The post The Essential Guide to Zionism, Anti-Zionism, Antisemitism and Jew-Hatred first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

A mixed bag. That is the best way to understand the way the war with Iran ended in a tenuous ceasefire on Wednesday.

It cannot yet be defined as a victory, as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wants Israelis to believe. But it is also not the colossal failure that Yair Lapid and Naftali Bennett have tried to portray.

The reason many Israelis are struggling to process this outcome is because they now find themselves in a reality they are not used to – one that has taken shape over the last two and a half years of war. Part of the problem is that politicians deceived the public into believing that everything could be achieved quickly and decisively through military force alone.

In Gaza, for example, we were promised “total victory” and that military pressure alone would destroy Hamas. Instead, after more than two and a half years, Hamas still controls 50% of Gaza and has not disarmed.

In Lebanon, we were told in November 2024 that Hezbollah had been dealt a devastating blow and that Israel had fundamentally changed the equation in the North. Yet now, Israel is again deep inside a Lebanese quagmire. Then came the 12 Day War with Iran in June, when Israelis were told that the nuclear program had been obliterated and that Israel had achieved a “victory for generations.” And yet eight months later, together with America, we launched a new war against Iran – one that would carry on for more than five weeks.

No total victory. No victory for generations. No permanent strategic transformation.

What we have instead is something more familiar to anyone who understands how wars are actually supposed to end: impressive military achievements on the battlefield, unprecedented degradation of the enemy’s capabilities, and then the handoff to diplomats to see whether those gains can be translated into an arrangement that preserves them.

Managing expectations in war

And that is the crux of the problem: expectation management.

For too long, Israelis were sold on the wrong expectation. Not because the military achievements were not real. They were. But because they were marketed as final and absolute. The problem is that this is never how war works, especially not in the Middle East and certainly not against an enemy like Iran. Military action can buy time and weaken, disrupt, and delay. But it does not, on its own, produce the victory.

And that is why, when we look at this war and ask what exactly was achieved, there is not yet a clear answer. At the most basic level, what Israel and the United States accomplished was extraordinary. In a historic joint military campaign, the two allies inflicted serious damage on Iran’s military and nuclear infrastructure. Missile stockpiles were hit. Production sites were struck. Launchers were destroyed. Naval assets were targeted. Air defenses were degraded. Scientists and commanders were eliminated.

FOR A regime that had spent decades building a powerful ring of fire around Israel and the Gulf, this was no small blow. But as impressive as the military campaign was – and it was impressive – the real question is what comes next. Because if there is one lesson Israelis should have learned over the last two and a half years, it is that wars are not judged only by what is destroyed on the battlefield.

They are judged by what is built, secured, or prevented afterward. They are judged by whether the diplomatic and strategic outcome locks in the military gains and prevents the enemy from simply rebuilding.

And that is why the next two weeks matter so much.

Will the military achievements now be translated into political success? Will Iran be forced to surrender its roughly 460 kg. of highly enriched uranium? Will there be real, verifiable limits on future missile development and production? Will the Strait of Hormuz be opened in a way that weakens one of Iran’s most powerful tools of coercion?

Then there is the question that hovered over this war from the very beginning: regime change. That did not happen.

But maybe it was never realistic to expect it to happen from the air. If change is going to come to Iran, it will have to come from within. It will have to come from the Iranian people themselves. Those are the questions that will determine whether this war was merely a military success – not small at all – or something more enduring.

So is this the moment to celebrate victory? No. But it is also not the moment to declare failure, as some politicians have been quick to do. What this is, first and foremost, is a moment to wait, to watch, and to let diplomacy play out. Only when these talks either succeed or fail will we know whether this war was just a remarkable military success or something more durable that can genuinely be called a victory.

There is, however, another point that is important to keep in mind – what we saw over the last five and a half weeks was, in many ways, the full implementation of the most important lesson of October 7.

Before that day, Israel knew that Hamas and Hezbollah had amassed massive arsenals and built extensive military infrastructure. It knew about the rockets, the tunnels, the launchers, the anti-tank missiles, the fighters, and the command structures. But Israel was trapped in a containment strategy focused on one central question: intent. That the enemy had weapons, we knew.

The question was whether they intended to use them. Did Hamas want war or did it prefer quiet? Was Hezbollah deterred or preparing to attack? In trying to assess intentions, Israel ended up deterring itself. It allowed the enemy’s capabilities to grow, but so long as they were not being used, everything was considered okay.

That was the disaster of October 7.

AFTER THE 12 Day War in June, when it became clear that Iran had accelerated missile production and was nearing a nuclear threshold, Israel decided not to get pulled back into the old trap.

It did not want to wait until Iran had fully restored its missile arsenal and accumulated enough military-grade uranium and then be forced to debate whether Tehran intended to use those capabilities or not. It acted first to deny the capabilities themselves.

That is important. It shows that Israel has learned from October 7 and revamped its defense doctrine. It is no longer willing to tolerate threats on its borders simply because the enemy has not yet pulled the trigger. But this lesson comes with a painful implication. It means that what happened over the last five and a half weeks may not be exceptional. It may be the model for the future.

Because as long as this regime remains in Tehran, it will rebuild. It will develop newer missiles. It will seek to reconstitute its nuclear program.

And any future supreme leader will draw the most obvious lesson from this war: had Iran possessed a nuclear weapon, this war likely would never have happened. That means the regime’s incentive to continue pursuing one has only grown stronger. Which means Israel’s job – ideally in partnership with the United States and other allies – will be to stop it again.

Will that happen in eight months? In 12? In 16? No one knows. But that possibility is precisely why honesty matters. It is why leaders need to speak to be transparent with the public and set realistic expectations. They need to explain what has been achieved, and they need to explain just as clearly what has not. They need to say that military success is real and important, but that it is not permanent and that deterrence today does not guarantee quiet tomorrow.

This is not easy to hear. It is not the kind of message politicians like to deliver and does not fit neatly into campaign slogans or speeches. But it is the truth.

