80% saw Iran as an existential threat before the 12-day campaign, compared to 57% today. Most Israelis believe the war in Gaza is nearing its end.
Main Finding
There has been a dramatic decline in the share of Israelis who, in the wake of the Iran campaign, view the country as an “existential threat.” This report addresses the 12-day Iran campaign, the war in Gaza and the hostage deal, confidence in the nation’s leadership, ultra-Orthodox conscription, and an international comparative index of general trust in other people.
Additional Findings
- 80% of Israelis viewed Iran as an existential threat before the campaign, 57% do so now.
- Confidence in the government and and the prime minister is at its highest since the start of the war in October 2023.
- Most Israelis think the war in Gaza is nearing its end.
- Most favor returning the hostages and ending the war even if that means Hamas is not removed from power.
- Near-parity among Jewish Israelis who support a deal and those who prefer continuing the war until Hamas is removed.
- Most think that removing Hamas from power is an appropriate goal, but also feel that it is not realistic.
- A large majority of Israelis want a “fast track” to ending the prime minister’s trial.
- Near-parity among Jewish Israelis who support the passage of an ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) exemption/conscription law and those who do not.
- Most respondents believe that “On most important issues, most Israelis agree with each other.”
- A large gap exists between Jewish and Arab Israelis on whether “people can be trusted.”
- Relative to other countries, a large percentage of Jewish Israelis say “most people can be trusted.”
- Among Arab Israelis, there is a deep lack of faith that people (including Arab Israelis) can be trusted.
- Among Jewish Israelis, a small percentage say that “most Arab Israelis can be trusted.”
- Compared to a year ago, there has been no change regarding the desire to emigrate: a quarter of Jews and a third of Arabs wish to do so.
- Compared to a year ago, there has been a rise, mainly among Jews, in overall optimism with respect to the State of Israel’s future.
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The Iran Campaign
This is the first JPPI survey conducted after Israel’s 12-day Iran campaign, during which Israel struck nuclear facilities and other sites in Iran, while also being hit by Iranian missile barrages. The campaign was dramatic, even relative to earlier stages of the war that has been ongoing since the October 7 Hamas onslaught.
A large majority of Jewish Israelis, and a certain percentage, though not a majority, of Arabs, believe that Iran posed an “existential threat” to Israel before the campaign. Sixty-seven percent of Jewish Israelis the Iran was an existential threat “to a great extent,” and another 24% think it was “to some extent.” The share of Israelis who believe that Iran is an existential threat to Israel now that the campaign is over is significantly lower. This means that a large proportion of Israelis believe the Iran campaign achieved its objective, at least in part, and turned Iran from an existential threat to a non-existential threat (or, in some cases, from an existential threat “to a great extent” to an existential threat “to some extent”). Before the campaign, 91% of Jewish Israelis perceived Iran as an existential threat (to a great extent or to some extent), but the percentage who do so now that the campaign is over has dropped to 63% – a dramatic decrease.
Right-wing Israelis and coalition voters show the most significant decline of those who identify Iran as an existential threat to. For example, 85% of those self-identifying as “right-wing” thought Iran was an existential threat before the campaign, but only 14% now say that Iran continues to be an existential threat to a very great extent. That is, most of this cohort has been convinced that the level of threat posed by Iran dropped very substantially after the campaign. Among centrists, the share of those who believed Iran to be an existential threat “to a great extent” declined from 58% before the campaign to 21% after it. This diminished threat assessment is evident across all ideological cohorts.
The sense Israelis have (especially in the Jewish sector) that Israel achieved significant accomplishments in the Iran campaign is also reflected in a comparison of questions about the campaign’s success, versus Israel’s success in the broader ongoing war. In both cases, respondents were asked to rate, on a scale of 1 to 5, their feeling about whether Israel has won or is winning the war; one question explicitly and specifically refers to the Iran campaign, and the other refers to the “war in general” with a parenthetical clarification: “refers to the war on all fronts that started on October 7.”
Overall, this month saw a rise in Israelis’ sense of victory compared to previous months, even regarding the war in general – but there is still a major gap between the more prevalent feeling that Israel won the Iran campaign, and the less prevalent feeling that Israel has won or is winning the war in general. While 72% of Jewish Israelis assess the Iran campaign as an Israeli victory (ratings of 4 or 5), 53% think that Israel has won or is winning the war in general.
