In May 2022, a few months after Russia invaded Ukraine, I wrote a column in these pages warning that Israel could one day find itself facing Russian-style sanctions.

The world was imposing the most sweeping sanctions regime in decades on Moscow, targeting thousands of individuals, companies, banks, and government entities. And while back in 2022 it seemed far-fetched that something like this could one day happen to Israel, there were already voices being heard on the fringes asking whether similar tools could one day be used against the Jewish state.

There was a politician in Colombia, someone on the far Left in Britain, a few pundits in Europe and the United States. It was not overly significant, but it was something.

My argument then was simple: Eventually, there would be another war in Gaza. Israel would do what it believed necessary to defend itself, and images of Palestinian casualties would fill television screens and social media feeds. Despite Israel’s efforts to minimize civilian casualties, public opinion would turn against it.

No one knew then that just 17 months later, Hamas would invade Israel on October 7, and that despite suffering the worst attack in its history, Israel would find itself experiencing the greatest diplomatic isolation since its establishment.

Which brings us to what happened this month.

On September 8, Britain, France, and Canada announced plans to impose restrictions on trade with Israeli settlements – an import ban on settlement goods, as well as measures targeting companies and individuals providing construction, infrastructure, financing, and other services that facilitate settlement expansion. British legislation is expected to take several months to implement.

For now, these measures are designed to distinguish between Israel within the Green Line and Israeli activity beyond it. Indeed, the British government has explicitly said that its planned import ban is supposed to avoid affecting Israel within its recognized borders.

But sanctions have a way of expanding.

Imagine that after the October 27 election, the next Israeli government decides to formally annex part of the West Bank. It does not have to be all of the territory or even all of Area C, where the settlements are located. It could just be the Jordan Valley, a strip of land that even opposition parties believe should belong to Israel.

What happens then? How difficult will it be for countries that have already imposed sanctions to move the dial another click? Today it is a company building homes in a settlement. Tomorrow it could be a company building a highway serving that settlement. Then the bank financing the project. Then the financial institution underwriting the bank.

Earlier this week, I drove along Highway 60 toward Psagot and got stuck in traffic because work was underway to expand the West Bank highway. Now imagine that a construction company doing that work risks sanctions, or the bank that is financing it, as well as the American or European company that is supposed to supply the bulldozers and trucks.

Impossible? Sadly, no.

There are those who claim that America would never do that to Israel. The problem is that the line was crossed in 2024 when the Biden administration imposed sanctions on Israeli settlers accused of violence and destabilizing activity in the West Bank. While Donald Trump rescinded those sanctions immediately upon taking office in January 2025, the taboo has been broken, and what Biden did paves the way for a future Democratic administration.

There was also a time when the idea of Western governments imposing sanctions on Israeli cabinet ministers would have sounded absurd. But that has happened as well, with Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, who have been sanctioned by the UK and parts of Europe.

So why would anyone confidently assume that what we see today is the end of the process rather than just a taste of what can still come? We need to remember that a comprehensive sanctions regime would not merely mean that a few politicians cannot travel to London, or that a few settlers would have their bank accounts frozen. A genuinely broad sanctions regime would strike at the foundation of Israel’s economy.

International companies would need to ask themselves whether maintaining operations in Israel is worth the legal exposure. Israeli tech companies would most likely decide to relocate abroad. Foreign investment would drop. The brain drain that Israel already worries about would accelerate.

And even if America were to remain outside such a sanctions regime, Israel cannot simply shrug and claim that Europe does not matter. The European Union is Israel’s largest trading partner. In 2025, trade in goods between Israel and the EU totaled €43.3 billion. The EU accounted for 33.1% of Israel’s imports and 29.4% of its exports.

Losing significant access to that market would not be an inconvenience – it would fundamentally change the Israeli economy.

So what can Israel do? On the one hand, it needs to diversify its trade and diplomatic ties. It should expand trade and diplomatic relationships in Asia, particularly with countries where Gaza and the Palestinian issue play a smaller role in determining economic ties. Israelis are innovative – supply chains can be rebuilt, and new trading partners can be found.

Israel would survive, but it would become a different country.

It would be more isolated, more expensive to live in, less attractive for investment, and increasingly disconnected from the Western economic and diplomatic system, of which Israel has spent decades playing an integral part.

None of the above means that Israel should allow foreign governments to dictate its decision-making. A sovereign country must make decisions even when they carry costs, and there will always be moments when Israelis decide a particular policy is essential to their security and are willing to pay that price.

But we should at least understand the price and stop the habit of dismissing every warning as meaningless.

Our politicians tell us that Europe doesn’t matter, that the United Nations is a waste of time, and that the International Criminal Court is irrelevant. The problem is that none of this is true. All of these institutions matter – just ask Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who cannot travel to Europe anymore – and their decisions actually affect lives here in Israel.

In this context, Netanyahu addressed the UN on Thursday. As I wrote this column, the prime minister was making his way to New York, where he was expected to give a powerful speech. Whatever one thinks of him, Netanyahu remains one of Israel’s most talented communicators, a gifted orator who understands the theater of the UN better than almost any Israeli leader before him.

There may be a prop, and there will almost certainly be a memorable line. But none of it will solve the problem, because a speech, no matter how good, cannot reverse three years of diplomatic deterioration. Israel’s public diplomacy has been neglected throughout this war. For more than two years, Netanyahu failed to appoint a permanent head of the National Public Diplomacy Directorate. Ministers have repeatedly been allowed to say whatever they wanted without considering the diplomatic consequences.

Settler violence has been treated as a nuisance rather than as a strategic threat that hands Israel’s adversaries ammunition on a silver platter.

And only now, after years of accusations against Israel and the IDF, has the military finally decided to establish a multidisciplinary team to respond to false claims and distortions about its conduct, due to a film that received a standing ovation in Venice.

So, yes, Netanyahu stood at the UN and made Israelis proud. But speeches are not a strategy. Israel faces a campaign today being waged on several fronts: on the battlefield, in international institutions, in the information arena, and now through economic and financial pressure.

Does anyone seriously believe we are ready for what comes next?

Published in The Jerusalem Post

The post Israel is fighting a new war on the financial front – and it is not ready first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Ursula von der Leyen made a striking proposal in Strasbourg on September 16. With Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney in attendance, the European Commission president opened the door to Canada becoming what she called the European Union’s first “associate member.”

There is only one problem. The European Union has no such status.

Associate membership does not appear in the EU treaties. There is no established package of rights and obligations attached to it, no predetermined place for an associate member in the Union’s institutions, and no agreement about how much access to the Single Market it would entail. Von der Leyen supplied a name before Europe had designed the institution.

But Brussels does not need to start with a blank sheet of paper.

It should look at Israel. Canada may indeed become the first country formally granted whatever new status the EU eventually calls “associate membership.” But it would hardly be the first country to inhabit the space between membership and an ordinary third-country relationship. Israel has spent nearly seven decades constructing one version of such a relationship: integration without membership.

The story began almost as soon as the European project itself. In April 1958, only months after the Treaty of Rome entered into force, Israel became the third country, after Greece and the United States, to request the establishment of a diplomatic mission to the European Economic Community in Brussels. Full diplomatic relations followed in February 1959.

And Israel wanted more than trade.

From the beginning, Israeli policymakers sought association with the emerging Community. The Israeli ambition was substantially political as well as economic. Israel eventually accepted agreements that fell short of association, but the larger objective was to secure a recognized place alongside the developing European project.

What Israel was asking Europe in the late 1950s sounds surprisingly familiar in 2026: how close can a non-member country come to the European project without actually joining it?

The answer emerged gradually rather than through grand constitutional design.

