Political violence is like pollution – no matter what the source, it threatens everyone. Rav Joseph Soloveitchik, the great 20th-century sage, explained that Jews still fast, mourning the assassination of Gedaliah ben Ahikam in 586 B.C.E., because “the enemy was not from without but from within… It serves as a reminder that we are our own worst enemy when we allow internal strife to eclipse our shared identity.” Nevertheless, this third assassination attempt against President Donald Trump triggered another round of hypocritical attacks blasting political violence – from the other side.

On CNN, Dana Bash asked Congressman Jamie Raskin (D-Md.), who has called Trump a “fascist,” a “tyrant” and a “gangster” guilty of “murder”: “You have, as many of your fellow Democrats, have, used some heated rhetoric against the president. And do you think twice about that when something like this happens?” Raskin stunned everyone by sounding stunned, asking: “What rhetoric do you have in mind?” Similarly, Trump’s press secretary blamed the assault on the Democrats’ “systemic demonization” of Trump amid a “left-wing cult of hatred.”

This is not the pathway to healing. Sanctimonious calls for unity in between partisan rants only backfire. Speaking out of one side of your mouth won’t stop this scourge. All must condemn left-wing, right-wing and Jihadi terrorism consistently. Today’s scorching political rhetoric fuels this exhibitionist violence, as indoctrination eclipses inquiry, certainty banishes uncertainty, and demonization discourages debate – online, on the air and even in too many classrooms.

Increasingly, with only one in four attending religious services weekly, Americans are replacing their grandparents’ overriding faith in religion with political orthodoxy. Many fill the God-sized holes in their hearts with simplistic slogans shortcircuiting their brains – and curdling their souls. More and more seek out romantic partners who agree with them politically, while avoiding conversations with those who dare to disagree.

This polarized environment has even colored how people view the violent acts that recently wracked the nation. Three-quarters of Democrats deemed the 2020 George Floyd protests peaceful – despite rioting that caused over a billion dollars of damage and killed dozens – while 54% of Republicans deemed the protests violent. Yet, 81% of Democrats called the January 6, 2021 Capitol Hill riot an “insurrection,” with 74% of Republicans disagreeing.

Partisans keep confusing ends and means. Believing in your cause doesn’t require justifying violence carried out in its name. Actually, the most fervent believers carry special responsibility – they have the street cred among their comrades to discourage violence.

Instead, while pro-Palestinian groups have been most identified with the dishonorable, nihilistic, antidemocratic (and antisemitic) cry “by any means necessary,” it’s become an all-purpose rationale whenever your allies overreach. We need the opposite. We need Palestinian and Muslim activists condemning anti-Zionist and anti-Western Jihadi terrorism, socialists decrying the December 2024 murder of the UnitedHealthcare CEO, liberals mourning Charlie Kirk and conservatives condemning attacks targeting Democrats ranging from Nancy Pelosi’s husband Paul Pelosi to Pennsylvania’s Governor Josh Shapiro.

Instead, too many political leaders and influencers are so angry, they forget that their political rivals are fellow citizens too. In November, President Trump condemned six Democratic lawmakers for “SEDITIOUS BEHAVIOR, punishable by DEATH!” Even all the Washington “swamp” talk is rabble-rousing – swamps are toxic and must be drained.

Similarly, Senator Elissa Slotkin (D-Mich.) shouldn’t have called the duly-elected President of the United States an “existential threat to democracy,” while her Michigan congressional colleague Rashida Tlaib (D) shouldn’t have branded him a “war criminal.” And anyone romanticizing the murderer of Brian Thompson, the United Healthcare CEO, or, like the influencer Hasan Piker, invoking “social murder” to “explain” it, is part of the problem.

Amid so much media noise, with social media creating Algorithmic Radicals, spiraling deeper and deeper into violence-inducing echo chambers, many believe the shriller the better. But words matter – and tone matters too. It’s no better to have Candace Owens calling Democrats “demonic” than for Bill Clinton’s Secretary of Labor, Professor Robert Reich, to say “Donald Trump poses a threat to civilization.”

In “The Nature of Prejudice” (1954), Harvard’s legendary social psychologist, Gordon Allport, studied racism to show how words can kill. His five-point scale built from “verbal violence” – trash-talking – to snubbing, discriminating, wounding then killing. With so many angry, lost, broken Americans today, the overheated rhetoric creates armies of rageoholics ready to fight on the street – or hunt down political enemies.

Long before the Internet monetized today’s aggression-attention economy, America seemed addicted to political violence – roused by waves of barn-burners. Historians have long speculated about what causes this bloody red-white-and-blue affliction. It’s resulted in four martyred presidents, Civil War, and so many riots – against immigrants in the 1850s and by immigrants resisting the draft in the 1860s; by antiwar forces and pro-war forces a century later; and by racists against Blacks, and by Blacks against racism, among other manifestations. The violence may come from America’s wild, rollicking, frontier origins; many demagogues’ need to rally around some enemy; the alienation people feel in such a diverse, rootless, mobile, society; or the anxiety they feel amid America’s dynamic but chaotic economy.

Often, like today, high-stakes clashes over complicated challenges leave even reasonable people worried that their political opponents pose unreasonable threats.

Fortunately, America also has a rich history of leaders who stirred what Abraham Lincoln called “the better angels of our nature.” George Washington faced down a potential mutiny with his Newburgh Address in 1783, warning that “the flood Gates of Civil discord” would only “deluge our rising Empire in Blood.” By simply fumbling with his spectacles, the aging general broadcast a sense of humility and patriotism that calmed the furies.

In 1838, Abraham Lincoln’s “Lyceum Address” offered a “simple” answer to the great threat that most feared America faced –  collective suicide through internal dissension: “Let every American, every lover of liberty, every well-wisher to his posterity, swear by the blood of the Revolution, never to violate in the least particular, the laws of the country; and never to tolerate their violation by others.”

And in 1968, still mourning his beloved brother John’s 1963 assassination, Robert Kennedy soothed angry mourners in Indianapolis minutes after Martin Luther King’s murder. RFK proclaimed: “What we need in the United States is not division; what we need in the United States is not hatred; what we need in the United States is not violence or lawlessness; but love and wisdom, and compassion toward one another….”

If our leaders, our social media influencers, our Facebook “friends” cannot model such behavior – these historical voices must resonate throughout the land. The White House Correspondents’ Dinner was filled with Trump Administration officials – and critics. But bullets, like pollutants, threaten everyone, whether they’re on the wrong side or not.