Status of the War
This month’s Israeli Society Index survey was conducted a few days after the Iran campaign concluded, and at a time when hostage-release negotiations, including provisions for further discussion about ending the war, were at issue. While data collection was underway, it was announced that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would be going to Washington to meet with President Trump, who publicly expressed his sense that the end of the war was near.
Assessments of Israel’s status in the war, and of whether or to what extent Israel is winning the war, largely correlate with ideological orientation. A significant majority among the right-wing cohorts think Israel is winning or has won the war (the general war, not just the Iran campaign); among the left-wing cohorts, which are smaller, there is a less favorable assessment of Israel’s war achievements.
Notably, in light of the political debate over negotiations to end the war, supporters of the coalition parties – some of whose leaders (especially in the Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit parties) are hesitant to end the war, feeling that Israel has yet to sufficiently achieve its objectives – have an overall sense that Israel is winning and/or has won the war. That is, these voters do feel (or at least did, at the time of this survey)that Israel has reached sufficiently meaningful achievements in the war.
Given the time that has elapsed since the start of the war, the negotiations for a deal that also includes a possible end to the war, and perhaps Israel’s achievements in the Iran campaign, most Israelis think the war is nearing its end. A comparison of what respondents said in May, when the war had reached its year-and-a-half mark, and what they are saying now – we can see that estimates of the war’s duration have changed significantly in the past three months. In May, most Israelis (55%) estimated that the war would continue for another “year or more.” In July, the share of respondents holding this view dropped to less than 25%, with the majority estimating that the war will end within a few weeks or months.
A Deal – Yes or No
The end-of-war picture is growing hazy in the days of negotiations over a hostage-return deal, to be followed by discussions about ending the war. The specific terms are not known to the public, and the diplomatic dynamics make it difficult to obtain a clear picture of the situation. Therefore, caution is advised when inquiring about Israelis’ preferences regarding arrangements to be reached in the coming days or weeks. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that these views are still largely subject to political influence and by Israelis’ support of, or opposition to, the positions of the government and the coalition.
July’s survey presented two options for “the right thing to do in Gaza.” The first: try to reach an agreement to return the hostages, even if it means not achieving the goal of ousting Hamas from power. The second: continue the war until the stated goals (all hostages returned, no Hamas rule) have been achieved. The Israeli public shows a preference for the first option (return the hostages and end the war). It should be noted, however, that this preference reflects, in great part, the view of the Arab respondents, who chose this option by a very large majority, while Jews expressed support for the first and second options in nearly equal numbers. Forty-nine percent of Jews prefer freeing the hostages even if Hamas is not ousted from power, while 45% prefer continuing the war until the latter goal is achieved (along with the return of all the hostages).
The primary divide on this question is between the supporters of right-wing positions, for the most part coalition voters, and the other cohorts (including the center-right). Among those who self-identify as right-wing, 86% support continuing the war if an end to the fighting would mean that Hamas is not removed from power. Among center-right cohort, a small majority favors ending the war (46% versus 41% in favor of continuing the war). In the other cohorts and, as noted, among Arab Israelis, a large majority support ending the war.
This month, to better understand the preferences of the different survey groups on major issues, we asked respondents to rate themselves on an additional scale to the five-point right-left scale (right-wing, center-right, centrist, center-left, left-wing). We presented a nine-point scale ranging from “deep right” to “deep left.” This breakdown placed 63% of Jews to the right of center, while 10% positioned themselves exactly at the center and 22% left of center (3% chose not to position themselves on this scale). Arab Israelis had the highest share of respondents who would not position themselves on the scale, or who position themselves precisely at the center. Based on comparisons to other questions, it can be assumed that this scale has different meanings for Jewish and Arab Israelis.
