Pope Leo XIV’s new encyclical, “Magnifica Humanitas: On Safeguarding the Human Person in the Time of Artificial Intelligence,” is an important contribution to the growing global debate about AI. By placing artificial intelligence in continuity with “Rerum Novarum,” the landmark 1891 encyclical that addressed the social consequences of industrialization, the Pope argues that AI is the defining technological challenge of our age. Like the factory system in the 19th century, AI is transforming work, education, knowledge and human relationships.

The Vatican’s tone is cautious. It warns that AI can concentrate power, weaken human responsibility and reduce people to data points and economic functions. These concerns deserve serious attention. AI is not morally neutral, and its impact will depend on the values of those who design, regulate and use it.

Yet for Jews, in Israel and across the Diaspora, the conversation should not stop with warnings. Another urgent question is what good AI can do for Judaism, Jewish learning, and Jewish peoplehood. At a moment when so much attention is devoted to apocalyptic predictions and distant scenarios, Jews should also ask how this technology might serve the texts, relationships and responsibilities that have long sustained Jewish life.

Judaism has long been known as the tradition of the “People of the Book.” The study of texts is not a peripheral activity in Jewish life; it is one of its defining features. From the Bible and Talmud to medieval commentaries, responsa literature, philosophy and modern scholarship, Jewish identity has been shaped through reading, interpretation, debate and transmission. Learning is not simply an intellectual pursuit but a religious and cultural obligation, central to the formation of the Jewish person.

As Prof. Moshe Koppel has noted, AI can help scan and digitize old books, correct textual errors, identify citations, expand abbreviations, add punctuation and uncover connections across thousands of volumes of Jewish literature. Much of this work is already being pioneered through Dicta, the nonprofit research lab he founded, which develops digital tools for studying rabbinic texts. Tasks that once required years of specialized expertise may increasingly become available to students, educators and interested readers around the world.

The implications are significant. A student with a limited background could navigate complex rabbinic texts with greater confidence. Researchers could trace ideas across centuries of Jewish writing in seconds rather than months. Teachers could create customized educational materials adapted to different ages, languages and levels of knowledge. A student in Buenos Aires might read a Hebrew source sheet with explanations in Spanish; a rabbi in a small European community might prepare a class drawing on responsa literature that was previously difficult to access. AI has the potential not merely to preserve Jewish learning but to broaden access to it.

This is particularly important at a time when many Jews feel distant from traditional texts. AI may lower barriers that have long discouraged engagement. It can help translate difficult Hebrew and Aramaic passages, explain references and guide readers through unfamiliar intellectual terrain. Used wisely, it could bring more people into the world of Torah study. The goal should not be to make Torah study effortless. It should be to make the first steps less forbidding while preserving the discipline, patience and argument that meaningful Jewish learning requires.

AI also presents opportunities for strengthening Jewish peoplehood. Advances in translation technology may dramatically reduce barriers between Hebrew-speaking Israelis, English-speaking North Americans, European Jews, Latin American communities and others. AI could make Israeli scholarship, Hebrew-language educational resources and contemporary debates far more accessible to Jews around the world, while helping Israelis engage more deeply with the ideas and experiences of Diaspora communities. These tools could strengthen the sense that Jews everywhere are participating in a shared conversation despite differences of language and geography.

None of this means that Judaism should embrace AI uncritically. Translation can carry words across borders without necessarily carrying context, trust or the emotional weight that different Jewish communities bring to the same debate. In education, AI may encourage intellectual shortcuts, weaken the habits of close reading and sustained argument and tempt students to substitute generated answers for genuine learning. In Jewish study especially, there is a risk that the struggle with the ancient text – the very process through which understanding is formed – will be replaced by instant summaries and simplified conclusions.

Likewise, while AI can help connect Israel and the Diaspora, it can also make real connection harder to attain if technological mediation replaces personal encounter. Digital tools can translate texts, summarize debates and facilitate communication across distance, but they cannot substitute for the trust built through face-to-face conversation, shared study, visits, hospitality and sustained relationship.

The Vatican has offered an important warning about what AI may mean for humanity as a whole. Jews should take those concerns seriously. But our task is also more particular. A Jewish response to AI should begin neither with panic nor with technological enthusiasm, but with the question of whether this tool can help human beings become more responsible, more learned and more bound to one another.

Artificial intelligence may be the defining technology of our generation. The challenge is not only to prevent its harms. It is also to imagine what goods it should serve. Used wisely, AI could deepen Torah study, open inherited texts to new readers, bridge Hebrew and Diaspora conversations, and give educators new ways to serve their communities. But it will do so only if we remember that technology can assist learning, not replace it.

This is why the Jewish conversation about AI cannot remain abstract. Jewish communal institutions, universities, rabbinical schools, educational networks, philanthropies and research centers should begin convening this conversation now. We need working groups that bring together rabbis, educators, technologists, ethicists, scholars of Jewish thought and communal leaders to ask how AI should be used in schools, synagogues, yeshivot, Hillels, JCCs and Jewish learning platforms.

Encouragingly, some of this work is already underway. The Jewish People Policy Institute, for example, is developing a book project on the AI and broader technological revolution and the future of the Jewish people, bringing together scholars from different countries and disciplines to reflect on how emerging technologies may reshape Jewish education, identity, peoplehood, religious life and communal institutions. Just as importantly, such work asks how Jewish thought, values and practices might contribute to a more constructive understanding of the technological revolution itself.

That is the kind of effort we need more of. The question is not whether Jewish communities will use AI; they already are. The question is whether we will adopt these tools passively, or shape them deliberately according to Jewish values, Jewish learning and Jewish responsibility.

Published in the Jewish Journal

The post What Can AI Do for Us? first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Israel has stumbled into a dangerous gamble with historic consequences. Its relationship with the Trump administration, for better or worse, has become the beating heart of its national-security doctrine. A foreign leader, however friendly, is imposing his policy on Israel and making decisions, independently of us, that determine when the Israel Defense Forces may act and when they must hold back.

There is no way to dress this up: since US President Trump’s second election, some of Israel’s core national-security decisions are no longer being made solely by the Israeli government or the security cabinet. They are increasingly being shaped in conversations between the prime minister and the US president – and, judging by recent reports, often in accordance with the president’s demands.

The reported exchange in which Trump allegedly berated Netanyahu over Israeli military actions – in the roughest, most candid of terms – is noteworthy not just because of its tone, but also because of what it suggests about the relationship itself. If such reports are accurate, they point to a reality in which Israeli strategic choices are being constrained not through formal alliance mechanisms but through the personal leverage of a foreign leader.

It is hard to overstate the enormous value of the enduring alliance with the United States: technological advantage, diplomatic backing, security assistance, international deterrence. Trump upgraded that alliance when the US military flew wing-to-wing with Israel in the war against our greatest enemy, over Iranian soil. We are the “bestie” of the king of the world. Lucky us.

