This report examines attitudes as the new year begins and assessments of the year just ended; the importance of the approaching elections and the issues likely to determine them; the future of the Gaza Strip; the sense of victory in the war; the Qusra incident; the rise in antisemitism worldwide; and the education system.

Additional Findings

▪ A fateful election: Four in ten Israelis believe these elections will be “the most important in the country’s history,” while an equal share say they will be especially important.
▪ The issues emerging as decisive in the coming elections: security, relations between the government and the judiciary, and unity.
▪ Three-quarters of Jewish Israelis would not agree “under any circumstances” to an Israeli withdrawal from the security perimeter in Gaza; support among Jewish Israelis for occupying the Strip has increased over the past year.
▪ One-third of Israelis describe the Jewish youths involved in the Qusra incident as “Israeli terrorists”; virtually no respondents on the right chose that description.
▪ Perceptions of antisemitism: Three-quarters of Jewish Israelis regard an academic boycott of Israel antisemitic, compared with two-thirds a year ago.
▪ One-third attribute the rise in antisemitism worldwide to Israeli policy; two-thirds believe there is no connection, or only a weak one, between Israel’s conduct and antisemitism.
▪ The education system continues to erode: a growing share describe it as “not good.”
▪ The most contested subject: Many Israelis want to add more hours of Jewish studies to the school timetable, while many others want to reduce them.

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As the New Year Begins

For the second year, ahead of Rosh Hashanah, we asked Israelis which statement best reflects their view of Israel’s overall situation. This year’s picture is somewhat more optimistic than last year’s: 35% of all Israelis and 43% of Jewish Israelis chose “Israel is improving, and things will get even better,” compared with 30% and 36%, respectively, in September 2025. At the same time, the share who believe Israel is deteriorating and that the trend will continue fell from 38% to 30% among all Israelis and from 34% to 24% among Jewish Israelis. Among Arab Israelis, by contrast, there was no significant change: just 5% chose the most optimistic option and 54% the most pessimistic – exactly as last year.

Among Jewish Israelis, optimism is closely associated with ideological orientation. Among those who identify with the right, three-quarters (76%) believe Israel is improving and will continue to improve, up from two-thirds (68%) last year. The increase is even sharper among center-right respondents, from 32% to 42%. There was almost no change in the center, and not a single respondent on the left chose the most positive option.

On the left, however, there was movement of a different kind: the share who believe deterioration will continue fell sharply from 77% to 49%, with almost all of those who moved away from that view shifting to “Israel is deteriorating, but I think things will get better” (22% last year versus 49% today). In other words, the right has become more optimistic, while the left has become less pessimistic.

When the same question was asked about the world, half of Israelis (49%) said the world is deteriorating and will continue to do so, while only one in eight (12%) said it is improving and will continue to improve figures almost identical to those recorded last September (50% and 10%, respectively). The gap between Israelis’ assessments of Israel’s condition and of the world, already evident last year, has persisted and widened: Israelis have much more confidence in Israel’s ability to create a better future for itself than in the world’s ability to do so. Notably, the gap between Jewish and Arab Israelis is much smaller on the question about the world than on the question about Israel.

Looking Back at the Past Year

Respondents were asked three identically worded questions to assess the past year in three areas: security, the economy, and society. The results reveal a clear hierarchy. The social sphere receives the lowest rating and is the only one in which there has been no improvement since last year: 52% of Israelis describe the past year as “poor” socially, while only 4% describe it as “good.”

The economic assessment improved slightly: the share describing the year as “poor” fell from 35% to 30%, while the share describing it as “good” rose from 11% to 18%. In security terms, the picture is almost unchanged: 37% describe the year as “poor,” compared with 36% last year. Among Jewish Israelis, however, half (50%) now describe it as a “good” or “fair” year in security terms.

The social sphere is also the only one of the three in which the ideological gap has widened rather than narrowed. Among respondents who identify with the right, the share describing the year as “poor” socially remained at about one-quarter, while it rose from 74% to 86% in the center-left and from 62% to 70% in the center. In other words, the growing sense that Israel is experiencing a social crisis is concentrated almost entirely in the center and on the left of the Jewish ideological spectrum.

The Most Important Elections in the Country’s History

Ahead of the elections expected this fall, the sense that the election is fateful has strengthened. Four in ten Israelis (40%) believe these will be “the most important elections in the country’s history,” up from one-third (33%) in February. Another 41% say the elections will be “especially important.” Overall, eight in ten Israelis therefore see these elections as exceptional in importance, while the share describing them as “as important as any election” fell from 24% in February to 16% today. This sense is stronger among respondents who identify with the center and left: 60% in the center-left, 57% on the left, and 55% in the center say these will be “the most important elections in the country’s history,” compared with 35% on the right and 39% in the center-right. Among Arab Israelis, the sense is more muted: 23% hold this view. This month, we also examined which issue voters regard as decisive in the coming elections. Of the six substantive issues presented, security remains the leading consideration.