Americans need not bury the hatchet – but we must lower the rhetorical temperature. Jews have long appreciated the power of machloket, constructive, even if impassioned, debate. The Progressive educator John Dewey was right: “Democracy begins in conversation.” But democracy only survives when watered with self-doubt, open-mindedness, and respect for our fellow-citizens – especially when they exasperate us.

Published in Jewish Journal

The post Are Americans Finally Ready to Denounce Violence — Left, Right and Jihadist? first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

The post Newsletter 15.5.26 first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Abe Foxman, a legendary Jewish leader, and the head of the Anti-Defamation League from 1987 to 2015, passed a few days ago, aged 86. It’s been a while since we last spoke, but speaking with him had always been one of the more enjoyable perks for a person writing about U.S. Jewish life. In the introduction to the book about the U.S. community I wrote about a decade and a half ago, a little story about Foxman appeared, which I thought was appropriate as a farewell to this man and to an era. Reading through it reveals just a little of what made Foxman endearing in many ways, and it also reveals, by being so offhand, almost naïve, how much America changed in such a short time.

So here is one little story, about antisemitism, basketball, humor and Foxman. RIP.

American and Israeli basketball fans with long memories will recognize the name Michael Ray Richardson, a player who was linked to the Israeli team Hapoel Ramat Gan 15 years ago after being banished from the NBA due to drug use. Richardson, who died about a year ago, had a long history of brief scandals; in 2007, another was added to the list when he was fired from coaching the “Albany Patroons.” One of the reasons: antisemitic remarks.

This was an incident that taught me a lesson about the state of American Jewry far more than it taught me about Richardson, who never quite excelled at choosing his words. “I’ve got big-time lawyers. I’ve got big-time Jew lawyers,” he said in response to a question regarding his contract renewal. When told that some might be offended by his words, he responded: “Are you kidding me? They’ve got the best security system in the world. Have you ever been to the airport in Tel Aviv? They’re real crafty. Listen, they are hated all over the world, so they have to be crafty.” He said about us – Jews – that we’ve got a lot of power in the world, “you know what I mean?” He said “I think that’s great.” He didn’t think there’s anything wrong with that. If you look at professional sports, he said, Jews run it. If you look at most successful companies and such, most businesses, Jews run them.

In America, compliments must be given with caution. Richardson ultimately just wanted to say something nice about Jews. That didn’t prevent his suspension, nor did it stop the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) from complaining about the “pain his words caused to many people” (to be precise: an anti-gay remark was also among the reasons for his dismissal for the Patroons). In principle, the claim made by the head of the ADL, Abraham Foxman, was correct: Richardson’s description of Jews bore too much resemblance to antisemitic stereotypes.

However, as author Ze’ev Chafets noted in an op-ed published in The Los Angeles Times: “Jews, as a people, are indeed smart. And they are proud of it, too.” Indeed, around the same time, a long-form article by Charles Murray appeared in the Jewish-American magazine Commentary. Murray – one of the controversial authors of “The Bell Curve,” which caused an uproar by claiming (and this would be a highly simplistic description) that Black Americans were less intelligent than Whites and Asians – argued that the roots of “Jewish genius” lie in processes that began even before the Jews went into exile. No one accused him of antisemitism. It was a sensitive and yet an interesting article.

Reading it reaffirmed the need for a redefined, updated definition of the verbal “danger zone”: in the 21st century, given the influence and visibility of Jews in America, one shouldn’t jump at every use of a stereotype as if it were a racist event deserving of condemnation. Not every generalization justifies punishment.

The Richardson case was a minor event, worth lingering over because it masked a persistent fear of majority prejudice. It served as a reminder that this large, powerful community – the U.S. Jewish community – possesses a minority consciousness that seemingly cannot disappear. But as is the way with fears, they sometimes paralyze – paralyzing judgment, clarity of thought and the ability to put events into proper perspective.

After Richardson was suspended, I wrote in the newspaper that “merciful Jews” – another controversial generalization about our people – should call for his reinstatement. For the cancellation of Richardson’s suspension. David Stern, the commissioner of the NBA and one of the Jews who “runs professional sports,” came to Richardson’s defense and stated that he “is not an antisemite.” Abe Foxman, who initially welcomed the suspension, admitted to me in a conversation that “perhaps it really is too harsh a punishment.” He agreed that we must be careful lest, on the rocky road to eliminating antisemitism, Jews lose another beloved stereotype: that they have an excellent sense of humor.

Published in Jewish Journal

The post Remembering the Inimitable Abe Foxman first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

The post Christianity Under Pressure? Israel’s Interfaith Crisis first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

The map of threats against Israel is crowded, and we are straining every muscle to thwart them. They loom in the south, the north, and the east. But one serious threat – perhaps the gravest in the long term – is being neglected: the very legitimacy of Israel’s existence is under assault by voices in the free world.

Israel has managed to survive as a villa in the regional jungle partly because it is seen as an overseas extension of the West. The villa’s extensive system of ties with that world – on the cultural, economic, diplomatic, and, of course, security fronts – has served as Israel’s safety net. But that critical network is now dramatically fraying. The demonization of Israel has become fashionable across Europe and among expanding segments of American public opinion. The villa is more isolated than ever, which is why the prime minister likens it to Sparta.

Whatever the cause of this demonization – classic antisemitism on the right, progressive antisemitism on the left, the sting of the Qatari scorpion, Israeli government policies perceived as extremist, the spirals of venom on social media, and more – it must not be accepted as a decree of fate. There is a temptation to curl up into fatalism: “the whole world is against us,” or “Esau hates Jacob,” and hope for the best.

Another temptation is to focus on the half-full glass: the friends we still have, such as India, the evangelicals, and countries ruled by authoritarian regimes. But that would be an irresponsibility of the highest order. The consoling image of “a people that dwells alone” is a strategic danger to the future of the Zionist project.

It has been reported that Israel is rushing to acquire new fighter squadrons from the United States, fearing that after two pro-Zionist presidents – Biden and Trump – there may emerge an isolationist president, or even one hostile to us. The free world was saved during World War II when the ideas of Franklin Roosevelt triumphed over those of Charles Lindbergh, an extreme isolationist and antisemite who sympathized with Hitler and considered running for president before backing down.

We were spared the dystopia of a Lindbergh presidency that Philip Roth imagined in The Plot Against America. But who can guarantee that a future president will not be a Republican in the mold of Tucker Carlson, or a Democrat in the mold of Zohran Mamdani? Can we rely on Europe, where Islam is the rising force?