But all this largesse, it is becoming clear, comes at a price. Israel is failing to translate the IDF’s extraordinary battlefield successes into decisive strategic outcomes. Iran is recovering from severe blows while preserving key capabilities. Hezbollah continues to exact a heavy price from our soldiers and has not allowed the north to return to normal. Hamas is reestablishing effective control over significant parts of Gaza.

These developments run counter to Israel’s security interests and erode deterrence. Yet Israel has accepted growing constraints on its freedom of action because Washington’s priorities have become an increasingly decisive factor in determining when and how force may be used.

Israel’s surrender – temporary? – rests on the assessment that the broader Israeli interest, especially in the campaign against Iran, requires this “flexibility” and that the benefits outweigh the costs. Really? In the immediate term, there is no telling how all these ongoing campaigns will end. The current situation is unsatisfactory. If it becomes entrenched over the long term – because of an agreement between Iran and the United States that the Gulf states embrace and that forces Israel to restrain itself – we may now be building our enemies’ launching pad for the next major war.

Our conduct toward the Trump administration at this moment may one day be seen, historically, as a shift from a partnership between states to a small country’s dependence on a global power. The difference is a matter of mindset, but its implications are critical: a sovereign state is not a protectorate.

The reported confrontation between Trump and Netanyahu is therefore troubling not merely as a diplomatic episode. It symbolizes a deeper shift. When a foreign leader can reportedly speak to Israel’s prime minister in such terms while simultaneously influencing Israel’s operational decisions, the relationship begins to resemble dependency more than partnership.

The same is true internally, in our own sense of ourselves. Consider Trump’s scandalous intervention in the criminal proceedings against the prime minister, which some on the extreme right greeted with applause. Or the hoisting of American flags everywhere on Israel’s Independence Day. A troubling change is taking shape in Israel’s understanding of its own independence.

The difficulty is exacerbated when we assess, without naiveté, the depth of the bond with the United States. Cultural changes in our country and theirs are undermining the closeness between the two societies and Israel is increasingly seen as a burden by broad swaths of the American public.

Will Israel’s security remain a central consideration in American foreign policy after the Trump era? Does the special relationship have an expiration date two and a half years from now? And if so, what must be done today?

A common answer is to make the most of the current window of opportunity. But such a strategy assumes a stable foundation. Trump is many things, but stable and predictable are not among them. His abrupt reversals, shifting priorities, and highly personalized style of decision-making make him an uncertain basis for a long-term Israeli security doctrine. Building strategy on such ground is like standing on a trampoline: it may lift you higher than expected, but it may also throw you off balance without warning.

The fear is not imaginary. It is not certain that Israel’s security is a central consideration for Trump. It is more reasonable to assume that he acts out of interests – some detractors would add, also personal ones – and those interests, by their nature, shift as events unfold.

Israel does have something to “sell” the United States and Trump: we are a sophisticated forward outpost of the West in the great zone of friction with the East, and we create real value for American security. But the balance of interests may change.

Trump’s top priority is the global competition with China. If he concludes that improving relations with key Muslim states better serves that objective than maintaining Israel’s current standing, there is no guarantee that Israeli interests will prevail. Israel remains valuable to the United States, but value is not the same as permanence. The Gulf states understand this and are working energetically to reshape the balance in their favor.

What is needed is a weaning process: a measured, calculated descent from the Trumpoline to more stable ground. Let me stress: I am not proposing that Israel shift its orientation from the United States to some other great-power alternative. No such alternative exists. But we must navigate our relations with “the world” in a much more informed manner, neither out of despair nor out of aggression.

We need a more balanced approach toward friendly countries in Europe and beyond, and we must rebuild our relationship with the American public across the political spectrum. American Jews, most of whom are not Trumpists, remain a critical bridge to the broader American consensus and to younger generations increasingly distant from Israel.

This requires two things. First, Israel must treat international legitimacy as a strategic asset and stop squandering it through undisciplined and inflammatory public messaging. Second, strategic planning must account not only for immediate military gains but also for the long-term diplomatic and political conditions that determine Israel’s freedom of action.

These are not alternatives to military strength. They are forms of risk diversification that responsible leadership must pursue before today’s dependence becomes tomorrow’s vulnerability.

Published in TOI

The post Get off the Trumpoline first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

On Monday morning, Israel sent Iran a strategic message that echoed far beyond the borders of the Middle East: it acts according to its own independent interests.

It is true that US President Donald Trump said in several interviews on Sunday evening that he did not want Israel to act. It is also true that the American pressure on Israel to restrain itself was real. And yet, Israel did what it believed it needed to do and what it determined was in its security interests. While this may appear to be a direct challenge to Washington and the president’s policy it is more likely that this was a carefully coordinated move: America remains outside this round of fighting, while Iran learns that Israel is capable of acting – and willing to act – even without explicit American backing.

Technically speaking it is important to keep in mind that Israel would not be able to carry out a strike against Iran with the Americans knowing. The American military is deeply embedded within IDF bases today and US Central Command is deployed heavily across the region. Planes that take off from Israel and fly to Iran are going to be seen by the Americans.

But more important is the message that the strike sends Iran and it is critical because, over recent months, the regime has been engaged in a clear strategy: buy time, drag out the negotiations and conduct them largely for appearances’ sake.

While diplomats worked to reach an agreement that would extend the ceasefire, Iran continued to spread instability throughout the region. It attacked the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Kuwait, including the strike on its airport several days ago, an incident that was nearly forgotten amid the never-ending news cycle. Iran was playing America and was exploiting Trump’s desire to secure a deal to buy time, rearm, and expand its influence.

Then came yesterday.

After weeks of coming under Hezbollah missile fire including almost daily casualties from drone attacks, Israel decided to bomb Beirut. The Iranians used that attack to respond by firing a salvo of missiles at Israel. Its rationale was simple – it wants to exert its influence over Lebanon and protect its proxy, Hezbollah. The regime believed that Trump would restrain Israel and that Iran would once again demonstrate that it is the one setting the rules in the Middle East.

That is why it would be a mistake to view Iran’s first missile attack solely as a military event. It was a strategic declaration by Iran which was trying to show that it has the power to determine what happens across the Middle East, including Lebanon. This is not the behaviour of a regime preparing to sign an agreement or make concessions. It is the behaviour of an adversary that feels immune, that believes its position is secure, and that America is so determined to avoid escalation that it will do almost anything to prevent another round of conflict.

That is why Israel had no choice but to retaliate. It needed to teach Iran a different lesson.

While Trump publicly called for restraint, Israel showed that its security does not depend on external approval. An “American green light” is not always required for the IDF, and even if some coordination took place behind the scenes, the outward appearance is one of Israeli independence – and that, in itself, strengthens deterrence.

It is possible that this is exactly what was agreed upon quietly between Israel and the U.S. America has an interest in ensuring that Iran understands that the equation has changed and that negotiations cannot be dragged out indefinitely. Iran needed to learn that there is a price to be paid for exploiting Trump’s desire to reach an agreement.

