

JPPI Israeli Society Index

The War Three Years After October 7; The Importance of the Upcoming Elections and the Issues Likely to Decide Them; Satisfaction with the Political Choices on Offer; Measures Israelis Want the Next Government to Take; and Changes in Religious Practice, Faith, and Self-Identification Since the War Began.

Main Finding


Three years after the war began, Israelis remain divided over whether Israel has won, and most expect the current calm to last no more than a few months. Security has accordingly become a more decisive issue in the elections.

Additional Findings

- Three years after the war began, four in ten Israelis feel Israel has won – slightly fewer than a year ago.
- “The October 7 War” remains the most commonly used name for the war. On the right, “War of Revival” has become the leading choice.
- Eight in ten Israelis regard the elections at month’s end as either especially important or the most important in the country’s history.
- Security is gaining ground as the decisive election issue, while unity and relations between the government and judiciary are losing ground.
- After the elections, majorities want prime ministerial term limits, an attempt to adopt a constitution, and a state commission of inquiry into October 7.
- A majority of Israelis oppose a government bringing together Likud and the largest party in the change bloc.
- About half of Jewish Israelis favor broad judicial reform; nearly two-thirds of Israelis oppose restoring military-service exemptions for Haredi Torah students.
- About half of Israelis are satisfied with the parties and prospective candidates for prime minister.
- Respondents on the right prioritize reform of the Ministry of Justice, while those in the center and on the left prioritize reform of the Ministry of Education.
- More than half favor abolishing both the Ministry of Jerusalem and Jewish Tradition and the Ministry of Heritage; nearly half favor abolishing the Ministry of Settlements and National Missions.
- Seven in ten Israelis say Trump is “the friendliest president Israel has ever had.”
- Fewer Israelis than last year report increased religious observance since the war began.

Three Years Since October 7

Sense of victory over time



Three years after the war began, four in ten Israelis (41%) rate their sense of victory at 4 or 5 on a five-point scale – almost unchanged from October 2025 (43%), when the fighting in Gaza ended. By contrast, roughly one-third (36%) choose the two lowest ratings, 1 or 2. Among Jewish Israelis, 46% give one of the two highest ratings, compared with 24% of Arab Israelis. Nearly half of Arab Israelis (46%) give one of the two lowest ratings. The ideological pattern is clear and consistent: 76% of those who identify with the right rate their sense of victory at 4 or 5, compared with 53% in the center-right, 16% in the center, 7% in the center-left, and 3% on the left.

Please rate, from 1 to 5, how much you feel that Israel is winning and/or has won the war overall. (%)

	1 – Not at all	2	3	4	5 – Completely
Sept. 2025	20	12	25	28	15
Oct. 2025	21	11	25	25	18
Nov. 2025	15	13	28	25	19
March 2026	7	10	27	28	28
April 2026	17	11	26	26	20
May 2026	22	14	26	22	16
June 2026	22	16	25	22	15
July 2026	24	17	21	23	15
Aug. 2026	23	15	25	23	15
Sept. 2026	21	16	24	23	16
Oct. 2026	23	14	22	22	19


Comparisons across the three years of war require some caution. During the first two years, respondents were asked about the future – “How confident are you that Israel will win the war?” Since October 2025, we have asked whether Israel “is winning and/or has won.” Although the wording has changed, the overall trend is clear. Among Jewish Israelis, the share choosing the two highest ratings has fallen from 74% in the war’s opening weeks to 63% one year later, 49% after two years, and 46% today. Over the same period, the share of Jewish respondents choosing the lowest rating has risen from 6% to 20%.

Sense of victory at the outset of the war and one, two, and three years later (Jews, %)

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	1 – Not at all	2	3	4	5 – Completely
Oct. 2023 (“How confident are you that Israel will win the war?”)	6	4	16	24	51
Oct. 2024 (“How confident are you that Israel will win the war?”)	12	8	16	25	39
Oct. 2025 (“How much do you feel Israel is winning and/or has won the war?”)	15	11	24	30	19
Oct. 2026 (“How much do you feel Israel is winning and/or has won the war?”)	20	14	20	24	22

Has the War Ended?



