

JPPI Voice of the Jewish People Index

Connected U.S. Jews' Disillusionment with the Iran Campaign Deepens: Just One-Third Now View It as a Success, while Nearly Two-Thirds See It as a Failure. Yet the Prevailing View Remains Hawkish: More than Half Say U.S. Action Did Not Go Far Enough.


Main Findings

- Views of the Iran campaign: A large majority of Harris voters see it as a failure, while a large majority of Trump voters see it as a success.
- A consistently hawkish stance: More than half of respondents say the U.S. action against Iran "did not go far enough," compared with nearly one-third who say it "went too far."
- Netanyahu's leadership on Iran: His leadership rating continues to erode moderately, with a sharp political divide – an overwhelming majority of strong conservatives rate his leadership positively, while an overwhelming majority of strong liberals rate it negatively.
- Israel's election: A majority of respondents prefer an opposition victory, compared with roughly one in seven who prefer the current coalition.
- Following but not voting: Three-quarters follow the Israeli election, but only about one in ten respondents are eligible to vote.
- Two-thirds view votes cast by Israelis living abroad as legitimate. Relatively few know Israelis who plan to travel to Israel to vote.
- Future of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank): Connected U.S. Jews lean toward establishing a Palestinian state, in contrast to Israeli Jews, among whom annexation is the most widely supported option.
- Moral map: The connected U.S. Jews surveyed are considerably more permissive than Israeli Jews on most issues, but less supportive of the death penalty.
- Jewish identity in the Diaspora: Nearly half conceal their Jewish identity while traveling at least sometimes.
- Ahead of the holidays, three in four respondents intend to attend prayer services in person (not remotely).

Survey context: August data was collected about a month after the signing of the agreement that brought the campaign against Iran to an end, as public debate continued over its results and the leadership that conducted it. At the same time, President Trump's initiative to disarm Hamas in Gaza occupied a prominent place in public discourse, alongside preparations for the congressional midterm elections and Israel's election, expected in the fall.

Methodological note: In recent months, we have also been surveying Jews in Canada and the United Kingdom. In August, 136 respondents participated from Canada and 68 from the UK. These findings should be interpreted with caution because of the small sample sizes. All breakdowns by ideology, denomination, or vote refer to U.S. Jews only.

The Iran War: Disillusionment Continues



As Operation Roaring Lion recedes, connected U.S. Jews' assessment of the campaign's success continues to erode. In March 2026, two-thirds (66%) viewed it as successful. Since then, the figure has declined almost steadily – to 56% in April, 48% in May, a low of 28% in June, and 36% in July. In August, just one-third (33%) view it as successful, while nearly two-thirds (64%) view it as a failure.

Thinking about the war with Iran, are you under the impression that the campaign succeeded or failed? (%)

U.S. respondents (2026)	Succeeded	Failed	Don't know
March	66	26	8
April	56	40	4
May	48	47	6
June	28	70	2
July	36	61	3
August	33	64	4

*“Succeeded” and “failed” combine the success categories (“The war was a major success for the United States and Israel” and “The war was somewhat successful”) and the failure categories (“The war was not very successful” and “The war was a failure for the United States and Israel”), respectively.

Among strong liberals, an overwhelming 89% view the campaign as a failure, while four in five strong conservatives (80%) still view it as a success. The divide is even sharper by 2024 presidential vote: 73% of Trump voters view the campaign as successful, while 84% of Harris voters see it as a failure. The trend is evident across all three communities: in Canada, the share viewing the campaign as a success fell from 70% in March to 37% in August; in the UK, from 75% to 31%.

Thinking about the war with Iran, are you under the impression that the campaign succeeded or failed? (%)

	The war was a major success for the United States and Israel	The war was somewhat successful	The war was not very successful	The war was a failure for the United States and Israel	Don't know
U.S. respondents	3	30	18	46	4
Canadian respondents	2	35	28	34	1
UK respondents	1	29	21	44	4
Strong liberal	0	8	11	78	3
Lean liberal	0	15	21	61	3
Center	2	37	25	31	4
Lean conservative	3	61	18	14	4
Strong conservative	16	64	14	4	3
Trump voters	8	64	16	8	4
Harris voters	0	13	17	66	3

The same substantial decline is evident in Canada and the UK. In Canada, the share viewing the campaign as successful fell from 70% in March to a low of 27% in June, before rising slightly to 37% in August. In the UK, it declined from 75% in March to 31% in August. The pattern thus extends across all three communities, although the degree of erosion varies.