Its increase occurred between July and August and has since stabilized: nearly one-third of Israelis (31%) say the decisive consideration in their vote will be “who will contribute most effectively to maintaining security.” The next two leading issues are relations between the government and the judicial system, and unity. Looking across the past several months, the picture is relatively stable: changes in Israelis’ responses are small, and the ranking of the issues remains similar from month to month. The main differences are between Jewish and Arab Israelis. Management of the economy ranks second in importance among Arab Israelis, while only 5% of Jewish Israelis identify it as the decisive issue in the coming elections. The two findings – the growing sense that these are fateful elections and the rise of unity as a decisive issue are consistent with last month’s finding that Jewish Israelis who had not yet made a final voting decision placed particular emphasis on “more unity and fewer disputes.” In other words, undecided voters are looking for a reduction in polarization and conflict.

In recent days, this group has faced an additional development: some parties in the “third bloc” have announced that they will not contest the coming election, while others have announced that they will merge with larger parties. The ideological breakdown reveals two distinct patterns. On the right, security (40%) and relations between the government and the judicial system (35%) are the decisive issues in the coming elections, and not a single respondent chose “a more liberal state.” On the left and center-left, by contrast, the leading issue is “a more liberal state” – 43% and 34%, respectively. In the center, the leading issue is unity (30%).

Best Suited to Be Prime Minister

When respondents consider several candidates at once, Benjamin Netanyahu remains the leading candidate for prime minister, but he is not the preferred candidate of a majority of Israelis. Thirty-six percent of all Israelis and 43% of Jewish Israelis regard him as best suited for the position. Gadi Eisenkot ranks second at 29% virtually identical among all Israelis and Jewish Israelis followed by Naftali Bennett at 13% and Avigdor Liberman at 4%. The three named alternatives together account for 46% of Israelis. The ideological breakdown shows Netanyahu as the dominant choice on the right (79%), while Eisenkot leads in all other camps: 71% on the left, 66% in the center-left, and 58% in the center. The center-right is the only camp in which there is a genuine contest: 44% choose Netanyahu, 21% Eisenkot, and 20% Bennett.

Gaza: The Security Perimeter and Occupation

This month, respondents were presented with two options concerning the future of the Gaza Strip, using wording identical to that used in September 2025, before the Hamas-Israel agreement that ended the war in Gaza and led to the return of all the hostages. The results should be read against the background of the August survey: following President Trump’s announcement of an agreement to disarm Hamas, a majority of Israelis (58%) believed it would not be implemented and that the current situation would remain roughly unchanged, while virtually none expected the full scenario of complete disarmament and complete Israeli withdrawal. In other words, this month’s responses concerning Gaza’s future do not refer to an arrangement regarded as imminent, but rather to one that most respondents do not expect to be implemented. The option that Israel withdraw to the Gaza border and not retain a security “perimeter” inside the Strip is rejected outright by nearly three-quarters of Jewish Israelis (72%), who say they would not agree to it “under any circumstances.” A majority of all Israelis (59%) say the same. Among Arab Israelis, by contrast, half (49%) agree that Israel should withdraw to the Gaza border and not maintain a security “perimeter” inside the Strip, up from 36% last year.

The opposite option that Israel occupy the entire Strip and administer it through the IDF for at least several years has gained support among Jewish Israelis over the past year. The share who “generally agree” with full occupation rose from 27% to 36%, while the share opposed “under any circumstances” remained stable. The movement therefore came mainly from those who had previously been hesitant, rather than from opponents. Among Arab Israelis, attitudes hardened in the opposite direction, with opposition to occupation under any circumstances increasing.

The ideological breakdown is stark. On the right, 62% generally agree with occupation and only 9% oppose it under any circumstances; in the center-right, 32% agree and 37% oppose. In the center, center-left, and left, opposition stands at 66%, 88%, and 91%, respectively. The religiosity breakdown follows the same gradient: 64% of secular Jews oppose occupation under any circumstances, compared with 13% of Haredim and 16% of religious Jews.

Sense of Victory in the War

Each month, we ask respondents to rate on a 1-to-5 scale the extent to which they feel that Israel is winning or has won the war that began on October 7. This month, as the year draws to a close, the sense of victory returned almost exactly to where it stood on the eve of last Rosh Hashanah, after considerable fluctuation over the past year. Forty percent rate it at the two highest levels, 4 or 5, compared with 43% in September 2025, while 37% rate it at the two lowest levels, 1 or 2, compared with 32% then.

