“We need better hasbara.”

“We need to reach out to Democrats.”

“We need to cultivate ties with the Latino community.”

These are the kinds of ideas I have been hearing repeatedly in recent weeks from Israelis and American Jews who are alarmed by the sharp decline in support for Israel in the United States. The concern is real and justified, since what we are seeing is a historic shift that may never return to the way things once were.

The vote in the Senate last week, for example, when 40 out of 47 Democratic senators supported a resolution to block the sale of bulldozers to Israel, and 36 backed a similar move on bombs, was not an outlier. It was a reflection of a broader trend that has been building for years and is now prevalent on both sides of the aisle.

A Pew Research Center survey published earlier this month found that 60% of American adults now hold an unfavorable view of Israel, including the share of Republicans, which has surged since last year, driven by those under 50.

Gallup data published just before the war showed how, for the first time in a quarter of a century, more Americans said they sympathized with Palestinians than with Israelis.

What makes this moment particularly striking, though, is the timing. The decline comes after the most vivid illustration of the strength and importance of the US-Israel alliance – the war against Iran. For 40 days, the US and Israeli militaries operated in a way never seen before. Intelligence was shared in real time, missions were planned in joint command centers, and aircraft flew side by side over hostile territory.

And yet, back in the United States, public sentiment was moving in the opposite direction.

In Israel, there is a tendency to dismiss this as the result of two external problems: growing antisemitism and a generational shift within the US that is independent of Israel’s actions. Both are partially true. Antisemitism is rising, and younger Americans lack the historical or emotional connection to Israel held by their parents. In addition, there is also a broad turn inward in American politics – from “America First” on the Right to skepticism of foreign alliances on the Left.

But these explanations are also an escape. They let us point a finger outward instead of asking the more uncomfortable question: What needs to change here in Israel?

And it is time we recognize that there is a blatant contradiction in how we talk about and treat the alliance with the US. When Washington supports us, we celebrate our diplomatic genius, yet when friction arises, we dismiss it as betrayal. This binary way of thinking – is the president for us or against us – misses the complexity of how modern statecraft actually functions, and it treats the alliance as one-dimensional.

We see this lack of nuance repeatedly.

When former US president Joe Biden visited Israel in the aftermath of October 7 and authorized a massive military resupply, deploying aircraft carriers to the region, and issuing his now-famous “don’t” warning, he was praised across the Israeli political spectrum. But when disagreements later emerged, and he delayed the delivery of certain munitions, the narrative flipped overnight. Suddenly, he was portrayed as hostile to Israel.

The same pattern is emerging with Donald Trump. During the kinetic phase of the war against Iran, he was viewed by many on the Israeli right as strongly supportive. Now, as he extends the ceasefire with Iran, even the Right in Israel is starting to have doubts.

This transactional mindset distracts us from the more important question: How is our own behavior eroding our most vital asset?

Take, for example, the issue of Jewish extremism in the West Bank. Everyone in Israel understands that it exists, even if it’s a tiny fringe minority. Yet, it resonates in the United States across both parties. We know the violence is wrong, we know it is damaging, and yet the government refuses to do anything to stop it.

Judicial reform was another example. While I personally supported many of the ideas, the way the reforms were being advanced expanded an already-existing rift between Israel and progressive Americans. People felt the ground shifting under the moral fabric that has sustained this alliance since the beginning, but despite warnings, the government refused to pause.

Another example was the refusal to outline a coherent political vision for Gaza during the war. For two years, Israel refused to discuss how it wanted the war to end and who it wanted to control Gaza the day after. The result was a perception that Israel was fighting just to fight and destroying just for the purpose of destroying without any other objective. That perception was further reinforced when Israeli ministers made extreme or irresponsible statements, whether about annexation or even the use of nuclear weapons.

Israels actions shape how the country is viewed

What we need to realize is that none of this exists in a vacuum. It shapes how Israel is viewed, how its actions are interpreted, and ultimately how people feel about the state. When they see an Israel that is embroiled in conflict for more than two years without end, even if it is justified, they distance themselves. A country at war is not one the average American wants to be identified with.

The hard truth is that while Israelis are experts in the tactics of war, they are strategically illiterate regarding the United States. Because if they were not, they would behave differently. If Israelis truly understood the value of the alliance, they would demand a different kind of behavior from their leaders. They would demand disciplined messaging, careful policies, and an awareness that our actions in Jerusalem have immediate consequences in Washington.

This is not just about military aid, even though that remains a critical issue. It is about something deeper – the strategic and moral framework at the foundation of Israel’s most important relationship.

In Washington, organizations like the American Israel Public Affairs Committee have spent decades educating lawmakers and shaping understanding of the alliance. It is time to build an AIPAC-style organization aimed at educating Israeli leaders and the public about the importance of this relationship, how it works, and how fragile it is when it is taken for granted.

Because the reality is simple: the alliance is not just defined in Washington. It is also shaped in Jerusalem, and if we want it to last, the work needs to start here.

Published in the Jerusalem Post

The post Israel must stop pretending bond with US is ‘unbreakable’ before it’s too late first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Additional Findings

• There has been a decline in the public’s overall sense of victory since the start of Operation Roaring Lion.
• A majority believes that if a U.S.-Iran agreement is reached that does not meet Israel’s objectives, the fighting should be halted.
• The achievements of the 12-day June 2025 war are perceived less positively than before.
• The achievements of the Lebanon campaign in fall 2024 are perceived less positively than before.
• Most Israelis believe that additional rounds of fighting will be required in Iran, Lebanon, and Gaza.
• Most Israelis say violence by Jews against Palestinians in Judea and Samaria (West Bank) must be confronted.
• Most Israelis are dissatisfied with the 2026 budget.
• Surging support for additional funding for the rehabilitation of the North and South, with a marked preference for cuts to the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) sector.
• Election priorities: on the center-left, replacing the government; on the right, judicial reform.
• Only a quarter of Israelis are satisfied with the range of political options ahead of the upcoming elections.
• The prevailing perception of the main difference among candidates for prime minister: “wisdom” (right) and “caring” (center-left).
• Differences in perceptions of candidates’ positions are most pronounced on religion and state issues, less so on security and the economy.