Thinking about the war with Iran, are you under the impression that the campaign succeeded or failed? (%)

The campaign succeeded	March	May	June	July	August
Canadian respondents	70	59	27	41	37
UK respondents	75	52	38	47	31


*"The campaign succeeded" combines the responses "The war was a major success for the United States and Israel" and "The war was somewhat successful."

Despite the erosion in assessments of the campaign's outcome, the majority's view of the military action itself remains positive and stable compared with last month. Among connected U.S. Jews, 55% say the U.S. action against Iran "did not go far enough," compared with 30% who say it "went too far" and just 3% who say it was "about right." Thus, criticism of the campaign does not reflect opposition to the use of force; for many, it reflects a belief that the force employed was not decisive enough. A breakdown by political orientation shows that nearly two-thirds (64%) of strong liberals say the action went too far, while overwhelming majorities of both lean conservatives and strong conservatives (93%–96%) favor a tougher approach. The voting divide is similarly pronounced: 94% of Trump voters say the action did not go far enough, compared with 45% of Harris voters who say it went too far. The hawkish view is also prominent in Canada (72%) and the UK (65%).

Did the U.S. military action against Iran go too far, not far enough, or was it about right? (%)

	Went too far	Not far enough	About right	Don't know
U.S. respondents – July	28	56	5	11
U.S. respondents – August	30	55	3	12
Canadian respondents – July	18	73	3	6
Canadian respondents – August	14	72	1	13
UK respondents – July	19	67	6	8
UK respondents – August	24	65	3	9
Strong liberal	64	19	1	16
Lean liberal	35	41	3	21
Center	12	72	5	11
Lean conservative	1	96	2	2
Strong conservative	1	93	4	2
Trump voters	0	94	3	2
Harris voters	45	34	2	18

Leadership Ratings on Iran



As assessments of the campaign's success eroded, so too did evaluations of the leaders who conducted it. President Trump's leadership rating on Iran fell from 46% "good" in March to a low of 21% in June, partially recovered to 32% in July, and declined again this month to 26%. Two-thirds (67%) rate his leadership as "poor," with a majority rating it "very poor." July's rebound, in other words, did not hold. Political orientation explains most of the variation: among strong conservatives, nearly three-quarters (73%) rate him positively, as do just over half (54%) of lean conservatives. Among strong liberals, by contrast, 90% rate his leadership as "very poor." Among centrists, 39% rate his leadership as "very poor," compared with 29% who rate it positively.

How would you rate President Trump's leadership on Iran? (%)

	Good	Neutral	Poor	Don't know
March	46	4	48	2
April	43	4	52	1
May	40	4	55	1
June	21	7	72	1
July	32	6	62	1
August	26	6	67	1

*Combined categories: "good" = very good + somewhat good; "neutral" = neither good nor bad; "poor" = somewhat poor + very poor.

The divide by 2024 vote is also sharp: 68% of Trump voters rate his leadership positively, while 81% of Harris voters rate Trump's leadership on Iran as "very poor."

How would you rate President Trump's leadership on Iran? (%)

	Very good	Somewhat good	Neither good nor bad	Somewhat poor	Very poor	Don't know
U.S. respondents – March	28	18	4	11	37	2
U.S. respondents – April	23	20	4	9	43	1
U.S. respondents – May	18	22	4	9	46	1
U.S. respondents – June	5	16	7	17	55	1
U.S. respondents – July	9	23	6	12	50	1
U.S. respondents – August	7	19	6	14	53	1
Strong liberal	0	3	0	5	90	2
Lean liberal	1	5	5	15	75	0
Center	4	25	11	20	39	0
Lean conservative	10	44	8	22	12	4
Strong conservative	33	40	13	13	1	1
Trump voters	21	47	10	15	4	3
Harris voters	1	4	4	10	81	1

Prime Minister Netanyahu's leadership rating on Iran has eroded slowly but steadily – from 53% rating his leadership as "good" in March to just 38% this month, while 52% now rate his leadership as "poor." Unlike Trump, Netanyahu did not experience a sudden collapse; rather, his rating has eroded gradually. The overall figure masks polarization even sharper than that surrounding Trump: 92% of strong conservatives rate Netanyahu positively, while 84% of strong liberals rate him negatively. Centrist respondents lean slightly positive (47% good versus 37% poor). Canadian Jews rate Netanyahu somewhat more positively than their U.S. counterparts, with half rating his leadership as "good"; the UK picture is similar to the U.S., with four in ten rating him positively.

