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JPPI
המכון למדיניות העם היהודי
THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE

The Jewish People Policy Institute | Glazer Information Center

JPPI Voice of the Jewish People Index

Connected U.S. Jews on the Midterm Elections, U.S. Policy on Israel, Confidence in President Trump, Combating Antisemitism, Israel's Next Government, and Perceptions of Victory in the War Since October 7

Main Finding

Following the U.S. midterm elections, most connected U.S. Jews are satisfied with the Democratic Party's substantial victory. Yet a large majority expect the incoming Congress to be less supportive of Israel than its predecessor, and almost all expect it to seek to impose conditions or restrictions on military aid to Israel. Respondents express greater confidence in the new Democratic majority on domestic issues than on relations with Israel or combating antisemitism. Nearly half are satisfied with Israel's election results, a much higher share than among Israeli Jews.

Additional Findings


- Six in ten U.S. respondents voted for the Democratic candidate for the House of Representatives and three in ten for the Republican, similar to the panel's reported vote in 2024.
- "Democracy and the rule of law" was the most important voting issue for nearly half of respondents. Just over a quarter chose either Israel or antisemitism as their top issue, as did half of Trump voters.
- Even among Harris voters in 2024, two-thirds expect Congress to be less supportive of Israel, and only a quarter trust the new Democratic majority on relations with Israel.
- The share who believe the United States does not support Israel enough has risen from less than a fifth in February 2025 to nearly four in ten. Since February 2026, the increase has been concentrated among centrist and lean-liberal respondents.
- Confidence in President Trump has declined: one in seven respondents expresses strong confidence that he will do the right thing on U.S.–Israel relations, down from a quarter in January. The decline has been concentrated among conservatives and centrists.
- A third believe the Republican Party would do a better job of combating antisemitism; a fifth favor the Democratic Party.
- Half of connected Jews see Israel's election results as evidence that most Israelis oppose the Netanyahu government. A third of Israeli Jews share this interpretation.
- Four in ten favor an opposition government supported by the Arab parties; three in ten prefer a unity government comprising Likud and Yashar.
- Four in ten believe Israel's next government should consider the views of U.S. Jews to a great extent or to some extent; a fifth believe it should not consider them at all.
- Just over a quarter feel that Israel has won or is winning the war that began on October 7, 2023, similar to the share recorded in the summer and about half the corresponding share among Israeli Jews.
- Four in five respondents plan to light Hanukkah candles on all eight nights.

This month's data was collected November 15–18, 2026, after the U.S. midterm elections in early November and Israel's 26th Knesset election, held one week before the U.S. vote. While U.S. Democrats won majorities in the House and Senate, neither Israeli bloc secured a parliamentary majority. In addition to the sample of connected U.S. Jews, 142 Canadian respondents and 73 UK respondents participated this month. Findings for these groups should be interpreted with caution given their small sample sizes. All breakdowns by ideology, denomination, or voting pattern refer to U.S. Jews only. Throughout this report, "Jews" and "U.S. Jews" refer to the connected Jews represented by JPPI's standing respondent panel, rather than to all U.S. Jews.

The U.S. Midterm Elections


Satisfaction with U.S. election results

(2024 presidential and congressional elections; 2026 midterm elections)



"Very satisfied" with the results

(by political ideology)



Nearly six in ten connected U.S. Jews (57%) are satisfied with the midterm election results: 41% are "very satisfied" and 16% "somewhat satisfied." Four in ten (40%) are dissatisfied. This reverses the picture recorded after the presidential election two years ago: in November 2024, six in ten (61%) were dissatisfied and about a third (35%) were satisfied.

Satisfaction closely tracks political ideology. Eight in ten strong liberals (79%) and six in ten respondents who lean liberal (60%) are "very satisfied," while 83% of strong conservatives and three-quarters of those who lean conservative (75%) are "very dissatisfied." Centrists are divided: 52% are dissatisfied and 42% satisfied. By denomination, seven in ten Reform respondents (71%) and six in ten Conservative respondents (58%) are satisfied, while two-thirds of Modern Orthodox respondents (68%) and a large majority of Haredi respondents (87%) are dissatisfied.


The results of the U.S. midterm elections make me feel... (%)

	Very dissatisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Very satisfied	None of these
November 2024*	56	5	9	27	4
November 2026	31	9	16	41	3
Strong liberal	3	3	13	79	2
Lean liberal	6	5	27	60	2
Center	34	18	24	18	6
Lean conservative	75	12	5	5	2
Strong conservative	83	8	1	0	7
Trump voters (2024)	83	9	2	1	4
Harris voters (2024)	5	7	22	64	2
Reform	22	5	16	55	1
Conservative	27	13	21	37	2
Modern Orthodox	59	9	13	15	4
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	67	20	0	7	7

**In November 2024, the question referred to the results of the presidential and congressional elections.*


House of Representatives election vote

(U.S. respondents, November 2026)



Voted for the Democratic candidate

(by political ideology)



Six in ten respondents (59%) said they voted for the Democratic candidate in their congressional district, three in ten (31%) for the Republican, and 4% for another candidate; 7% did not vote. These figures closely match last month's voting intentions, when 55% planned to vote Democratic, 31% Republican, and 10% were undecided. They also resemble the voting pattern reported by panelists after the 2024 election: 63% for the Democratic candidate and 31% for the Republican. The share who did not vote was slightly higher this month than in the presidential election, consistent with the broader U.S. pattern of lower turnout in midterms.