Over the decades, Israel and Europe built their ties layer by layer. The 1995 EU-Israel Association Agreement, which entered into force in 2000, established the central institutional framework. The European Neighbourhood Policy later added an Action Plan intended to bring Israel closer to European policies and programs. Cooperation expanded into research and innovation, aviation, pharmaceuticals, education and regulatory cooperation.

Israel’s largest trading partner

Today those ties reach remarkably far. The EU is Israel’s largest trading partner, accounting for 31.7% of Israel’s trade in goods in 2025, worth €43.3 billion. Israel participates in Horizon Europe. The EU-Israel aviation agreement connects the Israeli and European aviation markets, while another agreement facilitates trade in pharmaceuticals. Israel also participates in the Pan-Euro-Mediterranean system of rules of origin.

This is not EU membership. But neither is it a conventional relationship between two separate markets. Nearly two decades ago, Joel Peters and I described the logic behind this arrangement as “integration without membership.” We proposed a Euro-Israeli Partnership that would sit deliberately below full membership while moving beyond the existing Association Agreement. It envisaged deeper political cooperation, Israeli participation in European agencies and programs, gradual convergence with relevant parts of the European acquis, and greater access to the Single Market.

The objective was not to prepare Israel for eventual accession. It was to recognize that European integration need not end at the Union’s formal borders.

Israel is not the only precedent. Switzerland offers the EU’s most developed example of sector-by-sector integration outside membership, with extensive agreements connecting it to large parts of the Single Market and numerous European programs. But Switzerland is geographically and economically embedded in Europe. Israel offers a different lesson: a country outside geographical Europe, with no realistic membership perspective, can nevertheless become deeply connected to selected parts of the European system.

That distinction suddenly matters far beyond Israel.

Carney has ruled out Canadian EU membership. What Ottawa is seeking instead is what he has called a “unique alliance,” extending across trade, defense, technology, energy, and critical minerals. Canada has already moved closer to European defense structures through its participation in the EU’s SAFE defense program. Here the analogy with Israel has limits. Israel’s integration has developed overwhelmingly through economic, regulatory, scientific, and sectoral cooperation. It does not provide a blueprint for the defense and security dimension that Canada and the EU are now considering. If associate membership eventually encompasses defense procurement and strategic coordination, Brussels will be constructing something new.

But the Israeli experience does offer a model for how such a relationship can be constructed.

Closer ties do not have to be all or nothing. They can proceed sector by sector. Research systems can connect without political membership. Aviation markets can open. Regulations can converge in selected areas. European programs can admit non-member states. New areas of cooperation can be added as political circumstances and mutual interests change. None of that necessarily requires the full institutional rights of an EU member state. The Israeli case also cautions against romanticizing such arrangements. EU-Israel relations are currently experiencing a period of severe political strain. EU institutions have debated Israel’s compliance with the human-rights provisions of the Association Agreement and possible restrictions on parts of the relationship over the war in Gaza.

That does not invalidate the model. It demonstrates something important about it. Deep institutional ties do not eliminate political disagreement. They create structures within which cooperation, conditionality, and conflict can coexist.

Canada has, therefore, exposed a gap in the EU’s institutional architecture. There are countries that may want much more than a trade agreement without seeking membership. Switzerland demonstrates how far that principle can extend within Europe. Israel demonstrates that it can extend beyond it. Canada may now add a strategic and defense dimension neither model fully provides. Canada could still become the first country formally designated an EU associate member. But it would enter territory Europe has been exploring for decades.

The Canadian question is how a country can move much closer to the EU without becoming a member of it.

The name may be new. Much of the model is not.

Published in The Jerusalem Post

The post A new EU status for Canada? Israel has lived the model for decades first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Within a few days in late August, the world learned of the deaths of three giants of global culture: Dolly Parton, Péter Nádas, and Yayoi Kusama.

An American country singer, a Hungarian Jewish novelist, and a Japanese avant-garde artist. There is no obvious reason to place them together. They belonged to different generations, countries, artistic traditions, and cultural worlds. Yet the news of their deaths arriving within days of one another offers a reminder of something increasingly precious: culture can create common ground – and open a door into unfamiliar worlds – without requiring us to become alike.

I saw this quite literally at a Dolly Parton concert in Toronto in 2016. There were unmistakable groups: men in cowboy-style outfits, a visible Evangelical presence, and large numbers of gay and lesbian fans. Whatever else divided them – politics, religion, sexuality, social background – they all adored Dolly.

For a few hours, Parton created a community among people who might otherwise have had very little to say to one another. She did not resolve their disagreements. She did something more modest and perhaps more valuable: she gave them something they could love together. I am Jewish. I do not share Parton’s Christian faith. But I do not need to share it to understand the image at the heart of her music, that human beings need something that gives them wings and something that keeps their feet on the ground; faith and humility.

Péter Nádas represented a radically different cultural universe. By coincidence, I finished The End of a Family Story three days before his death. It is an uneasy book – difficult, claustrophobic, and unsettling. Nádas was Hungarian and Jewish, and the Jewishness of his writing is integral, not incidental.

In The End of a Family Story, family, faith, politics, and memory become entangled with the violent history of 20th-century Europe. People inherit worlds they did not choose and histories they cannot simply discard.

What Europe means for Jews

For Jews, and certainly for Israelis, Europe is rarely only a geographical place. It is also memory. Sometimes longing. Sometimes fear. Sometimes culture. Sometimes a family story whose beginning we no longer know and whose ending remains unfinished.

Then there is Yayoi Kusama. I first encountered her work in person on the Japanese island of Naoshima in 2017. I later attended her major retrospective at the Tel Aviv Museum of Art.

Again, the crowd was part of the experience. There were secular Israelis, families with children, and a large, visible group of Arab Israelis. Some had come to see the work of one of the most important artists of the past century. Others were drawn to the mirrors, dots, and pumpkins. Children seemed delighted by a universe that required no explanation before entering it. Kusama could speak to all of them for entirely different reasons.

That is what great culture can do. It does not require everyone standing before the same painting, reading the same novel, or listening to the same song to understand it in precisely the same way. It creates common ground without demanding uniformity.

That ability feels particularly valuable now. We are living through a period in which the boundary between culture and politics is becoming increasingly difficult to preserve.

Israelis experience this with particular intensity. They want to know what the singer said about Israel. Whether the writer signed a petition. Whether the artist supports a boycott. Whether the university severed relations with an Israeli institution. Whether the country voted for us or against us. These questions are not imaginary. Sometimes they matter enormously. Since the Hamas-led massacre on October 7, 2023, Israelis have learned that cultural, academic, and artistic institutions that appeared universal can suddenly become places where belonging feels highly conditional.

But allowing politics to become our only language for encountering other societies carries its own danger.

Jewish experience offers another possibility. For centuries, Jews wrote in Hebrew, Aramaic, Arabic, Yiddish, Ladino, German, Hungarian, Russian, Polish, and English. They borrowed melodies, literary forms, philosophical ideas, and languages from the societies around them. They participated in surrounding cultures while stubbornly refusing to disappear inside them.

That tension between belonging and particularity became one of the great creative forces of Jewish life. Israel should understand this better than most. The Jewish state was not created so that Jews could stop encountering the world. It gave Jews a sovereign home from which to encounter it. That distinction matters today. Israel sometimes feels extraordinarily alone. Its relationship with parts of the cultural world has become strained. Israelis arrive at international encounters wondering whether they will be welcomed as individuals or judged first by the passport they carry.

The understandable response is to retreat. To stop listening. To divide everything between those who are with us and those who are against us. We should resist that temptation.

The cowboys, Evangelicals, gays, and lesbians in Toronto did not become one another when Parton walked onto the stage. The secular Israelis, Arab Israelis, and families with children in Tel Aviv did not need to experience Kusama in the same way. Nádas did not make the contradictions of Jewish and European history disappear; he turned them into literature.