We must mobilize the national resources we have accumulated to change the narrative that attacks the legitimacy of Zionism, and to drain the swamp of consciousness from which these wild shoots grow. We cannot be content with help from Jews overseas – like AIPAC – or with another Israeli “hasbara” campaign. A paradigm shift is needed. That shift will come only when we internalize that the struggle for our existence is decided not only at our borders, but also in how the free world sees us. We invest more than 100 billion shekels a year in defending our borders, but spend only pennies, in national terms, on the battlefield of global consciousness. This neglect may have existential consequences.

The battle is far from lost. What is needed is Ben-Gurionist leadership that grasps the depth of the challenge and tackles it professionally and decisively. Professionalism means pooling knowledge and expertise, developing a “war doctrine” suited to the new reality, mapping the field, shaping a narrative, designing tools to disseminate it, building international partnerships, and more.

Decisiveness requires understanding that change is required across the board. Alongside physical national security, entrusted to bodies that operate at home (the IDF and Shin Bet) and abroad (the Mossad), Israel must entrust the cognitive sphere – the national security of consciousness – to a new dedicated entity: a nonpartisan state body like the other security agencies, with generous long-term funding befitting the challenge, and under the direct responsibility of the Prime Minister’s Office or the Ministry of Defense. This is not “just” about foreign relations or the protection of Diaspora Jews. It is, emphatically, at the core of national security.

The private sector, too, must be mobilized. Just as physical national security draws on Israel’s defense-tech industry, the national security of consciousness could draw on the cyber industry, artificial intelligence, and the broader technological world, with all its new developments, where Israel, as is well known, is a global engine. Because this is a matter of “influence,” careful attention must be paid to how the responsibilities should be divided, making use of the relative advantages of the state on one hand and the private sector on the other.

National security depends not only on victories in Bint Jbeil or Rafah, but also on the battlefields of consciousness in Washington, Berlin, and Paris.

Published in the Jerusalem Post

The post A War of Consciousness first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

In Israel today, educators are grieving students. Yet we do not have the language to describe what that grief means. After every round of war, we count the fallen. We speak of families, of parents, of siblings—and rightly so.

Standing in the background, almost without words, are hundreds of teachers, mentors and educators. People who loved, guided and helped shape the lives that were lost. Are they bereaved? In a documentary by Noam Damsky, Rabbi Yaakov Medan resists this term. The language of bereavement, he says, belongs to parents. When educators use the word, they risk taking something that does not belong to them.

There is moral clarity in this refusal. And yet, it leaves a gap, because educators do experience a profound sense of loss, one that remains unnamed and is therefore insufficiently understood. I am a teacher who has lost students in this war: Ilay Graphinkel, Yuval Shoham, Nevo Fisher and Shahar Buzaglo. Their deaths have forced me to confront not just grief, but the meaning of education itself.

What, after all, is a teacher’s role in a society where students are also soldiers? What does it mean to educate toward a future that some of your students will not live to see? At its core, education rests on three commitments: to human beings, to knowledge and to a vision of the future.

First, there is a commitment to the student as a person. Teaching begins with attention, with care, with a willingness to enter into a meaningful relationship with someone in the midst of becoming. This is not parental love, but it is real and formative. It is what allows a teacher to see not only who a student is, but who they might become.

Second, there is a commitment to knowledge. Teaching is driven by the belief that ideas matter, that wisdom, culture and intellectual traditions should not remain private possessions; they are meant to be shared and transmitted. Each educator is a link in a chain, passing something forward. Third, there is a commitment to the future. Education is geared to what does not yet exist. It is grounded in the belief that the world can be better, and that the next generation will help bring that future into being.

These three commitments: relationship, knowledge, and future, are what give education its meaning. War fractures each of them. When a teacher loses a student, the natural order is reversed, and the world is shaken. The relationship is cut short. The act of teaching, once oriented toward growth and continuity, is interrupted. And the eye to the future, which gave meaning to the entire endeavor, is suddenly diminished.

This is why the loss of students is not only personal. It is structural. It touches the very foundations of what education is. In Israel, this reality is not theoretical. It is lived. Teachers are asked, implicitly, to prepare young people for a future that includes the possibility of war, and at times, the reality of death. At the same time, they are asked to cultivate hope, moral responsibility and a vision of life worth living.

This is not a paradox that can be resolved. It is a tension that must be carried. How do educators continue? There is no single answer. But acknowledging the nature of this loss is a necessary beginning.

First, we must recognize that the relationship between teacher and student matters in ways that extend beyond the classroom. It shapes identity, values and choices. When a student is lost, something real is lost for the educator as well. Next, we must reaffirm the role of knowledge and learning, not as an escape from reality, but as a framework that gives it meaning. Education connects individuals to something larger than themselves: tradition, wisdom, a shared human story. Finally, we must hold on to the future, even when it is wounded. The students we have lost were part of the future we believed in. Their absence changes that future. But it does not eliminate the responsibility to continue working toward it.

In a society shaped by conflict, education cannot remain untouched by loss.

But it mustn’t surrender to it. To teach, even now, is to insist, quietly but firmly, that the future still matters.

jns

The post What does it mean for a teacher to lose a student? first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

I have just come back from a weeklong visit to New York, and would like to share some subjective impressions of Jewish and Israeli life and presence there. While Jewish life certainly goes on, it does seem to me that something has changed.

I especially visited areas most heavily frequented by tourists – 42 Street, 5th Avenue, the main branch (Stephen A. Schwarzman) of the New York Public Library, and the Metropolitan Museum of Art.

What struck me first was that one does not hear any Hebrew in any of these locations. The masses of global tourists speak every conceivable language – European and Asian, except one. This struck me because in every tourist venue that I have ever visited – from Trinity College in Dublin to Dubrovnik in Croatia – identifiable Israeli tourists were seen and heard. Is the absence of Hebrew due to a lack of Israeli tourists, or do they just not want to be identified? I do not know.

In a similar fashion – no (or very few) visible kippot. Everyone, including readily identifiable Hasidic Jews, wore baseball caps or other hats – even in midtown Manhattan near the Diamond District on 47th Street. This felt very strange. Since I was in high school in Brooklyn 60 years ago, one could unabashedly wear a kippa in midtown Manhattan.