Between these two points from last Rosh Hashanah to this one there were substantial shifts, including a peak in March 2026 after Operation Roaring Lion and a low in recent months. The sense-of-victory question shows the sharpest ideological divide of any survey item measured this month. Among respondents who identify with the right, 77% rate their sense of victory at 4 or 5; in the center-right, 44%; in the center, 16%; in the center-left, 7%; and on the left, none.

The overall increase in the sense of victory, from 37% in August to 40% in September, is entirely concentrated on the right. Among right-wing respondents, the share rating their sense of victory at 4 or 5 jumped from 67% to 77% in a single month, while in every other camp the change is only one or two percentage points in either direction. In other words, what appears to be a slight recovery in the sense of victory is in fact a strengthening of that sentiment among those who already held it, rather than a broad-based change. This occurred in a month with no significant change across the IDF’s various combat arenas, suggesting that the shift may reflect greater exposure to partisan election-campaign propaganda across the political spectrum.

The Situation in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank)

During the past month, a violent incident took place in the village of Qusra in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), after dozens of masked Israeli civilians arrived in pickup trucks and threw stones at Palestinian residents. Some of the rioters barricaded themselves inside a local home while its residents were present. Several Palestinian residents were injured, including a woman who was evacuated for medical treatment. When security forces arrived, the Israeli rioters fled, and no arrests were made. The incident drew considerable attention and commentary from numerous politicians. It was also widely covered by media outlets around the world and led to condemnation of Israeli policy in Judea and Samaria. This month, we asked respondents to choose the description they considered most appropriate for the group of young Jewish men involved in the incident, selecting from several terms used by Israeli politicians.

The strongest label – “Israeli terrorists” was also the most frequently selected: one-third of Israelis (33%) described the Qusra rioters as “terrorists.” Together with “nationalist criminals,” 51% chose one of the two harshest descriptions. At the other end of the spectrum, the two most lenient descriptions “young people who sometimes go too far” and “the salt of the earth” were chosen by 13% of Israelis. Among Arab Israelis, the share describing the group as “Israeli terrorists” is substantially higher than among Jewish Israelis (55% versus 27%).

More lenient descriptions are correspondingly rare among Arab respondents: “a handful of rioters,” “a violent minority,” “young people who sometimes go too far,” and “the salt of the earth” together account for only one-tenth of Arab responses. The ideological gap on this question is dramatic. On the left, 63% choose “Israeli terrorists” and another 31% “nationalist criminals” – 94% combined. In the center, about half choose “terrorists” and roughly one-third “criminals.” On the right, only 3% choose “Israeli terrorists”; the most common descriptions are “a handful of rioters” (22%) and “a violent minority” (20%). Overall, 30% on the right choose one of the two most lenient labels, including 12% who choose “the salt of the earth.” By religiosity, 72% of secular Jews choose one of the two harshest descriptions, compared with 17% of Haredim. Conversely, 36% of Haredim choose one of the more lenient descriptions, including 29% who choose “young people who sometimes go too far.”

This finding is not an isolated one. Last month, we asked a differently worded question: whether Jewish farms and outposts in the West Bank are a burden on the IDF and harm the security of all Israeli citizens. The result was almost evenly split: 36% of Israelis “strongly disagreed” and 36% “strongly agreed.” Placing the two questions side by side reveals the same ideological ordering, at almost the same intensity. The questions are different and should not be compared directly, but they reveal the same fault line: attitudes toward violence by fringe groups within the settlement movement appear to be shaped less by information or facts than by identity.

Antisemitism and Foreign Relations

For the second consecutive year, we examined Israelis’ attitudes toward the rise in antisemitism worldwide. The principal finding is an erosion of the middle position. Thirty-six percent of Israelis believe the increase in antisemitism is “not at all because of Israeli policy,” compared with 33% last year; among Jewish Israelis, the share rose from 38% to 44%. At the opposite end, there was little change: 34% of Israelis believe antisemitism is increasing “to a great extent” because of Israeli policy, compared with 32% last year.

It is the middle position that has contracted. Among Arab Israelis, the share attributing the increase in antisemitism “to a great extent” to Israeli policy rose from 42% to 58%. Among Jewish Israelis, meanwhile, the view that there is no connection at all between Israeli policy and antisemitic phenomena abroad has strengthened. This shift is especially evident in the middle of the religiosity spectrum: among traditionalist (Masorti), nonreligious Jews, the share saying there is no connection at all rose from 42% to 55%; among traditionalist (Masorti), religious Jews, it rose from 41% to 57%. There was no change among Haredim, while among religious (Dati) Jews the share declined slightly.

