A majority of Israelis are in favor of completing the hostage deal, and express low levels of confidence in the senior Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) echelon.
Additional Findings
- There has been a decline in the share of Israelis who think Trump’s proposal for population transfer from Gaza is practical.
- A majority of Israelis have very low confidence in the government.
- There has been a decline in the confidence Jewish Israelis have in the senior IDF command.
- Most say their confidence in the Attorney General’s Office is low.
- Half of Jewish Israelis favor changing the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee; 43% are opposed.
- Most Jewish Israelis believe there is no chance for a peace agreement with the Palestinians in the foreseeable future.
- Most Jewish Israelis think the West Bank settlements are a security asset for Israel.
- Most Jewish Israelis believe the coalition’s survival is the chief motive for advancing an exemption/conscription law for the ultra-Orthodox.
- A third of Likud and Religious Zionism voters believe dissolution of the government would be preferable to a draft exemption law for the ultra-Orthodox.
- There has been a rise in the proportion of Israelis who think investment in security should be greater than in education.
- Most Jewish Israelis favor a free-market system, while most Arab Israelis favor a welfare state.
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The Hostage Deal
The first phase of the hostage deal officially ended at the start of the month. It included the return of 33 hostages in exchange for the release of Palestinian terrorists held by Israel and a temporary ceasefire in Gaza. Survey data was collected in early March, when it was not clear whether the deal would proceed to Phase 2 (or if Hamas would agree to an extension of Phase 1). Given the rapid pace of events, this should be kept in mind when reviewing this report.
JPPI’s March Israeli Society Index found that most of the Israeli public, Jews and Arabs, support fully completing the hostage deal, and deferring a decision on the fate of Hamas rule in Gaza until afterward. A fifth of all Israelis, and a quarter of Jewish Israelis, would prefer to halt the hostage deal to resume fighting in Gaza to topple the Hamas regime. Four out of five Arab Israelis support completing the deal, while a small minority favor a resumption of fighting. Compared to last month’s Israeli Society Index, there has been a very small increase in the respondent share in support of proceeding with the deal – a rise of 3% among Jewish Israelis and a 5% increase in the Arab sector.
In a breakdown by political orientation, a majority across ideological respondent cohorts favor “Progressing with the hostage deal and deciding later what should become of Hamas rule in Gaza,” except those self-identifying as right-wing, nearly half of whom (47%) advocate resuming the war, versus a third (34%) who favor continuing with the deal. This finding remained stable relative to last month. A breakdown by voting pattern and political party affiliation shows that a significant majority (76%) of Religious Zionism (National Union–Tkuma) support a resumption of the war.
In a breakdown by religiosity level, there is a clear trend – the further one moves along the spectrum from religious to secular, the higher the percentage in support of continuing the hostage deal. A majority of secular and traditionalist (Masortim) respondents support the hostage deal, while the picture is more balanced among the religious (Datiim) – 43% support the deal while 37% favor a resumption of fighting.
Among Likud voters, a small majority favor continuing the deal (43% versus 33%). A clear and overwhelming preference for continuing the deal was found among opposition party voters – 100% of Yesh Atid and The Democrats supporters, 90% of National Unity supporters, and 82% of Yisrael Beiteinu supporters.
Confidence in the Country’s Leadership, and in Victory
Last month, we reworded our question on public confidence in an Israeli victory in the war. Instead of asking a future-oriented question – “How confident are you that Israel will win the war?” – we phrased it to inquire about the present – “To what extent do you believe Israel is winning and/or has won the war?”
This rewording led to a major discrepancy in responses. Again this month, we used the new wording, and the results are consistent with last month’s responses.
Almost ten percent of respondents are completely confident that Israel is winning or has won the war. At the same time, a fifth are not at all confident that this is the case. There was a slight increase over last month in the share of Jewish Israelis reporting that they are not confident that Israel is winning/has won the war.
In a breakdown by political ideology, a fifth (17%) of the right-wing cohort say they are completely confident in Israeli victory, while 44% of the left-wing cohort say they are not at all confident in Israeli victory in the war. No consensus was found among Jewish Israelis across ideological cohorts on the question of whether Israel has won/is winning the war.
Most evacuated residents of northern Israel are slated to return to their home localities this month. Fifty-three percent of Israelis feel that it is safe to return to the North – 14% think it is completely safe, while 39% say it is “quite safe.” Differences exist in how the various ideological cohorts perceive the return to the North.
Most respondents in the right-wing cohorts (right + center-right) believe “the North is completely safe and residents can return” or that “the North is quite safe and it appears that residents can return.” Most respondents in the left-wing cohorts (left + center-left) believe “the North is not completely safe and I don’t know whether residents should return,” or “the North is not safe and residents should not return.”