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The Iran War

This April survey was conducted before Passover, in the midst of the war with Iran, alongside a sharp escalation on the northern front in Lebanon. After four months of relative calm – beginning with the ceasefire in Gaza and the return of all hostages – Israel returned to a state of war. This round of fighting, Operation Roaring Lion, lasted 40 days until the United States and Iran announced their acceptance of a Pakistan-brokered ceasefire. The “Islamabad Agreement” stipulated a two-week ceasefire during which negotiations for a long-term cessation of hostilities would be held. In parallel with the calm on the Iranian front, the fighting with Hezbollah continued in Lebanon.

This month saw a decline in optimism about the effect of the Iran war on the Middle East. Half of Israelis (53%) believe the situation after the war will improve in the long term (22% are certain and 31% think so). At the same time, 28% are unsure, and 13% think the situation will worsen (9% think so and 4% are certain). Among Jewish Israelis, optimism is slightly higher: 58% anticipate positive change, 29% are unsure, and 10% foresee a worsening. Among Arab Israelis, 33% anticipate positive change, 24% are unsure, and 28% believe the situation will worsen.

Compared with last month, the survey points to a weakening belief that the current war will improve the situation in the Middle East over the long term. The share of Israelis who are certain that the situation will improve fell from a third (31%) to a fifth (22%), while the share who are unsure rose from a fifth (18%) to a quarter (28%). This weakening was recorded only among Jewish Israelis, where the figure fell from 75% to 58%. Among Arab Israelis, by contrast, there was a slight increase in the expectation of positive change, from a quarter (27%) to a third (33%).

Forty-three percent of Israelis believe that, once the war ends, the situation in Iran will not have changed enough to prevent another war. A similar share (44%) says it is too early to tell. Only 10% think that no additional war with Iran will be required. This finding is broadly consistent with the shift in recent weeks in Israelis’ views of the war’s possible effect on the Middle East.

Twenty-two percent of Arab Israelis believe that Israel will not need to return to fighting Iran after the current war. This share is significantly higher than the share of Jewish Israelis who think so (10%). Broken down by ideological orientation (Jewish Israelis only), center and center-left respondents tend to believe that Israel will need to fight again (50% and 65%, respectively). The share is lower (32%) on the right, but most respondents (51%) say it is too early to know. In none of the ideological groups does the share who believe Israel will not need to return to fighting Iran after the current war exceed one-fifth.

This month, we asked respondents what realistic objective Israel should continue fighting for until it is achieved. Thirty-four percent of respondents think the removal of all fissile nuclear material from Iran is the ultimate objective, followed by regime change (28%) and the maximum weakening of Iran’s military capability (22%). Alongside these responses, 10% of Israelis believe the current war has already run its course. Among Arab Israelis, 17% support regime change, 27% support the removal of nuclear material, and 17% support military weakening. A higher share of Arab Israelis (19%) believes the war has run its course than their Jewish counterparts, and 20% do not know.

Broken down by ideological orientation (Jewish Israelis only), regime change is the leading objective on the right (44%), while there is a clear preference for removing the nuclear material among center-right and centrist respondents (42% and 41%, respectively). There is a broader distribution among the center-left: military weakening (27%), nuclear material (32%), and the view that the war has run its course (24%). On the left, the view that the war has run its course is especially prominent (57%). In other words, the farther left one moves along the ideological spectrum, the lower the support for continuing the fighting to achieve broad objectives and the stronger the tendency to see the war as having already run its course.

Following the question about war aims, we asked respondents what they think Israel should do if the United States and Iran reach an agreement to end the war without achieving the objective they had identified. This question takes on an acute relevance in light of recent events, as it is possible that the current ceasefire will lead to a long-term agreement between the U.S. and Iran to end the war, thus realizing the scenario described in the question. Half of Israelis (48%) think that in such a case, Israel should stop and wait for further developments. Only a minority supports continued independent fighting – a fifth (19%) favors continuing the war even without President Trump’s support, and another fifth (22%) favors continuing only if he accepts it. Among Jewish Israelis, the tendency to condition continued fighting on American approval is somewhat stronger (25%), whereas among Arab Israelis, the preference for stopping and waiting is more robust (53%), alongside a relatively high share (19%) who did not know.

Here, too, substantial gaps were found between ideological cohorts. On the right, there is a strong willingness to continue fighting: 35% support doing so even without approval, 26% only with approval, and 30% prefer stopping if there is a U.S.-Iran agreement without the Israeli war aim having been achieved. The opposite approach becomes stronger as one moves toward the center and the left: half (54%) of those who self-identify as centrist favor stopping, and the majorities become even more substantial among the center-left and left (69% and 74%, respectively). The center-right also leans toward stopping (43%), but with significant weight given to continued fighting in coordination with the United States (34%).

The difficulty of achieving the objectives hinted at the beginning of the campaign, likely requiring another one, appears to have eroded Israelis’ sense of achievement looking back at the June 2025 campaign, Operation Rising Lion. Four in ten Israelis (38%) now say it achieved less than they had previously thought. Forty-two percent say that their perception of the results of Rising Lion was about what it had been, and 13% think the results were better than they had previously thought. This is a significant change relative to four months ago, when we asked the same question half a year after the war. Since December 2025, the share of Israelis who think the war results were better than they had previously thought declined, and the share who think the war results were worse than they had thought increased by ten percentage points. The share who think the results of “Rising Lion” remained unchanged since last December also rose by ten percentage points.

The War in Lebanon

In recent weeks, there has been a sharp escalation of fighting with Hezbollah on the northern front. The IDF has expanded targeted ground activity in southern Lebanon in an effort to push Hezbollah forces north of the Litani River and destroy the organization’s underground infrastructure. Hezbollah, for its part, has responded with drones and extensive rocket fire, targeting communities along the border with Lebanon and into central Israel. Residents of the North, who only a year ago returned to their homes after a year and a half as evacuees, are once again coping with heavy fighting, and some have again left their homes voluntarily.

A majority of Israelis (56%) believe that the current campaign in Lebanon will not be the last, with just 12% thinking otherwise and 32% saying it is too early to tell. Among Jewish Israelis, this pessimistic assessment is even more pronounced, with 58% saying that renewed fighting on the northern front will be required and only 9% believing it will not. Half of Arab Israelis (50%) believe additional fighting will be required, compared with 21% who think it will not, and 29% who say it is too early to know.

