The Jewish People Policy Institue

Most Israelis think the Supreme Court should not stay the Shin Bet chief’s dismissal, but if it does, the government should comply with its ruling.
This survey report addresses the state budget, the judiciary, and confidence in the nation’s leadership and victory in the ongoing war.

Additional Findings

• Most Israelis think there is a real danger of civil war in Israel.
• Most Israelis believe claims of an Israeli “deep state” are wrong or exaggerated.
• Most believe that the Supreme Court should not overturn the dismissal of the Shin Bet chief.
• Most Israelis say that if the Court does overturn the dismissal, the government should comply.
• Most Israelis oppose Supreme Court intervention if the Attorney General were to be dismissed.
• A third of Jewish Israelis support complete Israeli control of the Gaza Strip after the war.
• Most Israelis are dissatisfied with the 2025 state budget; the ultra-Orthodox are the only satisfied group.
• Most Israelis believe that the annual state budget does not meet the country’s needs and is excessively oriented toward funding the coalition.
• A third of Israelis think coalition funds should be cut, and the number of government ministries reduced.
• Most of the public has low confidence in the Ministry of Finance’s senior professional staff.
• Confidence in the government has risen slightly (36%) but remains low.
• Following changes in its top brass, Jewish Israelis’ confidence in the IDF senior command has increased.
• Most say their confidence in Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Katz is low.
• Most Arab Israelis support having all the Arab parties run jointly for the Knesset as a unified list.
• Most Jewish Israelis say they read the Passover Haggadah, including the part that follows the seder meal.
• A third of Israelis say the likelihood of them viewing this year’s official Independence Day torch- lighting ceremony is lower than usual.
• The retirement age Israelis (on average) consider appropriate: 66.1.
• Compared to most other countries, Israelis favor earlier home-buying and later retirement.

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The Judiciary

On March 21, Prime Minister Netanyahu and his ministerial cabinet voted to dismiss Ronen Bar, the head of the Shin Bet (Israel Security Service). On April 8, shortly after publication of this month’s survey, the Supreme Court will hear arguments on the legality of his dismissal.

According to this month’s survey findings (it should be noted that the survey was conducted before “Qatergate” came to dominate the Israeli headlines), half of Israelis believe that the Court should not overturn the Shin Bet chief’s dismissal – 40% think it is beyond the Court’s jurisdiction to do so, and 11% feel that even if the Court has the authority to do so, the dismissal itself is appropriate. Two in five Israelis (38%) think the Court should overturn Ronen Bar’s dismissal. A 60% majority of Jewish Israelis believe the Court should not overturn Bar’s dismissal, while a third (32%) think the Supreme Court should overturn the Shin Bet chief’s dismissal. Three out of five Arab Israelis think the Supreme Court should overturn the dismissal, while a quarter said they don’t know.

Within the “right” and “center-right” cohorts, a clear majority think the Supreme Court should not overturn the Shin Bet chief’s dismissal. Among the right-wing cohort, 76% feel the Court lacks the authority to nullify the dismissal, while 13% believe that even if it does have such authority, the dismissal is appropriate. Among the center-right cohort, 47% maintain that the Court does not have the authority to nullify the dismissal, and another 18% think that even if the Court does have this authority, the dismissal itself is appropriate. A majority of respondents in the “left,” “center-left,” and “centrist” cohorts think the Court should nullify Ronen Bar’s dismissal.

Most Israelis think that if a decision is made to oust Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara – the government has announced its intention to do so but has not yet taken action – the Supreme Court should not interfere with the dismissal. Thirty-five percent think the Court does not have the authority to overturn such an action, and 18% believe that even if it does have the authority, the attorney general’s dismissal is appropriate. Most respondents

in the left (87%), center-left (81%), and centrist (68%) cohorts believe the Court should overturn the attorney general’s dismissal if and when it occurs. Most in the center-right (60%) and right-wing (88%) cohorts believe the Court should not overturn the attorney general’s dismissal. Two in three right-wing respondents believe the Supreme Court lacks the authority to do this.

