Nearly a year after the October 7 attacks and the start of the war: A drop in how Israelis assess the country’s security and economic strength
This report has five main parts: the continuing war, confidence in the country’s leadership, the education system, religion-and-state, and the future of the state.
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Additional Findings
- Most of the Israeli public believes that the prime minister brings considerations of his own “political benefit” when making decisions regarding a hostage deal.
- Just over half of Israelis (51%) support a hostage deal necessitating significant Israeli concessions.
- Most of the Israeli public believes that the government should not have organized a state ceremony marking a year since the Hamas onslaught.
- Most Israelis say they will not watch the televised state memorial ceremony for October 7; opinions are divided regarding the civil ceremony.
- A small majority of Jewish Israelis favor opening a second front in Lebanon as soon as possible.
- Confidence in Israel’s political leadership remains very low; confidence in the IDF senior command is somewhat low.
- About half of Israelis support holding elections within three months; a majority of coalition supporters want elections at their appointed time (October 2026).
- Most Israelis believe the IDF is acting too slowly to draft the ultra-Orthodox, and that sanctions against those who ignore conscription notices should be stiffened.
- Most Israelis support ending the child day care subsidy for draft-eligible ultra-Orthodox men who do not report for IDF induction.
- Most Israelis oppose the Tel Aviv Municipality’s decision to prohibit holiday prayers in the city’s public spaces.
Continuation of the War
As the first anniversary of the October 7 Hamas attacks and the start of the Israel-Hamas War approaches, this month’s Index registered a certain rise in the percentage of Israelis who believe that Israel will win the war compared to recent months, although the percentage remains very low compared with the early months of the war. A majority of Arab Israelis “aren’t certain” Israel will win, as in previous months. Among Jews, nearly 40% assume that Israel will win (ratings of 4 and 5 on a scale of 1 to 5), while nearly a third assume that Israel will not win.
The Philadelphi Corridor and a Hostage Deal
Data collection for the September Index, which began a few hours after the execution of six hostages in Gaza was disclosed, found a small Jewish majority who feel that “Israel must not relinquish control over the Philadelphi Corridor (the Egypt-Gaza border), even at the expense of hostage deal” (49%). Among Arab Israelis, a very large majority (84%) favor a hostage deal. Weighting the two positions shows that slightly over half of the entire Israeli public supports a deal with terms that would obligate Israel to make significant concessions (51%). When this figure is compared with findings from other public surveys released around the same time, we find a similar percentage of deal-supporters across the board; JPPI found a slightly larger percentage than other surveys of those (Jewish Israelis) who oppose such a deal.
In view of the debate over Israel remaining (or not) in the Philadelphi Corridor, only a third of Israelis feel that the prime minister’s stance on the hostage-deal issue is objectively based solely on “security, humanitarian, and political” considerations. Nearly half of Israelis (45%) think that the prime minister’s considerations include his own “political benefit,” and a fifth say that his considerations mix policy and politics (19%).
An examination of the question regarding Philadelphi and the hostages against the question about the prime minister and his considerations shows the degree to which confidence in the considerations of Israel’s leadership overlaps with respondent views and their willingness to accept the policy that the leadership represents as correct. When responses to both questions are cross-referenced (in the table below, for Jewish Israelis), there is a clear overlap between support for Netanyahu’s position (against leaving the Philadelphi Corridor) and the belief that Netanyahu’s considerations are objective. Thus, among Jewish Israelis who believe that “Israel must not give up control over the Philadelphi Corridor, even if this means no hostage deal,” the vast majority (74%) say that the prime minister’s considerations are “primarily security, humanitarian, and political considerations.” By contrast, among those who chose “Israel should give up control over the Philadelphi Corridor in order to facilitate a deal to free hostages,” an even larger majority (86%) believe that “the prime minister’s considerations are primarily of political benefit.”
A Year of War
The controversy over how to mark the one-year anniversary of the Hamas attacks, and the fact that there will be both a state (filmed) ceremony and a privately organized, crowd-funded civilian ceremony, finds expression in this month’s survey. Most Jewish and Arab Israelis say they do not plan to view the state ceremony. Of all the ideological subgroups, only among the right is there a majority who say that they intend to watch the ceremony, meaning that the ceremony clearly bears a strong sectoral character. Among the religious, half say they will watch the ceremony, while a quarter of traditionalists and a much smaller percentage of the secular – 18% – plan to do so.