Broken down by ideological orientation (Jewish Israelis only), the expectation that renewed fighting will be required increases as one moves leftward along the spectrum: 61% among the center-right, 63% among centrists, 78% among the center-left, and 65% among the left. The share is lower on the right (46%), which also includes a relatively high share who believe it is too early to know (38%).

Similar to our solicitation of retrospective assessments of the achievements of the June 2025 campaign against Iran, we examined how Israelis now perceive the achievements of the previous campaign in Lebanon, a year and a half ago. Only 10% of Israelis believe the achievements were better than they had thought in the past, while 38% say they were in line with previous assessments, and 44% say they were worse than they had previously believed. Among Arab Israelis, the share who think the achievements were worse than they had thought is lower (36%), alongside a higher share (17%) who now assess the achievements of the previous war in Lebanon more positively than they had in the past.

A majority (56%) of Jewish Israelis who self-identify as right-wing now assess the achievements of the war on the northern front as they had in the past, compared with 29% who view the achievements as less favorable than they had previously thought, and 11% who now view the achievements of the previous war with Lebanon more positively. Among centrist and left-wing Jewish Israelis, the picture is more critical: 58% of centrists, 69% among the center-left, and 70% on the left believe the achievements were worse than they had once thought. Taken together with the findings from the previous question, the data produces a consistent picture: a sense of only partial achievement translates into a broad expectation that the conflict is not over and may resume in the future. In other words, doubt about past success leads to the assessment that instability will continue.

The War in Gaza

When identical questions are asked about the Gaza front, a 67% majority of the Israeli public believes that Israel will need to return to fighting there after the current war in Iran and Lebanon. By contrast, 11% think it will not, and 22% say it is too early to know. Among Jewish Israelis, the expectation that a return to fighting will be necessary is even clearer, with three-quarters (74%) anticipating renewed fighting and fewer than one-tenth (7%) believing it will not be necessary. Among Arab Israelis, the picture is different: 38% believe additional fighting will be required, 30% estimate that it will not, and 32% stress that it is too early to tell.

A breakdown by ideological orientation (Jewish Israelis only) shows broad agreement that Israel will need to return to fighting in Gaza. In every cohort, a majority estimates that additional fighting will be required, but this majority is firmer among the right than among the left. Accordingly, as one moves leftward along the ideological spectrum, the share who say it is too early to know rises from 16% on the right to 35% on the left. At bottom, there is a broad perception that the confrontations in the Gaza Strip have not ended and may resume once the current war in Iran and Lebanon concludes.

Trust in Leadership and Confidence in Victory

This month, JPPI’s Israeli Society Index found a decline among both Jews and Arabs on the general question of Israelis’ sense of victory in the war across all fronts. Whereas last month, with the beginning of the campaign in Iran, a majority of Israelis reported feeling that Israel was winning the war overall – the highest sense of victory recorded in the past year – this month saw a drop in confidence in victory – a return to the levels recorded six months ago. Among respondents in the two right-wing cohorts (center-right and right), most placed themselves at the higher levels of confidence in victory (4 or 5 out of 5), whereas among the centrist and left-wing cohorts (center-left and left), the mood is more pessimistic.

Following the peak of trust in the government recorded last month, with the outbreak of the Iran war, there has been a slight decline in Israelis’ level of trust in their government. A majority of the public (55%) reports not trusting the government, alongside 42% who do. Among Arab Israelis, the share of respondents who do not trust the government (63%) is higher than that of their Jewish counterparts (53%).

Broken down by ideological orientation (Jewish Israelis only), a majority in the right-wing cohorts (right-wing and center-right) trust the government (83% and 48%, respectively), whereas a majority of respondents in the center and left-wing cohorts do not trust the government. This majority grows as one moves leftward along the ideological spectrum.

A 79% majority of Israelis express trust in the IDF senior command (20% completely and 59% somewhat). Among Jewish Israelis, the figure is even higher, at 79%, while a 52% majority of Arab Israelis also express trust in the IDF senior command. Compared with last month, the share of Jews who trust the IDF senior command has declined. The March survey was conducted a few days after the start of the Iran war and its successful opening strikes, in which the supreme leader and other senior Iranian leaders were killed. It is possible that the early successes generated a temporary increase that dissipated within a few weeks.

U.S.-Israel Relations

The ongoing cooperation between the United States and Israel in the Iran war is unprecedented. Still, this month saw a decline in Israelis’ trust that President Trump will “do the right thing” regarding U.S.-Israel relations. This may reflect the fact that the survey was conducted during a period in which there were several reports of Trump’s desire to bring the war to a rapid end. Nineteen percent say they have “a great deal of trust” in the president on this issue, 51% place some trust in him, and 26% say they have no trust that he will do the right thing regarding relations between the two countries. Despite a decline relative to last month, there is still a higher level of trust in him than recorded in the aftermath of the June 2025 12-day campaign. At that time, trust in the U.S. president stood at 64% (July 25), whereas this month it is 70%. The main difference lies in the share of respondents reporting “some trust” in Trump – 51% this month, compared with 45% in the survey conducted last July.

Trust that Trump will act appropriately in the context of U.S.-Israel relations is especially high among Jewish Israelis: 75% express trust in the president, while 26% say they have no trust in him. Among Arab Israelis, by contrast, the level of trust is much lower – 49%, with 43% reporting that they do not trust him. Broken down by ideological orientation (Jewish Israelis only), the trust increases as one moves rightward along the ideological spectrum.

Among the right-wing cohort, the highest level of trust is recorded (36% a great deal and 55% some). Among center-right respondents, a large majority expresses some level of trust (80%). In the center, the level of trust is still high at 65%, but among center-left and left-wing respondents, a different picture emerges: 83% of left-wing respondents say they have no trust in Trump, and just 17% report some trust in him. Compared with last month, trust in Trump has decreased across ideological cohorts, with the sharpest drop among those who identify as right-wing. At the start of the current Iran war, the share expressing “a great deal of trust” in Trump stood at 60%; this month it is only 36%.

