Additional Findings

• Nearly half of Israelis interpret the result as a message that the current government should not remain in office. Among Jewish Israelis, four in ten believe a majority of the Jewish public supports the government.
• For Jewish Israelis, the next government’s most urgent challenges are security and the judicial system; for Arab Israelis, crime and the cost of living. Voters in the two blocs share almost no common priority.
• The average Israeli rules out four of the 11 parties as coalition partners; about one in ten respondents rule out enough parties to leave no possible 61-seat coalition.
• The most widely shared condition for coalition participation is acceptance of the principle that Israel is a “Jewish and democratic state.” Next are two principles promoted by change-bloc parties: a state commission of inquiry into October 7 and broad Haredi military service.
• Four in ten Israelis feel Israel is winning or has won the war, a slight increase from October. Among Jewish Israelis, the sense of victory over Iran has fallen to four in ten.
• Among Jewish Israelis, those who feel Israel is winning or has won are more than twice as likely to be optimistic as those who do not (79% versus 36%), and only 7% would consider emigrating.
• Half give Israel’s achievements against Iran and Hamas the same rating; those who distinguish between the fronts tend to rate the outcome against Hamas more highly.
• More than half of Israelis are optimistic about the country’s future, up from a year ago, mainly because optimism has risen among Arab Israelis. One-quarter would emigrate if they could, unchanged from previous surveys.
• India and Germany are perceived as friendly to Israel; France and the United Kingdom are not. Jewish and Arab Israelis have sharply contrasting views of France and the United Kingdom; Arab Israelis are roughly six times as likely as Jewish Israelis to see China and Russia as friendly.

Throughout the report, ideological and religiosity breakdowns refer to Jewish respondents. Bloc breakdowns are based on voting in the 2026 elections.

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Election Results

Elections for the 26th Knesset were held in late October 2026. According to the published results, Likud is the largest party (27 seats), followed by Yashar, led by Gadi Eisenkot (21); Beyachad, led by Naftali Bennett (12); the Joint List (11); the Democrats (8); Ra’am (8); Yisrael Beytenu (7); Otzma Yehudit (7); United Torah Judaism (7); Shas (6); and Religious Zionism (6). The outgoing coalition parties won 53 seats in total, the change-bloc parties 48, and the Arab parties 19 – a historic high, driven by a rise of more than 20 percentage points in turnout in Arab localities compared with 2022. No bloc can reach a majority on its own without breaking party leaders’ pre-election commitments.

The survey was conducted a few days after the results were published (November 1–3). Six in ten Israelis (59%) said they had decided whom to vote for “several months ago,” one-fifth “in the last few weeks,” one-eighth “in the last few days” before the election, and 8% on Election Day itself. Late-deciding voters were concentrated in the center: Beyachad voters were the most hesitant – only 45% decided months in advance, while one-fifth (21%) decided in the final days. By contrast, 78% of voters for the Democrats and 72% of Likud voters said they had decided well in advance.

Satisfaction with the Result

Nearly two-thirds of Israelis (62%) are dissatisfied with the election results, while one-third (33%) are satisfied. But the overall figure masks sharply different views among Jewish and Arab Israelis. Seven in ten Jewish Israelis (73%) are dissatisfied – 44% “not very satisfied” and 29% “not at all satisfied” – while virtually none (2%) are “very satisfied.” Among Arab Israelis, three-quarters (75%) are satisfied, including 37% who are “very satisfied.” The Arab parties reached a record high, while the outgoing coalition lost its majority. Among Jewish Israelis, dissatisfaction cuts across ideological camps, though for different reasons. On the right, whose bloc failed to secure a majority, one-quarter (28%) are satisfied. In the center, four in ten are “not at all satisfied.” On the left, represented in the Knesset by the Democrats’ eight seats, three in ten (29%) are satisfied – presumably because the outgoing coalition lost its majority. By party, Shas and United Torah Judaism voters are the most satisfied (39% and 33%, respectively, are “fairly satisfied”). Otzma Yehudit voters are the least satisfied (83% dissatisfied), followed by Yisrael Beytenu (80%) and Beyachad (77%). Three-quarters of Likud voters (76%) are dissatisfied.

Three in four respondents (75%) believe that “these elections were fateful and will have a major impact on the state of the country – for better or worse,” while one-fifth (19%) believe that “in practice, life in Israel for people like me will not change very much.” Among Jewish Israelis, the sense that the elections were fateful rises as one moves leftward across the ideological spectrum: nearly all on the left (92%) say so, compared with seven in ten (73%) on the right. Among Arab Israelis, two-thirds (64%) say the elections were fateful, while three in ten believe their lives will not change. In October, before the elections, four in ten Israelis called them “especially important” and another four in ten “important” – a different question, but a similar picture.

What Government Now?

No bloc has a Knesset majority that would allow it to form a government while keeping its pre-election commitments. What do voters want now? Four in ten Israelis (36%) want “a change-bloc government together with the Arab parties,” one-quarter (23%) “a Likud–Yashar unity government with additional parties,” one-sixth (17%) “a Netanyahu-bloc government with a party from the change bloc,” and one in seven (14%) another election soon. A change-bloc government with the Haredi parties – another option under active public discussion – draws just 3% support. Among Arab Israelis, three-quarters (76%) want the change bloc with the Arab parties. Among Jewish Israelis, preferences are more evenly divided: 27% favor unity, 26% the change bloc with the Arab parties, 20% the Netanyahu bloc with a change-bloc party, and 17% another election.

As expected, each ideological camp wants a different government. The right is divided between a Netanyahu government with a change-bloc party (38%) and another election (29%); one-quarter (26%) favor unity. The center-right is the only camp in which unity is the preferred option (41%). Half of those in the center (50%), six in ten in the center-left, and three-quarters on the left (77%) want the change bloc with the Arab parties. Another election appeals almost exclusively to the right – especially Haredim (40%). The breakdown by vote is sharper. Likud voters prefer a Netanyahu-led government with a change-bloc party (45%) or another election (33%); only one-fifth (21%) favor unity with Yashar. Yashar voters divide between the change bloc with the Arab parties (52%) and unity with Likud (27%); among Beyachad voters, the figures are 49% and 38%. Yisrael Beytenu voters are the only group in the change bloc among whom unity leads (41%), while one-fifth (21%) accept none of the options. In other words, the unity government favored by one-quarter of the public is not the preferred option of a majority of voters in either of the two parties that would have to form it.