Only a fifth of the Israeli public (and a quarter of Jewish Israelis) feels that “a state ceremony is needed to mark October 7, and the government is right to organize it.” A larger group, 40%, say that “the war isn’t over yet and so it’s too early to organize a state ceremony to mark October 7.” The only group in which the dominant view is supportive of a government ceremony next month comprises those Israelis who self-identify as “right-wing” – 47% chose the option “A state ceremony is needed to mark October 7, and the government is right to organize it.” All the other ideological groups take the view that the war hasn’t yet ended and so there is no need for a state ceremony.
Opinions on the civil ceremony – the one that is referred to as the “alternative” ceremony – are divided. A third of Jewish respondents feel that “it’s the right ceremony at this time” (35%), while a similar percentage say that it is “a ceremony that undermines the national character of the state memorial ceremony and shouldn’t be held” (32%). Responses to this question show disagreement along ideological lines, with the right-wing groups (right and center-right) largely opposing the civil ceremony, and the centrist and left-wing groups largely favoring it.
The Fighting in Lebanon
As the fighting continues in northern Israel and southern Lebanon there has been a modest uptick in the share of Israelis who believe that Israel should open a second front in Lebanon and mount a military campaign against Hezbollah. This finding results from the changing views in the Jewish sector; a majority of the Arab sector believes that Israel should “try to reach an agreement with international support that will prevent the need for a war against Hezbollah.”
When looking at the views of Jewish Israelis, we find a certain decline in the percentage of those who favor a de-escalation of the fighting via an agreement, and a rise in the share who think that a second front should be opened without delay – the latter is now the majority group.
The West Bank (Judea and Samaria)
several reported attacks by West Bank settlers against Palestinians, and of the debate sparked regarding their causes, the correct response to them, their scope, and the collective responsibility of “all settlers” for extreme incidents, we sought to determine how the Jewish public relates to these questions. Of the entire Jewish respondent pool, half characterized the incidents as “deplorable”; a third said that the phenomenon is “exaggerated”; and a fifth felt that the attackers’ actions were reasonable given what is happening in Judea and Samaria. As one might expect, the responses differ by ideological subgroup, with a third of those on the right (33%) choosing the “reasonable reaction” option and 49% choosing the “exaggerated” option. Among centrist (75%) and left-wing respondents (93%) a large majority chose the “deplorable” option.
Confidence in Leadership
This month’s survey showed no significant change in levels of confidence in the government. Less than a third of Israelis (and a third of Jews) have high or somewhat high levels of confidence in the government. A substantial majority of Israelis have low confidence in the government.
Confidence in the prime minister, like confidence in the government as a whole, remains low as well. Thirty percent of Israelis have high confidence in Benjamin Netanyahu, versus 68% who have low confidence in him. Among Jewish Israelis, 35% have high confidence in the prime minister, while 63% have low confidence in him. The only group with a majority of those with relatively high confidence in the prime minister is that of Jews who self-identify as “right-wing” (on a scale of 1 to 5). Within this group, 71% of respondents have high or somewhat high confidence in Netanyahu. Among the center- right, a majority do not have confidence in Netanyahu (55%). The highest level of confidence in the prime minister is found among Shas and United Torah Judaism voters. Among Likud voters, 78% have confidence Netanyahu – 48% high confidence, 30% somewhat high confidence.
Confidence in the IDF senior command remains similar to what it was in July, when the question’s wording changed from “confidence in IDF commanders,” to “confidence in the senior IDF command.” A steep decline was found between March and September in the share of respondents who have confidence in the senior command. Between the July and the September surveys there was no meaningful change in confidence levels. In this month’s Index, a small majority of survey respondents, 56%, reported very low or somewhat low confidence in the IDF senior command.
When to Hold Elections
Along with the relatively low trust in Israel’s leadership most Israelis want early elections: half believe that elections should be held as soon as possible (within three months); a fifth believe that elections should be held some time after the war ends; and a third say that elections should be held at their scheduled time (October 2026). Among coalition-party voters, a majority of respondents feel that elections should be held at their scheduled time. However, a third believe that elections should be moved up to some degree (although not right away).
Compared with earlier questions about the timing of the elections, in which the response options varied in accordance with when the surveys were conducted, we can see that the percentage of those who want elections within three months is on the rise. One reason for this is that some respondents had expected a date for elections to have been set by now. The percentage who believe that elections should be held at their scheduled time remains quite similar to what it was in the past.
The Education System
As the school year opened, with high school teachers on strike at the time the survey was conducted, a very low percentage of Israelis (18%), and a particularly low percentage of Jewish Israelis (14%) felt that the Israeli education system could be called “good.” The dominant respondent view (and the majority view among Jewish respondents) is that the education system is “mediocre.” A third of respondents with an opinion on the matter believe that the education system is not good (the data refers to respondents who currently have or once had children in the education system).