How would you rate Prime Minister Netanyahu's leadership on Iran? (%)


	Very good	Somewhat good	Neither good nor bad	Somewhat poor	Very poor	Don't know
U.S. respondents - March	35	19	5	12	26	4
U.S. respondents - May	25	21	7	14	31	2
U.S. respondents - July	21	20	8	15	35	2
U.S. respondents - August	19	19	8	17	35	3
Strong liberal	2	9	3	15	69	4
Lean liberal	3	11	10	31	43	2
Center	19	28	13	17	20	4
Lean conservative	40	34	13	10	2	2
Strong conservative	64	28	3	3	0	2
Canadian respondents	21	28	10	13	26	2
UK respondents	21	22	10	13	31	3

In Canada and the UK, local leaders receive low ratings on Iran. In Canada, Prime Minister Mark Carney's rating remains low and stable: only 18% rate his leadership as "good," while nearly two-thirds (63%) rate it as "poor." In the UK, respondents were asked this month for the first time about the new prime minister, Andy Burnham, who replaced Keir Starmer. Views are mixed and relatively diffuse: only 16% rate him positively, 28% choose the middle category, and half rate him negatively.

How would you rate Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney's leadership on Iran? (Canadian respondents, %)

	Very good	Somewhat good	Neither good nor bad	Somewhat poor	Very poor	Don't know
March	6	20	14	20	40	1
April	5	7	19	18	46	5
May	7	12	15	20	45	2
June	5	10	11	15	56	3
August	7	11	16	23	40	3

Israel's Election



With Israel's election expected in two months, this month we examined how connected U.S. Jews view it. Attention is high: 78% follow election news very or somewhat closely, although only 8% hold Israeli citizenship and are eligible to vote. When asked whom they would prefer to win, respondents lean toward a change of government: a majority (54%) prefer the current opposition, compared with 14% who prefer the current coalition; 8% have no preference, and 24% say it is not their place to say.

Preference largely mirrors ideological orientation and the composition of the panel, which has a Democratic majority. Among strong liberals, 78% support the opposition in Israel, as do 74% of Harris voters in the 2024 election. At the other end of the ideological spectrum, 56% of strong conservatives and 43% of Trump voters prefer the coalition. Even among them, however, the preference is not overwhelming, and a sizable 34% of Trump voters decline to take a position. Canadian (49%) and UK (57%) respondents resemble their U.S. counterparts in their support for a change of government.

Do you have a clear preference as to who wins the upcoming election in Israel? (%)

	Current coalition	Current opposition	No preference	It is not my place to say
U.S. respondents	14	54	8	24
Canadian respondents	19	49	8	24
UK respondents	15	57	9	19
Strong liberal	2	78	6	14
Lean liberal	1	71	5	23
Center	8	49	10	33
Lean conservative	31	21	13	35
Strong conservative	56	8	10	25
Trump voters	43	13	10	34
Harris voters	1	74	6	18

Breaking respondents down by eligibility to vote in the upcoming Israeli election sharpens the picture. Support for the current opposition remains stable and dominant in both groups: similar majorities of eligible voters (55%) and those not eligible to vote (53%) prefer an opposition victory. Differences emerge, however, in support for the coalition and in reluctance to express a view. Among eligible voters, support for the current coalition is nearly twice as high as among those who are ineligible (26% versus 14%). By contrast, those who are not eligible to vote are considerably more likely to refrain from taking a position: one-quarter (25%) say “it is not my place to say,” and the share with no preference is almost twice as high. In other words, eligibility to vote sharpens preferences and strengthens support for the coalition somewhat, without eroding the opposition’s advantage.