The preferences in this survey are consistent with what we measured before the elections. In October, one-quarter (27%) wanted “a government after the elections that includes both Likud and the largest party in the change bloc,” while six in ten (60%) did not. In July, using different wording, one-quarter of Israelis (27%) chose “the change bloc including Arab parties” as their preferred coalition. Today, with that option now concrete and few alternatives apparent, four in ten choose it.

How Israelis Interpret the Result

Nearly half of Israelis (46%) say that “the election results make clear that the people do not want the current government to remain in office.” One-quarter (24%) believe that “the people prefer the current government to any other government,” and another quarter (26%) accept neither statement. Jewish Israelis are divided: 38% choose “the people do not want,” 28% “the people prefer,” and 30% neither. Among Arab Israelis, three-quarters (76%) choose the first interpretation. When the question distinguishes between “a majority of the Israeli public” and “a majority of the Jewish public,” the picture reverses among Jewish Israelis: four in ten (39%) say the result reflects “support by a majority of the Jewish public for the Netanyahu government,” while one-third (34%) choose “opposition by a majority of the Israeli public.” Among Israelis overall, the order is reversed: 41% choose opposition and 34% support. Both statements are arithmetically true: the outgoing coalition’s 53 seats represent a majority among Jewish voters but a minority among all voters. The choice between them is therefore ideological and political. On the right, two-thirds (68%) choose “support by the Jewish public”; on the left and center-left, three-quarters or more choose “opposition by the Israeli public”; and in the center-right, roughly one-third choose each statement and one-third accept neither.

“Neither” and “Don’t know” are not shown in the table.

“Neither” and “Don’t know” are not shown in the table.

The Urgent Challenges

We asked respondents to select up to two major challenges the next government should address before other issues, regardless of who heads it. Among Israelis overall, security – Iran, Gaza, and the north – leads (36%). Four issues follow at roughly similar levels: the judicial system and relations among branches of government (27%), the cost of living (26%), Haredi military service and equality in sharing the burden (19%), and crime and public security (19%). But the average masks sharply different agendas. Among Jewish Israelis, the leading issues are security (43%), the judicial system (34%), and Haredi military service (23%); only 8% select crime. Among Arab Israelis, crime and public security (65%) and the cost of living (62%) dominate; all other issues are at 10% or below. Security, the top Jewish priority, is selected by just 7% of Arab Israelis.

Even with the qualifier “regardless of who heads it,” bloc differences remain stark. Voters in the two Jewish blocs have entirely different priorities. Among outgoing-coalition voters, security (66%) and the judicial system (56%) stand out; almost no one selects drawing lessons from October 7 or Haredi military service (2% and 5%). Among change-bloc voters, Haredi military service leads (39%), followed by drawing lessons from October 7 (34%) and polarization (27%); only one in seven (14%) selects the judicial system. Security is the only issue receiving substantial support in both blocs, though even here the gap is wide: 66% versus 20%. Among Haredim, the judicial system ranks first (51%), followed by security (48%); 14% select Haredi military service.

*Each respondent selected up to two issues.

Asked which issue was “most important to you in deciding how to vote,” respondents give a similar picture in more personal terms. Among Israelis overall, the leading issues are security (19%), the judicial system (13%), responsibility for October 7 (11%), crime (11%), “the personal question: Netanyahu – yes or no” (10%), and the cost of living (10%). Among Jewish Israelis, the cost of living – often the leading answer when surveys ask about “the most important problem” – determined the vote of only 6%. Among Arab Israelis, at least in retrospect, crime was decisive for half (52%) and the cost of living for one-quarter (25%). On the right, four in ten voted mainly on security and one-quarter on the judicial system; in the center and center-left, responsibility for October 7 led. On the left – a relatively small group – it was Netanyahu.

Who Will Address the Most Important Issues?

Cross-tabulating responses to the urgent-challenge and preferred-government questions shows that those who selected security want a Netanyahu-led government with a change-bloc party (34%), a unity government (29%), or another election (24%); only 7% want the change bloc with the Arab parties. A large majority (62%) of those who selected drawing lessons from October 7 want a change-bloc coalition with the Arab parties. Those who selected Haredi military service divide between unity (40%) and the change bloc with the Arab parties (36%); only 4% would accept a change-bloc government with the Haredi parties. Those who selected the judicial system are the group most likely to support another election (34%): respondents who want judicial reform to continue prefer another election to a government that includes a change-bloc party.

Each row shows the distribution of preferred governments among respondents who selected that challenge; a respondent may appear in two rows.

Coalition Options

We asked respondents to imagine that they could determine the makeup of the next coalition. From the 11 parties elected to the Knesset, they selected all those they wanted in the coalition and all those they did not want included under any circumstances (“even if that means another election”). The three parties most often wanted in the coalition are all in the change bloc: Yashar (65%), Beyachad (63%), and Yisrael Beytenu (59%). They are followed by Likud (50%), Religious Zionism (44%), and the Democrats (42%). The parties most often ruled out are the Joint List (62%), Otzma Yehudit (50%), and Ra’am (45%). The Democrats are ruled out by 37%, Religious Zionism by 35%, and Likud and each Haredi party by about one-third. The three centrist change-bloc parties are rarely ruled out (9%–13%).

Among Jewish Israelis, the two Arab parties are ruled out most often (Joint List 76%, Ra’am 56%), followed by the Democrats (46%) and Otzma Yehudit (44%). Among Arab Israelis, Otzma Yehudit (77%), Likud (68%), and Religious Zionism (57%) are ruled out most often; only one-fifth rule out the Haredi parties, and just 5%–17% rule out the three centrist parties and the Democrats. The main difference between the two Jewish blocs is whom they exclude: outgoing-coalition voters almost unanimously rule out the two Arab parties and the Democrats, while almost none rule out the Haredi parties. Change-bloc voters rule out Otzma Yehudit (85%), the Joint List (57%), and each Haredi party and Religious Zionism (54%–59%); nearly half (45%) also rule out Likud.

The exclusions are not symmetrical. Likud voters rule out Yashar (22%) and Beyachad (27%) at relatively modest rates; half of Yashar voters rule out Likud (53%), as do three in ten Beyachad voters (30%). A unity government is therefore a larger problem for Yashar voters than for Likud voters. Change-bloc electorates also differ in their exclusions. Yisrael Beytenu voters rule out Ra’am (47%) almost as often as Likud (39%), and rule out the two Haredi parties (61%–68%) more often than Likud. Beyachad voters rule out Shas (71%) and United Torah Judaism (67%). Voters for all right-wing parties rule out the Democrats (83%–100%) almost as often as the Arab parties.

Is There a Majority Coalition Most Israelis Do Not Rule Out?