This same theme emerged in regard to Kosher restaurants. Upon inquiring about them, my NY friend told me that Mendy’s and other well-known kosher establishments don’t really exist anymore as places where one can sit and eat. Rather, their business is mainly take-out and delivery. The one kosher café where I did have breakfast was in the lobby of a hotel, not really out in the open.

My cumulative impression from these observations is that Jews, Israelis, and Jewishness do not appear to have a public presence anymore, even in New York City. What had been the norm 20 or 30 years ago – the public presence of Jewishness – seems to have totally disappeared.

These observations were corroborated by what my New York friends told me. One prominent philanthropist and communal leader said that New York is no longer a Jewish city. She does not feel afraid, but it no longer feels like “her city.” Another friend said that criticism of Israel among Jews has become a trifle more muted, as people become more afraid. They think they may need Israel as a refuge or insurance policy. Why are Jews keeping a low profile even in New York?

Some may connect it to the election of Zohran Mamdani, the new Muslim, anti-Israel mayor of the city. Many people, though, argue that so far, his influence seems to be negligible, at least until he passes a budget. I would suggest that the election of Mamdani itself is a symptom of a deeper cause. The Jews used to be a symbol of New York. This was not only because of the large number of Jews there, making it the largest Jewish city in the world, but because the Jewish meshed so perfectly with the narrative of the city.

New York enables, through its fabulous resources – a world-class city university system, an amazing public library network, and the infinite possibilities of employment – a place where downtrodden and impoverished immigrants can succeed and become middle-class Americans. The Jews were the epitome of that – through attending school and working hard, persecuted and poor Jewish immigrants became doctors, lawyers, engineers, and business people.

The most insidious change in the position of the Jews in the United States is the change in their narrative. They are no longer regarded as a persecuted people “who made it,” but rather as white oppressors whose wealth and standing came at the expense of others. According to this narrative, the Jews do not belong to the city but are rather like a cancer or parasite feeding upon it.

One of the most potent traditional Jewish symbols is that of the Exile – the Galut. In its simplest and most powerful meaning, it connotes that the Jews are out of place, or do not have a place. For some years now, we have been trained to use the word “Diaspora” for the Jewish communities outside of Israel, but perhaps we should start thinking about reverting to the older, more authentic term – Galut.

The post New York: Diaspora or Galut? first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Additional Findings:

• There has been a decline in the share of Israelis who think launching the Iran war (Operation Roaring Lion) was justified, but a majority still think it was.
• A similar decline was found in the share of Israelis who expect a positive long-term outcome of the Iran war.
• A majority of the public believes that Prime Minister Netanyahu’s depictions of the war’s results are inaccurate.
• Trust in the IDF senior command has eroded after peaking during Operation Roaring Lion.
• Trust that President Trump will act appropriately in the context of U.S.-Israel relations has continued to decline.
• Israelis are divided over why American support for Israel is eroding.
• Most of the Israeli public supports establishing a commission of inquiry into the war as soon as possible. Still, it is split over the preferred type: a state commission of inquiry or a commission based on “broad consensus.”
• An overwhelming majority of Israelis denounce vandalizing religious symbols: Nine in ten think the soldier who smashed the crucifix in Lebanon was wrong.
• Defeat in the upcoming elections would be seen as regrettable by right-wing Israelis and “intolerable” by their left-wing counterparts.
• Most of the public supports civil marriage, but many oppose intermarriage between Jews and non-Jews.
• What most endangers the future of humanity? Nuclear weapons rank first, followed by social media, global warming, and artificial intelligence.

Click here to download the PDF version.

The Iran War

After a month and a half of fighting, a Pakistan-brokered ceasefire took effect on April 8. The calm was extended several times during April and in early May and has held despite tensions on the ground. As of this writing, efforts are underway to negotiate an end to the crisis, while Israel maintains military readiness out of concern that the confrontation may resume.

Six in ten Israelis (59%) believe that the decision to launch Operation Roaring Lion was the right one, while 22% believe it was wrong and 19% say it is too early to determine. This is a sharp decline from the 72% who supported the decision to strike in March at the start of the campaign. Among Jewish Israelis, broad support (70%) remains, with only 10% opposing the move. Still, this represents a significant decline relative to the 85% majority who supported the decision to strike at the war’s onset (March 2026 survey).

There is a direct correlation between respondents’ position along the ideological spectrum and the degree to which they think the operation was justified. On the right, there is almost complete support for the move (96%), and substantial (73%) support among the center-right. As one moves leftward along the spectrum, support declines and ambivalence rises: in the centrist and center-left cohorts, more than one-third (36% and 37%, respectively) say it is too early to tell whether the decision was correct. Among the left-wing cohort, 50% think it was the wrong decision. In other words, the right views the attack as a necessary step, while the center and the left exhibit uncertainty and even opposition to the move.

As in the previous two months (March and April), the May Israeli Society Index survey again examined whether Israelis think the war with Iran will or will not change the situation in the Middle East over the long term. This month, there was some stabilization in the level of optimism on this question. After the sharp decline recorded between March (65% optimistic) and April (53%), the share of those who believe the situation will change for the better in the long term still stands at about half (52%). At the same time, the share of Israelis who are unsure about the campaign’s outcomes remains high (26% of respondents).

Broken down by ideological orientation, the right-wing cohort exhibits almost complete belief in positive long-term change (92%), with half of respondents (52%) saying they are “certain” of it. The opposite picture appears on the left, where virtually no respondents expect positive change and half (50%) expect the situation to worsen over the long term. Both the center and center-left cohorts include a high share of respondents who are unsure whether the war will have a positive or negative long-term effect (44% and 53%, respectively). This indicates that respondents outside the right and center-right cohorts still find it difficult to view the war’s achievements as a regional paradigm shift.

An examination of the level of credibility the public attributes to the prime minister’s reports on the outcomes of the “Rising Lion” (June 2025) and “Roaring Lion” (2026) campaigns reveals a crisis of trust. Six in ten Israelis (60%) believe Netanyahu’s descriptions of the campaigns’ achievements are inaccurate (20% “not very accurate” and 40% “very inaccurate”), compared with just over a third (38%) who believe he describes the reality correctly. More than half (56%) of Jewish Israelis question the accuracy of his depictions, and a large majority (76%) of Arab Israelis say that Netanyahu’s depictions are inaccurate.