Voting closely followed political ideology: nine in ten strong liberals (90%) and those who lean liberal (88%) voted Democratic, while 86% of strong conservatives voted Republican. Among centrists, a fifth of whom (21%) were still undecided in October, nearly half (48%) voted Democratic, a third (34%) Republican, and 12% did not vote. Cross-party voting was limited: 7% of Trump's 2024 voters chose a Democrat this time, while 5% of Kamala Harris's 2024 voters chose a Republican. By denomination, nearly three-quarters of Reform respondents (73%) and six in ten Conservative respondents (58%) voted Democratic, while half of Modern Orthodox respondents (49%) and two-thirds of Haredi respondents (67%) voted Republican.

In the House of Representatives election in my district, I voted for… (%)

	The Democratic candidate	The Republican candidate	Another candidate	Did not vote
November 2024*	63	31	3	4
November 2026	59	31	4	7
Strong liberal	90	2	4	4
Lean liberal	88	5	3	4
Center	48	34	6	12
Lean conservative	12	76	2	10
Strong conservative	7	86	1	6
Trump voters (2024)	7	84	2	8
Harris voters (2024)	87	5	4	5
Reform	73	20	2	5
Conservative	58	33	3	6
Modern Orthodox	35	49	6	10
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	7	67	0	27
Other	62	27	4	7
No denomination	52	36	5	7

**In November 2024, the question referred to the presidential and congressional elections.*


A quarter of respondents (26%) said no Senate election was held in their state. Among the 74% whose states held one, 55% voted Democratic and 36% Republican.

In my state's Senate election, I voted for... (only respondents whose states held a Senate election, %)

	The Democratic candidate	The Republican candidate	Another candidate	Did not vote
U.S. respondents	55	36	2	7
Strong liberal	93	2	2	3
Lean liberal	83	8	3	6
Center	39	47	2	12
Lean conservative	10	78	2	10
Strong conservative	1	95	0	4
Trump voters (2024)	5	89	1	6
Harris voters (2024)	85	9	2	4


Most important voting issue

(U.S. respondents)



Most important issue

(by 2024 presidential vote)



We also asked which issue mattered most in respondents' voting decisions. Nearly half (47%) chose "Democracy and the rule of law." The two "Jewish" issues came next: Israel (16%) and antisemitism (12%), together accounting for 28%. They were followed by the economy and cost of living (8%) and foreign policy and the war with Iran (6%). After the 2024 election, half of panelists (50%) also identified "democracy" as their main concern, although that question offered different options and did not list Israel and antisemitism separately. Last month, 55% said Israel-related issues would be a "very important" factor in deciding how to vote; when asked this month to identify the single most important issue, however, only one in six chose Israel.

Priorities vary sharply by ideology. Four in five strong liberals (78%) and nearly two-thirds of those who lean liberal (63%) chose democracy. Among centrists, the leading issues were democracy (30%), Israel (26%), and antisemitism (19%). Among those who lean conservative, Israel (28%) and antisemitism (26%) ranked first and second. By 2024 presidential vote, half of Trump voters (50%) chose either Israel (27%) or antisemitism (23%), compared with 15% of Harris voters, two-thirds of whom (68%) chose democracy.


Which issue was most important to you when deciding how to vote? (%)

Respondents	Democracy and the rule of law	The economy and cost of living	Immigration	Health care	Foreign policy and the war with Iran	Israel	Antisemitism	Other	Did not vote
U.S. respondents	47	8	2	0	6	16	12	6	2
Strong liberal	78	6	1	1	2	5	1	4	1
Lean liberal	63	7	1	0	2	12	6	7	1
Center	30	9	2	1	6	26	19	5	3
Lean conservative	11	9	4	0	12	28	26	6	3
Strong conservative	17	14	7	0	12	20	17	10	3
Trump voters (2024)	11	10	6	0	12	27	23	9	2
Harris voters (2024)	68	7	1	0	2	10	5	5	1


The New Congress and Israel

The New Congress and Israel

(U.S. respondents)




Expect the incoming Congress to be less supportive of Israel



Say the new Congress is "very likely" to try to impose conditions or restrictions on U.S. military aid to Israel

Trust to do a good job

(U.S. respondents)



Although most connected Jews are satisfied with the election results, nearly eight in ten (78%) expect the incoming Democratic-controlled Congress to be less supportive of Israel than the outgoing Republican-controlled Congress. Another 13% expect about the same level of support, and only 2% expect more. This expectation spans the political spectrum: 62% of both strong liberals and those who lean liberal expect less support, compared with 88% of centrists and almost all conservatives. Even among Harris voters, two-thirds (65%) expect less support.