Perhaps that is what these three artists, whose deaths entered the news so unexpectedly close together, have in common. Great culture does not erase the boundaries between people. Nor does it require agreement. It gives us permission to cross into unfamiliar territory, to become curious about lives unlike our own, and even to discover something of ourselves there.

Three artists. Three distinct worlds. And three reminders that sharing a culture does not require sharing politics, a religion, or a history.

Published in The Jerusalem Post

The post What three cultural giants can teach us about finding common ground first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

How many people in Israel, or even around the world, could name the winner of the Special Jury Prize at the Venice Film Festival last year? Probably almost no one.

Venice is one of the world’s most prestigious film festivals, but it is an industry event – a place where filmmakers, directors, and producers showcase their latest projects, generate buzz, and hope that distributors and critics take notice. Most of what happens there never reaches the wider public.

Then came NAZA, the documentary by Israeli journalists Yuval Abraham and Rachel Szor that won the Special Jury Prize at Venice this weekend and almost immediately became the center of a political and public storm in Israel. The film examines allegations surrounding Israeli military targeting in Gaza, including anonymous testimony from purported soldiers and intelligence officers claiming that the IDF permits “mass killing” with AI-powered tools.

And if the goal of the Israeli officials attacking the film was to prevent people from seeing it, they accomplished exactly the opposite. Culture and Sports Minister Miki Zohar’s announcement that he would seek to revoke the filmmakers’ citizenship only increased the world’s attention to the film. He can be sure that now viewer numbers will go up exponentially.

What Zohar fails to understand is that this is not the way to counter the false allegations raised in the movie. Like Zohar, and almost everyone else attacking the film, I have not seen it (it is not available yet in Israel), and so it is hard to start to dissect the details.

Nevertheless, we can argue about the general way the IDF fights – in my view, in one of the most humane ways in modern warfare – and against the perverse claims of genocide that have been leveled for the last three years against Israel. In other words, you can hate the film, believe it is distorted, unfair, or even defamatory. You can challenge every allegation and even take the filmmakers to court and sue them for libel. But threatening to strip Israelis of their citizenship because they made a film critical of their country is something else entirely.

Not only does such a move not make Israel look stronger, but it creates the impression that we have something to hide and are afraid of criticism. It makes it seem like we fear to stand up for our truth and what we believe in.

Doing this undermines one of the basic values Israel has always insisted distinguishes it from its enemies: that as a vibrant democracy, we allow people to say things that the government – and many citizens – might find outrageous.

This is not how a side confident in its case should behave. Someone wants to make a movie accusing the IDF of war crimes? Then fight back. Explain why the claims are wrong. Show how the combatant-civilian ratio is historically low when compared to any urban warfare conflict with remotely similar conditions. Produce a film showing your truth and the other side of what happened in Gaza. Make the case. But don’t try to silence the criticism. Confront it head-on.

But the political response was only one part of the problem. Then came the IDF’s response.

Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir ordered the establishment of a multidisciplinary, interorganizational team led by the head of the IDF Planning Directorate to develop ways to counter what the military described as false allegations against the IDF and its soldiers.

I read that announcement and had one question: Where has Zamir been for the last three years? Did nobody in the IDF, the Prime Minister’s Office, or the Foreign Ministry read an American or European newspaper over the last three years? Did nobody watch CNN or the BBC? Did nobody see the way Israel and the IDF were being portrayed around the world?

Now, because of a movie, the IDF is creating a multidisciplinary team? This should have been done years ago. Israel needed a coordinated effort to collect facts, release information, quickly investigate accusations, and challenge false claims in real time.

A responsible country doesn’t wait for a movie to come out before realizing it has an information problem. It identifies the problem early on (the massive protests around the world should have helped them wake up) and builds the tools needed to confront it. But even if Israel had handled the public diplomacy surrounding the war perfectly, NAZA would still raise a deeper and far more uncomfortable question – one that Israelis need to confront regardless of whether the movie itself is accurate, distorted, or something in between.

It is a question about Gaza itself.

A few months into the war, in a meeting with a senior executive at one of Israel’s leading television stations, I asked her a simple question: Why don’t we see on the evening news what is happening inside Gaza? She answered that we did, since almost every night there was footage from IDF operations there.

I explained that what I meant was not what the IDF was doing in Gaza but what was happening to Gaza.

To her credit, she paused before answering.

“We have limited time on the news,” she said. “We have hostages, dead soldiers, evacuees from the north and the south, and protests across the country. We can’t show everything.” I was not arguing that Israeli television had some ideological obligation to generate sympathy for Gaza. My point was simpler: Israelis were forced into a war that they did not want and were now fighting in one of the most just wars in the nation’s history.

In addition, what was happening in Gaza was Hamas’s fault. They embedded themselves in civilian infrastructure since they wanted Israel to attack and kill as many civilians as possible. It was for this reason that Israel, for almost 20 years, held back from launching such an operation despite fighting a conflict almost every two years since the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005.

But none of that meant that Israelis should ignore the full scope of the war. We can believe that Israel was 100% justified in responding the way it did to October 7 and in fighting Hamas with the aim of its elimination, while also recognizing the consequences of that war. To understand the conflict we are fighting, we also need to understand what it has done to the people living on the other side. War is terrible. That we know. It is why we tried for so long to avoid it. But understanding a war means looking not only at why it was fought and what our soldiers were asked to do, but also at what happened as a result.

Importance of recognising the suffering of the other side

Our sympathy will obviously be first and foremost for ourselves. That is the way it should be. But that does not mean we should ignore what is happening on the other side, including the pain and suffering there as well. That, too, is part of the story.

Recognizing that does not mean accepting the accusations against Israel. It does not mean agreeing with claims that Israel committed genocide or deliberately targeted civilians. I have repeatedly explained why I believe those accusations are baseless and false. But rejecting those accusations does not require us to deny what happened in Gaza. It simply means recognizing what happened.

We can believe that the war was forced upon Israel by Hamas and that Hamas bears responsibility for the devastation because of the way it fights and embeds itself in civilian infrastructure. We can believe that after October 7, Israel could no longer tolerate a genocidal terrorist army on its border with a declared desire to carry out another massacre. We can remain committed to the mission that has yet to be accomplished to ensure that Hamas no longer exists and at the same time, we can look at what happened in Gaza and acknowledge the tragedy.

Those two thoughts can coexist.

In many ways, that tension helps explain why NAZA has touched such a raw nerve. Whatever one thinks of the film itself, it forces Israelis to look directly at something that, as a society, we have largely managed not to look at for nearly three years.

Our own suffering has understandably dominated our consciousness since October 7. We suffered the worst massacre of Jews since the Holocaust, saw entire communities destroyed, people killed in the worst ways known to man, and hostages starved in complete darkness inside tunnels.

That trauma is real. But recognizing what subsequently happened to civilians in Gaza does not diminish it. It does not create some moral equivalence between October 7 and the war that followed. It simply requires us to look at the full picture.

Part of the reason that has been so difficult is leadership. Israeli political leaders do not speak publicly about Palestinian suffering during the war. Even acknowledging it is viewed as an admission of guilt rather than a recognition of the human consequences of war. But leadership is only part of the explanation. There is another reason Israelis have struggled to look at Gaza: For much of the public, the war does not feel over.

All of the hostages, living and dead, have returned home, but Israeli soldiers remain deployed in Gaza, and Israeli strikes continue. Hamas has yet to disarm, and significant parts of President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan for Gaza remain unfinished. The objective of the war – Hamas’s destruction – has yet to be met.

As a result, the wound of October 7 therefore remains open, and when your own wound is still open, it is difficult to look at somebody else’s.