Whereas in the right-wing cohort, a majority (77%) believes Netanyahu’s descriptions are accurate, the opposite perception holds among the center-right, where slightly more than half (53%) believe his reports are inaccurate. As one moves further leftward on the ideological spectrum, trust in the prime minister’s words almost entirely evaporates: in the center, 89% of respondents do not believe his depictions of the outcomes have been accurate, and in the center-left and left-wing cohorts, the figure reaches 96% and 100%, respectively. Perceptions of the security reality and assessments of the military’s achievements are mediated through the political prism, with declarations about the campaigns’ success by the political echelon received with deep skepticism by more than half of the Israeli public.

Trust in Leadership and in Victory

Recent months have seen a sharp and continuing decline in the Israeli public’s general sense of victory in the war across all fronts. At the height of “Operation Roaring Lion” in March, a majority of Israelis (56%) reported a strong sense of victory (ratings of 4 and 5), but this figure has eroded this month to 38%. Among Jewish Israelis, the decline was even more dramatic: from a peak of 62% in March to 42% in May. At the same time, there has been a significant rise in the share of Israelis who report that they do not feel Israel is winning at all, a figure that tripled within two months – from 7% in March to 22% in May. Among the Arab public, pessimism is even deeper: half of respondents (52%) believe Israel is not winning the war (1 or 2), and only a fifth (20%) feel that Israel is winning.

We identified very large gender gaps with respect to this question. Fifty-seven percent of men said Israel is winning, compared with 25% of women. This is a gap of 32 percentage points between men and women, reflecting entirely different readings of reality. Even after analysis controlling for political views, religiosity, age, income, and education, the differences remain large. Not only does a gender-based gap remain, but it is growing from month to month. Incidentally, the group in which the sharpest decline during these months can be identified is Likud-supporting women aged 25 to 45. Among them, the sense that Israel is winning fell from 84% in March to 52% in May.

Erosion of public trust in the government also continued this month, a trend that began immediately after the peak of “Operation Roaring Lion.” In March, trust in the government reached 45%, its highest level in the past two years. However, in the two months since, the figure has gradually declined – to 42% in April and to 41% in May.

Among Jewish Israelis, trust in the IDF senior command has also gradually eroded since the peak recorded at the start of the campaign against Iran. In March, trust in the IDF senior command reached its highest level in the past two years (82%); it declined to 75% in May. Especially notable is the erosion in the share of respondents expressing “very high” trust, which has almost been cut in half over the last two months.

An examination of the data by sector (Jewish and Arab) reveals deep gaps in perceptions of the senior military echelon. Among the Jewish public, a three-quarters majority (75%) expresses trust in the command; among the Arab public, the picture is reversed, with only 42% expressing any degree of trust in the IDF senior command, and half (51%) saying they do not trust the senior command (including 27% who “do not trust it at all”). The weighted trust rate among all Israelis this month stands at 68%.

U.S.-Israel Relations

This month, there was a decline in Israelis’ confidence that President Trump will “do the right thing” in the context of U.S.-Israel relations. Whereas at the height of “Operation Roaring Lion” trust in the U.S. president in this context stood at 75%, this month the figure is 62%. This trend is accompanied by a significant rise in the share of respondents who say they have no trust at all in the president, from 20% in March to 32% today – a level approaching the nadir recorded in June 2025, just before “Operation Rising Lion.” Overall, trust in Trump has been highly unstable over the past year and a half, with positive spikes around the hostage-release deal in January 2025 and around the military operations against Iran in July 2025 and March 2026.

Among those who self-identify as right-wing, 85% have trust in Trump (39% a great deal of trust and 46% some trust); among those self-identifying as center-right, the level of trust stands at 78%. As one moves leftward along the ideological spectrum, trust diminishes: among the center cohort, a majority (58%) still expresses some trust, but in the center-left and left-wing cohorts the opposite picture emerges – a majority of these respondents (55% and 75%, respectively) say they have no trust in the U.S. president in the context of U.S.-Israel relations.

Recent surveys on Israel’s standing in the United States by the Pew Research Center and Gallup have found a significant erosion in its image across almost all demographics. Israelis explain this erosion in different ways. The most common explanation among the options offered in JPPI’s May Israeli Society Index survey (28%) attributes the erosion to Israel’s foreign and security policy, but similar shares of Israelis attribute it to the ideological “craziness” of Americans (27%) or to poor Israeli public diplomacy (24%). Among the Arab public, there is broad agreement that Israeli policy is the decisive factor in the erosion of its standing in the U.S. (51%), while the Jewish public assigns greater weight to external or image-related factors, with the leading explanation being internal ideological changes in the U.S. (32%), followed by the quality of Israeli public diplomacy (27%).

Among Jewish Israelis, just over half of those who self-identify as right-wing (53%) absolve Israel of primary responsibility for the erosion of its standing and instead blame ideological dynamics within the U.S., while only 5% attribute the erosion to Israeli government policy. By contrast, the centrist and left cohorts tend to place responsibility on Israel itself: centrists primarily focus on failures in Israel’s public-diplomacy apparatus (40%), while center-left and left-wing respondents primarily say that Israeli policy is mostly to blame for the erosion (57% and 78%, respectively). Notably, Israel’s identification with Donald Trump is perceived as a secondary factor across all groups.

The Sense of Security in Israel’s North and South

A State Comptroller’s report published just a few days before this writing pointed to serious failures in the handling of the rehabilitation of communities in Israel’s north and south that were damaged during the war. The sense of uncertainty about the future of the regions in question is directly expressed in public attitudes: a 60% majority of Israelis believe that, under the current circumstances, residents of the north will not be able to return to living in peace; just 33% express optimism. Deep pessimism was registered among the Arab public, with 75% doubting the possibility that residents of the north will be able to feel secure where they live, compared with half (56%) of the Jewish public who hold this view.

Here, too, a breakdown of the data by ideological orientation highlights gaps in perceptions of security and rehabilitation: among those who identify as right-wing, a majority (61%) believe that residents of the north will be able to return to living calmly. However, the right-wing camp is the exception: among the center-right, center, center-left, and left cohorts, pessimism prevails. Three-quarters (76%) of centrists do not believe it will be possible to restore a sense of security to residents of the north; among the center-left and left-wing cohorts, the figure rises to 92% and 91%, respectively.

Unlike public attitudes regarding restoring a sense of security on the northern border, nearly half of Israelis (49%) think that residents of the Gaza envelope communities will be able to feel secure where they live; a similar share (45%) holds the opposite view.