One year after the fighting stopped, we repeated the November 2025 question about whether the war had ended for an extended period. In November 2025, nearly four in ten Israelis (37%) expected the calm to last at least a year: 18% said “several years” and 19% said “one or two years.” Today, only one in five (21%) expect the calm to last that long – 10% for several years and 11% for one or two years. Instead, one-third (32%) expect it to last “another few months,” up from 20% in November 2025, and another 30% say “no more than another few weeks,” compared with 32% a year ago. In other words, six in ten Israelis expect the calm to last no longer than a few months, compared with about half of Israelis a year ago. The pattern is similar among Jewish and Arab Israelis.

This change has not been evenly distributed across the political spectrum. In November 2025, the right was the most pessimistic camp: 44% of respondents identifying with the right expected the calm to last only a few weeks, compared with about one-quarter in the center and center-left. Today, those differences have all but disappeared. In every ideological camp, roughly one-third expect only a few weeks of calm, and between one-quarter and one-third expect a few months. The shift has come mainly from the center and left. The share anticipating at least a year of calm has fallen from 44% to 15% in the center-left, from 43% to 15% on the left, from 38% to 18% in the center, and from 38% to 19% in the center-right. The decline on the right is much smaller, from 32% to 25%. Put differently, a year ago the center and left hoped the agreement would mark the end of the war, while the right was skeptical. Today, respondents across the ideological spectrum are less confident that the agreement marked the end of the war. In July 2026, when asked what Israel should do in Gaza, 35% of Israelis and 41% of Jewish Israelis chose “resume the fighting until the objectives are achieved.” For some Israelis, then, the expectation that the calm is temporary is not merely a forecast – it also reflects a preference.

In your assessment, has the war ended for an extended period? (%)




	I expect calm to last several years	I expect calm to last one or two years	I expect calm to last a few more months	I expect calm to last no more than a few weeks	Don't know
All Israelis – Nov. 2025	18	19	20	32	11
All Israelis – Oct. 2026	10	11	32	30	16
Jews – Nov. 2025	17	21	21	33	9
Jews – Oct. 2026	9	11	33	30	17
Arabs – Nov. 2025	22	13	19	27	19
Arabs – Oct. 2026	14	11	27	33	16

Expecting the calm to last at least a year ("several years" + "one or two years") (%)



	Nov. 2025	Oct. 2026
Right	32	25
Center-right	38	19
Center	38	18
Center-left	44	15
Left	43	15

What Should the War Be Called?



After the fighting ended, the government changed the war's official name from "Swords of Iron" to "War of Revival." In November 2025, we asked what the war should be called; this month, using slightly different wording, we asked what respondents actually call it. The overall picture is stable. "The October 7 War" remains the most widely used name, chosen by 43% of Israelis, compared with 42% a year ago. The government's preferred name, "War of Revival," is still used by about one in six respondents (18%, up from 16%), while 16% use the original military name, "Swords of Iron" (13% last year). The only substantial shift is the declining use of "Simchat Torah War": 12% chose it in November 2025, compared with just 6% today. Another 11% say none of the proposed names is suitable.

Among Jewish Israelis, what people call the war depends heavily on their political orientation. Majorities of those identifying with the left, center-left, and center (72%, 77%, and 68%, respectively) use “The October 7 War.” It is also the most popular name in the center-right. On the right, by contrast, “War of Revival” has become the leading choice over the past year: 43% use it, compared with 32% in November 2025, while only 17% call it “The October 7 War.” “Simchat Torah War,” chosen a year ago by 23% on the right and 45% of religious Jews, has fallen to 8% and 12%, respectively. Only among secular Jews does a single name command majority support: 66% use “The October 7 War.” Among religious and Haredi Jews, preferences are divided among “War of Revival” (30% and 32%), “Swords of Iron” (31% and 17%), and “Simchat Torah War” (12% and 20%). Among Arab Israelis, 32% say none of the names is suitable, while 37% use “The October 7 War.”