These exclusions allow us to calculate, for each respondent, which coalitions of 61 seats or more could be formed without any party they ruled out. The average Israeli excludes about four parties (3.6; Jewish Israelis 3.7, Arab Israelis 2.9). About one in ten respondents (9%) are left with no possible 61-seat coalition. Everyone else has at least one possible coalition – but almost never the same one. We examined ten theoretically possible coalitions and calculated the share of respondents who did not rule out any of their parties. Only one reaches half the public: Likud, Yashar, Beyachad, and Yisrael Beytenu (67 seats). It is not ruled out by 51% of Israelis, including 57% of Jewish Israelis and one-quarter of Arab Israelis.

The first three parties alone total 60 seats – one short of a majority – and are not ruled out by 54%. A Likud–Yashar government with the Haredi parties (exactly 61 seats) is not ruled out by four in ten Israelis (41%), but by only 17% of change-bloc voters. The outgoing coalition plus Yashar (74 seats) is not ruled out by 31% – seven in ten outgoing-coalition voters, almost no change-bloc voters (4%), and 6% of Arab Israelis. A change-bloc government with the Arab parties (67 seats) – the option four in ten say they want – is not ruled out by one-third (32%): seven in ten Arab Israelis, one-fifth of Jewish Israelis, four in ten change-bloc voters, and virtually no outgoing-coalition voters. A change-bloc government with the Haredi parties (61 seats) is not ruled out by one-quarter (26%).

The conclusion: the only coalition not ruled out by a majority of respondents is a center-right coalition without the Haredi parties, Otzma Yehudit, or the Arab parties – in other words, one in which Likud sits with parties that pledged not to sit with it. This does not address who would serve as prime minister, a question not tested in the survey but one that would presumably affect support. Every other coalition currently under discussion is ruled out in advance by at least half of Israelis. It is also important to distinguish between “want” and “do not rule out”: a change-bloc government with the Arab parties is the most desired option (36%) but is ruled out by two-thirds; a Likud–Yashar–Beyachad–Yisrael Beytenu government is the least often ruled out, yet fewer than one-fifth explicitly say they want a government containing all four parties.

“Do not rule out” – the share of respondents who did not mark any party in the coalition as one they “under no circumstances” want in the coalition. “Haredi parties” – Shas and United Torah Judaism; “change bloc” – Yashar, Beyachad, the Democrats, and Yisrael Beytenu; “outgoing coalition” – Likud, Religious Zionism, Otzma Yehudit, Shas, and United Torah Judaism.

Principles Respondents Set as Conditions

Alongside party exclusions, we presented respondents with nine principles and asked them to identify those they considered prerequisites for coalition membership – principles that, in their view, any party joining the coalition must accept. The average Jewish respondent selected three; the average Arab respondent, one. The most widely accepted principle is that “Israel is a Jewish and democratic state” – six in ten Israelis (62%) and nearly three-quarters of Jewish Israelis (74%). Substantial shares in every ideological camp make coalition participation conditional on this principle: 60% on the left and 85% in the center-right; among Arab Israelis, 13%. Next come two principles strongly supported by change-bloc voters: broad or full Haredi military service, with sanctions for those who do not serve (38% of Israelis, 43% of Jewish Israelis, 71% in the center-left, 68% in the center, and 19% on the right); and a state commission of inquiry into October 7 (36% of Israelis, 38% of Jewish Israelis, 81% on the left, 66% in the center, and 8% on the right).

Right-wing coalition supporters emphasize a narrower set of conditions: no reconstruction in Gaza while Hamas remains in power (43% of Israelis, 69% on the right, 17% on the left); support for settlement in Judea and Samaria (30% of Israelis, 68% on the right, 1% in the center-left); and reform reducing some Supreme Court powers (28% of Israelis, 61% on the right, 0% in the center-left). The opposite condition – opposition to such reform – is selected by 19% (52% on the left); opposition to settlement by 8% (28% of Arab Israelis); and a broad or full exemption for Haredi Torah students by 12%. Among Haredim, nearly half (45%) require such an exemption, alongside support for settlement (61%) and judicial reform (60%), conditions similar to those set by right-wing voters. Here too, the conditions add up to a coalition that does not exist. One-quarter of Israelis (26%) require both a state commission of inquiry and Haredi military service – two conditions that no party in the outgoing coalition supports. Another quarter (23%) require both support for settlement and judicial reform – conditions not accepted by every change-bloc party.

“I do not agree with any of these conditions” (6%) and “Don’t know” (6%) are not shown in the table.

Victory in the War

Four in ten Israelis (43%) feel Israel is winning or has won the war overall (ratings 4 or 5 on a five-point scale) – a slight increase from October (41%) and September (39%), and the highest level since April. Among Jewish Israelis, half (49%; 46% in October) feel this way; among Arab Israelis, one-fifth do (20%; 24% in October). As in previous months, the sense of victory varies sharply by political identification: three-quarters on the right (77%), half in the center-right (52%), one-fifth in the center (20%), and still fewer in the center-left and on the left. This month’s increase is concentrated on the right and center-right; the center and left show no change.

In addition to the general victory question, this month we asked separately about two fronts. The sense of victory against Hamas (42% of Israelis; 47% of Jewish Israelis) is close to the overall figure. The sense of victory against Iran is lower – 38% of Israelis and 43% of Jewish Israelis – and has fallen sharply since July 2025, immediately after the latest campaign, when nearly three-quarters of Jewish Israelis (72%) felt Israel had defeated Iran, far more than felt Israel was winning the war overall (53%). By November 2026, the order had reversed: the campaign against Iran is now seen as a weaker component of Israel’s overall wartime achievements. The decline cuts across ideological camps: on the right, two-thirds (68%) feel Israel achieved victory against Iran, compared with 77% in the war overall. Among Arab Israelis, the three measures are similar – about one-fifth perceive victory in each.

Consistent and Split Assessments

Do Israelis distinguish between the fronts, or is the sense of victory a single judgment applied to every question about the war? Half of Israelis (53%; Jewish Israelis 48%, Arab Israelis 73%) gave Israel’s achievements against Iran and Hamas the same rating, and only one in ten (10%) gave ratings that differed by two points or more. The two ratings are highly correlated, and the “overall” sense of victory is slightly closer to the Hamas rating than to the Iran rating. Grouped into four types, one-third of Jewish Israelis (34%) feel Israel achieved victory on both fronts, one-fifth (21%) on neither, and only about one-fifth are “split”: 13% feel victory against Hamas but not Iran, and 9% against Iran but not Hamas. Among Arab Israelis, four in ten (44%) feel victory on neither front, and the share with split assessments is even lower (9%). Those who do distinguish between the fronts tend to rate Israel’s achievement against Hamas more highly. Among Israelis overall, 28% rate the outcome against Hamas higher than the outcome against Iran, while 19% do the reverse; in the center, the gap is especially wide (41% versus 15%). Religious Jews are the only group in which Iran is still seen as the greater victory (32% versus 23%).