Compared with the outgoing Republican-controlled Congress, do you expect the incoming Democratic-controlled Congress to be… (%)

	More supportive of Israel	About as supportive of Israel	Less supportive of Israel	Don't know
U.S. respondents	2	13	78	8
Strong liberal	2	20	62	16
Lean liberal	3	22	62	14
Center	1	8	88	4
Lean conservative	2	2	97	0
Strong conservative	0	0	100	0
Trump voters (2024)	0	1	99	0
Harris voters (2024)	3	19	65	13

Almost all respondents (96%) believe the new Congress is likely to seek to impose conditions or restrictions on U.S. military aid to Israel: nearly two-thirds (63%) consider this "very likely" and a third (33%) "somewhat likely." The perceived likelihood varies by ideology: 44% of strong liberals consider it "very likely," compared with 70% of centrists and 86% of strong conservatives. The question measured expectations, not preferences: respondents were not asked whether they supported or opposed such conditions.

How likely is the new Congress to try to impose conditions or restrictions on U.S. military aid to Israel? (%)

	Very likely	Somewhat likely	Not very likely	Not at all likely	Don't know
U.S. respondents	63	33	2	0	2
Strong liberal	44	48	4	1	2
Lean liberal	54	44	1	0	1
Center	70	27	1	0	2
Lean conservative	84	14	1	0	2
Strong conservative	86	12	1	0	1
Trump voters (2024)	88	10	1	0	1
Harris voters (2024)	51	44	3	0	2

We also asked whether respondents trust the new Democratic majority in Congress to do a good job on five issues. A majority (54%) trust it on democracy. Respondents are divided on the economy (45% trust it; 41% do not) and immigration (48% and 43%, respectively). Confidence is lower on the two Jewish issues: only 16% trust it on relations with Israel, while 63% do not. On combating antisemitism, 21% trust it and 61% do not.

Do you trust the new Democratic-majority Congress to do a good job on each of the following issues? (%)

Issue	Trust	Do not trust	Don't know
Democracy	54	37	9
The economy	45	41	14
Immigration	48	43	10
Relations with Israel	16	63	22
Combating antisemitism	21	61	18

These differences also appear within political groups. Among Harris voters in 2024, eight in ten (81%) trust the new Democratic majority on democracy, but only a quarter (25%) trust it on relations with Israel and a third (33%) on combating antisemitism. Many are unsure about the latter two issues (33% and 27%, respectively). Among strong liberals, 35% trust the Democratic majority on relations with Israel, while 28% do not. Among centrists and conservatives, trust on either issue is very low.


In November 2024, after the presidential election, we asked a similar question about President-elect Trump. At the time, 44% trusted him on relations with Israel and 34% on combating antisemitism, but only 24% on democracy. For the new Democratic majority, the pattern is almost reversed.


Do you trust the new Democratic-majority Congress to do a good job on each of the following issues? (% answering "Trust")

	Democracy	The economy	Immigration	Relations with Israel	Combating antisemitism
Democratic majority in Congress – November 2026	54	45	48	16	21
President-elect Trump – November 2024*	24	32	38	44	34
Strong liberal	86	83	82	35	47
Lean liberal	80	67	73	17	21
Center	45	24	31	6	10
Lean conservative	9	5	4	2	2
Strong conservative	2	1	0	0	0
Trump voters (2024)	4	2	2	0	1
Harris voters (2024)	81	70	73	25	33

**In November 2024, respondents were asked whether they trusted President-elect Trump to do a good job on each issue.*

U.S. Policy on Israel





Following Trump's statement earlier this month that the United States would end security assistance to Israel, we again asked respondents how they would describe U.S. policy on Israel. The wording was identical to that used in February 2025 and February 2026. Four in ten connected Jews (43%) believe the United States provides about the right level of support for Israel, nearly four in ten (38%) say it does not support Israel enough, and 15% say it supports Israel too much. The share who consider U.S. support insufficient rose from 18% in February 2025 to 31% in February 2026 and 38% this month. Over the same period, the share who consider the level of support appropriate fell from 57% to 43%.

Since February, the view that U.S. support is insufficient has gained ground mainly among centrists and those who lean liberal. Among centrists, the share rose from roughly a third to half; among those who lean liberal, it rose from roughly a quarter to a third. The increase was smaller among those who lean conservative (from 46% to 53%). Among strong liberals, the share was virtually unchanged (16% and 17%); the largest group (40%) believes the United States supports Israel too much.