On the practical question of whether Israel should modify its policies because of the rise in antisemitism, the position of Jewish Israelis is essentially unchanged: 57% say Israel should make no changes, compared with 56% last September. Among all Israelis, the figure is 47% – identical to last year. Here too, the only substantial movement is among Arab Israelis, where the share supporting policy change “to a great extent” rose from 14% to 60%. This sharp shift largely reflects a substantial decline in “Don’t know” responses in this group, from 48% to 15%. For the second consecutive year, we also examined how Israelis classify various international actions toward Israel and over the past year, some of these actions have ceased to be hypothetical. The data indicates that Israelis’ definition of what should be considered “antisemitic” has broadened somewhat. For three of the four actions examined, the share of Jewish Israelis who regard them as antisemitic either antisemitic alone or both anti-Israel and antisemitic increased. For an academic boycott, the share rose from 68% to 74%; for calls for punitive measures against Israel because of the humanitarian situation in Gaza, from 51% to 58%; and for barring ministers and Knesset members from entering various countries, from 43% to 45%. The exception is recognition of a Palestinian state, the action that had already been implemented most extensively in practice even before this year. The share of Jewish Israelis defining such a step as antisemitic remained at 41%, unchanged from last year.

The Education System

With the opening of the school year, we again examined a series of questions concerning Israel’s education system. This is the third consecutive year we have asked these questions, and the trend has moved consistently in one direction: the share of Israelis who describe the education system as “not good” rose from 32% in 2024 to 35% this year.

The share who describe it as “good” has fallen by four percentage points over the past two years, to 14%, while the share who describe it as “average” fell from 50% to 33%. Among Jewish Israelis, 37% now say the system is “not good,” compared with 28% last year and 32% two years ago. Among Arab Israelis, there has likewise been a decline over the past two years in the share describing the education system as “good” from one-third (32%) in 2024 to one-fifth (19%) today. A breakdown by religiosity shows that the deterioration is concentrated primarily in secular Jews’ assessment of the education system: the share of secular respondents who describe it as “not good” rose from 34% to 46% over the past year. There was also a substantial increase in negative assessments among traditionalist (Masorti) Jews. There was no change among religious (Dati) Jews, while among Haredim the share satisfied with the system increased: 22% now describe it as “good,” compared with 10% last September.

Responses to questions about the subjects Israelis would add to or reduce in the school timetable are remarkably stable compared with last year. Among Jewish Israelis, “Jewish studies” is the subject the largest share would strengthen (29%, compared with 27% last year), followed by civics (21%). Yet “Jewish studies” is also the second-most frequently chosen subject for cuts (20%, compared with 24% last year) after literature, which just over one-quarter of Jewish Israelis (26%) would cut. Among Arab Israelis, priorities are entirely different: English is the subject most frequently chosen for additional hours (31%, up from 25% last year), followed by mathematics (20%).

The divide between secular and religious Jews is especially stark. Thirty-six percent of secular Jews would add hours to civics and only 8% to Jewish studies; 44% of religious Jews and 71% of Haredim would add hours to Jewish studies, while only 6% and 7%, respectively, would add hours to civics. In the opposite direction, 41% of secular Jews would cut Jewish studies, compared with 0% of religious Jews and 4% of Haredim. Religious Jews and Haredim would direct their cuts primarily toward literature (33% and 36%) and civics (9% and 18%).

Data for JPPI’s September Israeli Society Index was collected between September 1 and 3, 2026, via the Madad.com panel (663 Jewish-sector respondents) and Afkar Research in the Arab sector (206 respondents, approximately half online and half by telephone).

The data was weighted according to voting patterns and religiosity and analyzed to represent the views of Israel’s adult population. Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepkov compile the JPPI Israeli Society Index, with research, production, and writing assistance from Yael Levinovsky. Prof. David Steinberg provides statistical supervision.

The post JPPI Israeli Society Index – September 2026: Israelis See the Election as Especially Important first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

The post Newsletter 11.9.26 first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

PROJECT HEAD

Yaakov Katz

CONTRIBUTORS

Ita Alcalay | Michal Bar-Asher Siegal | Shlomi Bereznik | Rachel Fish | Shlomo Fischer | Shuki Friedman | Or Horvitz | Eli Kannai | Dov Maimon | Sharon Pardo | Shmuel Rosner | Matt Shapiro | Noah Slepkov | Daniel Staetsky | Yedidia Stern | Gil Troy | Hila Zehavi

EDITOR

Barry Geltman

The post Annual Assessment of the Jewish People 2026 | 5786 first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Recently, voices from across Israel’s political divide – from Bennett’s Beyachad party to the Movement for Quality Government – have proposed placing the Declaration of Independence at the opening of Israel’s future constitution, thereby elevating it to the apex of the country’s normative legal hierarchy. Former Supreme Court chief justices, Meir Shamgar and Aharon Barak, have expressed similar views. Is this appropriate?