The two groups with consistent assessments align closely with ideological camps. Those who feel Israel achieved victory on both fronts are overwhelmingly outgoing-coalition voters (87%); two-thirds identify with the right, and six in ten are “very optimistic” about the country’s future. Those who feel victory on neither front are overwhelmingly change-bloc voters (79%); three-quarters are secular, and two-thirds (64%) want a change-bloc government with the Arab parties. The “split” groups, by contrast, do not clearly belong to either camp: among those who feel victory only against Hamas, 43% voted for the outgoing coalition and 45% for the change bloc; among those who feel victory only against Iran, the figures are 44% and 36%. They are also the only groups in which a unity government is the preferred option (39% and 42%, compared with 24% among those who feel victory on both fronts and 17% among those who feel victory on neither). Those who feel victory only against Iran lean further right and are more religious (56% right-wing; one-third religious), while those who feel victory only against Hamas are concentrated in the center and center-right, are secular or traditionalist, and are dissatisfied with the election results (81%). In other words, a split sense of victory is characteristic of Israelis who do not clearly belong to either bloc.

“Victory” – ratings 4–5; “no victory” – ratings 1–2.
Respondents who gave a rating of 3 on one or both fronts are not included in the four victory/no-victory categories.

Respondents who gave a rating of 3 on one or both fronts are not included in the four victory/no-victory categories.

Optimism and Emigration

Ideological breakdowns refer to Jewish respondents.

More than half of Israelis (55%) are optimistic about the country’s future – 26% “very” and 29% “somewhat” – up from October 2025 (50%) and just below November 2024 (57%). Among Jewish Israelis, optimism is stable at six in ten (60%), similar to a year ago (58%) and two years ago (60%). The main change is among Arab Israelis: after falling from 40% optimistic in November 2024 to 20% in October 2025, the figure has rebounded to 42%. Half (50%) were “very pessimistic” a year ago, compared with one-quarter (23%) today. Among Jewish Israelis, the intensity of sentiment has also shifted: the share who are “very optimistic” fell from 36% to 31%, while the “very pessimistic” share fell from 19% to 13%. As in the past, optimism is closely associated with ideology and religiosity. On the right, eight in ten (79%) are optimistic, compared with one-third (35%) on the left; among Haredim, 84% are optimistic, compared with 42% of secular Jews. Optimism is also closely linked to the sense of victory: among Jewish Israelis who feel Israel is winning or has won, eight in ten (79%) are optimistic; among those who do not, one-third (36%) are optimistic and one-quarter are “very pessimistic.”

Excludes “Don’t know.”

The desire to emigrate has also changed little. One-quarter of Israelis (25%) agree that “if I had a practical opportunity to move abroad, I would do so” – 11% “strongly” and 14% “somewhat” – the same as in October 2025 (25%) and close to November 2024 (27%). More than half (54%) “strongly disagree.” Among Jewish Israelis, one-fifth (22%) would emigrate; among Arab Israelis, four in ten (39%) would, including one-quarter (24%) who “strongly agree” – three times the Jewish share (8%). Among Jewish Israelis, the ideological gap is large: 9% on the right would emigrate, compared with one-fifth in the center-right, one-third (35%) in the center, and four in ten in both the center-left and left. Among secular Jews, four in ten (38%) would emigrate, compared with 5% of religious Jews. As with optimism, interest in emigration tracks the sense of victory: among Jewish Israelis who do not feel that Israel is winning or has won, half (51%) would emigrate; among those who do, 7% would.

Excludes “Don’t know.”

Nearly half of Israelis (46%) know Israelis who, “because of the situation, are considering moving abroad” – 18% “know many such people” and 28% “know some” – similar to 51% in October 2025. Among Jewish Israelis, four in ten (40%; 44% a year ago and 47% two years ago) know such people, while the share who “do not know any” has risen steadily, from 23% in November 2024 to 29% in October 2025 and 37% today. Among Arab Israelis, seven in ten (69%; 79% a year ago) know such people. On the left, three-quarters know Israelis considering moving abroad; on the right, one in seven do.

Friendly and Unfriendly Countries

This is the third year in which we have asked whether six countries are friendly or unfriendly toward Israel. India and Germany are perceived as friendly; the other four are not. Three-quarters of Israelis (76%) see India as friendly, a marked increase from October 2025 (61%); among Jewish Israelis, eight in ten do (83%; 65% a year ago). Nearly two-thirds (62%) see Germany as friendly – similar to a year ago (64%) and well below November 2024 (80%). Ratings of the United Kingdom and France continue to fall: one-fifth see the United Kingdom as friendly (21%; 45% in November 2024 and 27% in October 2025), and 15% see France as friendly (27% and 19%, respectively). Among Jewish Israelis, only 8% see France as friendly, while two-thirds (67%) see it as unfriendly; the figures for the United Kingdom are 13% and 52%. China and Russia are seen as unfriendly by 43% and 61%, respectively, and as friendly by just 6% each.

Arab Israeli assessments differ sharply from those of Jewish Israelis. Four in ten see France as friendly (42%), and half see the United Kingdom as friendly (55%), compared with 8% and 13%, respectively, of Jewish Israelis. One-fifth see China and Russia as friendly (20% and 17%), compared with 3% of Jewish Israelis. Only India and Germany are viewed as less friendly by Arab Israelis than by Jewish Israelis (50% and 56%, respectively). Among Arab Israelis, ratings have declined from a year ago: France from 48% to 42%, the United Kingdom from 60% to 55%, China from 29% to 20%, and Russia from 32% to 17%. Among Jewish Israelis, ideological differences are concentrated mainly on Europe: on the left, one-third (32%) see France as friendly, compared with 2% on the right; nearly everyone on the left (94%) sees Germany as friendly, compared with fewer than half on the right (45%). Differences over China and Russia are minimal; the gap over India, though smaller than the gaps over the European countries, is still 23 percentage points.

