To understand the significance of Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw about 5,000 U.S. troops from the roughly 45,000 stationed in Germany, one must go back to 1944, to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s initiative and the Bretton Woods Conference. There, the foundations were laid not only for a new monetary system but for an entire world order shaped by the lessons of two devastating world wars. The organizing idea was clear: the United States would lead the creation of a more stable world through a combination of economic openness, collective security and limits on militarized nationalism.

Within that vision, later termed globalization, Washington assumed broad responsibilities: rebuilding Germany and Japan, opening the American market to their exports with minimal tariffs, and shaping a constitutional order that restricted their ability to undertake military action while anchoring pacifism as a core principle.

Against this backdrop, the current friction between Trump and U.S. allies is not incidental. It began early in the conflict with Iran, when Washington asked Germany and Japan to assist in operational activities in the Strait of Hormuz, including mine-clearing and securing shipping lanes. For the U.S. administration, this was a reasonable request within an alliance. For Berlin and Tokyo, it crossed constitutional and political red lines. Germany’s refusal was unusually public.

Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said, “This is not our war.” But it was Chancellor Friedrich Merz who escalated the confrontation, saying the United States was being “humiliated” by Iran. Trump responded sharply and directly, continuing to criticize the chancellor and writing on his Truth Social platform that he “should spend more time ending the Russia-Ukraine war.” He added: “He should spend more time fixing his broken country, and he should spend less time interfering with those who are getting rid of the Iranian nuclear threat.”

The friction is no less acute in Asia. In March 2026, a political crisis erupted in Tokyo after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi refused Trump’s request to send naval forces and mine-sweeping vessels to the Strait of Hormuz. At a White House meeting on March 19, Takaichi made clear that Japan would assist where it could but would not exceed the limits imposed by its pacifist constitution. The refusal angered the White House and stirred domestic upheaval in Japan, where lawmakers from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party warned the move could jeopardize the American security umbrella and even trigger economic retaliation.

Trump anticipated this. More than a decade ago, long before the current crisis, he pointed to the gap between U.S. commitments and what he saw as a lack of reciprocity from allies, saying: “You know about our military, everybody talks about our military budget, but they don’t understand we’re taking care of Germany, probably nobody even knows that. We’re taking care of Japan — you know, we have a defense treaty with Japan. If we’re attacked, Japan doesn’t have to help us, and if Japan is attacked, we’re in World War III. We have a war now. What kind of deal is that?”

Meanwhile, Berlin is engaged in a dual and even contradictory process. On one hand, political hesitation and a reluctance to be drawn into a confrontation with Iran alongside the United States. On the other, an unprecedented acceleration in military preparedness. The term Zeitenwende — meaning “historic turning point” or “epochal shift” — describes Germany’s attempt to change strategic direction. Accordingly, Germany is investing billions in upgrading logistical infrastructure, including adapting ports such as Bremerhaven to handle heavy tank transport.

At the same time, deals are being considered to convert civilian factories, such as Volkswagen facilities, to defense production, including cooperation with Israeli companies. Yet the gap between declarations and actual readiness remains wide. Germany faces significant challenges in building its military strength, chief among them manpower shortages, difficulties in recruitment and a lack of full preparedness for large-scale conflict scenarios. Discussions about reinstating conscription and improving operational readiness underscore how far the process is from completion.

This is compounded by a quieter but potentially more significant shift. As of April 1, an amendment to German law took effect with little public attention, requiring millions of men of service age to obtain government approval to travel abroad for more than three months. The implications go far beyond a technical change. Viewed in context, the measure strengthens the state’s ability to control its manpower in an emergency, even if it is still framed in softened bureaucratic language.

Here the paradox sharpens: Germany is preparing for a future confrontation with Russia and investing vast resources toward that end, yet hesitates to take part in the current confrontation alongside the United States. It is trying to build capabilities, change laws and prepare infrastructure, but is still not politically or operationally ready to enter real-time friction. Within this context comes Trump’s decision. The withdrawal of 5,000 troops may appear limited, but it is a clear signal. A full withdrawal would require congressional approval, but a significant reduction is within presidential authority. As such, this is likely only a first step. For Trump, the equation is simple: if allies do not act when asked, there is no reason to continue providing them with a full security umbrella. Germany and Japan are seen as benefiting from the system without sharing the burden.

The implications extend far beyond troop deployments. This is a deep crack in the order established since Bretton Woods. But unlike past crises, this is not an external challenge — it is erosion from within. If Germany and Japan continue to benefit from the U.S. security umbrella while refusing to act when called upon, and if the United States itself begins to question the value of the system it created, then this is no longer a localized crisis but a change in the rules of the game.

Trump’s drawdown in Germany may involve only 5,000 troops, but it is likely just an initial phase in a broader process. Its significance is far greater: it is an opening shot in a reassessment of the very U.S. commitment to the world order it built. In that vacuum, there are also beneficiaries. For Russian President Vladimir Putin, any rift between Washington and Berlin is a strategic gain, one that weakens NATO from within. In Asia, the widening gap between the United States and Japan offers Chinese President Xi Jinping a similar opportunity — to test how durable American alliances are at a moment of truth.

If this is the direction, Europe and Japan may soon discover that the world they have relied on is no longer what it was, and that the era in which the United States served as a stable and unquestioned anchor is steadily eroding.

Published on Ynet

The post Trump rewrites global alliances, signals new era of conditional US ties first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Apple:

Spotify:

In this episode of Jewish Crossroads, Tamar Ish Shalom sits down with Jon Polin. Together with his wife, Rachel Goldberg-Polin, Jon became one of the most recognizable voices of the hostage crisis after their son, Hersh Goldberg-Polin, was kidnapped on October 7 and held in Gaza by Hamas for 328 days. Over that time, they carried his story across continents and audiences, becoming for many the human face of a national trauma.

The post Tamar Ish Shalom in conversation with Jon Polin first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

While the war with Iran is not yet over – and the possibility of renewed hostilities still lingers – one conclusion is already clear: Israel’s standing in the Gulf has been significantly strengthened.

The report revealing that Israel transferred an Iron Dome battery to the United Arab Emirates at the outset of the war, reportedly along with personnel to operate it, should not have come as a surprise. For years, Israeli defence systems have reportedly been quietly embedded across the Gulf. Systems like SPYDER and Barak have played a central role in protecting strategic assets in the region.

Which is why, what has changed is not the cooperation itself – but its context.

ration itself – but its context.

Publicly, relations between Israel and the UAE – the strongest in the Gulf – have not always been smooth. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, for example, has yet to make an official state visit to the UAE since the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, and Emirati officials have – when needed – made their frustration with controversial Israeli policies public.

But beneath all of that, something more durable has taken shape.

Economically, culturally, and most importantly militarily, ties between Israel and the UAE have remained robust – even during moments of tension. Trade has expanded, tourism has grown, and intelligence and defence cooperation has only deepened. The one country whose airlines have continued to fly to Israel over the last two and a half years with barely an interruption is the UAE. That is because the relationship was never meant to be transactional. Once Abu Dhabi made the strategic decision to normalise relations, it did so with a long-term view in mind, rooted in shared concerns about regional stability, technological advancement, and more.

That reality was underscored this week by Anwar Gargash, a senior adviser to the UAE president, who noted that Israel is no longer seen as a threat by most Gulf countries. While commitment to the Palestinian issue remains, he predicted that interest in Israeli defence technology would grow.

Gargash has been remarkably consistent on this point. Earlier in the war, as Israeli and American forces were still striking Iranian targets, he argued that Iran’s aggression would not weaken Israel’s position in the region – but strengthen it. For countries that already have relations with Israel, he added, those ties will deepen. For those that do not, new channels may open.

At the time, it seemed like a bold assessment. The region was on edge and the UAE was under missile and drone threat. Yet Gargash understood something fundamental and that logic today extends beyond the UAE.

Perhaps even more telling has been the silence of other Gulf states – Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait – throughout the conflict. These are countries that do not have formal diplomatic relations with Israel. Historically, they have not hesitated to criticise Israeli military action.

Despite the fact that Israel – alongside the United States – initiated the war against Iran, and despite the fact that these Gulf states came under retaliatory fire, there was no wave of public condemnation. No emergency summits denouncing Israeli actions. No coordinated diplomatic pushback. That absence of criticism is not accidental.

It reflects a quiet, if unspoken, realignment. Gulf leaders understand that Iran poses as much of a threat to them as it does to Israel. They recognise that Israel’s actions, while taken first and foremost in its own defence, degrades a common adversary – one that has invested heavily for years in missile programs, nuclear weapons, and regional destabilisation.

As a result, their perspective is fundamentally different from that of critics of the war in Washington or Europe, where debates over the legitimacy of the conflict continue to dominate the discourse. In the Gulf, the question of whether the Iranian threat is “imminent” is not theoretical. Missiles and drones have already fallen in their territory.

That is why for Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and beyond, the calculation is simple – a weaker Iran is a safer Middle East.

That explain why, behind the scenes, Gulf leaders have reportedly urged Washington to sustain pressure on Tehran and not to agree to a premature deal. For them, the risk of war is real, but so too is the risk of allowing Iran to emerge from the conflict intact and emboldened.

None of this means that normalisation with Saudi Arabia is imminent. The political obstacles remain significant, not least the unresolved Palestinian issue, which continues to serve as both a domestic and regional constraint for Arab leaders. Nor does it mean that these countries will publicly embrace Israel or shift their rhetoric overnight.