And I suspect that most Israelis, after everything they have lived through over the last two and a half years, already understand it. They may not want to say it out loud and may still long for the old promises of quick wars, but deep down, they know the reality has changed. War is no longer a fleeting moment for this generation of Israelis. It is a recurring condition of life in this country. That is the reality.

What will help is clarity and honesty. And what will help most is understanding that this war, like the ones before it, should not be judged by slogans but by results – not just on the battlefield, but in the weeks and months that follow.

Published in the Jerusalem Post

The post Iran war is huge success for Israel – but it is not a victory, yet first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

The post Newsletter 31.3.26 first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Israel was born without a constitution and long resisted judicial supremacy. For decades, its legal system reflected the British parliamentary tradition, in which courts interpreted statutes but did not claim authority to override the political branches. Only in recent decades did Israel begin to emulate the American model of constitutionalized judicial power. This turn, championed largely by liberals, is likely to prove a grave mistake. American history shows that reliance on courts as engines of liberal reform is both normatively troubling and strategically self-defeating. The American past, in this sense, is a warning about Israel’s future.

Judicial supremacy was not inevitable in the United States. Unlike Israel, the United States adopted a written constitution at its founding, but that document did not clearly assign courts the final word when it came to interpreting it. Even Marbury v. Madison (the 1803 landmark case that established the principal of judicial review) did not inaugurate a regime of unchecked judicial power, and for much of the 19th century courts exercised restraint. It was only after Reconstruction, when Congress retreated from democratic transformation in the South, that judges began asserting sweeping authority – often to entrench laissez-faire economics and block social reform.

A 50-year mobilization against this phenomenon kicked off, culminating in Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal revolution against the Supreme Court’s obstructionism. Reformers focused not just on the invalidation of statute by judges, but also aggressive statutory interpretation that allowed judges to impose their own preferences. Judges “battered their way to supremacy with their double axes,” one reformer and judge himself, Learned Hand, explained. “One edge is the control over legislation by its unconstitutionality, the other is such free interpretation of statutes as suits their purposes.” Ultimately, after a long struggle, the judges were beaten. The experience showed that managing political change legally rather than politically is doomed to fail. Long after World War II, liberals like Associate Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter remained anxious that judges could never serve as the emissaries of liberalism, certainly not as a substitute for political victory.

Nor was the U.S. constitutional model influential globally until long into the 20th century, except among conservatives upset about the coming of a new kind of democracy grounded on universal suffrage, and eager to explore how to avoid its consequences. No wonder that parliamentary sovereignty without checks appealed far more for so long on a global scale, notably in the postcolonial states born after World War II — including, of course, in Israel for many decades. That changed.

The reason, paradoxically, was that liberals in the United States adopted antidemocratic techniques to lay the groundwork of a liberal and egalitarian society in the context of race relations. For a time, their tactics looked both successful and transformative. Those who protested not the ends but the means of advancing liberal values, such as Frankfurter, came to be seen as conservative rather than progressive. In retrospect, the strategy failed. The Warren Court – the U.S. Supreme Court of the 1950s and 1960s, led by Chief Justice Earl Warren – achieved iconic victories, but its accomplishments proved fragile. Desegregation stalled without political support, and reliance on courts generated backlash that fueled a long conservative campaign to capture the judiciary. By the time liberals secured landmark rulings on abortion and gay rights in the succeeding decades, the Supreme Court was already drifting rightward.

Liberals were slow to reckon with the consequences of their own strategy. Having encouraged judicial supremacy, they found themselves powerless when their opponents mastered the same tools. Now it is widely agreed that they made a profound mistake and some wish they could take it back. Liberal lion Laurence Tribe, a longtime Harvard law professor once known for his esteem for the court, wrote in 2023 that “The era of the Warren Court was the exception rather than the norm.” Americans, he wrote, must give up “an outdated conception of the Court until recently held by many” and “misplaced … reverence.”

Israel imported this model at precisely the wrong moment. Beginning in the 1990s, under Chief Justice Aharon Barak, the Israeli Supreme Court embraced a theory of judicial authority explicitly inspired by American constitutional practice. Its Supreme Court now wields powers exceeding even those of its American counterpart: striking down legislation based on vague principles, neutralizing laws through aggressive interpretation, invalidating executive decisions for “unreasonableness,” and supervising routine governance. The court also controls its own composition, suppresses dissent within the judiciary and has transformed the attorney general into a quasi-supervisory authority over elected officials. Together, these doctrines have produced an extraordinary concentration of unelected power.

This system rests on a fiction familiar from American debates: that judges stand above politics and merely apply neutral legal principles. They do not. Judges are not moral or policy experts, and empirical evidence confirms that their decisions track ideological commitments. Judicial reasoning often rationalizes preferred outcomes rather than neutrally discovering law. The most damaging feature of judicialized liberalism is not that courts make political decisions. It is that liberals insist – against all evidence – that they are not doing politics at all. They claim that the law itself already commands the outcomes they favor, and that judges merely “discover” these mandates through neutral interpretation. This pretense may reassure allies, but it convinces no opponents.

Political adversaries understand perfectly well what is happening. They see courts being used to entrench substantive moral and social commitments that failed to win democratic endorsement. They therefore respond not with legal argument, but with political counter-mobilization – aimed above all at capturing the judiciary itself. In this way, the denial that judging is political does not depoliticize conflict; it intensifies it, while shifting it into institutions ill-suited to contain it. Courts come to be viewed not as arbiters, but as instruments – venues for continuing political struggle by other means. Every appointment becomes a high-stakes ideological battle; every procedural rule a potential weapon. This happened in the United States and it is now happening in Israel. Worse still, judicial power acquired in the name of liberalism does not remain liberal for long. Once courts are openly understood as political prizes, there is no reason to expect they will remain in friendly hands. American liberals learned this lesson painfully when decades of reliance on judicial power culminated in a Supreme Court dominated by their ideological opponents – who then used the very tools liberals had legitimized to dismantle liberal achievements.