How would you describe U.S. policy on Israel? (%)

	The United States supports Israel too much	The United States supports Israel about the right amount	The United States does not support Israel enough	Don't know
U.S. respondents – February 2025	18	57	18	7
U.S. respondents – February 2026	14	48	31	6
U.S. respondents – November 2026	15	43	38	4
Strong liberal	40	36	17	7
Lean liberal	9	53	34	5
Center	3	43	51	3
Lean conservative	0	46	53	1
Strong conservative	1	43	54	3
Trump voters (2024)	0	44	55	1
Harris voters (2024)	22	44	29	6

Share of respondents who believe "The United States does not support Israel enough" (%)

Respondents	February 2025	February 2026	November 2026
Strong liberal	9	16	17
Lean liberal	14	23	34
Center	24	37	51
Lean conservative	24	46	53
Strong conservative	27	46	54

Views are more uniform among Canadian and UK respondents, who were asked about their own country's policy. A large majority of Canadian respondents (87%) and three-quarters of UK respondents (77%) believe their country does not support Israel enough, up from 79% and 69%, respectively, in February. As noted at the start of the report, these are small samples.


How would you describe your country's policy on Israel? (%)

	My country supports Israel too much	My country supports Israel about the right amount	My country does not support Israel enough	Don't know
Canadian respondents – February 2026	3	12	79	6
Canadian respondents – November 2026	4	8	87	2
UK respondents – February 2026	8	20	69	4
UK respondents – November 2026	3	14	77	7

Confidence in Leaders


"A great deal" of confidence in Trump

(U.S. respondents)



"A great deal" of confidence in Trump on U.S.–Israel relations

(November 2026, by political ideology)



We asked how confident respondents are that President Trump will do the right thing on three issues during the remaining two years of his term. Apart from this reference to the time remaining in office, the question was identical to one asked several times since December 2024, most recently in January 2026. Confidence declined on all three issues. Among connected Jews, 14% express a great deal of confidence in Trump on U.S.–Israel relations, down from 24% in January, while nearly half (48%) have none at all, up from 43%. On Iran, 9% express a great deal of confidence, down from 16%, and 58% have none at all, up from 41%. On combating antisemitism, 15% express a great deal of confidence, down from 23%, while 48% have none at all, compared with 45% in January.

The decline was concentrated among conservatives and centrists, as confidence among liberals was already very low. Among strong conservatives, the share expressing a great deal of confidence in Trump on U.S.–Israel relations fell from three-quarters (75%) in January to half (48%). It fell from roughly half to a quarter among those who lean conservative, and from a quarter to a tenth among centrists. On combating antisemitism, the corresponding share fell from roughly three-quarters to half among strong conservatives and from half to a quarter among those who lean conservative. On Iran, roughly a quarter of Trump voters now express a great deal of confidence in the president, compared with half in January.

How much confidence do you have that President Trump will do the right thing on U.S.–Israel relations in the remaining two years of his term? (%)

	A great deal	A little	None at all	Don't know
U.S. respondents – January 2026*	24	29	43	4
U.S. respondents – November 2026	14	36	48	2
Strong liberal	3	11	85	1
Lean liberal	4	31	61	3
Center	11	55	31	3
Lean conservative	28	55	16	1
Strong conservative	48	45	6	1
Trump voters (2024)	38	52	8	1
Harris voters (2024)	3	24	70	3

**In January 2026 and earlier surveys, the question did not include the phrase "in the remaining two years of his term."*

How much confidence do you have that President Trump will do the right thing in dealing with Iran in the remaining two years of his term? (%)

	A great deal	A little	None at all	Don't know
U.S. respondents – January 2026*	16	35	41	9
U.S. respondents – November 2026	9	31	58	2
Strong liberal	0	7	92	1
Lean liberal	2	16	81	2
Center	9	44	44	3
Lean conservative	15	60	22	2
Strong conservative	38	53	6	3
Trump voters (2024)	27	56	14	3
Harris voters (2024)	1	16	81	1

**In January 2026 and earlier surveys, the question did not include the phrase "in the remaining two years of his term."*

How much confidence do you have that President Trump will do the right thing in combating antisemitism in the remaining two years of his term? (%)

	A great deal	A little	None at all	Don't know
U.S. respondents – January 2026*	23	29	45	3
U.S. respondents – November 2026	15	35	48	2
Strong liberal	1	14	84	1
Lean liberal	2	31	63	3
Center	14	50	34	2
Lean conservative	29	57	13	1
Strong conservative	56	42	3	0
Trump voters (2024)	42	54	5	0
Harris voters (2024)	2	25	71	2

**In January 2026 and earlier surveys, the question did not include the phrase "in the remaining two years of his term."*

