Jewish professionals and observers have long voiced their concern over the apparent decline in interest and identity among American Jews, especially millennials and their younger counterparts. Community institutions often find it challenging to engage this demographic and are investing considerable efforts and resources to this end – some with greater success than others.
These concerns are based on local and anecdotal evidence provided by community members and leaders, as well as data provided by various studies from recent years. They lean on certain often-used metrics that, in the past and still to a large extent, were correlated with the strength of Jewish identity and identification in the U.S. – namely denominational affiliation and membership in synagogues and other mainstream communal institutions.
Jews who are not fully immersed in Jewish life but do belong to synagogues, federations, or community centers have been loosely characterized as the “Jewish middle.” “The Shrinking Jewish Middle” was the title of both Steven M. Cohen’s 2014 article in the American Jewish Year Book,151 , and a chapter in JPPI’s 2014-2015 Annual Assessment by Dr. Shlomo Fischer, which analyzed the 2013 Pew Research Center study on American Jewry.,152 The Jewish middle, according to Fischer, refers to:
Jews who are highly committed to the Jewish people and the Jewish community but who are not necessarily committed or involved in Jewish religious practice or Orthodox observance (though they do belong to Conservative or Reform synagogues). Together with their strong commitment to the Jewish people, they are significantly involved in general American life, and on average, have relatively high incomes and educational and professional achievements.
Indeed, if we look at the two major denominations that have traditionally constituted the Jewish middle, Reform and Conservative, we can point to two major negative trends. The first is the shrinking of the Conservative movement, from 40% of U.S. Jewry in 1990, or 723,000 adults (NJPS 1990 Study), to 18%, or 570,000 in 2013 (Pew Research Center) and even fewer today. Furthermore, the numbers of those who identify as Conservative (but are not synagogue members) shrank by 47% in the same period, from 739,000 to 392,000 adults. At the same time, the average age rose considerably (the number of those in the 55-64 age cohort in Conservative synagogues is triple that of the 35-44 cohort).,153
Although the Reform movement’s affiliation numbers grew during this same period, its ranks were filled by many who had left the Conservative movement and their non-Jewish spouses. Through these shifts, overall levels of Jewish engagement have remained stable or weakened. For example, from 1990 to 2013, the number of non-Jewish adult members of Reform synagogues increased as a result of the growing share of intermarried families. In 1990, 8% of married Jewish adults in Reform synagogues had a non-Jewish spouse, compared to 31% in 2013.,154
The increasing prevalence of intermarried families in Jewish communal life has been a cause of concern for many Jewish leaders. This is because, beyond the obvious halachic significance of this, and the erosion of ethnic identity, there is significant data showing a correlation between factors like denominational affiliation, synagogue membership, and in-marriage and most other common metrics of Jewish identity and practice. In other words, the more one has a denominational identity, synagogue affiliation, and is in-married, the higher the likelihood they will engage more fully in Jewish life.,155
To understand the scope of this challenge, it is helpful to look at some data. Today, 56% of all married Jews have Jewish spouses, while 58% of those married between 2000 and 2013 married non-Jewish spouses. Even if we look only at “Jews by religion,” taking those who are “Jews of no religion” from the equation, half of Jews married between 2000 and 2004 and 45% from 2005 to 2013 also married a non-Jewish spouse.,156
For example, the non-denominational sample in the 2013 Pew study were far less likely to attend synagogue at least once a month (6%) than denominational Jews – Orthodox (75 percent), Conservative (40%), and Reform (17%). That said, according to Leonard Saxe, this grouping primarily took into account Gen X and older groups (According to Pew, Generation X comprises those born after 1965) along with their modes of social and religious engagement. As for millennials and younger generations (born since 1981), the study did not take into account new Jewish initiatives, including programs like Birthright that operate outside of traditional frameworks, which are changing some of these fundamental assumptions. That is, even engaged Jews are less likely to identify with a denomination, and Jewish engagement is taking on different forms and patterns than in previous generations.