Violence in Judea and Samaria (West Bank)

In the past month, several violent incidents perpetrated by Jews against Arabs in Judea and Samaria (West Bank) made headlines. We asked respondents to address a public appeal issued last month by Major General Avi Bluth, who heads the IDF Central Command, to the leaders of the Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria. In his letter, Bluth wrote that a “violent group of lawbreakers is operating in the area in violation of the laws of the state, the values of the Jewish people, and the values on which Zionism is founded. These people are harming a Palestinian population that is not involved in terrorism… Beyond the fact that these actions are illegal and immoral, they constitute a real danger.” Respondents’ reactions to Bluth’s letter indicate that most of the Israeli public does not condone the violence, but they are not uniform in their views of its scope and significance.

Thirty percent of respondents believe that Bluth’s letter is an important warning and that community leaders should act against those involved in the violence. One-quarter (28%) believe that Bluth’s condemnation is too weak and argue that the IDF turns a blind eye to, and even assists, the rioters. By contrast, 10% of respondents claim that “these are not violent lawbreakers; they are pioneers who should be assisted.” Another quarter does not attach much importance to the phenomenon: 28% chose the response that such violence does exist, but is not significant, and that it would be better for the regional commander to focus on security tasks.

About half of the right-wing respondents (53%) believe that such violence indeed exists, but that “it is not a big deal, and it is more important that Bluth focus on security.” One-fifth (20%) of Jewish right-wing respondents believe that “these [the perpetrators] are pioneers who should be assisted.” That is, three in four right-wing respondents do not see the reported violence as a significant phenomenon that should be addressed with high priority. A breakdown by party affiliation is particularly striking: 36% of Otzma Yehudit voters say that “these are not violent lawbreakers; they are pioneers who should be assisted,” and 58% of them believe that the phenomenon of violence is marginal.

The head of the IDF Central Command sent the following letter to the leadership of the Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria (West Bank): “A violent group of lawbreakers is operating in Judea and Samaria without restraint, contrary to the laws of the state, the values of the Jewish people, and the values on which Zionism is based. These people are harming a Palestinian population that is not involved in terrorism… Beyond the fact that these actions are illegal and immoral, they constitute a real danger.” Which of the following comes closest to your view? (%)

The State Budget

At the time of data collection for April’s Israeli Society Index, the 2026 state budget was approved by the Knesset. On the night the budget passed, an additional ILS 800 million allocation for the Haredi community was unexpectedly approved. As was the case last year, a majority of Israelis (55%) say they are dissatisfied with the budget, while one-quarter (25%) say they are satisfied with it. One-fifth (19%) of the public did not know how to answer the question – a relatively high rate, recorded among both Jews and Arabs. The share of Jewish Israelis satisfied with the budget (27%) is higher than the share of Arab Israelis (17%). Compared with last year, when we asked the same question about the 2025 budget, satisfaction with the budget is slightly higher. That said, this figure might have been different had the survey been conducted after the full scope of the late-night transfer of additional funds to the Haredi sector became clear.

A breakdown by political camp shows sharp gaps in the level of satisfaction with the budget. On the right, satisfaction is relatively high, with 52% expressing satisfaction (20% very satisfied and 32% somewhat satisfied), alongside a minority expressing dissatisfaction (22%) and a relatively high share (26%) who did not know how to answer. By contrast, as one moves leftward along the political spectrum, satisfaction declines and criticism increases: among the center-right, 57% are dissatisfied (44% very dissatisfied), in the center, a clear 80% majority is dissatisfied (71% very dissatisfied); and among the center-left and the left there is almost no satisfaction, with 90% and 100%, respectively, expressing dissatisfaction. The findings point to deep political polarization around the budget, with support concentrated mainly on the right (though even there, it is only half of respondents), whereas the other camps show broad and unequivocal opposition.

In addition to Israelis’ satisfaction with the state budget, we also examined what they think the Knesset should have done in the budget but did not do or did not do enough. Respondents were offered 17 response options and asked to mark the three items they considered most important to add to or cut from the budget. Unlike last year, the most prominent demand is to add funds for the rehabilitation of the North and South (45% marked this item as one of their three priorities). This is followed by calls to cut funding for the Haredi sector (29%), cut coalition funds (28%), and reduce the number of government ministries (24%). Also notable is the desire to add benefits for regular-service soldiers and reservists (25%). Among Jewish Israelis, the demand for rehabilitation of the North and South is even stronger (52%), whereas among Arab Israelis, different demands stand out – chiefly tax cuts (41%), alongside support for additional funding earmarked for the Arab sector (21%).

Compared with last year’s budget, several central trends stand out: as noted, there was an increase in the demand for investment in the rehabilitation of the North and South (from 28% to 45% among the public overall, and from 31% to 52% among Jews), alongside a slight rise in the demand to strengthen security. By contrast, there was a decline in the demand to step up funding to fight crime (from 20% to 15%) and in calls to reduce the number of government ministries (from 32% to 24%). Demand for cuts in coalition funds also weakened somewhat, although it remains high. Among Arab Israelis, especially notable changes were recorded over last year: a sharp and surprising decline in demand for additional funding to fight crime (from 43% to 19%), alongside a decline in demand for tax cuts and a moderate increase in demand for investment in reconstruction and budget allocations for the Arab sector.

2026 Elections

The most important issue for Israelis in the upcoming elections is replacing the current government (31%), followed by judicial reform (22%). Security-related issues, such as defeating Hamas in Gaza (6%) and encouraging settlement in Judea and Samaria (2%) are emphasized less, while addressing crime (7%) and lowering the cost of living (9%) still rank high on the list of decisive issues. Among Jewish Israelis, replacing the government (34%) and judicial reform (27%) clearly lead the list. Among Arab Israelis, by contrast, the central issue is crime and violence (29%), followed by lowering the cost of living (27%) and replacing the current government (20%). Compared with responses recorded two months ago, two notable changes have occurred among Arab respondents: the share ranking “addressing crime and violence” as the most important issue in the upcoming elections fell from 48% to 29%, and the share ranking “replacing the current government” rose from 8% to 20%.

A breakdown by ideological orientation (Jewish Israelis only) shows that replacing the current government is the most important issue for most voters in the upcoming elections in the center, center-left, and left-wing cohorts, where it leads with shares of 53%, 88%, and 87%, respectively. On the right, by contrast, judicial reform carries relatively greater importance (51%). Among the center-right group, a wider dispersion of issues is evident: replacing the government leads (27%), followed by judicial reform (25%). Strengthening national unity (15%) and Haredi conscription (15%) also occupy meaningful places.

