

JPPI Israeli Society Index

This report examines attitudes as the new year begins and assessments of the year just ended; the importance of the approaching elections and the issues likely to determine them; the future of the Gaza Strip; the sense of victory in the war; the Qusra incident; the rise in antisemitism worldwide; and the education system.


Main Finding

In each of the social, economic, and security spheres, a majority of Israelis say the past year was not good. Four in ten say Israel is improving, but a majority believe it is deteriorating.

Additional Findings

- A fateful election: Four in ten Israelis believe these elections will be “the most important in the country’s history,” while an equal share say they will be especially important.
- The issues emerging as decisive in the coming elections: security, relations between the government and the judiciary, and unity.
- Three-quarters of Jewish Israelis would not agree “under any circumstances” to an Israeli withdrawal from the security perimeter in Gaza; support among Jewish Israelis for occupying the Strip has increased over the past year.
- One-third of Israelis describe the Jewish youths involved in the Qusra incident as “Israeli terrorists”; virtually no respondents on the right chose that description.
- Perceptions of antisemitism: Three-quarters of Jewish Israelis regard an academic boycott of Israel as antisemitic, compared with two-thirds a year ago.
- One-third attribute the rise in antisemitism worldwide to Israeli policy; two-thirds believe there is no connection, or only a weak one, between Israel’s conduct and antisemitism.
- The education system continues to erode: a growing share describe it as “not good.”
- The most contested subject: Many Israelis want to add more hours of Jewish studies to the school timetable, while many others want to reduce them.

As the New Year Begins



For the second year, ahead of Rosh Hashanah, we asked Israelis which statement best reflects their view of Israel's overall situation. This year's picture is somewhat more optimistic than last year's: 35% of all Israelis and 43% of Jewish Israelis chose "Israel is improving, and things will get even better," compared with 30% and 36%, respectively, in September 2025. At the same time, the share who believe Israel is deteriorating and that the trend will continue fell from 38% to 30% among all Israelis and from 34% to 24% among Jewish Israelis. Among Arab Israelis, by contrast, there was no significant change: just 5% chose the most optimistic option and 54% the most pessimistic – exactly as last year.

Ahead of Rosh Hashanah and the new year, which of the following best reflects how you feel about Israel's overall situation? (%)



	Israel is improving, and things will get even better	Israel is improving, but I am concerned that things will not get better	Israel is deteriorating, but I think things will get better	Israel is deteriorating, and I am concerned that this trend will continue	Don't know
All Israelis - Sept. 2025	30	6	22	38	3
All Israelis - Sept. 2026	35	6	25	30	4
Jews - Sept. 2025	36	4	22	34	3
Jews - Sept. 2026	43	5	25	24	3
Arabs - Sept. 2025	6	13	22	54	4
Arabs - Sept. 2026	5	8	26	54	6

Among Jewish Israelis, optimism is closely associated with ideological orientation. Among those who identify with the right, three-quarters (76%) believe Israel is improving and will continue to improve, up from two-thirds (68%) last year. The increase is even sharper among center-right respondents, from 32% to 42%. There was almost no change in the center, and not a single respondent on the left chose the most positive option. On the left, however, there was movement of a different kind: the share who believe deterioration will continue fell sharply from 77% to 49%, with almost all of those who moved away from that view shifting to "Israel is deteriorating, but I think things will get better" (22% last year versus 49% today). In other words, the right has become more optimistic, while the left has become less pessimistic.

Ahead of Rosh Hashanah and the new year, which of the following best reflects how you feel about Israel's overall situation? (Jews) (%)



	Israel is improving, and things will get even better		Israel is deteriorating, and I am concerned that this trend will continue	
	September 2025	September 2026	September 2025	September 2026
Right	68	76	7	7
Center-right	32	42	31	20
Center	17	15	50	38
Center-left	3	4	60	46
Left	2	0	77	49


When the same question was asked about the world, half of Israelis (49%) said the world is deteriorating and will continue to do so, while only one in eight (12%) said it is improving and will continue to improve – figures almost identical to those recorded last September (50% and 10%, respectively). The gap between Israelis' assessments of Israel's condition and of the world, already evident last year, has persisted and widened: Israelis have much more confidence in Israel's ability to create a better future for itself than in the world's ability to do so. Notably, the gap between Jewish and Arab Israelis is much smaller on the question about the world than on the question about Israel.