But something important has been reinforced.

The Gulf states have once again been reminded that when the region is under threat, there is one country that is both willing and capable of acting. Israel is seen as a country that not only defends itself, but takes action that alters the strategic balance for others as well.

That realisation does not make headlines but quietly leads to defence cooperation, intelligence sharing, in decisions not being criticised, and in deeper ties behind closed doors. And that, perhaps more than anything else, is the real story of this war.

Jewish Chronicle

The post The real story of the Iran war: the strengthening of the Israel-Gulf alliance first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Main findings

• There has been a continued erosion of support among U.S. Jews for going to war with Iran, and a decline in the share identifying support for the war in their social environment.
• Only half of the respondent panel considers the war with Iran a success.
• There has been a shift in the definition of victory: a decline in the share conditioning the war’s success on regime change.
• Four in ten “strong liberal” respondents believe the war is a failure, regardless of the outcome.
• Most respondents support the U.S. blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.
• A regional picture of victory: Most respondents believe the wars in Gaza and Lebanon have been successful.
• Assessments of Donald Trump’s and Benjamin Netanyahu’s performance vis-à-vis Iran have eroded.
• Regarding Iran, confidence in Netanyahu’s leadership is greater than confidence in Trump’s management.
• Half of the Jews surveyed attribute the erosion of Israel’s standing in the United States to rising anti-Jewish sentiment.
• A quarter of the Jews surveyed attribute the erosion of support for Israel to Israel’s actions.
• Most link the restoration of Israel’s standing in the United States to changes in its policy or leadership.
• Ahead of Israel’s 78th Independence Day, there is consensus among respondents that Israel is a success story.
• Ahead of the U.S. 250th anniversary celebrations, two-thirds of respondents consider America a success story.
• Half of U.S. respondents say they will vote for a Democratic congressional candidate, compared

To download a PDF version, click here.

Survey Background: Data for this month’s JPPI Voice of the Jewish People Index survey was collected April 15-19. Several key events influenced both the selection of survey questions and the attitudes reflected in the Index. At the center were the war with Iran and the ceasefire in force for the duration of the negotiations. The joint U.S.-Israeli operation, which began on February 28, lasted 40 days until a Pakistan-brokered agreement was reached for a two-week cessation of hostilities, which has since been extended to provide time for negotiations on a long-term arrangement. The survey was conducted one week after the pause took effect, alongside the start of the U.S. blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and President Trump’s announcement of a temporary ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon.

Methodological Note: In recent months, we have begun to survey the views of Jews in Canada and the UK. In both countries, panels are taking shape and growing, albeit slowly. In April, about 50 respondents from the UK and 110 from Canada participated in the survey. Accordingly, the data on attitudes of Jews in these countries should be treated with caution. When the report presents data broken down by ideological orientation, denominational affiliation, or voting pattern, it refers only to U.S. respondents.

Support for the Iran War

After 40 days of fighting, including extensive U.S. and Israeli strikes against military infrastructure and nuclear facilities in Iran, a two-week Pakistan-brokered ceasefire took effect on April 8. Just before it was set to expire, President Trump announced an extension. This ceasefire was still in force at the time of this writing.

We have examined support for the U.S. decision to go to war against Iran several times through the JPPI Voice of the Jewish People respondent panel since the start of the war. These repeated measurements indicate a consistent erosion in U.S. Jewish support for the decision to go to war. In the war’s first week, support stood at 68% but declined to 62% in its third week and stood at 60% in the week following the ceasefire. Alongside this decline in support, there was a gradual increase in opposition to the campaign, from 26% at the outset to 34% in the present survey. Unlike this survey, which focuses on “connected” U.S. Jews, surveys with a representative sample of all U.S. Jews show that a majority oppose the war (according to a J Street survey conducted by GBAO, about 60% of American Jews opposed the war in March).

A breakdown of Voice of the Jewish People respondents by ideological orientation shows marked political polarization in perceptions of the campaign, with near-total support for the decision to launch the war among the conservative cohorts (96% among the “strong conservative” and 94% among the “leaning conservative”). High support was also recorded among centrist respondents (83%). By contrast, most (71%) of the “strong liberal” cohort opposed the move. The “leaning liberal” group emerged as the most divided and hesitant group, with an almost even split between supporters and opponents (42% and 44%, respectively) and a relatively high share (15%) who had not yet formed an opinion.

In the first week after the ceasefire went into effect, broad support for the war was maintained among respondents in the Jewish communities in Canada (81%) and the UK (75%), alongside low levels of opposition ranging from one-sixth to one-quarter.

In line with the decline in support for the Iran war (“Operation Roaring Lion” in Israel), there was also a shift in how respondents interpreted the mood within their social environment. At the beginning of the war, more than half of respondents (53%) thought most of their Jewish acquaintances supported the war, but this fell to 43% within a month. At the same time, there was an increase in the share reporting opposition to the war within their social environment (from 20% to 28%).

A breakdown by ideological orientation reveals deep differences in respondents’ perceptions of their social environments. At the liberal end of the ideological spectrum, a majority (56%) report opposition to the war within their social environments, compared with 21% who report support. This picture reverses as one moves rightward along the ideological spectrum. Among centrists and the conservative streams, the reported level of support within their social environment stands at 59%–63%, while the level of opposition is 14% or lower. Notably, the share of respondents selecting “don’t know” on this question is relatively high, which may indicate avoidance of discussing the issue.

Data from Canadian and UK respondents indicate substantially higher levels of support, though in those countries, too, erosion is evident. Still, reported support fell below half among U.S. respondents; in Canada and the UK, it remained relatively robust at 73% and 60%, respectively. At the same time, the erosion rate among UK respondents is similar to that of their U.S. counterparts, with a 10% decline in support and a doubling of the opposition rate (from 6% to 13%). Among Canadian respondents, relative stability was recorded.

Success in the Iran War

This month, there was a decline in the assessment of U.S. respondents regarding the war’s achievements compared with last month. The share of respondents characterizing the campaign as a “major success” fell from one-quarter (24%) to one-eighth (14%), while the share seeing it as a “failure” rose from one-eighth (14%) to one-quarter (25%). Overall, whereas in March a roughly two-thirds majority (66%) interpreted the war as successful (major success plus somewhat successful), in April this fell to 56%, alongside an increase in the share assessing the outcome negatively (from 26% to 40%).

As with other questions on this subject, a breakdown by political orientation reveals substantial gaps in the assessment of the war’s results. Among conservatives, there is broad agreement that the campaign was successful, with 93% of the ‘strong conservative’ cohort and 90% of the ‘leaning conservative’ cohort defining it as fully or partially successful. By contrast, among the “strong liberal,” a majority (59%) see the war as a failure, and only one-fifth (22%) define it as successful to some degree.

As in the United States, among Canadian and UK respondents, there was a decline in the share characterizing the war as a “major success,” this month in favor of a more moderate evaluation.

Last month, nearly half of respondents in the United States (46%) believed that the war’s success depended on regime change in Iran, but the figure fell to 38% this month. At the same time, there was a slight increase in the share of respondents satisfied with goals of deterrence and threat reduction: 24% of respondents believe that preventing another war for at least five years qualifies as success, and 19% are satisfied with a significant weakening of Iran even if it means future conflict. The share of respondents who see the war as a failure, regardless of how that is defined, rose only slightly over the past month.

A breakdown by ideological orientation reveals differences in defining the campaign’s goals, with the “strong liberal” cohort showing a striking figure: 41% believe the war is a failure regardless of its outcomes, compared with negligible shares among centrist and conservative respondents. Among the conservative and centrist cohorts, the primary criterion for success remains regime change.

As among U.S. respondents in April, there was also a decline in the share of Canadian and UK respondents who condition the war’s success on regime change in Iran. In Canada, the share supporting this objective fell from 59% to 49%, and in the UK, there was a decline from 52% to 46%. At the same time, in both countries, there was a growing willingness to settle for weakening Iran and achieving deterrence over a defined time horizon, consistent with the diplomatic reality after the ceasefire took effect.

The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the most complex focal points of strategic tension in the campaign. The United States is using a military blockade of the Strait of Hormuz as a policy tool, while Iran is blocking passage through the strait as a policy instrument serving its own interests.

Among the respondent panel, there is broad support for imposing a military blockade of the strait. A majority of U.S. respondents (59%) support this move (strongly or somewhat), compared with 28% who oppose it. Among Canadian respondents, 75% support the move, most of them (56%) strongly. In the UK, support was recorded at 65%, compared with 16% who oppose it.

Among the conservative U.S. respondent cohorts, there is near-total agreement with the move (95% of strong conservatives and 91% of leaning conservatives). Broad support is also evident among the centrist cohort (80%). By contrast, the “strong liberal” cohort opposes the move (61% opposition versus 23% support). This gap is also reflected in a breakdown by vote in the 2024 presidential election: an overwhelming majority (96%) of Trump voters support the blockade, but Harris voters are split, with 44% opposing the move and 37% supporting it.

The War in Gaza

While global attention is focused on Iran, most survey respondents share a largely positive assessment of the results of the war in Gaza, albeit with differing degrees of intensity. Among the U.S. Jews surveyed, two-thirds (63%) perceive the war fought in Gaza as successful, whereas one-fifth (21%) define it as a failure. In the UK, the picture is similar, with six in ten (59%) assessing the campaign as a success versus two in ten (19%) who see it as a failure. Canadian respondents present the most positive view, with three-quarters (73%) seeing the war as a success (13% as a major success and 60% as somewhat successful), and only 10% regarding it as a failure.