Of the names mentioned, what do you call the war? (%)



	War of Revival	The October 7 War	Simchat Torah War	Swords of Iron	None of these	Don't know
All Israelis – Nov. 2025	16	42	12	13	7	10
All Israelis – Oct. 2026	18	43	6	16	11	7
Jews – Oct. 2026	22	44	6	17	6	4
Arabs – Oct. 2026	2	37	3	9	32	17
Right	43	17	8	20	5	7
Center-right	22	42	8	20	5	4
Center	5	68	3	16	6	2
Center-left	0	77	3	10	9	1
Left	0	72	3	10	8	8
Secular	10	66	2	11	6	4
Traditionalist (Masorti), nonreligious	29	42	2	18	6	3
Traditionalist (Masorti), religious	28	33	9	21	7	2
Religious (Dati)	30	14	12	31	7	5
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	32	15	20	17	5	10

The Importance of the Elections and the Decisive Issue

Importance of the 2026 elections

The most important in the country's history

39%


Especially important

40%

No more important than other elections

17%

The most decisive issue in the elections: top three



With the elections imminent, the sense that the vote is fateful remains as strong as last month. Four in ten Israelis (39%) believe these will be “the most important elections in the country’s history,” compared with 40% in September and 33% in February. Another 40% consider them “especially important.” Only 17% consider them no more important than other elections. This sense of importance grows stronger moving leftward along the political spectrum: 69% on the left and 59% in the center-left call them the most important elections in Israel’s history, compared with 45% in the center, 32% in the center-right, and 33% on the right.

One-third of Israelis (34%) say their decisive consideration in the elections will be “who will contribute most effectively to maintaining security,” slightly more than in September and August (31%) or July (28%). Meanwhile, the two issues previously ranked second and third – relations between the government and the judiciary, and “more unity and fewer disputes” – have lost ground. The share choosing “a more liberal state” remains at 13%, and the economy at 9%. Among Arab Israelis, security (37%) and the economy (20%) are the leading considerations.

Security’s growing importance spans ideological camps, though it has displaced different priorities in each. On the right, its share rose from 40% to 46%, primarily at the expense of relations between the government and the judiciary. In the center, security increased from 24% to 25%, and in the center-right from 30% to 36%, largely at the expense of unity. On the left and center-left, “a more liberal state” remains the leading issue (46% and 30%, respectively).

Of the following options, what will be the most decisive issue for you in the elections? (%)




	Security	Economy	Unity	Government and judiciary	A more Jewish state	A more liberal state	None of these	Don't know
All Israelis – July 2026	28	10	13	18	4	15	7	5
All Israelis – Aug. 2026	31	9	15	17	4	13	8	4
All Israelis – Sept. 2026	31	9	17	19	3	12	7	2
All Israelis – Oct. 2026	34	9	13	14	4	13	9	4
Jews – Sept. 2026	28	5	18	24	3	13	7	2
Jews – Oct. 2026	34	6	13	17	4	14	9	3
Arabs – Sept. 2026	40	27	13	2	1	6	7	5
Arabs – Oct. 2026	37	20	10	5	4	6	11	6
Right	46	5	8	26	7	1	4	2
Center-right	36	8	14	20	2	11	6	3
Center	25	4	19	6	1	25	14	5
Center-left	20	5	21	5	0	30	14	6
Left	18	3	8	10	0	46	15	0

After the Elections


Do you want or not want the following to happen after the elections?

■ Want ■ Do not want ■ Don't know



State commission of inquiry vs. judicial reform (By Ideological Orientation)

■ State commission of inquiry ■ Broad judicial reform



This month, we presented respondents with six possible initiatives for the post-election period, all of which have figured in political debate over the past year, and asked whether they wanted each one to be implemented. Three enjoy majority support: a law limiting the prime minister's tenure (63%); an attempt to adopt a constitution for Israel (59%); and the establishment, by the Supreme Court, of a state commission of inquiry into October 7 (58%). A broad judicial reform that would reduce some of the Supreme Court's powers divides the public almost evenly, with 46% in favor and 42% opposed, although a majority of Jewish Israelis (52%) support it. Two initiatives face majority opposition: reinstating the military-service exemption for Haredi men studying Torah (64% opposed) and forming a government that includes both Likud and the largest party in the change bloc, with the prime minister chosen by mutual agreement (60% opposed).

Several of these proposals have been tested in earlier JPPI surveys, using different wording, and this month's results are broadly consistent with previous findings. In May 2026, nearly two-thirds of Israelis (63%) said some form of inquiry should be established "as soon as possible." But when asked to choose between types of commissions, only 46% preferred a state commission headed by a Supreme Court justice, while 40% preferred a "national" commission without Supreme Court involvement. In November 2025, the respective figures were 46% and 42%. When the question simply asks whether respondents want a state commission of inquiry, without offering an alternative, support rises to 58%. One reason is that some center-right supporters of a national commission had also supported the state-commission option in earlier surveys. As for a constitution, only 46% believed in February 2026 that "agreements can be reached that would make a constitution possible." Today, 59% want an attempt to be made. In other words, more Israelis may want a constitution than believe one is attainable.