Data from the 2013 Pew study showed that a majority (59%) of the children in intermarried families identified as Jewish but had far fewer markers of Jewish identity and engagement. At the same time, and as the JPPI article also points out, the Orthodox population in the U.S. is on the rise due to high birth rates and a low intermarriage rates. Orthodox Jews amounted to 6.6% of the adult Jewish population in 1990 and 10% in 2013; 27% of all Jewish children in the U.S. today are Orthodox. Although the Orthodox constitute a relatively small percentage of American Jews today, they will likely continue to grow as a proportion of American Jewry in the coming decades.
Therefore, the report went on to describe growing edges – that of Jewish or assimilated – as the traditional middle that was not religious in practice but “very committed to Jewish sacred ethnicity and community” was shrinking. One side of the Jewish community was growing more “Jewish” in its behavior, another was more American, while the crucial bridging element was shrinking.
Fischer goes on to claim this development was problematic as:
The Jewish middle constitutes the “glue” that holds together the two poles of the Jewish community…. the Orthodox have commitment and affiliation, but the ultra-Orthodox, who constitute two thirds of this population, have relatively low incomes, education and professional attainment. The intermarried assimilated wing does have high incomes, education and professional attainment, but their Jewish commitment and affiliation is low. Until now, it has been the Jewish middle that maintained both Jewish commitment and affiliation and financial status and professional resources….,158
This is, of course, one maximalist take on the role played by the middle, essentially liberal affiliated Jewry. Janet Aronson of Brandeis, a co-author of a number of the Jewish community studies we examined, offered a less dramatic view. She argues that “The existence of a thriving liberal Judaism, generally associated with the Reform and Conservative movements, provides a viable and necessary way of being Jewish for those who do not adhere to the stringencies of Orthodox life but still desire a religious Jewish commitment.” Aronson goes on to explain that increasingly, there “are many ways of being in the middle with regard to Jewish engagement,” as shown in the Brandeis community studies soon to be discussed.
Some of these trends were not limited to American Jews, but rather reflected broad social trends taking place in America. The 2013 Pew study of American Jewry and a 2017 PRRI study of religion in America all pointed to a marked decline in denominational identification among millennials and post-boomers in general. Pew’s 2019 study, headlined “In U.S., Decline of Christianity Continues at Rapid Pace,” shows that among American Christians, denominational identification with one of the Christian denominations continues to decrease, as 65% of American adults identify as Christians today compared to 78% a decade ago. This study noted this is relevant for both Protestants (down from 51% in 2009 to 43% in 2019) and Catholics (23% in 2009 and 20% a decade later). The percentage of self-described atheists and agnostics is slightly up, but the largest increase is in “nothing in particulars,” at 17% in 2019 compared to 12% a decade earlier.,159
For American Jews this translated into a growing group identifying as “just Jewish” or as not belonging to any denomination or as even having no religion (“nones” or “Jew of no religion”). This trend was further reflected in a number of demographic studies of major Jewish communities across the U.S. discussed in the next section.,160,,161 ,
Synagogue membership is another metric often cited, and here too we see a decline among the young adult cohort: 24% of Jews in the 18-29 cohort belong to a synagogue; the number rises to 29% in the 30-49 age group; and further to 36% for those between ages 50 and 64.
Leonard Saxe, Sylvia Barack Fishman and others have noted that declining synagogue membership likely has as much to do with delayed marriage and childbearing as other factors. Young single and childless adults generally don’t hold membership in much of anything, and as the average age of marriage and family life rises, so too does the age at which they become members of communal institutions. The trend also holds for membership in Jewish organizations generally and donating to Jewish organizations. Just to give us an idea, the number of Conservative synagogue members aged 55-64 is triple that of the 35-44 cohort; the imbalance is even greater within the Reform movement. These trends are also largely reflected in studies of major Jewish communities (including Boston and Washington DC) conducted by Saxe and others at Brandeis as well as in another set of community studies (including Detroit and Miami) conducted by the University of Miami demographer Ira Sheskin.