In that sense, the new equation may actually serve Trump’s interests. He can tell the Iranians that he is trying to reach a deal, but that if they refuse to compromise, he cannot control Israel. If the ayatollahs want a deal, he will be able to tell them, they will need to do it now.

The question that remains is whether Tehran will draw the right conclusions. Will the regime understand that its strategy of delaying has reached its limits? Will it recognise that operating proxies, and issuing threats from afar no longer provide the protection they once did?

Or are we headed for yet another round – more missiles, more airstrikes and more attempts to secure a fictitious ceasefire that will only allow Iran to rebuild and continue back along the same path?

Either way, Israel made one thing unmistakably clear: it has no intention of waiting for an answer.

Jewish Chronicle

The post Striking Iran without US green light strengthened Israeli deterrence first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

The postmortem seems to have raised more questions than it answered—and the role of pro-Israel policy may only be one of them.

Yet when the autopsy finally arrived, the much-anticipated words (or even topics) “Gaza,” “Israel” or “Jews” did not appear even once in the 192 pages of what “Pod Save America” host Jon Favreau called “gobbledygook.” Finally, it seemed to some that transparency would distinguish legitimate policy debate from claims that unfairly assigned collective responsibility to Jewish or pro-Israel Democrats.

However, rather than accept the data and analysis of the report, progressives pivoted again—suggesting that the glaring exclusion of Gaza was suspect and that their suspicions about its role in 2024 remain.

What can be made of these sins of (possible) omission, and where does this leave some Jewish Democrats who still feel singled out for blame at the ballot box?

At very least, it was clear from the summer of 2024 that Gaza was emerging as a divisive issue in the campaign—and therefore could be considered as part of a multi-causal analysis in the autopsy. After all, by the time Harris became the Democratic nominee without competing in a primary, she had distanced herself from then-President Joe Biden’s handling of the Israel-Hamas war but didn’t offer much in the way of her own alternative vision.

The matter came to a head at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, when the “Uncommitted” movement, primarily composed of Arab and Muslim voters, and progressive and campus activists, was not offered a speaking timeslot (although the Goldberg-Polin family was). Controversy also swirled over the vice-presidential selection process, including as Pennsylvania’s Jewish Gov. Josh Shapiro later confirmed in his best-selling memoir, Where We Keep the Light: Stories From a Life of Service, that he had been grilled by vetters asking whether he had ever worked as an agent of Israel.

While Harris highlighted her family connection to the Jewish community, she offered few specific commitments on issues many Jewish and Zionist voters prioritized, and spent considerable energy appealing to other constituencies.

After the election, progressive activists and Democratic-adjacent commentators leaned into the explanation that Gaza—or, more broadly, Israel and the pro-Israel community—was a decisive factor in the 2024 loss, and could endanger both the midterms and 2028. Several Democratic figures and candidates, including Reps. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez of New York and Ro Khanna of California, and presidential hopefuls California Gov. Gavin Newsom and former Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel, wondered aloud about allegations of genocide in Gaza, conditioning or cutting U.S. aid to Israel, and a reassessment of U.S. relations with Israel and the Palestinians.

In her 2025 memoir 107 Days, Harris criticized Biden’s “blank check to Netanyahu” and “inadequate and forced” concern for Gazans as contributing to her loss. The DNC seemed to have engaged with the role of Gaza when it leaked to Axios that it was working with the Institute for Middle East Understanding (IMEU) Policy Project, a pro-Palestinian advocacy organization, to investigate the issue, although IMEU later accused the DNC of burying their contribution. By spring, when Harris began gearing up for a renewed presidential push, she pointedly told donors that she wanted the autopsy released.

Is the report’s omission of Gaza suspect or simply not relevant? Certainly, it was a divisive issue, and a lack of data on voter attitudes and behavior in the report means that we can’t know how determinative it was at the ballot box either way. Further, the fact that DNC chair Ken Martin suddenly reversed course in hastily publishing the report, with the caveat that he felt under pressure to release it and didn’t “endorse” it, hasn’t helped allay concerns about what it does and does not contain.

Democratic analysts have also noted other striking omissions and incomplete sections, including discussions of Biden’s age and health status, and Harris’s rushed nomination. Was this a report that wasn’t quite ready for primetime, though it generally contained the major explanatory points? Or was it an unfinished document that didn’t follow through on its remit, by omission, commission or otherwise of topics that related to the 2024 defeat?

The postmortem seems to have raised more questions than it answered—and the role of pro-Israel policy may only be one of them.

But acknowledging the odd and opaque circumstances surrounding the report does not justify saying that “the Zionists,” Jewish donors, or pro-Israel Democrats cost Harris the election. The question is not whether Gaza and Israel matter to many Democrats. The answer is still that Gaza and Israel are unlikely to explain everything about the 2024 election.

The Democrats have many lessons to learn about their failures for the midterms and the 2028 general election. But the most important should be that a blame game can’t replace rigorous data and analysis-driven interrogation of the party’s successes and failures at the ballot box, especially at the cost of its loyal Jewish and Zionist constituencies. If it takes a second autopsy to get to the truth, including about Gaza, so be it.

Posted in JNS

The post The DNC autopsy doesn’t mention the Jewish state first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

The latest scandal that emerged overnight marks a troubling escalation in the subterranean conflict unfolding within the American establishment against Israel.

The dramatic leak to NBC News, according to which the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) raised Israel’s espionage threat level to the highest “critical” category, is not a routine security incident. To understand its significance, historical context is essential.

Since the Jonathan Pollard affair in the 1980s, Israel has been careful to avoid spying on U.S. soil or monitoring senior American officials. For that reason, the current report raises numerous questions, particularly given that the leaked document reportedly contains no forensic evidence or concrete findings proving a breach, only alleged “concerns.” The absence of evidence raises an obvious question: Is this merely a coincidence, or could the document represent a kind of land mine or parting gift left behind by departing intelligence officials? To answer that question, one must look at the timing.

It is highly noteworthy that anonymous intelligence-community “sources” chose to leak the information precisely as Congress is considering Section 224 as part of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2027.

A dramatic initiative

Section 224 is a dramatic and critical initiative intended to deepen, synchronize and accelerate U.S.-Israel defense technology cooperation. The provision focuses on shared challenges at the forefront of military technology, including counter-drone systems, missile defense, artificial intelligence and cybersecurity.

It requires the Pentagon to appoint a senior official to coordinate that cooperation, ensuring that American and Israeli forces maintain a qualitative advantage on the battlefield. The isolationist wing in the United States has mounted a forceful campaign against the provision, spreading what the author views as myths that it would “merge” the two militaries, give Israel influence over Pentagon supply chains and, above all, grant Israel unrestricted access to sensitive U.S. military data.

Now, just as the provision faces a critical test, an intelligence document surfaces warning that Israel is aggressively spying on the United States. The institutional logic of the leakers is, in the author’s view, entirely clear: How can Congress approve legislation that expands information-sharing and technological cooperation with a country simultaneously designated a “critical espionage threat”? This amounts to a targeted effort to derail the legislation. To connect the dots behind this campaign, it is worth revisiting the controversy surrounding Joe Kent’s departure two months ago.