The ideological divisions on most of these questions are sharp. Support for a state commission of inquiry stands at 97% on the left, 87% in the center, and 18% on the right. Support for term limits is 95%, 90%, and 27%, respectively. Support for judicial reform runs in the opposite direction: 90% on the right, 17% in the center, and 0% on the left. The gap over a constitution is narrower, partly because opinions on the right are divided: 39% want an attempt, 30% do not, and 30% are undecided. The outlier is a proposed government bringing together Likud and the largest party in the change bloc – the only initiative opposed in every ideological camp. Opposition is overwhelming on the left (87%) and center-left (80%), and stands at 74% in the center. But even on the right a majority (54%) do not want such a government; only the center-right is relatively evenly divided (41% in favor, 48% opposed).

Opposition to a joint government of Likud and the change bloc is neither new nor evidence that Israelis do not value unity. In June 2026, respondents gave the importance of unity in Israeli society an average rating of 7.9 on a scale of 0 to 10. Yet the same survey also found declining willingness to compromise on policy for the sake of social cohesion. The following month, in July 2026, when we asked what coalition Israelis wanted after the elections, only 28% selected one of three versions of a “broad coalition with parties from both blocs”: 16% without Haredi and Arab parties, 8% without Haredi parties, and 5% without Arab parties. Another 30% wanted a coalition led by the right-wing bloc and 35% one led by the change bloc. Israelis want unity, but they want their own political camp to form the next coalition even more.

Do you want or not want the following to happen after the elections? (%)



	Want	Do not want	Don't know
Enact a law limiting the prime minister's term in office	63	27	11
Make an attempt to adopt a constitution for Israel	59	18	24
Establish a state commission of inquiry into October 7 (by the Supreme Court)	58	34	9
Enact broad judicial reform reducing some Supreme Court powers	46	42	12
Form a government including both Likud and the largest party in the change bloc	27	60	14
Restore the military-service exemption for Haredi Torah students	22	64	15


All Israelis, weighted. The six items were presented as separate questions, each beginning: “Do you want or not want the following to happen after the elections...?”

Share supporting the following post-election proposals (%)



	Term limits for the prime minister	Attempt to adopt a constitution	State commission of inquiry into October 7	Broad judicial reform reducing some Supreme Court powers	Government including Likud and the largest change-bloc party	Restore military- service exemption for Haredi Torah students
All Israelis	63	59	58	46	27	22
Jews	61	61	55	52	28	24
Arabs	70	50	68	23	20	14
Right	27	39	18	90	35	37
Center-right	63	64	51	58	41	20
Center	90	78	87	17	17	8
Center-left	96	87	99	8	14	3
Left	95	85	97	0	5	8
Secular	82	79	79	26	16	10
Traditionalist (Masorti), nonreligious	55	59	49	57	38	20
Traditionalist (Masorti), religious	56	53	49	58	30	26
Religious (Dati)	42	43	30	79	42	22
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	25	32	20	90	35	75

Satisfaction with the Political Choices



How satisfied are Israelis with their choices in the elections? The picture is mixed. A slim majority (53%) say they are “generally satisfied” with the parties competing, while 37% are dissatisfied. When asked about the prospective candidates for prime minister, about half (49%) are satisfied and 42% dissatisfied. Satisfaction is higher among Jewish Israelis (57% for the parties and 54% for the candidates) and much lower among Arab Israelis, of whom only 38% are satisfied with the parties and 31% with the candidates.


Among Jewish Israelis, satisfaction with the parties is similar across ideological camps, apart from the relatively small left-wing camp, where it is lower. The divide is more apparent when it comes to prime-ministerial candidates: majorities are satisfied in all camps from the right through the center-left, while a majority on the left are dissatisfied. In February 2026, we asked a related question, worded differently and with three response options. At that time, 24% said they were “satisfied with the available choices,” 34% said “there are enough reasonable options,” and 34% were dissatisfied. The questions cannot be compared directly, but the share of dissatisfied voters was similar earlier in the election year and on the eve of the vote.