Studies Revisited
Virtually all major U.S. Jewish communities have commissioned demographic studies in the past decade, which are illuminating on both the local and national levels. One insight that immediately jumps out and is not understood when looking at national studies, is that there are significant differences in Jewish attitudes and behavior patterns from community to community. Some of these differences are influenced by the surrounding culture, others by the Jewish activity and infrastructure in place. One reading of these studies supports the claims of decline. However, examining the studies from a different angle reveals a different story, one of high levels of interest and engagement in Jewish identity and practice among young adult Jews. Some of the studies offer the possibility that in some locales, a significant part of those identifying as “just Jewish” or as non-denominational are actually not significantly less Jewishly engaged than their older counterparts and may simply eschew labels and institutional affiliation more than they are disconnecting from Jewish identity and Jewish life. That is, decline is just one part of the story. But what is often missed in the current narrative is that many younger Jews in the U.S. seem interested in engaging in Jewish life than do their older peers, and this is not always discernible from such studies.
Although American Christians may be forgoing denominational affiliation and therefore religion altogether, this is not so for Jews. Due to the persistence of an ethnic and cultural identity component alongside the religious one, many young Jews are questioning and transforming their Jewish identities, but not necessarily abandoning them.
The debate between these two viewpoints, between decline and stability, is nothing new, and has been hashed out by leading scholars of American Jewry since the 2013 Pew study was published and the 1990 NJPS before that. For the sake of our argument, we offer a brief look at a response written by one such scholar to another. In the 2018 American Jewish Year Book, Leonard Saxe challenges Steven M. Cohen’s view that the Jewish middle is actually in decline. Saxe argues that when comparing the 2013 Pew with the 1990 NJPS study, there is a growth (25%) of individuals who participate in the Jewish community, noting that the “proportion engaged in synagogue life remains consistent, but because the population is larger, the number of individuals is greater.” Moreover, “the increase is consistent across measures of Jewish engagement, including attending services, fasting on Yom Kippur and importance of being Jewish.” Lastly, he points to the “most dramatic change” which relates to Israel – whereby the proportion of those who visited doubled, primarily due to funded programs such as Birthright.
Saxe suggests that the problem with gloomy predictions such as Cohen’s and others is the use of a backward-looking perspective. “Indicators that only assess traditional, institutionally based Jewish behaviors are inadequate to describe modern Jewishness. For example, in many communities, membership in bricks-and-mortar synagogues has declined… (but) participation in Minyanim, Chavurot, and Chabad has dramatically increased.”
Beyond the reexamination of the Pew study by Saxe and others, we looked at a handful of studies conducted of major Jewish communities since 2013. We wanted to see if we could find generational shifts in identification and behavior that cut across denominational labels. We also took a broader look at Jews by age group, accounting for the rise in Orthodox-identified Jews. That is, we examined data compiled between 2000-2018 from Jews in nearly 30 communities to see if we could notice generational patterns of engagement. We similarly removed the Orthodox participants to see if our hypothesis held up. Basically, what do the community studies reveal about how Jews from different generations act and feel Jewishly?
One series of community studies Saxe conducted at Brandeis (along with Janet Krasner Aronson, Matthew Boxer, Matthew A. Brookner, and Charles Kadushin) with a uniform methodology, opens the possibility that some of the metrics the American Jewish community has been using are out of touch with contemporary social realities, calling into question the contention that there is a real downward trend in Jewish identity.
Looking at the Brandeis studies and the team’s methodology, we wanted to gain insight into two major questions: whether declines in denominational affiliation and synagogue membership translate into declines in other areas of Jewish behavior, and whether young adults today exhibit fewer Jewish behaviors than older age groups. Put differently, is it possible that some of these “unaffiliated Jews” or “just Jews” actually behave and identify “Jewishly,” and, do younger Jews behave less “Jewishly” than older ones?
We consider two of the major Jewish communities studied recently by this team: Boston and Washington DC. These are two of the larger North American Jewish communities, with significant young-adult populations, relatively small Orthodox populations, and a rich and diverse offering of young adult programming as well as alternative frameworks for Jewish expression.
We have not included other community studies conducted by the Brandeis group in this report for a variety of reasons. Pittsburgh, for example, has had a strong influx of young Orthodox families in recent years while South Palm Beach County has relatively few young adults, although this seems to be changing. Such dynamics make attempting to assess differences across age groups more difficult without conducting a full reanalysis of the raw data. Places with fewer young adults and limited young-adult programming or a strong Orthodox population make this difficult, at least with the available information.