Kent, the Trump-appointed director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), resigned and launched an unprecedented attack on Israel. He argued that Iran does not pose an immediate threat and accused Israel and its supporters of dragging America into an unnecessary war. He also linked his wife’s death in Syria to a conflict that he claimed Israel helped create. Kent is not operating in a vacuum. Does his worldview also reflect the outlook of former Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard? Throughout her tenure, Gabbard displayed deep opposition to any military confrontation with Iran. Although she presented her resignation as a personal decision related to her spouse’s illness, there are indications behind the scenes suggesting that she was actually forced out because of those disagreements.

Tying the president’s hands?

The DIA is structurally subordinate to the Pentagon, but as director of national intelligence, Gabbard controlled the National Intelligence Program budget and defined intelligence priorities.

Could the bureaucratic infrastructure left behind by her and Kent now be producing documents lacking forensic support in an effort to derail Section 224, tie the president’s hands and deepen the rift between the two countries? But the broader picture extends far beyond a struggle within the intelligence community.

The isolationist and nationalist current within the Republican Party and Trump’s political orbit is waging a multifront campaign to distance the United States from Israel. Intelligence matters and legislation are only one vector in that effort.

Another major vector currently being employed is the Christian issue, which played a significant role during the campaign in Lebanon. To understand this from a geostrategic perspective, one must remember that Trump pledged to protect Christians wherever they live around the world. Supporters point to actions such as the use of military force against Boko Haram in Africa, which Trump described as part of protecting Christians globally.

Against that backdrop, the unusual invitation extended to the Greek patriarch to visit the White House should be viewed in a different light.

The patriarch is not a head of state who would ordinarily be expected to meet with the president of the United States. Rather, the author argues, it was a calculated move by the same nationalist faction seeking to advance an anti-Israel narrative. The patriarch focused specifically on Lebanon and the Holy Land when he said that ancient communities seek to preserve their faith and freedom of worship, and that ensuring access to the Holy Land is a prerequisite for regional stability. Those pressures, according to the author, were reflected in a heated exchange between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Trump regarding the continuation of military operations in Lebanon.

It must also be acknowledged, the author argues, that the campaign there was ultimately affected by irresponsible actions by some Israeli soldiers who desecrated Christian symbols, including a cross associated with Jesus and a statue of Mary. Such conduct, together with the troubling phenomenon of ultra-Orthodox Jews spitting at tourists and clergy members in Jerusalem, provided officials in Washington with precisely the ammunition they were seeking to constrain Israel’s actions.

Add to that inflammatory comments from politicians discussing the takeover of southern Lebanon, including Christian villages, and a perfect campaign emerges portraying Israel as carrying out ethnic cleansing.

Israel’s Foreign Ministry has been making important efforts to counter what the author describes as this distortion on social media. In that context, the recent decision by Foreign Minister Gideon Saar to appoint a special envoy at the ambassadorial level to engage with the Christian world deserves mention. The appointment of Ambassador George Deek to the position is a strategic step intended to bring order to the issue, moderate tensions and centralize engagement with these communities, with particular emphasis on Christian Zionists.

When all of these developments are viewed together — the allegedly evidence-free DIA leak coinciding with the advancement of Section 224 in Congress and the pressure campaign surrounding Christian communities in Lebanon and Jerusalem — they form a coherent picture. This is a coordinated effort by the isolationist camp to apply pressure on the president and drive a deep wedge into U.S.-Israel relations.

Published on Ynet

The post The espionage affair: Who is driving a wedge between the US and Israel? first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Not long ago, in partnership with the Pittsburgh JCC, I helped convene a conversation that many people assumed could no longer happen: Bret Stephens and Jeremy Ben-Ami on the same stage talking seriously about Israel, American Jews, and the future of the US-Israel relationship.

I wanted to test whether civil discourse and reaching across the aisle still mattered. I hoped to show what I already believed: despite sharp differences, they shared substantial common ground.

Early on, Jeremy conceded that his side too often minimizes Israel’s legitimate security concerns and needs to correct that. Moments later, as he warned about the perilous erosion of Israeli democracy and the threat posed by National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, Bret echoed his alarm – and added that the lawlessness in the West Bank is profoundly troubling.

That experience matters because a nervous refrain has been growing louder among Israeli and American Jews: support for Israel in the United States is not merely ebbing; it is undergoing a historic realignment, and no one should assume it will reverse on its own. The evidence is no longer anecdotal. Recent Senate votes seeking to block specific arms sales to Israel, Pew findings showing increasingly negative views of Israel’s government, and Gallup data showing Americans’ plummeting favorable views of Israel and rising sympathy for Palestinians, especially among young Americans, all point to a tectonic shift. The old bipartisan cushion around Israel is thinning.

The shift is changing what it means to be pro-Israel in America. It is also making it far harder to inhabit the space between the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and J Street. For decades, those two organizations have served as shorthand for two instincts that many American Jews once held together: a deep commitment to Israel’s security and a conviction that Israel’s long-term security depends on democracy, diplomacy, and a credible political horizon for Palestinians. For many people, that was not a contradiction. It was the essence of responsible Zionism.

That middle ground still exists intellectually. Politically, it is becoming much harder to occupy.

Part of the reason is simple: American public sentiment has changed, and political organizations respond to incentives. When a large and growing share of the electorate distrusts Israel’s conduct, lawmakers and advocacy groups sharpen their messages. Donors treat contributions as signals. Activists demand clarity. Politicians hear that mixed positions are not thoughtful but evasive. In that environment, institutional brands harden. AIPAC’s security-first message becomes more emphatic. J Street’s insistence on accountability becomes more urgent. The space between them becomes more perilous.

A deeper reason is that the US-Israel alliance is no longer judged solely by what happens in joint command centers, intelligence briefings, or on battlefields. Tactical cooperation, however real and important, does not immunize Israel from scrutiny when its domestic politics and wartime conduct are seen as raising moral or strategic questions. Judicial reforms pursued without broad consensus, extremist settler violence in the West Bank, inflammatory rhetoric from senior Israeli officials, and a failure to articulate a post-war plan for Gaza have not gone unnoticed by many Americans. When those issues accumulate, sympathy erodes, and nuance evaporates.

Support for Israel is being reshaped

The problem is exacerbated by a political culture that prizes binary narratives. Presidents are cast as either “loyal friends” or “betrayers” based on episodic policy choices. An ally who once received unconditional praise can be labeled hostile in the quick wake of a disagreement. Social media accelerates this polarization, rewarding clear, uncompromising takes and punishing complexity.

Israel is either an apartheid genocidal state, or it can do no wrong. The result is that the political currency of being a bridge-builder has depreciated. Attempting to straddle both AIPAC’s concern for Israeli security and J Street’s insistence on democratic accountability invites attacks from both camps and diminishes one’s ability to influence either.