This expanded scale allows us to identify with great precision those Israelis (and in particular those Jews) who tend to favor a Gaza agreement (at the price of compromise on ousting Hamas). Support for continuing the war is very clear among the “deep right” and “right” cohorts. By contrast, the “moderate right” and “near-center right” prefer a deal that would end the war. Together, the “deep right” and “right” cohorts amount to 35% of all Jewish Israelis, and these cohorts do not comprise a large majority of coalition supporters. For example, 66% of Likud supporters self-identified as “deep right” (18%) or “right” (48%). Among Shas, Religious Zionism, and Otzma Yehudit supporters, the “deep right” share is even higher (it is lower among supporters of United Torah Judaism, which has a similar percentage of those who identify as “moderate right”).
An explanation for the views we have presented on ending the war can be found, among other things, in the responses to a question about whether “total victory” over Hamas is realistic. The July responses to this question are nearly identical to those we obtained three months ago, in the May 2025 Israeli Society Index survey. A majority feels that removing Hamas from power is an appropriate goal, but there is also a majority who feel that it is not realistically obtainable. Nearly half of Israelis, and a majority of Arab Israelis, think statements about the removal of Hamas have been made for political purposes. Another fifth think the goal is appropriate but will be hard to achieve, and a third think the goal is appropriate and achievable. The latter is the view of a large majority of coalition supporters, which explains the challenge the prime minister would face were he to advance a proposal for ending the war that does not include ending Hamas rule. In this context, it is worth recalling a finding from last month’s JPPI Israeli Society Index survey where most Israelis thought Hamas would remain in power when the war in Gaza ends (27%), or that Hamas rule would continue under a different name (30%). Less than a third of Israelis – but here too, most coalition supporters – said the Hamas regime would cease to exist (30%).
Confidence in the Leadership
This month, we posed three questions against the background of Netanyahu’s trip to Washington for another meeting with President Trump. The first: Do Israelis say their opinion of the prime minister changed for the better or the worse in the wake of the Iran campaign? The second: What degree of confidence do Israelis have in President Trump? The third: How much confidence does the public have in the IDF senior command? As part of our occasional assessments of different versions of questions, this month we decided to try something new: half the respondents were given the standard version of the question about “confidence level,” while the other half (the division was random) were asked the same question but with the following wording: “To what extent do you trust …” For example: “What is your level of confidence in Prime Minister Netanyahu?” versus “To what extent do you trust Prime Minister Netanyahu?” The changes in wording yielded subtle differences in most cases, except for the question about the IDF senior command, where the “trust” version largely increased the share of those who favorably assessed the senior military command.
This month, 43% of Jewish Israelis said their confidence in the prime minister is high or very high. This signals an improvement in the prime minister’s status compared to previous months, as reflected in the findings for all Israelis. Although Netanyahu’s standing among Arab Israelis did not improve significantly, confidence in the government and the prime minister is currently higher than it has been since the onset of war in October 2023.
Against the backdrop of the Iran campaign, this month we also looked at whether confidence levels in the prime minister have changed. We asked a direct question: Have you changed your views regarding Prime Minister Netanyahu in recent weeks? A majority of Israelis said they had not changed their opinion of Netanyahu. However, it is evident that among Jewish Israelis, a majority of whom (55%) said their opinion had not changed, over a third (36%) reported that their view of Netanyahu has changed for the better (9% said their opinion had changed for the worse). Those whose opinion of Netanyahu has improved, largely occupy the political space closest to the prime minister, i.e., those who tended to have a positive opinion of him in the first place now say that their opinion has grown even more favorable. Thus, a 57% majority of the right-wing cohort report that their view of Netanyahu has changed “somewhat” or “very much” for the better; 42% of the center-right cohort say this as well, but in the centrist and left-wing cohorts the degree of change among those whose view has changed for the better is much smaller (and sometimes smaller than the degree of change among those who changed their opinion of him for the worse). In other words, confidence in Netanyahu strengthened among his supporters, or his former or potential supporters, but did not improve significantly among those who oppose him.
Confidence levels in the government as a whole are very similar to confidence levels in the prime minister. Confidence in the government rose significantly compared to May (in the June survey, we did not ask about confidence in the government). In the context of this finding, half of Jewish Israelis, and a large majority of coalition supporters, think the next elections should be held at their scheduled time (October 2026). Among the Israeli public as a whole, Jewish and Arab Israelis, there is parity between those who want elections to be held this coming fall (a year early) and those who would prefer they be held the following autumn as currently scheduled.