Ahead of Rosh Hashanah and the new year, which of the following best reflects how you feel about the overall state of the world? (%)



	The world is improving, and things will get even better	The world is improving, but I am concerned that things will not get better	The world is deteriorating, but I think things will get better	The world is deteriorating, and I am concerned that this trend will continue	Don't know
All Israelis – Sept. 2025	10	6	27	50	7
All Israelis – Sept. 2026	12	6	27	49	6
Jews – Sept. 2025	10	4	28	50	7
Jews – Sept. 2026	13	5	29	47	6
Arabs – Sept. 2025	7	15	22	50	6
Arabs – Sept. 2026	7	7	21	57	9

Looking Back at the Past Year



Respondents were asked three identically worded questions to assess the past year in three areas: security, the economy, and society. The results reveal a clear hierarchy. The social sphere receives the lowest rating and is the only one in which there has been no improvement since last year: 52% of Israelis describe the past year as “poor” socially, while only 4% describe it as “good.” The economic assessment improved slightly: the share describing the year as “poor” fell from 35% to 30%, while the share describing it as “good” rose from 11% to 18%. In security terms, the picture is almost unchanged: 37% describe the year as “poor,” compared with 36% last year. Among Jewish Israelis, however, half (50%) now describe it as a “good” or “fair” year in security terms.

Was the past year... (%)



	Good	Fair	Not very good	Poor	Don't know
Security – Sept. 2025	19	19	22	36	3
Security – Sept. 2026	22	20	19	37	1
Economy – Sept. 2025	11	25	25	35	4
Economy – Sept. 2026	18	25	27	30	1
Society – Sept. 2025	4	16	29	50	2
Society – Sept. 2026	4	16	27	52	2


The social sphere is also the only one of the three in which the ideological gap has widened rather than narrowed. Among respondents who identify with the right, the share describing the year as “poor” socially remained at about one-quarter, while it rose from 74% to 86% in the center-left and from 62% to 70% in the center. In other words, the growing sense that Israel is experiencing a social crisis is concentrated almost entirely in the center and on the left of the Jewish ideological spectrum.

Was the past year... socially? (Jews, Sept. 2026) (%)



	Good	Fair	Not very good	Poor
Right	6	25	41	25
Center-right	2	13	31	53
Center	2	7	20	70
Center-left	0	2	12	86
Left	0	6	11	83

“The Most Important Elections in the Country’s History”



Ahead of the elections expected this fall, the sense that the election is fateful has strengthened. Four in ten Israelis (40%) believe these will be “the most important elections in the country’s history,” up from one-third (33%) in February. Another 41% say the elections will be “especially important.” Overall, eight in ten Israelis therefore see these elections as exceptional in importance, while the share describing them as “as important as any election” fell from 24% in February to 16% today.

This sense is stronger among respondents who identify with the center and left: 60% in the center-left, 57% on the left, and 55% in the center say these will be “the most important elections in the country’s history,” compared with 35% on the right and 39% in the center-right. Among Arab Israelis, the sense is more muted: 23% hold this view.

When you think about the 2026 elections, do you believe these will be... (%)



	The most important elections in the country's history	Especially important elections	As important as any elections	Less important than usual	Don't know
All Israelis – February 2026	33	40	24	2	2
All Israelis – Sept. 2026	40	41	16	1	2
Jews – February 2026	34	40	23	1	1
Jews – Sept. 2026	44	41	15	0	0
Arabs – February 2026	27	37	26	6	5
Arabs – Sept. 2026	23	43	19	6	9
Right	35	44	21	0	1
Center-right	39	43	18	0	0
Center	55	39	7	0	0
Center-left	60	35	5	0	0
Left	57	37	6	0	0

This month, we also examined which issue voters regard as decisive in the coming elections. Of the six substantive issues presented, security remains the leading consideration. Its increase occurred between July and August and has since stabilized: nearly one-third of Israelis (31%) say the decisive consideration in their vote will be “who will contribute most effectively to maintaining security.” The next two leading issues are relations between the government and the judicial system, and unity. Looking across the past several months, the picture is relatively stable: changes in Israelis’ responses are small, and the ranking of the issues remains similar from month to month. The main differences are between Jewish and Arab Israelis. Management of the economy ranks second in importance among Arab Israelis, while only 5% of Jewish Israelis identify it as the decisive issue in the coming elections.