When considering the upcoming elections, a quarter of Israelis (24%) are satisfied with the existing parties and candidates, a third (34%) believe there are enough reasonable options, and another third (34%) expresses dissatisfaction with the existing options. Among Arab Israelis, dissatisfaction is higher (39%), and the share who are satisfied is lower (14%). The right-wing cohort has the highest share of respondents (41%) who are satisfied with the existing options. In the center and left-wing groups, by contrast, satisfaction levels are lower: 13% among centrists, 21% among center-left respondents, and 17% in the left-wing cohort.

Alongside examining Israelis’ satisfaction with the available options, we examined the differences that respondents think exist between the leading contenders for prime minister. The main difference Israelis attribute to the candidates concerns their level of wisdom and grasp of reality (34%), followed by differences in how much they care about the people and the state (24%). Ideological gaps are seen as less central (14%), as is acceptability across social groups (11%). One in ten Israelis (11%) believes there is no significant difference between the candidates. Among Arab Israelis, a relatively small share emphasizes differences in wisdom, alongside a higher share who believe there are ideological differences, as well as a higher share who believe there are no significant differences among the different candidates (19%).

A breakdown by ideological orientation (Jewish Israelis only) reveals sharp gaps in perceptions of the differences: on the right there is a clear emphasis on wisdom and grasp of reality (62%), while in the center and center-left the claim that the main gap concerns how much the candidates care about the people and the state is especially prominent (37% and 53%, respectively). This claim also recurs when responses are examined by party affiliation. For example, 74% of Likud voters cited “wisdom and grasp of reality” as the main difference between the candidates for prime minister, while among supporters of Naftali Bennett or Gadi Eisenkot, the most prominent response is “how much they care about the people and the state” (48% and 42%, respectively).

One-third (30%) of the Israeli public believes there are significant differences on security issues among the leading contenders for prime minister; 33% see some differences, and another 31% believe that there are hardly any differences or no differences at all. Among Jewish Israelis, a larger majority identify either large or some differences, and the share who did not know how to answer is negligible. Among Arab Israelis, by contrast, only half identify differences (25% large and 25% some), while a third (30%) believe there are no differences or hardly any, and a fifth (21%) did not know how to answer.

Among the right-wing cohorts (right and center-right) there is a clear perception of substantial gaps, with a majority (53%) identifying large differences and another third (33%) seeing some differences. As one moves leftward along the ideological spectrum, this perception diminishes: in the center, only an eighth (12%) see large differences; on the left, the share rises slightly to a sixth (17%). Among the center-left and the left-wing cohorts, the feeling that the differences are small or almost nonexistent intensifies (48% and 61%, respectively). In other words, respondents in the right-wing cohorts tend to see substantive differences between the candidates on security, whereas in the center and left-wing cohorts, the tendency is to see their positions as more similar.

By voting intention in the upcoming elections, half (46%) of Religious Zionism supporters, and majorities of United Torah Judaism voters (56%), Likud voters (57%), and Otzma Yehudit voters (78%), believe there are large differences in positions between the leading contenders for prime minister. By contrast, only 19% of Bennett supporters, 11% of Yesh Atid supporters, 11% of Yisrael Beiteinu supporters, 8% of Eisenkot supporters, and 7% of The Democrats supporters believe so.

On economic issues, more moderate differences are found in how the candidates for prime minister are perceived: 27% believe there are large differences, 38% see some differences, and 24% see hardly any differences or no differences at all. Among Arab Israelis, a somewhat different picture is evident: although a majority still identify differences (29% large and 32% some), a higher share of respondents (20%) did not know how to answer this question.

Variation is also evident according to ideological orientation (Jewish Israelis only), though it is less pronounced than on security issues. At the ideological extremes, half of the respondents believe there are some differences in positions on economic issues, compared with lower shares in the center groups. As one moves along the ideological spectrum from right to left, the share who think there are hardly any differences between the candidates increases. Interestingly, the highest share who believe there are large differences in positions on economic issues is found in the center-left cohort.

With respect to religion and state issues, half of Israelis (51%) believe there are large differences in positions between the candidates, and a quarter (28%) identify some differences, meaning that roughly eight in ten see some degree of difference. Among Arab Israelis, the perception is less pronounced: a third (33%) identify large differences, a quarter (24%) see hardly any or no differences at all, and a fifth (18%) did not know how to answer this question. By ideological orientation (Jewish Israelis only), every group records a majority that sees large differences, with especially high shares at the extremes – on the right (60%) and on the left (57%).

Compared with the previous two issues (security and the economy), it is clear that religion and state matters are seen as more strongly differentiating the candidates. Whereas on security and economic issues, many tended to see moderate differences or even a similarity of positions, the public sees sharp and substantive gaps when it comes to issues of religion and state. The contrast is especially evident in the center and left groups, where, on the whole, respondents thought the differences vis-à-vis security were limited, while a clear majority of them identified large differences on religion and state matters.

The data indicates that the Israeli public perceives only a limited number of candidates as realistic contenders for prime minister, led by Benjamin Netanyahu (59%), followed by Naftali Bennett (42%) and Gadi Eisenkot (35%). The other candidates included in the question receive much lower levels of support as serious contenders.

On the right, there is near-total consensus around Netanyahu (89%), while Bennett and Eisenkot are viewed as realistic candidates at relatively lower rates than in the other groups. By contrast, in the center and center-left cohorts, Bennett and Eisenkot lead (71%-74% and 60%-64%, respectively), while Netanyahu receives lower shares viewing him as a realistic candidate for prime minister. On the left, a high share of voters view Netanyahu as a realistic candidate (65%), yet Bennett (87%) and Eisenkot (78%) are viewed as even more realistic.

Passover

Ahead of Passover and against the backdrop of the war, we examined how many Jewish Israelis in Israel chose to observe the holiday in a different format from usual. The data, collected before the holiday, shows that most Jews intended to participate in a Passover Seder this year, though often in a more limited format: 51% said they would celebrate the Seder as usual, 34% said they expected to participate in a smaller-than-usual Seder, and 12% thought that they would not participate at all. Examining this question by religiosity shows that the more religious respondents are, the greater the likelihood that they will hold the Seder as usual. Among Haredi (93%) and religious Jews (79%), very large majorities planned to hold a regular Seder, whereas among secular Jews, only a third (30%) said so, and many expected to hold a smaller Seder (43%) or to forgo it altogether (21%). The traditionalist groups lie in between, with a strong tendency toward participation, though often in a smaller format.

