Israel’s political future depends on adopting a thin constitution that prioritizes stability, fairness, and compromise, ensuring democratic governance amid internal divisions.
We have entered an election year. What will the “day after” look like? If the current coalition wins again, the prevailing assumption is that the judicial overhaul will resume – this time with renewed legitimacy and greater intensity. But if a different government emerges and truly seeks to ease social polarization and stabilize Israeli democracy over the long term, what should it do?
Three paths present themselves: incremental reform (pursuing new policies through ordinary legislation), revolutionary reform (using unconventional or extralegal tools to “correct” reality), or constitutional reform (changing the rules of the game). Incremental reform will not suffice. Revolutionary reform is dangerous. Only constitutional reform – through adoption of a “thin constitution” – can reduce polarization and stabilize democracy.
Incremental reform is the default: a new government governs within the existing rules. The Bennett–Lapid “change government” chose this route. It projected competence, pragmatism, and statesmanship, and recorded real achievements. Yet its impact was short-lived. With a slim Knesset majority, it fell as soon as that majority evaporated. In retrospect, from a liberal perspective, this proved to be a missed opportunity. Workmanlike governance, however impressive, is reversible and ephemeral.
The current government chose a radical course. Immediately upon its formation, the justice minister advanced a plan aiming at a revolution in Israel’s constitutional order. Narrow elements were enacted, but the core remains unrealized. Tactical victories come and go, and while some democratic foundations have been shaken, Israel’s essential democratic character endures. Should a new coalition respond with revolution in the opposite direction?
Some advocate exactly that. They claim the earth has been scorched, the rule of law compromised, and “mines” have been planted to obstruct future repair. If incremental tools cannot defuse those mines, they argue, then decisive steps must be taken even if “technically” illegal: purging public systems, closing a broadcast channel, or otherwise wielding state power to reset the board. The liberal camp, on this account, must assume it is operating on borrowed time and act accordingly.
This radical course is a recipe for disaster. You cannot entrench the rule of law by means that undermine it. Preferring ends over process is not a slippery slope; it is a gaping abyss beneath our feet. Instrumentalizing rules destroys public trust in them. Formal rules exist to restrain power; once they are breached, nothing ensures that power will be wielded exclusively for “good” cause.
Nor is it realistic to imagine that domestic law can be violated while relying on international standards and institutions “outside the national bubble.” That proposal exemplifies the disconnect between academic constructs and political and social reality; inviting external norms to override the sovereign law of the Knesset will not heal polarization.
The minimal consensus on which democracy depends – that the losers consent to accept the rules until the next round – will collapse if the liberal camp chooses to act outside the law. The moment winners are prepared to break the law “to fix things,” they erode that consensus and undermine the very foundation that allows us to live together while disagreeing. Even a “liberal revolution” that refrains from overt illegality yet radically rewrites the law would also be destructive and unwise. It would deepen the conflict, accelerate the cycle of institutional revenge already underway, and turn governance into coercion.
The attempt to advance a conservative revolution brought masses into the streets and created a destructive atmosphere in which the ideological other is treated not merely as an opponent but as an enemy. Reversing the polarity would amplify the damage. The two paths outlined so far – incremental and revolutionary – pose a false dilemma. We are not confined to a choice between a slow, reversible path and an unlawful or radical leap. There is a third option that is both effective and lawful: constitutional reform by adopting a “thin constitution.”
Israel’s rules of the game are not anchored in a constitution and can be changed by a simple Knesset majority. That endangers everyone. Whoever wins an election – conservative or liberal – can legally reshape the regime. Judicial review constrains this only at the margins, and judicial review of Basic Laws is itself contested; it has been used only once, by the narrowest of majorities, a majority that no longer exists. In such a system, each side fears that the other can – and will – use the momentary levers of power to impose sweeping structural change.
For the past two years, the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI) has convened a group of constitutional scholars – both liberal and conservative – to draft a thin constitution. Unlike a full constitution, which also codifies the state’s identity and fundamental values, a thin constitution deals “only” with the rules of the game for managing our deepest disagreements: the overarching Israeli dispute. It would comprise Basic Laws on legislation, adjudication of the judiciary, and the operation of the three branches of government, with related arrangements. In other words, it is a regime-focused constitution. Durable constitutional legitimacy requires enactment by a supermajority (or through a constituent assembly or referendum). Given the current culture war, such a majority is not attainable for identity-and-values questions. But there is a realistic prospect of broad agreement – across society and in the Knesset – on the governmental administrative portion: the rules of the game.
All political actors know their camp might lose the next election – or the one after – and then watch Israel’s character dramatically shift in ways they highly dislike. We are all, conservatives and liberals alike, behind a “veil of ignorance” regarding who will win. That uncertainty creates a shared interest in fair, efficient, and stable rules, even if they fall short of fully realizing any camp’s dream.
Though it pains many to postpone codifying equality and other noble values – and I am one of them – political reality counsels that, for now, we make do with enacting a regime-focused constitution – a thin constitution. A thin constitution would foreclose the possibility of any revolution – by either side – in how public life is conducted. It would not decide the culture war’s substantive winners and losers. Rather, it would set agreed limits to the possible and return our struggle to a bounded field of play. Armored against dramatic change of the Israeli regime’s nature by occasional coalition majorities, it would reduce the appetite and leverage of fringe actors who thrive on brinkmanship. By draining the mutual threat that “the other side” will impose a sweeping transformation of Israeli democracy upon regime change, it would diminish polarization and help us become opponents again, not enemies.
This approach also addresses the weaknesses of the other two paths. The drawbacks of incremental reform – its slowness, inefficiency, and reversibility – are overcome because a thin constitution would be harder to amend without a supermajority and could be enacted through a transparent, time-bound process. The dangers of revolutionary reform – its polarizing, law-breaking logic – are avoided because a thin constitution is rooted in broad consent, encourages inclusion, and stabilizes the future without coercion.
The key condition is political: a broad coalition capable of mustering the necessary supermajority. That requirement should already shape leaders’ conduct during the campaign. Yes, electioneering rewards sharp contrasts. But Israelis increasingly yearn for non-partisan leadership that can knit society back together and steady our democracy. Recent polls show that about two-thirds of the public are more concerned about Israel’s internal tensions than about external security threats. If the war ends before the elections, this overwhelming majority will likely grow even larger.
Therefore, parties that declare – before the vote – that alleviating internal tensions is their central mission are likely to garner broad support. A thin constitution is a necessary condition for delivering on that mission; its adoption is substantively right and politically rewarding. Whoever is chosen to form the next coalition – liberal or conservative, Right or Left, religious or secular – could enter the annals of the Jewish people as an Israeli nation-builder by choosing partners committed to stabilizing Israel through a thin constitution and by implementing that vision with resolve.