The two findings – the growing sense that these are fateful elections and the rise of unity as a decisive issue – are consistent with last month’s finding that Jewish Israelis who had not yet made a final voting decision placed particular emphasis on “more unity and fewer disputes.” In other words, undecided voters are looking for a reduction in polarization and conflict. In recent days, this group has faced an additional development: some parties in the “third bloc” have announced that they will not contest the coming election, while others have announced that they will merge with larger parties.

The ideological breakdown reveals two distinct patterns. On the right, security (40%) and relations between the government and the judicial system (35%) are the decisive issues in the coming elections, and not a single respondent chose "a more liberal state." On the left and center-left, by contrast, the leading issue is "a more liberal state" – 43% and 34%, respectively. In the center, the leading issue is unity (30%).


The most decisive issue in the elections – all Israelis, July to September 2026



Of the following options, what will be the most decisive issue for you in the elections? (%)

	Security	Economy	Unity	Government and judiciary	A more Jewish state	A more liberal state	None of these	Don't know
All Israelis – July 2026	28	10	13	18	4	15	7	5
All Israelis – August 2026	31	9	15	17	4	13	8	4
All Israelis – Sept. 2026	31	9	17	19	3	12	7	2
Jews – July 2026	27	5	14	21	4	17	6	5
Jews – August 2026	30	5	16	20	4	15	9	3
Jews – Sept. 2026	28	5	18	24	3	13	7	2
Arabs – July 2026	34	26	9	7	1	9	8	5
Arabs – August 2026	38	23	10	4	3	7	6	9
Arabs – Sept. 2026	40	27	13	2	1	6	7	5
Right	40	6	9	35	5	0	3	2
Center-right	30	4	22	24	1	14	6	0
Center	24	5	30	12	1	19	8	1
Center-left	12	5	19	15	1	34	11	4
Left	11	3	14	17	0	43	11	0

Best Suited to Be Prime Minister




When respondents consider several candidates at once, Benjamin Netanyahu remains the leading candidate for prime minister, but he is not the preferred candidate of a majority of Israelis. Thirty-six percent of all Israelis and 43% of Jewish Israelis regard him as best suited for the position. Gadi Eisenkot ranks second at 29% – virtually identical among all Israelis and Jewish Israelis – followed by Naftali Bennett at 13% and Avigdor Liberman at 4%. The three named alternatives together account for 46% of Israelis.

The ideological breakdown shows Netanyahu as the dominant choice on the right (79%), while Eisenkot leads in all other camps: 71% on the left, 66% in the center-left, and 58% in the center. The center-right is the only camp in which there is a genuine contest: 44% choose Netanyahu, 21% Eisenkot, and 20% Bennett.

Of the following candidates, who do you think is best suited to be the next prime minister? (%)

	Benjamin Netanyahu	Gadi Eisenkot	Naftali Bennett	Avigdor Liberman	Someone else	Don't know
All Israelis	36	29	13	4	10	7
Jews	43	29	14	4	7	3
Arabs	11	27	8	4	25	25
Right	79	3	6	3	6	3
Center-right	44	21	20	6	5	4
Center	9	58	21	5	7	1
Center-left	0	66	20	5	5	4
Left	0	71	14	0	9	6

Gaza: The Security Perimeter and Occupation



This month, respondents were presented with two options concerning the future of the Gaza Strip, using wording identical to that used in September 2025, before the Hamas-Israel agreement that ended the war in Gaza and led to the return of all the hostages. The results should be read against the background of the August survey: following President Trump's announcement of an agreement to disarm Hamas, a majority of Israelis (58%) believed it would not be implemented and that the current situation would remain roughly unchanged, while virtually none expected the full scenario of complete disarmament and complete Israeli withdrawal. In other words, this month's responses concerning Gaza's future do not refer to an arrangement regarded as imminent, but rather to one that most respondents do not expect to be implemented.

The option that Israel withdraw to the Gaza border and not retain a security "perimeter" inside the Strip is rejected outright by nearly three-quarters of Jewish Israelis (72%), who say they would not agree to it "under any circumstances." A majority of all Israelis (59%) say the same. Among Arab Israelis, by contrast, half (49%) agree that Israel should withdraw to the Gaza border and not maintain a security "perimeter" inside the Strip, up from 36% last year.