JPPI’s April 2026 Israeli Society Index was conducted March 26-29, 2026. Data collection was by theMadad.com internet panel (541 Jewish respondents), and Afkar Research (202 Arab respondents, approximately half online and half by telephone). The data was analyzed and weighted by voting pattern and religiosity to represent the views of Israel’s adult population. The JPPI Israeli Society Index is compiled by Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepkov, with research, production, and writing assistance from Yael Levinovsky. Prof. David Steinberg serves as statistical consultant.

The post JPPI Israeli Society Index for April 2026 first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Rather than confrontational rhetoric, he is attempting to build an alternative from within.

Spotify

The post Tamar Ish Shalom in conversation with Rabbi Menachem Bombach first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

There is a moment every Israeli traveler knows. You are standing in a European airport—at the check-in counter, passport control or in the security line—and you reach into your bag. The small navy-blue booklet comes out, its cover bearing a menorah flanked by two olive branches, with the words “State of Israel” printed in English and Hebrew, and something in the air changes. A glance. A pause that lasts half a second too long. An expression that requires no translation. You have not said a word. You have done nothing except exist with the wrong document in your hand.

Since Oct. 7, 2023, and through the cascade of war that followed, traveling through Europe with an Israeli passport has become an exercise in performed invisibility. You tuck the document face down. You slide it under your palm on the counter. You are now an expert at the swift, low transfer from pocket to official hand and back, minimizing the risk that anyone nearby might read the words on its cover.

Dimitry Kochenov, the “Passport Professor,” whose 2019 MIT Press book Citizenship dissects the global passport hierarchy with surgical precision, writes that a passport “carries borders in one’s pocket,” and is not a neutral identity document but a condensed statement of one’s place in the global hierarchy. He is right. What he could not have fully anticipated is that for the Israeli traveler in today’s Europe, the passport carries something more visceral than hierarchy. It has become a target.

Kochenov argues that passports judge people “by the color of their passport and nothing else,” making the document a practical measure of worth. The Israeli experience in European airports is that framework made flesh, a moment of eye contact, an awkward silence.

The check-in agent takes slightly longer than necessary, expressionless in a way that nonetheless conveys something dark. The security officer’s questions drift from the procedural into something more editorial. The fellow passenger in the boarding line registers the navy booklet in your hand and shifts their weight, almost imperceptibly, away. The duty-free cashier whose warmth, freely extended to the travelers before and after you, runs briefly cold. No accusation is made. None is needed. The passport has already spoken. It is the setting that makes all this so suffocating. Europe is not incidental here. This is the continent that spent centuries constructing the legal, theological and eventually biological architecture of Jewish exclusion. This is the continent whose 20th century produced the definitive proof of where that logic leads. And this is the continent that built its postwar identity around the vow of “never again.”

The airports of Berlin and Amsterdam, Paris and Brussels are not neutral transit zones. They are built on specific ground, and Israelis moving through them carry that history in their bodies, not just their passports. When a fellow passenger gives you that look across the departure lounge, you are not simply a citizen of an unpopular state. You are a Jew in Europe being scrutinized. The layers do not separate cleanly.

In Citizenship, Kochenov argues that for most of the world, citizenship is primarily a liability rather than an asset, a blood-based allocation of burdens and privileges that reproduces global inequality at every border crossing. The Israeli passport was never a mobility superpower, long excluded from Arab states and fraught with complications across parts of Asia. But within the Western world, particularly Europe, it has carried full visa-free access, indistinguishable in practical terms from any other Western passport. A gateway, not a gate. This is eroding.

The formal visa arrangements remain unchanged, but the human texture of crossing has shifted in ways no bilateral agreement captures. Hostility leaves no paper trail. A look costs nothing and proves nothing. And yet it accumulates, checkpoint by checkpoint, until a flight becomes something to get through rather than enjoy.

There is a word that goes missing in the respectable discourse about Israeli policy and its contested morality. That word is antisemitism. Not a criticism of a government. Not anger at a military operation. Not the entirely legitimate range of political positions one might hold about Gaza or the strikes on Iran. Antisemitism: the ancient, persistent, shape-shifting conviction that Jewish presence is itself the problem, that Jewish people carry their guilt collectively and wear it on their passports.

What is happening to Israeli travelers in European airports is not a political protest. Political protest is a banner unfurled outside an embassy. What is happening at the check-in counter is something older and more reflexive, updated for the current news cycle but drawing from the same well. Kochenov wrote about the global architecture of citizenship, not about Jews in Europe. Yet his words—citizenship systems as instruments of “complacency, hypocrisy and domination”—land with uncomfortable precision on this continent and in this moment.

Europe mourns its historical antisemitism in museums and memorial days, in plaques and pedagogy, in solemn ceremonies at the sites of its greatest crimes. It is considerably slower to recognize the live version standing in its passport control lines, clutching a navy-blue booklet embossed with a menorah, waiting to be waved through or held up, welcomed or made to feel like a problem that needs processing.

The Israeli traveler learns to expect it. Learns to minimize the exposure of that booklet, to read the room before reaching into your bag—to brace for the weight of judgment that arrives before a single word is exchanged. That is what it means to carry your place in the world in your pocket and know that in Europe, in 2026, that place is unwelcome.

The booklet has not changed. Europe has simply stopped pretending.

jns

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As it enters its 79th year, the State of Israel stands at a crossroads. It can drift toward becoming a Jewish-religious nationalist state, with Third World levels of public services and GDP, or it can return to the Zionist path and serve as a model for combining liberal values with ancient tradition.

If we do not bring about a dramatic change of course, the first scenario is the more likely one. But the choice is ours. It is up to the Zionist majority – the citizens who serve, work, and share the burden of the state – to turn the ship around and prevent it from crashing into the iceberg toward which it is now headed.

Israelis will celebrate the country’s 78th Independence Day after two and a half years of war and nearly four years of a government that relies on parties that do not share the Zionist vision and are indifferent to the country’s fate. “Total victory” on every front is elusive, and the geopolitical future remains fraught. But the Jewish People Policy Institute’s Israeli Society Index shows that what worries Israelis most are the challenges at home.