Among U.S. Jews in the strong liberal cohort, half (52%) think of the war as a failure, and only a negligible share regards it as a major success. The opposite picture emerges from the strong conservative cohort: 88% assess the war as successful, and a negligible share considers it a failure. This gap is also reflected in a breakdown by vote in the 2024 presidential election: a majority (89%) of Trump voters see the war as a success, while the picture is divided among Harris voters – half (48%) see it as a success, and a third (33%) view it as a failure.

The War in Lebanon

Against the backdrop of efforts to stabilize the ceasefire agreement with Iran, a temporary pause in fighting with Hezbollah in Lebanon also came into effect. Trump’s announcement of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire was made as data were being collected for this survey. That is, for some respondents, Lebanon was still an active front, but for others the pause in fighting had already taken effect.

A majority of U.S. respondents (61%) consider the war a success (11% as a major success and 50% as somewhat successful), while 27% see it as somewhat unsuccessful or even a failure. By contrast, a higher level of confidence in its success was registered among Canadian and UK respondents.

A breakdown by ideological orientation shows a very high level of satisfaction with the Lebanon campaign among conservative respondents, with 86% of the strong conservative cohort and the same share of Trump voters considering it a success; only negligible shares in these groups regard it as a failure. By contrast, a more critical tone is evident in the strong liberal cohort, with 37% characterizing the war as a failure and only 5% regarding it as a major success. The same pattern holds among Harris voters, with 46% perceiving the war as a success and 22% seeing it as a failure; a relatively high share (14%) of Harris voters had not yet formed an opinion on the issue.

Confidence in Leaders

In the past month, there has been some erosion in evaluations. During the active phase of the Iran war, the share of respondents assessing his leadership as very good stood at 28%; this month the figure fell to 23%. At the same time, criticism of his performance increased: the share of respondents rating the president as a very poor leader rose from 37% to 43%. Together, negative assessments constituted a 52% majority of U.S. respondents.

Leadership assessments are made largely through an ideological lens. Among conservative respondents, support for the president is almost unanimous, with 93% of the strong conservative cohort and 95% of Trump voters evaluating his leadership positively. The reverse picture appears among liberal respondents, with 88% of the strong liberal cohort and 80% of Harris voters evaluating Trump’s leadership as poor (with 81% and 68%, respectively, rating his leadership as very poor). Centrist respondents take a mostly positive stance, with 58% assessing his leadership positively and 32% assessing it as poor.

This month, there was also a slight erosion in respondents’ assessments of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s leadership on Iran. The share rating Netanyahu as a “very good leader” dropped from 35% to 30%, and positive assessments now total 49% rather than the 54% recorded last month. At the same time, the share viewing him as a poor leader (very poor or somewhat poor) rose from 38% to 44%, mainly because of the increase in the share evaluating his leadership as very poor. Nevertheless, Netanyahu enjoys a higher overall positive evaluation than Trump (49% versus 43%) and a substantially lower share rating his leadership as very poor (31% versus 43% for Trump). In other words, the connected U.S. Jews surveyed tend to place greater trust in Israeli leadership than in American leadership in the context of the Iran war.

As with previous questions, this question also revealed significant gaps between ideological groups.

Among Canadian and UK respondents, too, there has been a decline in confidence in Prime Minister Netanyahu’s leadership on Iran. In Canada, the share rating Netanyahu as a very good leader fell from 43% to 38%, while the share rating him as a very poor leader rose to 20%. In the UK, a more substantial decline was recorded, with total positive assessments falling from 70% to 52%, alongside an increase in the share rating his leadership as very poor. Of the Jews surveyed, Canadian respondents tend to view Netanyahu’s leadership on Iran most positively (63%), followed by UK respondents (52%), and U.S. respondents (49%).

Jews in Canada and the UK evaluate their own national leadership in relation to Iran negatively overall. In the UK, assessments of Keir Starmer’s leadership remained mostly negative (65%), with only one-fifth (18%) rating him positively. In Canada, confidence in Prime Minister Mark Carney vis-à-vis Iran declined by more than half over the past month. At the same time, the share rating him as a “very poor leader” increased.

The Erosion of Israel’s Image

New surveys of Israel’s standing in the United States (Pew, Gallup) reveal substantial erosion across nearly all audiences. JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People panel of connected Jews believes that the rise in antisemitic attitudes in the United States is the primary factor behind this erosion. Nearly half of respondents (45%) identify antisemitism as the central reason for the erosion in Israel’s standing, while changes in Israeli policy are seen as the second most important factor (28% of respondents). Smaller groups chose other reasons presented in the survey.

A denominational breakdown points to differences in identifying the source of the erosion. The more religiously observant the stream, the greater the tendency to attribute the situation to antisemitism. Among Modern Orthodox respondents, a 60% majority blames rising antisemitism, while only 12% point to Israeli policy as the central factor in the erosion of Israel’s standing. By contrast, 33% of Reform respondents attach significant weight to Israeli policy, a figure just five percentage points less than the weight they give to antisemitism (38%).

A majority of the respondent panel (55%) believes that the State of Israel could positively influence its image in the United States by changing its policies or leadership. By contrast, 37% of the panel believes the erosion stems from developments within the United States, and that Israel therefore has no real ability to improve its image.

A denominational breakdown reveals a similar pattern in how respondents characterize both responsibility and Israel’s capacity to improve its image. Among Reform and Conservative respondents, a majority (67% and 61%, respectively) believes a change in Israeli policy or leadership would lead to significant or partial improvement of its standing. Among respondents from the Orthodox streams, the picture is reversed: a majority of Haredi (77%) and Modern Orthodox (58%) respondents believe that the erosion of Israel’s Image is the result of internal American processes not under Israel’s control. This is especially striking among Haredi respondents, with a negligible share believing that Israeli measures could significantly improve its image in the United States.

The Israeli Project

A question posed just ahead of Israel’s 78th Independence Day indicates that a large majority of the connected Jews surveyed see the State of Israel as a success story. Three-quarters (75%) of the respondents characterize Israel in this way, with an overwhelming majority (57%) seeing it as “a major success.” Among Canadian respondents, the share is even higher: 84% see the state as a success (71% say it is a major success). Among UK respondents, the share identifying Israel as a success stands at 71%.

A respondent breakdown by ideological orientation shows that there is consensus among conservative respondents and those self-identifying as centrists that Israel is a success (94%–96%). A 71% majority of the leaning liberal cohort also holds this view. By contrast, less than half (45%) of the strong liberal cohort sees Israel as a success, compared with a third (32%) who have mixed feelings and a fifth (22%) who see the state as a disappointment.

The American Project

Ahead of the 250th anniversary of the United States, most connected U.S. Jews surveyed (67%) consider the country a success story, with 45% seeing it as a major success and another 22% as a success. A breakdown by ideological orientation shows broad agreement in the conservative and centrist cohorts that it is a success (between 62% and 72% consider it a major success). The picture among the strong liberal cohort is far more qualified: Only 20% see the United States as a major success; a similar 22% see it as a disappointment or major disappointment; and an especially high 38% report mixed feelings.

A comparison of perceptions of the success of Israel and the United States reveals that the connected U.S. Jews surveyed tend to rate Israel’s success more favorably than the success of their own country. Whereas three-quarters (75%) see Israel as a success (57% as a major success), two-thirds (67%) regard the United States as a success (45% as a major success).

Midterm Congressional Elections

As summer approaches, the American political system is gearing up for the November midterm congressional elections, which are likely to be held close to Israel’s general elections. The election campaign is unfolding amid an intense public debate over U.S. military involvement in the Middle East and the economic implications of the Iran war. In a reality of deep political polarization, the election results are expected to limit the maneuvering room of the Trump administration in shaping future foreign policy, preserving strategic alliances, and dealing with the challenges of security and antisemitism, issues of great concern for the U.S. Jewish community.

Half of respondents say they expect to vote for a Democratic Party candidate (50%), compared with one-third (32%) who expect to vote for a Republican Party candidate. A Jewish Electorate Institute survey of U.S. Jews, released in mid-April, found that 74% said they would vote for Democrats, 22% for Republicans, and 4% were undecided. As expected, there is an almost complete correspondence between ideological orientation and voting intentions, with an overwhelming 89% of the strong liberal cohort intending to vote Democratic, while an overwhelming 90% majority of the strong conservative cohort intends to vote Republican. A negligible share of respondents does not intend to vote. The data further indicate high party loyalty: 91% of Trump voters intend to support a Republican congressional candidate, and 81% of Harris voters intend to vote for a Democratic candidate.

The data also show that “Israel” is an influential factor for connected Jews in determining their vote. A 58% majority of the respondent panel says that Israel will be either the most important factor or one of the most important factors in their decision. A quarter (25%) sees Israel as a somewhat important factor, while a sixth (17%) says that Israel is not an important consideration for them.

Among the ideologically conservative groups, Israel is perceived as a critical issue: 82% of the strong conservative and 88% of the leaning conservative cohorts say it is the most important factor or one of the most important factors, a view shared by 86% of Trump voters. By contrast, in the ideologically liberal cohorts, the importance of Israel in determining respondents’ votes is much lower: a third (31%) of the strong liberal cohort and fewer than half of Harris voters (41%) see Israel as a central factor in their vote. In fact, one-third (36%) of strong liberal respondents said that Israel will not be very important or not at all important to them in casting their ballots.