But eventually Israel will have to. Part of recovering from October 7 will mean confronting what was done to us: the failures that allowed the attack to happen, the trauma that followed, the lives that were lost, and the damage this war inflicted on Israeli society.

Recovery will also require something else: the confidence to look honestly at what happened on the other side without believing that doing so somehow weakens our own story. What it means is understanding that a country can believe deeply in the justice of its cause and still recognize the consequences of the war it was forced to fight.

Israel is strong enough to do both.

Published in The Jerusalem Post

The post Israel can reject NAZA’s claims without ignoring Gaza’s suffering first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Main Finding

More Jews Attribute Rising Global Antisemitism to Israeli Policy: Two in Five Say It Contributes “to a Great Extent.” Even So, When Countries Take Measures Against Israel, Growing Shares of Connected Jews View Them as Both Anti-Israel and Antisemitic.

Additional Findings

▪ An increasing number of connected Jews see antisemitism in measures taken against Israel: Growing shares view recognition of a Palestinian state, calls for punitive measures against Israel, and academic boycotts as “both anti-Israel and antisemitic.”
▪ Israel’s election: Preference for the opposition remains steady – nearly six in ten connected Jews prefer an opposition victory.
▪ One-third follow election news very closely; nearly half follow it somewhat closely.
▪ A majority still rate Trump’s leadership on Iran as poor; about one-third rate it positively.
▪ Half say U.S. military action against Iran did not go far enough, while one-third say it went too far.
▪ The Ruffalo controversy: A large majority consider actor Mark Ruffalo’s remarks antisemitic rhetoric, a view that cuts across political camps.
▪ Looking ahead to the New Year: Israeli Jews are far more optimistic about Israel’s future than Diaspora Jews are about the future of their own countries.
▪ Fewer respondents than last year believe Israel is on a trajectory of continued deterioration.
▪ Political divide over the future of the United States: Nearly three-quarters of Harris voters believe the country is on a path of continued deterioration, compared with roughly one-third of Trump voters.
▪ Half of respondents know hundreds of Hebrew words or more; familiarity with Hebrew is especially strong among those who have lived in Israel.

Click here to download the PDF version.

This month’s data was collected shortly before Rosh Hashanah, amid continued debate over international pressure on Israel including calls for punitive measures in response to events in the West Bank and to the humanitarian situation in Gaza – as well as public discussion of antisemitism and its relationship to Israeli policy. At the same time, preparations continued for Israel’s expected fall election and the U.S. midterm elections. Methodological note: In addition to the sample of connected U.S. Jews, 99 Canadian respondents and 59 UK respondents participated this month. Findings for these groups should be interpreted with caution given their small sample sizes. All breakdowns by ideology, denomination, or vote refer to U.S. Jews only.

Antisemitism and Israeli Policy

At the start of the new year, we returned to a question examined a year ago: Is the rise in antisemitism around the world related to Israeli policy? This year, responses shifted clearly in one direction – two in five connected Jews (39%) say Israeli policy contributes to rising antisemitism “to a great extent,” up from 31% in September 2025. Another 35% say it contributes “to some extent,” while just under one-quarter (23%) say the two are not related at all, down from 32% a year ago. In other words, the view that Israeli policy is connected to the rise in antisemitism has become more prevalent among connected Jews. As expected, responses differ substantially across ideological groups. A majority of strong liberals (68%) attribute the rise in antisemitism to Israeli policy “to a great extent,” compared with just 1% of strong conservatives; a majority of strong conservatives (55%) reject any connection. The divide by respondents’ 2024 vote is similarly sharp: 56% of Harris voters, compared with only 5% of Trump voters, say Israeli policy contributes to the rise in antisemitism “to a great extent.”

Responses also vary with respondents’ ties to Israel: among those who have visited Israel once, 48% say Israeli policy contributes to antisemitism “to a great extent,” compared with 31% of those who have lived in Israel. Comparing U.S. respondents with Israeli Jews, who were asked the same question this month in JPPI’s Israeli Society Index, highlights how much more critical connected U.S. Jews are of Israeli policy: 39% of U.S. respondents attribute the rise in antisemitism to Israeli policy “to a great extent,” compared with 28% of Israeli Jews. The share rejecting any connection is far lower among connected U.S. Jews (23%) than among Israeli Jews (44%). In Israel, the view that there is no connection between Israeli policy and rising antisemitism strengthened this year; among connected U.S. Jews, the trend was in the opposite direction. Similarly, the share of respondents who believe Israel should change its policy in response to rising antisemitism also increased this year. Just over one-quarter of connected Jews (28%) now say Israel should change its policy “to a great extent,” compared with 21% a year ago, while the share saying Israel should not change its policy at all fell from 45% to 37% (the question did not specify how Israeli policy should change).

Political differences are again pronounced: a majority of strong liberals (56%) support substantial policy change, compared with only 1% of strong conservatives. Fully 81% of strong conservatives and 77% of Trump voters say policy should not change at all. The gap between connected U.S. Jews and Israeli Jews is also evident in responses to the policy-change question: 28% of connected Jews say Israel should change its policy “to a great extent,” compared with 17% of Israeli Jews. A majority of Israeli Jews (57%) say policy should not change at all, compared with 37% of connected U.S. Jews. Thus, the increase recorded this month among connected U.S. Jews widens rather than narrows the gap between them and Israeli Jews. As the next section shows, however, criticism of Israeli policy does not translate into acceptance of international measures against Israel.

International Measures Against Israel: Anti-Israel or Antisemitic?

This month, we examined four types of measures countries take toward Israel, three of which were also examined a year ago. We asked respondents whether each was anti-Israel, antisemitic, both, or neither. For all four measures, the most common response is “both anti-Israel and antisemitic,” although the intensity of rejection varies. Rejection is less pronounced for recognition of a Palestinian state (45% say this is both anti-Israel and antisemitic) and especially high for an academic boycott of Israel (81%). Recognition of a Palestinian state is also the only measure that a sizable share of respondents (26%) view as “neither anti-Israel nor antisemitic.” Compared with September 2025, the share of respondents who regard these measures as both anti-Israel and antisemitic has clearly risen. The share describing recognition of a Palestinian state this way rose from 40% to 45%; calls for punitive measures against Israel because of the humanitarian situation in Gaza, from 48% to 64%; and an academic boycott, from 70% to 81%. The question about boycotting settlement products was asked for the first time this year, following related measures taken by several European countries in recent weeks. Just over half of respondents (53%) say a ban on products from Israeli settlements in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) is both anti-Israel and antisemitic.

When connected U.S. Jews are compared with Israeli Jews, the pattern seen on the broader antisemitism question is reversed: connected U.S. Jews are more likely than Israeli Jews to classify these international measures as “both anti-Israel and antisemitic.” The gap is pronounced for academic boycotts (81% versus 50%), calls for punitive measures (64% versus 42%), and recognition of a Palestinian state (45% versus 32%). Israelis also view these measures as hostile, but are more likely to classify them as “anti-Israel” alone rather than as antisemitic. In other words, connected U.S. Jews are more critical of Israeli policy, yet also more likely to see antisemitism in measures taken against Israel. The rise in criticism of international measures is not uniform; it is sharper for measures perceived as more direct and harmful. An academic boycott associated with the delegitimization of Israel on campuses, a particularly sensitive issue for the connected American Jewish community draws the strongest rejection: only 3% regard such boycotts as “neither anti-Israel nor antisemitic.”

At the other end of the spectrum, recognition of a Palestinian state a diplomatic step that also has supporters on the Jewish left is least likely to be viewed as both anti-Israel and antisemitic: one-quarter (26%) regard it as neither anti-Israel nor antisemitic. The measure examined for the first time this year, a boycott of settlement products, falls in the middle (53% “both”), while 13% call it “neither” the second-highest share after recognition of a Palestinian state. This reflects the distinct status of the settlements in the eyes of some connected Jews. On recognition of a Palestinian state, just over half of strong liberals (53%) say the step is neither anti-Israel nor antisemitic, while an overwhelming majority of strong conservatives (85%) view it as both anti-Israel and antisemitic. For academic boycotts, by contrast, a majority in every ideological camp say the measure is both anti-Israel and antisemitic.