It should be noted that across all studies, those who identify as Orthodox are the most highly engaged across all measures of Jewish behavior and institutional membership and attendance. It is among those who would have once identified as Conservative or Reform and today eschew these labels that we are interested in.
There is also another element to consider that makes answering this question far more difficult. According to Janet Krasner Aronson, the associate director of the Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies and Steinhardt Social Research Institute at Brandeis, examining whether one Jewish generation behaves differently than another mistakenly assumes that one’s Jewish behavior remains stable throughout life or that an individual’s religious behavior becomes fixed at a certain age. She suggests, rather, that Jewish (and other social) behaviors change, increase and decrease, throughout our lives in similar patterns, meaning we are just as likely to take on new behaviors and attitudes as we are to cease them. Aronson offered the example of a family that belonged to a denominational synagogue and celebrated Jewish holidays while their children lived at home, then stopped their membership and reduced their holiday observance when the children moved out.
Relating to the question about whether denominational affiliation can predict Jewish behavior, and the decrease in denominational affiliation among young adults, Aronson offered a dilemma to consider: Who behaves “more Jewishly,” the Conservative synagogue member who attends once a year or the unaffiliated “cultural Jew” who reads Jewish content on the internet regularly or engages in Israel advocacy? She also suggests that one of the shifts we might be seeing with the younger generation is a greater willingness to be “honest” about self-definitions. That is, perhaps young adults today are less likely to call themselves “Conservative” or “Reform” if they don’t feel their behavior patterns match up with the normative definitions they believe those labels carry. Therefore, Aronson and the Brandeis team developed what they argue is an alternative and more sophisticated method to analyze Jewish engagement.
The authors’ method (multivariate analysis) serves to measure and characterize Jewish engagement beyond the traditional metrics of denominational affiliation or synagogue membership.,164 Utilizing the “latent class analysis” (LCA) method, the authors distinguish between three basic levels of engagement. They designate one group as “minimally involved,” another as “fully involved” or “immersed” and the “middle” groups, which comprise the majority of Jews in these communities.,165 Jewish engagement takes a variety of forms – at times prioritizing the ritualistic, communal, cultural, or personal aspects, or any combination of these. These classifications account for a range of practical behaviors that, at least in the middle categories, cut across denominational and organizational boundaries and seem to be more useful in understanding young adults who are not so institutionally connected. Through this prism, one can discern some differences, but not necessarily declines in identity or behavior, when comparing age groups.,166
To construct this analysis, the researchers asked a variety of questions about different behaviors. These included inquiring whether respondents did any of the following:,167
Family holiday celebrations: participating in a Passover seder, lighting Chanukah candles, and other practices typically done in the home.
Ritual practices: keeping kosher, observing Shabbat in any manner (candles, dinner), attending religious services, participating in High Holiday services, fasting on Yom Kippur, and more.
Personal/cultural activities: reading books, listening to music, watching television shows or movies, visiting Jewish museums, or spending time on Jewish- or Israel-related websites.
Communal activities: membership in and attending communal institutions, such as synagogues, JCCs or others, attending organized Jewish activities, or volunteering for Jewish causes.
So how does this play out when we dive into specific communities?
In the Boston Jewish community study (2015), overall, around half of Jews identified as having no denomination, (split roughly equally between those who are “Just Jewish” and those who are “secular”). Among younger age groups, this trend is more pronounced. To compare, less than one-fifth of Boston’s Jews identified as having no denominational affiliation just a decade prior.,168
However, when looking at other markers, such as participation in Jewish programming, home observance of traditions like Shabbat meals or Passover Seders, or informal markers such as following news about Israel or Jewish culture, we see that young adults seem quite interested in Jewish engagement, often as much as their older counterparts.