A cross-tabulation of the last two questions reveals a direct and significant correlation between the weight respondents assign to Israel and the party for which they will vote in the midterms. Among respondents who define Israel as “the most important factor” in deciding for whom to vote, there is an overwhelming preference for a Republican (68% versus only 12% for a Democrat). This trend persists among those who see Israel as “one of the most important factors,” where the Republican Party leads with 44% support versus 33% for the Democratic Party. The data show, not for the first time, that at the present moment Jewish voters who place ties with Israel at the top of their priorities are more likely to see the Republican Party as their preferred political home.

Similarly, as the importance of Israel declines among voters’ considerations, support for Democratic candidates rises sharply. Among respondents who believe that Israel is a “somewhat important” factor, three-quarters (77%) intend to vote Democratic, and this share rises to 88% among those for whom Israel is “not very important,” and to 92% among those for whom it is “not at all important.” In other words, the Jewish-Republican voting bloc is influenced to a large extent by attachment to Israel, whereas the Jewish-Democratic bloc is composed mostly of those who consider Israel a secondary priority compared with other issues on the agenda.

Optimism about the Future

This month, we once again examined respondents’ degree of optimism regarding the future of their country, the future of Jews in their country, and the future of the State of Israel. We compared these data with data from identical questions asked last year. Optimism and pessimism were rated on a scale from minus 5 (pessimism) to plus 5 (optimism), and the results presented here are the respondents’ average optimism scores on each of the questions.

Among the connected U.S. Jews surveyed, there is greater optimism regarding the future of the State of Israel (1.59) than regarding the future of the United States (0.76) or the future of the U.S. Jewish community (-0.03). The slight pessimism regarding the future of American Jewry is notable.

The ideological breakdown shows that whereas conservatives express substantial confidence in the future (especially regarding Israel, with an average of 3.94), liberals present a much gloomier picture. The strong liberal cohort is the only one that reports pessimism on all three measures, including an unusual negative score regarding Israel’s future (-0.67).

A denominational breakdown shows that Israel serves as an anchor of optimism for all groups, but this is especially true among Modern Orthodox and Haredi respondents (3.54). The Reform cohort is the only one with some degree of optimism regarding the future of U.S. Jewry (0.37), whereas respondents from the other denominational cohorts tend toward pessimism or neutrality.

There appears to be some increase in the level of optimism among U.S. Jews on all measures compared with last year. The largest change was recorded with respect to the future of the United States, which rose from a pessimistic level of -0.6 to an optimistic score of 0.76, meaning an uptick of 1.4 points. At the same time, optimism regarding Israel’s future reached 1.59, the highest figure since we initiated this metric in February 2025. Nevertheless, the data indicate that the future of U.S. Jews remains the most worrying and least stable issue for respondents. Despite a slight rise of 0.3 points over the past year, the score remains on the threshold of pessimism (-0.03).

The same question was asked of Canadian and UK respondents. The findings show that, similar to the trend observed in the United States, the State of Israel is perceived as an anchor of optimism (2.40 in Canada and 1.71 in the UK). At the same time, unlike in the United States, where respondents are relatively optimistic about the future of their own country (0.76), Canadian and UK respondents are pessimistic about their respective countries’ futures (-0.85 in Canada, and an especially low score of -1.52 in the UK).

The comparison of the three countries highlights the sense of insecurity felt by Canadian and UK respondents relative to their U.S. counterparts. The Canadian Jews surveyed are the most optimistic with respect to Israel’s future (2.40).

Engagement in Jewish Activity

As part of another comparison with last year, this month we examined the extent of the respondent panel’s involvement in Jewish activity. The share of respondents reporting increased activity was similar to last year, but it remains to be seen whether this reported increase by such a large group indeed indicates that growing numbers of individual Jews are participating in Jewish activity (25% this year versus 26% last year). The main change in the data is in the group reporting a level of activity “the same as before” (70% versus 59%).

A denominational breakdown shows that most respondents across all cohorts report no change in their level of involvement in recent months. Especially notable are Haredi respondents, among whom 85% report the same level of activity as before, and only 8% report an increase (this, of course, stems from the intensity of communal life in Haredi society, which means that there is little room for an increase).

At the same time, suggesting a possible internal contradiction in the data, responses to another question show a significant decline this year in the reported levels of involvement and Jewish connectedness among U.S. Jews relative to last year’s data. Whereas last year the average practical involvement stood at 8.28 (on a question asking respondents to place their level of activity on a scale from 0 to 10), this year it fell to 7.15. A similar trend was recorded in the degree to which Jews want to be more involved, which fell from 8.95 to 7.86. This question raises the possibility that after the rise in communal involvement that characterized the period following the outbreak of the war in October 2023, a stabilization occurred at lower levels, perhaps indicating a return to routine or some erosion in the intensity of communal connection over time.

Despite the downward trend, the data show that in all religious streams there is a consistent “aspiration gap” – respondents express a desire to be more involved than they actually are. This gap is especially pronounced among Reform respondents: the aspiration for involvement (7.70) is higher than actual involvement (6.58). By contrast, Haredi respondents (a small number of survey participants) display the highest level of involvement, with an average of 9.50, and the smallest gap between actual and aspirational involvement. Unaffiliated respondents present the lowest levels of connectedness in the table, and only a small actual/aspirational gap is recorded, indicating a limited desire to strengthen involvement (6.61 versus 6.24), which points to a small, unrealized potential for communal connection in this group.

Survey Data and Implications

This report is based on a survey of 806 Jews registered for JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People panel. Broadly speaking, the survey reflects the views of “connected” American Jews – that is, those with a relatively strong connection to the Jewish community, and/or to Israel, and/or to Jewish identity. The survey also included 48 participants in the UK and 108 in Canada. Unless otherwise noted, the results reflect the views of U.S. respondents only. JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People Index surveys are conducted by JPPI fellows Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepkov, with assistance from Yael Levinovsky. Statistical supervision: Prof. David Steinberg.

This table includes data on the U.S. survey respondents for April 2026.

The post Voice of the Jewish People Index – April 2026: Support for the war in Iran has eroded first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

“We need better hasbara.”

“We need to reach out to Democrats.”

“We need to cultivate ties with the Latino community.”

These are the kinds of ideas I have been hearing repeatedly in recent weeks from Israelis and American Jews who are alarmed by the sharp decline in support for Israel in the United States. The concern is real and justified, since what we are seeing is a historic shift that may never return to the way things once were.

The vote in the Senate last week, for example, when 40 out of 47 Democratic senators supported a resolution to block the sale of bulldozers to Israel, and 36 backed a similar move on bombs, was not an outlier. It was a reflection of a broader trend that has been building for years and is now prevalent on both sides of the aisle.

A Pew Research Center survey published earlier this month found that 60% of American adults now hold an unfavorable view of Israel, including the share of Republicans, which has surged since last year, driven by those under 50.

Gallup data published just before the war showed how, for the first time in a quarter of a century, more Americans said they sympathized with Palestinians than with Israelis.

What makes this moment particularly striking, though, is the timing. The decline comes after the most vivid illustration of the strength and importance of the US-Israel alliance – the war against Iran. For 40 days, the US and Israeli militaries operated in a way never seen before. Intelligence was shared in real time, missions were planned in joint command centers, and aircraft flew side by side over hostile territory.

And yet, back in the United States, public sentiment was moving in the opposite direction.

In Israel, there is a tendency to dismiss this as the result of two external problems: growing antisemitism and a generational shift within the US that is independent of Israel’s actions. Both are partially true. Antisemitism is rising, and younger Americans lack the historical or emotional connection to Israel held by their parents. In addition, there is also a broad turn inward in American politics – from “America First” on the Right to skepticism of foreign alliances on the Left.

But these explanations are also an escape. They let us point a finger outward instead of asking the more uncomfortable question: What needs to change here in Israel?

And it is time we recognize that there is a blatant contradiction in how we talk about and treat the alliance with the US. When Washington supports us, we celebrate our diplomatic genius, yet when friction arises, we dismiss it as betrayal. This binary way of thinking – is the president for us or against us – misses the complexity of how modern statecraft actually functions, and it treats the alliance as one-dimensional.

We see this lack of nuance repeatedly.

When former US president Joe Biden visited Israel in the aftermath of October 7 and authorized a massive military resupply, deploying aircraft carriers to the region, and issuing his now-famous “don’t” warning, he was praised across the Israeli political spectrum. But when disagreements later emerged, and he delayed the delivery of certain munitions, the narrative flipped overnight. Suddenly, he was portrayed as hostile to Israel.

The same pattern is emerging with Donald Trump. During the kinetic phase of the war against Iran, he was viewed by many on the Israeli right as strongly supportive. Now, as he extends the ceasefire with Iran, even the Right in Israel is starting to have doubts.

This transactional mindset distracts us from the more important question: How is our own behavior eroding our most vital asset?

Take, for example, the issue of Jewish extremism in the West Bank. Everyone in Israel understands that it exists, even if it’s a tiny fringe minority. Yet, it resonates in the United States across both parties. We know the violence is wrong, we know it is damaging, and yet the government refuses to do anything to stop it.

Judicial reform was another example. While I personally supported many of the ideas, the way the reforms were being advanced expanded an already-existing rift between Israel and progressive Americans. People felt the ground shifting under the moral fabric that has sustained this alliance since the beginning, but despite warnings, the government refused to pause.