Share of respondents expressing "a great deal" of confidence that President Trump will do the right thing on three issues (%)

Survey date	U.S.–Israel relations	Dealing with Iran	Combating antisemitism
January 2025	–	30	26
February 2025	–	28	32
March 2025	27	–	–
April 2025	–	15	28
May 2025	13	10	22
June 2025	18	13	–
July 2025	24	23	–
January 2026	24	16	23
November 2026	14	9	15

Confidence in national leaders is even lower among Canadian and UK respondents. Two-thirds of Canadian respondents (68%) have no confidence at all that Prime Minister Mark Carney will do the right thing on Canada–Israel relations, compared with 64% in January. Similar shares have no confidence in him on Iran (58%) and combating antisemitism (63%). Among UK respondents, seven in ten (70%) have no confidence at all in Prime Minister Andy Burnham on UK–Israel relations. In January, when the question referred to his predecessor, Keir Starmer, the figure was 60%. Respondents are somewhat more confident that Burnham will do the right thing in combating antisemitism.


How much confidence do you have that the prime minister will do the right thing on… (Canadian and UK respondents) (%)

	A great deal	A little	None at all	Don't know
Canada, Mark Carney: Canada–Israel relations – January 2026	9	24	64	3
Canada, Mark Carney: Canada–Israel relations – November 2026	6	23	68	3
Canada, Mark Carney: Dealing with Iran	8	30	58	4
Canada, Mark Carney: Combating antisemitism	4	32	63	1
UK, Keir Starmer: UK–Israel relations – January 2026	9	19	60	11
UK, Andy Burnham: UK–Israel relations – November 2026	8	18	70	4
UK, Andy Burnham: Dealing with Iran	8	22	63	7
UK, Andy Burnham: Combating antisemitism	15	25	58	3

The Parties and the Fight Against Antisemitism


Party better at combating antisemitism

(U.S. respondents)



Democratic Party rated better at combating antisemitism

(liberal U.S. respondents)



We returned to a question last asked two years ago, ahead of the 2024 presidential election: Which of the two major U.S. parties would do a better job of combating antisemitism? Just over a third of connected Jews (36%) choose the Republican Party, a fifth (20%) choose the Democratic Party, and a third (34%) consider both equally bad. The share choosing the Republicans is virtually unchanged from September 2024 (37%). The share choosing the Democrats, however, has fallen from 31% to 20%, while the share who consider both parties equally bad has risen from 23% to 34%.

The shift occurred among liberals. In September 2024, three-quarters of strong liberals (76%) chose the Democratic Party. This month, half (49%) do so, while a third (34%) consider both parties equally bad. Among those who lean liberal, 15% now choose the Democrats, down from 31% in September 2024 and 42% in October 2024; more than half (56%) consider both parties equally bad. Among Harris voters, 31% choose the Democrats and 45% consider both parties equally bad. Views among conservatives have changed little.

Which of the two major U.S. parties would do a better job of combating antisemitism? (%)

	The Democratic Party	The Republican Party	Both equally good	Both equally bad	Don't know
U.S. respondents – September 2024	31	37	4	23	6
U.S. respondents – October 2024	30	38	4	23	5
U.S. respondents – November 2026	20	36	4	34	7
Strong liberal	49	4	2	34	10
Lean liberal	15	13	9	56	7
Center	7	45	4	39	5
Lean conservative	2	76	0	19	3
Strong conservative	0	91	1	6	2
Trump voters (2024)	0	86	1	12	2
Harris voters (2024)	31	10	5	45	9

Party considered better at combating antisemitism by political ideology (%)

Political ideology	Democratic Sept. 2024	Democratic Oct. 2024	Democratic Nov. 2026	Republican Sept. 2024	Republican Oct. 2024	Republican Nov. 2026
Strong liberal	76	66	49	3	4	4
Lean liberal	31	42	15	13	10	13
Center	10	12	7	50	47	45
Lean conservative	2	4	2	72	79	76
Strong conservative	0	0	0	88	94	91


Israel's Election

Satisfied with Israel's election results

(Very satisfied + Fairly satisfied)



The election results reflect...



Israel's election to the 26th Knesset, held in late October, left neither political bloc with a parliamentary majority. We subsequently asked connected U.S. Jews several questions also put to Israelis earlier this month in JPPI's Israeli Society Index. Nearly half of U.S. respondents (47%) are satisfied with the election results, while 38% are dissatisfied. Another 15% are unsure or insufficiently familiar with the results to answer. The picture among Israeli Jews is different: only 22% are satisfied, while 73% are dissatisfied. Canadian and UK respondents are also less satisfied than their U.S. counterparts: in both countries, 34% are satisfied, while roughly half are dissatisfied (53% in Canada and 51% in the UK).