What do you think of the possibility that Israel withdraw to the Gaza border and not retain a security "perimeter" inside the Strip? (%)



	Would not agree under any circumstances	Might agree	Generally agree
All Israelis - Sept. 2025	61	29	10
All Israelis - Sept. 2026	59	18	14
Jews - Sept. 2025	68	28	4
Jews - Sept. 2026	72	18	5
Arabs - Sept. 2025	32	33	36
Arabs - Sept. 2026	10	19	49

* Excludes respondents who answered "Don't know."

The opposite option – that Israel occupy the entire Strip and administer it through the IDF for at least several years – has gained support among Jewish Israelis over the past year. The share who "generally agree" with full occupation rose from 27% to 36%, while the share opposed "under any circumstances" remained stable. The movement therefore came mainly from those who had previously been hesitant, rather than from opponents. Among Arab Israelis, attitudes hardened in the opposite direction, with opposition to occupation under any circumstances increasing.

The ideological breakdown is stark. On the right, 62% generally agree with occupation and only 9% oppose it under any circumstances; in the center-right, 32% agree and 37% oppose. In the center, center-left, and left, opposition stands at 66%, 88%, and 91%, respectively. The religiosity breakdown follows the same gradient: 64% of secular Jews oppose occupation under any circumstances, compared with 13% of Haredim and 16% of religious Jews.


What do you think of the possibility that Israel occupy the entire Gaza Strip and administer it through the IDF for at least several years? (%)




	Would not agree under any circumstances	Might agree	Generally agree
All Israelis – Sept. 2025	46	30	24
All Israelis – Sept. 2026	46	17	30
Jews – Sept. 2025	42	31	27
Jews – Sept. 2026	40	19	36
Arabs – Sept. 2025	63	27	9
Arabs – Sept. 2026	69	8	5
Right	9	26	62
Center-right	37	24	32
Center	66	13	14
Center-left	88	8	1
Left	91	3	6
Secular	64	15	16
Traditionalist (Masorti), nonreligious	36	21	40
Traditionalist (Masorti), religious	24	30	41
Religious (Dati)	16	23	56
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	13	18	62

* Excludes respondents who answered "Don't know."

Sense of Victory in the War



Each month, we ask respondents to rate on a 1-to-5 scale the extent to which they feel that Israel is winning or has won the war that began on October 7. This month, as the year draws to a close, the sense of victory returned almost exactly to where it stood on the eve of last Rosh Hashanah, after considerable fluctuation over the past year. Forty percent rate it at the two highest levels, 4 or 5, compared with 43% in September 2025, while 37% rate it at the two lowest levels, 1 or 2, compared with 32% then. Between these two points – from last Rosh Hashanah to this one – there were substantial shifts, including a peak in March 2026 after Operation Roaring Lion and a low in recent months.




The sense-of-victory question shows the sharpest ideological divide of any survey item measured this month. Among respondents who identify with the right, 77% rate their sense of victory at 4 or 5; in the center-right, 44%; in the center, 16%; in the center-left, 7%; and on the left, none. The overall increase in the sense of victory, from 37% in August to 40% in September, is entirely concentrated on the right. Among right-wing respondents, the share rating their sense of victory at 4 or 5 jumped from 67% to 77% in a single month, while in every other camp the change is only one or two percentage points in either direction. In other words, what appears to be a slight recovery in the sense of victory is in fact a strengthening of that sentiment among those who already held it, rather than a broad-based change. This occurred in a month with no significant change across the IDF's various combat arenas, suggesting that the shift may reflect greater exposure to partisan election-campaign propaganda across the political spectrum.

Sense of victory – by ideological orientation (%)

	1 – Not at all	2	3	4	5 – Completely
Right	5	3	15	44	33
Center-right	12	17	27	25	19
Center	27	26	32	11	5
Center-left	39	27	27	7	0
Left	49	34	17	0	0

The Situation in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank)



During the past month, a violent incident took place in the village of Qusra in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), after dozens of masked Israeli civilians arrived in pickup trucks and threw stones at Palestinian residents. Some of the rioters barricaded themselves inside a local home while its residents were present. Several Palestinian residents were injured, including a woman who was evacuated for medical treatment. When security forces arrived, the Israeli rioters fled, and no arrests were made. The incident drew considerable attention and commentary from numerous politicians. It was also widely covered by media outlets around the world and led to condemnation of Israeli policy in Judea and Samaria.