Another example was the refusal to outline a coherent political vision for Gaza during the war. For two years, Israel refused to discuss how it wanted the war to end and who it wanted to control Gaza the day after. The result was a perception that Israel was fighting just to fight and destroying just for the purpose of destroying without any other objective. That perception was further reinforced when Israeli ministers made extreme or irresponsible statements, whether about annexation or even the use of nuclear weapons.

Israels actions shape how the country is viewed

What we need to realize is that none of this exists in a vacuum. It shapes how Israel is viewed, how its actions are interpreted, and ultimately how people feel about the state. When they see an Israel that is embroiled in conflict for more than two years without end, even if it is justified, they distance themselves. A country at war is not one the average American wants to be identified with.

The hard truth is that while Israelis are experts in the tactics of war, they are strategically illiterate regarding the United States. Because if they were not, they would behave differently. If Israelis truly understood the value of the alliance, they would demand a different kind of behavior from their leaders. They would demand disciplined messaging, careful policies, and an awareness that our actions in Jerusalem have immediate consequences in Washington.

This is not just about military aid, even though that remains a critical issue. It is about something deeper – the strategic and moral framework at the foundation of Israel’s most important relationship.

In Washington, organizations like the American Israel Public Affairs Committee have spent decades educating lawmakers and shaping understanding of the alliance. It is time to build an AIPAC-style organization aimed at educating Israeli leaders and the public about the importance of this relationship, how it works, and how fragile it is when it is taken for granted.

Because the reality is simple: the alliance is not just defined in Washington. It is also shaped in Jerusalem, and if we want it to last, the work needs to start here.

Published in the Jerusalem Post

The post Israel must stop pretending bond with US is ‘unbreakable’ before it’s too late first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

To download the full study, click here.

A new study by JPPI based on advanced artificial-intelligence analysis, points to a systematic pattern of exceptional treatment by UN Secretary-General António Guterres toward the State of Israel, both in the volume of his statements and in their tone, even though his role requires fairness and neutrality toward all countries.

The study, conducted by analysts at JPPI’s Diane and Guilford Glazer Information Center, examined more than 1,100 official statements made by the Portuguese UN Secretary-General since he assumed office in January 2017 through April 2026. These included statements delivered to journalists or published on the UN website. The analysis compared references to Israel with references to a selected group of other countries accused of human-rights violations, including Iran, China, Russia, North Korea, and Qatar.

The analysis included both a quantitative measurement of the scope of the references and a sentiment analysis of the tone of the statements, using advanced AI-based tools.

The data shows that Israel is the country mentioned most frequently in statements by the UN Secretary-General, by a significant margin over the other countries examined. The volume of references to Israel is higher even than that of major countries such as Russia, and nearly three times higher than the number of references to Iran.

The sentiment analysis yielded similarly stark findings: more than half of the statements about Israel were negative, the highest share among all countries examined. By contrast, statements about countries such as Iran were mostly neutral, with positive references outnumbering negative ones.

Negative statements about China were de minimis, despite criticism by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and other human rights organizations of his relative silence on China’s alleged persecution of its Uyghur minority. Qatar received particularly favorable treatment. Even when criticism was directed at Russia, its scope was narrower than the criticism directed at Israel.

The study also identifies a clear trend of an intensifying negative tone toward Israel over the course of the UN Secretary-General’s tenure, especially in recent years.

Guterres has, on several occasions, expressed support for Israel’s right to exist and to security; he condemned the October 7 attack, met with families of hostages, and called for their release. Yet a qualitative analysis of the full body of his statements reinforces the numerical findings and points to a consistent pattern: even when the UN Secretary-General condemns terrorism against Israel, the emphasis quickly shifts to criticism of Israeli policy.

Similarly, even when Israel’s right to security is acknowledged, that recognition is not expressed with the same force as the criticism directed at Israel.

For example, in a statement on October 13, 2023, just days after the Hamas attack, in which 1200 Israelis were murdered and another 250 abducted, the UN Secretary-General opened with the assertion: “The situation in Gaza has reached a dangerous new low.”

Although the Secretary-General did condemn the Hamas onslaught, he devoted relatively brief attention to it, while the bulk of his remarks focused on sharp criticism of Israel, including the evacuation of civilians in Gaza and claims that Gaza’s health system had been harmed:

“Moving more than one million people across a densely populated warzone to a place with no food, water, or accommodation, when the entire territory is under siege, is extremely dangerous — and in some cases, simply not possible.”

In a January 2024 statement, he described Israel’s Gaza operations as the “most intensely destructive campaign” since he became Secretary-General: “The relentless Israeli bombardment… is the most intensely destructive campaign waged since I became Secretary-General.”

In another statement, from August 2025, he directly accused Israel of harming civilians, medical teams, and journalists, describing its actions as “horrors,” while making only minimal reference to the hostages and the terrorism that led to the war:

“One attack was followed by another — killing civilians, including medical personnel and journalists who were carrying out their essential work. All with the world watching. I know so many of the reporters here — along with us — have lost dear colleagues. These attacks are part of an endless catalogue of horrors.”

is of hundreds of official statements. The picture that emerges is one of a clear gap between the way the UN Secretary-General treats Israel and the way he treats other countries”, said JPPI President Prof. Yedidia Stern.

“The role of the UN Secretary-General requires balance, caution, and consistency of standards, as someone who acts on behalf of, and for, the entire international community. When the State of Israel — a country ranked fairly high in global democracy indices published by expert international organizations — is exposed to such extreme criticism at such an exceptional scale, while totalitarian states with a documented record of systematic violations of their own citizens’ human rights receive more moderate treatment, a fundamental question arises regarding Guterres’s performance.

“Our study does not seek to reject criticism of Israel, but rather to point out the double standard applied by a central figure in the international community toward the nation-state of the Jewish people. We recommend that Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs distribute these findings among the representatives of UN member states.”

Published on Ynet

The post AI study: UN chief singles out Israel for harsher treatment than Iran, China, Russia first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Additional Findings

• There has been a decline in the public’s overall sense of victory since the start of Operation Roaring Lion.
• A majority believes that if a U.S.-Iran agreement is reached that does not meet Israel’s objectives, the fighting should be halted.
• The achievements of the 12-day June 2025 war are perceived less positively than before.
• The achievements of the Lebanon campaign in fall 2024 are perceived less positively than before.
• Most Israelis believe that additional rounds of fighting will be required in Iran, Lebanon, and Gaza.
• Most Israelis say violence by Jews against Palestinians in Judea and Samaria (West Bank) must be confronted.
• Most Israelis are dissatisfied with the 2026 budget.
• Surging support for additional funding for the rehabilitation of the North and South, with a marked preference for cuts to the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) sector.
• Election priorities: on the center-left, replacing the government; on the right, judicial reform.
• Only a quarter of Israelis are satisfied with the range of political options ahead of the upcoming elections.
• The prevailing perception of the main difference among candidates for prime minister: “wisdom” (right) and “caring” (center-left).
• Differences in perceptions of candidates’ positions are most pronounced on religion and state issues, less so on security and the economy.

To download the PDF file, click here.

The Iran War

This April survey was conducted before Passover, in the midst of the war with Iran, alongside a sharp escalation on the northern front in Lebanon. After four months of relative calm – beginning with the ceasefire in Gaza and the return of all hostages – Israel returned to a state of war. This round of fighting, Operation Roaring Lion, lasted 40 days until the United States and Iran announced their acceptance of a Pakistan-brokered ceasefire. The “Islamabad Agreement” stipulated a two-week ceasefire during which negotiations for a long-term cessation of hostilities would be held. In parallel with the calm on the Iranian front, the fighting with Hezbollah continued in Lebanon.

This month saw a decline in optimism about the effect of the Iran war on the Middle East. Half of Israelis (53%) believe the situation after the war will improve in the long term (22% are certain and 31% think so). At the same time, 28% are unsure, and 13% think the situation will worsen (9% think so and 4% are certain). Among Jewish Israelis, optimism is slightly higher: 58% anticipate positive change, 29% are unsure, and 10% foresee a worsening. Among Arab Israelis, 33% anticipate positive change, 24% are unsure, and 28% believe the situation will worsen.

Compared with last month, the survey points to a weakening belief that the current war will improve the situation in the Middle East over the long term. The share of Israelis who are certain that the situation will improve fell from a third (31%) to a fifth (22%), while the share who are unsure rose from a fifth (18%) to a quarter (28%). This weakening was recorded only among Jewish Israelis, where the figure fell from 75% to 58%. Among Arab Israelis, by contrast, there was a slight increase in the expectation of positive change, from a quarter (27%) to a third (33%).

Forty-three percent of Israelis believe that, once the war ends, the situation in Iran will not have changed enough to prevent another war. A similar share (44%) says it is too early to tell. Only 10% think that no additional war with Iran will be required. This finding is broadly consistent with the shift in recent weeks in Israelis’ views of the war’s possible effect on the Middle East.

Twenty-two percent of Arab Israelis believe that Israel will not need to return to fighting Iran after the current war. This share is significantly higher than the share of Jewish Israelis who think so (10%). Broken down by ideological orientation (Jewish Israelis only), center and center-left respondents tend to believe that Israel will need to fight again (50% and 65%, respectively). The share is lower (32%) on the right, but most respondents (51%) say it is too early to know. In none of the ideological groups does the share who believe Israel will not need to return to fighting Iran after the current war exceed one-fifth.