Satisfaction among connected U.S. Jews is consistent with their preferences before the election, when 57% said they wanted the opposition to win. Six in ten strong liberals (61%) and those who lean liberal (59%) are satisfied with the results, compared with 43% of centrists, 33% of those who lean conservative, and 16% of strong conservatives. By 2024 presidential vote, 60% of Harris voters are satisfied, compared with 22% of Trump voters. The share unable to assess the results declines with closer ties to Israel: 27% among those who have never visited, compared with 7% among those who have lived there.

How do you feel about the results of Israel's election? (%)

Respondents	Very satisfied	Fairly satisfied	Not very satisfied	Not at all satisfied	Don't know / Not familiar enough to say
U.S. respondents	3	44	29	9	15
Israeli Jews (JPPI Index)	2	20	44	29	5
Canadian respondents	1	33	33	20	12
UK respondents	1	33	36	15	15
U.S. Jews					
Strong liberal	5	56	21	8	10
Lean liberal	5	54	25	4	11
Center	3	40	28	9	20
Lean conservative	0	33	33	11	23
Strong conservative	1	15	50	19	15
Trump voters (2024)	0	22	44	15	19
Harris voters (2024)	5	55	23	6	11
Never visited Israel	4	38	21	10	27
Visited Israel once	2	43	25	7	23
Visited Israel more than once	4	44	33	8	11
Lived in Israel	3	46	32	13	7

Satisfaction with the election results depends in part on how respondents interpret them. We therefore presented two statements and asked which they considered more accurate. Half of connected U.S. Jews (51%) chose "The election results reflect opposition to the Netanyahu government among a majority of Israelis." Only 8% chose "The election results reflect support for the Netanyahu government among a majority of Israeli Jews." A further 28% chose neither. Among Israeli Jews, the order was reversed: 39% chose the statement describing majority support for the Netanyahu government among Israeli Jews, and 34% chose the statement describing majority opposition among Israelis. Even on the conservative side of the U.S. political spectrum, relatively few interpreted the results as support for the government: 21% of strong conservatives and 18% of Trump voters did so. Larger shares in each group (35% and 40%, respectively) chose neither statement. Among Canadian and UK respondents, roughly four in ten interpreted the results as opposition to the previous government, while similar shares chose neither statement.

Which of the following statements do you consider most accurate? (%)

Respondents	The election results reflect opposition to the Netanyahu government among a majority of Israelis	The election results reflect support for the Netanyahu government among a majority of Israeli Jews	Neither	Don't know
U.S. respondents	51	8	28	14
Israeli Jews (JPPI Index)*	34	39	26	1
Canadian respondents	42	11	41	7
UK respondents	44	8	40	8
U.S. respondents				
Strong liberal	65	4	20	12
Lean liberal	62	5	22	10
Center	45	6	32	17
Lean conservative	33	11	40	16
Strong conservative	28	21	35	16
Trump voters (2024)	25	18	40	16
Harris voters (2024)	63	4	21	12

**See JPPI's monthly Israeli Society Index reports here.*

What government would respondents like to see formed in Israel?

(U.S. respondents vs. Israeli Jews; selected responses)



Four in ten connected U.S. Jews (39%) favor a government formed by the opposition bloc and supported by the Arab parties, while three in ten (30%) favor a unity government comprising Likud, Yashar, and additional parties. Another 10% selected "I expect another election soon"; 8% chose a Netanyahu-led government comprising the outgoing coalition parties and one opposition party; and 3% chose a government formed by the opposition bloc and the Haredi parties. Among Israeli Jews, asked a comparable question, the two leading preferences are a unity government (27%) and a government formed by the change bloc and the Arab parties (26%). A fifth (20%) prefer a government formed by the Netanyahu bloc and one party from the change bloc. Connected U.S. Jews are thus more likely than Israeli Jews to favor a government that relies on the Arab parties, and less likely to favor one led by Netanyahu.

Preferences closely track U.S. political ideology. Seven in ten strong liberals (71%) and more than half of those who lean liberal (54%) favor an opposition government supported by the Arab parties. A unity government is the most popular option among centrists (39%), those who lean conservative (53%), and strong conservatives (41%); 31% of strong conservatives prefer a Netanyahu-led government. Trump voters also prefer a unity government (44%) to one led by Netanyahu (23%). By religious affiliation, nearly half of Reform respondents (47%) favor an opposition government supported by the Arab parties. Among Conservative respondents, the leading options are a unity government (38%) and an opposition government (35%), while nearly half of Modern Orthodox respondents (48%) favor a unity government. A unity government is also the most popular option among Canadian respondents (34%) and UK respondents (40%).