This month, we asked respondents to choose the description they considered most appropriate for the group of young Jewish men involved in the incident, selecting from several terms used by Israeli politicians. The strongest label – "Israeli terrorists" – was also the most frequently selected: one-third of Israelis (33%) described the Qusra rioters as "terrorists." Together with "nationalist criminals," 51% chose one of the two harshest descriptions. At the other end of the spectrum, the two most lenient descriptions – "young people who sometimes go too far" and "the salt of the earth" – were chosen by 13% of Israelis. Among Arab Israelis, the share describing the group as "Israeli terrorists" is substantially higher than among Jewish Israelis (55% versus 27%). More lenient descriptions are correspondingly rare among Arab respondents: "a handful of rioters," "a violent minority," "young people who sometimes go too far," and "the salt of the earth" together account for only one-tenth of Arab responses.

The ideological gap on this question is dramatic. On the left, 63% choose “Israeli terrorists” and another 31% “nationalist criminals” – 94% combined. In the center, about half choose “terrorists” and roughly one-third “criminals.” On the right, only 3% choose “Israeli terrorists”; the most common descriptions are “a handful of rioters” (22%) and “a violent minority” (20%). Overall, 30% on the right choose one of the two most lenient labels, including 12% who choose “the salt of the earth.” By religiosity, 72% of secular Jews choose one of the two harshest descriptions, compared with 17% of Haredim. Conversely, 36% of Haredim choose one of the more lenient descriptions, including 29% who choose “young people who sometimes go too far.”

Which of the following descriptions, used by politicians when discussing the young men who rioted in Qusra, seems most accurate to you? (%)



	Israeli terrorists	Nationalist criminals	A handful of rioters	A violent minority	Young people who sometimes go too far	The salt of the earth	None of these	Don't know
All Israelis	33	18	12	12	8	5	6	6
Jews	27	19	14	14	10	6	7	3
Arabs	55	16	6	4	1	0	2	16
Right	3	5	22	20	18	12	15	5
Center-right	23	22	19	14	8	4	6	4
Center	49	31	5	10	3	1	1	1
Center-left	58	34	2	5	1	0	0	0
Left	63	31	0	6	0	0	0	0
Secular	46	26	9	8	4	3	3	2
Traditionalist (Masorti), nonreligious	17	20	19	17	12	7	7	2
Traditionalist (Masorti), religious	19	14	24	14	11	8	5	5
Religious (Dati)	10	11	16	22	11	11	15	3
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	4	13	13	18	29	7	11	4


This finding is not an isolated one. Last month, we asked a differently worded question: whether Jewish farms and outposts in the West Bank are a burden on the IDF and harm the security of all Israeli citizens. The result was almost evenly split: 36% of Israelis “strongly disagreed” and 36% “strongly agreed.” Placing the two questions side by side reveals the same ideological ordering, at almost the same intensity. The questions are different and should not be compared directly, but they reveal the same fault line: attitudes toward violence by fringe groups within the settlement movement appear to be shaped less by information or facts than by identity.

Two measures along the same fault line: farms and outposts (August 2026) and the Qusra rioters (Sept. 2026) (%)



	Strongly disagree that farms and outposts are a burden on the IDF (August 2026)	Describe the Qusra rioters as "Israeli terrorists" (Sept. 2026)	Describe the Qusra rioters as "young people who sometimes go too far" + "the salt of the earth" (Sept. 2026)
Right	82	3	30
Center-right	39	23	12
Center	11	49	4
Center-left	1	58	1
Left	0	63	0

Antisemitism and Foreign Relations



For the second consecutive year, we examined Israelis' attitudes toward the rise in antisemitism worldwide. The principal finding is an erosion of the middle position. Thirty-six percent of Israelis believe the increase in antisemitism is "not at all because of Israeli policy," compared with 33% last year; among Jewish Israelis, the share rose from 38% to 44%. At the opposite end, there was little change: 34% of Israelis believe antisemitism is increasing "to a great extent" because of Israeli policy, compared with 32% last year. It is the middle position that has contracted.

Among Arab Israelis, the share attributing the increase in antisemitism “to a great extent” to Israeli policy rose from 42% to 58%. Among Jewish Israelis, meanwhile, the view that there is no connection at all between Israeli policy and antisemitic phenomena abroad has strengthened. This shift is especially evident in the middle of the religiosity spectrum: among traditionalist (Masorti), nonreligious Jews, the share saying there is no connection at all rose from 42% to 55%; among traditionalist (Masorti), religious Jews, it rose from 41% to 57%. There was no change among Haredim, while among religious (Dati) Jews the share declined slightly.