This month, we asked respondents what realistic objective Israel should continue fighting for until it is achieved. Thirty-four percent of respondents think the removal of all fissile nuclear material from Iran is the ultimate objective, followed by regime change (28%) and the maximum weakening of Iran’s military capability (22%). Alongside these responses, 10% of Israelis believe the current war has already run its course. Among Arab Israelis, 17% support regime change, 27% support the removal of nuclear material, and 17% support military weakening. A higher share of Arab Israelis (19%) believes the war has run its course than their Jewish counterparts, and 20% do not know.

Broken down by ideological orientation (Jewish Israelis only), regime change is the leading objective on the right (44%), while there is a clear preference for removing the nuclear material among center-right and centrist respondents (42% and 41%, respectively). There is a broader distribution among the center-left: military weakening (27%), nuclear material (32%), and the view that the war has run its course (24%). On the left, the view that the war has run its course is especially prominent (57%). In other words, the farther left one moves along the ideological spectrum, the lower the support for continuing the fighting to achieve broad objectives and the stronger the tendency to see the war as having already run its course.

Following the question about war aims, we asked respondents what they think Israel should do if the United States and Iran reach an agreement to end the war without achieving the objective they had identified. This question takes on an acute relevance in light of recent events, as it is possible that the current ceasefire will lead to a long-term agreement between the U.S. and Iran to end the war, thus realizing the scenario described in the question. Half of Israelis (48%) think that in such a case, Israel should stop and wait for further developments. Only a minority supports continued independent fighting – a fifth (19%) favors continuing the war even without President Trump’s support, and another fifth (22%) favors continuing only if he accepts it. Among Jewish Israelis, the tendency to condition continued fighting on American approval is somewhat stronger (25%), whereas among Arab Israelis, the preference for stopping and waiting is more robust (53%), alongside a relatively high share (19%) who did not know.

Here, too, substantial gaps were found between ideological cohorts. On the right, there is a strong willingness to continue fighting: 35% support doing so even without approval, 26% only with approval, and 30% prefer stopping if there is a U.S.-Iran agreement without the Israeli war aim having been achieved. The opposite approach becomes stronger as one moves toward the center and the left: half (54%) of those who self-identify as centrist favor stopping, and the majorities become even more substantial among the center-left and left (69% and 74%, respectively). The center-right also leans toward stopping (43%), but with significant weight given to continued fighting in coordination with the United States (34%).

The difficulty of achieving the objectives hinted at the beginning of the campaign, likely requiring another one, appears to have eroded Israelis’ sense of achievement looking back at the June 2025 campaign, Operation Rising Lion. Four in ten Israelis (38%) now say it achieved less than they had previously thought. Forty-two percent say that their perception of the results of Rising Lion was about what it had been, and 13% think the results were better than they had previously thought. This is a significant change relative to four months ago, when we asked the same question half a year after the war. Since December 2025, the share of Israelis who think the war results were better than they had previously thought declined, and the share who think the war results were worse than they had thought increased by ten percentage points. The share who think the results of “Rising Lion” remained unchanged since last December also rose by ten percentage points.

The War in Lebanon

In recent weeks, there has been a sharp escalation of fighting with Hezbollah on the northern front. The IDF has expanded targeted ground activity in southern Lebanon in an effort to push Hezbollah forces north of the Litani River and destroy the organization’s underground infrastructure. Hezbollah, for its part, has responded with drones and extensive rocket fire, targeting communities along the border with Lebanon and into central Israel. Residents of the North, who only a year ago returned to their homes after a year and a half as evacuees, are once again coping with heavy fighting, and some have again left their homes voluntarily.

A majority of Israelis (56%) believe that the current campaign in Lebanon will not be the last, with just 12% thinking otherwise and 32% saying it is too early to tell. Among Jewish Israelis, this pessimistic assessment is even more pronounced, with 58% saying that renewed fighting on the northern front will be required and only 9% believing it will not. Half of Arab Israelis (50%) believe additional fighting will be required, compared with 21% who think it will not, and 29% who say it is too early to know.

Broken down by ideological orientation (Jewish Israelis only), the expectation that renewed fighting will be required increases as one moves leftward along the spectrum: 61% among the center-right, 63% among centrists, 78% among the center-left, and 65% among the left. The share is lower on the right (46%), which also includes a relatively high share who believe it is too early to know (38%).

Similar to our solicitation of retrospective assessments of the achievements of the June 2025 campaign against Iran, we examined how Israelis now perceive the achievements of the previous campaign in Lebanon, a year and a half ago. Only 10% of Israelis believe the achievements were better than they had thought in the past, while 38% say they were in line with previous assessments, and 44% say they were worse than they had previously believed. Among Arab Israelis, the share who think the achievements were worse than they had thought is lower (36%), alongside a higher share (17%) who now assess the achievements of the previous war in Lebanon more positively than they had in the past.

A majority (56%) of Jewish Israelis who self-identify as right-wing now assess the achievements of the war on the northern front as they had in the past, compared with 29% who view the achievements as less favorable than they had previously thought, and 11% who now view the achievements of the previous war with Lebanon more positively. Among centrist and left-wing Jewish Israelis, the picture is more critical: 58% of centrists, 69% among the center-left, and 70% on the left believe the achievements were worse than they had once thought. Taken together with the findings from the previous question, the data produces a consistent picture: a sense of only partial achievement translates into a broad expectation that the conflict is not over and may resume in the future. In other words, doubt about past success leads to the assessment that instability will continue.

The War in Gaza

When identical questions are asked about the Gaza front, a 67% majority of the Israeli public believes that Israel will need to return to fighting there after the current war in Iran and Lebanon. By contrast, 11% think it will not, and 22% say it is too early to know. Among Jewish Israelis, the expectation that a return to fighting will be necessary is even clearer, with three-quarters (74%) anticipating renewed fighting and fewer than one-tenth (7%) believing it will not be necessary. Among Arab Israelis, the picture is different: 38% believe additional fighting will be required, 30% estimate that it will not, and 32% stress that it is too early to tell.

A breakdown by ideological orientation (Jewish Israelis only) shows broad agreement that Israel will need to return to fighting in Gaza. In every cohort, a majority estimates that additional fighting will be required, but this majority is firmer among the right than among the left. Accordingly, as one moves leftward along the ideological spectrum, the share who say it is too early to know rises from 16% on the right to 35% on the left. At bottom, there is a broad perception that the confrontations in the Gaza Strip have not ended and may resume once the current war in Iran and Lebanon concludes.

Trust in Leadership and Confidence in Victory

This month, JPPI’s Israeli Society Index found a decline among both Jews and Arabs on the general question of Israelis’ sense of victory in the war across all fronts. Whereas last month, with the beginning of the campaign in Iran, a majority of Israelis reported feeling that Israel was winning the war overall – the highest sense of victory recorded in the past year – this month saw a drop in confidence in victory – a return to the levels recorded six months ago. Among respondents in the two right-wing cohorts (center-right and right), most placed themselves at the higher levels of confidence in victory (4 or 5 out of 5), whereas among the centrist and left-wing cohorts (center-left and left), the mood is more pessimistic.

Following the peak of trust in the government recorded last month, with the outbreak of the Iran war, there has been a slight decline in Israelis’ level of trust in their government. A majority of the public (55%) reports not trusting the government, alongside 42% who do. Among Arab Israelis, the share of respondents who do not trust the government (63%) is higher than that of their Jewish counterparts (53%).

Broken down by ideological orientation (Jewish Israelis only), a majority in the right-wing cohorts (right-wing and center-right) trust the government (83% and 48%, respectively), whereas a majority of respondents in the center and left-wing cohorts do not trust the government. This majority grows as one moves leftward along the ideological spectrum.

A 79% majority of Israelis express trust in the IDF senior command (20% completely and 59% somewhat). Among Jewish Israelis, the figure is even higher, at 79%, while a 52% majority of Arab Israelis also express trust in the IDF senior command. Compared with last month, the share of Jews who trust the IDF senior command has declined. The March survey was conducted a few days after the start of the Iran war and its successful opening strikes, in which the supreme leader and other senior Iranian leaders were killed. It is possible that the early successes generated a temporary increase that dissipated within a few weeks.

U.S.-Israel Relations

The ongoing cooperation between the United States and Israel in the Iran war is unprecedented. Still, this month saw a decline in Israelis’ trust that President Trump will “do the right thing” regarding U.S.-Israel relations. This may reflect the fact that the survey was conducted during a period in which there were several reports of Trump’s desire to bring the war to a rapid end. Nineteen percent say they have “a great deal of trust” in the president on this issue, 51% place some trust in him, and 26% say they have no trust that he will do the right thing regarding relations between the two countries. Despite a decline relative to last month, there is still a higher level of trust in him than recorded in the aftermath of the June 2025 12-day campaign. At that time, trust in the U.S. president stood at 64% (July 25), whereas this month it is 70%. The main difference lies in the share of respondents reporting “some trust” in Trump – 51% this month, compared with 45% in the survey conducted last July.

Trust that Trump will act appropriately in the context of U.S.-Israel relations is especially high among Jewish Israelis: 75% express trust in the president, while 26% say they have no trust in him. Among Arab Israelis, by contrast, the level of trust is much lower – 49%, with 43% reporting that they do not trust him. Broken down by ideological orientation (Jewish Israelis only), the trust increases as one moves rightward along the ideological spectrum.