Amid this stormy period, many Israelis look dumbfounded at a government that prefers to bankroll the haredim (ultra-Orthodox) rather than those who serve and pay taxes. Even in wartime, when there is an acute need for more soldiers, this government is determined to pass a law exempting them from military service.

Israeli social media and too many surveys to count show that talk of leaving Israel is increasingly common. Some are doing more than talking. According to data from the Central Bureau of Statistics, the scale of emigration from Israel over the past two years has been exceptional. Even after excluding those who were not born here, these past few years have seen a historic number of native-born Israelis leaving.

More detailed data show disproportionately high emigration rates among people in sought-after professions, such as doctors and workers in technological fields. Israel’s security and economy rest on the qualitative edge of its human capital. The departure of these professionals – certainly if the trend continues – is a serious threat to Israel’s ability to prosper and sustain the level of security it requires.

What is driving so many highly capable Israelis to leave their home and become strangers in another country? It seems that what troubles these Israelis most – and many who still live here – goes beyond the difficult present. More disturbing is what many see as a future that portends a change in Israel’s character and casts doubt on its ability to endure.

A look at Israel’s demographic trajectory, alongside the political shift to the right and toward greater traditionalism, especially among the young, leads many to believe that a drastic transformation of Israel’s character is in the offing Already today, the haredi birth rate far exceeds that of the secular. Before long, a third of Israelis will be haredi. This community is not only religiously extreme and anti-liberal, but it also does not share in shouldering Israel’s economic and security burden.

Haredim becoming a larger group in Israeli society

The haredim constitute about 15% of Israel’s population, alongside a productive non-haredi majority willing to fight for the state. It is still possible to contain this group and maintain a functioning economy and national security.

But if many of those who pay taxes and serve in the IDF choose to leave, the haredi share will grow much faster, and the resources needed both to support their way of life and to sustain the state itself will shrink. My grandparents, survivors snatched from the flames of Europe, held visas to the golden land, the “goldene medina” – the United States. But they were Zionists, and they chose the transit camps and housing blocks of the Land of Israel.

The Zionism of the 21st century is a struggle for the soul of a Jewish, democratic, liberal Israel. It is not a struggle against our haredi brothers and sisters or against Israel’s non-Jewish citizens. It is a struggle to preserve the Zionist character of the State of Israel – a struggle that demands determined, sustained government policy to reverse the course the country is currently on. To succeed, hard decisions are needed in both of the rival “blocs” that have dominated Israeli politics in recent years. After a decade of negating the other side and imposing mutual boycotts, the choice must be Zionism and the ability to realize the vision of the Jewish state.

Zionism must also be the moral choice of those considering leaving Israel: to stay here and fight. Together, we must drain the swamps of corruption, lawlessness, and inequality in burden sharing among communities, and build an Israeli-Zionist partnership that will steady the State of Israel and lead it safely to its hundredth year.

Published in the Jerusalem Post

The post Israel at a crossroads: Choosing between decline and a renewed vision for Israel first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

The special character of contemporary antisemitism is that it emanates from both the right and the left. Just a few years ago, the “new antisemitism” seemed to be a strictly left-wing affair, tied to the Israel-Palestine conflict and informed by the “Red-Green Alliance” between the Western Left and Islamist groups. Right-wing Israeli and Jewish commentators emphasized that fact and added it to the advantages of identification with the Republican Party and other conservative groups.

But in the last year and a half, this picture has been fractured by the emergence of virulently antisemitic right-wing “influencers” such as Candace Owens and Nick Fuentes and the cover they are provided by political and media figures such as Vice President JD Vance and Tucker Carlson.

Many commentators have expressed surprise at this development. Yet should this really be surprising? Hadn’t xenophobia, anti-immigrant sentiment and discrimination against various groups (starting with Native peoples and African chattel slaves) been intrinsic to America, at various times and in various circumstances, since its inception? Furthermore, conspiracy theories demonizing Jews and others may be a deeply rooted byproduct of modernity. One strong tradition in American politics, once associated with Southern Democrats but, since the 1960s, increasingly tied to the Republicans, holds that true membership in American society, with its rights and privileges, belonged to white, Protestant men, especially those who had been part of the American social fabric for generations. Such membership is not open to all people of any background who enter into the American social contract, but rather to a group with specific racial, ethnic, religious and gender characteristics.

On the margins of this restricted conception of belonging were organizations and movements that were more extremist in their racism, antisemitism and advocacy of conspiracy theories – the Ku Klux Klan in the 1880s and 1920s, Father Coughlin and the American Nazi Party in the 1930s; and Sen. Joe McCarthy (R-Wisc.) and the John Birch Society in the 1950s and ‘60s. While these extremist actors and movements have only intermittently become significant political factors, they should not be relegated to the “lunatic fringe.” Rather, they are structurally related to the “more moderate” mainstream.

A key trait of extremist groups is that they traffic in conspiracy theories, especially those involving Jews. Since the Middle Ages, Jews and other groups, such as Freemasons and witches, have often been described as secret players in a conspiracy to take over the world and enslave, dispossess, or even kill other populations. According to these theories, Jews play this role as agents of the devil or some other principal of cosmic evil.

Such thinking seems to be a result (in one fashion or another) of anomie or anomia, a concept first advanced by Émile Durkheim, the late 19th-century “father of sociology.” It refers to a social state of normlessness, that is, when the social norms that permit social interaction are unknown (or cannot be known), unclear or unable to be implemented. Durkheim showed that in such situations where individuals are cut off from social life, they will, among other things, engage in self-destructive behavior. This situation can be caused, among other factors, by rapid change in both negative and positive directions, either rapid impoverishment or rapid enrichment.

In essence, anomia means that the social world has stopped making sense. In such a situation, one might be susceptible to the suggestion that the forces governing the social world are hidden and generally malevolent, perhaps a conspiracy brewed by witches or Jews. Some have suggested that belief in conspiracy theories grants a feeling of having privileged knowledge, together with a sense of control. It has been hypothesized that the outbreak of one grand, hugely murderous conspiracy theory, the European witch craze (1480-1650), which resulted in the execution of 50,000 women and men, was linked to widespread moral confusion and anomie – feelings of living in an alien and indifferent universe in which, because of the religious wars, death and destruction became ends in their own right.