Judicialization was a choice, not a destiny. In both the United States and Israel, the era since the 1970s has seen the rise of the right, roughly marked by the electoral victories of Menachem Begin and Ronald Reagan. It was natural to experience depression about the prospect of regaining the prior near-hegemonic majorities associated with the Labor and Democratic parties that came near to making both Israel and the United States one-party states over several decades. The appeal was understandable – but the long-term costs were severe.

Courts can block legislation, but they cannot build coalitions or legitimacy. Liberalism advanced through judges narrows its ambitions and provokes counter-mobilization. Over time, it transforms from a governing vision into a defensive posture defined by fear of democracy. American history offers a different lesson. At key moments – Reconstruction and the New Deal – liberal elites ultimately chose democratic contestation over judicial insulation. The risks were real, but the alternative was worse. Democratic politics, not courts, produced durable liberal achievements.

Israeli liberals are not condemned to repeat the American mistake. Democratic politics remains open-ended: Coalitions can be rebuilt, arguments renewed, defeats reversed. Liberalism does not fail when it loses elections; it fails when it abandons the effort to win them.

The path forward runs not through courts, but through voters – and it is still available.

Published in Haaretz.

The post Israeli Liberals Must Understand: The Courts Will Not Save Democracy first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

• Within two weeks, a slight decline in support for the war against Iran.
• Rising concern that the war will damage Israel’s image in the United States and increase antisemitism.
• A worsening sense of threat to Israel’s image compared with the first week of the war.
• Half of the Jews surveyed say the war’s success depends on regime change in Iran.
• Trump and Netanyahu are rated more favorably on Iran than their overall leadership.
• Netanyahu’s leadership regarding Iran is rated more positively than Trump’s.
• Most of the Jews surveyed believe that Israeli-Palestinian peace is not possible in the foreseeable future.
• Even so, most think there is no substitute for a peace arrangement with the Palestinians.
• A majority believes the settlements are a burden on the IDF and harm Israel’s security.
• Unlike Jews in Israel, most think the State of Israel is Jewish “to the right extent.”
• Most respondents expect to host or attend a traditional Passover seder.
• Artificial intelligence: enthusiasm and curiosity among Jews in Israel, concern among Jews in the United States.

To download the PDF document, click here.

Survey Background: Data for the March Voice of the Jewish People Index was collected between March 13 and 17. Over the past month, several notable developments shaped both the selection of survey questions and the attitudes reflected in respondents’ answers. Chief among them was the war with Iran.
The joint U.S.-Israeli operation, which began on February 28, has included extensive coordinated airstrikes on nuclear facilities and missile launchers, alongside operations against the Tehran regime’s military infrastructure. The survey was conducted during the operation’s third week and includes comparisons with responses obtained in the war’s first week. At the same time, the Lebanese front became active again, leading the IDF to reinforce forces in Israel’s north and carry out ground operations. Preparations are now underway for a significant expansion of reserve mobilization. No evacuation of northern residents from their homes is planned.

Methodological Note: In recent months, we have also begun surveying Jews in Canada and the United Kingdom. In both countries, panels are taking shape and slowly growing. In February, approximately 60 participants from the United Kingdom and about 120 from Canada responded to the survey. Accordingly, the data on Jewish attitudes in these countries should be treated with caution. Whenever the report presents findings broken down by ideological orientation, religiosity, or voting behavior, it refers to the U.S. respondent panel only.

War with Iran

A majority of U.S. respondents (62%) support the decision to launch a war against Iran, while 31% oppose it. Support has declined slightly over the past two weeks. In the war’s first week, it stood at two-thirds of respondents (68%), with a quarter (26%) opposing it. Support for the war varies according to ideological orientation: the more politically conservative the respondent, the higher the level of support. Among strong liberal respondents, a majority opposes the move (64% versus 25% in support). Among those who self-identify as centrist, support is high (83%), and it rises further in the leaning conservative (95%) and strong conservative cohorts (100%). When broken down by vote choice in the 2024 presidential elections, support for the campaign is nearly unanimous among Trump voters (98%). By contrast, Harris voters are divided – half (49%) oppose the decision to go to war, while 40% support it. Among respondents in Canada and the United Kingdom, support for the war against Iran is even higher: three-quarters of respondents in both countries support the move, compared with one-sixth who oppose it.

Half of U.S. Jews (53%) believe that most Jews they know support the war, while one-fifth (20%) think that most Jews they know oppose it. One-quarter of participants (28%) did not know how to answer this question. In Canada and the United Kingdom, estimates of support among those in respondents’ surroundings were higher – in Canada, eight in ten respondents (77%) and in the United Kingdom, seven in ten (70%) believe that most Jews they know support the war in Iran.

Just as support for the war rises as one moves from liberal to conservative along the ideological spectrum, so too does the perception that one’s Jewish environment supports it. Among strong conservative respondents, eight in ten (81%) believe that most Jews they know support the war; among leaning conservatives, seven in ten (71%) say the same; and among those identifying with the center, two-thirds (65%) do so. By contrast, neither of the liberal cohorts has a majority who think that most in their Jewish environment support the war. Indeed, a quarter of leaning liberals report the opposite – that most Jews they know oppose the war in Iran; among strong liberals, that share reaches 42%. In addition, the proportion of respondents who did not know how to answer this question was high relative to other questions, between a sixth and a third in each ideological group.

In all three countries, we found a tendency to view the war in Iran as a success, at least to some extent. The dominant opinion in all three is that “the war is somewhat successful” (42% in the United States and Canada, and 49% in the United Kingdom). At the same time, the share viewing the war as “a major success” is around one-quarter of respondents (24%–28%), and negative assessments are lower: between 10% and 14% think it is a failure, and another 10%–13% see it as somewhat unsuccessful. It should be noted that this data was collected before President Trump announced that the U.S. had entered negotiations to end the war.