Among the right-wing cohort, the highest level of trust is recorded (36% a great deal and 55% some). Among center-right respondents, a large majority expresses some level of trust (80%). In the center, the level of trust is still high at 65%, but among center-left and left-wing respondents, a different picture emerges: 83% of left-wing respondents say they have no trust in Trump, and just 17% report some trust in him. Compared with last month, trust in Trump has decreased across ideological cohorts, with the sharpest drop among those who identify as right-wing. At the start of the current Iran war, the share expressing “a great deal of trust” in Trump stood at 60%; this month it is only 36%.

Violence in Judea and Samaria (West Bank)

In the past month, several violent incidents perpetrated by Jews against Arabs in Judea and Samaria (West Bank) made headlines. We asked respondents to address a public appeal issued last month by Major General Avi Bluth, who heads the IDF Central Command, to the leaders of the Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria. In his letter, Bluth wrote that a “violent group of lawbreakers is operating in the area in violation of the laws of the state, the values of the Jewish people, and the values on which Zionism is founded. These people are harming a Palestinian population that is not involved in terrorism… Beyond the fact that these actions are illegal and immoral, they constitute a real danger.” Respondents’ reactions to Bluth’s letter indicate that most of the Israeli public does not condone the violence, but they are not uniform in their views of its scope and significance.

Thirty percent of respondents believe that Bluth’s letter is an important warning and that community leaders should act against those involved in the violence. One-quarter (28%) believe that Bluth’s condemnation is too weak and argue that the IDF turns a blind eye to, and even assists, the rioters. By contrast, 10% of respondents claim that “these are not violent lawbreakers; they are pioneers who should be assisted.” Another quarter does not attach much importance to the phenomenon: 28% chose the response that such violence does exist, but is not significant, and that it would be better for the regional commander to focus on security tasks.

About half of the right-wing respondents (53%) believe that such violence indeed exists, but that “it is not a big deal, and it is more important that Bluth focus on security.” One-fifth (20%) of Jewish right-wing respondents believe that “these [the perpetrators] are pioneers who should be assisted.” That is, three in four right-wing respondents do not see the reported violence as a significant phenomenon that should be addressed with high priority. A breakdown by party affiliation is particularly striking: 36% of Otzma Yehudit voters say that “these are not violent lawbreakers; they are pioneers who should be assisted,” and 58% of them believe that the phenomenon of violence is marginal.

The head of the IDF Central Command sent the following letter to the leadership of the Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria (West Bank): “A violent group of lawbreakers is operating in Judea and Samaria without restraint, contrary to the laws of the state, the values of the Jewish people, and the values on which Zionism is based. These people are harming a Palestinian population that is not involved in terrorism… Beyond the fact that these actions are illegal and immoral, they constitute a real danger.” Which of the following comes closest to your view? (%)

The State Budget

At the time of data collection for April’s Israeli Society Index, the 2026 state budget was approved by the Knesset. On the night the budget passed, an additional ILS 800 million allocation for the Haredi community was unexpectedly approved. As was the case last year, a majority of Israelis (55%) say they are dissatisfied with the budget, while one-quarter (25%) say they are satisfied with it. One-fifth (19%) of the public did not know how to answer the question – a relatively high rate, recorded among both Jews and Arabs. The share of Jewish Israelis satisfied with the budget (27%) is higher than the share of Arab Israelis (17%). Compared with last year, when we asked the same question about the 2025 budget, satisfaction with the budget is slightly higher. That said, this figure might have been different had the survey been conducted after the full scope of the late-night transfer of additional funds to the Haredi sector became clear.

A breakdown by political camp shows sharp gaps in the level of satisfaction with the budget. On the right, satisfaction is relatively high, with 52% expressing satisfaction (20% very satisfied and 32% somewhat satisfied), alongside a minority expressing dissatisfaction (22%) and a relatively high share (26%) who did not know how to answer. By contrast, as one moves leftward along the political spectrum, satisfaction declines and criticism increases: among the center-right, 57% are dissatisfied (44% very dissatisfied), in the center, a clear 80% majority is dissatisfied (71% very dissatisfied); and among the center-left and the left there is almost no satisfaction, with 90% and 100%, respectively, expressing dissatisfaction. The findings point to deep political polarization around the budget, with support concentrated mainly on the right (though even there, it is only half of respondents), whereas the other camps show broad and unequivocal opposition.

In addition to Israelis’ satisfaction with the state budget, we also examined what they think the Knesset should have done in the budget but did not do or did not do enough. Respondents were offered 17 response options and asked to mark the three items they considered most important to add to or cut from the budget. Unlike last year, the most prominent demand is to add funds for the rehabilitation of the North and South (45% marked this item as one of their three priorities). This is followed by calls to cut funding for the Haredi sector (29%), cut coalition funds (28%), and reduce the number of government ministries (24%). Also notable is the desire to add benefits for regular-service soldiers and reservists (25%). Among Jewish Israelis, the demand for rehabilitation of the North and South is even stronger (52%), whereas among Arab Israelis, different demands stand out – chiefly tax cuts (41%), alongside support for additional funding earmarked for the Arab sector (21%).

Compared with last year’s budget, several central trends stand out: as noted, there was an increase in the demand for investment in the rehabilitation of the North and South (from 28% to 45% among the public overall, and from 31% to 52% among Jews), alongside a slight rise in the demand to strengthen security. By contrast, there was a decline in the demand to step up funding to fight crime (from 20% to 15%) and in calls to reduce the number of government ministries (from 32% to 24%). Demand for cuts in coalition funds also weakened somewhat, although it remains high. Among Arab Israelis, especially notable changes were recorded over last year: a sharp and surprising decline in demand for additional funding to fight crime (from 43% to 19%), alongside a decline in demand for tax cuts and a moderate increase in demand for investment in reconstruction and budget allocations for the Arab sector.

2026 Elections

The most important issue for Israelis in the upcoming elections is replacing the current government (31%), followed by judicial reform (22%). Security-related issues, such as defeating Hamas in Gaza (6%) and encouraging settlement in Judea and Samaria (2%) are emphasized less, while addressing crime (7%) and lowering the cost of living (9%) still rank high on the list of decisive issues. Among Jewish Israelis, replacing the government (34%) and judicial reform (27%) clearly lead the list. Among Arab Israelis, by contrast, the central issue is crime and violence (29%), followed by lowering the cost of living (27%) and replacing the current government (20%). Compared with responses recorded two months ago, two notable changes have occurred among Arab respondents: the share ranking “addressing crime and violence” as the most important issue in the upcoming elections fell from 48% to 29%, and the share ranking “replacing the current government” rose from 8% to 20%.

A breakdown by ideological orientation (Jewish Israelis only) shows that replacing the current government is the most important issue for most voters in the upcoming elections in the center, center-left, and left-wing cohorts, where it leads with shares of 53%, 88%, and 87%, respectively. On the right, by contrast, judicial reform carries relatively greater importance (51%). Among the center-right group, a wider dispersion of issues is evident: replacing the government leads (27%), followed by judicial reform (25%). Strengthening national unity (15%) and Haredi conscription (15%) also occupy meaningful places.

When considering the upcoming elections, a quarter of Israelis (24%) are satisfied with the existing parties and candidates, a third (34%) believe there are enough reasonable options, and another third (34%) expresses dissatisfaction with the existing options. Among Arab Israelis, dissatisfaction is higher (39%), and the share who are satisfied is lower (14%). The right-wing cohort has the highest share of respondents (41%) who are satisfied with the existing options. In the center and left-wing groups, by contrast, satisfaction levels are lower: 13% among centrists, 21% among center-left respondents, and 17% in the left-wing cohort.

Alongside examining Israelis’ satisfaction with the available options, we examined the differences that respondents think exist between the leading contenders for prime minister. The main difference Israelis attribute to the candidates concerns their level of wisdom and grasp of reality (34%), followed by differences in how much they care about the people and the state (24%). Ideological gaps are seen as less central (14%), as is acceptability across social groups (11%). One in ten Israelis (11%) believes there is no significant difference between the candidates. Among Arab Israelis, a relatively small share emphasizes differences in wisdom, alongside a higher share who believe there are ideological differences, as well as a higher share who believe there are no significant differences among the different candidates (19%).

A breakdown by ideological orientation (Jewish Israelis only) reveals sharp gaps in perceptions of the differences: on the right there is a clear emphasis on wisdom and grasp of reality (62%), while in the center and center-left the claim that the main gap concerns how much the candidates care about the people and the state is especially prominent (37% and 53%, respectively). This claim also recurs when responses are examined by party affiliation. For example, 74% of Likud voters cited “wisdom and grasp of reality” as the main difference between the candidates for prime minister, while among supporters of Naftali Bennett or Gadi Eisenkot, the most prominent response is “how much they care about the people and the state” (48% and 42%, respectively).

One-third (30%) of the Israeli public believes there are significant differences on security issues among the leading contenders for prime minister; 33% see some differences, and another 31% believe that there are hardly any differences or no differences at all. Among Jewish Israelis, a larger majority identify either large or some differences, and the share who did not know how to answer is negligible. Among Arab Israelis, by contrast, only half identify differences (25% large and 25% some), while a third (30%) believe there are no differences or hardly any, and a fifth (21%) did not know how to answer.