The impulse is easy to understand, even compelling. The Declaration is an Israeli canonical text – without equal. For decades, Israelis have recognized the almost miraculous significance of the broad consensus reached by the leaders of the pre-state Yishuv. At the very moment the state was being born, with its survival still in doubt, they managed, through words, to give form to the Israeli spirit of a Jewish people renewing its life in its homeland.

The Declaration tells our story at the singular turning point when the Jewish people returned to history as a people. It is a capsule of distilled Israeli DNA, implanted in our national bloodstream by the founding generation as a gift to those who followed. It would therefore seem only natural to give it pride of place at the head of our future constitution.

But we should not.

Anyone who wants to preserve the Declaration’s exalted status above Israel’s political disputes must recognize the distinction between two very different kinds of discourse: one of identity and one of rights. The Declaration belongs to the first. It should serve as an instrument for forging shared identity. It is Israeli identity’s home port – the place from which Israelis set sail into the riptides of disagreement and to which they return to recover a sense of common belonging. Its success in fulfilling this historic role depends on broad popular support, both emotional and intellectual.

That support, however, will not survive if the Declaration is transformed from an identity-defining national canon into a legal instrument for determining rights. Dragging it into the discourse of rights will damage it, because that discourse plays out through judicial rulings, with winners and losers. When one side seeks to defeat the other by invoking the Declaration, it pushes its opponent toward rejecting the Declaration itself – thereby diminishing its value as a shared identity asset.

That erosion of the Declaration’s symbolic, educational, and identity-building power has already begun. During the dramatic Supreme Court hearing on the “reasonableness standard,” the lawyer representing the government challenged the Declaration’s importance, arguing that it had been drafted by an unrepresentative group, written in haste, and is old and anachronistic. He later clarified and softened his remarks, but the damage had been done: the Declaration had been deeply scarred.

At the other extreme, a Supreme Court justice, in a supremely activist lone opinion in the case concerning the “Tiberias Law,” held that the Declaration is the fundamental norm on which the entire Israeli legal system rests. He thus set in motion an intellectual and legal project that seeks to turn the Declaration into a legal trump card – one that could serve as the basis for judicial review even of Basic Laws.

The justice reiterated this position in a ruling handed down last week on the law freezing the arrests of Haredi draft evaders. In his view, the law “was enacted outside the scope of the Knesset’s authority and is therefore void,” because it infringes the right to “full equality” enjoyed by all citizens by virtue of the operative legal force he attributes to the Declaration.

Those seeking to incorporate the Declaration into a future constitution are embracing this justice’s position – and taking it a step further. In doing so, they risk turning the Declaration from a cultural asset into a legal weapon. Their well-intentioned effort to elevate its status could end up, paradoxically, destroying the very value it holds for all of us.

We suffer from a toxic syndrome: the Israeli public conversation repeatedly gravitates toward the discourse of rights while neglecting the discourse of identity. We choose to shift the center of gravity of our cultural disputes away from the public arena – ideology, politics, and the marketplace of ideas – and into the judicial arena, where binding decisions are handed down. Those who cherish the Declaration must resist placing it in the legal arena. The debate over judicial review of ordinary laws and Basic Laws should not be decided by invoking the noble words of the Declaration of Independence.

We live on shifting sands. Precisely for that reason, we have an urgent – even existential – need for a fixed point of consensus capable of holding us together. The closest thing we have to such a fixed point – our one secular sacred text – is the Declaration of Independence.

We must not squander the founding generation’s gift.

Published in jns

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It would be more fun to write a feel-good column on the promise of a much better year. But reality points the other way. A convergence of trends and events – some global, some local – threatens to turn 5787 into a “perfect storm”: several forces coming together, each likely to confront us with challenges even greater than those we have already endured.

At home: political instability, intensifying internal conflict, accelerating net emigration, and continuing security threats. Abroad: artificial intelligence; a climate spinning out of control; instability in the international system and intensifying great-power competition; and, as a result of all these, the continued rise of antisemitism, which, true to form, blames Jews for every ill.

I hope I turn out to be wrong. But I may not.

The problems facing Israel in the new year

Let’s start in Israel. Elections will be held shortly after the holidays. Months of polling, including surveys conducted in recent days, point to a political deadlock. Like two wrestlers in the ring, the political “blocs” have each other by the throat, with neither able to prevail. If that holds, we can expect a replay of the election years of 2020–2023 and prolonged instability. This time, however, the social reality is more extreme – most Israelis identify the social rift as the greatest risk facing Israel –despite the immense challenges of the security environment. As conditions deteriorate, more Israelis are leaving the country, including many who are part of the backbone of the economy.

The security and foreign-policy fronts are also unstable – and in some respects, worsening. Israel has failed to achieve a decisive victory on any front. The IDF is stretched to the limit in Lebanon, Gaza, and the West Bank, while another “round” with Iran looms as a very real possibility. The security burden on military personnel and the Israeli economy is enormous – almost unprecedented.