Do you have a clear preference as to who wins the upcoming election in Israel? (%)				
	Yes, the current coalition	Yes, the current opposition	No, I have no preference	It is not my place to say
Eligible to vote	26	55	5	15
Not eligible to vote	14	53	9	25

In a follow-up question, we examined connected U.S. Jews’ views of Israelis living abroad who plan to travel to Israel to vote. The subject has generated lively debate in Israel in recent months over the legitimacy of such voting, and initiatives such as “Vote&Fly” have emerged to encourage Israelis abroad to travel to Israel to cast ballots and thereby broaden participation in the election.

Nearly two-thirds (65%) of respondents say that if Israelis care enough to invest the time and money required to travel to Israel and vote, their vote is legitimate, compared with 17% who say that voting by people who do not live in Israel and do not bear the consequences of their vote is problematic. Another 18% answer “don’t know.” Majorities of both Trump voters (58%) and Harris voters (70%) regard voting by Israelis living abroad as legitimate. However, 27% of Trump voters see such voting as problematic, more than twice the share among Harris voters (12%). Notably, panel participants who are eligible to vote in Israel are more likely than those who are not eligible to view such voting as potentially problematic.

Under Israeli law, Israelis must be in Israel to vote. There is currently a debate in Israel over whether Israelis living abroad should vote and influence Israel's future. Which of the following statements comes closest to your view? (%)

	If people care enough to invest the time and money to travel back to Israel, their vote is legitimate	If people do not live in Israel and do not bear the consequences of their vote, their participation in Israeli elections is problematic	Don't know
U.S. respondents	65	17	18
Canadian respondents	67	19	14
UK respondents	63	16	21
Strong liberal	68	12	20
Center	66	14	20
Strong conservative	61	24	15
Trump voters	58	27	15
Harris voters	70	12	19
Eligible to vote	63	27	10
Not eligible to vote	66	16	18

Most panel participants say they do not know Israelis living outside Israel who plan to travel to Israel to vote in the upcoming election (63% in the United States, 68% in Canada, and 59% in the UK). Only a few percent of respondents say they know “many” Israelis planning to come vote. Looking at all forms of acquaintance (“a few,” “one or two,” and “many”), just over one-third of respondents (37% in the United States, 33% in Canada, and 41% in the UK) know Israelis who plan to travel to Israel to vote.

A breakdown by political orientation shows broadly similar patterns across the ideological spectrum, with only modest differences in familiarity with the phenomenon. In every political camp, a majority say they do not know Israelis planning to travel to Israel to vote, with unfamiliarity somewhat more pronounced among conservatives. The combined share who know Israelis planning to travel reaches a high of 41% among strong liberals, suggesting that discussion of traveling to vote is somewhat more common in center-left circles, but remains limited overall.

Do you know Israelis living outside Israel who plan to travel to Israel to vote in the upcoming election? (%)

	Yes, many	Yes, a few	Maybe one or two	Not that I know of
U.S. respondents	5	18	14	63
Canadian respondents	1	19	13	68
UK respondents	6	16	19	59
Strong liberal	6	18	17	59
Lean liberal	5	21	11	63
Center	8	15	17	60
Lean conservative	2	20	7	70
Strong conservative	3	14	15	69

Respondents' interest in the upcoming election reflects broad and sustained attention to Israeli politics. Nearly eight in ten (78%) say they follow news about the election – 35% “very closely” and 43% “somewhat closely.” By contrast, only 18% say they do not follow it very closely, while the share who do not follow it at all remains marginal.

A breakdown by political orientation reveals meaningful differences in the intensity of attention, with respondents in the center and on the conservative right following the election more closely than those on the liberal wing. Strong conservatives are the most likely to follow the election “very closely” (47%), followed by centrists (44%) and lean conservatives (35%). Among liberals, the share following very closely is substantially lower – 28% among strong liberals and 29% among lean liberals – with the largest shares instead following “somewhat closely” (47% and 50%, respectively). Even so, when “very closely” and “somewhat closely” are combined, interest remains high (above 75%) across the ideological spectrum, and disinterest is minimal in every group.

A breakdown by respondents' direct ties to Israel shows a clear relationship between those ties and the intensity with which they follow the election. Among respondents who previously lived in Israel, 51% follow the election “very closely,” and the combined share following it reaches 90%. A similar pattern appears among those who have visited Israel more than once: 39% follow very closely and another 44% somewhat closely. As direct ties weaken, intensive attention declines. Among those who have visited Israel only once and those who have never visited, the share following “very closely” falls to about half that level (20% and 18%, respectively), alongside higher shares who do not follow very closely (26% and 30%) or do not follow at all (8% and 9%).