On a question regarding Bible studies in Jewish schools, half of the respondents believe that the Bible should be studied in the schools – “each sector in its own way.” Another quarter say that the Bible should be studied as cultural material, while a fifth believe it should be taught as religious study material. In all sectors except for the ultra-Orthodox, the majority response was that the Bible should be taught in each sector in its own way.
Religion and State
Most of Israel’s Jewish public supports the attorney general’s ruling (whose implementation has in the meantime been delayed) that ultra- Orthodox families in which men obligated to enlist have not done so, will be unable to receive subsidized child day care. A third of the public (36%) feel that the ruling is “excessive.” Among the ultra-Orthodox, unsurprisingly, a large majority oppose the decision. The religious subgroup, however, is almost evenly divided on the issue: 49% say that the decision is “excessive,” while 43% say that it is correct.
Most of those who expressed an opinion, and half of the Jewish public, think the IDF is taking too long to draft yeshiva students, now that the Supreme Court has ruled against their exemption from IDF conscription. Regarding the pace at which the IDF is acting on this issue, there is a major difference in views between Jews at the less-traditional end of the spectrum and those at the more-traditional end.
Views also diverge regarding the lesson to be learned from the low level of ultra-Orthodox compliance with the requirement to report to the army recruiting offices since their exemption expired. For a large majority of secular Israelis, who constitute the country’s largest population group, the lesson is that increased financial pressure in the form of sanctions should be applied in order to incentivize ultra- Orthodox draft-reporting compliance. The other groups (except for the ultra-Orthodox), are divided between those who feel that the low reporting levels are proof of a failed attempt to conscript yeshiva students against their will, and of the need to return to “dialogue,” and those who think that increased pressure should be exerted on those who do not report for the draft.
Arab Conscription
Against the background of the debate over ultra-Orthodox conscription into the IDF, we also posed draft- related questions to Arab-sector respondents. The first question asked whether, “in your opinion, this debate is also relevant to Israel’s Arab sector.” Nearly a third responded affirmatively (30%); the largest group (42%) responded negatively (“not relevant”); and nearly a third said that they don’t know.
A quarter of Arab Israeli respondents said that they “hope” Israel “will also aspire to draft young Arab men for military or national service.” Half responded that they hope this “won’t happen.”
Accordingly, when asked what the appropriate reaction to an Arab conscription initiative should be, half of the respondents said that the Arab Israeli leadership should oppose such an initiative, a quarter said that they don’t know, and the remaining quarter, corresponding to those who “hope” for such an initiative, said that it should be accepted or that there should be a dialogue about the details.
Prayer Services in Tel Aviv
Most Israeli Jews oppose the Tel Aviv Municipality’s decision to prohibit prayer services in public spaces during the High Holidays, due to its opposition to gender separation in the public sphere. Nearly half of the public (45%) oppose the decision because they believe “there is no problem with gender separation in the public sphere when there are those who want it.” Another 16% think the decision was mistaken because “there is a limited place for gender separation in the public sphere.” However, a small majority of the secular (52%) support the decision.
Israel’s Future
In recent months there has been a lowering of Israelis’ assessment of the country’s security and economic resilience. On a scale of -5 (weakness) to 5 (strength), Israelis gave the country’s security strength an average rating of 2.75, and its economic strength a rating of 2.26. For both parameters there is a large rating disparity between Jews (who feel that Israel is stronger) and Arabs (who think the country is less strong).
Compared with the findings for an identical question asked in January (to Jewish Israelis), assessments have grown more negative regarding Israel’s strength. It should be noted that, unlike many other questions, the strength rating does not significantly overlap with political orientation. The highest rating of Israel’s security strength was given by the center-right and centrist groups (3.5). The highest economic strength rating was given by the right (3.46). However, in both cases the ratings are substantially lower among the center-left and the left.
Optimism Levels
There was no significant change this month in the optimism/pessimism levels of Israelis compared with previous months. On a scale of -5 (pessimism) to 5 (optimism), the Israeli average is 1.2. As in previous months, a large gap was found between Jews (1.71) and Arabs (-0.84). Optimism levels vary greatly
in accordance with traditionalism levels and political orientation; in general, the closer one is to the Traditionalist/religious and right-wing end of the spectrum, the more optimism expressed.
Data was collected for JPPI’s September survey by theMadad.com (747 Jewish respondents via an online poll) and by Afkar Research (203 Arab respondents, half online and half by phone). Data was analyzed and weighted by political affiliation and religiosity level to represent Israel’s adult population. Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepkov compile the JPPI Israeli Society Index; Professor David Steinberg is statistical consultant.