Thus, based on the multivariate analysis of Saxe et al, which takes into consideration a broad range of behaviors rather than relying solely on self-definition, the researchers categorized Boston’s Jewish community into five sub-groups: minimally engaged (17%); familial (24%), for whom Jewish practice revolves mainly around celebrating holidays at home: affiliated with Jewish institutions (26%); culturally connected (18%); and immersed (15%) who have the highest connection to Jewish identity, community, and institutions in every manner.,169/a>
When reexamining the community from this angle, it is not at all clear that younger adult Jews are significantly more likely to be “minimal” or less likely to be “immersed.” In the middle categories of engagement, young adults are considerably less likely to be “affiliated” and more likely to be “culturally” engaged. This, however, seems to signify a shift in how younger Jews behave and think Jewishly. In other words, nearly 85% of Boston’s Jews are engaged in Jewish life in some manner, including nearly 80% of Jews in the 18-34 age cohort. Even if the ways young adult Jews are engaging are changing, there is no real sign in this analysis that they are less engaged. Moreover, we see that the majority of “immersed” Jews in Boston are not Orthodox. Beyond that, more than two-thirds of Boston’s Jews seem to fall into one of the three “middle” groups of affiliated, cultural, or familial.
Further challenging existing assumptions regarding children of intermarried families, we see that while the vast majority of the “minimally involved” are children of interfaith families, a sizeable minority of cultural and affiliated Jews are also from interfaith families, along with over a tenth of “immersed” Jews.
What about synagogue membership or participation? The Boston study shows that younger adult Jews are the least likely to be synagogue members, although not by much (only a third of the 18-34 group vs. closer to 40% for older age groups). At the same time, it also shows that the forms of synagogue engagement are diversifying to include non-denominational synagogues, membership in non-dues paying communities, and other alternative forms that appeal more to younger adults. Overall, these numbers are consistent with the assertion that younger Jews without children tend to avoid membership in organizations in general.
We can make two initial conclusions from the Boston community study: first, young adults do not seem to be “less Jewish” than older Jews in Boston; second, even if Jews today exhibit fewer traditional engagement markers, such as denominational affiliation or synagogue membership, they do not seem less likely to “act Jewish” when using other, more contemporary parameters. When looking at factors like attending services or participating in religious programs, young adults are as likely to do so as their older counterparts. Similarly, when examining behaviors such as participating in unsponsored activities, the numbers are even higher for younger adults. These include informal Jewish activities that are not organized or sponsored by any organization, such as Shabbat or holiday meals, informal Jewish book clubs, listening to Jewish or Israeli music, reading literature, or visiting websites.
We also examined the Washington, DC community study conducted by the same Brandeis team. The greater Washington, DC area Jewish community has recently grown to be one of the largest in the United States, surpassing 300,000 adults, and is less transient than in the past. DC Jews also tend to intermarry at higher rates than in other U.S. cities and have lower rates of denominational affiliation and synagogue membership across age groups. Moreover, while younger adult Jews are less likely to be synagogue members, they are slightly more likely to be involved in the alternative synagogue models prevalent in the area.
Regarding denominational identity, we see few differences between the various age groups. Unlike in Boston, there do not seem to be significant differences in how different age groups identify. Around 40% identified as not having a denominational affiliation.
Here too, as in Boston, many of those identified as “none” were very much engaged in Jewish life. When characterizing DC Jews by behavior, as opposed to self-identification, we see that overall, nearly one-fifth of Jews in the DC area are immersed, one-third are highly involved, nearly one-fifth are cultural, one-fifth are holiday Jews and only 14% are minimally engaged. The one difference between age groups is that those under 40 seem somewhat less likely to be “cultural” Jews, and somewhat more likely to be “holiday” Jews.
Like Boston, the vast majority (three-fourths) of the “immersed” Jews are not Orthodox, including one-tenth of those from the “none” category. The same “nones” further comprise a quarter of the “involved” group, over half of the “cultural” group, and over half of the “holiday” group. Unsurprisingly, they also constitute four-fifths of the “minimal” group.
What does this mean? One possibility is that many of those who do not identify with a denomination in Washington DC are involved in Jewish life. And while this group prefers non-institutional Jewish engagement modalities, whether centered around holiday observance or cultural interaction, a not insignificant number are also involved in organized Jewish life.
When religious behavior is examined by age group, we similarly find that young adults are as or more likely than older counterparts to take on regular home-based Jewish rituals. Many, especially those without children, also regularly participate in Jewish programming – including and especially (over half) in the rich array of young adult engagement offerings in the DC area.