How closely are you following news about the upcoming election in Israel? (%)


	Very closely	Somewhat closely	Not very closely	Not at all
U.S. respondents	35	43	18	4
Canadian respondents	33	48	18	1
UK respondents	37	38	21	4
Strong liberal	28	47	21	5
Lean liberal	29	50	17	4
Center	44	38	16	2
Lean conservative	35	41	21	3
Strong conservative	47	35	11	6
Never visited Israel	18	43	30	9
Visited Israel once	20	47	26	8
Visited Israel more than once	39	44	14	2
Lived in Israel	51	39	9	2

The data also reveals a clear gap in the intensity of attention to Israel's upcoming election between panel participants who are eligible to vote and those who are not. Among eligible voters, an overwhelming 92% say they follow political developments in Israel (63% "very closely" and 29% "somewhat closely"), compared with just 8% who follow "not very closely" or "not at all." Among those who are not eligible to vote, overall attention remains high at 77%, but the intensity differs: only about one-third (32%) follow "very closely," while 45% follow "somewhat closely," and the share who follow "not very closely" or "not at all" nearly triples to 23%.

How closely are you following news about the upcoming election in Israel? (%)

	Very closely	Somewhat closely	Not very closely	Not at all
Eligible to vote	63	29	5	3
Not eligible to vote	32	45	19	4

The Future of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank)



This month, panel participants were asked the same question presented in JPPI's Israeli Society Index about what they view as the realistic long-term objective for the future of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) and the settlements there. The wording asked respondents to choose an outcome that is "both feasible and preferable, even if it can only be achieved many years from now." Respondents were presented with ten options, condensed from proposals voiced by different Israeli public figures. These can be grouped into four clusters: annexation of the entire territory (three variants differing in the status of the Arab population); partition of the territory (between Israel and Jordan or a Palestinian state); transfer of the entire territory to another entity; and continuation of the status quo. Comparing connected U.S. Jews with Israeli Jews reveals a clear difference: among Israeli Jews, the balance of opinion tilts toward annexation (38%), while among connected U.S. Jews it tilts toward partition (31%) or relinquishing the entire territory (20%).

When you think about Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) and its long-term future, what should Israel's realistic strategic objective be? (Choose your preferred option, even if it can only be achieved many years from now.) (%)

	Connected U.S. Jews	Israeli Jews	Canadian respondents	UK respondents
Annex all; citizenship + vote	8	1	6	4
Annex all; autonomy, no citizenship	9	14	13	6
Annex all; Arab population relocates	9	22	11	12
Partition by majority: Israel/Jordan	15	14	19	21
Partition by majority: Israel/Palestinian state	16	21	18	16
Jordan annexes all/nearly all	2	1	2	0
Palestinian state in all/nearly all	18	5	11	28
Status quo for decades	5	12	4	0
None of these options	6	4	7	6
Don't know	12	5	9	7

The gap concerns not only overall support for annexation (26% among connected U.S. Jews versus 38% among Israeli Jews), but also the form annexation takes. Among Israeli supporters of annexation, the most common version is one in which “the Arab population moves to other countries” (22%). Among connected U.S. Jews, only 9% choose this option. Conversely, the single most common option among connected U.S. Jews is establishing a Palestinian state throughout the entire territory (18%), compared with only 5% among Israeli Jews.

The ideological divide in the U.S. panel is stark: among strong liberals, 43% choose an outcome in which Israel relinquishes the territory (most support a Palestinian state throughout it), while 62% of strong conservatives choose annexation of the entire territory. The difference is also evident by vote: 48% of Trump voters choose annexation, compared with 31% of Harris voters who choose relinquishment. Connected Canadian Jews lean somewhat more toward annexation than their U.S. counterparts, while UK Jews are the most dovish – 28% choose a Palestinian state throughout the entire territory.