The international outlook is no brighter. On the eve of the new year, Britain – once a close Israeli ally – imposed unprecedented sanctions on Israel. Eleven other European countries have followed suit, including major EU members. Israel’s standing in the United States is deteriorating as well. On both sides of the political divide, rhetoric toward Israel and Jews is becoming more extreme. Israel has already become a major issue in the midterm elections – not to its advantage – and as the 2028 presidential race heats up, the situation is likely to worsen. Public support for Israel is at a historic low. Then there is antisemitism. In Europe, this is old news – and the situation is bad. But over the past year, antisemitism in the United States, together with denial of Israel’s right to exist, has also surged and gained legitimacy, with such views now openly voiced by influencers and politicians. Antisemitism and rejection of Israel have become intertwined, threatening Jewish life in the Diaspora and becoming a national-security challenge for Israel itself.

Added to these are global challenges that will significantly affect Israel. The first is artificial intelligence. Many experts now expect AI to advance faster than previously thought – and to reshape our lives sooner than expected. There will be benefits, but the labor market and global economy also face the real prospect of a severe crisis – one that could last until economies and governments adapt to this new environment. Israel, whose economy is driven by its technology sector, is especially exposed.

Over all of this hangs the climate crisis. On its own, it might not drastically alter the international system. Combined with other pressures, however, it could become a major factor. Together, these trends intensify instability in the international system and sharpen great-power competition – both with consequences for Israel.

Some of these trends are beyond our control, and Israel has little influence over them. That does not exempt Israel from confronting them and preparing for their effects. Others – those directly involving Israel – are much more within our power to shape. Some result from government policy; others from external forces. But in both cases, we can do more to address them. The challenges awaiting us in 5787 could coalesce into a perfect storm. But this outcome is not inevitable; the choices we make can soften the blow. Despite it all – happy new year!

Published in the Jerusalem Post

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“We are getting dangerously close to a violent, multifront confrontation. According to reports from the security establishment, the number of warnings in Judea and Samaria is unprecedented.

“The ones who will pay the price are our children, who will once again have to enter the Jenin refugee camp, once again go into Gaza, and perhaps once again into Lebanon. The ones who will pay the price are our parents, who will once again have to sit in their safe rooms.” These words sound like something that could have been said yesterday. They were, however, spoken by Yair Lapid, the head of the opposition, three years ago this month, on September 20, 2023 – just a couple of weeks before the Hamas invasion on October 7.

Lapid later explained that he decided to go before the cameras with such a stark, dire warning after receiving one of the regular monthly security briefings given to the opposition leader by the prime minister and his military secretary. During that meeting, Lapid said, he was shown some of the most sensitive and classified intelligence collected by Israel’s security establishment. The message, as he understood it, was clear: Israel’s enemies were watching the deep divisions tearing through Israeli society over the government’s judicial overhaul. They saw weakness and vulnerability. And they believed there might be an opportunity to strike.

That was why, on the eve of Yom Kippur in 2023, Lapid issued his warning. He could hardly have been more prophetic. Two-and-a-half weeks later, Hamas invaded Israel. Our children were sent to fight in Gaza, Jenin, and eventually Lebanon. Our parents – and the rest of us – were sent running to bomb shelters and safe rooms.

October 7 to play a role in next election

From the moment elections were called for the end of October, it was obvious that October 7 would play a central role in every political party’s campaign. What was less obvious was the extent to which the disaster would become the subject of manipulation, distortion, and outright fabrication, particularly by members of the governing coalition determined to deflect criticism and wash their hands of responsibility for the greatest catastrophe to befall the Jewish people since the Holocaust, a catastrophe that happened on their watch.

That is how we need to look at the interview that Sara Netanyahu gave this week to Channel 14 in which she attempted to tarnish the reputation of Yair Golan, the leader of the Democrats Party, who famously put on his uniform on the morning of October 7, drove south, and helped rescue Israelis from the killing fields around the Supernova music festival.

Like so many heroic Israelis who saw their fellow citizens in mortal danger that morning, Golan did not wait for orders. A former deputy IDF chief of staff, he took his sidearm and headed toward the fighting, repeatedly entering an area crawling with terrorists to rescue people and bring them to safety. Yet Sara Netanyahu insinuated that Golan must somehow have had advance knowledge that something was about to happen, because he put on his uniform that morning – while her husband, the prime minister, had not been woken by the heads of the security establishment.

It was a disgusting accusation. It not only suggested some sort of conspiracy against Benjamin Netanyahu, but cast suspicion on a man who risked his own life to save others. To question the integrity, courage, and motives of Israelis who voluntarily entered a combat zone that morning is appalling.

While her comments were rightly condemned across the political spectrum, Sara Netanyahu is not really the story. She is the prime minister’s wife, not an elected official, and her comments should not consume too much of our attention.