This is not only an American problem. It is also a failure of Israeli strategy. Too often, Israelis ascribe declining US support to external problems – antisemitism, a generational turn – rather than as warning signs of how Israeli actions are being read. That’s a dangerous intellectual posture. If you cared about preserving the alliance, you would discipline public messaging, curb extremist violence decisively, muzzle incendiary rhetoric, and articulate a coherent political vision for Gaza and the future. You would recognize that strategic success requires both battlefield competence and diplomatic literacy. Decisions made in Jerusalem play out in American living rooms and congressional corridors.

So can AIPAC and J Street coexist? In communal life, yes. They must. Quiet, behind-the-scenes bridge-building still matters – working on pressing communal concerns, fighting antisemitism, ensuring Jewish student safety – but the era in which a visible public figure could reliably represent both camps is ending.

Leaders in Israel and the American Jewish community must reckon with that truth. If the alliance is to survive and thrive, it will require more than military might; it will require a sober rethinking of strategy, messaging, and moral clarity. The middle ground is inherently noble, but nuance is valuable – as long as it is coupled with discipline and credibility. The question for Israelis and American Jews who care about the future of the alliance is no longer, “Can you be both AIPAC and J Street?” It is: “Are we willing to change our behavior so that ample space for common cause remains?”

If the answer is yes, the work must start now – in Jerusalem as much as in Washington. We need more conversation between Bret Stephens and Jeremy Ben-Ami.

Published in the Jerusalem Post

The post Can AIPAC and J Street coexist? The shrinking middle ground in US-Israel support first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

The post The EU bashes Israel publicly, but buys from it privately first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Main Findings

• Half of the respondent panel characterizes the war with Iran as a failure.
• Perceptual gap: Jews in Israel are more confident than U.S. Jews regarding the war’s achievements. § Erosion of confidence in Trump deepens: most rate his performance on Iran negatively.
• Consensus in the Diaspora: antisemitism in the West is becoming a “normal” routine.
• Changing patterns of daily life: most report concealing Jewish markers and heightened vigilance.
• Most respondents believe that Israel bears substantial responsibility for the continued existence of the Jewish people in the Diaspora.
• There is broad support for investing Israeli resources in education and the strengthening of Jewish identity in the Diaspora.
• Israel as a refuge: Most respondents view Israel as a safe haven forJews.
• Most respondents feel a personal responsibility for the fate of Israeli Jews and feel that they share a common destiny.
• Like Israelis, U.S.Jews perceive nuclear weapons as the gravest threat to humanity.
• Climate-crisis perception gap: deep concern in the United States, relative indifference in Israel.
• Perceptual gap: U.S. Jews view social media as a much more serious threat than Jewish Israelis do.

To download the PDF file, click here.

Survey Background: Data for this month’s Voice of the Jewish People Index survey was collected May 14-20. Several key events over the past month shaped the survey questions and the attitudes reflected in the Index. Central among them was the extension of the ceasefire with Iran, which first took effect at the beginning of April. The continuing diplomatic pressure exerted by the U.S. administration to extend the pause and shift the center of gravity to the diplomatic arena prompted an active public discussion about the degree of trust in American and Israeli leadership and in the outcome of the campaign. At the same time, in the U.S. domestic arena, the political system accelerated its preparations for the congressional midterm elections, with U.S. involvement in the Middle East and its economic implications occupying a central place in the public discourse.

Methodological Note: In recent months, we have also begun surveying the views of Jews in Canada and the United Kingdom. In both countries, panels are being assembled and are growing, albeit slowly. In May, approximately 70 participants from the UK and approximately 130 from Canada responded to the survey. Accordingly, the data on Jewish views in these countries should be interpreted with caution. When the report presents data broken down by ideological orientation, denominational affiliation, or voting pattern, it refers only to U.S. respondents.

Support for the War with Iran

This month’s Voice of the Jewish People Index survey was conducted about a month after the ceasefire among Iran, the United States, and Israel came into effect. Shortly before the ceasefire was set to expire, President Trump announced its extension. This was the situation at the time of this writing, and it is the central context for assessing public opinion.

An examination of the respondent panel’s support for the war with Iran over recent months indicates relative stabilization compared with the beginning of the campaign. This month, the share of panel respondents who support the war still constitutes a 58% majority, only a slight decline from the 60% recorded last month and a cumulative decrease of 10 percentage points since the first week of the war (68%). The share opposing the campaign also remained stable, at 34%. These figures suggest that the prolongation of the ceasefire did not generate dramatic shifts in respondents’ opinions.

A breakdown by ideological orientation shows deeply polarized opinions of the war. Consensus exists at the conservative end of the ideological spectrum: both strong-conservative and leaning-conservative respondents support the move overwhelmingly (92%). Support is also high among the centrist cohort (79%), whereas the opposite picture emerges at the liberal pole, where close to three-quarters of the strong liberal cohort (72%) report having opposed the war. The leaning-liberal cohort is the most divided, with slightly more supporters (45%) than opponents (39%); 16% have not yet formed a final position on the issue.

Similar to the U.S.Jews surveyed, in recent months, there has also been an erosion of support for the war among Canadian and UK respondents, against the backdrop of the extended ceasefire. Among Canadian respondents, there has been a relatively moderate five-point decline in support (from 81% to 76%), while the share of those opposed to the war remained stable (15%). Among UK respondents, support for the war fell by 12 percentage points and now stands at 63%, alongside an increase in the share who oppose it (to 29%). Despite the downward trend in both countries, a majority of respondents continue to support the decision to go to war against Iran, with Canadian respondents continuing to display the strongest support.

Success in the War with Iran

One month into the ceasefire, the respondent panel’s assessment of the war’s achievements is marked by disappointment and skepticism, with only 9% regarding its results as very successful. Conversely, close to half of the respondents (47%) view the war as either a failure or somewhat of a failure. The middle group, which regards the war’s results as a “partial success,” constitutes a substantial share, four in ten respondents (39%). This data reflects a significant gap among the U.S. Jews surveyed between the war’s stated objectives and their achievement.

A breakdown by ideological orientation reveals a clear correlation between political outlook and the level of criticism regarding the results of the fighting. At the liberal end of the ideological spectrum, the war is regarded as a failure: three-quarters (78%) of the strong liberal cohort and half(51%) of the leaning-liberal cohort characterize it as such. Among the centrist and the two conservative cohorts, the dominant position is more moderate and tends to regard the outcomes so far as representing some degree of success. Still, it is worth noting that even in the strong conservative cohort, the share identifying the outcome as very successful is only a third (31%). This seems to reflect a general dissatisfaction with the framework under which the fighting was halted.

The erosion in the assessment of the war’s achievements is also clearly evident among Canadian and UK respondents. In Canada, the share of respondents who see the campaign as very successful fell to just 9%, while the total share assessing the results negatively rose to 37%. In the UK, the retreat is even sharper: the share characterizing the war as very successful dropped to a negligible 3%, while almost half of respondents (46%) see the results as negative: 26% view it as a failure, 20% as somewhat of a failure. Nevertheless, in both countries, most respondents still tend toward a moderate assessment, characterizing the war as somewhat successful.