These are, of course, only two communities out of hundreds, even if they are among the larger ones and contain significant and vibrant young adult Jewish populations. And yet, the findings raise questions. Did these two locations have highly engaged but independent young adult Jewish communities to begin with, or is this the result of investment and innovation in young adult programming on the part of the Jewish community and funders, as suggested by Raimy Rubin who works with the Jewish Federation of Greater Pittsburgh and commissioned their community study. Even if we don’t have clear answers, the possibility that such communal investments can yield dividends within the course of a decade should offer hope to planners and funders.
Another set of studies conducted by Professor Ira Sheskin used a different methodology and included large and mid-size Jewish communities such as Miami (2014), and Detroit (2018). Sheskin is the Director of the Jewish Demography Project at the Miller Center for Contemporary Judaic Studies at the University of Miami. In all, he has conducted over 50 studies of Jewish communities across the United States.,171
The Detroit study, conducted in 2018, shows a different dynamic from the Boston and Washington DC studies. In Detroit, those under 35 are significantly more likely to be Orthodox and as likely to be Conservative or Reform as other age groups and least likely to be “just Jewish.” In Detroit, the “just Jewish” group is by far the least likely to attend synagogue. That is, the outcome for Detroit ends up matching the expected religious behavior of the different denominational groups. However, there doesn’t seem to be a major difference between age groups with respect to synagogue attendance.
When examining “religious practice,” which Sheskin defines as conducting at least one Jewish practice regularly (such as Passover observance, Shabbat candles, maintaining a kosher home, etc.), we see that the younger group is actually the most likely to do so.
In Detroit, younger adults were significantly more likely to have attended Jewish summer camp, participated in a youth group, partaken in Jewish activity in college, and taken college level courses on Jewish subjects. Young adults were also more likely to attend adult Jewish education programs, engage in Jewish study, or attend Jewish cultural events (especially those under 35). In terms of emotional attachment to Israel, the various age groups exhibit similar attachment levels. In the case of Detroit, all this might be explained by the increase of Orthodox Jews among this cohort. Similarly, the “just Jewish” group in Detroit was the least likely to conduct regular Jewish ritual practice.
Overall, two general conclusions can be reached about the Detroit community. First, Jewish engagement across age groups is stable, if not increasing. Second, this seems to be connected to the increase in those identifying as Orthodox and high numbers of those identifying as Conservative among the younger generation.
While Detroit is a relatively large community, it should be pointed out that it is not home to a significant number of the alternative Jewish engagement frameworks that appeal to young adults who are disaffiliating from the established Jewish community. One aspect that relates to the larger theme of this study is the percentage of those, especially young adults, participating in Jewish outreach programs that by definition cater to the unaffiliated and disaffiliated. This finding hints to at least one policy direction for community leaders: outreach programs work. Perhaps more resources should be invested in creating and encouraging alternative frameworks and young adult engagement programs that focus on those less engaged within the Jewish community.
Sheskin’s team also conducted a study of Miami’s Jewish community in 2014. Overall, the study pointed to an increase in Orthodox, Reform, and “just Jewish” Jews in Miami since the previous study (conducted in 2004), along with a decrease in Conservative Jews (as in the rest of the country). Interestingly, in Miami, there were not significant differences in denomination by age group, in that the four age groups mentioned in the study were spread evenly throughout the Conservative, Reform, and just Jewish designations.
In Miami, when examining synagogue participation, the older groups were more likely to hold membership (but not necessarily attend) while the youngest group was most likely to attend only on the High Holidays or to partake in Chabad services and programs.
The younger cohorts in Miami tended to be more likely to observe Jewish practices, and were more likely to have attended camp, partake in youth group activities, and attend Jewish programming in college. They were also more likely to have participated in adult Jewish education programs, and as likely to have partaken in Jewish culture events. Similar levels of emotional attachment to Israel were detected across age groups.