The more conservative the respondent, the stronger the tendency to see the war as a success, and especially as “a major success” (71% among the strong conservatives versus 4% among the strong liberals). By contrast, among the strong liberals, a third (35%) see the war as a failure, and an additional 22% consider it somewhat unsuccessful.

Nearly half of U.S. respondents (46%) believe the war will count as a success only if it leads to regime change in Iran. Twenty-one percent think it would be considered a success if it weakens Iran and likely prevents another war for at least five years; 16% if it significantly weakens Iran even if another war is needed in the coming years; and 13% believe the war is a failure regardless of the outcome. Among Canadian and UK respondents, the share who say the war will count as a success only if it brings regime change in Iran is even higher, at 59% and 52%, respectively.

A breakdown by ideological orientation reveals both variation and a degree of agreement around the demand for regime change as a condition for success. Among centrists, leaning conservatives, and strong conservatives, half or more support this formula. By contrast, among strong liberals, the picture is less clear: one-third (35%) see regime change as a condition for success, while another third (33%) believe the war will be a failure regardless of the outcome – a considerably higher share than in the other cohorts. By vote choice in 2024, most Trump voters (59%) would regard the war as a success only if it leads to regime change in Iran. Among Harris voters, the answers are less definitive: four in ten would say the war is a success only if the regime falls (39%), 21% if Iran is weakened enough to make another war unlikely in the coming years, 15% if it is significantly weakened even if another war is required, and 20% think the war will be a failure regardless of its outcome.

The War and Israel’s Image

The implications of the war with Iran for Israel’s image in the United States are not yet known. While the security coordination between the two countries may indicate closer relations, doubts about the necessity of entering the campaign may erode support for Israel among various population groups. Any criticism will likely compound existing reservations among some groups regarding Israel’s security policy over the past two years, fuel critical discourse, and deepen the divide in American public opinion regarding Israel.

A comparison between the results of a flash JPPI survey during the war’s first week and the present survey (three weeks in) shows growing concern about damage to Israel’s image. The share believing the war will harm Israel’s image rose over the past two weeks from 45% to 56%, and the share who think its image will remain unchanged declined from 32% to 27%. The share who sees a possibility of improvement remained low and even fell slightly (from 10% to 8%). At the same time, the share of respondents who did not know how to answer also declined (from 13% to 9%), suggesting increasing exposure and greater ability to form an opinion as the war progresses. Already in the war’s first week, respondents tended to think that its consequences for Israel would be negative, and that perception has only strengthened over time.

When the data is broken down by ideological orientation, the gaps are especially sharp. While most respondents in the two liberal groups and half of those self-identifying as centrists believe the war will harm Israel’s image in the United States, the prevailing view among the two conservative cohorts is that the war will not affect Israel’s image. In addition, uncertainty is higher among conservatives, which may indicate a less settled view than among liberals (or a reluctance to state that the war will have a harmful effect). By vote choice, while 77% of Harris voters believe the war will damage Israel’s image, only 22% of Trump voters think so. Forty-five percent of Trump voters believe the war will not affect Israel’s image, and another 19% think it will improve it.

Nearly half of UK and Canadian respondents estimate that the war will not change Israel’s image in their country (49% and 46%, respectively), while 41% believe it will damage it, and only a negligible share foresee improvement. In other words, in these countries, too, there is concern that the war will damage Israel’s image, although Israel’s starting point in these countries is significantly different, and the effect of such erosion on Israel’s overall position is less consequential.

A comparison between the first and third weeks of the war also shows a clear intensification of concern about rising antisemitism. The share who believe the war will increase antisemitism rose substantially from 52% to 65%, while the share who think there will be no change fell from 33% to 28%. At the same time, the proportion believing that antisemitism will decline remained negligible and even decreased, and the share of respondents who did not know how to answer this question fell from 11% to 6%.

A breakdown by denominational affiliation shows relatively broad agreement across cohorts that the war can be expected to lead to an increase in antisemitism, though with varying intensity. Among Reform Jews (74%) and Conservatives (65%), this is the dominant view. Among Modern Orthodox respondents, the share is lower (55%), alongside a relatively high share who think there will be no change (38%).

Most UK and Canadian respondents (63% and 65%, respectively) think the war will increase the level of antisemitism in their country, while about one-third (32% and 30%, respectively) believe it will have no impact on antisemitism levels. Only a negligible share thinks the war will reduce antisemitism. Again, it is worth recalling that the starting point in these countries differs from that of the United States.

Confidence in World Leaders

There is no consensus among U.S. respondents on the quality of Trump’s leadership vis-à-vis Iran: 46% rate him as a good leader (very or somewhat), and 48% regard him as a poor leader (somewhat or very); the rating receiving the largest share among the five options presented is “very poor leader” (37%). The share of neutral respondents and those who do not know is relatively low, indicating fairly settled views.

In a breakdown by ideological orientation and voting pattern, the polarization becomes even sharper. Among strong conservatives and leaning conservatives, Trump’s rating in the Iran context is high, whereas among strong liberals and leaning liberals, his leadership in this context is viewed negatively, with large majorities seeing him as “a very poor leader” (75% and 48%, respectively). The centrist cohort has a relatively positive view, with a majority rating Trump as a good leader (very or somewhat). The division is stark between Trump and Harris voters. Among 2024 Trump voters, 97% rate him as a good leader on Iran, whereas 60% of Harris voters see him as a very poor leader on this issue.

Among the U.S. respondent panel, the picture is mixed but leans somewhat positive in evaluating Prime Minister Netanyahu’s leadership vis-à-vis Iran: 54% rate him as a good leader (35% very good and 19% somewhat good), compared with 38% who regard him as a poor leader (12% somewhat poor and 26% very poor). When broken down by ideological orientation, the gap widens: among strong conservatives and leaning conservatives, support is nearly sweeping (up to 95% positive assessment), whereas among strong liberals, a majority see him as a very poor leader (59%). The center clearly leans positive (73%).