Thinking about the parties contesting the elections and the prospective candidates for prime minister, are you generally satisfied with the choices? (%)



	Satisfied – parties	Dissatisfied – parties	Satisfied – PM candidates	Dissatisfied – PM candidates
All Israelis	53	37	49	42
Jews	57	35	54	39
Arabs	38	47	31	55
Right	59	34	55	37
Center-right	58	37	54	44
Center	58	30	53	35
Center-left	60	31	64	31
Left	46	41	31	54

Government Ministries



Ahead of the elections, we asked respondents which of six ministries most urgently needs a minister who will undertake substantial reform. Two ministries are virtually tied: the Ministry of Justice (31%) and the Ministry of Education (30%). Some distance behind were the Ministry of Public Security (18%) and the Ministry of Finance (9%). The Ministry of Defense (4%) and the Ministry of Health (2%) were seldom selected.


The near tie between Justice and Education reflects sharply different priorities among ideological camps. On the right, 62% choose the Ministry of Justice and 17% Education. In the center, 50% choose Education, 23% Public Security, and just 9% Justice. About half of respondents in both the center and center-left prioritize Education. The pattern is equally clear by religiosity: 58% of Haredi Jews and 50% of religious Jews choose Justice, while 42% of secular Jews choose Education. Among Arab Israelis, the Ministry of Public Security ranks first, at 37%.

Which ministry most urgently needs a minister who will undertake substantial reform? (%)




	Justice	Education	Defense	Finance	Health	Public Security	None of these	Don't know
All Israelis	31	30	4	9	2	18	1	4
Jews	35	34	3	9	2	14	1	3
Arabs	15	17	6	11	4	37	3	5
Right	62	17	4	9	1	4	0	2
Center-right	42	34	2	8	2	10	2	2
Center	9	50	1	10	1	23	0	4
Center-left	7	48	4	4	0	28	3	7
Left	0	59	5	3	3	28	3	0
Secular	21	42	2	7	1	22	1	4
Traditionalist (Masorti), nonreligious	37	34	3	6	3	14	1	2
Traditionalist (Masorti), religious	40	30	2	9	0	14	2	2
Religious (Dati)	50	31	4	10	0	2	2	2
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	58	15	10	10	3	0	0	5

Which ministries should be abolished after the elections?



Abolish Jerusalem and Jewish Tradition vs. Social Equality (By Ideological Orientation)



*Respondents could select more than one ministry. The six ministries chosen most often are shown.

In a separate question, respondents were asked which ministries, from a list of 14, should be abolished after the elections. The number of ministries has grown substantially under recent governments, reaching 31. This expansion has prompted public debate and criticism, with critics arguing that additional ministries waste public funds to reward coalition partners. Three ministries top the list of those Israelis would abolish: Jerusalem and Jewish Tradition (55%), Heritage (54%), and Settlements and National Missions (49%). Next come Social Equality (41%), Intelligence (41%), and the Negev, Galilee, and National Resilience (34%). Only one in eight Israelis (12%) say none of the ministries should be abolished. Support for closures is greater among Jewish Israelis: nearly two-thirds would abolish Jerusalem and Jewish Tradition (64%) and Heritage (63%). Support is much lower among Arab Israelis, 22% of whom would abolish none of the ministries.

Here too, priorities differ substantially across ideological camps. On the left, center-left, and center, respondents most often favor abolishing the current coalition's "identity ministries": Jerusalem and Jewish Tradition (97%, 91%, and 78%, respectively), Settlements and National Missions (87%, 86%, and 73%), and Heritage (87%, 82%, and 80%). On the right, by contrast, the most frequently chosen ministry for abolition is Social Equality (54%). Only about 40% would abolish Jerusalem and Jewish Tradition or Heritage, and about one-third would abolish Settlements and National Missions.