An examination of the sense of victory in the multi-front war that began after the October 7 Hamas massacre shows stability in the views of the U.S. respondent panel over the past year, alongside a small gap compared with Jewish Israelis. This month, one-third of the U.S. Jews surveyed (30%) believe that Israel has won or is winning (ratings of 4 or 5), a figure very similar to those recorded in July and August 2025. By contrast, more than a third (38%) feel that Israel is not winning (ratings of 1 and 2); 33% hold an intermediate position. A somewhat different picture appears among Jewish Israelis this month (as per the May 2026 JPPI Israeli Society Index). Jews in Israel show greater confidence in the achievements of the campaign: four in ten (42%) feel that Israel is winning or has won, including 16% who feel this completely (compared with only 4% of the U.S. respondent panel), while only 32% share the sense that Israel is not winning.

Assessment of the war’s outcome correlates directly with ideological orientation. At the conservative end of the ideological spectrum, majorities among the strong conservative and leaning-conservative cohorts believe Israel has won or is winning (57% and 59%, respectively). This position weakens among centrist respondents and weakens further among the leaning-liberal cohort, where only 15% perceive that Israel has won or is winning in the multi-front campaign. Among those who self-identify as strong liberals, 65% assert that Israel is not winning the war, with only 9% believing it is.

Among Canadian and UK respondents, too, the sense of victory remains qualified, although they display slightly greater confidence than U.S.Jews. A third of Canadian respondents (36%) feel that Israel is winning/ has won the war, compared with another third (34%) who believe that Israel has not won or is not winning. Similarly, among UK respondents, the share identifying an Israeli victor stands at one-third (31%), as does the share rejecting that view (32%). In both countries, as in the U.S., the share of respondents who feel that Israel is completely winning remains negligible.

Trust in Leaders

The erosion of respondents’ confidence in President Trump’s handling of Iran deepened over the past month. The data shows that the share of respondents giving Trump’s leadership the maximum rating, “very good,” has been in consistent decline, falling from 28% in March to 23% in April and to only 18% this month. At the same time, criticism of the president is intensifying: the share rating his leadership as “very poor” in the Iranian context has risen consistently in recent months. Overall, a majority (55%) of the respondent panel now assesses Trump’s leadership on Iran negatively.

Assessment of the president’s leadership also correlates with ideological orientation. At the conservative end of the ideological spectrum, support forTrump is nearly sweeping (95% amongthe strongconservative cohort and 80% among the leaning conservative group). The opposite picture emerges in the liberal camp,

where an overwhelming majority of the strong liberal (92%) and leaning liberal (80%) cohorts view Trump’s leadership as poor, with 86% of the strong liberal cohort rating it as very poor.

The data show that U.S. respondents’ confidence in Prime Minister Netanyahu’s leadership in the context of Iran is low. Three in ten (31%) respondents characterize Netanyahu’s leadership as very poor. Overall, 45% assess the prime minister’s leadership negatively. Conversely, the core of positive support for Netanyahu’s leadership remains limited but stable, with 25% giving his leadership a positive assessment.

At the conservative end of the ideological spectrum, there is a near-consensus positive assessment of the prime minister: nine in ten (94%) strong conservative respondents and eight in ten (86%) leaning- conservative respondents characterize his leadership in the Iranian context as good. An opposite picture emerges in the two liberal cohorts: an overwhelming majority of strong liberals (83%) and leaning liberals (63%) reject his leadership. The centrist group presents a nuanced position but skews negative.

This month, a continued erosion in assessments of Netanyahu’s leadership on Iran was also recorded among Canadian and UK respondents. The share viewing his leadership as poor reached 32% in Canada and 41% in the UK. Despite this trend, Netanyahu’s overall rating remains higher among Canadian respondents than among U.S. respondents; the figures for UK and U.S. respondents are almost identical.

Assessments of British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s leadership in the Iranian context indicate a gradual improvement among UK respondents overthe past month, despite an overall negative position. The share of UK respondents characterizing his leadership as very poor fell by 10 points compared with March.

Assessments of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s leadership regarding Iran stabilized after the decline in confidence recorded in April, but remain largely negative. Positive assessments of his performance are at 19% this month, compared with 12% last month. Conversely, criticism of Carney remains broad, with two-thirds of Canadian respondents (65%) rating his leadership negatively.

Antisemitism

This month, we examined whether respondents feel that antisemitism is becoming normalized and is not being treated with sufficient seriousness. This followed a series of attacks onJews in London that attracted considerable attention and led to an unusual public response from Britain’s chief rabbi.

The data indicate broad, cross-community agreement that antisemitism is becoming normalized in Western countries, with Britain, France, Canada, and Australia perceived as the principal centers of risk. Britain leads the list of countries in which the phenomenon is perceived as most severe, with sweeping levels of agreement ranging from 82% among UK respondents themselves to 92% among their Canadian counterparts. Canada is also rated highly, peakingat 91% among local respondents. Canadian respondents express the most critical and concerned stance toward most of the countries examined, including Australia (85%) and the United States (76%). By contrast, UK respondents take a relatively moderate stance in their assessment of the overall situation, expressing less concern with respect to the United States (55%) and Germany (31%), but sharing the general concern about developments in France (75%) and Belgium (72%). Only a negligible share rejects the claim entirely.

At the beginning of this month, The New York Times reported that many American Jews have changed their behavior in response to the surge in antisemitic incidents in recent years, and especially since the October 7 attack. According to the report, the change is reflected in the concealment of public expressions of worship and identity, increased vigilance in public spaces, and the circulation of warnings and alerts within the community.

The survey data indicate that the rise in antisemitism has had a significant effect on the lives of respondents, with a majority (54%) reporting concealing Jewish markers and increased vigilance. This sentiment crosses political camps and illustrates that security and social anxiety among most of the U.S. Jewish community is front and center. Just one-fifth of respondents (18%) report that the characterization does not correspond at all to their situation.

Examining the findings by religious stream shows that the sense of vulnerability and the need to change behavior are felt particularly strongly among those affiliated with institutional streams, especially those who tend to wear public religious markers or frequently attend communal institutions. Agreement peaks among Orthodox (65%) and Conservative respondents (61%). Half of Reform respondents (51%) also report a broad effect of antisemitism on their conduct.

The question of circumcision in Belgium reached a legal crisis point in recent weeks, when authorities filed criminal indictments against three Belgian mohels (circumcizers) who allegedly performed the procedure contrary to guidelines and in violation of the law, which requires physician-performed circumcisions. Most respondents believe that this has antisemitic undertones that restrict the Jewish community’s freedom of action in the country.