The picture in Canada and the United Kingdom is more positive and less polarized. Two-thirds (67%) of Canadian respondents rate Netanyahu positively and only a quarter (25%) negatively; in the United Kingdom, the positive rating is even higher (70%) and the negative rating relatively low (19%). In other words, while Netanyahu’s leadership remains hotly contested in the U.S., UK and Canadian respondents tend to view him as a successful leader with respect to Iran, with less pronounced gaps between camps.

In both the United Kingdom and Canada, respondents evaluate their respective national leaders negatively on the Iran issue. In the UK, a majority (68%) rate Keir Starmer’s handling of Iran negatively, with 44% seeing his leadership as very poor and another 24% as somewhat poor; only a small minority (18%) rate him positively. In Canada, the picture is similar but slightly less sharp. Mark Carney receives mainly negative evaluations on Iran (60%), though with a somewhat higher positive rating (26%) than in the United Kingdom.

For both Trump and Netanyahu, leadership ratings are higher when the issue is Iran than when respondents evaluate their leadership more generally. When we asked how respondents view their national leaders in general – rather than in the specific context of the war – a large majority of U.S. respondents rated Trump negatively: (52% see him as a very poor leader, 11% as somewhat poor, and only a small minority define him as a very good leader (15%) or a somewhat good leader (17%).

When the distribution is examined by political inclination, a clear trend emerges: the more liberal the stance, the more negative the assessment of Trump. Among the strong liberal respondents, there is almost no support, with 92% defining him as a very poor leader. By contrast, among leaning conservative and strong conservative respondents, the picture reverses. In these groups, large majorities evaluate Trump positively, especially among the strong conservatives, where 65% see him as a very good leader and another 31% as somewhat good. The center presents a more mixed position, though with a tendency toward a negative evaluation of his leadership.

One-third (35%) of U.S. panel participants see Netanyahu as a very good or somewhat good leader, while a majority (56%) rate him as somewhat poor or very poor. Among respondents in Canada and the United Kingdom, evaluations of Netanyahu are more positive (48% and 47%, respectively).

A breakdown by ideological orientation shows that strong liberals and leaning liberals rate Netanyahu as a very poor leader (77% and 55%, respectively). By contrast, leaning conservatives and strong conservatives give him a highly positive rating, with an outright majority of strong conservatives (66%) regarding him as a very good leader, while 41% of leaning conservatives do so. The centrist cohort gives more mixed evaluations with a slight negative tilt.

Relations with the Palestinians

This month, the Voice of the Jewish People Index survey revisited several questions about Israeli-Palestinian relations that were asked exactly one year ago. The data shows that most of the U.S. respondent panel (75%) do not think Israeli-Palestinian peace is possible in the foreseeable future. There has been no change compared with last year. The U.S. respondent panel and respondents in the UK and Canada concur with this assessment.

Broken down by ideological orientation, a majority across cohorts agrees (completely or somewhat) with the statement, “There is no chance of a peace agreement with the Palestinians in the foreseeable future.” Compared to a year ago, there has been a decline in the share of conservatives who strongly agree with this statement (from 75% to 69%). Eighty-eight percent of Trump voters agree with this statement, as do 67% of Harris voters, which marks an increase compared with a year ago, when 56% of her voters answered this way.

On the question of the need to reach a long-term peace settlement as well, attitudes in the United States have remained stable over the past year: two-thirds of respondents agree (completely or somewhat) that there is no substitute for a long-term peace arrangement, while one-quarter disagree. In Canada and the United Kingdom there is likewise relatively broad support for this approach, even slightly higher than in the United States, with about three-quarters agreeing and lower rates of opposition. The share of respondents who did not know how to answer this question remained relatively low in all countries, indicating settled views.

The ideological breakdown reveals significant gaps between groups. Among the two liberal cohorts, there is sweeping agreement with the statement about the need for a long-term arrangement. Seventy-three percent of strong liberal respondents and 55% of leaning liberal respondents completely agree, and another large majority somewhat agree. Among conservative respondents, by contrast, the picture is reversed: among the strong conservative cohort, only 37% agree (fully or partly), while an identical share (37%) completely disagrees. Leaning conservatives show a more mixed position, but still one tending toward opposition. The center stands out for its relative split between agreement and disagreement, with a comparatively high share of intermediate positions and uncertainty.

After a year, we also revisited two statements about Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). The first reflects the view that “the settlements are a burden,” and the second posits that “the settlements are an asset.” When the two are juxtaposed, a very similar pattern of agreement and disagreement emerges for each. Between March 2025 and March 2026, attitudes among the U.S. respondent panel have been relatively stable: the share who “do not agree at all” with the statement that settlements create deterrence and contribute to security rose slightly from 30% to 33%, while the share who “completely agree” fell slightly from 25% to 22%. That is, there has been slight erosion in strong support for the claim that settlements contribute to security, alongside a strengthening of sharp opposition to it.

The more conservative the respondent, the greater the support for the claim that Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) provide deterrence and contribute to the security of all Israeli citizens. Among the strong conservative cohort, a clear majority supports the statement (63% completely agree and 24% somewhat agree). Still, there is sweeping opposition in the strong liberal cohort (66% completely disagree, while only a small minority supports it). The middle groups show a gradual transition: the leaning liberal cohort tends to oppose the statement but not absolutely, while the centrist cohort tends toward relative agreement (55% full or partial agreement). A clear majority in the leaning conservative group agrees (69%), though less sharply than in the strong conservative cohort.

We also asked a question on the settlement issue from the opposite perspective – whether the settlements are “a burden” – and obtained a mirror image of the answers to the previous question. Most U.S. respondents (55%) believe that Jewish West Bank settlements are a burden on the IDF and harm the security of all Israelis. By contrast, 35% do not agree with this claim, and 10% did not know how to answer. Compared to a year ago, only small changes have occurred – the image of the settlements has not changed over the past year in the eyes of the U.S. Jews surveyed. The United Kingdom stands out with a higher rate of agreement (60%) with the claim that the settlements are “a burden,” while in Canada, the gap between those who agree (51%) and those who oppose (41%) is smaller.