Half of all Israelis (52%) report that their confidence in the government is very low, while 10% say that it is very high. A fifth (18%) say their confidence level is very low, while another 18% report that their degree of confidence in the government is somewhat high. Most Jewish Israelis (67%) say that their confidence in the government is low (somewhat low + very low), while a third say their confidence in the government is high (somewhat high + very high). Among Arab Israelis, four in five express low confidence in the government; 15% say their confidence in the government is high. In a breakdown by political orientation, a majority in all cohorts except the right have low confidence in the government. Among right-wing respondents, a third (36%) have low confidence in the government.
Half of all Israelis (52%) say their confidence in Prime Minister Netanyahu is very low. By contrast, a fifth (19%) say their confidence in him is very high. Again, a majority in all ideological cohorts, aside from the right, report low confidence in the prime minister.
Confidence in Public Service Institutions
This month’s data indicates that attitudes toward several of Israel’s major public service institutions correlate with political orientation. Confidence in institutions such as the IDF, the Shin Bet, and the Attorney General’s Office is significantly influenced by political views. That is, the image of these governmental bodies is strongly politicized, even if these public service institutions are not themselves politically partisan. It is hard not to view this phenomenon, regardless of the reasons behind it (which would undoubtedly be a matter of public debate), as a challenge with broad repercussions for Israeli society.
This month’s survey was conducted shortly before Israel’s 24th IDF Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir, assumed his duties, replacing Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi, who had resigned. Amid the changeover, there was a continuation this month of the slow trend of declining confidence of Jewish Israelis in the senior IDF command. This month’s confidence level is among the lowest we have detected over the past year. Half of Jewish Israelis say their confidence in the IDF senior command is high (very high + somewhat high), while the other half say their confidence is low (somewhat low + very low). While only 3% report very high confidence in the IDF senior command, a fifth (21%) report very low confidence. Most left-wing and centrist respondents say their confidence in the IDF senior command is high (somewhat high + very high). By contrast, most right-wing respondents say their confidence is low (somewhat low + very low). The change in the right-wing cohort’s confidence level is clear when compared to previous months: in November 2024, 41% of the right-wing cohort reported high confidence in the senior IDF command; in January 2025, the corresponding figure was 27%; and this month only 20% of the right-wing cohort gave such a response.
Half of all Israelis (53%) report having low confidence (somewhat low + very low) in the Shin Bet’s (Israeli Security Agency) leadership echelon; 44% say their confidence is high (somewhat high + very high). Among Jewish Israelis, confidence in the Shin Bet’s leadership echelon is slightly higher than among Arab Israelis. Most left-wing and centrist respondents say their confidence in the Shin Bet leadership is high (somewhat high + very high). By contrast, most right-wing respondents report low confidence (somewhat low + very low) in the Shin Bet leadership. Broken down by religiosity level, a majority in all cohorts except the secular report low confidence (somewhat low + very low) in the Shin Bet leadership.
Most Israelis (61%) say their confidence in the Attorney General’s Office is low; a third (35%) say it is high. Half (48%) of Jewish Israelis have very low confidence in the Attorney General’s Office, while 9% say it is very high. Among Arab Israelis, a tenth say their confidence level in the Attorney General’s Office is very high, a quarter say it is somewhat high, a third say it is somewhat low, and a quarter say it is very low. Most left-wing and centrist respondents report high confidence (very high + somewhat high) in the Attorney General’s Office, while most right-wing respondents say it is low (very low + somewhat low). An overwhelming majority (92% and 95%, respectively) of Likud and Religious Zionism voters said that their confidence in the Attorney General’s Office is low.
US-Israel Relations
In early February, Prime Minister Netanyahu met with President Trump in Washington. Later, Trump met with a delegation of eight released hostages.
A quarter of Israelis report being very confident that the US president will “do the right thing” regarding US-Israel relations; another quarter say they have no such confidence, while 40% say they are somewhat confident. Overall, Jewish Israelis’ confidence in the president on this issue is higher than among Arab Israelis. A third of Jewish Israelis (30%) say they are very confident that Trump will do the right thing, while a fifth (21%) say they have no confidence that he will. Among Arab Israelis, a fifth (20%) report being very confident that Trump will do the right thing regarding relations between the two countries, while 41% say they have no confidence that he will. Since January, when we asked the same question, there has been a decline in the share of Israelis (Jews and Arabs) who report being very confident that Trump will do the right thing regarding US-Israel relations. A majority of left-wing respondents (65%) report no confidence in Trump in this regard, while most right-wing respondents (58%) say they are highly confident in him.