Data for the JPPI Israeli Society Index survey was collected November 1–3, 2026, immediately after publication of the election results, through the Madad.com online panel (1,787 Jewish panelists, from whom 600 were randomly selected within quotas based on voting in the 2026 election) and Afkar Research (205 Arab respondents, approximately two-thirds online and one-third by telephone). The data was analyzed and weighted by voting patterns and religiosity to represent Israel’s adult population. Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepokov compile the JPPI Israeli Society Index with research, production, and writing assistance by Yael Levinovsky. Prof. David Steinberg provides statistical supervision.

The post JPPI Israeli Society Index – November 2026: Most Israelis Are Dissatisfied with the Election Results first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

The post Newsletter 4.11.26 first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

As Israelis headed to the polls, domestic debate largely overlooked a key question: How much could new leadership change Israeli foreign policy? At first glance, very little.

Since October 7, 2023, Israelis have expected their government to confront threats before they reach the country’s doorstep. Those security priorities are unlikely to change soon; what may change is how Israel pursues them.

The current government has too often failed to turn military gains into durable political arrangements. A successor less dependent on the far-right could rebuild international trust and pair force more effectively with diplomacy.

Regarding Iran, the basic posture is unlikely to change.

A successor government would inherit deep distrust of Tehran and strong pressure to maintain a hard line. That would leave limited political room for negotiations, while the need to coordinate with Washington would continue to shape Israel’s military options. Israel is therefore likely to keep up pressure on Tehran, with close US coordination on military action.

Distrust also constrains policy toward the Palestinians. Many Israelis view the 2005 Gaza withdrawal and Hamas’s 2007 takeover as warnings about territorial concessions. Although Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas has condemned the October 7 attacks, distrust of the PA persists.

Washington says payments to convicted attackers and their families continue despite announced reforms. A successor would be unlikely to pursue a comprehensive peace agreement or major territorial concessions in the near term.

That need not preclude practical cooperation: security coordination with the PA continued during the war, even under Israel’s most right-wing government, and is likely to endure. Settlement construction is also likely to continue where a successor coalition sees broad political backing or a security rationale.

Gaza is the clearest test. A new government could combine military operations to defeat Hamas in the areas it still controls with diplomacy to strengthen Palestinian civilian institutions and build a credible alternative to Hamas rule.

The United Arab Emirates already participates in the Gaza Executive Board and supports the Palestinian committee established to administer Gaza. Working with the Emirates, Morocco, and other partners, a successor could help these arrangements take hold by enabling Palestinian administrators to exercise real authority.

Jewish extremist violence is another area where a new coalition could make a difference. The current government bears some of the responsibility for the violence. It has too often minimized the problem, while some ministers have given political support to extremists, despite repeated warnings from Israel’s intelligence and security services.

A coalition less dependent on National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich could end that political support and give security and law enforcement authorities stronger backing to confront the perpetrators.

That could enable a West Bank policy focused on protecting civilians, enforcing the law at agricultural settlement outposts, and reducing friction between Israelis and Palestinians.

A new government could repair Israel’s standing

Lebanon and Syria offer scope for progress through security arrangements, even without formal peace.

In Lebanon, a successor could work with Washington and Beirut to consolidate the US-brokered framework signed in June. The task would be to make those commitments effective on the ground, while maintaining a hard line toward Hezbollah and demanding clear security guarantees before withdrawing from southern Lebanon.

A coalition less dependent on the far-right might have more room to pursue that goal. Hezbollah’s weakened position and continued US engagement could help, although Lebanon’s ability to enforce its commitments would remain crucial.

An agreement with Lebanon would also face fewer domestic obstacles than territorial compromise in the West Bank, with its Israeli settlements and deep historical and religious significance for many Israelis.

In Syria, a full peace agreement remains unlikely. President Ahmed al-Sharaa has reaffirmed Syria’s claim to the Golan Heights, and an Israeli government would be reluctant to relinquish territory it regards as vital to security. Syria’s civil war and October 7 have deepened that reluctance.

Even so, a successor might build on existing talks to pursue practical security understandings and expand quiet cooperation where interests overlap.

Saudi Arabia remains the biggest diplomatic prize – and one of the hardest to secure. Before October 7, Israel and Saudi Arabia appeared close to an agreement extending the Abraham Accords. Normalization has since grown more difficult.

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman must weigh regional security interests against the political cost of ties with Israel, and Riyadh has explicitly linked normalization to Palestinian statehood. Shared threats from Iran and the Houthis give the two countries reasons to cooperate.

A successor would still need to determine what commitments on the Palestinian issue it could offer Riyadh. Whether the two sides could bridge that gap, and whether US President Donald Trump would invest in doing so, remains uncertain.

These openings depend in part on Israel’s standing abroad, which a new government could begin to repair. A stronger response to Jewish extremist violence and the departure of ministers such as Ben-Gvir could help restore confidence in Israel’s leadership and make international partners more receptive to its diplomatic initiatives.

That goodwill could matter most in Washington. A new government could work to rebuild support across party lines and among Americans alienated by its predecessor’s policies. The close relationship between Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has partly obscured the strain in Israel’s broader American ties.

Clearer public diplomacy, backed by substantive policy changes, could help repair them. A successor would still confront anti-Zionism and antisemitism, even as it addressed criticism of specific Israeli policies.

The next government will have little time for a honeymoon. It must seize these diplomatic openings while preserving the security Israelis demand.

Published in The Jerusalem Post

The post A new government could expand Israel’s diplomatic options first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

The post Podcast: The Arab Vote and the Battle to Form a Government first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

No one – with the exception of Israel’s Arab citizens – is happy with the election results. The right-wing bloc prevailed overall, but the loss of 15 Knesset seats has left it in an unfamiliar position: in the minority. The new Knesset will be hostile terrain for the right. The change bloc has also failed: it cannot form a government without cooperating with the two Arab parties. Even the exceptional, perhaps one-time, conditions for a change of government were not enough.

The ultra-Orthodox, Israel’s fastest-growing demographic sector, lost a third of their political strength. The ad hoc parties that sprang up after the war vanished below the electoral threshold. And the hopes of everyone else – from the Democrats to the far right – of translating their theoretical strength in the polls into actual power were dashed. The victory speeches delivered by every party leader except those of the Arab parties bear little relation to reality.

Can this lemon be turned into lemonade? Can the relative failure of every party – again, except the Arab parties – become the starting point for a political initiative that produces a collective victory? Here is the recipe. It requires every side to give up something it considers sacrosanct. In return, each stands to gain far more. Under the present conditions, Israel can turn its familiar zero-sum political game into a positive-sum one.