The Jewish Character of Israel

Most of the U.S. respondent panel (66%) believes Israel is “Jewish to the right extent,” and only relatively small minorities think it is either not Jewish enough (12%) or too Jewish (11%). This position differs from that of Jewish Israelis, as reflected in the results of JPPI’s Israeli Society Index survey last month. In Israel, 38% think Israel is Jewish “to the right extent,” while 36% believe it is not Jewish enough; 24% think it is too Jewish. UK and Canadian respondents are more in line with U.S. Jews than Israeli Jews. Large majorities of UK respondents (78%) and Canadian respondents (75%) think Israel is Jewish to the right extent. The shares who think Israel is either not Jewish enough or too Jewish are small in both countries.

A breakdown by denominational affiliation reveals sharp gaps: among the ultra-Orthodox (Haredim) in the United States (as in Israel), an overwhelming majority (80%) think Israel is not Jewish enough, while almost none think it is too Jewish. A similar, though more moderate, tendency is also evident among Modern Orthodox respondents. By contrast, Reform, Conservative, and unaffiliated respondents tend to think Israel is Jewish to the right extent, alongside a small share who believe it is too Jewish.

Half of the U.S. respondent panel (48%) says that religion is very important in their lives, a higher share than in Canada (35%) and the United Kingdom (32%). In Canada and UK by contrast, the view that religion is somewhat important is more prominent (44% and 48%, respectively). The share of those who regard religion as not especially important is similar across the three countries, though slightly higher in Canada and the UK than in the U.S.

As one might expect, religion is very important to the ultra-Orthodox cohort, as it is for the Modern Orthodox cohort (85%). Among the Conservative cohort, a majority sees religion as a very important life component (50%), while the Reform cohort tends to fall in the middle, when somewhat and very important are combined. Among other things, this finding illustrates how JPPI’s U.S. panel of “connected” Jews differs from other survey findings on the attitudes of the broader U.S. Jewish population. A Pew Research Center survey from February 2025 found that for 27% of Jews think religion is “very important,” 30% think it is somewhat important, and 43% consider it not important.

Following the question on the importance of religion, we examined synagogue attendance. Nearly one-quarter (23%) of the U.S. respondent panel attends synagogue weekly, more than for Canadian respondents (17%) but fairly similar to those in the UK (21%). In both Canada and the United Kingdom, a significant share report attending only rarely (44% and 38%, respectively); among UK respondents, a relatively high share never attends synagogue (13%). Overall, in all three countries, the most common pattern is infrequent attendance.

As one would expect, a denominational breakdown shows significant differences in synagogue attendance patterns. Among ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) and Modern Orthodox respondents, attendance is very high, with majorities attending synagogue every week (73% and 57%, respectively). Conservatives also show relatively high attendance rates, though lower (25%). Reform respondents tend to attend less frequently, and many do so only rarely. Among unaffiliated respondents, a particularly high share never attends at all (29%) or do so only rarely (43%).

Passover

Ahead of Passover, we examined respondents’ plans for the coming holiday in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The data shows that the seder remains a central and meaningful event among Jews in the various countries. A large majority of U.S. respondents (80%) say that they expect to host or attend a traditional seder, with stability over time (the same share as last year). The figure is similar in Canada (79%), and slightly lower in the United Kingdom (73%), though still a clear majority. Only a small share of respondents in all three countries say they have no plans to celebrate at all.

Among Modern Orthodox and Haredi respondents, almost all plan to participate in a traditional seder (93%-94%). Participation rates among Conservative and Reform respondents are also quite high (86% and 78%, respectively). Among unaffiliated respondents, by contrast, 55% plan to participate in a traditional seder, 25% say they do not intend to participate in any special Passover event, and 18% had not yet decided.

Artificial Intelligence

In recent months, artificial intelligence (AI) systems have occupied a prominent place in the global discourse, arousing both interest and concern. This month, we examined how respondents in the three countries (and Israel earlier in the month) relate to the improved capabilities of artificial intelligence. Among U.S. respondents, 36% report that AI mainly frightens them, 38% say they are mainly curious, and 9% find it exciting. When compared with Jewish Israelis, a clear difference emerges: in Israel, fear of AI is less pronounced (22%), while curiosity is higher (44%) and the sense of excitement about the field is also significantly greater (20%). In addition, among Jewish Israelis, a lower share of respondents reported not being interested in AI.

A breakdown by ideological orientation reveals significant differences in attitudes toward AI. Notably, fear is substantially higher (49%) among strong liberal respondents, while curiosity and excitement are relatively low. In the other groups, by contrast, the share of those who are curious or excited exceeds the share who are apprehensive.

Survey Data and Implications

This report is based on a survey of 906 U.S. Jews registered with JPPI’s “Voice of the Jewish People” panel. Broadly speaking, the survey reflects the views of “connected” American Jews – that is, Jews with a relatively strong connection to the Jewish community, and/or Israel, and/or Jewish identity. The survey also included 60 respondents in the United Kingdom and 120 in Canada. Unless otherwise noted, the results reflect the views of respondents from the United States only. JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People Index survey was conducted by JPPI fellows Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepkov, with assistance from Yael Levinovsky. Statistical supervision: Prof. David Steinberg.

This table includes data on U.S. respondents in March 2026.

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By law, Israeli courts are supposed to close on Shabbat – the Jewish day of rest. Yet last Shabbat, the High Court of Justice heard a petition challenging the cap on the number of participants allowed at a Tel Aviv demonstration.