Given the results, what government would you like to see formed in Israel now? (%)

Respondents	A Netanyahu-led government with the outgoing coalition parties and one opposition party	A unity government comprising Netanyahu's Likud, Eisenkot's Yashar, and additional parties	An opposition-bloc government supported by the Arab parties	An opposition-bloc government with the Haredi parties	I expect another election soon	None of these / Don't know
U.S. respondents	8	30	39	3	10	10
Israeli Jews (JPPI Index)*	20	27	26	3	17	7
Canadian respondents	13	34	27	4	10	12
UK respondents	8	40	34	0	11	7
U.S. respondents						
Strong liberal	0	13	71	1	8	6
Lean liberal	2	25	54	4	8	7
Center	7	39	22	5	13	15
Lean conservative	13	53	9	2	12	12
Strong conservative	31	41	2	3	15	9
Trump voters (2024)	23	44	5	3	13	12
Harris voters (2024)	1	22	57	3	9	8
Reform	5	25	47	3	9	10
Conservative	6	38	35	2	12	8
Modern Orthodox	9	48	17	8	11	7
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	27	27	0	13	13	20

**See JPPI's monthly Israeli Society Index reports here.*

Half of connected Jews (50%) say Israel's election results do not change their feelings toward the country, while a third (33%) say their feelings depend on which government is formed. A further 12% say the results make them feel closer to Israel, and only 3% feel more distant. "It depends on which government is formed" is most common among liberals: 46% of strong liberals and 42% of those who lean liberal choose it. The results do not change the feelings of 72% of those who lean conservative and 68% of strong conservatives.

Do the results of Israel's election make you feel... (%)

Respondents	Closer to Israel	More distant from Israel	It depends on which government is formed	No change in my feelings	Don't know
U.S. respondents	12	3	33	50	3
Canadian respondents	8	2	26	61	3
UK respondents	11	5	32	48	4
U.S. respondents					
Strong liberal	15	4	46	33	2
Lean liberal	12	3	42	39	3
Center	10	2	26	59	3
Lean conservative	12	0	13	72	2
Strong conservative	8	2	20	68	2
Trump voters (2024)	10	1	17	69	2
Harris voters (2024)	13	3	43	38	2

We also asked to what extent Israel's next government should consider the views of U.S. Jews when making decisions. Four in ten (40%) believe it should consider them "to a great extent" (9%) or "to some extent" (31%); 36% say "to a limited extent," and 21% say "not at all." Support for considering these views is higher among liberals: roughly half of strong liberals (48%) and those who lean liberal (46%) favor considering U.S. Jewish views to a great extent or to some extent, compared with a fifth of those who lean conservative (20%). Roughly a third of those who lean conservative (33%), strong conservatives (37%), and Trump voters (35%) believe these views should not be considered at all, compared with 14% of Harris voters. Canadian and UK respondents, asked about Jews in their own countries, see less need for such consideration: 41% of Canadian respondents and 47% of UK respondents believe Israel's government should not consider their communities' views at all.

To what extent should Israel's next government consider the views of U.S. Jews when making decisions? (%)


Respondents	To a great extent	To some extent	To a limited extent	Not at all	Don't know
U.S. respondents	9	31	36	21	3
Canadian respondents (about Canadian Jews)*	6	19	30	41	5
UK respondents (about UK Jews)*	7	16	27	47	3
U.S. respondents					
Strong liberal	12	36	29	19	4
Lean liberal	9	37	40	13	1
Center	7	34	40	16	3
Lean conservative	5	16	43	33	4
Strong conservative	7	24	29	37	3
Trump voters (2024)	6	16	38	35	4
Harris voters (2024)	11	38	34	14	3
Reform	13	36	35	13	2
Conservative	7	35	34	22	2
Modern Orthodox	5	24	38	31	2
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	13	20	27	40	0

**Canadian and UK respondents were asked how much Israel's next government should consider the views of Jews in their own countries.*

Victory in the War


Feel that Israel has won or is winning

(selecting 4 or 5, November 2026)



Feel that Israel has won or is winning – over time

(U.S. respondents, selecting 4 or 5)



This month, we again asked to what extent respondents feel that Israel has won or is winning the war that began on October 7, 2023. The question covered all fronts. Just over a quarter of connected U.S. Jews (27%) feel that Israel has won or is winning, selecting 4 or 5 on a five-point scale. Four in ten (40%) do not, selecting 1 or 2, and a third (33%) chose the midpoint. The share perceiving victory is close to the summer readings (23% in June and 26% in July) and slightly below May's level (30%). Among Israeli Jews, according to JPPI's Israeli Society Index published earlier this month, half (49%) feel that Israel has won or is winning – nearly twice the share among connected U.S. Jews. The gap is particularly pronounced at the top of the scale: 20% of Israeli Jews selected the highest rating, compared with 3% of U.S. respondents.


As in previous surveys, the share who feel that Israel has won or is winning rises toward the conservative end of the political spectrum. Half of strong conservatives (50%) and 44% of those who lean conservative feel that Israel has won or is winning, compared with 31% of centrists, 18% of those who lean liberal, and 13% of strong liberals. Six in ten strong liberals (63%) do not feel that Israel has won or is winning. Among Canadian and UK respondents, the shares perceiving victory (21% and 21%, respectively) are lower than in May (36% and 31%).