A broad-based government should be formed – without the Arab parties, the Haredim, or the far right – backed by 75 members of Knesset. On paper, this may look like a government built for paralysis, given the deep disagreements among its members. It is not. Such a government could move Israel forward decisively in confronting three wars that threaten us: the military war against our enemies, the war for global consciousness, and a potential civil war.

On the military front, the parties in such a government agree on the core tenets of Israel’s security doctrine and on how they should be applied against our enemies. A broad coalition would project national unity – the opposite of Israel’s condition on the eve of the October 7 massacre – and that unity is itself an important component of national security. We could end the wars in accordance with the national interest while translating the IDF’s achievements into diplomatic initiatives. The paralysis afflicting the current government, driven by fear that the far right will bring down the coalition, would give way to proactive security and diplomatic policies aimed at realistic arrangements.

Our adversaries in the war for global consciousness seek to delegitimize the Jewish state around the world. For the first time in decades, the American public is turning its back on Israel. The danger is real, and under certain circumstances – especially under an anti-Israel administration in Washington – the “Sparta” scenario could become reality. A broad-based government cognizant of the gravity of the threat would not settle for “hasbara.” It would respond through responsible policy and conduct. The statesmanlike, non-extremist right could once again be true to itself.

A tangible defeat in the war for global consciousness could exact an enormous economic price, potentially triggering a tsunami of crippling international sanctions. The prime minister himself has raised the possibility of Israeli banks being cut off from the international clearing system. If that happened, Israel would cease to be the country we have known. But a government without the far right could restore the rule of law in the West Bank, avoid inflammatory declarations, rebuild bridges with the wider world, and thereby pull the rug out from under the growing BDS campaign against us. Ireland and Spain may continue imposing sanctions, but the far more important United Kingdom, Germany, and United States would return to business as usual with the Middle East’s only democracy.

Civil war is what Israelis fear most. We came perilously close during the push for a judicial overhaul. Now, as the new Knesset takes shape, the right-wing bloc cannot proceed with its original plan. Nor can the change bloc, without the Arab parties, advance a counterrevolution that would be dangerous in its own right. This is precisely the right moment to establish a Thin Constitution – a compromise framework that meets many of the expectations of both blocs without fully aligning with the position of either. If a cross-bloc government enacts a Thin Constitution, it could stabilize Israeli democracy for generations.

A broad-based government without the Haredi parties could also advance a sensible conscription policy: those who are not seriously engaged in Torah study – more than half of the Haredi public – would be drafted, while those who neither study nor serve would face a noncriminal sanction: the loss of economic benefits. Once such an arrangement is enacted, the Haredi parties might even join the broad-based government, because it would guarantee that those who are genuinely engaged in serious Torah study could continue studying.

A state commission of inquiry could likewise be established through mutual compromise. The right would agree to establish it, despite its lack of trust in the Chief Justice who appoints the commission’s members, while the change bloc would agree to limit its mandate to examining “what happened” rather than “who is to blame.” This would be a sound approach in its own right. We would lose the catharsis of assigning personal blame to individual decision makers, but the commission could complete its work more quickly because there would be less need for lawyers to defend potential targets. Testimony would also be more reliable, since those involved would not have to shape their accounts to protect themselves personally. Israel could then correct what needs correcting with relative speed, before the next disaster and on the basis of wider agreement.

Taken together, these proposals would not fully satisfy any of Israel’s identity camps. Everyone would have to swallow some bitter pills. But if these proposals were implemented, every camp would find itself living in a better Israel – even by its own lights – than the Israel we have today. With courage and imagination, the lemon can indeed become lemonade.

Published in TOI

The post Nobody won Israel’s election. That could be a victory for everybody first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Here is the question Israel’s political leaders need to ask themselves in the aftermath of Tuesday’s election: Do we really want to go through this all over again?

It is a simple question, but one with enormous implications for the country’s future. And if the answer is no, as it should be, then the parties elected to the Knesset this week need to start thinking differently about what comes next.

There is no question that Israelis who voted for Gadi Eisenkot, Naftali Bennett, Avigdor Liberman, and Yair Golan did not want Tuesday’s result. They voted with the overriding objective of removing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from office. That was the purpose of their vote and the promise they made to their supporters.

For months, it seemed like it might actually happen. The opposition had momentum, and unlike previous elections, no votes were going to be wasted on parties failing to cross the threshold. Tens of thousands of Israelis flew in from abroad to cast their ballots, and while the polls did not show a clear 61-seat majority, they suggested that the opposition would emerge with the larger bloc, potentially allowing Eisenkot to establish a minority government and begin advancing at least part of his agenda.

But that is not what happened.

Instead, Netanyahu emerged as the political winner. Likud is the largest party with approximately 27 seats, while his bloc has about 53, more than the 48 won by the Eisenkot bloc. That is a remarkable achievement considering that almost all polls predicted the exact opposite.

It is true that the opposition, together with the Arab parties, is projected to hold approximately 67 seats, meaning that a majority of the next Knesset will be represented by parties opposed to Netanyahu, but that is not how governments are formed in Israel. What matters is who can assemble 61 seats and turn them into a functioning coalition. Neither side can do that right now, but Netanyahu appears to be in the stronger position, and his success can be explained by two factors.

The first is that Israeli politics remains deeply tribal. Despite the massacre on October 7, 2023, the failures of his government, and the momentum against him, Netanyahu’s traditional voters largely remained loyal. They might have reservations about his policies and even his leadership, but when they enter the voting booth, they come home.

The second is that Netanyahu ran an extremely effective closing campaign. He focused on two fears: Iran and massive Arab turnout. To his critics, it looked like desperation. But Netanyahu understood something about the Israeli electorate. These messages tapped into deep, visceral fears about the country’s security and future. For many Israelis, he remains the known commodity, the leader they instinctively turn to when danger looms. Whatever they think of his record, the alternative was perceived as an even greater gamble.

That is the political reality. And whether we like it or not, it is the reality from which the next government needs to emerge. Which brings us back to the question of what happens now. I would argue that if we accept two basic premises, there is only one responsible path forward.

The first is that Eisenkot does not have a realistic path to forming a government. Some on the Left have suggested that he take the roughly 48 seats of the Zionist opposition parties and establish a government with the support of the Arab parties.

That is almost impossible to imagine happening. It would have been one thing had Eisenkot emerged with a bloc in the mid-50s and needed just a handful of votes from Mansour Abbas’s Ra’am party. But relying on both Ra’am and the Joint List is something entirely different.

Bennett and Liberman would almost certainly reject such an arrangement, even if Eisenkot was willing to consider it, which itself is unlikely.