Explaining the extraordinary step, the court said: “It is clear that this is a matter of pikuah nefesh” – of preserving life. Really? What would have happened had the hearing been postponed until Sunday? The Home Front Command’s limit of 150 participants at the Saturday-night protest would have remained in force. True, in the court’s view, reducing the number of demonstrators (to the same number the Home Front Command set for every other public gathering) amounted to a disproportionate infringement of freedom of expression. But what does that have to do with preserving life?

To the court’s credit, it tried to hold the hearing before Shabbat, but the effort failed because the police dragged their feet (they deny it) and the Home Front Command did not submit its position on Friday. The court also tried to minimize the desecration of Shabbat by holding the hearing by phone rather than in open court. Even so, as a state institution, it should have refrained. Sheltering behind a supposed claim of pikuah nefesh does it no honor. More fundamentally, what the court lacks is not resolve or professionalism but sensitivity and a feel for the society in which it operates. Its latest ruling makes that plain enough.

Still, even those who believe, as I do, that the court erred cannot countenance the unbounded assault loosed upon it, after its decision, by rabbis – including the current and former Sephardi chief rabbis – on the very legitimacy of the institution and its judges.

Rabbi David Yosef, the current chief rabbi, called the judges “impudent” and accused them of lawlessness and of trampling both law and Torah. After declaring the High Court an enemy of Judaism, he announced that “we will fight them with all our might.” His brother, Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef, the former chief rabbi, went further: “infidels,” “haters of Israel,” and finally “wicked men whom the Almighty should destroy – should kill.” Later, he softened the remark, explaining that he was assigning that task to God, not to human beings, since “violence is forbidden.”

These statements should not be brushed off as lip service, as we do, for example, with the extremist rhetoric politicians sling at each other. Rabbi David Yosef is president of the Great Rabbinical Court. He is the equivalent in religious law to Judge Isaac Amit, chief justice of the Supreme Court. In other words, the head of the state’s highest religious judicial body is calling for war against the head of its highest civil judicial body. This declaration of war is not over any concrete dispute. Its purpose is to undermine the legitimacy of a parallel state judicial institution – to challenge its composition, authority, and decisions. Imagine the storm that would be unleashed if Chief Justice Amit had determined that Israel’s chief rabbi was impudent, lawless, and an enemy of the State of Israel.

The chief rabbis’ outburst has deep roots. Their father, the late Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, along with many other rabbis, held that Israel’s courts are “gentile tribunals.” Decoded, this phrase implies that Jews may not turn to them. It echoes Maimonides and the Shulhan Aruch, “whoever comes before them for judgment is wicked.” This is, to put it mildly, a deeply problematic halachic-cultural position. The ban on litigating before gentile courts was, of course, formulated in exile. How can one ignore the transition from the reality of a Jewish minority community – seeking to differentiate itself from a dominant non-Jewish environment and its value system – to the reality of a sovereign state in which Jews are the overwhelming majority, whose governing norms are enacted by the Knesset, whose judges are mostly Jewish, and whose lecterns bear the blue-and-white flag and the symbol of the menorah? Are these really “gentile tribunals”?

Postponing the High Court hearing would not have created a condition of pikuah nefesh; it would not have endangered a single life. Incendiary calls to war by the heads of the state’s religious judiciary against the heads of its civil judiciary, by contrast, are a national matter of life and death.

Published in the Jerusalem Post

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“Our position on the aggression against Iran, Lebanon and Palestine, and the violation of holy sites, is a principled stance rooted in confronting the Israeli enemy and exerting efforts to resist it, and we emphasize our readiness at the military level in accordance with developments.” This was proclaimed on March 19 by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, the leader of the extremist Shi’ite regime that bears his family name and rules northwestern Yemen. It was a public declaration noteworthy precisely for what it did not include: a commitment to take part in the Iranian regime’s existential campaign for its very survival.

For a month now, Iran has been waging a broad regional campaign aimed at exhausting Israel and the United States, and preventing them from achieving what it perceives as a clear and overt attempt to overthrow the regime. In this campaign, all means are considered legitimate: indiscriminate fire at population centers; attacks on energy infrastructure in the Persian Gulf; fire on allies such as Qatar and Oman, as well as NATO countries such as Turkey and Cyprus; and aggressive pressure on its regional proxies to join the campaign.

On March 28, the terror group based in Yemen launched multiple rounds of missiles at the Jewish state.

Hezbollah answered the call, yet the Houthis—radical, antisemitic and eager for battle, with the slogan “Death to America, Death to Israel, a Curse upon the Jews” literally emblazoned on their flag—had until now refrained from assisting Shi’ite Iran in the defining battle over its existence. Why?

Some of the best minds in Israel and the United States are grappling with this question, and there is no clear answer. The best possibility from Israel’s standpoint were that the Houthis are deterred from direct participation after having exhausted a substantial portion of their capabilities in recent years, and after a series of aggressive Israeli strikes against them, which targeted command-and-control objectives and damaged national infrastructure. In the background was also perhaps the calculation that using force would not significantly advance the Iranian effort, but would exact a heavy price from the Houthis, who are trying to rebuild their strength for the next round.

The decision may also reflect Houthi operational independence and their insistence on not acting under Iranian dictates. The Houthis cooperate strategically with Iran, but unlike Hezbollah, they do not regard themselves as subordinate to Tehran, militarily or religiously.

Moreover, the Houthi leader has ambitions of his own. In al-Houthi’s regional vision, he sees himself occupying a central leadership position within the axis system, one not necessarily subservient to Iran. The decision not to act until now may be a signal to Iran and the entire region that the Houthis do not dance to anyone’s tune, even if that actor is a partner in the struggle. It may also express a sober Houthi assessment that Iran’s weakening is inevitable, obliging them to conserve their strength for the day they may inherit the crown of leadership of the Shi’ite axis.

And it is also possible that the Houthis have been waiting in the wings for the right moment to enter the stage, whether because the campaign drags on, the stability of the Iranian regime erodes or developments in the Palestinian arena make intervention worthwhile. As a reminder, the Houthis tied their fate to the campaign in Gaza, and they may wish to preserve one of the few tools of deterrence they have left against a return to fighting in the Strip. Being drawn into Iran’s war might divert Houthi attention from what they believe truly matters: leading the regional struggle to defend “Palestine.”