Half (50%) of all U.S. respondents believe the physician-only Belgian circumcision law is antisemitic. An additional quarter (25%) believe that although the law may be reasonable in itself, in the specific case of Belgium, it takes on an antisemitic character, bringing the total share identifying intentional harm to the Jewish community to a 75% majority. By contrast, the minority who believe there is no problem with the Belgian law and that local mohels should comply with it remains negligible, at 9% ofthe total sample; 16% of respondents did not know how to answer this question.

A breakdown by denominational affiliation reveals a direct correlation between religiosity and the severity of the interpretation of the Belgian case. Among Haredi and Modern Orthodox respondents, there is sweeping rejection of the law: three-quarters (77% of Haredim and 72% of Orthodox respondents) consider it antisemitic, and support for the Belgian state authorities is effectively nonexistent. This position moderates gradually as one moves along the denominational spectrum toward the liberal end: 56% of Conservative respondents view the law as antisemitic, while 37% of Reform respondents do so.

Special National Shabbat

As part of Jewish American Heritage Month (JAHM), President Trump declared the weekend of May 15- 16 a “special national Shabbat” marking 250 years of American independence. The move sets a historic precedent in which the White House officially calls for a distinctly religious act of Shabbat observance, while integrating the initiative into conservative prayer events. While the Orthodox U.S. Jewish community supported the initiative and held official events in cooperation with the administration, Reform and Conservative Jewish organizations condemned the move, arguing that it violates the principle of separation of religion and state and erodes governmental neutrality.

The willingness to take part in the initiative was high among the Voice of the Jewish People respondent panel, though mostly among those who already observe Shabbat. Half of the connected U.S.Jews surveyed (48%) said they intended to observe this special Shabbat. Conversely, a substantial 21% explicitly stated that they would not observe this special Shabbat, and a similar share of respondents (19%) said that they had heard of the initiative but had not yet decided what to do or had not heard of it at all.

Among Modern Orthodox and Haredi religious respondents, there was near-complete consensus, with the share of those who routinely observe Shabbat ranging from 81% to 95%, alongside a small percentage who honored the specific initiative. A more varied picture emerges as one moves toward the liberal end of the religious axis: in the Conservative cohort, the response was moderate, with four in ten (38%) observing Shabbat regularly and an additional 12% mobilized by the president’s initiative. Among Reform respondents, reservations about the initiative are evident: only 7% chose to join the initiative specifically, alongside one-quarter who observe Shabbat as a matter of routine. The largest group in this stream (31%) stated that they did not intend to participate in Trump’s special Shabbat initiative.

Threats to Humanity’s Future

This month, we asked respondents to rate, on a scale from 1 (not a threat at all) to 5 (a very serious threat), several issues that some have asserted over the past decade constitute “threats to humanity’s future.” This examination is designed to compare attitudes amongJews surveyed in the United States and among Jewish Israelis, who were asked the same questions at the beginning of the month.

Across the four risk domains presented, Jewish Israelis and connected U.S. Jews like to identify the proliferation of nuclear weapons as the most serious existential threat to humanity. A majority of respondents in both places gave this issue the highest score (a very serious threat): 64% amongJewish Israelis and 58% among U.S. respondents. When the two highest-risk levels (scores of 4 and 5 combined) are combined, the figure rises to more than 80% in both samples. This broad consensus highlights that despite rapid technological change, the nuclear threat remains the central and most consistent concern, crossing geographic boundaries.

In contrast to the agreement on the nuclear issue, a significant gap appears in perceptions of global warming as a threat, reflecting substantial differences between the two communities. While the U.S. Jews surveyed view the climate crisis as a serious and immediate threat, with 61% rating the issue at 4 or 5 (including 43% as a very serious threat), Jewish Israelis display relative indifference, with a different distribution of responses. Forty-three percent of Jewish Israelis placed the risk in the high-threat categories, and only 21% gave it the maximum score. Similar but more moderate gaps were also recorded regarding the impact of social media, which is perceived as far more of a threat by the U.S Jews surveyed77%) compared with 53% in Israel, and regarding the development of artificial intelligence (AI), which in both.

This month, we asked respondents to rate, on a scale from 1 (not a threat at all) to 5 (a very serious threat), several issues that some have asserted over the past decade constitute “threats to humanity’s future.” This examination is designed to compare attitudes amongJews surveyed in the United States and among Jewish Israelis, who were asked the same questions at the beginning of the month.

Across the four risk domains presented, Jewish Israelis and connected U.S. Jews like to identify the proliferation of nuclear weapons as the most serious existential threat to humanity. A majority of respondents in both places gave this issue the highest score (a very serious threat): 64% amongJewish Israelis and 58% among U.S. respondents. When the two highest-risk levels (scores of 4 and 5 combined) are combined, the figure rises to more than 80% in both samples. This broad consensus highlights that despite rapid technological change, the nuclear threat remains the central and most consistent concern, crossing geographic boundaries.

In contrast to the agreement on the nuclear issue, a significant gap appears in perceptions of global warming as a threat, reflecting substantial differences between the two communities. While the U.S. Jews surveyed view the climate crisis as a serious and immediate threat, with 61% rating the issue at 4 or 5 (including 43% as a very serious threat), Jewish Israelis display relative indifference, with a different distribution of responses. Forty-three percent of Jewish Israelis placed the risk in the high-threat categories, and only 21% gave it the maximum score. Similar but more moderate gaps were also recorded regarding the impact of social media, which is perceived as far more of a threat by the U.S  Jews surveyed77%) compared with 53% in Israel, and regarding the development of artificial intelligence (AI), which in both

The samples were rated as the least serious of the four threats, with a large share of respondents in both Israel and the United States ranking it a 3.

Content Consumption: Israel and Judaism

Patterns of consumption of literature about Israel among the connected U.S. Jews surveyed point to a sustained and active intellectual interest, with a majority (70%) of respondents reporting that they had read a book on this topic in the past year. The distribution of responses indicates an active and dynamic readership: one-fifth of the connected U.S. Jews surveyed (21%) say they are currently reading a book about Israel, alongside another fifth (20%) who have read such a book in the past month. Conversely, a quarter of respondents (27%) report not having read a book on Israel for a long time, while only a negligible share (3%) states that they have never read an Israel-related book.

There is a clear and consistent correlation between ideological orientation and the frequency of reading about Israel, with the conservative cohorts showing the highest level of engagement. A majority (57%) of respondents in the strong conservative cohort have read a book about Israel in the past month or are currently reading one. Thirty-one percent of the leaning-conservative cohort, too, are currently reading an Israel-related book. As one moves along the ideological spectrum toward the liberal end, the frequency of reading about Israel declines gradually: among centrist respondents, the share currently reading stands at one-fifth (19%), and in the liberal cohorts it falls slightly to 17% among leaning-liberal respondents and 15% among those in the strong liberal group. Notably, even at the strong liberal pole, most respondents (55%) have read an Israel-related book in the past year.