The emergence of conspiratorial antisemitism around the turn of the 20th century, embodied, above all, in “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion,” also seems to be related to moral and social chaos and anomie. This arose from rapid industrialization and urbanization in Europe, especially in Germany, and later from the mass, mechanized killing of World War I. Today, too, there appears to be a great deal of moral confusion and the widespread feeling that American society does not enable a meaningful and productive life. This is evident in the “deaths of despair” of middle-aged, lower-class white men, the epidemic of Fentanyl addiction across all classes, and the feeling of Gen-Z young adults that they will never achieve the fundamental attributes of American middle-class existence – one’s own home, good health insurance, adequate retirement savings.

We should not be surprised that conspiratorial antisemitism has reemerged in the current circumstances. But there is a deep reason that ties it specifically to the right. One of the major and recurrent generators of anomie since the end of the Middle Ages has been the clash of traditional markers of collective identity – race, ethnicity, religion – with the increasingly rationalized and technological means of production on the one hand, and the increase of social criticism based on liberal reason that traces back to the 18th-century Enlightenment and extends to the current “progressive” ideology. The contemporary “woke” mindset applies the rational, liberal ideals of equality and freedom to new areas of criticism – not only to gender, but to sexual orientation and behavior. Whether such criticism has value or utility can be contested, but it has certainly contributed to a pervasive moral confusion and lack of normative clarity.

Today’s anomie and the conspiracy theories that spring from it (including about Jews) may be an ironic byproduct of modernity. We should not be surprised by them, but rather focus our energies on mitigating them as we do with other unwanted byproducts of modernity, like other various forms of pollution.

Published in the Jewish Journal

The post Should We Be Surprised by Right-Wing Antisemitic Conspiracy Theories? first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

In ordinary years, the IDF marks Independence Day with an impressive air show over the country’s skies. In the past three years, however, that festive flyover has been canceled because of the war. During this period, the “air show” has effectively moved beyond Israel’s borders, from Tehran to Yemen. Instead of breathtaking aerobatics and colorful smoke trails once a year, the Air Force now deploys formidable power on a daily basis, sending gray plumes of smoke billowing over enemy states.

This transition from the ceremonial and celebratory to the operational reflects the transformation in Israeli life over these years. Civil society, once relatively complacent and largely preoccupied with individual concerns, has become activated and determined, focused above all on national concerns, in and out of the IDF uniform.

Borders that once seemed relatively stable have become fluid: in the south (the yellow line in Gaza), in the east (beyond the separation line in Syria), and in the north (the anti-tank line in Lebanon). The existential security of Jews in the Jewish state – the greatest achievement of Zionism – has been shaken in these last few years. But it has also become clear that our younger generation is prepared to do whatever is required, at immense personal sacrifice, to restore it. The spider web Nasrallah once imagined turned out to be a web of Israeli steel.

On the state’s 78th Independence Day, we should assess this new reality – both its darkness and its light – across four spheres: the international, the national, the regional, and the domestic.

In the international sphere, activity has been seismic. On the one hand, entering battle side by side with the U.S. military against the greatest of our enemies is not only an extraordinary practical force multiplier; it is also a resounding exclamation mark attesting to Israel’s unique global standing, operating in unprecedented coordination with the world’s most powerful leader.

On the other hand, Israel has never been so isolated from “the rest of the world.” Alongside widespread criticism of the way Israel has wielded force in the war, a noxious ferment is spreading that challenges the very legitimacy of Israel’s existence and of the Zionist idea itself. Especially grave and troubling is the declining value of the Israeli brand in American public opinion, among Democrats, and among the younger American generation as a whole. We must marshal all our resources to reverse this ominous trend.

The same is true in the national sphere, which includes Diaspora Jewry. The golden age that followed the Second World War, when Jews were largely free from antisemitic attacks, is gone. This ancient, inexplicable disease has reared its vile head once again, and the immune systems against racism of many societies in the West, especially in Europe, are having difficulty coping with it.

The Jewish state must mobilize to fight antisemitism in the Diaspora while at the same time preparing itself for the mass absorption of new immigrants, much as it did in the 1990s with Soviet Jewry. Alongside the unfolding tragedy, an opportunity is emerging for a far-reaching demographic renewal of Israeli society.

In the regional sphere, Israeli position has improved dramatically. True, many of the war’s declared goals – exaggerated and unrealistic from the outset – have not been achieved. But there is no doubt that the balance of power vis-à-vis our neighbors, near and far, tilts more in our favor today than at any point in the past generation.

Israeli deterrence has been restored, the destructive capacity of our enemies has been massively eroded, and Israel has internalized the necessity of adopting a proactive, uncompromising posture in the face of threats. Still, we must translate these achievements into the diplomatic arena. Israel’s supreme interest does not lie in the conquest of security zones, but in the creation of reliable security arrangements through diplomatic means. If these mature into peace agreements, a better future may yet dawn in the international and national spheres as well – at least among those not afflicted by antisemitism.

And finally, in the domestic sphere, the fierce tug-of-war among Israel’s identity groups continues unabated. The extremists in every camp have taken off the gloves, and blows are now being exchanged directly, with escalating rhetoric and a growing practical willingness to test the limits of what Israeli society can bear. Sometimes it feels that Israel is like a carob tree that appears solid from the outside but is being eaten away from within by the termites – the extremists.

And yet it seems that the Israeli majority is repulsed by these extremists but is paralyzed in fighting them. I believe that in order to open the way for recovery, we must, as a first step, have a broad social agreement regarding how we manage disagreements within our society. Israel needs a constitutional framework that would define the rules of the game for governance – a “Thin Constitution.”

On Independence Day, let us acknowledge both the bitter and the sweet in each sphere of Israeli existence, look them squarely in the eye, and pray: “For all of these, keep watch for me, my good God… restore me, and I shall return to the good land” (Naomi Shemer).

THE JERUSALEM POST

The post Independence Day and the new reality first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

The post Yaakov Katz in Conversation with Avner Vilan first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Time and again, it becomes clear that Israel’s existence is not something we can take for granted. The state is a precious trust that we must defend with resolve and cultivate responsibly. How blessed we are to be “a free people in our own land.”

The post Newsletter 21.4.26 first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.