The more important story is the coalition itself, which continues to do all it can to evade responsibility.

While Sara was in the headlines, Netanyahu was also pushing his new claim – had he been woken at 4 or 5 a.m. on October 7, he would have made decisions that could have prevented the Hamas invasion. Why wasn’t he woken? Because, he suggested, the security chiefs knew that he would force them to act, and they did not want him to.

There are several problems with this argument. The first is that it is highly unlikely Netanyahu would have done what he now claims.

Had he been woken, he would have heard from IDF chief of staff Herzi Halevi, Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) director Ronen Bar, and Military Intelligence chief Aharon Haliva. All three would have given him essentially the same assessment they themselves mistakenly believed as they analyzed the little intelligence that was coming in that night: Hamas was probably not preparing for a major attack, and if something was going to happen, it would be limited in scope.

With every senior security official presenting essentially the same assessment, does anyone seriously believe Netanyahu would have ordered Israel to launch a war against Hamas at 4 or 5 in the morning? Far more likely, he would have instructed them to remain vigilant, continue monitoring the situation, and reconvene a few hours later.

That, essentially, was the catastrophic mistake that Amir Bohbot and I describe in our book While Israel Slept. The warning signs were there, but they were interpreted through an intelligence framework that assumed Hamas did not want a major war.

But Netanyahu’s political objective now is to portray October 7 as exclusively their failure, a tactical intelligence breakdown that had nothing to do with him, his policies, or the strategy he pursued toward Hamas for years. That strategy included containing Hamas, allowing Qatari money to flow into Gaza, and repeatedly deciding against using the IDF to remove Hamas from power.

Keeping the national debate focused narrowly on the intelligence and operational failures of the night of October 6 and the early hours of October 7 serves Netanyahu politically. It keeps attention away from the much larger question of strategy: how Israel reached a point where Hamas was able to build an army on the other side of the border, prepare an invasion for years, and convince Israeli leaders that it had no intention of using it.

The second problem with Netanyahu’s argument is even more fundamental.

It is a wrong illustration of leadership. Leadership is supposed to mean understanding that subordinates will sometimes make mistakes – even catastrophic ones – and that ultimate responsibility rests with the person at the top.

Sometimes I wonder what would have happened politically had Netanyahu chosen a different path after October 7. What if he had gone to the funerals of those murdered and visited their families during shiva? What if he had stood before the families and heard their yells and criticism, had appeared before the Israeli public and said something simple: I failed. What if he had publicly grieved for the 1,200 people massacred on his watch and accepted even a measure of responsibility for what happened? Perhaps it would even have helped him politically. Perhaps showing compassion, humility, and accountability would have won back some of the Israelis who turned away from him after October 7.

It is an interesting thought experiment, but that is all it is. Because Netanyahu’s political doctrine has long been clear: never accept responsibility, never admit failure, and, above all, never say sorry.

The tragedy is that nearly three years after October 7, Israel is not only still fighting over who was responsible for the failures of that day. It is heading into an election in which those failures are being rewritten in real time.

And a country that cannot honestly confront how it reached October 7 will have a much harder time ensuring that another one can never happen.

Published in the Jerusalem Post

The post Israel cannot prevent another October 7 if Netanyahu keeps rewriting the first one first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

In every case, the same principle is being established: when a man’s beliefs collide with a woman’s presence, the woman is the one expected to move.

In the ancient world – as in parts of our own world today – women were often seen as dangerous: seductive, destabilizing, their very presence liable to lead men into forbidden terrain.

One way of dealing with this imagined threat was to erase the woman. Cover her up. Restrict her movement. Keep her at home. Make her less visible in public. That, for example, was common in the Roman world.

But there was another possibility.

In the sermon attributed to Jesus in the Gospel according to Matthew, a man who looks at a woman with lust is told: if your eye causes you to stumble, pluck it out.

The image is extreme, of course, but the principle matters: responsibility for desire lies with the person who desires – not with the woman he is looking at.

That is an enormous moral distinction.

Even if you subscribe to a worldview in which the presence of a woman poses a sexual or religious challenge, dealing with that challenge is your responsibility, not hers. You do not get to turn her into an object to be moved aside so that you can comfortably maintain your way of life.

I, of course, reject the premise altogether. Women are not first and foremost sexual objects, any more than men are. We are human beings – thinking and acting subjects, researchers, soldiers, students, drivers, and doctors.

But I am liberal enough to let you think otherwise.

What I am not prepared to “accommodate” is a situation in which accommodating your beliefs means making me disappear. If looking at me threatens you, look away. If sitting beside me is too enticing, do not sit beside me. If my presence in public threatens your worldview, it is your responsibility to find a way to live with that threat. Stay home. Wear opaque glasses.