The Ruffalo Controversy

One issue that drew attention in the Jewish community this month involved actor Mark Ruffalo. In opposing a business deal, Ruffalo linked David Ellison, the Jewish CEO of Paramount Skydance and a central figure in the Paramount-Warner Bros. merger, to tech giant Oracle, which Ruffalo said was responsible for an “apartheid system of oppression” in Gaza. The remarks drew widespread condemnation from Jewish organizations, as well as letters of support for Ruffalo. We presented respondents with excerpts from two responses to his remarks one critical and one supportive – and asked which came closer to their own view. A large majority (76%) chose the view that “Mark Ruffalo’s posts… are cynical and sickening. [One can] oppose the Paramount merger on its merits… without descending into antisemitic rhetoric.” Only one in twelve respondents (8%) chose the view that “pointing out the crucial connections between what is happening in Gaza and what is happening in Hollywood is the exact opposite of antisemitism.” One in ten (10%) said neither statement reflected their view.

Rejection of Ruffalo’s remarks cuts across political camps. Even among strong liberals the group most inclined to criticize Israel half (51%) chose the statement rejecting the actor’s remarks as antisemitic rhetoric, compared with just under one-quarter (23%) who agreed with him. Among centrists and conservatives, the rejection is nearly unanimous. The Ruffalo controversy provides a concrete illustration of what emerges from the more abstract questions in the preceding sections: panel participants who are willing to criticize Israeli policy, and even to attribute part of the rise in antisemitism to it, still identify and reject rhetoric they perceive as antisemitic when it accompanies political criticism.

Israel’s Election

With Israel’s election scheduled for the end of October, the preference for the current opposition recorded among connected panel participants in August remained largely unchanged this month. A majority (57%) prefer an opposition victory (54% in August), compared with 17% who prefer the current coalition (14% in August). Another 8% have no preference, while 19% say it is not their place to say, down from 24% in August.

Attention to the election remains high: 77% follow election news “very closely” (31%) or “somewhat closely” (46%), even though only 8% are eligible to vote. Political preferences regarding Israel continue to mirror the U.S. partisan divide: 82% of strong liberals and 79% of Harris voters prefer the opposition, while 75% of strong conservatives and 50% of Trump voters prefer the coalition. Canadian respondents (51%) and UK respondents (49%) also lean toward the opposition. The stronger respondents’ ties to Israel, the more closely they follow the election. Among those who have lived in Israel, 45% follow the election “very closely,” and the combined share following it “very closely” or “somewhat closely” reaches 92%. Among those who have never visited Israel, by contrast, only 13% follow it “very closely,” while more than one-third (37%) do not follow it very closely. Political differences in attention to the election are more modest than those in electoral preference.

Leadership Ratings on Iran

The ongoing confrontation with Iran received less news coverage this month, but the survey continued to track two related indicators. Views of U.S. military action remained hawkish and stable: 51% say the action “did not go far enough,” compared with 32% who say it “went too far.” The political divide is sharp seven in ten strong liberals (70%) feel the action went too far, while nine in ten strong conservatives (91%) favor a tougher approach. President Trump’s leadership rating on Iran, which fell to a low in June (21% “good”) and has since recovered somewhat, edged up again in September to 30%. Still, nearly two-thirds (64%) rate his leadership as “poor,” including 52% who rate it “very poor.”

Ratings again vary substantially by political orientation: 83% of strong conservatives rate his leadership positively, while 92% of strong liberals rate it “very poor.” Among Canadian and UK respondents, their respective prime ministers continue to receive substantially lower ratings on Iran than Trump does. Only 18% rate Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s leadership as “good,” while just 10% say the same of UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham, down from 16% in August. In both communities, a majority rate their own prime minister’s leadership as poor.

Looking Ahead to the New Year

As in previous years, we examined the Jewish mood ahead of Rosh Hashanah. This time, we can compare four communities side by side: connected U.S. Jews, Jews in Canada and the UK, and Israeli Jews, who were asked identical questions in JPPI’s Israeli Society Index earlier this month. Respondents were asked how optimistic or pessimistic they are about the future of their own country, Israel, and the world as a whole. The overall picture is pessimistic, but a clear distinction emerges: in every community, the largest group of respondents fears continued deterioration in the state of the world, while views of their own country vary substantially. Israeli Jews are far more optimistic about their country’s future than Diaspora Jews are about the future of theirs. Among Israeli Jews, 43% say Israel “is on a trajectory of improvement and things will get even better,” compared with just 8% of connected U.S. Jews regarding the United States, 11% of Canadian respondents regarding Canada, and 7% of UK respondents regarding the UK. At the same time, only 24% of Israeli Jews say their country is “on a trajectory of deterioration that will continue.” compared with 61% in the United States, 58% in Canada, and 64% in the UK.

When it comes to optimism about Israel, the gap between communities narrows but remains substantial. While 43% of Israeli Jews choose the most optimistic response about their country’s future, only about half that share of connected U.S. Jews (19%) choose that response about Israel’s future. However, the share who see Israel as being on a “trajectory of continued deterioration” is nearly identical across all four communities about one-quarter in each. By contrast, all four communities are pessimistic about the world as a whole: pessimists constitute either a majority or the largest group in each, ranging from 47% among Israeli Jews to 73% among UK respondents, with U.S. respondents (63%) and Canadian respondents (60%) in between. In other words, Israeli Jews stand out in their confidence that their country can emerge from its current situation and secure a better future a confidence that has no parallel in the Diaspora and does not extend to the world as a whole. Panel participants are more optimistic about Israel than they were a year ago: the share who see its condition as deteriorating and expect that deterioration to continue fell from 38% in September 2025 to 25% this month.

The picture regarding the United States is more pessimistic and has changed less: 61% see continued deterioration, compared with 66% a year ago. Pessimism is greatest about the world as a whole, although it, too, has declined, from 71% last year to 63% this month. Notably, 16% of panel participants say they do not know how to answer the question about Israel’s future, compared with only 3% of Israeli Jews. A breakdown by respondents’ 2024 vote shows that nearly three-quarters (73%) of Harris voters say the United States is on a trajectory of deterioration that will continue, compared with 37% of Trump voters; among Trump voters, 22% say the United States is on a path of improvement and will continue to improve. On Israel, ideological differences are also pronounced: half of strong conservatives (51%) are highly optimistic about its future, compared with just 4% of strong liberals, half of whom (50%) fear continued deterioration.

Hebrew and Yiddish Proficiency

To mark the New Year, we also examined a dimension of cultural identity: panel participants’ familiarity with Hebrew and Yiddish. Knowledge of Hebrew is fairly widespread half of connected Jews (50%) report knowing “hundreds of words or more,” a finding that sheds light on the composition of the panel (13% are fluent, 15% know at least a thousand words, and 22% know hundreds of words). Only 2% say they do not know a single Hebrew word. Yiddish, by contrast, is far less familiar: 18% know hundreds of words or more, and the most common response is “dozens of words” (36%).

Familiarity with Hebrew increases with the strength of respondents’ ties to Israel and also varies by denomination. Among those who have lived in Israel, half (50%) are fluent Hebrew speakers and one-quarter (25%) know at least a thousand words. Among those who have never visited Israel, none are fluent and one-third (33%) know only a few words. Denominational differences are also sharp: among Modern Orthodox and Haredi respondents, a majority know hundreds of words or more, compared with fewer than one-third of Reform respondents. Familiarity with Yiddish is likewise greatest among Modern Orthodox and Haredi respondents.