Long-Term Objective for the West Bank (%)

	Annex entire territory	Partition territory	Relinquish entire territory	Continue status quo	None of these	Don't know
U.S. respondents	26	31	20	5	6	12
Strong liberal	14	22	43	2	8	11
Lean liberal	12	41	24	4	5	14
Center	27	43	7	5	7	11
Lean conservative	38	34	2	12	2	12
Strong conservative	62	14	0	4	5	15
Trump voters	48	25	1	7	5	14
Harris voters	14	33	31	3	6	12

Moral Map: Connected U.S. Jews and Israeli Jews

Share viewing each behavior as "morally acceptable"

Connected U.S. Jews, August 2026

Same-sex relations		80%
Abortion		74%
Physician-assisted suicide for severely ill patients		66%
Gambling		66%
Driving over the speed limit		55%
Medical experiments on animals		55%
Death penalty for murderers		54%
Paying cash without an invoice/receipt		46%
Polygamy		9%
Extramarital affairs		5%

Israeli Jews, August 2026

Same-sex relations		61%
Abortion		61%
Physician-assisted suicide for severely ill patients		59%
Gambling		27%
Driving over the speed limit		21%
Medical experiments on animals		48%
Death penalty for murderers		63%
Paying cash without an invoice/receipt		18%
Polygamy		9%
Extramarital affairs		8%

Once a year, we present respondents with a series of ten behaviors and ask them, independently of what is legal or illegal, whether they consider each behavior or activity “morally acceptable” or “morally unacceptable” according to their own worldview. The series is based on a similar questionnaire used by Gallup in the United States, enabling three comparisons: with Israeli Jews, with the U.S. public as a whole, and with connected U.S. Jews surveyed last year.

A comparison of moral attitudes among connected U.S. Jews and Israeli Jews shows substantial stability over time alongside cultural and structural differences between the two communities. The connected U.S. Jews surveyed express clearly more liberal and permissive attitudes on social and personal issues: 80% regard same-sex relations as morally acceptable (compared with 61% of Israeli Jews), and 74% say the same of abortion (compared with 61%). Even larger gaps appear in everyday and civic behaviors: 66% of the connected U.S. Jews surveyed regard gambling as morally acceptable and 55% say the same of driving over the speed limit, compared with 27% and 21%, respectively, of Israeli Jews. Similarly, 46% of the connected U.S. Jews surveyed regard paying cash without an invoice or receipt as morally acceptable, compared with just 18% of Israeli Jews. The only issue on which Israeli Jews express substantially greater acceptance is the death penalty for murderers, regarded as morally acceptable by 63% of Israeli Jews compared with 54% of the connected U.S. Jews surveyed.

Comparing the connected U.S. Jews surveyed with the U.S. public as a whole in the Gallup survey shows that the connected Jewish sample is consistently more liberal than the general public, especially on questions of individual liberty and end-of-life decisions. Abortion is regarded as morally acceptable by a much larger share of the connected U.S. Jews surveyed than of the general public (74% versus 49%), as is physician-assisted suicide for severely ill patients (66% versus 49%) and same-sex relations (80% versus 62%). On some issues, however, there is broad cross-community consensus: extramarital affairs are viewed as morally unacceptable by all groups, with only negligible shares considering them acceptable. Polygamy is also broadly rejected (9% among both Israeli Jews and the connected U.S. Jews surveyed), although acceptance among the U.S. public as a whole is twice as high (19%).

Share viewing each behavior as “morally acceptable” (%)


	Israeli Jews, August 2025	Israeli Jews, August 2026	Connected U.S. Jews, August 2025	Connected U.S. Jews, August 2026	All U.S. adults (Gallup, May 2026)
Gambling	30	27	69	66	57
Same-sex relations	61	61	79	80	62
Abortion	65	61	77	74	49
Medical experiments on animals	51	48	58	55	45
Paying cash without an invoice/receipt	20	18	49	46	—
Death penalty for murderers	64	63	55	54	52
Physician-assisted suicide for severely ill patients	60	59	67	66	49
Extramarital affairs	13	8	4	5	7
Driving over the speed limit	19	21	53	55	—
Polygamy	10	9	12	9	19

As expected, moral judgments vary with ideology. On issues commonly associated with liberal values, the gap between the poles is very wide: same-sex relations are regarded as morally acceptable by all strong liberals (100%) compared with one-third (32%) of strong conservatives; on abortion, the figures are 97% and 20%, respectively. The death penalty reverses the pattern: 90% of strong conservatives regard it as morally acceptable, compared with just 19% of strong liberals. By contrast, on less ideologically polarized issues, such as gambling and driving over the speed limit, the gap nearly disappears.