Which government ministries should be abolished after the elections? (Select all that apply.) (%)




	All Israelis	Jews	Arabs	Left	Center-left	Center	Center-right	Right
Environment	16	19	4	5	7	9	18	28
Social Equality	41	49	8	49	42	37	48	54
Construction and Housing	5	5	7	0	4	3	5	6
Innovation, Science and Technology	18	21	6	23	23	16	19	22
Aliyah and Integration	13	14	12	18	12	10	14	13
Foreign Affairs	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Energy and Infrastructure	6	7	3	10	8	6	6	7
Jerusalem and Jewish Tradition	55	64	18	97	91	78	64	42
Intelligence	41	49	8	74	71	54	47	38
Negev, Galilee, and National Resilience	34	39	14	67	51	42	35	28
Settlements and National Missions	49	55	26	87	86	73	55	31
Communications	6	6	3	13	5	4	4	7
Heritage	54	63	14	87	82	80	67	41
Culture and Sport	11	13	4	10	9	5	11	17
None should be abolished	12	10	22	0	1	6	14	15
Don't know	6	3	15	3	1	3	2	5


Trump and the United States

"Trump is the friendliest president Israel has ever had"

■ Very true ■ Fairly true ■ Not very true ■ Not true ■ Don't know



The statement is true* (By Ideological Orientation)



*"Very true" and "fairly true" combined, October 2026.

In November 2025, after President Trump visited Israel and addressed the Knesset, we asked whether Israelis agreed with the claim, made by the prime minister and others, that Trump is "the friendliest president Israel has ever had." We repeated the question this month. Agreement remains widespread: seven in ten Israelis (69%) consider the statement "very true" (34%) or "fairly true" (35%), compared with 72% in November 2025. Agreement among Jewish Israelis has slipped from 76% to 72%; among Arab Israelis, it remains at about six in ten (58%). It is worth noting that, in a separate question asked every few months, the share of Israelis expressing "a great deal of trust" in Trump fell during 2026 from 34% in March to 10% in August. In February 2026, nearly half (49%) called Trump "one of the best presidents in U.S. history." In July 2026, when asked whether the United States is a "true friend" of Israel, 27% said it was a true friend "more than in recent years" and 26% said "less than in recent years." Israelis still see Trump as a great friend of Israel, but their trust in him has eroded.


The modest erosion in Trump's standing has not occurred on the right, where agreement that he is Israel's friendliest president remains almost universal (94%), or on the left, where it remains low (18%). Rather, it is concentrated in the center-left, where agreement has fallen from 52% to 32%, and, to a lesser degree, the center-right (from 85% to 80%).

Several Israeli public figures, including the prime minister, have called Donald Trump “the friendliest president Israel has ever had.” How true is this statement, in your opinion? (%)



	Very true	Fairly true	Not very true	Not true	Don't know
All Israelis – Nov. 2025	38	34	15	6	8
All Israelis – Oct. 2026	34	35	17	9	5
Jews – Nov. 2025	40	36	15	5	5
Jews – Oct. 2026	35	37	18	8	3
Arabs – Nov. 2025	30	26	15	9	20
Arabs – Oct. 2026	31	28	14	14	14
Right	62	32	3	2	0
Center-right	41	39	12	4	5
Center	9	51	27	8	5
Center-left	2	30	49	16	4
Left	0	18	36	38	8

The War, Religious Tradition, and Faith



In November 2025, when the fighting in Gaza ended, we published a special report on how the war had affected Israelis' religious observance, faith, and self-identification. Nearly a year later, we repeated the same battery of questions, using identical wording. The broad picture is similar: most report no change in religious practice, and among those reporting a change, increases in observance outnumber declines. But the shift toward greater observance is less pronounced than a year ago. One in five Jewish Israelis (20%) say they observe more Jewish traditions than before the war, down from 27% in November 2025. One in ten (10%) say they observe fewer traditions (8% last year), and nearly seven in ten (69%) report no change (62% last year). The pattern is similar for belief in God: 22% of Jewish Israelis say they believe more strongly than before, 12% less strongly, and 65% about the same. Among Arab Israelis, too, the share reporting a strengthening has declined slightly – from 23% to 20% for religious practice and from 37% to 32% for faith – although the share reporting weaker faith remains very low (3%).