Survey Data and Implications

This report is based on a survey conducted September 15-17, 2026, among participants in JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People respondent panel. The survey primarily reflects the views of “connected” Jews those with relatively strong ties to the Jewish community, Israel, and/or Jewish identity and is not representative of all U.S. Jews. The survey included 646 U.S. respondents, 99 Canadian respondents, and 59 UK respondents. Unless otherwise noted, the results apply to U.S. respondents only; Canadian and UK findings should be interpreted with caution given their small sample sizes. JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People Index survey was conducted by JPPI fellows Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepkov, with research and writing assistance from Yael Levinovsky. Prof. David Steinberg provided statistical oversight.

The post JPPI’s “Voice of the Jewish People” Index for September 2026: U.S. Jews Show Strong Interest in the Upcoming Elections first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

This report examines attitudes as the new year begins and assessments of the year just ended; the importance of the approaching elections and the issues likely to determine them; the future of the Gaza Strip; the sense of victory in the war; the Qusra incident; the rise in antisemitism worldwide; and the education system.

Additional Findings

▪ A fateful election: Four in ten Israelis believe these elections will be “the most important in the country’s history,” while an equal share say they will be especially important.
▪ The issues emerging as decisive in the coming elections: security, relations between the government and the judiciary, and unity.
▪ Three-quarters of Jewish Israelis would not agree “under any circumstances” to an Israeli withdrawal from the security perimeter in Gaza; support among Jewish Israelis for occupying the Strip has increased over the past year.
▪ One-third of Israelis describe the Jewish youths involved in the Qusra incident as “Israeli terrorists”; virtually no respondents on the right chose that description.
▪ Perceptions of antisemitism: Three-quarters of Jewish Israelis regard an academic boycott of Israel antisemitic, compared with two-thirds a year ago.
▪ One-third attribute the rise in antisemitism worldwide to Israeli policy; two-thirds believe there is no connection, or only a weak one, between Israel’s conduct and antisemitism.
▪ The education system continues to erode: a growing share describe it as “not good.”
▪ The most contested subject: Many Israelis want to add more hours of Jewish studies to the school timetable, while many others want to reduce them.

Click here to download the PDF version.

As the New Year Begins

For the second year, ahead of Rosh Hashanah, we asked Israelis which statement best reflects their view of Israel’s overall situation. This year’s picture is somewhat more optimistic than last year’s: 35% of all Israelis and 43% of Jewish Israelis chose “Israel is improving, and things will get even better,” compared with 30% and 36%, respectively, in September 2025. At the same time, the share who believe Israel is deteriorating and that the trend will continue fell from 38% to 30% among all Israelis and from 34% to 24% among Jewish Israelis. Among Arab Israelis, by contrast, there was no significant change: just 5% chose the most optimistic option and 54% the most pessimistic – exactly as last year.

Among Jewish Israelis, optimism is closely associated with ideological orientation. Among those who identify with the right, three-quarters (76%) believe Israel is improving and will continue to improve, up from two-thirds (68%) last year. The increase is even sharper among center-right respondents, from 32% to 42%. There was almost no change in the center, and not a single respondent on the left chose the most positive option.

On the left, however, there was movement of a different kind: the share who believe deterioration will continue fell sharply from 77% to 49%, with almost all of those who moved away from that view shifting to “Israel is deteriorating, but I think things will get better” (22% last year versus 49% today). In other words, the right has become more optimistic, while the left has become less pessimistic.

When the same question was asked about the world, half of Israelis (49%) said the world is deteriorating and will continue to do so, while only one in eight (12%) said it is improving and will continue to improve figures almost identical to those recorded last September (50% and 10%, respectively). The gap between Israelis’ assessments of Israel’s condition and of the world, already evident last year, has persisted and widened: Israelis have much more confidence in Israel’s ability to create a better future for itself than in the world’s ability to do so. Notably, the gap between Jewish and Arab Israelis is much smaller on the question about the world than on the question about Israel.

Looking Back at the Past Year

Respondents were asked three identically worded questions to assess the past year in three areas: security, the economy, and society. The results reveal a clear hierarchy. The social sphere receives the lowest rating and is the only one in which there has been no improvement since last year: 52% of Israelis describe the past year as “poor” socially, while only 4% describe it as “good.”

The economic assessment improved slightly: the share describing the year as “poor” fell from 35% to 30%, while the share describing it as “good” rose from 11% to 18%. In security terms, the picture is almost unchanged: 37% describe the year as “poor,” compared with 36% last year. Among Jewish Israelis, however, half (50%) now describe it as a “good” or “fair” year in security terms.

The social sphere is also the only one of the three in which the ideological gap has widened rather than narrowed. Among respondents who identify with the right, the share describing the year as “poor” socially remained at about one-quarter, while it rose from 74% to 86% in the center-left and from 62% to 70% in the center. In other words, the growing sense that Israel is experiencing a social crisis is concentrated almost entirely in the center and on the left of the Jewish ideological spectrum.

The Most Important Elections in the Country’s History

Ahead of the elections expected this fall, the sense that the election is fateful has strengthened. Four in ten Israelis (40%) believe these will be “the most important elections in the country’s history,” up from one-third (33%) in February. Another 41% say the elections will be “especially important.” Overall, eight in ten Israelis therefore see these elections as exceptional in importance, while the share describing them as “as important as any election” fell from 24% in February to 16% today. This sense is stronger among respondents who identify with the center and left: 60% in the center-left, 57% on the left, and 55% in the center say these will be “the most important elections in the country’s history,” compared with 35% on the right and 39% in the center-right. Among Arab Israelis, the sense is more muted: 23% hold this view. This month, we also examined which issue voters regard as decisive in the coming elections. Of the six substantive issues presented, security remains the leading consideration.

Its increase occurred between July and August and has since stabilized: nearly one-third of Israelis (31%) say the decisive consideration in their vote will be “who will contribute most effectively to maintaining security.” The next two leading issues are relations between the government and the judicial system, and unity. Looking across the past several months, the picture is relatively stable: changes in Israelis’ responses are small, and the ranking of the issues remains similar from month to month. The main differences are between Jewish and Arab Israelis. Management of the economy ranks second in importance among Arab Israelis, while only 5% of Jewish Israelis identify it as the decisive issue in the coming elections. The two findings – the growing sense that these are fateful elections and the rise of unity as a decisive issue are consistent with last month’s finding that Jewish Israelis who had not yet made a final voting decision placed particular emphasis on “more unity and fewer disputes.” In other words, undecided voters are looking for a reduction in polarization and conflict.

In recent days, this group has faced an additional development: some parties in the “third bloc” have announced that they will not contest the coming election, while others have announced that they will merge with larger parties. The ideological breakdown reveals two distinct patterns. On the right, security (40%) and relations between the government and the judicial system (35%) are the decisive issues in the coming elections, and not a single respondent chose “a more liberal state.” On the left and center-left, by contrast, the leading issue is “a more liberal state” – 43% and 34%, respectively. In the center, the leading issue is unity (30%).

Best Suited to Be Prime Minister

When respondents consider several candidates at once, Benjamin Netanyahu remains the leading candidate for prime minister, but he is not the preferred candidate of a majority of Israelis. Thirty-six percent of all Israelis and 43% of Jewish Israelis regard him as best suited for the position. Gadi Eisenkot ranks second at 29% virtually identical among all Israelis and Jewish Israelis followed by Naftali Bennett at 13% and Avigdor Liberman at 4%. The three named alternatives together account for 46% of Israelis. The ideological breakdown shows Netanyahu as the dominant choice on the right (79%), while Eisenkot leads in all other camps: 71% on the left, 66% in the center-left, and 58% in the center. The center-right is the only camp in which there is a genuine contest: 44% choose Netanyahu, 21% Eisenkot, and 20% Bennett.