When you think about the rise in antisemitism worldwide, which of the following comes closest to your view? (%)



	Not at all because of Israeli policy	To a small extent because of Israeli policy	To a great extent because of Israeli policy	Don't know
All Israelis – Sept. 2025	33	28	32	7
All Israelis – Sept. 2026	36	25	34	5
Jews – Sept. 2025	38	28	29	4
Jews – Sept. 2026	44	25	28	3
Arabs – Sept. 2025	15	28	42	15
Arabs – Sept. 2026	7	23	58	13

“The rise in antisemitism is not at all because of Israeli policy” (%)



	Sept. 2025	Sept. 2026
Secular	21	24
Traditionalist (Masorti), nonreligious	42	55
Traditionalist (Masorti), religious	41	57
Religious (Dati)	64	60
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	67	67

On the practical question of whether Israel should modify its policies because of the rise in antisemitism, the position of Jewish Israelis is essentially unchanged: 57% say Israel should make no changes, compared with 56% last September. Among all Israelis, the figure is 47% – identical to last year. Here too, the only substantial movement is among Arab Israelis, where the share supporting policy change “to a great extent” rose from 14% to 60%. This sharp shift largely reflects a substantial decline in “Don’t know” responses in this group, from 48% to 15%.

When you think about the rise in antisemitism worldwide, which of the following comes closest to your view? – Policy response (%)



	Israel should not modify its policies at all	Israel should modify them somewhat	Israel should modify them to a great extent	Don't know
All Israelis – Sept. 2025	47	23	15	14
All Israelis – Sept. 2026	47	21	25	7
Jews – Sept. 2025	56	22	16	6
Jews – Sept. 2026	57	21	17	5
Arabs – Sept. 2025	11	28	14	48
Arabs – Sept. 2026	7	18	60	15

For the second consecutive year, we also examined how Israelis classify various international actions toward Israel – and over the past year, some of these actions have ceased to be hypothetical. The data indicates that Israelis’ definition of what should be considered “antisemitic” has broadened somewhat. For three of the four actions examined, the share of Jewish Israelis who regard them as antisemitic – either antisemitic alone or both anti-Israel and antisemitic – increased. For an academic boycott, the share rose from 68% to 74%; for calls for punitive measures against Israel because of the humanitarian situation in Gaza, from 51% to 58%; and for barring ministers and Knesset members from entering various countries, from 43% to 45%. The exception is recognition of a Palestinian state, the action that had already been implemented most extensively in practice even before this year. The share of Jewish Israelis defining such a step as antisemitic remained at 41%, unchanged from last year.

Share defining the action as “antisemitic” (alone or together with “anti-Israel”) (%)




	All Israelis – Sept. 2025	All Israelis – Sept. 2026	Jews – Sept. 2025	Jews – Sept. 2026
Academic boycott of Israel	58	62	68	74
Calls for punitive measures over the situation in Gaza	44	49	51	58
Barring Knesset members and ministers from entry	39	39	43	45
Recognition of a Palestinian state	37	35	41	41

How should countries taking the following actions toward Israel be described? (Jewish respondents) (%)




	Antisemitic	Anti-Israel	Anti-Israel and antisemitic	Neither anti- Israel nor antisemitic	Pro-Israel	Don't know
Academic boycott	24	24	50	2	0	1
Punitive measures over Gaza	16	33	42	7	1	2
Barring Knesset members and ministers from entry	14	35	31	15	2	2
Recognition of a Palestinian state	9	40	32	15	1	3

The Education System



With the opening of the school year, we again examined a series of questions concerning Israel's education system. This is the third consecutive year we have asked these questions, and the trend has moved consistently in one direction: the share of Israelis who describe the education system as "not good" rose from 32% in 2024 to 35% this year. The share who describe it as "good" has fallen by four percentage points over the past two years, to 14%, while the share who describe it as "average" fell from 50% to 33%. Among Jewish Israelis, 37% now say the system is "not good," compared with 28% last year and 32% two years ago. Among Arab Israelis, there has likewise been a decline over the past two years in the share describing the education system as "good" – from one-third (32%) in 2024 to one-fifth (19%) today.