With Sheskin’s help, we zoomed out for a broader look at 27 different Jewish communities (29 studies conducted by Sheskin in 27 communities since 2000) on questions of Jewish practice by age group. We wanted to see if the lack of visible decline in Jewish behavior among non-Orthodox young adults (versus older adults) held true outside of Boston and Washington, DC. As the prevalence of large Orthodox populations can skew such results, Sheskin compiled and shared with us statistics for the various age groups in these communities for all non-Orthodox households.,174
When comparing across age groups, we see that younger adults were generally as likely to practice some of the more recognized rituals such as participating in a Passover Seder, lighting Hanukkah or Shabbat candles, observing Shabbat in some manner or maintaining some form of Kosher observance.
While non-Orthodox young adults were generally less likely to attend synagogue frequently and less likely to be synagogue members (something common for this age group), they were as likely as older groups to participate in synagogue life. Young adults were also as likely as older adults to participate in Jewish community events and adult education programs.
At the same time, young adults were far more likely to be intermarried and have a Christmas tree in their home and were generally less attached to Israel despite being more likely to have visited. They were also less likely to donate to Jewish causes.
Conclusion
The studies discussed (and more that were examined but not discussed) suggest that young adult Jews in the United States are in some ways disengaging from organized Jewish life. Yet in other ways, they seem to be as likely to engage in Jewish life as their older counterparts when that engagement is examined more broadly. The studies support anecdotal findings that younger Jews are engaging in Jewish life in somewhat different ways than previous generations. This changing reality does not always appear on the radar screens of Jewish professionals, who are measuring new identity and engagement phenomenon with old yardsticks.
In some cases, such as the Boston and Washington, DC studies conducted by Saxe’s group, we also see that a significant portion of non-Orthodox, including the “just Jewish” or “no denomination” groups, is involved in many aspects of Jewish life, but seems to prefer avoiding labels and membership in mainstream Jewish institutions. That is, contrary to the common belief, being “just Jewish” or “no denomination” does not necessarily mean having one foot out of the door of Jewish identity and Jewish communal life. It is also the case that these groups engage in Jewish life in different ways than older groups and denominationally affiliated groups.
The Detroit and Miami studies also show that young Jews are often as engaged in Jewish life than their older peers. This may be attributable to the growth of Orthodox Jews among the younger cohorts (and Conservative in Detroit’s case), while the “just Jewish” groups do not seem to be nearly as engaged as those with denominational identities.
By looking at a handful of studies, undertaken by two different research teams in different U.S. communities, we can reach two broad conclusions with policy implications. First, although differences exist between age groups, i.e., between generations, there is little evidence of an overall decline in Jewish identification and engagement. Therefore, communities that work to identify what succeeds with younger generations and offer frameworks and programming that cater to them seem to have success.
Second, there are differences in engagement and identification levels between communities – not all Jewish communities are equal. Much rests on regional and communal factors; Jewish communities tend to reflect their surroundings – the West Coast, especially the Bay Area and Seattle – is generally less religious (less “churched,” as one rabbi coined it) than other parts of the country, whereas the South and Midwest tend to be more encouraging of traditional communal structures.
It may very well be that the increased levels of Jewish engagement in some places is directly connected to how much that community invests in engagement and education for young Jews, and how much those communities offer alternative, modern, and creative frameworks for Jewish life and expression. Thus, communities like Boston and Washington seem to be hubs for creative, independent Jewish life. When young Jews (and not just young ones) have alternative frameworks more suited to their tastes, they seem to engage more in Jewish life. Saxe refers to this in his response to Cohen, noting that the 1990s (due to panic caused by the 1990 NJPS survey), saw new and massive investments in Jewish education, subsidized trips to Israel, and outreach to engage young Jews in a variety of programs.,175
Saxe and others have concluded that the resources and efforts invested in children and young adults since the 1990s have had positive results. The more communities invest in engagement, outreach, and alternative and modern Jewish life frameworks, the more young Jews remain engaged with the Jewish community and their own Jewish identities.
From a broader perspective, and returning to the “shrinking middle,” we can say that while the traditional “Jewish middle” as defined by JPPI and others has no doubt declined according to certain metrics, the notion of a cohort of American Jews, at once engaged in society and with their Jewish lives and Jewish communities, remains stable across generations. Several community studies have been conducted since the completion of this text and many more are planned for the near future. Hopefully, they will cast further light on this phenomenon. The accepted notions of what constitutes this “middle” may need to be reconsidered.