Gaza: The Security Perimeter and Occupation

This month, respondents were presented with two options concerning the future of the Gaza Strip, using wording identical to that used in September 2025, before the Hamas-Israel agreement that ended the war in Gaza and led to the return of all the hostages. The results should be read against the background of the August survey: following President Trump’s announcement of an agreement to disarm Hamas, a majority of Israelis (58%) believed it would not be implemented and that the current situation would remain roughly unchanged, while virtually none expected the full scenario of complete disarmament and complete Israeli withdrawal. In other words, this month’s responses concerning Gaza’s future do not refer to an arrangement regarded as imminent, but rather to one that most respondents do not expect to be implemented. The option that Israel withdraw to the Gaza border and not retain a security “perimeter” inside the Strip is rejected outright by nearly three-quarters of Jewish Israelis (72%), who say they would not agree to it “under any circumstances.” A majority of all Israelis (59%) say the same. Among Arab Israelis, by contrast, half (49%) agree that Israel should withdraw to the Gaza border and not maintain a security “perimeter” inside the Strip, up from 36% last year.

The opposite option that Israel occupy the entire Strip and administer it through the IDF for at least several years has gained support among Jewish Israelis over the past year. The share who “generally agree” with full occupation rose from 27% to 36%, while the share opposed “under any circumstances” remained stable. The movement therefore came mainly from those who had previously been hesitant, rather than from opponents. Among Arab Israelis, attitudes hardened in the opposite direction, with opposition to occupation under any circumstances increasing.

The ideological breakdown is stark. On the right, 62% generally agree with occupation and only 9% oppose it under any circumstances; in the center-right, 32% agree and 37% oppose. In the center, center-left, and left, opposition stands at 66%, 88%, and 91%, respectively. The religiosity breakdown follows the same gradient: 64% of secular Jews oppose occupation under any circumstances, compared with 13% of Haredim and 16% of religious Jews.

Sense of Victory in the War

Each month, we ask respondents to rate on a 1-to-5 scale the extent to which they feel that Israel is winning or has won the war that began on October 7. This month, as the year draws to a close, the sense of victory returned almost exactly to where it stood on the eve of last Rosh Hashanah, after considerable fluctuation over the past year. Forty percent rate it at the two highest levels, 4 or 5, compared with 43% in September 2025, while 37% rate it at the two lowest levels, 1 or 2, compared with 32% then.

Between these two points from last Rosh Hashanah to this one there were substantial shifts, including a peak in March 2026 after Operation Roaring Lion and a low in recent months. The sense-of-victory question shows the sharpest ideological divide of any survey item measured this month. Among respondents who identify with the right, 77% rate their sense of victory at 4 or 5; in the center-right, 44%; in the center, 16%; in the center-left, 7%; and on the left, none.

The overall increase in the sense of victory, from 37% in August to 40% in September, is entirely concentrated on the right. Among right-wing respondents, the share rating their sense of victory at 4 or 5 jumped from 67% to 77% in a single month, while in every other camp the change is only one or two percentage points in either direction. In other words, what appears to be a slight recovery in the sense of victory is in fact a strengthening of that sentiment among those who already held it, rather than a broad-based change. This occurred in a month with no significant change across the IDF’s various combat arenas, suggesting that the shift may reflect greater exposure to partisan election-campaign propaganda across the political spectrum.

The Situation in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank)

During the past month, a violent incident took place in the village of Qusra in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), after dozens of masked Israeli civilians arrived in pickup trucks and threw stones at Palestinian residents. Some of the rioters barricaded themselves inside a local home while its residents were present. Several Palestinian residents were injured, including a woman who was evacuated for medical treatment. When security forces arrived, the Israeli rioters fled, and no arrests were made. The incident drew considerable attention and commentary from numerous politicians. It was also widely covered by media outlets around the world and led to condemnation of Israeli policy in Judea and Samaria. This month, we asked respondents to choose the description they considered most appropriate for the group of young Jewish men involved in the incident, selecting from several terms used by Israeli politicians.

The strongest label – “Israeli terrorists” was also the most frequently selected: one-third of Israelis (33%) described the Qusra rioters as “terrorists.” Together with “nationalist criminals,” 51% chose one of the two harshest descriptions. At the other end of the spectrum, the two most lenient descriptions “young people who sometimes go too far” and “the salt of the earth” were chosen by 13% of Israelis. Among Arab Israelis, the share describing the group as “Israeli terrorists” is substantially higher than among Jewish Israelis (55% versus 27%).

More lenient descriptions are correspondingly rare among Arab respondents: “a handful of rioters,” “a violent minority,” “young people who sometimes go too far,” and “the salt of the earth” together account for only one-tenth of Arab responses. The ideological gap on this question is dramatic. On the left, 63% choose “Israeli terrorists” and another 31% “nationalist criminals” – 94% combined. In the center, about half choose “terrorists” and roughly one-third “criminals.” On the right, only 3% choose “Israeli terrorists”; the most common descriptions are “a handful of rioters” (22%) and “a violent minority” (20%). Overall, 30% on the right choose one of the two most lenient labels, including 12% who choose “the salt of the earth.” By religiosity, 72% of secular Jews choose one of the two harshest descriptions, compared with 17% of Haredim. Conversely, 36% of Haredim choose one of the more lenient descriptions, including 29% who choose “young people who sometimes go too far.”

This finding is not an isolated one. Last month, we asked a differently worded question: whether Jewish farms and outposts in the West Bank are a burden on the IDF and harm the security of all Israeli citizens. The result was almost evenly split: 36% of Israelis “strongly disagreed” and 36% “strongly agreed.” Placing the two questions side by side reveals the same ideological ordering, at almost the same intensity. The questions are different and should not be compared directly, but they reveal the same fault line: attitudes toward violence by fringe groups within the settlement movement appear to be shaped less by information or facts than by identity.

Antisemitism and Foreign Relations

For the second consecutive year, we examined Israelis’ attitudes toward the rise in antisemitism worldwide. The principal finding is an erosion of the middle position. Thirty-six percent of Israelis believe the increase in antisemitism is “not at all because of Israeli policy,” compared with 33% last year; among Jewish Israelis, the share rose from 38% to 44%. At the opposite end, there was little change: 34% of Israelis believe antisemitism is increasing “to a great extent” because of Israeli policy, compared with 32% last year.

It is the middle position that has contracted. Among Arab Israelis, the share attributing the increase in antisemitism “to a great extent” to Israeli policy rose from 42% to 58%. Among Jewish Israelis, meanwhile, the view that there is no connection at all between Israeli policy and antisemitic phenomena abroad has strengthened. This shift is especially evident in the middle of the religiosity spectrum: among traditionalist (Masorti), nonreligious Jews, the share saying there is no connection at all rose from 42% to 55%; among traditionalist (Masorti), religious Jews, it rose from 41% to 57%. There was no change among Haredim, while among religious (Dati) Jews the share declined slightly.

On the practical question of whether Israel should modify its policies because of the rise in antisemitism, the position of Jewish Israelis is essentially unchanged: 57% say Israel should make no changes, compared with 56% last September. Among all Israelis, the figure is 47% – identical to last year. Here too, the only substantial movement is among Arab Israelis, where the share supporting policy change “to a great extent” rose from 14% to 60%. This sharp shift largely reflects a substantial decline in “Don’t know” responses in this group, from 48% to 15%. For the second consecutive year, we also examined how Israelis classify various international actions toward Israel and over the past year, some of these actions have ceased to be hypothetical. The data indicates that Israelis’ definition of what should be considered “antisemitic” has broadened somewhat. For three of the four actions examined, the share of Jewish Israelis who regard them as antisemitic either antisemitic alone or both anti-Israel and antisemitic increased. For an academic boycott, the share rose from 68% to 74%; for calls for punitive measures against Israel because of the humanitarian situation in Gaza, from 51% to 58%; and for barring ministers and Knesset members from entering various countries, from 43% to 45%. The exception is recognition of a Palestinian state, the action that had already been implemented most extensively in practice even before this year. The share of Jewish Israelis defining such a step as antisemitic remained at 41%, unchanged from last year.