Although most of the public believes the Supreme Court should refrain from intervening in the dismissals of the two aforementioned senior officials, a larger majority thinks the government should respect the Court’s ruling – should there be one – to nullify the dismissals. Forty percent justified their support for compliance with the Court’s decision via the response option “… because otherwise we’ll be drawn into a constitutional crisis,” while another 23% chose the option “… the Supreme Court is the authorized interpreter of the law.” One in three Israelis believes that if the Supreme Court invalidates a decision to dismiss the Shin Bet chief or the attorney general, the government should not obey the Court, as it lacks the authority to rule in these matters. A little over 10% of Arab Israelis think the Court lacks authority in this sphere; a quarter responded that they don’t know.

Across all ideological cohorts except the right-wing group, a majority expressed the view that if Supreme Court overturns the dismissals, the government should comply and leave the Shin Bet chief and/or the attorney general in their positions. A third of those in the right-wing cohort gave this response, while two-thirds said the government should not obey the Court in this instance.

The Condition of Israeli Society

In recent months, the term “deep state” has been deployed in the context of claims made by some Israeli leaders against the state’s public service institutions. A few weeks ago, the prime minister posted on social media that “when a strong right-wing leader wins an election, the leftist deep state weaponizes the justice system to thwart the people’s will.” In this month’s survey, we used his statement to determine whether and to what degree the public agrees with framing the functioning of the Israeli government as a situation where the “deep state” actually controls the state systems and negates the power of elected officials to reify the people’s will. Regarding the prime minister’s statement, two in five Israelis say he is “wrong,” two in five say he is right, and one in five think he was exaggerating. This latter group agreed that, indeed, “Israel has a problem with the balance of power, but not a ‘deep state.’” In sum, a 58% majority does not agree with the prime minister’s contention.

Among Jewish Israelis, a slightly higher proportion believe the prime minister described the situation accurately, while a slightly lower share feel he is wrong. Half of Arab Israelis think the prime minister’s statement was inaccurate, with less than 10% maintaining that it was correct.

Most of those in the right-wing cohort agree with Prime Minister Netanyahu’s assertion (79%), while most respondents in the left-wing (87%), center-left (76%), and centrist (61%) cohorts think it is incorrect. Most Likud voters (82%) agree with Netanyahu’s assertion, 12% think it is an exaggeration, and 4% disagree with it.

Former Supreme Court Chief Justice Aharon Barak also made a statement that sparked large-scale public debate. In television interviews, Barak warned that “we are very close to a civil war.” A quarter of Israelis agree with Barak’s assessment; a third (33%) think his statement was somewhat exaggerated but that there is, nevertheless, a “real danger.” A fifth think Barak “greatly exaggerated” and that Israel is not on the verge of civil war. Sixteen percent of respondents believe there is no danger of a civil war in Israel. Half of Arab Israelis feel that Justice Barak is correct that Israel is close to a civil war. In total, 60% of all Israelis, and 58% of all Jewish Israelis, think the danger of a civil war is real (feel that Barak is correct + he exaggerated but the danger is real).

Within the Jewish population, a majority across all ideological cohorts except the right-wing group feel there is a real danger of civil war. A third of those in the right-wing cohort think there is no danger of civil war in Israel, a third believe that Israel is nowhere close to civil war, a fifth feel that Barak exaggerated but the danger is real, and 7% think Barak is right.

Confidence in the Public Sector Institutions

Again this month, we assessed Israelis’ confidence levels in the country’s public sector institutions. The findings show a clear correlation between political orientation and degree of confidence in several of those institutions.

This month’s survey data was collected after Israel’s 24th chief of the general staff, Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir, took office, following the sacking of the IDF chief spokesperson, Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari, and the dismissal of Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar – moves that sparked broad controversy and judicial intervention.