On a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (completely), to what extent do you feel that Israel has won or is winning the war that began on October 7, 2023? (The question refers to the war on all fronts.) (%)

Respondents	1 – Not at all	2	3	4	5 – Completely
U.S. respondents – July 2025	23	16	28	29	4
U.S. respondents – August 2025	22	15	31	28	4
U.S. respondents – May 2026	21	17	33	26	4
U.S. respondents – June 2026	28	17	33	20	3
U.S. respondents – July 2026	28	18	29	23	3
U.S. respondents – November 2026	21	19	33	24	3
Israeli Jews					
Israeli Jews – May 2026	19	13	26	26	16
Israeli Jews – June 2026	21	16	23	25	15
Israeli Jews – November 2026	13	12	26	29	20
Canadian and UK respondents					
Canadian respondents – May 2026	13	21	31	33	3
Canadian respondents – November 2026	24	17	38	18	3
UK respondents – May 2026	15	17	37	29	2
UK respondents – November 2026	18	16	44	16	5
Political ideology					
Strong liberal	41	22	25	10	3
Lean liberal	18	27	37	17	1
Center	15	16	38	28	2
Lean conservative	6	15	36	42	2
Strong conservative	6	9	34	44	6
2024 presidential vote					
Trump voters (2024)	6	14	37	39	4
Harris voters (2024)	29	23	31	15	2


Looking Ahead to Hanukkah

Plan to light candles "on all eight nights"



"On all eight nights"

(by religious affiliation – selected categories)



With Hanukkah approaching, eight in ten connected U.S. Jews (79%) plan to light candles on all eight nights, and another 9% on most nights; 4% do not plan to light candles at all. The share planning to light candles every night is similar to last year's level (82%) and higher than two years ago (72%). As in previous years, the more traditional the denomination, the greater the share planning to light candles every night: 58% of respondents with no denomination, 76% of Reform respondents, 86% of Conservative respondents, 97% of Modern Orthodox respondents, and all Haredi respondents (100%). A substantial gap separates those connected to a Jewish community (84%) from those who are not (53%); 17% of the latter do not plan to light candles at all. Differences by political outlook are minimal. Among Canadian respondents, 77% plan to light candles on all eight nights, compared with 63% of UK respondents.

Do you plan to light Hanukkah candles this year? (%)

Respondents	On all eight nights	On most nights	On some nights	Perhaps once or twice	No
U.S. respondents – December 2024	72	13	5	2	6
U.S. respondents – November 2025	82	7	2	2	4
U.S. respondents – November 2026	79	9	4	3	4
Canadian respondents	77	10	4	4	6
UK respondents	63	15	7	4	11
Reform	76	12	7	2	2
Conservative	86	8	3	2	2
Modern Orthodox	97	3	0	0	0
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	100	0	0	0	0
Other	74	10	4	6	7
No denomination	58	14	6	10	12
Connected to a community	84	10	3	2	2
Not connected to a community	53	7	8	14	17

Survey Methodology

This report draws on a November 2026 survey of participants in the Jewish People Policy Institute's (JPPI) Voice of the Jewish People panel. The survey primarily reflects the views of "connected" Jews – those with relatively strong ties to the Jewish community, Israel, and/or Jewish identity. The sample is not representative of all U.S. Jews. The survey included 836 U.S. respondents, 142 Canadian respondents, and 73 UK respondents. Unless otherwise stated, the results reflect U.S. respondents only. The UK findings require particular caution because of the small number of participants. JPPI's Voice of the Jewish People surveys are conducted by Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepkov, with research and writing assistance from Yael Levinovsky. Prof. David Steinberg provides statistical oversight.

This table profiles the U.S. participants in the November 2026 survey.

Profile of U.S. respondents in November 2026

Respondent characteristic	Number	Percentage
Reform	203	24%
Conservative	264	32%
Modern Orthodox	100	12%
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	15	2%
Other	155	19%
No denomination	99	12%
Political ideology		
Strong liberal	248	30%
Lean liberal	175	21%
Center	176	21%
Lean conservative	129	15%
Strong conservative	108	13%
Marital or partnership status		
Single / divorced / widowed	222	27%
Married / in a relationship with a Jewish partner	490	59%
Married / in a relationship with a non-Jewish partner	124	15%
Connection to a community		
Connected to a community	718	86%
Not connected to a community	118	14%
Experience in Israel		
Never visited Israel	155	19%
Visited Israel once	122	15%
Visited Israel more than once	390	47%
Lived in Israel	168	20%
2024 presidential vote		
Trump voters (2024)	252	30%
Harris voters (2024)	512	61%