Among the right-wing cohorts (right and center-right) there is a clear perception of substantial gaps, with a majority (53%) identifying large differences and another third (33%) seeing some differences. As one moves leftward along the ideological spectrum, this perception diminishes: in the center, only an eighth (12%) see large differences; on the left, the share rises slightly to a sixth (17%). Among the center-left and the left-wing cohorts, the feeling that the differences are small or almost nonexistent intensifies (48% and 61%, respectively). In other words, respondents in the right-wing cohorts tend to see substantive differences between the candidates on security, whereas in the center and left-wing cohorts, the tendency is to see their positions as more similar.

By voting intention in the upcoming elections, half (46%) of Religious Zionism supporters, and majorities of United Torah Judaism voters (56%), Likud voters (57%), and Otzma Yehudit voters (78%), believe there are large differences in positions between the leading contenders for prime minister. By contrast, only 19% of Bennett supporters, 11% of Yesh Atid supporters, 11% of Yisrael Beiteinu supporters, 8% of Eisenkot supporters, and 7% of The Democrats supporters believe so.

On economic issues, more moderate differences are found in how the candidates for prime minister are perceived: 27% believe there are large differences, 38% see some differences, and 24% see hardly any differences or no differences at all. Among Arab Israelis, a somewhat different picture is evident: although a majority still identify differences (29% large and 32% some), a higher share of respondents (20%) did not know how to answer this question.

Variation is also evident according to ideological orientation (Jewish Israelis only), though it is less pronounced than on security issues. At the ideological extremes, half of the respondents believe there are some differences in positions on economic issues, compared with lower shares in the center groups. As one moves along the ideological spectrum from right to left, the share who think there are hardly any differences between the candidates increases. Interestingly, the highest share who believe there are large differences in positions on economic issues is found in the center-left cohort.

With respect to religion and state issues, half of Israelis (51%) believe there are large differences in positions between the candidates, and a quarter (28%) identify some differences, meaning that roughly eight in ten see some degree of difference. Among Arab Israelis, the perception is less pronounced: a third (33%) identify large differences, a quarter (24%) see hardly any or no differences at all, and a fifth (18%) did not know how to answer this question. By ideological orientation (Jewish Israelis only), every group records a majority that sees large differences, with especially high shares at the extremes – on the right (60%) and on the left (57%).

Compared with the previous two issues (security and the economy), it is clear that religion and state matters are seen as more strongly differentiating the candidates. Whereas on security and economic issues, many tended to see moderate differences or even a similarity of positions, the public sees sharp and substantive gaps when it comes to issues of religion and state. The contrast is especially evident in the center and left groups, where, on the whole, respondents thought the differences vis-à-vis security were limited, while a clear majority of them identified large differences on religion and state matters.

The data indicates that the Israeli public perceives only a limited number of candidates as realistic contenders for prime minister, led by Benjamin Netanyahu (59%), followed by Naftali Bennett (42%) and Gadi Eisenkot (35%). The other candidates included in the question receive much lower levels of support as serious contenders.

On the right, there is near-total consensus around Netanyahu (89%), while Bennett and Eisenkot are viewed as realistic candidates at relatively lower rates than in the other groups. By contrast, in the center and center-left cohorts, Bennett and Eisenkot lead (71%-74% and 60%-64%, respectively), while Netanyahu receives lower shares viewing him as a realistic candidate for prime minister. On the left, a high share of voters view Netanyahu as a realistic candidate (65%), yet Bennett (87%) and Eisenkot (78%) are viewed as even more realistic.

Passover

Ahead of Passover and against the backdrop of the war, we examined how many Jewish Israelis in Israel chose to observe the holiday in a different format from usual. The data, collected before the holiday, shows that most Jews intended to participate in a Passover Seder this year, though often in a more limited format: 51% said they would celebrate the Seder as usual, 34% said they expected to participate in a smaller-than-usual Seder, and 12% thought that they would not participate at all. Examining this question by religiosity shows that the more religious respondents are, the greater the likelihood that they will hold the Seder as usual. Among Haredi (93%) and religious Jews (79%), very large majorities planned to hold a regular Seder, whereas among secular Jews, only a third (30%) said so, and many expected to hold a smaller Seder (43%) or to forgo it altogether (21%). The traditionalist groups lie in between, with a strong tendency toward participation, though often in a smaller format.

JPPI’s April 2026 Israeli Society Index was conducted March 26-29, 2026. Data collection was by theMadad.com internet panel (541 Jewish respondents), and Afkar Research (202 Arab respondents, approximately half online and half by telephone). The data was analyzed and weighted by voting pattern and religiosity to represent the views of Israel’s adult population. The JPPI Israeli Society Index is compiled by Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepkov, with research, production, and writing assistance from Yael Levinovsky. Prof. David Steinberg serves as statistical consultant.

The post JPPI Israeli Society Index for April 2026 first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Rather than confrontational rhetoric, he is attempting to build an alternative from within.

Spotify

The post Tamar Ish Shalom in conversation with Rabbi Menachem Bombach first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

There is a moment every Israeli traveler knows. You are standing in a European airport—at the check-in counter, passport control or in the security line—and you reach into your bag. The small navy-blue booklet comes out, its cover bearing a menorah flanked by two olive branches, with the words “State of Israel” printed in English and Hebrew, and something in the air changes. A glance. A pause that lasts half a second too long. An expression that requires no translation. You have not said a word. You have done nothing except exist with the wrong document in your hand.

Since Oct. 7, 2023, and through the cascade of war that followed, traveling through Europe with an Israeli passport has become an exercise in performed invisibility. You tuck the document face down. You slide it under your palm on the counter. You are now an expert at the swift, low transfer from pocket to official hand and back, minimizing the risk that anyone nearby might read the words on its cover.

Dimitry Kochenov, the “Passport Professor,” whose 2019 MIT Press book Citizenship dissects the global passport hierarchy with surgical precision, writes that a passport “carries borders in one’s pocket,” and is not a neutral identity document but a condensed statement of one’s place in the global hierarchy. He is right. What he could not have fully anticipated is that for the Israeli traveler in today’s Europe, the passport carries something more visceral than hierarchy. It has become a target.

Kochenov argues that passports judge people “by the color of their passport and nothing else,” making the document a practical measure of worth. The Israeli experience in European airports is that framework made flesh, a moment of eye contact, an awkward silence.

The check-in agent takes slightly longer than necessary, expressionless in a way that nonetheless conveys something dark. The security officer’s questions drift from the procedural into something more editorial. The fellow passenger in the boarding line registers the navy booklet in your hand and shifts their weight, almost imperceptibly, away. The duty-free cashier whose warmth, freely extended to the travelers before and after you, runs briefly cold. No accusation is made. None is needed. The passport has already spoken. It is the setting that makes all this so suffocating. Europe is not incidental here. This is the continent that spent centuries constructing the legal, theological and eventually biological architecture of Jewish exclusion. This is the continent whose 20th century produced the definitive proof of where that logic leads. And this is the continent that built its postwar identity around the vow of “never again.”

The airports of Berlin and Amsterdam, Paris and Brussels are not neutral transit zones. They are built on specific ground, and Israelis moving through them carry that history in their bodies, not just their passports. When a fellow passenger gives you that look across the departure lounge, you are not simply a citizen of an unpopular state. You are a Jew in Europe being scrutinized. The layers do not separate cleanly.

In Citizenship, Kochenov argues that for most of the world, citizenship is primarily a liability rather than an asset, a blood-based allocation of burdens and privileges that reproduces global inequality at every border crossing. The Israeli passport was never a mobility superpower, long excluded from Arab states and fraught with complications across parts of Asia. But within the Western world, particularly Europe, it has carried full visa-free access, indistinguishable in practical terms from any other Western passport. A gateway, not a gate. This is eroding.

The formal visa arrangements remain unchanged, but the human texture of crossing has shifted in ways no bilateral agreement captures. Hostility leaves no paper trail. A look costs nothing and proves nothing. And yet it accumulates, checkpoint by checkpoint, until a flight becomes something to get through rather than enjoy.

There is a word that goes missing in the respectable discourse about Israeli policy and its contested morality. That word is antisemitism. Not a criticism of a government. Not anger at a military operation. Not the entirely legitimate range of political positions one might hold about Gaza or the strikes on Iran. Antisemitism: the ancient, persistent, shape-shifting conviction that Jewish presence is itself the problem, that Jewish people carry their guilt collectively and wear it on their passports.

What is happening to Israeli travelers in European airports is not a political protest. Political protest is a banner unfurled outside an embassy. What is happening at the check-in counter is something older and more reflexive, updated for the current news cycle but drawing from the same well. Kochenov wrote about the global architecture of citizenship, not about Jews in Europe. Yet his words—citizenship systems as instruments of “complacency, hypocrisy and domination”—land with uncomfortable precision on this continent and in this moment.

Europe mourns its historical antisemitism in museums and memorial days, in plaques and pedagogy, in solemn ceremonies at the sites of its greatest crimes. It is considerably slower to recognize the live version standing in its passport control lines, clutching a navy-blue booklet embossed with a menorah, waiting to be waved through or held up, welcomed or made to feel like a problem that needs processing.

The Israeli traveler learns to expect it. Learns to minimize the exposure of that booklet, to read the room before reaching into your bag—to brace for the weight of judgment that arrives before a single word is exchanged. That is what it means to carry your place in the world in your pocket and know that in Europe, in 2026, that place is unwelcome.

The booklet has not changed. Europe has simply stopped pretending.

jns

The post The menorah at the European check-in counter first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.