The Education System

With the opening of the school year, we again examined a series of questions concerning Israel’s education system. This is the third consecutive year we have asked these questions, and the trend has moved consistently in one direction: the share of Israelis who describe the education system as “not good” rose from 32% in 2024 to 35% this year.

The share who describe it as “good” has fallen by four percentage points over the past two years, to 14%, while the share who describe it as “average” fell from 50% to 33%. Among Jewish Israelis, 37% now say the system is “not good,” compared with 28% last year and 32% two years ago. Among Arab Israelis, there has likewise been a decline over the past two years in the share describing the education system as “good” from one-third (32%) in 2024 to one-fifth (19%) today. A breakdown by religiosity shows that the deterioration is concentrated primarily in secular Jews’ assessment of the education system: the share of secular respondents who describe it as “not good” rose from 34% to 46% over the past year. There was also a substantial increase in negative assessments among traditionalist (Masorti) Jews. There was no change among religious (Dati) Jews, while among Haredim the share satisfied with the system increased: 22% now describe it as “good,” compared with 10% last September.

Responses to questions about the subjects Israelis would add to or reduce in the school timetable are remarkably stable compared with last year. Among Jewish Israelis, “Jewish studies” is the subject the largest share would strengthen (29%, compared with 27% last year), followed by civics (21%). Yet “Jewish studies” is also the second-most frequently chosen subject for cuts (20%, compared with 24% last year) after literature, which just over one-quarter of Jewish Israelis (26%) would cut. Among Arab Israelis, priorities are entirely different: English is the subject most frequently chosen for additional hours (31%, up from 25% last year), followed by mathematics (20%).

The divide between secular and religious Jews is especially stark. Thirty-six percent of secular Jews would add hours to civics and only 8% to Jewish studies; 44% of religious Jews and 71% of Haredim would add hours to Jewish studies, while only 6% and 7%, respectively, would add hours to civics. In the opposite direction, 41% of secular Jews would cut Jewish studies, compared with 0% of religious Jews and 4% of Haredim. Religious Jews and Haredim would direct their cuts primarily toward literature (33% and 36%) and civics (9% and 18%).

Data for JPPI’s September Israeli Society Index was collected between September 1 and 3, 2026, via the Madad.com panel (663 Jewish-sector respondents) and Afkar Research in the Arab sector (206 respondents, approximately half online and half by telephone).

The data was weighted according to voting patterns and religiosity and analyzed to represent the views of Israel’s adult population. Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepkov compile the JPPI Israeli Society Index, with research, production, and writing assistance from Yael Levinovsky. Prof. David Steinberg provides statistical supervision.

The post JPPI Israeli Society Index – September 2026: Israelis See the Election as Especially Important first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

The post Newsletter 11.9.26 first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

PROJECT HEAD

Yaakov Katz

CONTRIBUTORS

Ita Alcalay | Michal Bar-Asher Siegal | Shlomi Bereznik | Rachel Fish | Shlomo Fischer | Shuki Friedman | Or Horvitz | Eli Kannai | Dov Maimon | Sharon Pardo | Shmuel Rosner | Matt Shapiro | Noah Slepkov | Daniel Staetsky | Yedidia Stern | Gil Troy | Hila Zehavi

EDITOR

Barry Geltman

The post Annual Assessment of the Jewish People 2026 | 5786 first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Recently, voices from across Israel’s political divide – from Bennett’s Beyachad party to the Movement for Quality Government – have proposed placing the Declaration of Independence at the opening of Israel’s future constitution, thereby elevating it to the apex of the country’s normative legal hierarchy. Former Supreme Court chief justices, Meir Shamgar and Aharon Barak, have expressed similar views. Is this appropriate?

The impulse is easy to understand, even compelling. The Declaration is an Israeli canonical text – without equal. For decades, Israelis have recognized the almost miraculous significance of the broad consensus reached by the leaders of the pre-state Yishuv. At the very moment the state was being born, with its survival still in doubt, they managed, through words, to give form to the Israeli spirit of a Jewish people renewing its life in its homeland.

The Declaration tells our story at the singular turning point when the Jewish people returned to history as a people. It is a capsule of distilled Israeli DNA, implanted in our national bloodstream by the founding generation as a gift to those who followed. It would therefore seem only natural to give it pride of place at the head of our future constitution.

But we should not.

Anyone who wants to preserve the Declaration’s exalted status above Israel’s political disputes must recognize the distinction between two very different kinds of discourse: one of identity and one of rights. The Declaration belongs to the first. It should serve as an instrument for forging shared identity. It is Israeli identity’s home port – the place from which Israelis set sail into the riptides of disagreement and to which they return to recover a sense of common belonging. Its success in fulfilling this historic role depends on broad popular support, both emotional and intellectual.

That support, however, will not survive if the Declaration is transformed from an identity-defining national canon into a legal instrument for determining rights. Dragging it into the discourse of rights will damage it, because that discourse plays out through judicial rulings, with winners and losers. When one side seeks to defeat the other by invoking the Declaration, it pushes its opponent toward rejecting the Declaration itself – thereby diminishing its value as a shared identity asset.

That erosion of the Declaration’s symbolic, educational, and identity-building power has already begun. During the dramatic Supreme Court hearing on the “reasonableness standard,” the lawyer representing the government challenged the Declaration’s importance, arguing that it had been drafted by an unrepresentative group, written in haste, and is old and anachronistic. He later clarified and softened his remarks, but the damage had been done: the Declaration had been deeply scarred.

At the other extreme, a Supreme Court justice, in a supremely activist lone opinion in the case concerning the “Tiberias Law,” held that the Declaration is the fundamental norm on which the entire Israeli legal system rests. He thus set in motion an intellectual and legal project that seeks to turn the Declaration into a legal trump card – one that could serve as the basis for judicial review even of Basic Laws.

The justice reiterated this position in a ruling handed down last week on the law freezing the arrests of Haredi draft evaders. In his view, the law “was enacted outside the scope of the Knesset’s authority and is therefore void,” because it infringes the right to “full equality” enjoyed by all citizens by virtue of the operative legal force he attributes to the Declaration.

Those seeking to incorporate the Declaration into a future constitution are embracing this justice’s position – and taking it a step further. In doing so, they risk turning the Declaration from a cultural asset into a legal weapon. Their well-intentioned effort to elevate its status could end up, paradoxically, destroying the very value it holds for all of us.

We suffer from a toxic syndrome: the Israeli public conversation repeatedly gravitates toward the discourse of rights while neglecting the discourse of identity. We choose to shift the center of gravity of our cultural disputes away from the public arena – ideology, politics, and the marketplace of ideas – and into the judicial arena, where binding decisions are handed down. Those who cherish the Declaration must resist placing it in the legal arena. The debate over judicial review of ordinary laws and Basic Laws should not be decided by invoking the noble words of the Declaration of Independence.

We live on shifting sands. Precisely for that reason, we have an urgent – even existential – need for a fixed point of consensus capable of holding us together. The closest thing we have to such a fixed point – our one secular sacred text – is the Declaration of Independence.

We must not squander the founding generation’s gift.

Published in jns

The post Israel’s Declaration: A Secular Sacred Text, Not a Legal Weapon first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.