Last month, Trump announced that the Arab residents of the Gaza Strip should relocate to another country. Most Israelis (62%) support this idea, but the percentage of supporters has dropped substantially since last month. Of particular note is a steep decline in the share of respondents who think the plan is “practical” – from 43% last month to 32% this month. Another 32% endorse the plan but do not regard it as practical. A fifth of Israelis (20%) say the plan is a distraction and that realistic solutions need to be discussed; 13% of all Israelis, but only 3% of Jews think that the proposal is immoral. As was the case last month, a large majority of Arab Israelis consider the Trump proposal either immoral or a distraction.
In the past few months, there has been a decline in the share of Israelis (Jews and Arabs) who believe that a major effort, including concessions, should be made to preserve the alliance with the US. Last November, 45% of Israelis felt this way, but this month the figure is 35%. At the same time, there has been a rise in the percentage who believe Israel need not always capitulate to US positions, and in cases of disagreement, Israel should do as it sees fit. Half of Israelis hold this opinion. Nearly a tenth (8%) of Israelis believe the US to be an ally whose importance is declining, and a very small percentage feel that the US has caused Israel more harm than good in the past few years – a fifth of Arab Israelis agree with this assessment.
Sixty-three percent of Likud voters and 62% of Religious Zionism voters (2022 elections) believe that the US is an important ally, but in cases of disagreement, Israel should do as it sees fit.
The Judiciary
The Knesset is likely to soon vote on a proposal to change the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee, which appoints Supreme Court justices. The judicial reform proposed by Ministers Levin and Sa’ar is meant to strengthen the government’s influence on the committee. Forty-six percent of Israelis oppose such a change, while 43% support it. Among Jewish Israelis, half (48%) support the change, while 43% oppose it. Most Arab Israelis (55%) oppose the change, while a fifth (21%) support it. Most left-wing and centrist respondents oppose the change, while most right-wing respondents support it.
Relations with the Palestinians
This month’s JPPI Israeli Society Index survey included a few questions about Israeli-Palestinian relations that were also posed exactly one year ago. The data indicates that a large majority of Jewish Israelis and a sizable minority of Arab Israelis agree that there is “no chance of reaching a peace agreement with the Palestinians in the foreseeable future.” Eighty-five percent of Jews agree with this statement, including 70% who strongly agree. Among Arabs, 19% strongly agree with the statement, and another 19% “somewhat agree” with it – meaning that there is about 40% agreement within the Arab sector as well. Among Jews, only 8% disagree with the statement, while 31% of Arabs disagree with it (the rest neither agree nor disagree or don’t know). Compared to last year, the share of Jewish Israelis who strongly agree that “there is no chance of reaching a peace agreement in the foreseeable future” increased; among Arab Israelis, there has been a decline in the percentage of respondents who strongly disagree with the statement.
Does an alternative to a peace agreement exist? The survey presented respondents with the statement: “Ultimately, there is no substitute for a long-term peace settlement with the Palestinians,” and found that a majority of Jewish respondents do not agree with it; 35% of Jews agree with it (versus 43% last year). This month, a 55% majority of Arab Israelis said they agree with the statement, and a quarter say they do not agree with it. A majority of left-wing and center-left respondents agree with the statement, as do 46% of centrists and 22% of the center-right cohort.
The share of Jewish Israelis who believe that “Israel needs to strengthen its control over the Palestinians, expand the settlements, consider dissolving the Palestinian Authority and annexing Judea and Samaria [the West Bank]” rose over the last six months. In October 2024, a third (34%) of Jewish Israelis chose this statement as closest to their own position; today, nearly half (47%) say this. There has also been a decline in the percentage of Jewish Israelis who agree with the statement: “Israel should try to reach a peace agreement with moderate Palestinians, and allow the establishment of a Palestinian state that will live in peace alongside the State of Israel” – in October 2024, 19% of Israelis gave this response, this month 11% did so.
Arab Israelis have not changed their position on this question over the past six months. Most (63%) believe Israel should try to reach a peace agreement and allow the establishment of a Palestinian state. A fifth (19%) believe that Israel should strive for complete separation from the Palestinians and the dismantling of settlements outside the major blocs while maintaining the IDF’s freedom to act to prevent the growth of terrorist organizations in the territories. Nine percent of Arab Israelis think Israel needs to ramp up its control over the Palestinians.
This month, a year after our previous assessment of the issue, we looked at two statements pertaining to the settlements: one reflects the view that “the settlements are a burden,” and the other reflects the view that “the settlements are an asset.”
When placed side by side, we obtain a similar pattern of agreement and opposition to each of them. Most Jewish Israelis (58%) agree with the statement, “Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria create deterrence and contribute to the security of all Israeli citizens.” A similar majority (56%) of Jewish Israelis disagree with the statement, “Settlements in the territories are a burden on the IDF and harm the security of all Israeli citizens.”