Regarding the Gaza envelope communities in southern Israel, there is also a correlation between a right-wing ideological position and optimism that a sense of security will be restored there. Among right-wing respondents, a particularly high level of confidence was recorded, with eight in ten (80%) believing that residents of the Gaza border area will be able to feel secure. The picture reverses as one moves leftward along the ideological spectrum: while an optimistic majority remains among center-right respondents (57%), pessimism prevails in the center and left cohorts. Majorities in the center (64%), center-left (73%), and left (75%) cohorts believe that, under the emerging circumstances, it will not be possible to ensure that the region’s residents feel secure.

Commission of Inquiry

This month, Israel’s High Court of Justice held a hearing on petitions demanding an orderly investigation of the war through a state commission of inquiry. Nearly two-thirds (63%) of the Israeli public believes that a commission of inquiry into the events of October 7 and the war that followed should be established as soon as possible. This position is shared by a majority of respondents in both the Jewish sector (62%) and the Arab sector (67%). Fifteen percent of Israelis believe that establishing the commission should wait until the war has fully ended, and 11% believe that the decision on when to establish it should be left to the government’s discretion.

In the left (100%), center-left (99%), and center (87%) cohorts, there is nearly total support for the immediate establishment of a commission of inquiry. A 68% majority of center-right respondents also support an immediate inquiry. A different picture emerges in the right-wing cohort: only 34% support establishing a commission as soon as possible, while a majority prefers to postpone the move; 30% want to wait until the war is over, and another 26% believe that the government should determine the timing. Among Likud voters (2022 elections), positions are split: just over one-third (38%) support establishing an immediate commission of inquiry, while the majority (58%) prefer to wait until the war ends or to leave the timing to the government to determine.

The Israeli public is almost evenly divided over the structure of the commission that would investigate the events of October 7 and the war that followed, with a slight advantage for a state commission of inquiry headed by a Supreme Court justice (46%) over a national commission of inquiry composed of broadly agreed-upon public figures (40%). Only a negligible share of Israelis (5%) supports a government commission of inquiry, and a similar share (4%) believes there is no need for a commission of inquiry at all beyond the professional reviews conducted by the security agencies. Among Jewish Israelis, there is a slight preference for a “broad consensus” commission (48%) over a state commission (42%). Among Arab Israelis, there is a clear demand for a state commission headed by a Supreme Court justice (62%).

A breakdown by ideological orientation reveals that the involvement of the judicial system in the inquiry is the principal point of contention between ideological groups. Among right-wing respondents, there is almost complete opposition to a commission headed by a Supreme Court justice (6% support), with the majority (80%) preferring a national commission of inquiry composed of figures acceptable to broad segments of the population. The opposite picture appears among center, center-left, and left-wing respondents: in the center (78%), center-left (93%), and left (94%) cohorts, there is a broad consensus demanding a state commission of inquiry headed by a Supreme Court justice.

Vandalism of Religious Symbols

The international press widely covered two recent incidents in which IDF soldiers damaged Christian religious symbols in villages in southern Lebanon. In this month’s survey, we asked about the first incident, which involved the smashing of a crucifix; the second involved the desecration of a statue of Mary. These incidents, which generated international attention and criticism, met with a forceful institutional response in Israel. The command echelon, including the chief of staff, condemned the acts, characterizing them as a moral failure contrary to the IDF Code of Ethics. Disciplinary measures were taken against the soldiers involved.

An overwhelming majority of the Israeli public (90%) believes that the soldier who smashed the crucifix statue in southern Lebanon was wrong, on ethical and moral grounds: 65% of Israelis believe that it is forbidden to smash symbols of other religions. Among the Arab public, this position is even more pronounced, at 71% compared with 63% among the Jewish public. Alongside this moral rationale, a significant share of respondents believe that the soldier’s action was improper because it caused reputational damage to Israel (13%) or because it violated army orders (12%).

A breakdown by religious identity groups shows that the strongest opposition to the act based on respect for other religions was recorded among the secular public (80%). However, as the level of religious observance rises, this share decreases, reaching 39% among the ultra-Orthodox public. At the same time, higher levels of support for the act itself were recorded among the religious (Dati) and ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) groups: 20% of the religious and 21% of the ultra-Orthodox believe that the soldier did the “right thing,” with most of them objecting mainly to the fact that it was photographed and disseminated (12% and 15%, respectively).

2026 Elections

Ahead of the elections expected in late October, we once again examined how Israelis anticipate feeling in the event that the side they support is not victorious at the ballot box. This month, there was a slight uptick in the share of Israelis who say they will respect any decision the public delivers (from 23% in March to 27% this month). An examination of the right-wing and center-right camps reveals a relatively pragmatic approach: nearly half (47%) of the respondents in these cohorts characterize a possible loss as “regrettable, but that is life,” and about another third (30%) declare full respect for the decision of the majority. Forty percent of Arab respondents selected the option of respecting the public’s decision, a figure that stands out compared with the share among their Jewish counterparts (24%).

As in the findings recorded in the March 2026 Israeli Society Index, this month, too, there are differences among ideological groups in their understanding of the meaning of the results of the upcoming elections. As one moves from right to left along the ideological spectrum, the sense that an electoral defeat would be “intolerable” becomes more acute. In the left-wing camp, a majority (81%) gave this response, while a negligible share responded that they would respect “any decision” of the public. This feeling is also dominant in the center-left (62%) and center (49%) cohorts. This contrasts with the right-wing cohort, where only 20% of respondents attach such severe significance to defeat.

Civil Marriage

The question of civil marriage in Israel came onto the public agenda this month following remarks by Naftali Bennett indicating a willingness to establish such an option in Israel. The data shows that, in general, a majority of Jewish Israelis (59%) support the option of civil marriage, with nearly half (46%) saying they “strongly support” it. By contrast, the Arab public shows substantial opposition: 46% oppose the introduction of a civil marriage option, compared with 39% who support it, and a relatively high share of respondents (15%) who do not hold a consolidated position. Weighted across all Israelis, there is a 55% majority in support of changing the status quo on this issue.

A breakdown by religiosity shows that at the secular end of the spectrum, there is near-complete consensus (91%) in favor of civil marriage. Among traditionalist respondents, there is a division: most “traditionalist, not religious” respondents support the move (54%), but among the “traditionalist, religious” group, the picture reverses, and a majority (60%) oppose it. Opposition reaches its peak among the religious (77%) and Haredi (85%) groups, for whom religious marriage is perceived as a critical component of the state’s identity and of preserving the unity of the Jewish people.