Looking back at multiple elections

That leaves us with the second premise: Israel cannot afford another election.

Consider what this country is confronting. Iran remains a threat, with another military confrontation possible as early as next week. In Gaza, Hamas has yet to disarm; in Lebanon, Hezbollah is rebuilding its military capabilities while terrorism in the West Bank is increasing. The unresolved issue of the haredi draft continues to tear Israel apart. The cost of living remains high, the deficit is growing, and Israel faces an increasingly isolated situation on the international stage than ever before. And hovering over all of this is a society that remains deeply divided, still struggling to recover from the trauma of October 7 and the wars that followed.

Does anyone seriously believe another election would help solve any of these problems?

On the contrary: it would paralyze the political system for months, postpone critical decisions, and deepen divisions that Israel desperately needs to begin healing.

We know this because we saw this exact process happen before.

When Israelis look back at the years leading up to October 7, they tend to focus on 2023 and the government’s judicial reform, which tore the country apart. But we often forget what preceded it: five elections in less than three-and-a-half years. Judicial reform did not create all those divisions. It poured fuel on a fire that had already been burning for years. And as October 7 demonstrated, the erosion of social cohesion is not just a political problem. It is directly tied to national security. Israel’s enemies watch what happens inside this country; they study our divisions and look for opportunities to exploit them.

Why would we willingly send ourselves back into that destructive cycle?

Now consider something else. What, exactly, are the ideological differences between Netanyahu, Eisenkot, Bennett, and Liberman that make it impossible for them to sit together in a government?

Their four parties would have about 68 seats. That is more than enough to form a stable coalition, one that would not be held hostage by the demands of small sectoral parties or the extremes of either side of the political spectrum. Do they fundamentally disagree about Iran? Is it as if one believes the Islamic Republic should be allowed to obtain nuclear weapons while the others oppose it? Do they have radically different approaches to Gaza? Is any one of them advocating that Israel simply withdraw and allow Hamas to rebuild its military capabilities?

What about the Palestinians, the traditional divide between Israel’s Right and Left? Also, no real difference here. Netanyahu opposes Palestinian statehood; Bennett advocates annexing Area C, which comprises about 60% of the West Bank; and Liberman has proposed having Jordan take over while Eisenkot has called a two-state solution delusional.

On the economy, none are socialists. All broadly support the free market, private enterprise, and economic growth.

And what about the haredi draft?

Here, Netanyahu’s record is certainly different. For years, he has accommodated the demands of his ultra-Orthodox coalition partners, but that was when his political survival depended on the haredim. Put him in a different coalition, one that does not depend on Shas and United Torah Judaism, and the political equation changes.

None of this means these four leaders agree on everything. They do not. There are real differences over governance, the judiciary, the handling of October 7, and, most importantly, accountability for what went wrong. But those differences are not necessarily insurmountable. Certainly not when compared with the challenges Israel faces.

So what is really preventing such a government from being formed?

The answer is not ideology but rather personalities and a profound lack of trust between them.

That distrust is not imaginary, and Netanyahu has earned much of it. His political history is filled with broken commitments and efforts to undermine partners when doing so served his interests. Bennett, Eisenkot and Liberman have legitimate reasons to doubt that an agreement signed today would be honored tomorrow. And their voters did not send them to the Knesset to rescue Netanyahu. They voted for change, accountability and a different direction. These concerns cannot simply be brushed aside in the name of national unity. But neither can they become an excuse for condemning Israel to another election.

If the obstacle is trust, then the challenge is to create mechanisms to try to verify it, since if they can do that, such a government could tackle the real challenges Israel faces. It would be difficult. Perhaps extraordinarily difficult. But is it really more difficult than sending the country to another election, with all the damage that would entail?

Imagine what a government representing such a broad cross-section of Israeli society could accomplish. A government that could make decisions on Iran and Gaza without constantly calculating their impact on coalition survival. That could finally confront the ultra-Orthodox draft crisis, begin repairing Israel’s standing internationally, and tackle the economic challenges that have been neglected for far too long. Most importantly, imagine what it would mean for Israeli society to see political leaders who have spent years attacking one another decide that the country matters more than their personal rivalries.

I am not naive about the obstacles. Netanyahu would need to demonstrate that he can be trusted. Eisenkot, Bennett, and Liberman would need to explain to their voters why joining him does not mean abandoning the principles for which they were elected. All four would have to give up something they desperately want.

But that is what leadership is supposed to be about: recognizing when the circumstances have changed and finding the courage to adapt.

Israel has been through too much over the last four years. Too many lives have been lost, too many families have suffered, and too many opportunities have been missed. Another election would be the easy way out since everyone could stand by their promises, blame the other side, and return to the campaign.

The harder path would be to compromise, try to create trust, and form a government capable of governing.

After everything this country has been through, perhaps it is time for our leaders to try it.

Published in the Jerusalem Post

The post Israel cannot afford another election – its leaders must compromise for unity first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

Europe respects the choice of Israeli voters, but it has no intention of giving the next government, if one is formed, a blank check. The question in Brussels and other European capitals is not simply who will lead the government, but what policies that government will pursue and how long it will remain in office.

Israel’s elections are over, but for Europe, the important questions are only beginning. Will Benjamin Netanyahu remain prime minister? For how long? Will the next government manage to curb settler violence? And is Israel heading toward a further deterioration in its relations with the European Union (EU)?

In a statement issued the day after the election, the European External Action Service (EEAS) congratulated Israeli citizens on the high voter turnout, describing it as a reflection of Israel’s vibrant democracy. The EU expressed its willingness to work with the next government, building on the historic relationship between Israel and Europe and their shared commitment to democratic values.

It was a polite diplomatic statement, but also a carefully measured one. There was no personal congratulations to Netanyahu, no endorsement of a future coalition, and no commitment to changing European policy toward Israel. Europe respects the election results, but it will judge the next government solely by its actions.

This is where Netanyahu himself enters the picture. Over the years, he has become the figure most closely associated with Israel in Europe. He is perhaps the best-known Israeli prime minister on the continent, but also one of the Israeli leaders who has provoked the deepest political opposition there. For many Europeans, Netanyahu is the face of Israel, and that association does little to help Israeli-European relations.

European criticism is not simply a matter of Netanyahu’s personality or political style. It is tied to the war in Gaza, his policies toward the Palestinians, the settlements, and questions concerning Israeli democracy. Yet in international politics, the distinction between a leader and the country he represents often becomes blurred. European criticism of Netanyahu increasingly affects perceptions of Israel as a whole.