A third of Jewish Israelis (35%) agree with the latter statement, that is, they think that the settlements are a burden. Unsurprisingly, Arab Israelis are predominantly in the “burden” camp rather than the “asset” camp. Sixty-three percent of Arab Israelis do not consider the settlements an asset, and the same percentage agree that they are a “burden.”
Compared to a year ago, the percentage of Jewish Israelis who disagree that the settlements are an “asset” slightly decreased. At the same period, there has also been a slight increase in the percentage of Jewish Israelis who disagree that the settlements are a “burden.” Additionally, the share of Jews who strongly agree with the statement, “Settlements in the territories are a burden on the IDF and harm the security of all Israeli citizens” has declined, and the share of Arab Israelis who strongly agree with this statement has also dropped.
Ultra-Orthodox Conscription
A majority of Israelis (58%) think the government’s chief motivation for advancing an ultra-Orthodox exemption/conscription law is the survival of the coalition. Within the Jewish sector, the percentage of those holding this view is even larger – 63%. Among Arab Israelis, a third (36%) think this is the chief motivation, a fifth (21%) contend that the chief motivation is to meet security needs, 15% think it relates to unequal sharing of the national burden, and 11% believe the government’s chief motive in advancing an exemption/conscription law is to uphold a Supreme Court ruling on ultra-Orthodox conscription.
Recently, ultra-Orthodox Knesset members said that if there is no law exempting most ultra-Orthodox from conscription, “there will be no government.” Nearly half of all Israelis oppose the government, so the ultimatum makes no difference to them. Seventeen percent responded that they support the government, but if to preserve it, most ultra-Orthodox would have to be draft-exempt – they would prefer that the government dissolve. Sixteen percent say they support the government and its preservation is important to them, even at the cost of exempting most ultra-Orthodox from conscription, and 9% say that they support ultra-Orthodox exemption in any case. A third (31%) of those who voted for Likud and Religious Zionism in 2022 support the government but would prefer its dissolution if it depends on an exemption for most ultra-Orthodox Israelis.
Security versus Education
Two in five Jewish Israelis believe investment in education should exceed investment in security, and two in five hold the opposite view – that there should be greater investment in security than in education. Last year, a higher percentage of Jewish Israelis thought investment in education should exceed investment in security, but this year the percentage dropped to parity with the percentage holding the opposite view. Most Arab Israelis believe that investment in education should be greater than in security. In the last year, there has been a rise in the share of all Israelis (Jews and Arabs) who think investment in security should exceed investment in education. The further one moves along both the religious and ideological spectrums from liberal to conservative, the higher the respondent share who believe there should be greater investment in security than in education.
Most Jewish Israelis (63%) believe the Israeli economy should rely on private initiative and function as a free market as much as possible. A quarter (27%) maintain that the Israeli economy should be managed by the state so that it is socially equitable and fair. The views of Arab Israelis reflect a different picture: most Arab Israelis (68%) think the Israeli economy should be managed by the state, while a quarter (23%) think it should rely on private initiative. This year’s data shows a 20% decline since last year in the share of Arab Israelis who believe in a free market economy, with a similar increase in the share who support a more centralized approach. We have no clear data-based explanation for this difference; it may be a random discrepancy.
Most Jewish Israelis (64%) would prefer that Israel foster excellence, “even if it widens social gaps,” while a quarter (23%) would prefer that the state work to reduce these gaps, even at the expense of undermining the development of excellence. On this issue too, there is a fundamental discrepancy between the views of the Jewish and Arab publics. Most Arab Israelis (59%) would prefer that Israel strive to reduce social gaps, even if it undermines the development of excellence, while a third (30%) would prefer that Israel foster excellence, even if it widens social gaps. A majority in all religion cohorts would prefer that Israel foster excellence, even at the expense of widening social disparities.
The Future of the State
A majority of Israelis (57%) are optimistic about Israel’s future (very optimistic + somewhat optimistic), as opposed to 39% who are pessimistic about its future (very pessimistic + somewhat pessimistic). The Jewish population’s optimism level is higher than among the Arab population – 42% is optimistic, and 48% is pessimistic. Most of those who self-identify as right-wing (81%), center-right (77%), and centrist (53%) are optimistic about Israel’s future. By contrast, 63% of left-wing respondents (left and center-left) are pessimistic about Israel’s future. Broken down by religiosity, half the secular population is pessimistic about Israel’s future, while most of those in the other cohorts are optimistic.
The Jewish People Policy Institute’s March Israeli Society Index survey was administered between February 27 and March 5, 2025, to 735 respondents. Data was collected by theMadad.com (535 Jewish-sector respondents via an online poll) and by Afkar Research (200 Arab-sector respondents, half online and half by telephone). Data was analyzed and weighted by voting pattern and religiosity level to represent Israel’s adult population. Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepkov compile the JPPI Israeli Society Index; Professor David Steinberg serves as the statistical consultant.