The data indicate a very high incidence of reading books dealing with Judaism, including Torah texts, among respondents. An 80% majority reported having read a book on Jewish subjects in the past year. One-third (35%) report that they are currently reading a book about Judaism or Torah, compared with 21% who reported currently reading a book about Israel. An additional 19% report having read such a book in the past month, and 26% said they have done so in the past year. Just 17% reported not having read a Jewish book for a long time, and a negligible share (2%) reported having never read a book dealing with these topics.

A breakdown by denominational affiliation reveals a direct association between the level of conservatism and reading habits. Currently-reading rates among Haredi and Modern Orthodox respondents are the highest, reaching 68% and 59%, respectively, with only a negligible 5% sayingthey have not read a book on the subject for a long time and none reporting that they have never read such a book. This trend moderates gradually as one moves toward the liberal end of the denominational spectrum but remains substantial: among Reform and Conservative respondents, close to one-third are currently reading a Jewish or Torah book (32% and 27%, respectively), and most have read such a book in the past year.

Consumption of Israel-related films and television series is also high. Three-quarters (75%) of respondents reported having watched content of this kind in the past year, a figure slightly higher than the share that has read books about Israel (70%). However, a closer examination of consumption dynamics shows that while books have a higher share ofactive readers at any given moment (21% reported that they are currently reading a book), visual media are characterized by concentrated periodic consumption: only 9% of respondents said they were currently watching an Israel-related television series or film, but 31% have watched such content in the past month, and an additional 35% have consumed such content in the past 12 months. Conversely, 23% noted that they had not watched television or film concerning Israel for a long time.

Three-quarters (76%) of the respondent panel reported watching films or television series about Judaism, the Torah, or other Jewish topics in the past year. Ongoing consumption is characterized by a periodic dynamic: only an 8% minority of respondents report currently watching such content, but close to a third (31%) have watched Judaism-related content in the past month, and an additional third (37%) have consumed it over the past year. Conversely, one-quarter (23%) said they had not watched Judaism-related media for a long time, and just 2% reported never having consumed such content.

The Modern Orthodox cohort shows the highest level of engagement in regular viewing of Jewish content, with half of this group (51%) having watched a Jewish film or series in the past month or watching one now. Notable activity is also found among Haredi respondents, with 18% reporting current viewing, although 36% report little interest in such media. In the liberal cohorts, viewing patterns are broad and stable over time: 76% of Reform respondents and 75% of Conservative respondents have consumed Jewish-related media in the past year, with a third in both streams (31%) having watched such content in the past month.

Survey Data and Implications

This report is based on a survey of 989 Jews registered for JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People respondent panel. Broadly speaking, the survey reflects the views of connected American Jews – that is, those with a relatively strong connection to the Jewish community, and/or Israel, and/ or Jewish identity. The survey included 65 respondents in the United Kingdom and 131 in Canada. Unless otherwise noted, the results reflect the views of U.S. respondents only. JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People Index survey was conducted by JPPI fellows Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepkov, with assistance from Yael Levinovsky. Prof. David Steinberg provided

statistical supervision.

This table includes data on the U.S. survey respondents for May 2026.

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A few days ago, in a move that carries considerable tactical and operational significance, Israel’s Golani Brigade recaptured Beaufort Castle – 26 years after it was abandoned by the IDF. Depending on one’s point of view, the circle has either closed or reopened.

The 12th-century fortress is an integral part of the southern Lebanon landscape. Built on a mountain more than 700 meters above the surrounding terrain, Beaufort dominates key approaches in southern Lebanon. From such high ground, the IDF can improve observation, strengthen forward defense of northern Israeli communities, and complicate Hezbollah’s efforts to move fighters, anti-tank teams, and sniper cells south of the Litani River.

It can make Hezbollah’s tactical life more difficult, and it may help Israel enforce ceasefire understandings in an area where topography really matters.

The move also has significant psychological implications.

Beaufort Castle overlooks Nabatieh, the largest Shiite city in southern Lebanon and one of Hezbollah’s most formidable strongholds. It sends a message to Hezbollah and to the Lebanese state that Israel is prepared to expand its ground presence north of the Litani River as well, if necessary, to bring about Hezbollah’s disarmament – even within the current ceasefire framework and under American pressure.

A powerful Israeli national image

Israel’s return to Beaufort Castle is the kind of feat that invites talk of historical closure.

A flag on the ridge, a Crusader fortress overlooking southern Lebanon, and Golani soldiers back in one of the recognizable symbols of the old Security Zone create a powerful Israeli national image. Beaufort may improve Israel’s local military posture, but it does not solve Israel’s strategic problem in Lebanon. Beaufort Castle is also a central fixture in the collective memory of Israel’s long and costly presence in Lebanon before its 2000 withdrawal.

The significance of recapturing Beaufort should not be underestimated, but neither should it be overstated. The move does not fundamentally change Israel’s strategic problem in Lebanon: Hezbollah. The organization, an Iranian militia, is supported by a large segment of Lebanon’s Shiite community. It threatens Israel from Lebanese territory and, despite current peace talks between Jerusalem and Beirut in Washington, refuses to accept state control of military weapons.

At the most basic level, no localized (re)capture, however significant, can solve this problem.

Add to this the drone threat, which is increasingly one of the most significant operational challenges in Lebanon. This threat is not shaped by the classical principles of war, and Hezbollah is likely to continue launching drones at IDF forces operating in southern Lebanon, exploiting the asymmetric advantages inherent in the use of such systems. The IDF may be able to use its control of Beaufort to raid key nodes in the drones’ value chain, but it will likely be no more than a band-aid. In Ukraine, for instance, fiber-optic drones can reach ranges of up to 50 kilometers, while cellular drones can reach ranges of up to 2,000 kilometers.

Beaufort is a relatively isolated compound, and reaching it is complex, requiring slow, cumbersome, and vulnerable supply chains. This is a daunting challenge for the IDF, which will have to defend not just the outpost itself, but also the road leading to it. It must be remembered that a significant part of the blood price paid by the IDF during its years in Lebanon stemmed from Hezbollah’s ability to exploit the slow supply convoys to the outposts in striking Israeli forces.

The IDF will have to ensure that a battlefield advantage does not turn into a point of vulnerability and that the routes leading to the Beaufort remain safe and open for the movement of military forces.

It will be a Sisyphean task; there is a diplomatic horizon

Viewed soberly, the capture of Beaufort is an important move within the framework of the IDF’s activity in southern Lebanon, but it is not sufficient in and of itself, nor does it provide Israel with a strategic advantage in the struggle to disarm Hezbollah. To achieve that, the State of Israel needs full freedom of action against Hezbollah anywhere in Lebanon. Crucially, Israel must complement the military effort with effective diplomatic activity that leverages the historic crisis Hezbollah is currently facing in Lebanon.

With few allies left, declining support among the Shiite community, and growing pressure from the Lebanese state, the organization is increasingly isolated and vulnerable. It will be a Sisyphean task, long and complex, but for the first time, it is possible. There is a diplomatic horizon.

Israel would do well to focus more on these efforts and less on triumphalist rhetoric about the capture of Beaufort, important as it may be.

Published in the Jerusalem Post

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