There is also another possibility that keeps Israeli intelligence awake at night. It may be that the Houthis have waited for the right moment to surprise Israel with a strategic operation: a large-scale barrage of missiles or drones, or, more troubling still, a broad ground or maritime raid.

The Houthi leader has declared in the past the Yemeni people’s willingness “to move in the hundreds of thousands toward Palestine and wage the battle of holy jihad against the Zionist enemy.” This is reinforced by past reports of Houthi training for a ground or naval raid on Israel, strengthening the assessment in Israel that this possibility cannot be ruled out, despite the great distance and the many operational constraints.

As a central lesson of the failures on Oct. 7, 2023, the Israel Defense Forces has been preparing for this scenario, initiating a series of intelligence and operational efforts. Should the Houthis choose such a course of action, one may reasonably assume—and hope—that they would face an IDF vastly improved over the one that confronted Hamas on that Black Saturday.

Ultimately, the Houthis’ decision to join the fighting seems to have reflected, above all, their own resistance instinct and inability to remain on the sidelines while such a defining campaign for the Shi’ite axis was underway. In this sense, the prolongation of the war—and perhaps also indications that it might soon end—may have persuaded them that they did not want to be remembered as having stayed out of it.

In the background stood Iran’s desire to bring the chaos to a close across all arenas, and the Houthis may have seen an opportunity to shape developments not only in Lebanon and Gaza, but possibly in Yemen as well. They may also have identified a temporary window of opportunity in the fact that Israeli and American attention was focused primarily on Iran and Lebanon, thereby reducing the likelihood of the kind of large-scale strikes against them that might have been expected under other circumstances.

Either way, the Houthis are here to stay, and they are likely to remain a major challenge to regional and global stability regardless of how the campaign against Iran and Hezbollah develops. Their religious extremism, regional imperialism, relative resilience in the face of external pressure and burning hatred of Israel and Jews will continue to shape Houthi policy, making them one of the most complex and deceptive actors Israel has had to contend with in recent years.

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The post Why did the Houthis wait out the war until now? first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Recently, the Israeli police prevented Cardinal Pierbattista Pizzaballa, the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, and the Custos of the Holy Land on behalf of the Vatican, Francesco Ielpo, from entering the Church of the Holy Sepulcher as they made their way to the Palm Sunday Mass. The two were stopped en route, without any procession or public ceremony, and were forced to turn back. The incident, justified on the grounds of “ensuring their safety,” places Israel on a collision course with the Catholic Church—still the most powerful religious institution in the world—on the eve of the holiest days in the Christian calendar.

This is an unprecedented event: for the first time in centuries, the heads of the Church have been prevented from conducting one of Christianity’s most important rites. It constitutes a direct violation of freedom of worship and a dramatic departure from the long-standing status quo and the most basic norms of respect for holy sites and believers worldwide. One can only imagine how such a policy is being interpreted. When a state takes so drastic a step without even the appearance of concern for the religious rights of millions of Christians around the world, it sends a deeply troubling message. The contrast between the closure of holy sites and images of large ultra-Orthodox weddings proceeding undisturbed likewise does little to convey a sense of equality.

This outrageous decision must also be read alongside last week’s controversy, when, at a press conference with international media, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu paraphrased the American historian Will Durant to argue that justice and morality are insufficient to overcome the forces of evil, adding that “Jesus Christ has no advantage over Genghis Khan.” The remarks, widely perceived as offensive to Christians, were swiftly denied by Netanyahu and dismissed as “fake news.” In his clarification, he insisted that Christians “are protected and flourish in Israel.”

The wide resonance of those earlier remarks compelled Netanyahu to respond in both cases. His political engagement with Christian audiences—particularly evangelical ones, whose relationship with the Catholic Church is marked by deep rivalry into which Israel would do well not to enter—is well known. Yet the real issue is not political alignment or shared interests, but something far more fundamental: freedom of worship is a foundational principle of any society that seeks not merely to survive, but to truly live.

A state that does not protect the right of Christians to practice their faith with dignity fails at something far deeper than diplomacy. And that, today, is precisely the situation in Israel.

Since its founding, Israel has had to navigate the complex task of governing religious minorities whose significance extends far beyond its borders—above all Christianity, for which Israel is both birthplace and home to its most sacred sites. Over time, a delicate status quo emerged, regulating Christian life in Israel: its institutions, its sacred spaces, and the millions of pilgrims who visit them.

We should not mistake the Prime Minister’s words of reassurance for a reflection of current policy. They are closer to wishful thinking than to reality. The condition of Christians in Israel today is far from ideal, and the recent events at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre once again make this clear.

Christian communities in Israel face significant structural challenges. The absence of a clear legal framework governing religious and property registration creates ongoing difficulties for church leadership. Burial arrangements remain insufficiently regulated. Disputes over municipal taxation persist. Bureaucratic restrictions at times limit the conduct of religious ceremonies. Christian ecclesiastical courts receive unequal funding. Christian educational institutions suffer from chronic underfunding, despite their longstanding contributions to Israeli society. Many holy sites endure ongoing neglect, and Christian holidays and events often pass without any official acknowledgment by the state—reflecting a troubling indifference.

At the same time, issues of personal security have intensified significantly. Since the late 2000s, numerous incidents of vandalism and violence against churches, monasteries, cemeteries, and clergy have been documented. According to annual reports by the Center for Freedom of Religion Data, since 2023 there has been a sharp increase in harassment and violence against Christians, including spitting, verbal abuse, physical assaults, property damage, and disruptions of religious ceremonies—particularly targeting priests and monks. While the police have taken certain steps, such as installing cameras and increasing their presence in sensitive areas, many investigations are closed for lack of evidence, leaving communities with a persistent sense of vulnerability.

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