Responses to the civil-marriage question change somewhat when the question includes qualifying details. We examined two such qualifications: one clarifying that civil marriage would also include marriages between Jews and non-Jews, and one clarifying that it would include same-sex marriages.

Adding the possibility of intermarriage (between Jews and non-Jews) to the civil marriage equation affects public support. While the general question on civil marriage garnered 59% support among Jewish Israelis, support fell to less than half (46%) in a follow-up question that explicitly included intermarriage between Jews and non-Jews. Among all Israelis, half of the public (50%) opposes civil marriage when it includes the possibility of interreligious marriage, and 44% support it. Among Arab Israelis, too, opposition (48%) is higher than support (37%) for this model. The data shows that for a significant share of the public, opposition to interreligious marriage is a central barrier to their support for civil marriage more broadly.

A breakdown by Jewish religiosity shows that interreligious marriage generates opposition not only among the religious (Dati) and ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) cohorts, but also among the traditionalist (Masorti) groups. Although most “traditionalist, not religious” respondents support civil marriage in principle, their view changes when interreligious marriage is included, with a 59% majority opposing the move. Among the religious (87%) and Haredi (94%) publics, opposition is nearly complete. Even among the secular public, which supports civil marriage at high levels, support drops when the model includes intermarriage – from 91% to 75%.

Opposition to civil marriage that would also permit same-sex unions is lower: the Israeli public is divided almost evenly between support and opposition, with a slight advantage for supporters (49%) over opponents (45%). We found a large gap between Jewish and Arab respondents: whereas a 59% majority of Jewish Israelis support a move that would permit same-sex marriages, a 75% majority of Arab Israeli respondents are opposed, most of whom (62%) are “strongly opposed.”

Among Jewish Israelis, religiosity is a predictor of attitudes toward same-sex marriage. Among secular respondents, support was sweeping at 86%, and a 60% majority was recorded among traditionalist, not religious respondents. The shift to groups with a stronger religious affiliation marks the ideological turning point: among traditionalist, religious respondents, a 57% majority opposes recognition of same-sex civil marriages, and among the religious and Haredi groups, opposition is overwhelming (86% and 82%, respectively).

Attachment to Jewishness and Israeliness

This month’s survey repeated a question asked annually on the sense of “Jewishness” among Jews in Israel – that is, the extent to which they “feel Jewish” on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (the maximum possible). The data shows a consistent upward trend in the sense of Jewish identity among Jewish Israelis, with the overall average rising to 9.11, compared with 9.05 last year and 9.02 two years ago. Among the religious and traditionalist cohorts, the sense of Jewishness is close to the maximum score; among the secular public as well, a high and stable level of identification is recorded.

At the same time, we examined the extent to which Arab Israeli respondents feel “Israeli” on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (the maximum possible). Here, too, the data reveals a clear upward trend, with the overall average crossing the midpoint of the scale, having risen from 4.31 to 5.07. The trend is especially evident among the Muslim public, where a significant one-point jump was recorded, and among the Druze public, which continues to report a particularly high level of identification with “Israeliness.” The Christian public, however, is an exception to this trend, with a slight decline in the sense of “Israeliness.”

Threats to the Future of Humanity

This month, we asked respondents to rate several issues often regarded as dangerous to the future of humanity in recent years on a scale from 1 (not a threat at all) to 5 (a very severe threat). Among the four domains examined – global warming, artificial intelligence (AI), the influence of social media, and nuclear-weapons proliferation – the Israeli public ranks the proliferation of nuclear weapons as the most significant threat to humanity (84%). The influence of social media ranks second (56%), perceived as more dangerous than global warming (49%), while the development of artificial intelligence elicits the lowest level of concern (38%) among the issues examined.

Forty-nine percent of Israelis view global warming as a significant threat to the future of humanity (ratings of 4 and 5), but this figure conceals a sectoral gap. Among the Arab public, a majority (72%) characterizes the problem as dangerous. By contrast, among the Jewish public, the perception of threat is relatively low: 43% assign the issue a high danger rating, while 31% attribute a low level of danger to it (ratings of 1 and 2).

Ideological orientation emerges as a predictor of public attitudes regarding climate change, with perceived threat severity increasing as one moves leftward along the ideological spectrum. Among those who self-identify as right-wing, 21% view global warming as a major threat, compared with 49% who characterize it as a low-level threat. This picture reverses in the center cohort, where a 56% majority expresses significant concern, and reaches its peak in the left-wing cohort, where a consensus (88%) views the crisis as a severe threat, with 66% of the left-wing cohort characterizing it as “very dangerous.”

The Israeli public expresses concern about the development of artificial intelligence, with nearly four in ten (38%) viewing it as a significant threat to the future of humanity (ratings of 4 and 5). While only 32% of the Jewish public expresses serious concern, a 57% majority of the Arab public does so. However, the largest group among all respondents (34%) chooses the midpoint rating of 3, indicating an ambivalent or cautious position regarding the long-term implications of artificial intelligence.

Here, too, concern about artificial intelligence tends to rise as one moves leftward along the ideological spectrum, though to a limited extent. Whereas the lowest level of concern was recorded on the right (26% in ratings 4 and 5), among center-left respondents, the share reaches a peak of 41%.

Israelis identify the influence of social media as a greater threat to the future of humanity than artificial intelligence, with 56% assigning the issue a high danger rating. Among Arab Israelis, the concern is deeper, with nearly half (46%) characterizing the influence of social media as “very dangerous,” compared with less than a quarter of Jewish Israelis (23%). In terms of ideological orientation, concern about the consequences of social media appears to cut across camps, but it strengthens as one moves leftward along the ideological spectrum: from 45% high perceived risk on the right to 59% on the left.

Of the four issues examined, Israelis view the threat of nuclear proliferation as the most severe. More than eight in ten Israelis (84%) assign the issue a high danger rating, with 65% of all Israelis characterizing the phenomenon as “very dangerous to the future of humanity.” This perception cuts across sectors: among the Jewish public, the share of those who are very concerned is nearly two-thirds (64%), and is slightly higher among the Arab public, reaching 68%.

Unlike the other issues, the question of nuclear-weapons garnered a similar severity assessment across the ideological map. In the right-wing, center-right, and center cohorts, intense and similar levels of concern were recorded, with about two-thirds of respondents choosing the maximum risk rating. In the center-left and left cohorts, the share of respondents defining the situation as “very dangerous” was slightly lower (58% and 50%, respectively), but these groups balance this with a higher share of respondents assigning the issue a rating of 4.