In the wake of these high-echelon IDF staff changes, there was a rise in Jewish Israelis’ confidence in the IDF senior command this month. Although last month showed some of the lowest confidence levels of the past year, this month 60% of respondents say their confidence in the IDF senior command is high (very high + somewhat high). The last time JPPI’s Israeli Society Index found a majority of Jewish Israelis holding this view was last November. One in two Jewish Israelis report “somewhat high” confidence in the IDF senior command, and one in ten say it is “very high.” By contrast, one in four say their confidence in the IDF senior command is “somewhat low,” and one in eight say it is “very low.”

This month, a majority across all ideological cohorts say their confidence in the IDF senior command is high (somewhat high + very high). This is a deviation from the findings of the previous six months when most of those in the right-wing cohorts (right-wing + center-right) said their confidence in the IDF senior command was low (somewhat low + very low).

Most of the Israeli public, Jews and Arabs, report that their confidence in the Ministry of Finance’s senior officials is low (very low + somewhat low). A third (34%) say their confidence in the Ministry’s senior professional staff is high (somewhat high + very high).

Four in five Arabs say their confidence is low, and one in eight say their confidence level is high. A majority across all ideological cohorts except the right-wing group say their confidence in the Finance Ministry’s senior staff is low. Most Shas and United Torah Judaism voters, half of Likud voters (49%), and 43% of Religious Zionist Party voters (2022 elections) say their confidence in the Finance Ministry’s senior professional staff is low.

This month’s survey aimed to complement last month’s by modifying the wording of a question regarding the Finance Ministry. In retrospect, we were not convinced that last month’s question was sufficiently clear (i.e., that respondents would fully understand that the question refers to the Ministry’s senior professional staff, and not to its political leadership). This month, the wording was changed from confidence “in the upper echelon of the Ministry of Finance” to confidence in “the Ministry of Finance’s senior professional staff.” The different wording in the two surveys (of course, a temporal gap also exists) led to somewhat different findings. In both cases, a majority of Israelis, Jews and Arabs, reported that their confidence in the Finance Ministry’s upper echelon/senior staff is low.

State Budget

This month’s Israeli Society Index survey was conducted at the end of March, when the Knesset passed the state budget for 2025. The formulation of the budget was accompanied by extensive public and professional criticism. This month’s survey found that most of the Israeli public, Jews and Arabs, are dissatisfied with the 2025 budget. A quarter of Jewish Israelis say they are satisfied (somewhat satisfied + very satisfied) with it, while one in eight Arab Israelis is satisfied (somewhat satisfied + very satisfied) with the 2025 state budget.

A majority across ideological cohorts, except the right-wing group, say they are dissatisfied with the budget. Within the right-wing group, there isn’t a majority who are satisfied with the budget (44%). Nearly a third of Likud voters (31%) and Religious Zionist Party voters (30%) in the 2022 elections are dissatisfied with the 2025 budget. In a breakdown by religious orientation, a majority in all cohorts except the ultra- Orthodox expressed dissatisfaction with the 2025 budget.

Most of the Israeli public, Jews and Arabs, think the 2025 state budget does not meet the country’s needs and is “excessively” oriented toward funding the coalition. A third of Jewish Israelis think the budget is appropriate and designed to meet the state’s needs, even though it includes extensive coalition funding. Among Arab Israelis, just one in ten thinks the budget is adequate.

Most of those who self-identify as center-right (57%), centrist (86%), center-left (96%) and left-wing (94%) believe the budget is inappropriate. By contrast, most of the right-wing cohort (57%) thinks the budget is appropriate and designed to meet the country’s needs, despite the fact that it includes extensive coalition funding. Most Likud, Religious Zionist Party, Shas, and United Torah Judaism voters (in the 2022 elections) also believe it is appropriate. By contrast, most Yesh Atid, National Unity, Yisrael Beiteinu, Labor, and Meretz voters feel that the budget is inappropriate.

