological orientation and the frequency of reading about Israel, with the conservative cohorts showing the highest level of engagement. A majority (57%) of respondents in the strong conservative cohort have read a book about Israel in the past month or are currently reading one. Thirty-one percent of the leaning-conservative cohort, too, are currently reading an Israel-related book. As one moves along the ideological spectrum toward the liberal end, the frequency of reading about Israel declines gradually: among centrist respondents, the share currently reading stands at one-fifth (19%), and in the liberal cohorts it falls slightly to 17% among leaning-liberal respondents and 15% among those in the strong liberal group. Notably, even at the strong liberal pole, most respondents (55%) have read an Israel-related book in the past year.

Regarding books about Israel... (%)




	I am reading one now	I have read one in the past month	I have read one in the past year	I have not read one for a long time	I have never read one
U.S. respondents	21	20	29	27	3
Strong liberal	15	16	39	27	3
Leaning liberal	17	22	28	30	3
Center	19	24	25	30	2
Leaning conservative	31	19	24	24	1
Strong conservative	34	23	18	19	6

The data indicates a very high incidence of reading books dealing with Judaism, including Torah texts, among respondents. An 80% majority reported having read a book on Jewish subjects in the past year. One-third (35%) report that they are currently reading a book about Judaism or Torah, compared with 21% who reported currently reading a book about Israel. An additional 19% report having read such a book in the past month, and 26% said they have done so in the past year. Just 17% reported not having read a Jewish book for a long time, and a negligible share (2%) reported having never read a book dealing with these topics.

A breakdown by denominational affiliation reveals a direct association between the level of conservatism and reading habits. Currently-reading rates among Haredi and Modern Orthodox respondents are the highest, reaching 68% and 59%, respectively, with only a negligible 5% saying they have not read a book on the subject for a long time and none reporting that they have never read such a book. This trend moderates gradually as one moves toward the liberal end of the denominational spectrum but remains substantial: among Reform and Conservative respondents, close to one-third are currently reading a Jewish or Torah book (32% and 27%, respectively), and most have read such a book in the past year.

Regarding books about Judaism, Torah, or other Jewish subjects... (%)



	I am reading one now	I have read one in the past month	I have read one in the past year	I have not read one for a long time	I have never read one
U.S. respondents	35	19	26	17	2
Reform	32	18	28	19	2
Conservative	27	23	31	18	2
Modern Orthodox	59	17	19	5	0
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	68	23	5	5	0
Unaffiliated	33	15	21	27	4
Other	35	20	25	17	3

Consumption of Israel-related films and television series is also high. Three-quarters (75%) of respondents reported having watched content of this kind in the past year, a figure slightly higher than the share that has read books about Israel (70%). However, a closer examination of consumption dynamics shows that while books have a higher share of active readers at any given moment (21% reported that they are currently reading a book), visual media are characterized by concentrated periodic consumption: only 9% of respondents said they were currently watching an Israel-related television series or film, but 31% have watched such content in the past month, and an additional 35% have consumed such content in the past 12 months. Conversely, 23% noted that they had not watched television or film concerning Israel for a long time.

Regarding feature films, documentaries, and television series about Israel... (%)					
	I am watching one now	I have watched one in the past month	I have watched one in the past year	I have not watched one for a long time	I have never watched one
U.S. respondents	9	31	35	23	2
Strong liberal	6	28	36	27	2
Leaning liberal	6	28	38	26	1
Center	12	34	36	16	3
Leaning conservative	13	32	35	18	2
Strong conservative	13	35	27	20	5

Three-quarters (76%) of the respondent panel said they had watched films or television series about Judaism, Torah, or other Jewish topics in the past year. Ongoing consumption is characterized by a periodic dynamic: only an 8% minority of respondents report currently watching such content, but close to a third (31%) have watched Judaism-related content in the past month, and an additional third (37%) have consumed it over the past year. Conversely, one-quarter (23%) said they had not watched Judaism-related media for a long time, and just 2% reported never having consumed such content.

The Modern Orthodox cohort shows the highest level of engagement in regular viewing of Jewish content, with half of this group (51%) having watched a Jewish film or series in the past month or watching one now. Notable activity is also found among Haredi respondents, with 18% reporting current viewing, although 36% report little interest in such media. In the liberal cohorts, viewing patterns are broad and stable over time: 76% of Reform respondents and 75% of Conservative respondents have consumed Jewish-related media in the past year, with a third in both streams (31%) having watched such content in the past month.

Regarding feature films, documentaries, and television series about Judaism, Torah, or other Jewish subjects... (%)




	I am watching one now	I have watched one in the past month	I have watched one in the past year	I have not watched one for a long time	I have never watched one
U.S. respondents	8	31	37	23	2
Reform	4	31	41	22	2
Conservative	9	31	35	23	3
Modern Orthodox	15	36	33	16	1
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	18	14	23	36	9
Unaffiliated	6	29	33	27	4
Other	5	33	40	22	1

Survey Data and Implications

This report is based on a survey of 989 Jews registered for JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People respondent panel. Broadly speaking, the survey reflects the views of connected American Jews – that is, those with a relatively strong connection to the Jewish community, and/or Israel, and/or Jewish identity. The survey included 65 respondents in the United Kingdom and 131 in Canada. Unless otherwise noted, the results reflect the views of U.S. respondents only. JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People Index survey was conducted by JPPI fellows Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepko, with assistance from Yael Levinovsky. Prof. David Steinberg provided statistical supervision.

This table includes data on the U.S. survey respondents for May 2026.



May 2026 Survey: Participant Data		
	%	#
Reform	23	180
Conservative	33	259
Modern Orthodox	13	101
Ultra-Orthodox	3	22
Other	16	129
No stream	13	102
Strong liberal	28	222
Leaning liberal	21	170
Centrist	22	178
Leaning conservative	15	119
Strong conservative	13	104
Single / divorced / widowed	28	223
Married/in long-term relationship with a Jewish spouse	56	445
Married/in long-term relationship with a non-Jewish spouse	16	125
Affiliated	85	678
Non-affiliated	15	115
Never visited Israel	19	147
Visited Israel once	16	128
Visited Israel more than once	47	373
Lived in Israel	18	145
Jewish by religion	94	747
Jew by no religion (JBNR)	2	15
Partially Jewish	2	14
No religion	2	17