The central finding of the previous report still holds: increases in religious observance are concentrated among those who were already traditionalist or religious, while secular Jews – the largest group among Jewish Israelis – show the opposite tendency. Among secular respondents, 9% say they observe more traditions than before the war, compared with 17% who observe fewer; 6% say their faith has strengthened, compared with 21% who say it has weakened. In all other religiosity groups, the balance tilts toward stronger observance, increasingly so as religiosity rises. Among traditionalist (Masorti), nonreligious Jews, 25% observe more traditions and 22% report stronger faith; among religious (Dati) Jews, the figures are 26% and 41%; among Haredim, 38% and 52%. Not a single Haredi respondent reports a decline in religious observance. The ideological breakdown follows a similar pattern: on the right, 35% observe more traditions and 40% report stronger faith, while in the center-left, 21% observe fewer traditions and 26% report weaker faith.

Generally speaking, since the war began, would you say you...? – Religious practice (%)



	Observe more traditional practices	Observe fewer	About the same
Jews – Nov. 2025	27	8	62
Jews – Oct. 2026	20	10	69
Arabs – Nov. 2025	23	8	56
Arabs – Oct. 2026	20	7	59
All Israelis – Oct. 2026	20	9	67
Right	35	2	62
Center-right	17	6	75
Center	7	19	71
Center-left	3	21	73
Left	3	13	85
Secular	9	17	72
Traditionalist (Masorti), nonreligious	25	7	69
Traditionalist (Masorti), religious	23	7	70
Religious (Dati)	26	3	70
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	38	0	62

Generally speaking, since the war began, would you say you...? – Belief in God (%)



	Believe in God more strongly	Believe less strongly	About the same
Jews – Nov. 2025	28	9	59
Jews – Oct. 2026	22	12	65
Arabs – Nov. 2025	37	4	52
Arabs – Oct. 2026	32	3	56
All Israelis – Oct. 2026	24	10	63
Right	40	4	55
Center-right	23	6	70
Center	5	21	73
Center-left	1	26	71
Left	3	13	79
Secular	6	21	71
Traditionalist (Masorti), nonreligious	22	7	70
Traditionalist (Masorti), religious	30	0	67
Religious (Dati)	41	4	55
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	52	0	45

Among Jewish Israelis, fewer respondents reported an increase in every religious practice listed than in November 2025. Prayer remains the most common, but the share of Jewish Israelis who say they pray more often since the war began has fallen from nearly one-third to about one-fifth. The share reading more of the Bible or Psalms has fallen from one-fifth to roughly one-eighth. Fewer respondents also report attending synagogue more often, lighting Shabbat candles, putting on tefillin, wearing tzitzit, or dressing more modestly. Correspondingly, the share of Jewish Israelis who have not increased any of these practices has risen from 55% to 65%. Among Arab Israelis, 24% say they pray more, down from 32% a year ago. Nearly half of Haredim (48%), about one-third of religious Jews (35%), and 28% of traditionalist, nonreligious Jews report praying more often.

Which of the following do you do more often than before the war? (Select all that apply.) (%)



	Pray more often	Read more of the Bible / Psalms	Attend synagogue more often	Put on tefillin more often	Light Shabbat candles more often	Wear tzitzit more often	Dress more modestly	None of these
Jews – Nov. 2025	31	20	11	9	11	7	9	55
Jews – Oct. 2026	22	13	8	5	6	4	3	65
Secular	4	4	1	2	5	0	0	88
Traditionalist (Masorti), nonreligious	28	18	12	5	12	4	2	60
Traditionalist (Masorti), religious	30	12	14	9	2	7	2	58
Religious (Dati)	35	22	13	8	4	11	7	44
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	48	25	15	5	3	5	8	25

In another question, we asked respondents to place themselves on a seven-point scale, with the midpoint representing the strength of their faith before the war. Here too, the reported change is more modest than a year ago: a majority of Jewish Israelis (53%) say their faith remains at its prewar level, up from 43% in November 2025; 32% place themselves higher on the scale, down from 43%; and 15% place themselves lower, up from 12%. Among Arab Israelis, 44% report no change, 46% stronger faith, and 4% weaker faith. Once again, secular Jews stand apart from the other religiosity groups: 25% report a downward shift and 11% an upward shift, compared with 56% of religious Jews and 57% of Haredim who report stronger faith.