Share viewing each behavior as “morally acceptable” (%)

	Strong liberal	Center	Strong conservative
Same-sex relations	100	75	32
Abortion	97	77	20
Physician-assisted suicide for severely ill patients	86	62	32
Death penalty for murderers	19	69	90
Gambling	64	69	64

Jewish Identity



As we did during last summer's travel season, this month we examined whether panel participants conceal their Jewish identity when traveling. Nearly half (47%) do so at least sometimes – 5% "always" and 42% "sometimes" – while 40% never conceal their Jewish identity. The year-over-year comparison suggests a modest decline in concealment: the share who "always" conceal their identity fell from 9% in August 2025 to 5%, while the share who "never" do so rose slightly. By denomination, Modern Orthodox respondents stand out for the highest share answering "sometimes" (57%). UK respondents are the clearest outlier, with a much higher share than the other groups answering "always" (18%).

When you travel, do you conceal your Jewish identity in any way? (%)


	Always	Sometimes	Never	I rarely travel
U.S. respondents – August 2025	9	42	37	13
U.S. respondents – August 2026	5	42	40	12
Reform	6	37	44	12
Conservative	8	47	36	8
Modern Orthodox	1	57	37	5
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	6	19	63	13
No denomination	4	38	43	16
Canadian respondents	4	43	46	7
UK respondents	18	29	40	13

Ahead of the Holidays


Ahead of the Holidays

**"The Tishrei holidays begin in about a month.
Do you plan to:"**

- Attend a prayer service more than once
- Attend a prayer service at least once
- I do not plan to attend a prayer service
- Attend prayer services online only
- I don't know yet



**Plan to attend prayer services in person,
by denomination**



Ahead of the High Holidays, which begin roughly a month after the survey was conducted, 72% of respondents plan to attend prayer services in person (20% at least once and 52% more than once), a rate essentially unchanged from last year. As expected, denominational differences are pronounced: 92% of Modern Orthodox respondents and 88% of Haredi respondents plan to attend in person, compared with just 48% of those with no denominational affiliation. Respondents with no denominational affiliation also have the highest share who do not plan to attend prayer services at all (35%).

The Tishrei holidays begin in about a month. Do you plan to:

	Attend a prayer service at least once	Attend a prayer service more than once	Attend prayer services online only	I do not plan to attend a prayer service	I don't know yet
U.S. respondents	20	52	8	13	7
No denomination	19	29	6	35	10
Reform	22	46	13	11	9
Conservative	17	61	8	10	3
Modern Orthodox	25	67	1	5	2
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	19	69	0	13	0

Survey Data and Implications

This report is based on a survey of participants in JPPI's Voice of the Jewish People respondent panel, conducted August 15–20, 2026. The survey primarily reflects the views of “connected” Jews – those with relatively strong ties to the Jewish community, Israel, and/or Jewish identity. The sample is not representative of all U.S. Jews. The survey included 804 U.S. respondents, 136 Canadian respondents, and 68 UK respondents. Unless otherwise noted, the results reflect U.S. respondents only; Canadian and UK findings are presented as indicative trends because of the small sample sizes.. Comparisons with Israeli Jews are based on JPPI's August 2026 Israeli Society Index. JPPI's Voice of the Jewish People Index survey was conducted by JPPI fellows Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepko, with research and writing assistance from Yael Levinovsky. Prof. David Steinberg provided statistical oversight.

This table presents data on U.S. respondents for August 2026

Survey respondents – August 2026 (U.S.)

	#	%
Other	130	16
No denomination	109	14
Reform	188	23
Conservative	259	32
Modern Orthodox	102	13
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	16	2
Strong liberal	232	29
Lean liberal	185	23
Center	166	21
Lean conservative	125	16
Strong conservative	96	12
Single / divorced / widowed	219	27
Married / partnered with a Jewish spouse or partner	471	59
Married / partnered with a non-Jewish spouse or partner	114	14
Connected to the community	684	85
Not connected to the community	120	15
Never visited Israel	148	18
Visited Israel once	117	15
Visited Israel more than once	369	46
Lived in Israel	168	21
Voted for Trump (2024)	238	30
Voted for Harris (2024)	495	62