Hungary offers a particularly revealing example of how things have changed. For years, Viktor Orbán’s government provided Israel with important political backing within the EU. But with the election of Péter Magyar, the political landscape in Budapest has changed. Hungarian leaders are not necessarily interested in every detail of Israel’s coalition negotiations. Their questions are more practical: Will Netanyahu remain prime minister? Will his government be stable? Will it confront settler violence? And will Hungary face further European pressure because of its pro-Israeli positions?

These questions matter because relations between Israel and Europe have been in deep crisis for the past three years. In 2025, an EU review identified indications that Israel may have violated the human rights clause of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, the framework governing relations between the two sides. Following that review, the European Commission, the EU’s executive arm, proposed measures against Israel in the fields of research and trade. Although no final decisions have yet been taken on these proposals, the very fact that they are under discussion shows how profoundly the atmosphere in EU-Israeli relations has changed.

Israel still has important friends in Europe, including Germany, Italy, Czechia, Slovenia, and Hungary. But friendship does not give Israel immunity from European measures. These countries will find it increasingly difficult to block measures directed against Israel indefinitely. A shift in the positions of even a few European governments could affect trade, research, and forms of cooperation built over decades.

The next Israeli government will have an opportunity to influence the direction of this relationship. Curbing settler violence, refraining from annexation, and presenting a credible political horizon could help lay the groundwork for rebuilding trust. Continuing the policies that contributed to the crisis could deepen it further.

Europe, too, has responsibilities. It must distinguish between the Israeli government and Israeli citizens. Political disagreements do not justify sweeping measures that harm Israeli students, researchers, artists, and entrepreneurs.

Israeli voters have chosen their representatives to the Knesset. Europeans must now decide how to work with them. But one thing is worth remembering: Israeli voters can choose their government. They cannot also choose how an entire continent will respond.

Posted in TOI

The post Europe, Netanyahu, and the Diplomatic Price of the Elections first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

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The post JPPI Webinar: Jewish World Dialogue Report 2025–2026 first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.

The Foreign Ministry said the figures presented in the report do not accurately reflect the sanctions situation. Diplomatic officials added: “Ultimately, there are no substantial sanctions against Israel. Will that continue? There’s no guarantee it will last forever. It’s possible that, at some point, the outcome will be different.”

The database allows users to examine measures by country, category and status, and to view their geographic distribution on a world map. The findings indicate that pressure on Israel is not confined to a single sector. Financial measures account for the largest category, with 40 measures, about one-third of the total. Defense and security and trade follow, with 24 measures each. The database also records 14 diplomatic measures and 12 legal measures.

According to JPPI Director General Dr. Shuki Friedman, the findings should be assessed not only by the number of sanctions but, more importantly, by their potential cumulative impact on Israel’s economy and its ability to maintain international trade relationships, investment flows and supply chains.

“Anyone who thinks sanctions against ministers, individuals in the West Bank or products from the area will stop at the Green Line is mistaken,” Friedman said. “Sanctions have a ripple effect. When they accumulate, they can affect banks, companies, investors and trading partners that have no connection whatsoever to the person or entity being sanctioned. The real danger is the transition from targeted sanctions to damage to the systems on which Israel’s economy and security depend.”

The database also identifies the countries where the highest number of measures have been recorded. Spain leads with 10 measures, followed by the United States with eight, all currently limited to the academic sphere, along with two “historical measures” and five proposals to prevent supplies of various types of weapons. Britain follows with seven measures, while Belgium and Turkey have five each.

However, the number of measures does not necessarily indicate their severity or potential impact. A single measure may be far more consequential than several others. The map is therefore intended primarily to illustrate the scope of the phenomenon and its geographic spread. Alongside European countries, where a substantial share of the measures is concentrated, the database includes measures from North America, Latin America, Asia, Africa and Oceania.

“The figure of 121 is only the starting point,” Friedman said. “The important question is what will happen if this trend continues. A single sanction may be limited in scope. But 121 measures across 62 countries already warrant a systemic assessment. Israel needs to examine this risk as it would any other strategic threat: map it, prepare for it and act to prevent further deterioration.

“A national mechanism is needed to address the risk, one that examines the implications of these measures for the financial system, trade, investment, supply chains and the defense industry. The response cannot be limited to dealing with each sanction separately. It requires a comprehensive approach.”

Diplomatic officials said the map contains distortions, noting, for example, that European Union sanctions are also counted at the individual country level. They also argued that entry bans imposed on certain individuals should not be equated with sanctions against Israel itself.

“Ultimately, there are no substantial sanctions against the State of Israel, and that was not a foregone conclusion,” the officials said. “There was a realistic possibility of a different outcome, in which we would have ended 2026 facing EU sanctions against Israel. A great deal of the Foreign Ministry’s energy was devoted to thwarting those measures.”

They added: “There were sanctions that were prevented. The major threat was thwarted. If the EU had decided to undermine the trade agreement, every Israeli citizen would have felt the impact. The economic consequences would have been dramatic, but that was prevented. That diplomatic Iron Dome continued to hold.

“When you’re inside an Iron Dome and a lot of missiles are fired at you, some get through. But the warhead carrying a ton of diplomatic and economic explosives did not penetrate. Ultimately, we succeed because we have friendly countries we can mobilize, such as Germany, Italy and the Czech Republic. It’s not just Hungary. Hungary has changed, and the diplomatic Iron Dome remains intact.”

The officials continued: “It’s true that Smotrich and Ben-Gvir cannot enter the EU and that there are sanctions against settlers. But ultimately, people shopping at supermarkets in Ramat Gan and Tel Aviv are not feeling the impact of the biggest weapon, which is the trade agreement. The Horizon agreements and the Open Skies agreement have also been preserved.”

However, they warned that the situation could change. “Will this continue? There’s no guarantee it will last forever. It’s possible that, if the trends continue in the same direction, the outcome will be different in the future.”

According to the officials, “The Netherlands, Spain and Ireland are frustrated that they cannot achieve the outcome they want in Brussels. At the last meeting of European foreign ministers, there was frustration that it wasn’t working. So, with no other choice, they are pursuing other channels, such as the Dutch sanctions.

“We are managing to preserve the core interests, and we have also reversed negative measures in countries such as Slovenia and Colombia. It’s painstaking, thankless work because nobody sees what we have managed to prevent.”

The officials nevertheless acknowledged that measures introduced by Spain, Ireland and Britain concerning trade with Israeli settlements “are not positive,” adding that a concerning consequence is the shift toward action by individual countries.

Published on Ynet

The post Mapping sanctions against Israel: 121 measures across 61 countries first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institute.