We gave respondents the opportunity to weigh in on what the Knesset should have done with the state budget but didn’t do, or what it didn’t do enough. Each respondent could mark up to three items they think are especially lacking. A third of respondents assigned highest priority to cutting budgets for the ultra-Orthodox (31%), cutting coalition funds (31%), and reducing the number of government ministries (32%). A quarter chose the option of budget increases for rebuilding Israel’s South and North (28%) and increasing benefits for those serving in the regular army and the reserves (24%).

One in five Israelis think taxes should be cut and budgets should be increased for fighting crime or for education. Half of Arab Israelis (51%) think taxes should be cut, 43% marked the option of a budget increase for the war on crime, 35% marked the option of budget increases for the Arab sector, and 30% favored increased funds for education.

Half of the left-wing cohort (left-wing and center-left) think more funds should be allocated for rebuilding Israel’s North and the South, and coalition budgets cut. Over 40% of those belonging to all cohorts except the right-wing think the number of government ministries should be reduced.

A third of Likud voters support reducing the number of government ministries (32%) and increasing benefits for regular and reserve soldiers (35%). Two in five National Unity and Yesh Atid voters favor increasing funds for rebuilding the north and the south. Half of these parties’ voters support budget cuts for the ultra-Orthodox sector and the coalition.

Confidence in the Country’s Leadership, and in Victory

Two months ago, we reworded our question about confidence in an Israeli victory in the war. Instead of asking a future-oriented question about the war – “How confident are you that Israel will win the war?” – we phrased it to inquire about the present – “To what extent do you believe Israel is winning and/or has won the war?” The change resulted in a significant discrepancy in respondents’ answers over these past two months.

Ten percent of respondents are “completely confident” that Israel is winning or has won the war. By contrast, a fifth are “not at all confident” that Israel is winning or has won the war. Compared to last month, there has been a slight increase in the share of Jewish Israelis who say they

are confident (totally confident + somewhat confident) that Israel is winning the war. In a breakdown by political orientation, 15% of the right-wing cohort report being totally confident in an Israeli victory, while 53% of the left-wing cohort are “not at all confident” of an Israeli victory (last month, 44% gave this response). There was no consensus in any of the cohorts with respect to the question of whether Israel has won/is winning the war. The further one moves along the religious spectrum from liberal to conservative, the higher the percentage of respondents who think that Israel is winning/has won the war.

Most Israelis (54%) say their confidence in the government is “very low”; an eighth (13%) say it is “somewhat low.” By contrast, a tenth (10%) say their confidence in the government is “very high,” while a fifth (21%) say it is “somewhat high.” A majority of Jewish Israelis (62%) say their confidence in the government is low (somewhat low + very low), while a third (36%) say it is high (very high + somewhat high).

Compared to last month, there has been a 5% increase in the share of Jewish Israelis who say their confidence in the government is high, and a drop of 5% in the percentage who say their confidence in the government is low. Among Arab Israelis, 86% report having low confidence in the government; one in ten say their confidence in the government is high. In a breakdown by political orientation, a majority of all cohorts, except the right-wing group, express low confidence in the government. Among the right-wing cohort, a third (33%) report having low confidence in the government. A majority of Israelis (55%) say their confidence in Prime Minister Netanyahu is very low; a fifth (17%) say their confidence in him is very high. On this issue as well, a majority across all ideological cohorts except the right-wing group say their confidence in the prime minister is low (very low + somewhat low); among the right-wing cohort, a third (31%) give this response. Most of the right-wing cohort (68%) say their confidence in Netanyahu is high. However, 20% of Likud voters and 31% of Religious Zionist Party voters (in the 2022 elections) express low confidence in him.

Most Israelis (65%) have low (very low + somewhat low) confidence in Defense Minister Israel Katz; a third (32%) say their confidence in him is high (very high + somewhat high). Half of Jewish Israelis (47%) say their confidence in the defense minister is “very low,” while a fifth (17%) say it is “very high.” Two in three Arab Israelis have “very low” confidence in Katz, while another 17% say it is “somewhat low.”