Or, in Jesus’s version, pluck out your eyes. But do not demand that I disappear so that you can remain. Avoiding a woman’s handshake because it is more than just a handshake. A woman’s face on a billboard is not just a picture.

Demands that women not teach in a particular classroom, or not serve alongside men, are not a random collection of minor “accommodations” for a religious population.

Turning the language of accommodation around

In every case, the same principle is being established: when a man’s beliefs collide with a woman’s presence, the woman is the one expected to move. And once that principle is accepted, the next demand is never far behind.

If it is legitimate to insist on a male lecturer, why not a male prime minister? If we can create a course of study “free” of women, why not a military unit?

And if a woman’s presence is considered a legitimate reason to refuse to participate in a university program, why should it not also justify refusing to serve alongside her in a Namer, one of the IDF’s armored personnel carriers?

This is precisely how the language of “accommodation” gets turned on its head. Coexistence does not mean one side gets to live according to its beliefs while the other is expected to shrink itself so as not to interfere. Pluralism is not the right to dictate who may be visible in the public sphere.

And liberalism does not require me to tolerate people who demand that I disappear.

Liberalism means accepting, at the deepest level, that people who live differently from me are entitled to a full place in our shared society. A full place. Not behind a partition. Not outside the classroom. And not outside the Namer.

Published in the Jerusalem Post

The post When women are asked to disappear first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

After three years of war, with many Israelis having served hundreds of days in the reserves and the IDF – especially its regular-service soldiers – under unbearable strain, public tolerance for blanket military exemptions has all but vanished. A large majority of Israelis want Haredi men to serve, and polls show broad support for their conscription even among supporters of the current government.

To preserve his alliance with the Haredi parties while reassuring his own supporters, Netanyahu is now offering a formula: “Haredi men who do not study will be drafted.” In practice, the formula is both morally distorted and fundamentally false. Only a universal service obligation will actually bring large numbers of young men from the community into the IDF. Any politician who promises less is effectively giving up on meaningful enlistment. Throughout its term, the Netanyahu-led government has done almost nothing to advance enlistment from the Haredi community. On the contrary, it has invested enormous effort and political capital in promoting a law that would entrench draft evasion, at the unyielding insistence of the Haredi parties. But elections are approaching, and no one reads polls better than Netanyahu. Given Likud’s weakness and the growing demand – including within his own camp – that the burden be shared more equally, Netanyahu and other coalition figures are changing course: away from an evasion law and toward a new formula – “Those who study will be exempt from service; those who don’t will be drafted.”

For Netanyahu and coalition supporters, many of them traditional or religious, the formula sounds ideal. It lets them have it both ways: protect Torah study while expanding the ranks of those who serve. Problem solved.

Except it isn’t. The formula is a convenient illusion that falls apart on closer inspection.

First, there is no moral justification for exempting every Torah student from service. Torah study is an important value in a Jewish state, but it is not an automatic substitute for military service. One can study and serve. Thousands of religious young men do exactly that. Some spend years in yeshiva, perform meaningful military service, return to their studies, and continue to shoulder the burden in the reserves.

Nor is the formula practical. “Those who don’t study will be drafted” requires the state to decide who is really studying Torah, effectively turning the government into the supervisor of the yeshiva world. How exactly is that supposed to work? Will inspectors roam the yeshivot? Take attendance morning and afternoon? Administer Talmud exams? Check who is working off the books after the afternoon study session? And when a finding like that could mean lost funding and years of military service, what incentive would a yeshiva have to report that one of its students is not really studying?

The answer is obvious. Before long, we will discover that “your people are all righteous.” Everyone will be studying Torah. Even the most notorious yeshiva slacker will suddenly become a full-fledged student. There will be lists, certifications, attendance records, and oversight mechanisms. The state will inspect, the yeshivot will report, politicians will tout “enforcement” – and in the end, almost any young man determined to avoid service will find a way to be classified as a “Torah student.”

Anyone familiar with the state’s dealings with Haredi education has seen how this works. For years, the state has struggled to enforce even basic core-curriculum requirements in institutions it funds. To believe that an airtight oversight system will suddenly materialize when military service is at stake is naïve at best.

And that is precisely why the slogan is dangerous. It offers Israelis – especially right-wing voters who want broader military service but also want to preserve the political “bloc” – a comforting solution. One can say, “I support Haredi enlistment,” while simultaneously backing an arrangement that, in practice, perpetuates draft evasion.

There is only one real solution. The next government must adopt a simple principle: everyone serves. Military service can and should be adapted to the needs of the Haredi community. Appropriate frameworks can be created, and a very small quota of exceptional Torah scholars can be allowed to continue their studies. But they must be the exception. Everyone else must serve.

TOI

The post Netanyahu’s false promise of ‘study or serve’ first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.