Asked about the faith of their “relatives and friends,” respondents perceived more widespread strengthening than they reported for themselves. This echoes a pattern found in earlier JPPI studies of religious strengthening among young adults and adolescents. Among Jewish Israelis, 41% believe people around them have grown stronger in faith, down from 49% last year, while only 10% believe they have grown weaker. The gap between perceptions of oneself and of one’s social circle is especially striking among secular Jews: 11% report stronger faith themselves, while 20% believe faith has strengthened among people around them. As we noted in the previous report, this perception may reflect public discussion of growing religiosity – or simply the fact that increasing observance is more visible than declining observance.


Imagine a seven-rung ladder of belief in God, with level 4 representing your faith before the war. Where are you today? (%)



	1-3 (weaker faith)	4 (same as before the war)	5-7 (stronger faith)
Jews – Nov. 2025	12	43	43
Jews – Oct. 2026	15	53	32
Arabs – Nov. 2025	10	31	52
Arabs – Oct. 2026	4	44	46
All Israelis – Oct. 2026	13	51	35
Secular	25	63	11
Traditionalist (Masorti), nonreligious	10	55	35
Traditionalist (Masorti), religious	6	45	50
Religious (Dati)	6	38	56
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	3	40	57

Religiosity and Political Orientation

Placement on the political spectrum: before the war vs. today (Jewish Israelis, October 2026)



As in November 2025, we asked Jewish respondents to place themselves on a detailed nine-category religiosity scale, first as they recall their religious identity on the eve of the war and then as they identify today. The overall distribution has barely changed: roughly one-third (32%) describe themselves as “completely secular” both before and after the war, one-fifth as “secular with some traditional practices,” and 15% as “traditionalist.” About one in ten Jewish Israelis (10%) now place themselves in a more religious category than before the war, while half as many (5%) place themselves in a less religious one. The principal shifts are among those formerly “secular with some traditional practices” who now identify as “traditionalist” (12% of that group), and among “liberal religious” and “religious” respondents who have moved one category toward greater religiosity (16% of each group). Among the completely secular, 92% remain in the same category.

On the political scale, respondents report much greater movement – toward the right, particularly its outer edge, as we also found a year ago. The share of Jewish Israelis who now identify as “strong right” is 24%, nearly double the 13% who recall identifying that way before the war. The share placing themselves in one of the four right-wing categories is nearly unchanged between respondents’ recalled prewar positions and their positions today. What has changed is the distribution within the bloc. Looking at individual movements, 33% of Jewish respondents who placed themselves on the scale say they have shifted rightward since the war began, 14% say they have shifted leftward, and 54% report no change. Among Arab Israelis, as a year ago, there is little movement: about one-quarter place themselves “exactly in the center,” three in ten on the left, and one-quarter do not know how to respond.

One qualification is important: every July, we measure political orientation directly on this nine-point scale, without reference to the war. In July 2025, 13% of Jewish Israelis placed themselves on the strong right; in July 2026, 14% did so. Thus, the figure respondents give for “before the war” (13%) is consistent with the direct measurement, whereas their figure for “today” (24%) is substantially higher. The discrepancy may stem from wording that invites respondents to report a change. If so, some Israelis may feel they have moved further to the right than they actually have.

Where did you place yourself before the war, compared with where you place yourself today? (%)



	Strong right	Right	Moderate right	Right, near center	Exactly center	Left, near center	Moderate left	Left	Strong left
"Before the war I was..." – Nov. 2025	11	24	18	14	9	9	5	4	1
"Today I am..." – Nov. 2025	19	28	14	9	9	7	5	3	1
"Before the war I was..." – Oct. 2026	13	22	16	13	12	11	7	6	0
"Today I am..." – Oct. 2026	24	21	9	11	10	9	6	6	1

Totals may not equal 100% because "None of these" and "Don't know" responses are omitted and percentages have been rounded.

On a detailed scale of political orientation, where would you place yourself? (%)



	Strong right	Right	Moderate right	Right, near center	Exactly center	Left, near center	Moderate left	Left	Strong left
July 2025	13	22	16	12	10	8	7	5	2
July 2026	14	23	13	16	13	9	7	3	0

Data for the JPPI Israeli Society Index survey was collected in October 2026 through Madad.com (618 Jewish respondents) and Afkar Research (203 Arab respondents, approximately half online and half by telephone). The data was analyzed and weighted by voting patterns and religiosity to represent Israel's adult population. Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepokov compile the JPPI Israeli Society Index with research, production, and writing assistance by Yael Levinovsky. Prof. David Steinberg provides statistical supervision.