A majority across all ideological cohorts, except the right-wing group, say their confidence in the defense minister is low (very low + somewhat low). Most of the right-wing cohort (68%) say their confidence in the minister is high. One in five Likud voters (2022 elections) say their confidence in Katz is low, and one in four Religious Zionist Party voters give this answer as well.

US-Israel Relations

A quarter of Israelis report being very confident that President Trump will “do the right thing” regarding US-Israel relations. A quarter say they have no confidence in this regard, and 46% report being somewhat confident. Overall, the confidence of Jewish Israelis is significantly higher than among Arab Israelis. A quarter of Jewish Israelis (28%) say they are very confident Trump will do the right thing regarding US-Israel relations, while a fifth (19%) say they have no confidence that he will. One in ten Arab Israelis is very confident that Trump will do the right thing regarding relations between the two countries, while one in two reports having no such confidence. Compared to last month, there has been a drop in the share of Arabs who are very confident that Trump will do the right thing: last month 20% gave this response, but this month only 9% did.

Half of those in the right-wing cohort (49%) and a third in the center-right cohort (30%) are very confident that Trump will act appropriately regarding US-Israel relations. Half of the left-wing cohort (55%) and a third of the center-left cohort (35%) have no confidence in the US president on this issue.

The Day After the War

Last month, Israel resumed fighting in the Gaza Strip. This month, we again asked whom the Israeli public would like to see in control of Gaza after the war. A quarter of Israelis (28%) prefer that Israel be in charge of Gaza, another quarter (24%) would prefer a multinational Western force, an eighth (13%) prefer a force coming from Arab countries, and an eighth (12%) would like local, non-Hamas Palestinian entities to be in charge of Gaza after the war. A higher percentage (34%) of Jewish Israelis favor an Israeli administration, while a higher share (22%) of Arab Israelis prefers Palestinian Authority control of Gaza.

In an ideological breakdown, two-thirds of those in the right-wing cohort would like Israel to control Gaza after the war. A third of those in the center-right cohort feel this way, while another third would prefer administration by an international Western force. A third of centrist voters also prefer the option of administration by an international Western force. A quarter of the center-left cohort want administration by an international Arab force, while a third of the left-wing cohort would prefer a Palestinian Authority administration.

To further examine this topic, this month’s survey included a statement by US Special Envoy to the Middle East, Steven Witkoff, according to which Hamas will not be able to “control Gaza” and will “need to demilitarize,” but “maybe they could stay there [in Gaza] for a while and be involved politically.” Two in five Israelis think Israel should not agree to Witkoff’s proposal, 35% believe it should agree to the proposal in exchange for certain conditions, and 13% say that Israel should agree to the American envoy’s proposal. Half of Jewish Israelis (47%) think Israel should not agree to the proposal, while less than 10% believe Israel should agree to it. A third of Arab Israelis think Israel should agree to Witkoff’s proposal, a fifth believe it should agree in exchange for certain conditions, and an eighth say Israel should not agree to this proposal.

Arab Political Parties

This month, JPPI addressed two questions to the Arab public alone. Seven in ten Arab Israelis support the idea of all Arab parties running jointly for the Knesset as a united list. Fifteen percent oppose such an idea, and another 15% do not know. There is no consensus among Arab Israelis about the possibility of a legal option for interfaith marriages. Forty-four percent do not support such an option, while 42% do.

Holidays and Festivals

Most Jewish Israelis (87%) are likely to take part in a Passover Seder this year. According to JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People survey administered to American Jewish respondents in mid-March, a similar percentage of “connected” Jews in the US (82%) intend to participate in a Passover Seder this year.

Most Jewish Israelis read the Passover Haggadah on Seder night, including the parts that come after the meal, a fifth read only the portion that precedes the meal, 8% add new/modern segments to the Haggadah, and 4% read only a few selected parts.