JPPI’s May Israeli Society Index survey was administered between April 30 and May 4, 2026, to 749 respondents. Data was collected by HaMadad.com (547 Jewish sector respondents, in an online survey), and Afkar Research (202 Arab sector respondents, approximately half online and half by telephone). The data was analyzed and weighted by voting pattern and religiosity to represent the views of Israel’s adult population. The Index is compiled by Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepkov with research, production, and writing assistance from Yael Levinovsky. Prof. David Steinberg serves as statistical consultant.

The post JPPI Israeli Society Index – May 2026: Support for a Commission of Inquiry, Disagreement over its Composition first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Is war returning to Gaza? That is the question being quietly debated inside Israel’s security establishment.

In the IDF Southern Command, for example, senior officers are adapting and redrafting operational plans for a renewed offensive, including conquering the part of Gaza not currently under Israeli control.

And the reason is simple: Hamas is back. Not in the sense that it can immediately launch another October 7-style attack against Israel – the IDF still maintains control over significant parts of the Strip, including the buffer zone and the “yellow line” established after the war – but it is rebuilding, reconstituting itself and rearming.

Talk to commanders who have spent time in Gaza in recent months, and they all describe the same picture: Hamas operatives are openly moving around, humanitarian routes are being used to try to smuggle in weapons, terror infrastructure is slowly being rebuilt, and the organization is once again tightening its grip over the civilian population. Its finances, depleted during the war, are also recovering. Fear – Hamas’s most powerful weapon against Gazans themselves – is back.

Hamas did not build the capabilities for the October 7 massacre in just a year or two. It took decades. First came rudimentary rockets. Then, the longer-range rockets. Then tunnels. Then, precision explosives. Then, the elite infiltration units. Israel watched much of it happen in real time and convinced itself it could contain the threat, an illusion that was shattered on October 7.

Now Israeli officials fear the same cycle may already be restarting because the dilemma facing Israel is not simple. The first option is to return to war – to launch another massive ground invasion, reconquer the remaining areas of Gaza, and attempt once again to dismantle Hamas completely.

The problem is that Israel already tried this. For two years, the IDF operated in Gaza with the objective – as delineated by the prime minister – to destroy Hamas.

Extraordinary military force was employed, thousands of terrorists were killed, and almost the entire leadership was decapitated. Yet Hamas survived. Why would trying the same thing again yield a different result?

The second option is to avoid another war and try to manage the situation – maintain the status quo, work alongside the “Board of Peace” led by US President Donald Trump, deepen regional cooperation, and hope that eventually enough diplomatic and economic pressure will force Hamas to disarm and relinquish control.

Maybe that works. Maybe it does not.

For now, we know that Hamas refuses to disarm and that, as long as this is the case, the Board of Peace will not advance other Gaza reconstruction initiatives. But that is fluid, and over time, the demands on Israel will almost definitely shift. Pressure will mount to scale back operations, then it will be to scale back the presence of forces, and then it will be to leave the Gaza Strip completely.

There is another problem as well – if Israel restarts the war, much of the world will not understand why. From the outside, the ceasefire and the return of the hostages created the perception that the war was over. If Israel suddenly launches a new offensive, many will not understand why and will view it as unprovoked Israeli aggression.

The reason is that there has not been any serious public diplomacy campaign. No systematic effort to educate allies or international audiences about Hamas’s reconstitution, and no clear explanation why Israeli commanders believe time is again working in Hamas’s favor.

This situation, though, touches on a deeper issue – how did Israel even find itself here?

How is it possible that after the deadliest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust, after two years of war against the organization responsible, Hamas still exists and still controls half of Gaza?

Military force alone will not defeat Hamas

Part of the answer lies in a truth many Israelis continue to struggle to accept: military force cannot alone solve our problems. While military force is essential, and there was never a more legitimate war than the one after October 7, wars are not won only by force. They also require a political strategy.

Here is just one small example: Early in the war, Israeli forces seized Shifa Hospital, uncovering tunnels, command centers, and evidence that hostages had been held beneath and inside the facility. Hamas fighters were eliminated, and the area was cleared.

Then, months later, we awoke one morning to the news that Israeli forces had surrounded Shifa, where about 1,000 terrorists had taken refuge. It didn’t make sense. Just a few months ago, it was empty. How did it suddenly return to being a terrorist refuge? The answer was that while Israel cleared the area militarily, it left a vacuum, refusing consistently throughout the war to work with any alternative entity that could control Gaza. And in the Middle East, vacuums do not remain empty for long. Hamas filled it again.

That pattern repeated itself throughout the war – Israel would enter an area, dismantle terror infrastructure, withdraw, and then watch Hamas slowly return.

To some extent, the same thing happened in Lebanon. Israel fought Hezbollah, agreed to a ceasefire in November 2024, and assumed deterrence would hold. But there was no broader political architecture established afterward. No alternative mechanism. Then, after the war with Iran broke out at the end of February, Hezbollah resumed firing rockets into Israel once again. Even with Iran, when the recent war was over, the Israeli public largely felt like the country had failed, despite most of the defense establishment viewing the operation as a significant military success

The reason was that the moment the fighting transitioned into diplomacy and ceasefire negotiations, the Israelis lost confidence. If force did not get the Iranian regime to give up its uranium, then why would negotiations? And that may be one of the deepest strategic problems Israel faces today: there is no belief in political processes.

There are a number of factors behind this, but one of them is that Israelis are deeply traumatized by the failure of what was the last political process to try and end our longest conflict – the Oslo Accords.

While peace with Jordan was reached after the Oslo Accords were signed in 1993, this agreement with the Palestinians is remembered as such a failure that it impacts Israelis’ ability to consider political agreements as pathways to stability. That disenchantment is what shapes the nation’s approach to war and is why Israeli discourse revolves almost exclusively around phrases like “total victory,” “crushing the enemy,” and “victory for generations.” The language is always military, and the solutions are always military.

But if October 7 taught Israel anything, it should be that military force alone cannot sustainably solve these conflicts. Yes, Israel must remain powerful, must act preemptively against emerging threats, and must be prepared all the time to deploy military force, but after so many years of war, it should be obvious that military power by itself does not create political reality.

And unless Israel begins to think seriously about what follows the fighting – in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and beyond – it may continue winning battles while repeatedly finding itself dragged back into the same wars.

Published in the Jerusalem Post

The post Hamas is rebuilding, and Israel faces the same dilemma again first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.