The July survey found a slight rise in confidence in the IDF senior command. The data was gathered after the Iran campaign, which showcased the IDF’s operational capabilities; on the other hand, data collection also took place at a time when leaks about confrontations between the IDF’s upper echelon and several cabinet ministers over the IDF’s performance in Gaza were widely reported in the media. Unlike the situation regarding the country’s political leadership, confidence in the IDF senior command does not rise or fall as one moves from right to left along the political spectrum; rather, it follows a bell curve, with confidence lower on the right (and even lower for the “deep right”), rising as one approaches the center, and again dropping as one moves leftward along the spectrum.
On the eve of the prime minister’s departure for Washington, a slight increase was found in Israelis’ confidence that US President Donald Trump would “do the right thing” regarding US-Israel relations. However, even after the American strikes on several Iranian nuclear facilities, Israelis remain much more suspicious of Trump than they were at the start of his second presidential term. This wariness may be due, among other things, to Trump’s effort to arrange a hostage deal and end the war, and to the possibility that he would pressure Israel to consent to terms that Israelis do not want. As a result, Likud supporters are evenly divided (47%) between those who are “very confident” in the US president and those who are “somewhat confident” in him. By contrast, in January 2025, as Trump was about to take office, about 60% of Likud supporters were “very confident” in him on this issue. Among Arab Israelis, half expressed confidence that Trump will do the right thing (49%, very confident and somewhat confident), while a slightly lower percentage said they have no such confidence.
Draft Exemption for the Ultra-Orthodox (Haredim)
A coalition compromise regarding the law exempting the ultra-Orthodox from military conscription was reached a few hours before the start of the 12-day Iran campaign; now that the campaign is over, the Knesset is supposed to continue its discussion of the law, which the ultra-Orthodox parties are demanding be passed before the end of the Knesset’s summer session late this month. The final details of the law were unknown when this survey was conducted. Therefore, the survey question on this matter was quite general and does not precisely address several details that were made public just after data collection for the present survey concluded. The question started with a general summary of a few of the law framework’s underlying principles: “Just before the Iran campaign, the coalition reached an agreement on a framework for a Haredi draft exemption law. Per the agreement, 4,800 Haredim will be drafted in the first year, 5,700 in the second year, and half of all young Haredi males in every conscription cycle within five years. At the same time, some sanctions, such as a prohibition on drivers’ licenses and the cancellation of academic-study subsidies, will enter into force immediately, while other sanctions will be deferred until it becomes clear whether the state is reaching its Haredi conscription targets.” Following this summary, respondents were asked to choose one of two options: support for, or opposition to, the framework and its passage by the Knesset.
Within the Israeli public as a whole, a small majority favor the framework, thanks to high support among Arab Israelis. Among Jewish Israelis, there was near parity between those who supported the framework’s passage and those who opposed it. Most coalition supporters want the framework to pass, while the majority of opposition supporters were against it. However, among both coalition and opposition supporters, sizeable numbers take the counterintuitive side, or profess no opinion. Based on this, it can be assumed that only after the complete framework’s publication and the subsequent public debate will a clear view of the support-opposition distribution emerge.
The Netanyahu Trial
A large majority of Israelis want a “fast track” to be found for ending Prime Minister Netanyahu’s trial. However, no majority would agree to the trial ending and Netanyahu returning to his prime-ministerial duties without the cloud of legal proceedings hanging over him. This is because a sizeable share of the public is willing to end the trial if Netanyahu also withdraws from political life.
Regarding Netanyahu’s trial, a large majority of coalition supporters – especially those identified as “right-wing” – would like to enable him to return to his duties “as usual” after a swift conclusion of the trial. By contrast, a majority in the centrist and left-wing cohorts are prepared to end the trial in exchange for Netanyahu’s withdrawal from political life. Among the center-right cohort, 44% want to allow Netanyahu to return to his duties as usual, while 33% want the trial to end quickly in exchange for his withdrawal from political life (17% of this cohort supports the trial’s continuation).