The further one moves along the religious spectrum from secular to religious and ultra-Orthodox, the higher the percentage of those who say that they read the Haggadah, including the parts that come after the meal.

A third of Israelis say the likelihood of their viewing the torch-lighting ceremony this year on Yom Ha’atzmaut (Israel Independence Day) is the same as in most years, a third say they are less likely than in most years, a quarter responded that they never watch the torch-lighting ceremony, and a tenth say the likelihood of them viewing the ceremony this year is higher than in past years.

More than half of Arab Israelis said they never watch the torch- lighting ceremony. Most of those in the left-wing (61%), center-left (74%), and centrist (57%) cohorts say the likelihood of them viewing the torch-lighting ceremony this year is lower than in most past

years. Half of the right-wing cohort (53%) say the likelihood of them viewing the ceremony this year is the same as in most years, while nearly a fifth (17%) say the likelihood of their viewing the ceremony is greater this year. A third (33%) of those who said they would be voting Likud responded that the likelihood of them viewing the torch-lighting ceremony is greater than usual this year.

Major Milestones

This month, in tandem with the publication of an international survey conducted by the Pew Research Center, we asked about the age Israelis think it is best to reach several major life milestones. We compared our findings to an identical survey conducted in other countries.

A quarter of Israelis (26%) believe one’s first home should be purchased in the 25-29 age range, while another quarter (23%) say the appropriate age range is 30-34. One in ten believes the appropriate age for buying a first home is 20-24, and one in five Israelis thinks there is no optimal age for buying a first home. A higher percentage of Arab Israelis think the appropriate age range for buying a first home is 20-24 – one in five hold this view.

The Pew survey covered 18 countries, most in the developing world. Israel is one of the three countries with the lowest average age of first-time home buyers.

The average age for Jewish Israelis in our survey was 28.23, a figure similar to those of Mexico and Sri Lanka.

A third (35%) of Israelis believe the best age to retire is before 65, half (53%) think it is best to retire before 70, and a quarter (26%) think the best age to retire is over 70.

There were significant disparities between Jews and Arabs in response to this question – the optimal retirement age in the view of Arabs is significantly lower than the age preferred by Jews. Most Arab Israelis (57%) think it is best to retire before 65; 77% think the right age to retire is under 70 (compared to 47% among Jewish Israelis), while 14% say the best age to retire is over 70 (versus 29% of Jews who think this).

Note: the “before 65” and “before 70” figures are aggregate data. That is, those who said “before 65” are also included in the “before 70” total.

Our findings show differing retirement-age preferences by religiosity level among Jews. The further one moves along the religious spectrum from liberal to conservative, the higher the percentage of those who responded that the best age to retire is over 70. That is, compared with secular and traditionalist (Masorti) Jews, a higher share of religious and ultra-Orthodox Jews think it is best to retire at a later point. Most secular and non-religious- Masorti Jews think the best retirement age is before 70. Half of religious-Masorti Jews, 41% of religious Jews, and a quarter of the ultra-Orthodox feel this way as well. Nearly half of the ultra-Orthodox and a third of the religious think it’s best to retire after 70.

Compared to the other countries examined in the Pew survey, Israel is second from the top (66.1) in terms of optimal retirement age (on average). Israelis, that is, think it is best to stop working at a later age than do the overwhelming majority of citizens of the other countries surveyed. The only country where Pew survey respondents chose a higher average preferred retirement age – 66.9 – is Nigeria.

Due to the Eid al-Fitr and Passover holidays, data collection for JPPI’s April survey was moved up to March 24-29. The survey was administered to 1,217 Israeli respondents. Data was collected by theMadad.com (1017 Jewish-sector respondents via an online poll) and by Afkar Research (200 Arab-sector respondents, half online and half by telephone). Data was analyzed and weighted by voting pattern and religiosity level to represent Israel’s adult population. Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepkov compile the JPPI Israeli Society Index; Professor David Steinberg serves as statistical consultant.