When you think about the school your children attend or attended, would you say that... (%)


	Israel's education system is good	Israel's education system is average	Israel's education system is not good	Not relevant to me	Don't know
All Israelis - 2024	18	50	32	-	-
All Israelis - 2025	13	39	28	17	2
All Israelis - 2026	14	33	35	17	2
Jews - 2024	14	53	32	-	-
Jews - 2025	11	40	28	19	2
Jews - 2026	13	32	37	16	2
Arabs - 2024	32	39	29	-	-
Arabs - 2025	25	37	29	6	3
Arabs - 2026	19	33	26	18	3

A breakdown by religiosity shows that the deterioration is concentrated primarily in secular Jews' assessment of the education system: the share of secular respondents who describe it as "not good" rose from 34% to 46% over the past year. There was also a substantial increase in negative assessments among traditionalist (Masorti) Jews. There was no change among religious (Dati) Jews, while among Haredim the share satisfied with the system increased: 22% now describe it as "good," compared with 10% last September.

When you think about the school your children attend or attended, would you say that... - by religiosity (%)


	"Israel's education system is not good" - 2025	"Israel's education system is not good" - 2026	"Israel's education system is good" - 2025	"Israel's education system is good" - 2026
Secular	34	46	9	7
Traditionalist (Masorti), nonreligious	27	39	10	15
Traditionalist (Masorti), religious	28	38	9	14
Religious (Dati)	19	19	19	19
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	17	24	10	22

Responses to questions about the subjects Israelis would add to or reduce in the school timetable are remarkably stable compared with last year. Among Jewish Israelis, “Jewish studies” is the subject the largest share would strengthen (29%, compared with 27% last year), followed by civics (21%). Yet “Jewish studies” is also the second-most frequently chosen subject for cuts (20%, compared with 24% last year), after literature, which just over one-quarter of Jewish Israelis (26%) would cut. Among Arab Israelis, priorities are entirely different: English is the subject most frequently chosen for additional hours (31%, up from 25% last year), followed by mathematics (20%).

If you could add / remove three hours of instruction per week in every school, which subject would you choose? (%)



	English	Math	Jewish studies / religious studies	Civics	Science	Literature	Physical education	None / Don't know
Jews – add hours, 2025	13	15	27	18	13	2	3	10
Jews – add hours, 2026	12	12	29	21	12	1	3	9
Jews – reduce hours, 2025	1	2	24	6	3	25	6	34
Jews – reduce hours, 2026	1	3	20	7	2	26	6	35
Arabs – add hours, 2025	25	18	11	4	5	10	9	18
Arabs – add hours, 2026	31	20	9	4	6	5	11	14
Arabs – reduce hours, 2025	7	14	14	18	4	8	12	24
Arabs – reduce hours, 2026	2	11	14	19	4	8	7	35

The divide between secular and religious Jews is especially stark. Thirty-six percent of secular Jews would add hours to civics and only 8% to Jewish studies; 44% of religious Jews and 71% of Haredim would add hours to Jewish studies, while only 6% and 7%, respectively, would add hours to civics. In the opposite direction, 41% of secular Jews would cut Jewish studies, compared with 0% of religious Jews and 4% of Haredim. Religious Jews and Haredim would direct their cuts primarily toward literature (33% and 36%) and civics (9% and 18%).

Adding and reducing hours – by religiosity (%)



	English	Math	Jewish studies	Civics	Science	Literature	Physical education	None / Don't know
Secular – add hours	14	12	8	36	17	1	4	8
Religious (Dati) – add hours	14	9	44	6	11	1	1	15
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) – add hours	9	4	71	7	0	0	2	7
Secular – reduce hours	1	1	41	3	1	15	3	36
Religious (Dati) – reduce hours	2	3	0	9	3	33	8	41
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) – reduce hours	0	0	4	18	7	36	11	24

Data for JPPI's September Israeli Society Index was collected between September 1 and 3, 2026, via the Madad.com panel (663 Jewish-sector respondents) and Afkar Research in the Arab sector (206 respondents, approximately half online and half by telephone). The data was weighted according to voting patterns and religiosity and analyzed to represent the views of Israel's adult population. Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepko compile the JPPI Israeli Society Index, with research, production, and writing assistance from Yael Levinovsky. Prof. David Steinberg provides statistical supervision.