Trust in People
In recent decades, a number of countries around the world have shown a decline in the trust people place in others. For example, in the US, the share of those who agree that “most people can be trusted” dropped from 47% in 1973 to 34% today. Interpersonal trust is considered important to the proper functioning of society. In some cases, there is a correlation between interpersonal trust and economic prosperity, and a reverse correlation between interpersonal trust and economic inequality. Trust in other people is also related to personal happiness levels. Those who say that most people can be trusted report higher satisfaction with their lives, their health, and their family life.
Various international indices assess interpersonal trust levels in different countries, with many of them posing the standard question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can or cannot be trusted?” This month, we asked Israelis this question. The aim was to compare Israeli sentiment in this area to that of other countries. Half of Israelis say that most people can be trusted. The share of Israelis holding this view places Israel among those countries where interpersonal trust is high. However, there is a large disparity in the responses of Jewish and Arab Israelis. While most Jewish Israelis tend to trust other people, a substantial majority of Arab Israelis tend not to trust others. A discussion of this disparity lies beyond the scope of this report, but the topic certainly merits further examination. In the international rankings we also see that many Arab countries are at the bottom of the trust scale (Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, etc.).
For purposes of international comparison, we used statistics appearing on the Our World in Data website, based on Integrated Values Surveys from 2024. We also looked at other data published by the Pew Research Center and by Ipsos. The following table shows that Israel occupies a relatively high position in the “trust in people” rankings. In fact, Israel belongs to a group of only 11 countries in which a majority of the population says that “most people can be trusted.”
Further to the “most people” question, we also asked more focused questions pertaining to relations within the immediate environment: Israelis, Jewish Israelis, Arab Israelis. With regard to fellow Israelis – the general trust level rises. That is, Israelis trust Israelis more than they trust people in general. This picture changes slightly when the focus moves from Israelis in general to Jewish versus Arab Israelis.
Most Jews trust Jewish Israelis more than they trust Israelis in general. Most Jewish Israelis do not trust Arab Israelis. Among Arabs, trust in other people is low across the board, including fellow Arab Israelis – although the trust level is slightly higher here. Still, only a third of Arab Israelis say most Arab Israelis can be trusted.
Regarding Jews’ trust in Arabs, we find, as expected, significant disparities according to ideological camp (and in near-complete conformity with religiosity level as well).
Israel’s Future
Most Israelis say that even if they had the practical possibility of emigrating to another country, they would not do so. No change occurred on this score between July 2024 and July 2025. A little less than a third somewhat or strongly agree with the statement: “If I had a practical possibility to emigrate, I would do so.” Like last year, the data shows differences between Jewish and Arab Israelis: 24% of Jewish Israelis would emigrate, while slightly more than a third (36%) of Arab Israelis would do so.
As in the past, Jews show a strong correlation between ideological orientation and degree of agreement with the statement on emigration. The share of those who agree with the statement (that is, those who would consider emigrating) rises the further leftward along the ideological spectrum, as can also be seen on the detailed nine-point scale.
The findings regarding the desire of Israelis to emigrate have not changed, even though our findings on Israelis’ optimism about the future of the state have changed. The Israeli public is more optimistic in 2025 than it was in 2024. The change is mainly evident among Jewish Israelis, although a certain rise in optimism levels was observed among Arab Israelis as well. Among Jewish respondents, increased optimism appears primarily in the centrist and center-right cohorts. On this question as well, movement corresponds to the ideological spectrum: the right-wing cohorts are more optimistic, while optimism declines the further one moves to the left.
As expected, and as the following table shows, there is a correlation between Israelis’ optimism about the future of the state and their disagreement or agreement with the statement on emigration. For example, 89% of those who are “very optimistic” about Israel’s future “completely disagree” with the statement about emigrating abroad. By contrast, 79% of those who are very pessimistic about the state’s future strongly or somewhat agree with the statement about emigration.
Data for JPPI’s July Israeli Society Index was collected between July 1 and July 4, 2025. The questionnaire was administered to 833 respondents. Data was collected via theMadad.com (633 Jewish sector respondents in an online survey) and Afkar Research (200 Arab sector respondents, about half online and half by phone). The data was weighted and analyzed by voting pattern and religiosity to represent the adult population of Israel. The Index is compiled by Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepkov. Professor David Steinberg serves as statistical consultant.